CHAPTER 7 1

Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlé on Yoruba 2

Philosophy, Knowing, Not-Knowing 3

and the Pain of Letting Go 4

Björn Freter 5

IntroductIon 6

This contribution will outline some important aspects of Sophie Bọsẹdé 7

Olúwọlés groundbreaking work on Yorùbá oral philosophy. Using the 8
Yorùbá story ‘The Toothless Queen’ as a vehicle, we will outline her 9
understanding of oral philosophy as philosophy proper and investigate her 10
radically inclusive, non-absolutist, anti-nihilist conception of philosophy as 11
well as the fundamental onto-epistemological axioms of Yorùbá thought. 12
We will especially focus on Olúwọlés radical and revolutionary philosophi- 13
cal approach to rationality and rational conjectures. We will finish our 14
paper with Olúwọlés’ reflections on some of the obstacles that must be 15
overcome to make her revolution a reality in the global philosophical com- 16
munity, that is, the pain of letting theories, ideas, and principles dear 17
to us go. 18

B. Freter (*)
Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature

Switzerland AG 2024
A. Agada et al. (eds.), Contemporary African Metaphysical Thought,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-73963-7_7
 B. FRETER

19 Before we begin it is important to note that it is a notorious problem

20 that “Western philosophy understands itself simply as philosophy, and not
21 as in any way positioned or particular” (Allais 2016, 539). This sometimes
22 leads to the assumption that philosophy is to be divided into (sub)disci-
23 plines in a certain way and that only this order can represent philosophy
24 properly. Consequently, a philosopher deviating from this order might be
25 considered philosophizing disorderly. We must, for the sake of compre-
26 hensibility for the reader and the sake of adequate representation of
27 Olúwọlés’ philosophy, prevent this impression from being created.
28 Olúwọlé, for instance, does not distinguish between epistemology and
29 metaphysics as is common in the Aristotelian tradition. It is, in fact, of
30 great philosophical importance that she does not do so as she (which will
31 be explained below) develops an understanding of truth that can never be
32 described sufficiently as only epistemological or as only metaphysical.
33 Truth is both. This is why, in this text, we have to make use of a provi-
34 sional term and characterize her understanding of truth as
35 ‘onto-epistemological.’
36 This also explains why this text, even though published in an anthology
37 on African metaphysics, often refers to epistemology. The chapter is,
38 indeed, not focused on metaphysics in its Western understanding; how-
39 ever, it does focus on onto-epistemology in an African sense. At least in
40 Olúwọlés’ case, we have to understand that mere metaphysics or mere
41 epistemology does not exist in her philosophy. We hope the reader can
42 agree, that it might be valuable to represent a philosopher in this anthol-
43 ogy who allows the reader to understand that a title like ‘African meta-
44 physics’ requires developing a broader understanding of metaphysics
45 (and/or an understanding of the qualifier ‘African’). Speaking of African
46 metaphysics, as it seems, is only possible if we go beyond the Western
47 understanding. With that in mind, let us begin our exploration of Sophie
48 Bọsẹdé Olúwọlés’ thought.

49 ‘the toothless Queen’

50 Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlé1 tells us this story from Yorùbá folklore:

51 There was a society where it was morally demanded that the existence of a
52 toothless person be reported so that he or she would be killed since it was

1
On the names ‘Sophie’ and ‘Bọsẹdé’, see Olúwọlé and Baier (2001, 359–360) and
Kazeem (2018, 20). Overviews of the life and works of Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlé can be found
in Kazeem (2018) and Presbey (2020).
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

taboo for such a person to exist. It happened that one of the king’s wives 53
discovered that one of her mates was toothless. She brought this to the 54
notice of the people and a date was fixed for the revelation. On hearing this, 55
the toothless queen became restless and spent most of her time roaming 56
about the bush, moaning her impending death. On one of such roamings, 57
she met the spirit of her dead mother who told her to rub some herbs in her 58
mouth. When she did, she found to her great joy and utter surprise one of 59
the best sets of teeth in her mouth. She kept this to herself until the date of 60
the exhibition when nobody was found toothless. Her reporter was conse- 61
quently labeled a liar and executed, for that was the price for telling that 62
kind of falsehood. (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58) 63

It is not easy to understand this story—particularly the fate of the 64

reporting queen seems rather confusing. However, before we begin work- 65
ing on this story, we have to learn about Olúwọlés’ understanding of the 66
oral tradition of Yorùbá philosophy. 67

oral Yorùbá PhIlosoPhY 68

It is, writes Olúwọlé, an “undeniable fact that we have little or no written 69

documents in which the actual sayings of our progenitors are passed down 70
to us” (Olúwọlé 2003, 423) and that there are many challenges with oral 71
traditions, such as their “very short spatio-temporal existence” (Olúwọlé 72
1999a, 2). 73
However, Olúwọlé insists—contrary to Peter Bodunrin (1991), Paulin 74
Hountondji (1976) and Kwasi Wiredu (1991) and in accordance with 75
Henry Odera Oruka (1990)—that oral philosophy was taken seriously as 76
philosophy, and that we would be well advised to continue to take it seri- 77
ously as philosophy. Hountondji famously claimed that in philosophy, 78

a critical reflection par excellence cannot develop fully unless it ‘writes its 79
memoirs’ or ‘keeps a diary’. [Philosophy] would not be impossible as an 80
intellectual activity in an ‘oral’ civilization, but it would be confined to a 81
specific time and place and would survive in the collective memory only in 82
the impoverished form of a result, a conclusion, cut off from the train of 83
thought that has led to it. (Hountondji 1983, 105) 84

Olúwọlé, in sharp contrast, explains that 85

 B. FRETER

86 oral tradition, whichever way we look at it, is the creation of individual

87 minds even if the ideas expressed in them later become accepted as norms
88 and principles by the society. Such views, in all probability, must have been
89 listened to, analysed, criticized and rationalised by many thinkers before
90 they were socially accepted. (Olúwọlé 1999a, 8, see Ogundiran 2020, 131)

91 Kimmerle identified the “opposition of oral and literate” as

92 “Eurocentric” (Kimmerle 1997, 43). This opposition sets up a needless
93 and destructive “hierarchical order of higher and lower forms of thought”
94 (Olúwọlé 1999a, 20), a “modality so corrosive, so traditional to European
95 thought” (Olúwọlé 1999a, 20). Implicitly, it “distinguishes between sci-
96 entific and non-scientific styles of thought” and thus “contains the basic
97 seed of Eurocentrism: the belief that Western intellectual culture provides
98 a universal paradigm of human thought.” (Olúwọlé 1999a, 53, see Freter
99 2020, 2022 and Freter and Freter 2021). There is no doubt that oral and
100 written philosophy may well differ, but “[d]ifference is not inferiority”
101 (Olúwọlé 1995b, 4; 2001, 231–232). There is no reason at all to doubt
102 that oral traditions could be “the result of deep reflection and historical
103 experiences” (Kazeem 2013, 166). Olúwọlé even considers “verbal expres-
104 sions by human beings” the “primary2 endeavour of philosophy” (Olúwọlé
105 2003, 20). The “act of writing never coincides with the act of thinking
106 […], the former greatly depends on the latter, although it can never
107 replace it” (Olúwọlé 1999a, 6). Indeed, it seems surprising to ‘inferiorize’
108 those who philosophize orally and consider that their “critical reflection
109 […] cannot develop fully” (Hountondji 1983, 105) unless these philoso-
110 phers were to write their thoughts down (see Olúwọlé 1999a, 39–65).
111 Olúwọlé writes:

112 The custodians of oral tradition […] do not [all] just memorize oral texts.
113 Very often, they analyse, critically examine, and if need be, change some
114 unacceptable elements in them. (Olúwọlé 1999a, 70)

115 Oral philosophy is philosophy—it might be learned, applied, taught,

116 remembered, or discussed differently than written philosophy, but it has
117 been and continues to be one of the many forms of philosophizing.

2
The word ‘primary’ is, of course, to be understood in a merely temporal, not a hierar-
chical way.
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

radIcal InclusIvItY 118

One wonders why philosophy is so often—implicitly or explicitly—con- 119

cerned with the question of who is capable of philosophizing, who has the 120
authority to philosophize, and who decides who philosophizes in the 121
(allegedly) ‘right’ way? Has anyone working on these questions ever really 122
considered as a possible result of their work that, in fact, all human beings 123
(or even other living beings) can properly philosophize? Or can we per- 124
haps find in all these philosophers’ minds—just think, for instance, in the 125
Western tradition of Hume, Voltaire, Hegel, Kant, Fichte etc. (see 126
Bernasconi 2002; Bernasconi and Cook 2003; Freter 2018; Lu-Adler 127
2023; Mills 1997; Park 2013)—an interest in excluding certain living 128
beings from philosophy before they have done any philosophical work? One 129
wonders what could ever be lost for philosophy should it ever cease to 130
exclude. What is it that today’s exclusionist philosophers are so afraid of, 131
to the extent that it must be excluded from the human endeavor of phi- 132
losophizing? We do not need to wonder what would happen when we do 133
inferiorize or exclude certain living beings from philosophy—the examples 134
of superiorist philosophies overabundant.3 Olúwọlé certainly deserves the 135
greatest philosophical respect for being a radically inclusive philosopher. 136
She (re-)introduces the whole human being back into philosophy and 137
denies “the erroneous idea that reason is the only faculty for attaining 138
intellectual cogency” (Olúwọlé 1999a, 92, see Russell 1974, 24). 139
Philosophy should not be grounded in rationality alone, but should take 140
all human faculties into account, such as intuition, emotion, compassion, 141
memory, consciousness, and so on. Innocent Onyewuenyi made this point 142
as well; he wrote, in beautifully condensed words: “Thinking overshad- 143
owed philosophy” (Onyewuenyi 1991, 35). This is exactly what Olúwọlé 144
praised in Yorùbá philosophy: “The intellectual depths or ingenuity of 145
Yorùbá thinkers lies in their explicit recognition that none of the human 146
elements can be totally excluded during a process of reasoning and living.” 147
(Olúwọlé 1999a, 93). 148
She invites all human beings and divine (and perhaps even other) 149
beings to participate in the practice of non-exclusionary philosophy. This 150
is a radical vision of re-humanizing philosophy. 151

3
Just think, for instance, about the many anti-female philosophers, from Aristotle to
Tertullian, Thomas of Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, or,
Bertrand Russell (for more details see Clack 1999, Hagengruber 2015, 2020, Hutchison
and Jenkins 2013, Waithe 2020).
 B. FRETER

152 Let us now return to the story of the toothless queen. Olúwọlé has
153 taught us to appreciate the oral philosophical tradition as philosophy. We
154 can approach our story confidently knowing that, even though it might be
155 difficult to understand, it can be understood.

156 normatIve ontologY

157 Let us begin with the underlying concepts of reality found in our story. We
158 have to assume that the people of this society have teeth, and we know
159 that it is possible to factually exist as a toothless human being and that it is
160 possible to amend toothlessness. At the very moment when the ontic pos-
161 sibility of being (or becoming) a toothless human being becomes an ontic
162 reality,4 a toothless human will not (because of their toothlessness) cease
163 to factually exist, however, this human being (because of the toothless-
164 ness) ought no longer to exist. We learn that this society differentiates
165 between something we could call factual reality (is-reality, that which is)
166 and something we could call a moral reality (ought-reality, that which
167 ought to be5). Since an ought-not-to-be entity can still exist—a notorious
168 problem of many philosophical traditions, especially those burdened by
169 the task of theodicy, our narrated society needs to find ways to ensure that
170 only ought-to-be entities exist and that ought-not-to-be entities either do
171 not come into existence or do not continue to exist (see Olúwọlé 1995b,
172 21; 2001, 227).

173 normatIve behavIor

174 This normative ontology entails unambiguous practical instructions to
175 society. If this society finds a toothless human being, an ought-not-to-be
176 entity, it is the task of society to eradicate this very entity. It is important
177 to note that neither the idea that those who are but who ought not to be
178 should kill themselves, nor the idea that the reporter should carry out the
179 killing immediately after their observation, are entertained. The killing is
180 not a matter for a single human being, not for the one affected, not for the

4
Ontic (derived from the Greek ὄντος/ontos, which means ‘of that which is’) refers to the
mode of reality of one particular thing. Ontic possibility indicates that something can exist as
an ontic reality, that is, as a factual thing even though it currently does not.
5
For Olúwọlés (somewhat different) understanding of the term ‘ought,’ see Olúwọlé
(1988b, 5–96).
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

one observing. The killing is a societal matter. This is, in a certain way, also 181
true for the observation. The private, individual observation, as it is “mor- 182
ally demanded” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58), must be reported to the 183
people. The observation of toothlessness must not remain a private obser- 184
vation but rather be reported to society. In the story, it reads: the queen 185
“brought this [scil. her finding of the toothlessness of one of her mates] to 186
the notice of the people” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58). Even after 187
receiving the report, it is still not time for the execution. What one human 188
being has observed and then reported to society is not relevant as a report 189
of this one human being, but only as a reason for society to come together 190
to observe the reported phenomenon for themselves and thus confirm its 191
existence—a reflection of the “ontological primacy [of] community” 192
(Ramose 2002, 64) that we often find in African traditional thought. This 193
is what will happen on the “date” that “was fixed for the revelation” 194
(Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58). The report is therefore only of prelimi- 195
nary value. A report is not sufficient for the identification of an ought-not- 196
to-be entity. This can only be done communally on the day of “revelation” 197
or, as it is later called, the day of “exhibition” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 198
1995a, 58). 199
Let us summarize the ethics of this society as we have found them so far 200
in an abstract form: 201

1. Who is, but ought not to be, must be killed (at least in this case). 202
2. Whoever observes someone who ought not to be, must report this 203
to society (at least in this case). 204
3. Society must use this report as an opportunity to confirm the 205
reported observation through communal observation (at least in 206
this case). 207

Let us move on with what happens next. 208

aPProval 209

The toothless queen learns (we do not know how) that a date has been set 210
that will exhibit her as an ought-not-to-be. She—like her philosophical 211
brothers Socrates in Plato’s Crito or Jesus in Gethsemane (see Mark 14: 212
32–42)—does not kill herself, neither does she flee. However (unlike 213
Socrates, but not unlike Jesus, at least in Mark), she “becomes restless and 214
roams around the bush” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58). The toothless 215
 B. FRETER

216 queen certainly suffers from the horror of what is to come, but her actions
217 suggest that she approves of what is “morally demanded” (Olúwọlé 1988a,
218 16, 1995a, 58). In her desperation, she meets the spirit of her mother.
219 Following the motherly advice to “rub some herbs in her mouth” she
220 finds herself with “one of the best sets of teeth in her mouth” (Olúwọlé
221 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58). Someone who ought-not-to-be, here through
222 herbal medicine, can become someone who is no longer an ought-not-to-
223 be. Even though we are not able to determine how exceptional this meta-
224 morphosis is, we do learn that being an ought-not-to-be is not necessarily
225 permanent, it does carry a temporal index.
226 The queen keeps her metamorphosis secret and waits until the day of
227 revelation, the day when the report of the one shall be confirmed by the
228 observation of all. It is no surprise that “nobody was found toothless”
229 (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58), however, it is rather surprising that the
230 “reporter was consequently labeled a liar and executed, for that was the
231 price for telling that kind of falsehood.” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58).

232 IntentIon
233 How can the fate of the reporter be explained? What was the reporter’s
234 wrongdoing? Calling her a liar seems to be a misunderstanding, as she was
235 not lying about the phenomenon she saw and reported. Observation and
236 report do not transform into lies when the observed and reported phe-
237 nomenon has changed after the reported observation. What “kind of false-
238 hood” did she “tell” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58)? Why was her action
239 not that which was “morally demanded” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a,
240 58)? Olúwọlé explains: “Apparently what the storyteller does is to look
241 into the motive of the reporter” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 17, 1995a, 58). This
242 opens up the possibility of asking:

243 Does the reporting originate solely from a sense of responsibility to the
244 societal interests or from malice and hatred? Is it obedience to the norms of
245 society or from an attempt to get rid of a rival; or is it from the mere act of
246 rejoicing at the downfall of an enemy as somebody one does not like?
247 (Olúwọlé 1988a, 17, 1995a, 59–60)

248 Indeed, we have not yet inquired about the motivation of the reporter.
249 Why would that have been necessary? Was the reporting queen not simply
250 adhering to what was “morally demanded” when she brought her
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

observation “to the notice of the people” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 251
58)? This cannot be true since she would have been punished for doing 252
the right thing. “If the reporter here must be condemned, it must be for 253
a reason other than mere reporting which makes her action wrong, more 254
so since there is no evidence that she is an untruthful reporter” (Olúwọlé 255
1988a, 17, 1995a, 60). 256
Let us think again about what we know of the reporter: we know about 257
the observation, we know that the observed phenomenon factually existed 258
and we know that this phenomenon was reported. We cannot, as we have 259
to understand now, even though the text seems to suggest so, conclude 260
that the observation was reported because it was morally demanded. We 261
have to remember that the story said that the reporter was “executed, for 262
that was the price for telling that kind of falsehood” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 263
1995a, 58). Hence, she did not report as morally demanded, but she told 264
some “kind of falsehood” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 16, 1995a, 58). And, conse- 265
quently, she is punished for this falsehood. 266
But why are we not told why she did this, why are we not told what was 267
on her mind before she reported it to the people? We might find some- 268
thing here that we can call, in loose accordance with Roman Ingarden 269
(1931), a “Unbestimmtheitsstell[e]” (Ingarden 1931a, 261) a “spo[t] of 270
indeterminacy” (Ingarden 1931b, 246), or using the words of Michael 271
Titzmann, a blank space, a “Leerstelle” (Titzmann 1977, 237). We have to 272
determine this indeterminacy; we have to fill this blank space. However, is 273
nothing for us to know, there is no evidence for us to be found. We simply 274
do not know, cannot know, what moved the heart of the reporting queen. 275
As “humans we have no indubitable test which will always enable us to 276
identify the real aim of the reporter without mistaking good intentions for 277
bad ones.” (Olúwọlé 2015, 64) This is one of the fundamental ideas of 278
Yorùbá philosophy: 279

The Ọ́run-l’ó-mọ-Axiom of Yorùbá Philosophy 280

No human being possesses absolute knowledge or wisdom (see Olúwọlé 281
2015, 36, and Presbey 2020, 232–233) 282

I would like to suggest calling this the ọ́run-l’ó-mọ-epistemological 283

axiom. I take this Yoruba term (roughly translated as ‘only heaven knows’) 284
from the Yorùbá proverb: “Ọ́run l’ó mọ ẹni tí ó là [Only Heaven [k]nows 285
who would be saved in the end]” (Olúwọlé 2015, 36). In the case of our 286
story, this axiom means: no human can know what moved the heart of the 287
 B. FRETER

288 reporting queen. How can it be just that she was punished? Could it be
289 that this was just an arbitrary act? Was there no rational reason for her to
290 be punished?

291 the gods

292 We are in the difficult situation of knowing that there is something know-
293 able, that is, that which has moved the heart of the reporter, but we do not
294 know what that is, while at the same time knowing that knowing this is
295 vital for a just judgment.
296 To solve this problem—within the Yorùbá philosophy, we must

297 (a) first understand that just because we, as human beings, are not able
298 to know something, that does not mean that there is nothing under-
299 standable at all.

300 We have, “[b]ecause of the limited nature of our knowledge,” as we can

301 agree with Makinde, “no reason to dismiss one kind of knowledge just
302 because it is not open to the empirical investigation” (Makinde 1983, 69).
303 Olúwọlé makes it explicit that the “[Yorùbá] people do not believe that
304 the divine punishment of a moral deviant depends on human knowledge
305 of the offence.” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 19, 1995a, 62).
306 We must,

307 (b)“bring [in] a theoretical entity to perform the role of a psychological

308 detective” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 20–21, 1995a, 65), a detective who is
309 capable of understanding the heart of the reporter.

310 This is, as Olúwọlé explains, the “only way to ensure that justice is
311 done” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 20, 1995a, 65). “The invitation of the gods is
312 meant to fill this inevitable vacuum [of not knowing what needs to be
313 known] in [the] otherwise secular moral system [of the Yorùbá philoso-
314 phy]” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 20, 1995a, 65). This is the rational Yorùbá reac-
315 tion to the existential problem of not knowing enough. It is fascinatingly
316 similar to Kant’s “postulate of the reality of a highest original good [höch-
317 sten ursprünglichen Gutes], namely the existence of God” (Kant 1788,
318 241, A 125) as he described in his 1788 in his Critique of Practical Reason.
319 Yorùbá philosophy, in Olúwọlés’ understanding, does not accept the
320 per se unknowable, the per se incomprehensible—we simply would not be
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

able to live with the existential pressure of not knowing what we need to 321
know. We can find here another fundamental idea of Yorùbá philosophy as 322
Olúwọlé understands it: 323

The On-Epistetic-Axiom of Yorùbá Philosophy 324

That which is, is knowable. 325

Thus: Whatever is, is knowable, is rationally understandable to someone. 326

Transposed, with some generosity, into the language of the classical 327
Western tradition: ὄν [on]/ens (‘being’, or ‘what is’) is επιστήτος [epistetos]/ 328
quod scitus (‘what can be known’), or, in analytical language: The classes of 329
the knowable and the existing have the same elements. I would like to sug- 330
gest addressing this as the on-epistetic axiom. This axiom holds true for 331
human beings, but since the gods live in the same world that we live in, it 332
holds true for them as well. The gods can, as we will see below, do what 333
they do, because reality is understandable—even though divine beings 334
understand a larger portion of reality than humans do. 335
We understand: whatever is, there will be someone with rationality 336
capable of understanding it—in our case, for instance, there will be some- 337
one who can comprehend the heart of the reporter. Therefore, it becomes 338
quite understandable that for Yorùbá philosophy, it is “more rationally 339
consistent to go from the premise that man is physically limited in probing 340
into man’s motives to the assumption of the existence of beings who are 341
not physically limited” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 21, 1995a, 66). If there is some- 342
thing understandable that goes beyond our physical abilities, there must be 343
someone who exists beyond these physical limitations, someone who can 344
understand the—in the very literal sense—meta-physics of that something. 345
That which human rationality can no longer understand can be under- 346
stood by divine rationality (see Olúwọlé 1996a, 193 and Olúwọlé and 347
Baier 2001, 369). Rationality seems to be understood as a continuum on 348
which one being reaches one point and another being reaches another 349
point. It is most important to emphasize that the non-human being who 350
comprehends something a human being cannot comprehend is still explic- 351
itly understood to be a rational being. Rationality is a capacity not exclu- 352
sive to the human being. The divine being is, with regards to rationality, 353
not qualitatively different from the human being, but gradually differ- 354
ent—the divine rationality has access to significantly more facts, be they 355
physical or metaphysical, and the ability to understand them (on-epistetic 356
 B. FRETER

357 axiom). God is not “epistemologically limited in [...] the way [that]
358 humanity is.” (Olúwọlé 1997b, 104) Olúwọlé cites the aphorism:

359 Amóòkùn s’olè,

360 Bí ojú oba ayé kò rí o,
361 Ti oba òkè nwò ó
362 (You who steal under the cover of darkness
363 If the eyes of the earthly king do not see you,
364 Those of the heavenly ruler are watching). (Olúwọlé 1997b, 104)

365 A divine being able to do this can obviously also comprehend what
366 moved the heart of the reporting queen in our story. Think of Olódùmarè,
367 the “Searcher of Hearts” (Idowu 1964, 154). Olódùmarè can indeed see
368 what is hidden from a human being’s eyes and mind. Olódùmarè is the
369 “All-wise, All-knowing [and] All-seeing” (Idowu 1964, 42) who “sees
370 and knows everything and [their] judgment is sure and absolutely inescap-
371 able” (Idowu 1964, 154, Olúwọlé cites this passage in 1995a, 62). We
372 human beings cannot see into the hearts of our fellow human beings
373 (ọ́run-l’ó-mọ-axiom), but we can see “the sure and absolutely inescapable”
374 (Idowu 1964, 154) judgment of the god on this very heart. And thus we
375 can, in our limited ways, understand what god understood (on-epistetic
376 axiom) with fewer limitations, that is, that there was a fault in the heart of
377 the reporter. The fact that we do not know what god knows, and that we
378 thus do not know the deepest depth of factual reality, produces some dis-
379 tance to god. And indeed, to the Yorùbá, writes Olúwọlé, “God is in an
380 important sense an ‘unknown God’.” (Olúwọlé 1995a, 81) It is important
381 to note here that despite the epithets given to Olódùmarè above, Yorùbá
382 philosophers (often) “do not believe that God is omniscient” (Olúwọlé
383 1997a, 104), as reflected in the proverb: “Olorun paapaa o gbon to [Even
384 God is not wise enough]” (Olúwọlé 1997a, 104) or in the aphorism:
385 “Ogbón kìí se t’ omo enìkóòkan [Wisdom does not belong to anyone]”
386 (Olúwọlé 1999a, 88). Olúwọlé interprets these proverbs as a caveat. They
387 warn us “that reason is not always an absolute means for reaching cogent
388 and appropriate beliefs, principles and theories” (Olúwọlé 1999a, 92).
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

tolerance and metaPhYsIcal trIangulatIon 389

The Yorùbá version of the idea of the unknown god allows for religious 390
tolerance to a surprising degree (in deep contrast to the Western tradi- 391
tion). The Yorùbá, writes Olúwọlé, 392

do not traditionally force worshippers [sic] of one divinity to join those of 393
others. We do not need to worship several gods as they do. But in our 394
attempt to worship One God, we must realise that the liberty to believe in 395
one supreme God is not a licence to force everybody to one form of belief. 396
We must realise that the infinity of God makes room for the plurality of 397
understanding. We must live and let live in religious matters. This does not 398
mean we must not relate. We must co-exist, but that on [sic] a friendly basis. 399
It is only then that we can understand one another better. It is then [sic] we 400
will see all religions as partners in the march of progress towards under- 401
standing one God. (Olúwọlé 1989, 280) 402

This is a very important observation. It might be helpful to imagine this 403

co-existence like this: We know about a point A in reality and about 404
another point B. And we know that these two are connected via a third 405
point C. But this third point C lies behind a wall that is insurmountable 406
for us. We do not and we cannot know where C is to be found behind this 407
wall. However, we do know that from C it either advances to B or returns 408
to A. Our existential task is now to find a way to deal with the fact that we 409
cannot know C. We have to use A and B quasi to triangulate where C 410
might be found (for us). We have to find something we can live with. 411
(This is, even if only to a limited degree reminiscent of the rabbinic method 412
of Midrash halakha6as the Yorùbá philosophers attempt to identify what is 413
missing in their narration to understand what the narrations actually says, 414
see Stemberger 1989, 24). This is exactly the way Olúwọlé instructs us to 415
understand the story of the toothless queen: We know the narrative facts 416
of the story (here: A and B) and we have to find what it is (here: C) that 417
connects them in order to understand the moral teaching of the story. 418
This metaphysical triangulation allows differences in worldviews with- 419
out any need for conformity. Your triangulation may have this result, mine 420

6
The Midrash halakha is a rabbinic exegetical practice of Torah Study. The Midrash hal-
akha attempts to provide details that cannot be found in the scriptures, for example, to
explain something difficult to understand, amend contradictions, or find a scriptural basis
reason for something that was not explicitly anticipated in the scriptures.
 B. FRETER

421 may have that result—I can neither prove my C nor refute yours: the prac-
422 tical existential task remains to find out what we can live with, but we need
423 not be worried that we will be converted or that we have to convert our
424 fellow human beings (see Freter 2017). Metaphysical triangulation is pos-
425 sible with the Yorùbá philosophy, and this makes it relevant as a philosophi-
426 cal system. A “moral theory,” writes Olúwọlé, “which makes no adequate
427 provision for social justice in cases where human knowledge is inadequate
428 is philosophically irrelevant as a solution to an important moral problems
AU1 429 of human existence.” (Olúwọlé 1995, 71).

430 ratIonalItY
431 Let us return to our story again: The punishment of the reporting queen
432 did not happen because the gods arbitrarily decided in their divinity that
433 this punishment ought to happen. “The gods sanction moral norms not
434 because they are divine” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 22, 1995a, 67). They sanction
435 “because [something] is morally unacceptable to the rational mind”
436 (Olúwọlé 1988a, 22, 1995a, 67), that is, in our case because it is morally
437 unacceptable to the rational mind that someone reports an ought-not-to-
438 be for any other reason than to make sure that an ought-not-to-be will no
439 longer exist. Olúwọlé makes this very clear: “[Yorùbá] gods are rational
440 beings.” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 22, 1995a, 67, see Azenabor 2008, 233–234).
441 The Yorùbá gods are required to investigate the situation in the same way
442 that we humans are (on-epistetic axiom), only they are able to access all
443 existing facts. The gods are for the Yorùbá “agents of moral sanction
444 rather than authorities whose moral prescriptions man must obey”
445 (Olúwọlé 1988a, 22, 1995a, 68) and, we can add, the gods themselves
446 have to adhere to the very same moral prescriptions—gods and humans
447 adhere to the same rational morals. The “invitation of the gods” (Olúwọlé
448 1988a, 20, 22, 23, 1995a, 65, 68) is a reaction to the “apparent failure of
449 man’s ability to dispense absolute justice.” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 22, 1995a,
450 68). It is indeed stunning to realize that the existential problem that the
451 on-epistetic axiom has to admit (i.e. our human limitations) is counterbal-
452 anced by the ọ́run-l’ó-mọ-axiom (reduced divine limitations).
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

ontologIcal oPtImIsm of the on-ePIstetIc-axIom 453

We can find a similar intellectual maneuver in many of those traditions in 454

which the limitations of the human being cause a difference between fac- 455
tual reality (is-reality) and moral reality (ought-reality) and thus necessi- 456
tate divine support. We can find it in Zera Yacob, when he mourns the fact 457
that the “nature of man [ፍጥረተሰብ, fəṭrata sab] […] is weak and sluggish.” 458
(Zera Yaqob 1667, 7), and in Nana Asma’u, when she laments that human 459
beings are “straying [ɓace] from // The Path [hanya]” (Nana Asma’u 460
1842, 179 [= 20]). Of course we can find this in many other traditions as 461
well, for instance when Laozi “urges us to return to the earlier, natural 462
state when the Way [scil. the dao] was fully realized in the world” (Ivanhoe 463
and Van Norden 2001, 158) through “nonaction [↓Ⅽ, wuwei]” (Tao te 464
King 2 in Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2001, 160), in Kohelet’s complaint 465
that we human beings refuse to accept “our lot [‫ֶֹחְלֽקוֹ‬, chêleq]” (Kohelet 5: 466
18), in Paul’s, Augustin’s, or Luther’s idea of the “sin that dwells within 467
[us] [ἐνοικοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία, enoikousa en emoi hamartia]” (Romans 7: 468
17), meaning that we may will the right thing, but are never able to do it, 469
or in the Quran’s complaint that human beings, because they fail to pay 470
reverence, become “the manifest adversary [‫َﺼﯿ ٌﻢ‬ِ ‫ﺧ‬, khaṣīmun] of God” (Koran 471
16: 4). The human beings in all these philosophies require divine help to 472
be able to do what ought to be done. There is, however, an important 473
difference to the Yorùbá philosophers: The human being in Yorùbá phi- 474
losophy has not failed the god or the gods, the human being in Yorùbá 475
philosophy is simply not able to understand meta-physical facts 476
(ọ́run-l’ó-mọ-axiom) and thus requires support (possibly based on the on- 477
epistetic-axiom). This inability of the human being is not the consequence 478
of a failure, but just a matter of fact. It is, to use an Aristotelian term, 479
adiaphoric, that is, morally indifferent. This deep, downright anti-nihilistic 480
ontological optimism is a rather unique trait of the Yorùbá philosophy. In 481
the Western tradition, as far as we can see, this seems to be quite rare—it 482
can be found in philosophies that do not identify the human being as 483
guilty of the evil in the world, for instance in the Eastern Christian tradi- 484
tion in Irenaeus of Smyrna and Origen of Alexandria and later in Friedrich 485
Schleiermacher’s work. 486
 B. FRETER

487 ratIonal conjectures

488 The story of the toothless queen presents a “philosophical problem […]
489 which a full knowledge of empirical facts [scil. those facts which human
490 beings can securely know] cannot solve.” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 21, 1995a,
491 66). We are, as per Olúwọlé, when we are confronted with a humanly
492 unsolvable problem, existentially forced to find a solution. It is this “what
493 naturally leads to make ‘rational conjectures’.” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 21,
494 1995a, 66). And such a rational conjecture, as Olúwọlé calls it following
495 Bertrand Russell (see Olúwọlé 2015, 10 and Russell 1974), is exactly
496 what we find in Yorùbá philosophy.7 The Yorùbá philosopher does not
497 “despise secular ethics as an irrational endeavour as some Western authors
498 do, neither does he regard any moral law as absolute.” (Olúwọlé 1988a,
499 21, 1995a, 66). Yorùbá philosophy—firmly resting on the on-epistetic
500 axiom—“push[es],” that is, rationally conjects, “moral reasoning to the
501 end of a rational process and exclaim[s] at the dead end of a moral dis-
502 pute: ‘Ọlọ́r un [= Olódùmarè] á da a’ or ‘Ojú Ọlọ́r un [= Olódùmarè] to
503 o’, meaning that ‘God will dispense justice’, and that ‘The eyes of God
504 see it all’[.]” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 21, 1995a, 66). This is not an escape into
505 a bleak fatalism,8 this is not the hopeless philosopher delegating the
506 unsolvable problems to the gods. The “primary ambition” of Yorùbá
507 philosophy

508 is to provide a rational solution to the problem of moral sanctioning when

509 man’s efforts come to naught. [Yorùbá philosophy] does not hold that all
510 moral sins will be punished by the purgatory of hell. As a matter of fact,
511 social cohesion will elude the African if he identifies the authority of morality
512 with the gods. (Olúwọlé 1988a, 22, 1995a, 67)

513 A rational solution found via rational conjecture can, undoubtedly,

7
It is fascinating to bring Olúwọlés’ idea of the rational conjecture into conversation with
the concept of conjectura as developed by Nicolaus of Cusa in 1444 in his De coniecturies. He
explains: “Coniectura igitur est, positive assertio, in alteritate veritatem, uti est, participans.”
(Nicolaus of Cusa 1444, 66 [= c. 57]). We can translate this as: “Therefore, a conjecture is a
positive assertion partaking in the truth [as it is] in otherness.” We, limited by our embodi-
ment, can only partake in the truth as it is (i.e. what is in God’s unlimited mind) in Otherness.
This participation in alteritate/in Otherness seems to be comparable with the ọ́run-l’ó-mọ-
epistemological axiom.
8
For Olúwọlés’ rather optimistic understanding of fatalism, see Olúwọlé (1986/1987, 7, 71).
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

be false. This, however, does not demonstrate it as ‘irrational’ in the sense 514
that it does not respect the testimony of human experience or that it is logi- 515
cally self contradictory [sic] (Olúwọlé 2015, 102) 516

We have to understand that Yorùbá philosophy combines two ideas 517

often considered incompatible. Yorùbá philosophers 518

1. “have no divine moral norms yet they do not make man the final 519
arbiter of moral justice” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 25, 1995a, 71) 520

And, at the same time, Yorùbá philosophers 521

2. follow the divine entities as these entities apply, metaphysically, the 522
very same rationality: “Their religion starts where their philosophy 523
ends – at the dead end of man’s rational abilities to solve an impor- 524
tant problem of man’s existence.” (Olúwọlé 1988a, 25, 525
1995a, 71–72) 526

Yorùbá religion, in the understanding of Olúwọlé, is thus simply the 527

realm where rational thought is conducted by metaphysical entities consider- 528
ing physical and metaphysical facts—this is the consequent metaphysical 529
extension of the on-epistetic axiom. In fact, Olúwọlé reads Ifá divination 530
exactly in this way (see Olúwọlé 1996b). Ifá divination, she writes, 531

was designed as a process of knowing God’s Will. The act of Ifa divination 532
is, therefore, not a process of speaking directly to God like a medium. The 533
goal is that of choosing relevant verses from a large expanse of oral text 534
stored in a computer system. The technique formulated by Ọ̀rúnmìlà is one 535
in which predictions are arrived at through the use [of] mathematical laws 536
of probability. (Olúwọlé 2015, 41) 537

Ifá has the “goal […] to bridge the ontological gap between reality and 538
the limits of human cognition” (Ogundiran 2020, 131). It should be 539
noted that Olúwọlé explicitly 540

dissociate[s] [her]self [from] the Western assumption that all rational beliefs 541
must be formally or empirically demonstrated as true before they can serve 542
as guides to human existence. (Olúwọlé 1995a, s.p. [= v]) 543
 B. FRETER

544 She does “not accept this RATIONALITY of the West as a universal
545 absolute” (Olúwọlé 1988, s.p. [= v]).9 She rather opts

546 for the possibility of a rationality which makes no other claim than being
547 reasonable in the face of the empirical evidence of experiences even though
548 such rationality is not logically entailed by such experiences. (Olúwọlé
549 1995a, s.p. [= v] [my emphasis])

550 non-absolutIsm
551 Olúwọlés’ approach allows us to philosophize in a non-absolutistic way.
552 This philosophy does not require

553 that anything that we designate as real must be either actual in the sense of
554 conformity with what exists in nature, or true in the sense of fitting into a
555 pattern, a model, a standard: in short a system whose outline is already
556 known. (Olúwọlé 1978, 7–8, 1995a, 8)

557 Olúwọlés’ non-absolutistic philosophy rejects the notion “that any-

558 thing that cannot be tested, observed, etc. is not real.” (Olúwọlé 1978, 8,
559 1995a, 8). She exemplifies this with witchcraft. Witchcraft’s factual reality
560 cannot be denied just “because it does not cohere with a body of known
561 facts” (Olúwọlé 1978, 8, 1995a, 8). One of her most powerful arguments
562 for this philosophical approach is that, even though it is often kept in the
563 shadows, Western scientific “canons depend upon an assumption, an epis-
564 temological thesis yet to be proved” (Olúwọlé 1978, 10, 1995a, 10). This
565 epistemological thesis yet to be proved is to Olúwọlé—unfortunately fol-
566 lowing the rather controversial ideas of Joseph Banks Rhine (see Gardner

9
We must add here the brief remark that even though rationality (as ratiocinatio) is impor-
tant, if not the overarching ruling principle of Western philosophy we can find philosophers,
who showed a certain resistance within the so-called Western philosophy against the absolut-
ism of ratiocinatio. Just think of Xenophanes (see esp. Diels and Kranz 1996, 137; DK 21
B34), Meister Eckhart, Nicolaus of Cues, Lucretia Marinella, David Hume, Rosa Mayreder,
or, Olúwọlé mentions him explicitly, Bertrand Russell. Certainly, the most dominant more
recent force against the reductionism of the human being to mere detached rationality is to
be found in the existentialist movement from Blaise Pascal and Søren Kierkegaard and
Fyodor Dostoevsky over Virginia Woolfe and Kate Chopin to Hermann Schmitz and Sara
Heinämaa, David E. Cooper even remarked that “hostility to those philosophies, like
Descartes’, which dualistically separate human beings from the world, is a striking aspect of
existentialist thought.” (Cooper 2012, 2–33).
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

1988)—that whatever the human mind receives comes to it through the 567
senses. Whether or not one adheres to this thesis, Olúwọlés’ point remains 568
valid: Western scientific understanding must (unsurprisingly) always rest 569
upon something that it does not understand, it necessarily cannot under- 570
stand and cannot explain—a fact that indeed sometimes seems to be for- 571
gotten, perhaps even intentionally ignored, perhaps due to an infatuation 572
with the practical successes of science. There is simply no “indubitable 573
method of knowing what is real.” (Olúwọlé 1978, 11, 1995a, 11, see 574
Olúwọlé 1999b, 108). And as long as this is not admitted, as Olúwọlé 575
boldly claims, “so long will [Western scientists] give room for being 576
accused of ‘intellectual fraud’, ‘fraud’ for substituting the epistemic for the 577
ontic.” (Olúwọlé 1978, 11, 1995a, 11). This will continue to promote a 578
“denial of the mysterious as anything real.” (Olúwọlé 1978, 12, 1995a, 579
12). Olúwọlé has suggested an optimistic understanding of (rational) 580
fatalism that attempts to avoid this anti-mysterious monism. Her concept 581
of fatalism does not deny “the reality of causal connections amongst 582
empirical events nor of the truth that some occurrences defy that causal 583
principle. […] Fatalism adequately formulated sees both causality and 584
chance as co-existing phenomena.” (Olúwọlé 1986/1987, 75). 585

the PaIn of lettIng go 586

Olúwọlé warns that we 587

mislead the students we introduce to philosophy (Western or African) when 588

we give them the impression that philosophy sets forth scientific or mystical 589
absolutes. (Olúwọlé 1995, 53)10 590

Olúwọlé has not only warned us not—or no longer—to fall victim to 591
philosophical absolutism, but she has also taught us how to evade this 592
absolutism. This philosophical absolutism cannot be supported with phil- 593
osophical arguments, we cannot know what we would need to know to be 594
absolute—if something like an absolute can exist at all. I would argue, 595
agreeing with Olúwọlé, that if we want to be practical, we are necessitated 596
to speculate, necessitated to triangulate, necessitated to conduct 597

10
The problem of miseducation poses an ongoing challenge to avoid philosophical abso-
lutism in the present day. Students continue to be taught a superiorist view of philosophy in
many philosophical institutions (see Freter and Freter 2021; Van Norden 2017).
 B. FRETER

598 metaphysics.11 And when we cross the border to metaphysics, we need

599 help, we need to find someone or something to trust. Kant attempted to
600 bring peace to metaphysics by re-inventing it as something “that will be
601 able to come forward as science” (Kant 1783, 49), but, as his immediate
602 successors in German Idealism have shown, it did not bring existential
603 relaxation—the idealisms of Fichte, Hegel, or Schelling were certainly
604 inspired by Kant but went far beyond his critical idealism. And one of the
605 reasons might be that Kant does not see the whole human being, and
606 above all that his project of Enlightenment excluded the vast majority of
607 human beings.
608 The reader will remember that this question was posed above (in the
609 section Radical Inclusivity): What is it that today’s exclusionist philosophers
610 are so afraid of, to the extent that it must be excluded from the human
611 endeavor of philosophizing? Olúwọlé helps us to find the answer. She dis-
612 cusses some of the counterarguments which have been brought forth
613 against the existence of witches. We only wish to consider the last objec-
614 tion that she presents. Olúwọlé writes:

615 Another objection [against the existence of witches] is that if we accept

616 these bizarre experiences as real, science as we know it today would have to
617 undergo a radical change to incorporate them. Some of its basic principles
618 would have to be rethought. (Olúwọlé 1978, 34, 1995a, 19)

619 This is not easily done; this paradigm shift would necessarily entail an
620 enormous amount of work. But Olúwọlé, as a philosopher of the whole
621 human being, finds another intriguing, and perhaps much more plausible
622 explanation: “This [scil. to undergo this radical change], scientists think,
623 is intellectually painful and should be resisted” (Olúwọlé 1978, 34, 1995a,
624 19 [my emphasis]). This resistance against letting go “has almost always
625 been found to be based on emotion.” (Olúwọlé 1978, 34, 1995a, 20).
626 What a most surprising twist it would be, should it—at some point—be
627 possible to show that emotional attachment has made theories, principles,
628 truths so dear to us contemporary philosophers everywhere in the world! This
629 surprise twist would most certainly be followed by another one, that is that
630 philosophy, serious contemporary philosophy can be found not only in writ-
631 ing but in the spoken word, in stories that are told and retold and retold

11
A position quite similar to Kant’s but arrived at from very different premises and with
very different consequences—but this is not the space to explicate that.
 7 SOPHIE BỌSẸDÉ OLÚWỌLÉ ON YORUBA PHILOSOPHY, KNOWING…

again, in other words, in oral traditions. The real surprise here is that 632
something so self-evident can be surprising at all. I would even posit that 633
perhaps we will, one day, realize that a revolution of thought could not 634
happen because we simply could not bear to live without the theories so 635
dear to us. 636
We can pursue this idea even further: could it be an emotional attach- 637
ment that makes it so difficult for many philosophers, especially in the 638
Western world, to accept that so many ‘canonical’ philosophers were vul- 639
gar superiorists? Is Kant’s racism, Heidegger’s antisemitism, Russell’s sex- 640
ism so hard to admit, so difficult to think about, because these heroes are 641
so beloved and the (emotional) attachment to their ideas is something that 642
we cannot bear to have smothered? Is it so difficult to assess and critique 643
what these superiorisms do to the bodies of work of these philosophers 644
because they are our beloved intellectual homeland? Are we perhaps even 645
disappointed in those before us that they could betray our trust so much12? 646
Are we trying to “avoid the pain by tenaciously holding on to what we 647
know to be false” (Olúwọlé 1978, 34, 1995a, 20)? Olúwọlés’ verdict is 648
strict and clear: “it is generally agreed that to err is human, self-deceit, we 649
should also agree, is an unpardonable intellectual sin.” (Olúwọlé 1978, 650
34, 1995a, 20). 651

the PhIlosoPhIcal legacY of soPhIe bọsẹdé olúwọlé 652

and the resPonsIbIlItIes of PhIlosoPhY 653

Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlé has left us an astonishing body of philosophical 654

work that is both holistic and inclusive. Her work allows deepening 655
attempts to philosophize in a radically inclusive, anti-superiorist manner. 656
And she offers, implicitly, an important piece of therapeutic advice: the 657
extreme focus on rationality, or what was thought to be rationality, within 658
Western philosophy has a devastating historical record—it did not prevent 659
colonialism, slavery, or endless warfare in the Western world. Perhaps 660
Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlés’ work can help philosophers to heal their obses- 661
sion with a limited view of rationality. Perhaps it can help us realize that 662
rationality is a part of the human being’s way of making sense of the 663
world, but not all of it. Perhaps it can invite to the philosophical table 664
those who have traditionally been viewed as irrational. Perhaps it can 665

12
I learned about this beautiful thought in a conversation with Huaping Lu-Adler (see
Lu-Adler 2023).
 B. FRETER

666 relieve rationality of the burden of always having to be in command. And

667 perhaps, in this philosophical space that allows for different ways of know-
668 ing and a more expansive view of reality, we might be able to coexist with
669 tolerance and inclusivity as whole human beings.

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