FOI Studies in African Security

Managing Security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

The Red Sea Council and the Prospect of Multilateralism
Elin Hellquist and Samuel Neuman Bergenwall

Geopolitical tension is growing around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden – two of the world’s most strategically
important waterways. Not only do conflicts and security threats in the broader region spill over into the maritime
sphere, the US, China, and Russia have increased their military presence. Despite the high density of stakeholders
and security issues, the region has long lacked a multilateral institution designed to address common challenges
and manage diverging interests. However, in February 2020, the eight coastal states signalled a will to claim
regional ownership of maritime security by creating the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red
Sea and Gulf of Aden (hereafter: Red Sea Council, RSC).

International actors such as the European Union (EU) percent are essentially dead, and nearly 38 percent are
and the United Nations (UN), as well as numerous policy zombies”, that is, formally alive but dormant in terms of
analysts, all promote regional multilateralism as a solution mandate fulfilment. Are conditions present for the RSC
to security tensions in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area. to play a future role in managing maritime security, or
In its strategy for the Horn of Africa, the EU pledges is it rather predestined to become yet another zombie
that it “will support cooperation, dialogue and peaceful organisation? To tackle this question, this memo considers
settlement of disputes around the Red Sea and offer four sets of factors that scholarship has identified as central
privileged relations with regionally-owned initiatives such for the development of regional multilateralism elsewhere
as the Council of Arab and African States on the Red Sea (see, e.g., Kelly 2007; Mansfield and Solingen 2010).
and the Gulf of Aden” (Council of the European Union Thus, after a brief introduction to the Red Sea Council,
2021). In August 2021, UN Chef de Cabinet Maria Luiza the memo proceeds to assess what political and economic
Ribeiro Viotti mentioned “strengthening security in the factors, as well as the degree of regional identity and the
Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea” as one example of the UN’s role of external actors, can tell us about the prospect of
support to regional initiatives in maritime security (United multilateralism in the region.
Nations Secretary General 2021).
Regional cooperation may indeed offer important The Red Sea Council
potential benefits, such as mediating interests in regions The launch of the Red Sea Council followed a period of
characterised by power asymmetries, building stabilising intensified interactions between the countries bordering
institutions, and creating a clear interlocutor for external the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Saudi Arabia has invested
actors (Vertin 2019). According to Luigi Narbone and politically, economically and militarily in the Horn of
Cyril Widdershoven (2021, 5), “without stringent Africa, and African Red Sea states, in their turn, have
regional security and economic arrangements, the risk of joined the Saudi-led military coalition fighting the Houthi
new multi-layered conflicts may be high”. In a piece for rebels in Yemen. Formalising neighbourly relations in a
the Africa Report, Oraib Al Rantawi (2020) argued that regional organisation thus appeared timely.
“[i]f a multilateral structure is to be established, it is critical After an initial consultative meeting in December 2018,
that ownership of that structure remains in the hands of the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
the Red Sea countries themselves – across coasts”. Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti expressed that the
As desirable as regional cooperation might be in theory, creation of an entity for cooperation and coordination
it takes much more than setting up an organisation on was “part of the liability they are shouldering to provide
paper for expected benefits to emerge. According to Julia security at this water course” (Saudi Press Agency 2018).
Gray (2018), out of all international organisations, “10 In February 2020, these countries, now joined by Eritrea,

FOI Memo: 8112 February 2023

Project no: A12315
Approved by: Mike Winnerstig
signed the RSC’s foundational Charter in Riyadh, passive bystanders, as they are influenced by how the
Saudi Arabia. This was a non-trivial step in an area maritime space is regulated.
without prior formal regional institutions, where there
is an extensive presence of external actors and intense Political factors
geopolitical competition. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Multilateralism essentially strives to establish a
bin Farhan described the purpose of the new organisation cooperative umbrella that exceeds simple least-common-
as intensifying cooperation “so that we can deal with any denominator outcomes determined by the individual
risks or challenges facing our region, and work to protect preferences of participating states. Yet, states are central
the security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden” (quoted in to any multilateral project: “they are regarded as the
Arab News 2020). However, three years later, the RSC has constitutive elements of the multilateral system and it is
left few concrete traces of its existence, and there is no their interrelations that determine the form and content
indication that this level of ambition is within its reach. of multilateralism” (Van Langenhove 2010). This holds
One fundamental complicating factor is that, despite especially for cooperation with a security dimension,
strengthened links between the Arab and African littoral which tends to be intergovernmental; that is, based on the
states around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, these states agreement of constituent members. This section discusses
are far from alone in having a stake in maritime security three political factors that help us grasp the status of
governance. The region has an immense strategic value, interrelations between RSC members: shared interests,
which largely stems from the centrality of these waterways regime types, and power asymmetries.
for international trade. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
link the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean, providing Shared interests
a shortcut for trade between, on the one hand, Europe, Some basic level of shared political interests is a
and, on the other, Asia, the Middle East and East Africa. fundamental, necessary, but not in itself sufficient, factor
A majority of the trade in goods and commodities between enabling multilateral regional cooperation. At the same
the economic hubs of Europe and Asia passes here, as well time, multilateralism is a method for mediating diverging
as much of the energy exports from the Gulf region. When, interests within a defined scope. According to neo-
in 2021, the gigantic container ship, Ever Given, was stuck functionalist theory, cooperation stagnates when shared
in the Suez Canal, it showcased how reliant world trade interests are weak; it takes a leap forward – spilling over
is on the narrow water passage. The Russian war against into new areas – when core interests converge and it
Ukraine has added further importance to these passages, benefits initial priorities (Haas 1958).
whose smooth operation is crucial for European countries There are several security threats that the coastal
to succeed in diversifying their sources of energy import. countries in the area have, in principle, a shared interest
The RSC was formed in a security environment in countering. Naval mines and missile attacks undermine
characterised by geopolitical tension and competition. In free passage on the waterways, clearly a priority for
recent years, the rivalries and wars of the broader Middle all coastal states. Iran has amplified its presence in the
Eastern region have proliferated into the maritime domain southern Red Sea, as seen in its intensified activities in
of the Red Sea, with Yemen as the epicenter. Domestic the Bad Al-Mandab and the emergence of suspected spy
political turbulence, border conflicts, and the war in Tigray ships. Grey-zone maritime antagonism between Iran and
have strained neighbourly relations on the African side. Israel has occasionally culminated in attacks against both
Uncertainty about the US’s role in the region, together Iranian and Israeli ships in the Red Sea (see Nadimi 2021).
with the growing ambitions of other non-regional powers Furthermore, terrorist attacks have for many years been
(especially China and Russia) has further added to a recurrent security problem in the region. According to
geopolitical tension. the Global Terrorism Database (2021), the eight RSC
As this memo further discusses, the complex web of countries together suffered 5968 incidents between 2015
stakeholders present around the Red Sea and Gulf of and 2019. At sea, the smuggling of drugs, arms, and coal
Aden is both a rationale for, and an obstacle to, building (see Magdy 2022) fuels the financing and escalation of
a multilateral security architecture. On the one hand, conflict. Piracy (although at present low), and human
by joining multilaterally in an organisation such as the trafficking are other examples of maritime security issues
RSC, coastal states sought to counter the trouble-sparking that defy national borders. In addition, maritime cyber
influence of external actors and take their own command threats, such as “[threats to] shipping lines, remote seizure
of maritime affairs. On the other hand, countries without of navigation systems, hacked controls of oil pipelines,
their own direct access to the sea do not approve of being and severed undersea cables that would affect up to half

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of the world’s internet access” are gaining traction (United Without a clear and consistent commitment from
States Institute of Peace 2020, 12). Finally, there is the Saudi Arabia and, at a minimum, Egypt’s acceptance
looming threat of an environmental disaster, with possible of the Saudi vision, the RSC will have trouble getting
security implications. A concrete example of this threat anywhere. Although they share a similar basic strategic
is the mooring of a floating storage and offloading ship, outlook on regional security affairs, at present their
Safer, which is currently rusting along the coast of Yemen. priorities differ. Saudi Arabia focuses on challenges on
Issues such as those described above are contenders for the Arabian Peninsula, not least the war in Yemen, and
showing up on the agenda of a security-oriented regional the perceived threat from Iran. Egypt, on the other hand,
organisation such as the RSC. The goal to ensure free emphasises issues in North Africa (e.g., Libya) and the
waterways in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is especially Mediterranean as well as the question of Israel/Palestine.
important as a potential anchor around which cooperation Moreover, Egyptian financial dependence on Saudi Arabia
could take form. However, having such a core shared may complicate the possibilities for cooperation. Due to
interest is but a starting point for the emergence of its historical status as the pre-eminent regional power,
regional multilateralism. Frictions in other policy areas, Egypt is reluctant to accept a role as a junior partner to
or troubled relationships between regional leaders, risks Saudi Arabia. Thus, a key factor for the future of the RSC
undermining cooperation efforts even when interests in is that Saudi Arabia and Egypt settle on their respective
principle converge. roles in regional affairs. This entails sorting out the above-
The presence of prior armed conflict often implies mentioned ambiguities in their relationship, and clearly
enduring interest divergence and is a known obstacle committing to head in the same direction.
to building security-oriented multilateral cooperation When it comes to concrete policy, there is rarely a
(Swanström 2004). That there are no recognised ongoing perfect match between the interests of different states that
armed conflicts between any of the members of the RSC participate in a regional organisation. In consequence,
is thus a good sign for the organisation. However, the states have to be ready to compromise for institutionalised
region suffers from long-running internal conflicts, whose regional cooperation to gain practical relevance. As
consequences spill over national borders to affect the proposed in a report from the United States Institute
region as a whole. Moreover, ongoing severe conflicts in of Peace (2020, 10), the Red Sea arena can be thought
Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia, as well as instability in Egypt of as “a Venn diagram in which regional risks and
(see Council on Foreign Relations 2022) likely restrict the opportunities intersect with country-specific risks and
capacity of these states to contribute to regional institution opportunities at identifiable points”. One of the country-
building. Of these conflicts, the Yemen war has had the specific characteristics that shape the extent and direction
most significant impact on the maritime space, including of regional cooperation, the regime type of the member
attacks on ships in the Red Sea as well as the laying of sea states, is discussed below.
mines that impede navigation near the Strait of Bab Al-
Mandab (Al-Madhaji 2020). All of the RSC states have Regime type
joined the Saudi side in the war in Yemen, with Sudan’s even The domestic political dynamics of member states
deploying thousands of troops to the war zone, and Eritrea contribute to defining the scope and character of
allowing its territory to be used for military operations cooperation: “states that create regional organizations
(Hokayem and Roberts 2016). The littoral states’ unified transfer part of their principles, behaviors and mechanisms
stance on Yemen can be seen as a spearhead example of of action from the state to the international level”
concrete regional security cooperation under Saudi lead. (Grabowski 2020, 199, referring to Haas, 1961, 366–367).
At this still early stage of attempting to formalise Research has traditionally seen formal international
cooperation in the RSC, strong convergence of interest cooperation as an affair between democracies. Authoritarian
between Riyadh and Cairo is likely more decisive than states tend to not trust one another, are not accustomed
streamlining the preferences of all eight littoral states. In to complex decision-making that requires compromise,
the years preceding the launch of the RSC, Riyadh and and lack domestic accountability that enables credible
Cairo met on several occasions to discuss ways forward for international commitments (see literature review in Mattes
regional cooperation. The contours of the RSC that were and Rodríguez 2014). However, a growing literature on
presented in January 2020 reflected the Saudi model of a “authoritarian regionalism” has observed that despite these
formal security-oriented organisation rather than Egypt’s characteristics, authoritarian states also engage in formal
idea of a less hierarchical multi-issue organisation (Vertin regional cooperation. However, authoritarian leaders,
2019, 17). so it is argued, will have regime survival as their utmost

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priority even as they engage in cooperation with other the best case, these priorities will align with, or at least be
states (see Debre 2021). This means that cooperation acceptable to, those of less resourceful members. Smaller
between authoritarian states serves to boost the stability states may even consciously trade their votes against
of authoritarian regimes, rather than to promote their potential benefits in their relationships to more powerful
democratisation (see, e.g., Stoddard 2017; Russo and counterparts.
Stoddard 2018).
Moreover, if authoritarianism is combined with state Power asymmetries
fragility, “then regional security efforts are more likely to A third, interrelated, political factor is the distribution
turn on the suppression of internal dissent than interstate of power between members of a regional organisation.
conflict management” (Kelly 2007, 218). Identity Whereas power asymmetries may facilitate the initial
discourses, whether secular or religious, may provide a launch of regional cooperation, enduring asymmetries
“legitimizing framework” for such essentially self-regarding risk complicating efforts to build an effective, inclusive
efforts (Harders 2016, 42). and non-hegemonic multilateral security organisation.
All members of the RSC are authoritarian countries. Only if sophisticated interest-mediating institutions are in
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Eritrea and Jordan are all considered place can multilateralism even out the power asymmetries
stable closed autocracies, whereas Yemen, Egypt, and between participants. As Van Langenhove (2010) puts it:
Sudan have fluctuated between fully closed autocracies “[m]ultilateral relations between states are not a game in
and approaching the category of electoral autocracies over which all players have equal rights and duties.” This means
the last decades (Varieties of Democracy 2022). Whereas that the pre-existing distribution of power will shape the
none of the RSC countries is close to being a liberal scope and content of regional multilateralism.
electoral democracy, the states are highly diverse in terms There are pronounced power asymmetries between
of regime stability. The Fragile State Index ranks Yemen RSC members in both military and economic terms. As
as the most fragile country in the world, directly followed mentioned above, Saudi Arabia and Egypt both strive for
by Somalia. Sudan ranks 7th and Eritrea 18th, whereas regional leadership in the Red Sea area, reflecting their
Egypt comes in 42nd, Djibouti 48th, and Saudi Arabia 95th economic and military dominance. Apart from Israel,
of the 179 indexed countries (The Fund for Peace 2022). Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the only major economic
Although the reasons for weak statehood vary between and military powers among the littoral Red Sea and Gulf
the countries, the existence of competing social contracts, of Aden states, and the only ones with substantial naval
such as the tribe or the clan, are known to have impeded capabilities.
state-building, or catalysed state collapse in, for instance, Saudi Arabia is the regional economic giant, with a
Somalia and Yemen (see Bar 2020). GDP that is larger than that of all the other states in the
State fragility influences the prospects of regional region put together. In 2021, the GDP of Saudi Arabia
multilateralism, since regimes that worry about being was almost three times as big as Egypt’s, the second
overthrown tend to agree only to sovereignty-preserving largest economy of the region, and about 20 times the
cooperative practices (see Swanström 2004; Barnett and size of Jordan’s, the third largest economy (IMF, WEO
Solingen 2007). Given that security matters are at the core 2022). Saudi Arabia also dominates regional military
of sovereignty, delegation of power to the regional level is expenditure, with between 80 and 90 percent of the
especially unlikely in this domain. In addition, difficulties total official military spending in 2021 (SIPRI 2022).
in implementing policy are inherent to fragile states, Whereas Saudi Arabia spends over three times more than
which characteristically lack procedures and institutions second runner-up Egypt, the latter might fare well in a
with sufficient capacity to do so. Hence, even if countries comparison of actual capabilities. An old military power
manage to agree on regional policy, there is an overarching run by officers, Egypt has about 440,000 active military
risk that it is never put into effect. personnel and Saudi Arabia about 255,000. These are the
In sum, the pattern of regime types around the Red Sea second- and third-largest forces, respectively, in the Middle
and Gulf of Aden is one of predominantly authoritarian East and North Africa (after Iran). This may be compared
states, some of which are highly fragile. This combination with estimated troop numbers of ca 200,000 in Eritrea,
makes progressive, democracy-promoting regionalism 105,000 in Sudan, 100,000 in Jordan, 40,000 in Yemen,
highly unlikely to emerge among these countries. Rather, 14,000 in Somalia, and 10,000 in Djibouti (International
what can be expected is that a few powerful states – for the Institute for Strategic Studies 2022ab). Next to the national
RSC, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in particular – will set the troops, sizable military missions from the African Union
agenda in a way that reflects their national priorities. In and the United Nations are active in Somalia and Sudan.

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 The capabilities of the navies and coast guards differ investments in “cross-border infrastructure projects,
significantly between Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the one including land transport projects with Africa through
hand, and the other five countries, on the other. Sudan, Egypt”; the construction of Neom, a futuristic city on the
Eritrea, Jordan, and Djibouti have no principal surface Gulf of Aqaba, close to Egypt, Israel and Jordan; and the
combatants at all, but about a dozen patrol and costal transformation of Red Sea islands into tourist destinations.
ships each. Somalia and Yemen both lack the capacity to However, the regional economic and financial structures
operate militarily at sea. Egypt has arguably the largest are sharply hierarchical, and inter-state relations are
naval capacity – with 18 surface combatants, 73 patrol and correspondently asymmetric in terms of trade and capital
coastal combatants, about 17 amphibious ships, 23 support flows. Most states in the region are heavily dependent on
vessels, 14 ships for mine warfare, and 8 attack submarines, Saudi Arabia and Asian, European and American states for
as well as a large coast guard. The naval capacity of Saudi capital, goods and economic development.
Arabia, in terms of quantity, is somewhat less; in contrast To draw a more detailed picture of economic ties
to Egypt, Saudi Arabia has no submarines (International between countries in the region, the following passages
Institute for Strategic Studies 2022a). However, not all present data on trade exchanges, foreign aid, and
Egyptian and Saudi vessels can operate in the Red Sea and remittances from migrants.
Gulf of Aden at the same time. Egypt and Saudi Arabia
also have coastlines on the Mediterranean and the Persian Limited intraregional trade
Gulf, respectively, where their navies need to be present. In terms of trade, the region is not particularly integrated.
In sum, the political factors suggest that security- International Monetary Fund (IMF DOTS 2022) data
oriented regional multilateralism faces several hurdles in on merchandise trade indicates that most states in the
this region. The RSC countries do have a shared general region are more dependent on external actors for import
interest in keeping the waterways safe, but they may not and export of goods and commodities than on each other.
agree on how to achieve this. In view of pronounced In 2021, the share of intraregional trade relative to total
military asymmetries, security-oriented cooperation can international trade is thus low in all states: 3 percent in
be an opportunity for states with low defence capacity Saudi Arabia, 5 percent in Somalia, 6 percent in Eritrea,
to ‘piggy-back’ on, especially, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 10 percent in Egypt, 14 percent in Djibouti, 16 percent
However, this also means that several RSC members are, in Yemen, and about 20 percent in Sudan and Jordan.
feasibly, either too weak or too occupied with internal In comparison, Sweden exports 52 percent and imports
conflicts to be able to contribute substantially to any 68 percent of all its goods from other states in the EU
regional security activities. (European Union 2022).
The intraregional trade that does occur revolves around
Economic interdependence Saudi Arabia. In 2021, the Saudi Kingdom was the largest
Economic interdependence has long been considered a trading partner of Jordan (14 percent of total trade), the
primary driver of regional multilateralism, especially in second largest trading partner of Egypt (8 percent) and
Europe (Gleditsch 2002). Beneficial economic exchanges Yemen (16 percent), and the third largest trading partner
may, over time, facilitate not only cooperation in economic of Sudan (11 per cent). Trade between Saudi Arabia
affairs, but also spill-over and incite security-oriented and Egypt increased significantly in 2021, suggesting a
cooperation. In line with the traditional liberal hypothesis, potentially growing interdependence between the two
economically interdependent states would be disinclined contenders for regional leadership. Saudi Arabia’s role in
to enter into conflict with one another, and may therefore the trade of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia is not quite
be inclined to commit to collective security-favouring as important, but was still among their largest trading
policies. Economic and security regionalism have, indeed, partners in 2021 (IMF DOTS 2022).
been presented as “tightly linked” (Mansfield and Solingen
2010). Aid
As noted above, the birth of the RSC took place in a The OECD (2022) lists all countries in the region, except
context of increasing interactions between the Eastern and for Saudi Arabia, as recipients of Official Development
Western flanks of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Saudi Assistance (ODA). Yemen and Somalia are among the
Arabia looks westwards, towards the Red Sea region, most aid-dependent countries in the world (World Bank
envisioning itself as “an integral driver of international 2022). The United States is the biggest ODA donor to the
trade and to connect three continents: Africa, Asia and region, followed by the EU institutions and the United
Europe” (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2016). This involves Arab Emirates (UAE). Saudi Arabia is the only major

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donor among the states in the Red Sea region; Egypt and could facilitate regional cooperation within this group of
Yemen are particularly large recipients of Saudi foreign aid. countries does not yet exist.
According to Saudi statistics, between 2011 and 2021, At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s financial leverage
Saudi provided about 13 billion USD to Egypt, primarily implies that it has a lot to offer less advantaged countries
through budget support, and 10 billion USD to Yemen, willing to engage in Saudi-led initiatives. If economic
mostly humanitarian aid (King Salman Humanitarian Aid interdependence is not yet a starting-point from which
and Relief Centre 2022). multilateralism can grow, the prospect of future economic
gains with the regional hegemon may spark commitment
Migration and remittances to cooperation.
Most of the regional economies are dependent on
remittances from abroad. This applies not only to Somalia, Regional identity
especially, but also to Yemen, Jordan and Egypt (World Regional organisations do not emerge between just any
Bank 2018). Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Jordan constellation of countries, but those that belong to ‘a
and Egypt, are sources of remittances, including to other region’. Next to the political factors earlier discussed,
states in the Red Sea region. regions are formed around geographical and cultural
In 2020, Saudi Arabia was the third-largest source of commonalities. Over time, regional cooperation may, in
remittances and host of international migrants in the turn, contribute to strengthening regional cohesion. Thus,
world (UN DESA 2020). In 2021, 12 million foreigners, regions come into being through institutionalisation,
the majority from South and South-East Asia, lived in just as some level of like-mindedness is a prerequisite for
Saudi Arabia (General Authority of Statistics, Kingdom cooperation to take off in the first place (see discussion
of Saudi Arabia, 2021). Saudi authorities do not publish in Börzel 2011, 19). A degree of identification with the
country-specific data on the migrant population, but the region is important for regional arrangements to gain
UN estimates that more than 1.6 million citizens from popular legitimacy. Especially if a regional organisation
the region lived in Saudi Arabia in 2015, about 730,000 gets involved in matters that have traditionally been seen
Egyptians, 580,000 Yemenis and 182,000 Jordanians (UN as within the domain of domestic affairs, recognition of the
DESA 2015). Unknown numbers of Somalis, Eritreans, regional level’s authority is vital.
and Sudanese have also worked in the kingdom. Egypt, The RSC Treaty signatories, as of January 2020,
Yemen, Sudan and Jordan receive substantial remittances included all the coastal states with direct access to the Red
from migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. In 2017, inflows Sea and Gulf of Aden, with the exception of Israel. Thus,
from Saudi Arabia represented a large share of total the grouping started out by defining itself geographically
remittances to Yemen (60 percent), Sudan (almost 50 around the sea. The strict delineation of the membership
percent), Egypt (40 percent) and Jordan (25 percent). Data circle to countries on the Red Sea has, according to Vertin
on Eritrea and Somalia is unavailable (World Bank, 2018). (2019, 17), been especially important to Egypt. Making
Notably, Egypt, a former economic centre of the Arab the RSC a club exclusively for coastal states effectively
world, has become financially dependent on foreign shuts the door on Ethiopia, with which Egypt has an
actors, such as Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, ongoing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
including Jordan. In 2017, Jordan was Egypt’s third Dam (GERD).
largest remittance-sending country, after Saudi Arabia As noted by Fawn (2009, 16), “[m]any regions, and
and the UAE, contributing about 1.3 billion USD (World especially those better-known and considered successful,
Bank, 2018). Figures on Egyptian migrants in Jordan use geographical markers”. Processes of region-making
vary between 200,000 and 1.2 million (Abdelfattah have unfolded in other maritime areas, for instance the
2019). Whereas Egypt is a net receiver of remittances, it Black sea (Tsantoulis 2009, 243) and the Baltic Sea, where
also hosts a population of about 9 million migrants. A the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was formed
majority of these people come from the Red Sea region: 4 with the sea as its explicit point of reference.
million Sudanese, 1 million Yemenis, 600,000 Saudis, and There is a high degree of linguistic, religious and cultural
200,000 Somalis (IOM, 2022). coherence between the countries of the Council. Only four
Economic interactions between the countries in of the Red Sea countries are included in the World Values
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are growing, but in Survey: Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. All four
highly asymmetrical ways and with a leaning towards are placed in the African-Islamic cluster of “The Inglehart-
investments, remittances and aid, rather than trade. Broad Welzel World Cultural Map” (World Values Survey 2022).
or evenly distributed interdependence of the kind that This cluster is characterised by traditional and survival

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values, as opposed to secular and self-expression values. Overlapping initiatives
More detailed survey items from the Arab Barometer There are several other cooperation initiatives that tap into
(2019, 2022), where Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan adjacent regional identities. So, for instance, all RSC states
took part in 2018-2019, and Sudan, Egypt and Jordan in are members of the League of Arab States (LAS), except
2021-2022, add to this picture of relative value coherence. for Eritrea, which has been an observer at the League
Arabic is the official language in Djibouti, Saudi since 2003. Likewise, all, except for Eritrea, are part of the
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen; and a Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). Moreover, the
recognised national language in Eritrea. A shared language military alliances, the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism
may not only in itself be an element of a regional identity, Coalition (IMAFT) and the Saudi-led Yemen coalition, are
it is also practical for any organisation intending to discuss examples of defence cooperation involving countries in the
joint security problems, negotiate measures to solve these, region. The main initiator of the RSC, Saudi Arabia, is the
and produce written policy. leading member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
In all Red Sea and Gulf of Aden countries except Other GCC states, especially the UAE and Qatar, also have
Eritrea, the majoritarian religion is, by a large margin, strong interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area. Back
Sunni Islam. Yet, the dominance of Sunni Islam harbours in 2007, Yemen was in negotiations to join the GCC, and
internal diversity and tensions, which may convolute in 2011 a prospective Jordanian membership was also up
any potentially catalysing role for religion. In Yemen, the for some discussion. However, GCC membership for either
epicentre of insecurity in the Red Sea region, sectarian Yemen or Jordan remains unlikely in the foreseeable future.
polarisation between the Sunni majority and the Shia There are also an increasing number of overlapping
(Zaidi) minority has fuelled the civil war (Al-Muslimi organisations on the Western flank of the Red Sea and
2015). Gulf of Aden. During the last decades, African countries
Combined with geography and narratives of a shared have organised multilaterally in the continent-wide African
history (Vertin 2019), the linguistic and religious factors Union (AU), as well as in a number of sub-continental
add up to an Arab identity, which is, to some degree and organisations, including the Intergovernmental Authority
with the exception of Eritrea, shared by all the littoral on Development (IGAD), on the Horn of Africa. In
states. The weak level of institutionalised regionalism 2019, IGAD launched a Taskforce on the Red Sea and
in the Arab world has long been a riddle to scholars, the Gulf of Aden, mandated to “develop shared norms,
given these shared attributes and the historical experience common goals, and strategic coordination. . . with a view
of pan-Arabism (e.g. Barnett 1996). When it comes to to enhancing coordination, and multilateralism in the Red
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, there are three reasons Sea arena” (IGAD 2022). Since then, the taskforce has
why regional cooperation will have trouble drawing held a number of “National Consultative Meetings” and
on any pan-Arab political vision. First, most Arab at least four joint sessions (IGAD 2021). Moreover, in
states do not border on these seafronts. The “imagined January 2020, just days before the RSC Treaty was signed,
Arab community” (Harders 2016, 35) is clearly much Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea jointly proposed the creation
bigger, and has its epicentre elsewhere. Second, over of a new organisation for peace and security, the Horn of
time, pan-Arab visions in the wider region have largely Africa Cooperation (HOAC) (see Henneberg and Stapel
been replaced by Islamist and nationalist narratives and 2020). This was a remarkable step for three neighbours
ideologies. Third, Eritrea is not usually considered an with a history of troubled relationships. However, similar
Arab country. to the RSC, HOAC has a long way to go to leave an actual
In sum, although crucial building blocks of regional imprint on regional affairs.
identity exist in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area Finally, the Gulf of Aden members of the RSC (Djibouti,
(cultural affinity, language, religion), there is hardly Somalia, Yemen) also belong in the Western Indian Ocean
a strong specifically littoral identity that the RSC zone, where other potentially competing institutions for
can straightforwardly build on. In theory, a regional maritime security exist. Somalia and Yemen, for instance, are
organisation could be a springboard for such an identity both members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
to mature in the long run. However, for this to be possible, In sum, there is a myriad of arrangements with a
the division of labour between the RSC and initiatives potential stake in governing the Red Sea and Gulf of
with partly overlapping memberships would first need to Aden, but with little concrete progress towards building
be clarified. a regional security architecture with real-world impact.

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Rather, the existence of multiple cooperation initiatives 2022; Reuters 2021). A similar threat perception and
with overlapping memberships presents an opportunity for reports of a growing Iranian naval presence (Kubovich
countries to ‘forum shop’, that is, pick and choose between 2022) may incite further cooperation between Israel and
commitments; which risks leading to reduced organisatio- Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea. Israeli membership in the
nal effectiveness (see Panke and Stapel 2018). RSC would still be highly surprising, especially given that
the organisation has not moved beyond the drafting phase.
External actors Yet, if a future Israeli membership were to materialise, it
Finally, the outcome of regional cooperation is not entirely could be a gamechanger for the RSC. It would complete
in the hands of the participating states, but is influenced the circle of littoral members, somewhat balance the Saudi
by how stakeholders external to the organisation act. Yet, dominance and likely increase the organisation’s relevance
assuming ownership of regional affairs is the ideational in the eyes of the US and other external actors.
core of many regional projects. Attitudes toward external The delineation of membership to littoral states makes
involvement are therefore predestined to be ambivalent. the RSC an unlikely forum for handling issues of broader
External actors can facilitate or impede regional regional relevance. The unresolved regional dispute between
cooperation in different ways. One basic aspect is Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian
that regional security cooperation is often dependent Renaissance Dam (GERD) is one example. In February
on external funding. The African Peace and Security 2021, Saudi Arabian minister of African affairs, Ahmed bin
Architecture is a case in point: it is largely funded by the Abdul Aziz Kattan, said that the RSC would host a summit
European Union, despite efforts to increase the degree on the GERD issue (Ahram Online 2021). However, this
of self-financing from African Union member states summit has not yet taken place. With Ethiopia standing
(Hellquist and Hallqvist 2020). For the RSC, Saudi outside of the organisation, the prospect that the RSC will
Arabia is likely to be a leading financial contributor, play a constructive role regarding GERD is limited (see
adding to a perception that the organisation is a Saudi Custers 2021). At the same time, the fact that Ethiopia is
project, but perhaps reducing the risk of external not a member has been attributed precisely to its strained
dependency. External actors may also facilitate regional relationship with Egypt due to GERD (Custers 2021).
cooperation in non-monetary ways. Simone Ruiz and Access to the sea is a major issue for Ethiopia, which is
Valentin Zahrnt (2016, 57–58) highlight the following heavily dependent on trade in the Red Sea and has pushed
five roles (i): offering incentives, for instance trade and for another multilateral cooperative track through IGAD/
cooperation agreements with regional organisations, (ii) AU (de Waal 2020). Although landlocked, since 2018
treating the region as one, (iii) supporting institution- Ethiopia has attempted to rebuild its navy (Olewe 2018,
building, (iv) coaching on good regulatory practice, and Malhotra 2020), and in June 2021 various online media
(v) building infrastructure. However, external actors may reported an Ethiopian aspiration to establish a military
also play the contrary role, if the external actor chooses to base somewhere along the Red Sea (e.g., Middle East
operate through bilateral channels despite the existence Monitor 2021; Gomaa 2021). However, the Tigray war
of a regional structure. appears to have stalled these initiatives. More importantly,
A series of influential actors in the immediate Red the war has undermined Ethiopia’s standing in the wider
Sea/Gulf of Aden area stand outside of the RSC. Israel, region, and likely weakened its possibilities to be accepted
which has access to the Red Sea through the Bay of Aqaba as a co-player in Red Sea affairs.
and significant interest in the region, primarily related to In its present constellation, it looks as if the RSC
Iranian activities, is not a member. However, reportedly, reinforces rather than alters the bloc politics of the Middle
the possibility of Israel joining the RSC was raised at a top- East. Some non-littoral regional powers are clearly uneasy
level meeting between Israel and Sudan in January 2021 with any Saudi-led regional initiative that could take on a
(Bassist 2021). Important steps towards diplomatic détente military dimension. Whereas the UAE has welcomed the
between Israel and countries in the wider region have RSC (MoFAIC 2020), it is unlikely that Iran, Qatar and
been taken in the last few years, including the Abraham Türkiye will engage with the organisation. The “Sunni
Accords and linked initiatives. In 2022, Israel conducted world” rivalry over regional order and influence has been
unprecedented military exercises with the United States, exacerbated since the Arab Spring and affected Africa
the UAE and Bahrain in the Red Sea, and approved the and the Red Sea region. The one side, led by Türkiye
transfer of Tiran and Sanafir, two strategically located and Qatar, generally supported the Arab Spring and
islands, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, possibly paving the constituencies associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
way for normalisation of Saudi-Israeli relations (Ravid The other side, led by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt,

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generally opposed the Arab Spring; they label the Muslim In 2020, Russia had already signed a contract to establish
Brotherhood a terrorist organisation. In particular, Türkiye a base in Port of Sudan, in the Red Sea, the first Russian
and the UAE, which support opposite sides in the politics naval base south of the Mediterranean in the post-Soviet
of the Islamic world, have both stepped up their economic, era. After months of speculation over the status of the
political and military ambitions in the Red Sea region. contract, in late April 2021 it was announced that it had
Egypt, Somalia and Sudan, all located at the Red Sea, been suspended (Altus Intel 2021). However, discussions
have been theatres of the intra-Sunni rivalry. Although over Russian access to the Red Sea through Sudan have
tensions within the Sunni world have declined of late, non- continued, with Sudan engaged in what appears to be a
littoral states with national interests and military bases in delicate balancing act between different external actors
the region, such as the UAE and Türkiye, may counteract (The Arab Weekly 2021). As for China, it has built up a
proposed multilateral frameworks if they do not clearly blue water fleet, increased naval deployment in the Indian
work in their favour. Ocean, and established its first overseas military base, in
Last but not least, non-regional external actors decisively Djibouti (Reuters 2017), close to the major U.S. base in
shape the outlook for regional cooperation. During the region. According to Narbone and Widdershoven,
the Trump presidency, indications of a declining US China works on “a dual approach which connects its
presence opened up for numerous, partially antagonistic East African anti-piracy activities with the setting up of
actors to position themselves in the Red Sea and Gulf of naval and commercial ports in Djibouti and Sudan (Port
Aden area (Vertin 2019; see also Knopf 2018). Yet, the Sudan)” (Narbone and Widdershoven 2021, 13).
US has kept a substantial troop presence, and Narbone Ever since the opening of the Suez Canal, in 1869, the
and Widdershoven estimate that “35 to 45 American Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have had a special geopolitical
warships transit the Suez Canal and the Red Sea each year” importance. The density of external actors present in
(Narbone and Widdershoven 2021, 12). The continued the area reflects this importance. In the current times
strategic importance of the region for the US has been of high global uncertainty and tension, both regional
further emphasised under the Biden administration. The and non-regional powers will continue to position
president’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2022 included themselves strategically in the region. There is no realistic
attendance at the Jeddah Security and Development prospect that littoral countries will solely reign over these
Summit, together with GCC countries, Egypt, Jordan and waterways, regardless of how the RSC develops. However,
Iraq. On this occasion, Joe Biden declared: “We will not under favourable circumstances, the RSC could become
walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia a counterweight to the myriad of external actors, at best
or Iran” (quoted in Barron et al., 2022). However, China, ensuring that legitimate local concerns have an impact on
Russia, and Iran (among others) are already there, thus maritime policy.
making the US one of several strategic partners available
to countries in the region. Strategic competition between Conclusion
external actors will likely continue to shape relationships For multilateral cooperation to stand a chance in a
around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden for the foreseeable crowded and competitive geopolitical environment,
future. Recent US initiatives, such as the launch of the several favorable circumstances would need to be
CTF-153 maritime task force, take place in, and will present. Whereas the states of the Red Sea and Gulf
continue to shape, the strategic environment around the of Aden have a shared interest in regional ownership
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. over maritime affairs, the sharp asymmetries within the
After all, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al- grouping as well as the pronounced vulnerabilities of
Mandab are among the most important trade passages some member states are hurdles for such an ownership
in the world, making whatever happens there a direct to materialize. Despite the fanfare with which the RSC
concern for countries near and far. Trade through these was launched, little has been heard of it in the three
waterways is expected to further multiply in the coming years that have passed since the gathering in Riyadh.
decades. The vital importance of the passages for the This is already an indication that the life prospects of
world economy is also reflected in military engagements the soon three-year-old organisation are rather gloomy.
by external actors. Next to countries such as the US, Yet, it cannot be ruled out that multilateralism may
France and Italy, which have long had a military overcome these obstacles and eventually develop to
footprint in the region, China and Russia are increasing shape maritime security around the Red Sea and Gulf
their presence and activities in the maritime sphere. of Aden. For this to happen, three factors are decisive.

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 First and most importantly, any regional security of maritime incidents, coordination of existing coast-guard
architecture will depend on cooperation between Riyadh activities and support to building functioning coast-guard
and Cairo. These two states dominate the region in both capacities across the region.
political, economic and military terms, a fact that will leave Third, without a strategy for accommodating crucial
its imprint on any regional cooperation attempt. The flipside external actors, attempts at regional multilateralism in
of this is that the organisation risks becoming a tool of Saudi the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden arena risk becoming
Arabia, with Egypt as a contender, in which the concerns toothless. Other regional institutions, such as the
and preferences of the “lesser powers” are sidestepped. Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), the
Perhaps, Saudi financial influence over Egypt could incite CBSS, the IORA, and even the EU, have all developed
Cairo to buy into Riyadh’s agenda. In addition, trustful mechanisms for (selectively) including non-members in
personal ties between Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin their processes, for instance by admitting states and
Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi could organisations as observers. Given the significance of the
further facilitate policy coordination. Genuinely shared Red Sea and Gulf of Aden for world trade, it is unrealistic
leadership to the benefit of the collective may, however, that only the countries with a border on the sea will take
prove difficult, given the two states’ differing security exclusive command of maritime security in the area.
priorities and Egypt’s reluctance to play second fiddle. These waterways are de facto a ‘global commons’, with
Second, regional cooperation will stand a greater chance many regional and non-regional stakeholders. At the
at succeeding if it is clearly delineated around a few topics same time, the littoral states have legitimate concerns by
where the interests of members strongly converge. The virtue of their geographical proximity to evolving security
substance and scope of any potential security-oriented (and environmental) threats. If the littoral states can find
activities emanating from the RSC remain to be seen. ways to speak with one voice, this will increase their
However, it is unlikely that the organisation will be able possibilities to advance an agenda on maritime security
to deliver on the encompassing ambition that Saudi that is responsive to local needs and priorities. However,
representatives initially communicated. By focusing for such efforts to be truly fruitful, they will need to
on specific domains where there are concrete collective happen alongside, rather than in opposition to, external
solutions that do not threaten the interests of external actors. External actors, in turn, should maintain
actors, the organisation can prove its relevance without reasonable expectations concerning what an organisation
biting off more than it can possibly chew. Piracy is such as the RSC will be able to deliver in the short term.
sometimes brought up as such a domain (e.g., Narbone Nonetheless, the EU and its individual member states,
and Widdershoven 2021, 18), but it is nowadays a including Sweden, can potentially play constructive roles
marginal issue. Other avenues that could be worthwhile as interlocutors and, in the long term, as partners in
to explore include information-sharing on different kinds building relevant mechanisms for maritime security.

Elin Hellquist, Ph.D., Senior Analyst at FOI's Department for Operational Support
Samuel Neuman Bergenwall, Senior Analyst at FOI's Department for Security Policy and Strategic Studies

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Map: Per Wikström, FOI.

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Endnotes
1. The League of Arab States, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai 3. All numbers have been rounded to the nearest 5000. For Somalia, the
Cooperation Organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the estimated troop size is highly uncertain due to poor data reliability and
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America are examples of ‘open doors’ between armed groups, regional militias and state security
regional organisations largely made up by authoritarian-leaning states. forces. See CIA 2022.
2. The Fragile State Index is published yearly by the U.S. think tank the 4. There is no universally valid relationship between economic
Peace Fund, since 2019 together with The New Humanitarian. interdependence and the degree of regional cooperation (Börzel and
Risse 2019). This does not mean that economic factors are irrelevant,
but highlights that regionalism emerges from a complex and highly
contextualised interplay between different factors.

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