KEY CONCEPTS

Published
Governance
Barbara Adam, Time
Alan Aldridge, Consumption
Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer, Disability
Mildred Blaxter, Health
Steve Bruce, Fundamentalism
Anthony Elliott, Concepts of the Self
Steve Fenton, Ethnicity
Michael Freeman, Human Rights
Anne Mette Kjser, Governance
Michael Saward, Democracy
John Scott, Power
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism

Anne Mette Kjaer

polity
Copyright © Anne Mette Kjser 2004

The right of Anne Mette Kjser to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988.

First published in 2004 by Polity Press.

Reprinted 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 (twice), 2011 (twice), 2012 Contents
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purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or List of Figures and Tables viii
otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Acknowledgements ix
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
1 Introduction: The Meanings of Governance 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data What is governance?
Kjasr, Anne Mette. Governance and institutionalism
Governance / Anne Mette Kjser. Governance and core concepts 12
p. cm. - (Key concepts in the social sciences)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Outline of the book 15
ISBN 978-0-7456-2978-0 (hb : alk. paper) - ISBN 978-0-7456-2979-7
(pb : alk. paper) 2 Governance in Public Administration and
1. Legitimacy of governments. 2. Policy networks. 3. Corporate Public Policy: Steering Inter-Organizational
governance. 4. Democracy. 5. Globalization. I. Title. II. Series. Networks 19
JC497 .K52 2004
320'.01'1 - dc22
The traditional model of the public sector 20
2003016302 Challenges to the traditional model 22
The new public management (NPM) reforms 24
Typeset in 10.5 on 12 pt Sabon Changes in the aftermath of public sector reforms 31
by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong The impact of changes on central government 32
Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group
The impact of changes on local government:
For further information on Polity, visit our website: [Link] networks in service delivery
Governance in a modern complex setting 41
Democratic governance: holding
networks accountable 49
Conclusion: governance in public administration
and public policy 57
 58 Governance in Public Administration

emergence of networks, and that the networks may also f a j[.

r
in both efficiency and accountability terms (Jessop, 2000)
Governance in this sense is an analytical concept for address-
ing responses to the emergence of networks, but it is not a|
description of one particular response. It is about coordinat-
ing the plurality and complexity of hierarchies, markets and
networks. Governance in International
Governance theory in public administration and public
policy often fails to distinguish between types of policy and Relations: Governing in a
the nature of interests at stake in different policy sectors, with
the implications this may have for overall coordination and
Global Era
governance. When the benefits or costs of a particular policy
are highly concentrated, network steering may fail to take
account of the aggregated interest and instead be highly
skewed towards a few powerful interests. Governance
processes cannot, therefore, rely entirely on networks; they
have to draw upon hierarchic structures as well.
Global governance refers to more than the formal institutions
and organizations through which the management" of inter-
national affairs is or is not sustained . . . [it]is conceived to
include systems of rule at all levels of human activity . . . in
which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has
transnational repercussions. (Rosenau, 1995: 13)

International relations were once seen as mainly an inter-

governmental affair. Sovereign states conduct diplomacy, they
wage war, they negotiate and they achieve peace agreements.
They are the basic units in the international system. This
neo-realist view was challenged by scholars, who observed
that complex interdependence has a bearing on how states
interact. Non-state actors are also important in international
relations.
Interdependence has, argues liberalist scholars, accelerated
to the extent that it makes sense to talk about globalization
(Held and McGrew, 2000; Keohane and Nye, 2001). Glob-
alization involves economic, political, sociocultural, environ-
mental and military dimensions (Giddens, 1990; Keohane
and Nye, 2001). Financial markets have become increasingly
integrated; the information revolution and the World Wide
Web have reduced distances in space; the explosive growth
of the number of transnational non-governmental organiza-
 60 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 61

tions has led some to talk of an emerging global civil society ational and pursue their national security interests; they seek
These global changes may have led to an undermining of 3 increase their relative capabilities, they are unitary (i.e.
national constitutions, so that we now have many different they speak with one voice); and a change in their foreign
systems of rule of transnational character, and 'governance policy does not result from a change in the domestic politi-
without government' (Rosenau, 1992). al climate but from a change in the international system
This statement may be exaggerated; indeed the degree to (Waltz, 1979: 40).
which globalization undermines state capacity is contested The international system is anarchic. There is no sovereign
(Weiss, 2002). However, asking whether and how globaliza- a bove the states, no world government to guarantee that law
tion is responded to is asking about governance. As Robert and order is upheld on a global level. Therefore, international
Keohane and Joseph Nye have phrased it: 'if laissez-faire is politics and domestic politics are fundamentally different.
likely to be unstable in the long term, and networks of inter- Whereas international politics are dominated by power pol-
dependence are stretching beyond the boundaries of the itics, self-help and anarchy, domestic politics are constitu-
nation state, how is globalism to be governed?' (Keohane and tionalized, i.e. characterized by law and order (Waltz, 1979;
Nye, 2001: 258). Global governance is thus about setting up see also Jackson and S0rensen, 1999; or Viotti and Kauppi,
global institutions that address the changes resulting from 1987). In such a system, states are busy preparing for war,
globalization. actively engaging in war, or recovering from one. The reason
This chapter starts by sketching the traditional model of they go to war is that they fear other states will attack them.
international relations as found in the neo-realist paradigm. States find themselves in a security dilemma, because 'the
It then addresses the challenges to the traditional model, means of security for one state are, in their very existence,
mostly as they were formulated by the paradigm of liberal the means by which other states are threatened' (Waltz, 1979:
institutionalism. Then it discusses the extent of change that 64). Even if a state is sincerely arming only for defensive pur-
has taken place, and asks whether globalization entails a poses, it is rational in a self-help system to assume the worst
declined role of the state, and whether and to what extent regarding an adversary's intentions and keep pace in any arms
there is a need for global governance. It also sketches differ- build-up. Causes of changes in international political out-
ent visions of global governance. Most scholars have been comes should thus be found in the international system, not
concerned with how to increase the efficiency of global inside states.2 Examples of such causes can be technological
governance, but 'democratic globalists' also focus on how advances, transformations of weaponry or a disruption of
to democratize international institutions. The final section alliances (Waltz, 1979: 67).
thus addresses a particular vision of global governance, that Thucydide's classical explanation of the war between
of global democracy. Athens and Sparta is realist because it focused on the growth
of Athenian power, together with the fear this created in
Sparta. Sparta reacted by applying counter-measures to the
The neo-realist model of growth of Athen's power through building up its own mili-
tary strength. An arms race escalated that eventually led to
international relations war. The explanation of war is found in the nature of the
international system: a change in the balance of power upsets
The neo-realist model of international relations has often stability, and can lead to war. Such a change is equivalent to
been referred to as a billiard ball model, because it views a move of a billiard ball: it pushes the other balls around
states as the single most important units, the billiard balls, in (war) but finally the balls will come to rest in a new balance
the international system (the configuration of all the balls).1 of power. The notion of a balance of power is important to
The states, just like the balls, are equal units: they are all neo-realists because it explains why there is not constant war.
62 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 63

States negotiate, make alliances, and a balance will tend to Table 3.1 Neo-realism versus liberalism
occur in which no state feels immediately threatened by
others because of the relatively even distribution of capabil- Neo-realism Liberalism
ities. Thus the basic assumption of the traditional model is States are the States are not the only
Actors
that states are the most important actors on the international dominant actors relevant actors
scene, and these states pursue power politics because of the
Instruments Military force is Economic and other
absence of a world sovereign.
most effective resources are also
important means of
power
Challenges to the neo-realist model Sources of Balance of power International relations
peace are not only conflictual
but also cooperative;
Neo-realism has been challenged by a range of scholastic the- peace derives from
ories that can be subsumed under the label of liberalism.3 interdependence as
Most liberalists do not question the importance of states as well as from power
actors in the international arena, but they criticize the heavy balances
focus neo-realists put on states and they argue that other
Foreign policy Determined by Determinedly
actors are also important when trying to understand world
the international intranational and
politics. The other actors span from individuals who in transnational factors,
system
general travel more and more, through to trade between com- as well as by systemic
panies, the emergence of transnational corporations, and the factors
growth of international organizations such as the United
Nations, the World Bank, the EU and others. International Source: Compiled from Keohane and Nye (2001: 32); Jackson
transactions, such as flows of money, goods, people, and mes- and S0rensen (1999); and Viotti and Kauppi (1987)
sages across international boundaries, have increased signifi-
cantly since the Second World War.
According to prominent liberalists, such as Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye, such transactions are important, become so mutually integrated that war between them can
but what is even more important is to understand that inter- practically be ruled out. This is the case, for instance, with
national relations can now be characterized by what they America and Canada, or in Western Europe where, not many
term complex interdependence, a concept that refers to a sit- decades ago, Germany was at war with its neighbours. Sixty
uation in which countries and economies are mutually depen- years after the Second World War, it seems highly unlikely
dent and where a multiplicity of reciprocities exist across that the European states should wage war against one
borders (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 7-8). Table 3.1 summa- another. Peace in these areas of the world does not derive
rizes the liberalists' main claims against neo-realists. from a balance of power; rather, it is a result of cooperative
When focus is moved from the state to the many kinds of relations.4
flows across borders, the unitary, rational billiard ball model The mutual dependence caused by trade and other trans-
of the state seems unlikely to reflect reality. Some liberalists border flows may sometimes rule out military force as a
have instead used the notion of a cobweb model to illustrate viable instrument of foreign policy, for example, when set-
the transnational bonds over which states may have little tling an economic dispute between interdependent countries
control. Interdependence means that some states have (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 22). Force is simply not appropri-
 64 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 65
ate for many of the economic, environmental or other issues rate into globalization, and this process called out for global
that have become more prominent with modernization. This T vernance. Governance became relevant in at least two
additionally means that states that are not strong militarily !,ays. The first is the discussion about the need for global
such as Germany or Japan, may be great economic powers rovernance. What are the global changes about and do they
and therefore may to a large extent set the agenda. In other •all for global policy solutions? The second involves the polit-
words, 'low polities' (regarding non-military issues) rather ical implications of the changes: whether they undermine the
than 'high polities' (regarding military issues) can also prevail role of the state; and the extent to which global governance
in setting the international agenda. already exists. We will address the two ways in turn below.
Finally, interdependence also means that the international
system is not the only determinant of foreign policy. The dis-
tinction between what is domestic and what is foreign has
become increasingly blurred, and a change of foreign policy The extent of changes: the need for
can result from changes in domestic pressure or changes in governance in an era of globalization
transnational interactions as well as from changes in relative
military power capabilities. Foreign policy is often a result of There is no alternative to working together and using
complex processes, involving international as well as domes- collective power to create a better world. (Commission on
tic networks, and comprised of state as well as non-state Global Governance, 1995: 2)
actors.
Neo-realist reactions to the liberal claims against them
basically boil down to the counter-argument that, even when Since the end of the cold war, globalization has become a
states cooperate, they worry about relative gains. In other buzzword, not only in the social sciences but also in the inter-
words, even if there are absolute gains in cooperation (that national political community. 'Globalization denotes the
all parties involved do better), states worry about whether expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deep-
some parties may do even better still (Jackson and Sorensen, ening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social
1999: 131). Neo-realists do not believe that international interaction' (Held and McGrew, 2000: 4). 'A quiet revolu-
institutions can change state behaviour and stop them from tion' is the term the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan
being short-term power-maximizers. For neo-realists, inter- (1998), has used when describing post-cold war changes.
national institutions of cooperation reflect state calculations Responses and interpretations of this development vary
of self-interest, based primarily on concerns about relative greatly. Neo-realists recognize that there are changes, but
power. Institutional outcomes will reflect the balance of they do not think the changes are radical: a state's security
power (Mearsheimer, 1995: 82). For example, the actions and interests still matter! On the other end, 'democratic global-
declarations of the United Nation's Security Council reflect ists' claim it is now possible, and indeed worth striving for,
the security interests of the great powers rather than some to build a democratic global governance system. But what is
aggregated global interest. Some liberalists, like Robert globalization about?
Keohane, have to a certain extent accepted the realist argu- Globalization is usually referred to as being multi-dimen-
ment that relative gains have significance. Some neo-realists, sional (Giddens, 1990; Held et al., 1999). Globalization,
on the other hand, have accepted that low politics and inter- according to Giddens, involves the spread of the four insti-
dependence could sometimes be important. Thus, neo-realism tutional dimensions of modernity resulting in a global nation-
and liberalism approached each other during the 1980s. state system, a world military order, a world capitalist
The end of the cold war ignited a new debate on global- economy and an international division of labour.5 Held, et al.
ization and governance. Interdependence was seen to accel- (1999) trace seven aspects of globalization historically in
 66 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 67

order to examine whether it is indeed possible to talk of -t :es have become much more frequent since the war. In 1950,
more globalized world, a question they answer in the affir- (.4 4 per cent of maximum possible trade connectivity (every
mative. The seven aspects are: the political, including the -ountry trading with each other) involved a group of 68
spread of nation-states and the emergence of multi-layered -ountries, while in 1990, this share had risen to 95.3 per cent
governance; the expanding reach of organized violence jHeld et al., 1999: 167).
including war and arms production; global trade and Some scholars have suggested that the increase in the
markets; global finance; corporate power and global produc- number of trade links indicates a process of regionalization
tion networks, especially the rise of multinational corpora- rather than globalization (Weiss, 1998: 176-7; Lauridsen,
tions; global migration; cultural globalization; and, finally, 1997). They argue that mutual trade is concentrated within
environmental globalization. The Commission on Global three trade blocks: the American, the Asian and the Euro-
Governance was an independent group of twenty-eight pean. Trade within the EU, according to Weiss (1998), is
leaders that issued a report called 'Our Global Neighbour- more important to Europe than trade with other regions, and
hood' in 1995 about the implication of globalization for intra-Asian trade has been growing more rapidly than trade
global governance. Their conception of globalization, too, between Asia and the US. Other scholars, however, have
was one of several dimensions, including economic, security, investigated trends in interregional trade that demonstrate a
environment, the emergence of global civil society, and growth in trade between as well as within regions.6 Their
uneven global development, including development aid. findings confirm that trade, especially between Asia and
In the present account of globalization, we will address America, is growing. However, it is beyond dtjubt that the
economic, military, environmental and sociocultural global- increase in trade links is uneven. Less developed regions are
ization, and then in the following two sections deal with the far less linked by trade than developed regions. So, although
political implications of these changes, for the state as well it may be possible to speak of a global increase in trade exten-
as for global governance. sity, the increase is more marked among some regions than
others.
A growth in trade intensity has also been observed. World
Economic globalization exports, for example, have increased constantly since the
1970s, from less than 10 per cent of world GDP to over 15
In order to be able to talk about globalization, rather than, per cent of GDP. For developed countries, both export and
say, regionalization, economic relations must have spread import shares of GDP have risen up from about 10 per cent
across the entire globe. An expansion in trade within the in the 1950s to more than 20 per cent in the 1980s. Hirst
European Union, for example, would not qualify as global- and Thompson (1996) have argued that these trends mainly
ization. However, if economic transactions, in the form of reflect a return to high levels of trade in the inter-war years;
trade or financial flows, increase between continents, then it however, according to Held et al. (1999), trade has become
would be possible to talk about a process of globalization. even more dominant than in the inter-war period. Again, it
Economic globalization involves: (i) an increase in the inter- can be argued that trade intensity is not even across the globe.
continental networks and flows of trade; (ii) an increase in In fact, rather than being integrated in the global economy,
global financial flows; and (iii) a growth in the number and the African continent is increasingly marginalized. Africa's
size of multinational corporations. Held et al. (1999: 149-82) share of global manufactured exports is almost zero. The
find that both the extensity (the geographical reach) and the region accounts for barely 1 per cent of global GDP and
intensity (the magnitude) of trade has grown significantly about 2 per cent of world trade. Over the past years it has
since the Second World War. Indicators of more extensive lost market shares in global trade, even in traditional primary
world trade are, among others, that trade links between coun- products (World Bank, 2000b: 208). So, it is fair to say that
 68 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 69
although trade has become more extensive, the process is not jvlany forms of investments have become more global in
entirely global. A few regions, most significantly the African ach- Portfolio investments by institutional investors - insur-
region, are left out of trade globalization. nce companies, pension funds, unit trusts - in stock markets
If there is one area in which it is possible to speak about 'increased markedly in the 1980s and early 1990s (Commis-
globalization (save the less developed regions), it is that of sion on Global Governance, 1995: 136). Foreign Direct
finance. Enormous sums are constantly being transferred Investment (FDI) has also grown, particularly in developed
across the globe in a matter of split-seconds. World foreign- countries. For example, stocks of outward FDI by developed
exchange trading averages $1,490 every working day (Held economies grew from 67.0 billion dollars in 1960 to 2,243
et al, 1999: 189). Even sceptics adhere to the view that inter- billion dollars in 1994 (Held et al., 1999: 247). With respect
national capital flows have reached 'spectacular levels' to the countries receiving FDI, the distribution is uneven, with
(Weiss, 1998: 178). International capital flows can be defined developed countries receiving 73.8 per cent of inward FDI
as cross-border flows of assets and loans, both long-term and stocks and developing countries receiving only 25.3 per cent
short-term, and they are of several types, such as foreign (Held et al., 1999: 249). Overall private investments in devel-
direct investment, international bonds and bank lending, oping countries have risen, while overall development assis-
international equities, and international development assis- tance has declined (Commission on Global Governance,
tance (Held et al., 1999: 190). These flows have grown 1995: 136). However, investment is concentrated in some
considerably since the Second World War and especially since developing countries, while others receive very little private
the 1970s. From the end of the war until 1971, the Bretton investment. For example, private investments jn Africa con-
Woods system regulated capital flows, because exchange rates stituted practically the same share of GDP in 1997 as they
were fixed to the dollar, which again was fixed to gold at $35 did in 1964 (World Bank, 2000a: 20). In other words, the
an ounce. The system excluded the communist countries, but, growth in FDI has completely bypassed that continent.
within the system, the US authorities indirectly controlled Growth in FDI is also an indicator of the third and final
international monetary supply (Held et al., 1999: 200). In the aspect of economic globalization, that of global production
1950s, the Soviets began to deposit their dollar holdings in by multinational companies (MNCs). The MNC is a com-
European banks rather than American banks, and the pany with activities in more than one country. It produces
European banks lent them out instead of converting them to and markets its goods in several countries, and it typically
national currency. This Eurodollar business put increasing has one component for its product made in one place and
strain on the dollar, and, in 1971, American president Nixon other components in other places, according to where the
suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold (ibid.; cheapest or most efficient production sites are. A multina-
Keohane and Nye, 2001: ch. 6). This marked a new era, not tional enterprise thus does not leave one country for another,
of trade wars and a lack of regulation, but a period in which but rather it extends its activities across its homeland border.7
new rules about flexible exchange rates were agreed upon. In The Ford Motor Company, for example, has evolved from a
a flexible exchange-rate system, currency values are deter- predominantly US company, with some overseas subsidiaries
mined on a day-to-day basis, which encourages speculation serving local markets, to an integrated operation around
in selling and buying financial assets. If enough speculators regional subsidiaries that in Europe serve the Single Market,
think a currency is going to devalue, the aggregated effect of producing a 'world car' through coordinated operations. In
speculators trying to sell may in fact cause a currency to the post-war period, MNCs have acquired global presence,
devalue. Thus, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 was and stocks and flows of FDI have grown faster than world
partly caused by speculative activity on the international income. Overseas affiliates' production has grown from 4.5
money market (Held et al., 1999: 209). per cent of world GDP to 7.5 per cent (Held, et al., 1999:
 70 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 71

242-6). The United Nations has a 'transnationality index' nfined to a few neighbouring countries. During the cold
I11VV* v— " - - «_J l_v ^,

C'" ••• • i i i 1_ i • _ -_i_

that is calculated from the average ratio of foreign assets to r the military system remained entirely global in the sense
total assets, foreign sales to total sales, and foreign employ, hat Soviet-US relations affected the whole state system.
ment to totals employment. The index is then calculated for direct hot confrontation between the two powers was
a number of large companies, and for example, Nestle, based ruled out because of nuclear weapons' destructive potential,
in Switzerland, has an index of 94 while Japanese Sony's is the conflict was fought by 'cold means' in various parts of
59.1. An increasing number of companies thus has a large the state system. The state system itself became globalized
multinational element. Most production is, however, concen- vvhen the overseas colonies in Africa and the Oceanic area
trated in the developed world and Asia. The European Union achieved independence. Superpower competition extended to
houses 54,862 foreign affiliates, while Africa has a meagre these states and affected their internal political organization.
134 (Held et al., 1999: 245). por example, the Western powers repeatedly, and throughout
In all, although interpretations of the economic changes the 1970s and 1980s, provided massive support to Mobutu
vary greatly, it is fair to conclude that we can talk about a Sese-Seko, Zaire's long-term dictator. The great power strug-
real process of economic globalization in the post-war period, gle was fought in regions like East Asia (particularly the
and in particular after 1989 when the communist bloc col- Vietnam War), the Middle East, Central America, and Africa.
lapsed and became included in the world economy. Global- Since the end of the cold war, new types of conflict have
ization is, however, extremely uneven, and tends to involve emerged. The early years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in
marginalization of some parts of the world. The income gap 1989 were characterized by great optimism, with the hope
between rich and poor countries has increased with the that a brighter, more peaceful future lay ahead. The United
process of globalization. We shall turn to the political impli- States' campaign against Iraq to liberate Kuwait in 1991 was
cations on pages 78-98, but first look at other dimensions of often seen as a successful attempt to police the world and
globalization - the military and the sociocultural dimensions. prevent states from embarking on military aggression
towards other states. However, after a few years, it became
clear that state collapse, civil war and local conflicts in the
Military globalization Second and Third Worlds were part of the post-cold war geo-
political landscape. The tragedy in former Yugoslavia was but
There is in a sense no Third World in respect of weaponry; one example. Thus, in the years after the cold war, a picture
only a First World, since most countries maintain stocks of of a bifurcated world began to emerge. On the one hand, in
technologically advanced armaments and have modernized the North, a group of strong, rich states live peacefully
the military in a thoroughgoing way (Giddens, 1990: 75). together. These states are largely democratic in a liberal sense,
With the spread of modern weaponry, all citizens of the globe and war among them has become almost unimaginable. The
are potentially threatened, either by war which, with nuclear Northern military alliance, NATO, has not been dissolved
weapons, has enormous destructive potential, by oppressive with the disappearance of the Soviet enemy, but seems, in
states, or by international terrorism. The globalization of spite of occasional conflicts of interest, to be adapting to the
military power thus has to do with the spread of the war changes and has invited several post-communist countries to
system and the spread of weaponry and arms technology become members.
throughout the globe (Giddens, 1990; Held et al., 1999). On the other hand, a large group of states in the South are
The twentieth century saw two world wars that were of a poor and weak. They have very few administrative powers
global scale in that they involved all regions of the world, and many of them are not able to deliver basic political
with unprecedented destructive and tragic consequences. goods, such as peace and stability, for their citizens. In fact,
Before that, conflicts had had a more limited character, being some of these states constitute a security threat to their own
 72 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 73

citizens as they repeatedly violate basic human ment j^^ access to oil while the rebel movement had
(Zartman, 1995). In between these extremes, there j P - to diamonds (Hodges, 2001; Global . .Witness,
. 1998).
various regional security complexes (Buzan, 1991). pQ I all, military globalization involves global arms trading,
example, the Indian-Pakistani conflict continues even • on al and local conflicts, particularly in weak states, and
without superpower reinforcement, and China has territorial r impa ct on the security of all populations that renders
claims on Taiwan, which it refuses to recognize as a sover- Global governance urgent in the security area, a matter which
eign state (S0rensen, G., 2001). The military order, then 2 be discussed on pages 81-98 in the section on global
looks a lot less organized than during the cold war. However governance.
&
this does not mean that the world military order has become
any less global. As we shall see below on this page, the end
of the cold war has opened up opportunities for new arms Environmental globalization
trade links, while the increased incidence of terrorist attacks
has raised awareness that we all exist in a zone of risk, and Ever since the 'Earth Summit' (UN Conference on Environ-
in that sense we all live in one world. With the terrorist ment and Development) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, global
attacks on the World Trade Center, the symbol of Western environmental problems have regularly been at the top of the
capitalism in the heart of Manhattan, on 11 September 2001, international agenda. But how global is environmental degra-
the world entered an era in which the physical security of dation? Many problems of pollution are concentrated locally
populations reappeared on top of the political agenda. As the and only affect a confined area (Held, et al., 1999: 376). Yet
one superpower in the world, the United States reacted by most observers agree that some environmental problems are
waging a war against one of the weakest and poorest states of a global nature and therefore call for global solutions
in the world, Afghanistan, where the al-Qaeda terrorist (Roodman, 1999). Environmental degradation means the
network had a strong base. transformation of entire ecosystems, with consequences that
The global military order today is thus fragmented, but it have an adverse impact on the economic or demographic con-
is still global. Rich countries cannot afford to ignore the exis- ditions of life and health for human beings (Held, et al., 1999:
tence of weak and poor states, because conflict and poverty 377). Many see the entire planet as one single ecosystem, in
in these regions affect the wealthier nations, not only as which actions in some places affect the lives of people across
breeding grounds for terrorism, but also as a source of the globe. A prominent example is the phenomenon of global
political or economic refugees who often seek asylum in warming. Global climate change has been identified as one
the North. The military order is also global because of inter- of the greatest threats to our planet, because a global heating
national arms trade. While global exports of conventional can cause melting of the ice caps, rising sea levels, flooding
weapons have declined since 1983, the numbers of countries of low-lying lands and the spread of diseases such as malaria.
supplying arms, particularly to the developing world, has Global warming is caused by the emission of greenhouse
more than doubled since 1960 (Held, et al., 1999: 112-13). gases, most particularly CO2. These gases create a heat trap,
Following the end of the cold war, the post-communist coun- preventing the heat from leaving our system. Global carbon
tries are to a large extent supplying arms to the Third World. emissions have risen considerably since the 1950s, and this
Uganda's President Museveni, for example, travelled to has set in motion a so-called greenhouse effect, i.e. a man-
White Russia to buy arms. Less officially, extensive trading made global warming. The average global temperature has
takes place with resources available to Third World countries, risen by approximately 0.3 degrees since 1975. The global
such as diamonds, coltan and oil, paying for arms, weapons, temperature in 1998 was projected to be both the highest ever
helicopters and other war equipment. Angola's long-time civil and to represent the largest annual increase ever recorded
war was kept alive for decades, partly because the Angolan (Brown and Flavin, 1999: 14). Carbon emission derives
 74 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 75
mainly from the combustion of fossil fuels, such as coal and iver nmental organizations, social movements and advocacy
oil, and the developed countries are responsible for most Of ^ etvVO rks can be seen as a part of sociocultural globalization,
the increase in CO2 (World Bank, 2003). [though they are also political.
Thus, the development and energy consumption of the rich Mation-states and national cultures have been the locus of
countries has affected the lives of many citizens in the South ftiost cultural power in the modern era, but contemporary
for example, by causing floods in Bangladesh. And in the transformations challenge national cultures, national identi-
South, the hunt for mahogany trees has caused much destruc- t;es and their institutions (David Held et al., 1999: 328-75).
tion of rainforests in the Amazons. Deforestation also affects These transformations include technological innovations,
the global climate. In this way, populations in one area of the new progress in telecommunications, IT technology, and
globe are affected by the behaviour of individuals in other international media corporations such as, for example, the
areas of the globe, which has given rise to expressions such CNN. Cable and satellite voice paths over the Atlantic and
as the global commons and global public goods. If a healthy the Pacific made communication cheaper and faster than with
environment is a global public good, in the sense that nobody the old telex and telegraph networks. Global MNCs and
can be excluded from enjoying it, the provision of such a sociocultural markets are bigger than ever, particularly in
good requires global coordination. Even sceptical environ- news broadcasting, music and cinema, and they are primar-
mentalists agree that although the extent to which we should ily based in the Western world. During the 1990s, the Inter-
spend money on combating global warming can be debated, net gained prominence and provided new ways through
it should be debated in a global forum (Lomborg, 2001: 324). which a global consciousness, a conception of the world as a
In sum, although the degree to which our planet is seri- single place, could be developed (Olesen, 2002b). The global
ously threatened by environmental degradation is continu- infrastructures of culture and communication have con-
ously debated, no one seems to argue against the need for tributed to increasingly dense transnational elite and
global environmental governance. professional cultures. For example the academic elite in one
country may have more interaction or more in common with
elites in other countries than with citizens of their own
Sodocultural globalization nationality. The global communications infrastructure has
also increased the openness of information. For example,
The term 'sociocultural globalization' gives rise to associa- communist regimes could not prevent their citizens from
tions with such cultural icons as Coca-Cola, McDonalds, watching Western satellite TV, which made them conscious
Hollywood and Madonna. And it is true that cultural glob- of a potential alternative lifestyle and may have helped set in
alization has a lot to do with the spread of Western norms, motion the large flows of people towards the West when
ideas and values, for example secularism, human rights, Hungary opened its borders to Austria in the late 1980s.
democracy or personal liberty. Some of these ideas naturally Although it is doubtful whether increased communication in
impinge on political matters, and therefore also belong to our itself can make a difference, it may increase the pace of social
discussion on pages 78-98 of the political implications of change.
globalization. Some aspects of cultural globalization, such as j] However, it is far from clear that globalization reduces the
the spread of world music, probably do not have as clear rel- strength of traditional identities. Rather, globalization may
evance to global governance as do environmental or eco- function through local and national spheres, and may even
nomic issues. Nonetheless, to the extent that sociocultural strengthen them by providing social actors with new arenas
globalization affects identities and gives rise to new cleavages of contest and sources of support (Olesen, 2002b). National
or conflicts in the world, it does have implications for gov- NGOs may, for example, bypass their state and ally with
ernance. Also, the increasing numbers of international non- J other states in order to exert greater pressure on their own
 Governance in International Relations 77
76 Go\/ernance in International Relations
stand globalization too narrowly when they equate it to a
state, a phenomenon Keck and Sikkink (1998: 12-13) have
^lobal neo-liberalist conquest. In reality these social move-
termed the Boomerang pattern. This has often been the case
inents are themselves part of what globalization is about: the
in human rights campaigns, but also indigenous peoples and
extension of social relations across the globe. They represent
environmental campaigns have followed a Boomerang A globalization 'from below', so to speak, and are only anti-
pattern. In cases like the Indian government's damming of the
jrlobalists in the sense that they protest against capitalism's
Narmada River, international contacts significantly strength-
jehumanizing effects and argue for a more democratic world,
ened local organizations' demands (see chapter 7 on the
for more political steering of the market forces, and there-
World Bank). Social movements and international non-gov-
fore, as we shall see in the section on global governance
ernmental organizations thus increasingly use links to the rest
(pages 78-98), for better governance (Falk, 1999: 127-37;
of the world in order to achieve their goals. For example, the
Olesen, 2002a). Resistance to globalization can take differ-
Chiapas peasants' rebellion in Mexico started as a locally
ent forms. The most violent and destructive is international
confined protest, but grew into a transnational network of
terrorism, which showed its devastating consequences on 11
Zapatismo by using modern methods of communication and
September 2001 when the twin towers of the World Trade
formulating its goals in a language corresponding to a global
Center were hit by passenger airplanes hijacked by suicide
anti-liberalist discourse used by people who demonstrated
pilots. The attack was carried out by members of the al-
against the large multi-lateral economic organizations such as
Qaeda network, a transnational terror network that uses
the WTO (Olesen, 2002b). modern telecommunications to maintain links with other fun-
Resistance to globalization, i.e. the spread of neo-
damentalist networks, such as Islamic jihad. Islamic terror-
liberalism, is itself a part of globalization. Most movements
ism has many causes, but most of them can be found in
are peaceful and rely on pressuring big organizations and
processes of globalization (S0rensen, 2002): economic mar-
governments. Others are violent. The perception of global-
ginalization and inequality, the existence of weak states with
ization as a Western affair, spreading a Western secular
no ability to control their domestic domains, the seculariza-
culture in which everything is allowed - including free pro-
tion process of some Arab countries, like Saudi-Arabia, and
duction and marketing of pornography - is offensive to many.
maybe even the sociocultural clash between Western and
In particular, some Islamic groups have reacted strongly
against Westernization. In Nigeria, in 2002, there were local Islamic civilizations (Huntington, 1997).
Sociocultural globalization is about the global spread of
Islamic protests and street riots against a Miss World contest
Western culture, but this does not necessarily mean that a
where hundreds were killed, and the contest was eventually
single world culture will emerge or that other cultures will
moved to London. Western groups also react to events that
not affect Western culture. Sociocultural globalization does
take place in other cultures. For instance, in 2002, when a
not necessarily erase local or national identities, but may even
Nigerian woman, Amina Lawal, was sentenced to death
strengthen them. Nor does sociocultural globalization neces-
through stoning by a Sharia court of law, a widespread cam-
sarily mean secularization, as it may even strengthen some
paign through e-mail was set in motion, collecting thousands
religious identities. Finally, sociocultural globalization can
of signatures in a very short time. lead to more harmony between nations that identify more
Is globalization the same as Westernization? The under-
easily with one another, but it can also generate clashes
standing of globalization as the spread of neo-liberalism is
between cultures. To the extent that sociocultural globaliza-
widespread among anti-globalist social movements such as
tion has political implications, it is of concern to proponents
ATTAC, and the people who took to the streets in Seattle to
demonstrate against the WTO meeting in 1999, causing what of global governance.
has come to be known as 'the battle in Seattle'. These move-
ments express an anti-globalization attitude, but they under-
 78 Governance in International Relations
Governance in International Relations 79
Globalization and the need for
3.2 Views on the role of the state in an era of
governance: summing up globalization
Economics Politics most
'Globaloneys' think globalization processes are profound and most important important
truly transform the world into a global village. Sceptics think
Comparative Neo-liberal The regulatory
the changes do not lead to a qualitatively different world. In
national economists (Milton state (Linda Weiss,
the globalization version given here, a balanced account is development Friedman,
attempted, placing it among the 'transformationalists'. It is Peter Evans)
international
indeed possible to talk of an accelerated economic, social financial institutions) !

sociocultural and environmental interdependence, and it is

International Strong liberalism Neo-realism
fair to call this process globalization, although it is highly
relations (James Rosenau, (Kenneth Waltz,
uneven and entails marginalization of some regions. How-
Richard Falk) Stephen Krasner)
ever, even people in marginalized areas are a part of global-
ization when they become aware of the lifestyles of the rich
countries through CNN and Western TV shows, and this may
cause increased migration.
exchange rates and interest rates are determined within the
Whether a 'globalonist', a 'sceptic' or a 'transformational- context of global financial markets, and that states have no
ist' viewpoint is held, all agree that global changes have power to set the rates themselves. All states have to conform
occurred. We will now turn to the political implications of to the global financial markets, whether they want to or not.
these processes: globalization has been described as a 'jug- On the other hand, Linda Weiss (1998: 184) counter-argues
gernaut', a powerful runaway wagon that nobody can control that financial integration may not continue unabated, and
unless collective action is taken. 'The juggernaut crushes those that it is not certain that uniformly passive or undifferenti-
who resist it, and while it sometimes seems to have a steady ated national responses will prevail. Thus, there are differing
path, there are times when it veers away erratically in views with regard to the continued importance of the state.
directions we cannot foresee' (Giddens, 1990: 139). But The differing views on globalization's impact on the power
are we really powerless in the face of an all-encompassing of the state can be found in two debates. One is the com-
globalization? Differing views exist. There are two aspects of parative national development debate, which is mainly
the political implications of globalization, which we will between political scientists, who argue for the importance of
discuss in turn. The first concerns the implications for the role the state in economic development (Weiss and Hobson, 1995;
of the state, the second the implications for global governance. Weiss, 1998; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1996), and economists,
who argue for neo-liberal economic policies. Another is the
debate in international relations as to whether national inter-
Is the state's role in global ests still matter most when important stakes are at play, or
governance declining? whether increased globalization and integration can prevent
national interests from dominating international relations
Has the policy-making autonomy of nation-states declined? (Rosenau, 1995; Keohane and Nye, 2000; Waltz, 1999). Both
Do states no longer have the authority they used to have? debates, however, are basically about differing views of the
David Held et al. (1999: 189) argue that the worldwide importance of economics or politics, as shown in table 3.2.
trading of currencies and government bonds means that Neo-liberal economists argue that states should provide
enabling frameworks for the free market. With no state inter-
 80 Governance in International Relations
Governance in International Relations 81
vention, global trade will lead to economic growth and secure 1 i -.-jl interaction between post-communist countries and the
welfare for all. On the other hand, political scientists argu e Western world, but it also saw a number of weak states col-
that national economies have often done well hecjuse o/'state ' • pSL% such as Somalia, or Yugoslavia.
interventions to protect infant industries or guide local in- , In sum, has the role of states declined? Not necessarily. The
dustries in new directions. Thus, states are important when ' otential for collective action by states may have increased
meeting the challenges of globalization, and, in a competitive with globalization. States can organize within multi-lateral
system, state capacity matters more, not less (Weiss, 1998). organizations such as the EU, they can regulate international
Liberalists in international relations argue that econo- 1 trade through the WTO, and they can intervene in crisis
mic globalization may weaken the power of states. James ' situations through the United Nations Security Council.
Rosenau (1995: 18), for example, observes that shifts in the
Multi-lateral arrangements can provide mechanisms that
'location of authority and the site of control systems' have
protect individual countries from some of the threats of glob-
taken place and 'in some cases the shifts have transferred alization. For example, the European Monetary Union is a
authority away from the political realm and into the eco- i
macroeconomic mechanism that will offer an effective shield
nomic and social realms' (see also Mathews, 1997). Contrast for its member states from international speculation against
his words with those of Kenneth Waltz (1999: 699), whose
the individual country's currency rate (Pierre and Peters,
baseline is that 'politics prevails over economies'. Waltz
2000: 102). Also, many transnational networks are in fact
argues that economic globalization did not happen by itself;
transgovernmental, consisting of contacts between national
rather, it was the policies of nation-states that set in motion
courts and banks, etc., all over the world. States are, in this
the processes of economic globalization through deregulation sense, not disappearing but their relations to the world have
and agreements of international trade rules. But not only
become more complex (Slaughter, 1997).
were states important in setting globalization in motion; they International politics is not necessarily a zero-sum game in
remain important because they exist in a competitive system
which more global governance means less national gover-
in which they try to survive - they compete, adapt, protect
nance and vice-versa. Because of the different ways in which
themselves and imitate states that have been successful.
states manage external challenges, global and national are not
'States perform essential political social-economic functions necessarily competing principles of organization, but may be
and no other organization appears as a possible competitor
to them' (ibid.: 697). complementary as well (Weiss, 1999b). We will now turn
to the political implications of globalization at the global
Thus, if politics are viewed as more important than eco-
level.
nomics, the position is that states remain dominant actors,
and if economics are seen to prevail over politics, the posi-
tion is that states are in decline. In between these positions
are 'transformationalists' (Held et al., 1999; Serensen, G., What is the character of global governance?
2001), who believe that rather than to talk of state decline,
it is more appropriate to talk about state transformations. In
some areas, such as monetary policy, states may be losing Globalism is here to stay. How it will be governed is the
question. (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 38)
authority, but they still have authority in other areas, such as
social or military expenditure. They are so far the only orga-
nizations that can uphold the rule of law within a given ter-
There are many different views regarding the political impli-
ritory (Hirst and Thompson, 1995). Moreover, international
cations of globalization, and therefore about what global
forces shape different kinds of state differently. The end of
governance is or could be about. At least three perceptions
the cold war may have signified greater economic and po- of governance can thus be identified in IR: a narrow percep-
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Table 3.3 Views on global governance
Neo-realism Pluralism Liberalism/solidarism Global
democracy
Proponents Mearsheimer, Bull, Rosenau, Annan, Held, Archibugi,
Krasner, Waltz Jackson Commission on Global Falk
Governance, Wheeler.
Evaluation of There is no global International law International regimes are The existence of
existing global governance; the upholds the an important part of global civil society
governance international principles of global governance; and a global
system is anarchic sovereignty and governance at the citizenry call for
in spite of non-intervention sub-national, national more democratic
increasing and supra-national levels global governance
globalization dampens the effects of
omestic industri anarchy
human rights o Vision of Achieving a A legal Global governance in Cosmopolitan
more effective global stable balance of framework based many areas, not only the democracy
tes refused to ra governance power through on pluralist military, is required; involves a global
ational Criminal alliances is the norms; a world a legal framework based constitution and
cates free trade > only realistic of dialogue on solidarist norms and the recasting of
lfare worldwide characteristic of between separate ' with inbuilt enforcement territorial
global governance but recognized mechanisms; solidarist boundaries
political others norms place individual
rights as high as
sovereignty rights
 84 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 85
governance. Global governance in this framework is the However, according to this view, there is a limit to how
equivalent of some sort of world government built by states (. , global governance can extend beyond agreeing on an
and, since what ultimately counts is the national interest, jt ternational norm of sovereignty. If the sovereignty norm
is neither realistic nor desirable. ^re to be sacrificed in favour of human rights, international
r der would no longer prevail. Favouring human rights
Pluralists (the English School of international relations), on vould imply breaking the rule of non-intervention, which
the contrary, argue that states may indeed be bound by rules. would disturb international order. The Commission on
The international norm of sovereignty and the principle of Global Governance concludes that individuals' human rights
non-intervention are effective with regard to securing inter- should stand above the sovereign rights of states. It believes
national peace and order (Jackson, 2000). These rules chal- the Charter of the United Nations should be changed ac-
lenge the assumption of international anarchy and emphasize cordingly (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 132).
that power balancing need not be the only source of inter- Jackson (2000: 389), however, criticizes the Commission's
national order. On the contrary, there has been an interna- conclusions on the grounds that abandonment of the
tional society of states acting in accordance with mutually sovereignty norm would imply a threat to international
accepted norms and rules ever since the European West- order:
phalian Peace in 1648 (Jackson, 2000: 11). These rules 'have
waxed and waned. They have been attacked and defended, The globalization thesis is a useful sociological account of
violated and upheld. But even though they have on several important international changes that obviously are occurring
occasions been trampled upon, they have always been widely at the present time. The problem is the mistaken po-
restored afterwards' (ibid.). Although the UN Security litical inference drawn from those changes by the commission,
Council was unable to reach an agreement on a Resolution which has erroneously concluded that the socio-economic
to invade Iraq in 2003, this is not a reason for the Security changes captured by the globalization thesis necessitate
Council to cease to exist. In the post-Second World War corresponding changes of a normative kind to alter state
period, these rules, embodied in what Robert Jackson (2000: sovereignty.
13) terms 'the global covenant', extended beyond the Western
world, when decolonization gave rise to a world system To uphold a norm of human security would, according
of sovereign states. The global covenant is, according to to Jackson (ibid.: 214), imply enforcement, and this is
Jackson, the first attempt in world history to construct a unrealistic since no great power would be prepared to
society of states that operates within a doctrine of recogni- sacrifice its own citizens to save citizens of other, far-away
tion and non-intervention, bridging different cultures around countries.
the world. In that sense, global governance is very much In sum, neo-realism and pluralism have in common the
present, and it has been around for a while. view that states remain the most important actors in the inter-
The global covenant provides a normative guarantee of national system and that global governance is no more than
political independence but it does not guarantee that inter- what governments can agree upon; what distinguishes them
national freedom will be used wisely or effectively (ibid.: is the extent to which they consider states to be bound by
410). The global covenant gives peoples the opportunity to rules. Neo-realists reject the idea that states can be bound by
build a 'good state', but it is entirely in the hands of peoples global governance, whereas pluralists believe that the plural-
whether they do so or not. The global covenant does not steer ist norms of sovereignty and non-intervention are in place
the forces of economic, social and environmental globali- and, although they constitute a system of global governance
zation and nor should it, but it does provide a guarantee that may be far from efficient, it nonetheless works most of
that peoples can pursue their happiness without external the time. According to pluralists, this system is the best we
interference. get.
 86 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 87
, -essitates international cooperation. For instance, in the
Liberalism/solidarism: The extent of existing vironrnental area, negotiation and decision-making proce-
global governance e> res ro address global environmental problems have taken
Liberalists generally believe there are plenty of global I-ice. One example is the UN Framework Convention for
governance processes under way, which go beyond the rlimate Change, signed in Rio in 1992, in order to stabilize
exchanges between governments (Keohane, 2001; Kore- >en house gas concentrations in the atmosphere. A first

menos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001). The independent Commis- te p to reduce emissions was taken with the signing of the

sion on Global Governance is of the view that nearly all Kvoto Protocol in 1997. An often told success story with
transnational activities concern global governance. 'Global retard to global environmental governance is the reduction
governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental ( ,t chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that are known to break
relationships, but it must now be understood as also involv- Jo\vn ozone molecules. The ozone layer in the upper atmos-
ing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Citizens' move- phere protects living creatures from the sun's harmful ultra-
ments, multinational corporations, and the global capital violet rays. In the 1980s, a hole in the ozone layer above the
market' (Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 2). The Antarctic was discovered, which was connected to the emis-
Commission seems to be of the opinion that the activities of sion of CFCs. A series of international agreements, starting
economic actors (i.e. multinational corporations) are a part with the Montreal Protocol, then succeeded in reducing the
of governance, but this is not the view taken here. Economic production of CFC gases; it is assumed that the ozone layer
activities are part of globalism and form part of the need for will now regenerate slowly over the next fifty years. It is
governance. doubtful, however, if CFCs can be taken as a. representative
The general use of global governance in the paradigm of case in order to offer general statements about the feasibility
liberalism refers to political not economic activities. The of global environmental regulation, because implementing
definition used by the Centre for the Study of Global the ban on CFCs was relatively cheap and it was easy to find
Governance is illustrative of the way liberalist IR scholars substitutes.
understand governance: not as government but as a minimum The WTO (former GATT) is another example of an impor-
framework of rules necessary to tackle global problems, guar- tant international regime. Its purpose is to establish interna-
anteed by a set of institutions including both international tional trade rules in order to lower trade barriers and thereby
organizations and national governments.8 Global governance secure free trade. It promotes norms such as reciprocity, i.e.
is about the setting, application and enforcement of rules for that a country enjoying another country's lowering of tariffs
global politics. should reciprocate; liberalism, i.e. the reduction of barriers;
Global governance in the liberalist view refers to more or economic development (Finlayson and Zacher, 1983, see
than just the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention; it >>lso [Link]). The extent to which WTO really does
covers political activities on sub-national, national and promote development has been debated, and the organiza-
supra-national levels. Governance has grown since the tion has been criticized, for example, for not allowing the
Second World War, but became global in scope after the end least developed countries to follow the same protectionist
of the cold war. strategies as the developed countries have done. In addition,
The growth in the number of international regimes is an there are frequent complaints about countries breaking WTO
important part of global governance. International regimes rules, for example, by dumping the prices of goods produced
can be defined as principles, norms, rules and decision- in developing countries. No matter how imperfect, however,
making procedures, around which actor expectations con- the WTO has set up a number of trade rules, negotiated with
verge in a given issue-area (Krasner, 1982). International its 146 members, and therefore qualifies as an international
regimes arise because states recognize that globalization regime.
88 Governance in International Relations
The definition of an international regime does not specify ^
whether regimes are always intergovernmental. However
" Governance in International Relations 89
.... definition of global governance in relation to the
-ept of international regime is not quite clear, and the
IR literature often seems to refer to regimes as being abo C are sometimes used interchangeably. Like governance,
governance carried out by governments (Krasner, l9g-3. •mes include governmental as well as non-governmental
Rosenau, 2000). However, liberalists in IR stress that inter' ". ,rs formal as well as informal rules. However, regimes or
national norms and practices of global public policy can also j- are confined to one cause or issue, such as cam-
be affected by non-governmental actors. A good example a igning for human rights, or regulating trade, while gover-
is the international campaign against landmines, which has nce also covers the cross-cutting of these issues, with the
been a successful case of global agenda setting. In the early teering of the totality of networks and regimes (Rosenau,
1990s, there was consensus among states that landmines were 1992).
legal. But, in a number of countries, citizens could hardly g0 Some liberalists, such as James Rosenau (2000), reject the
for a walk or farmers tend to their fields without fear of tendency of the regime literature to assume that authority is
stepping on a landmine. The international campaign to ban state-based. In much theorizing about regimes, the actors that
landmines in 1992 united a host of NGOs with a common bring about a change in rules and norms are implicitly or
interest in banning them. Within a few years, the campaign explicitly assumed to be governments. However, as illustrated
succeeded in changing the norms surrounding landmine use. by the examples above, other actors are also involved in gov-
Through extensive publicity campaigns, the use of landmines ernance processes. The tendency to equate governance with
became a humanitarian issue and, in 1997, 122 countries government in international relations theory should be aban-
signed the Ottawa Treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines. 9 doned. In light of the increasingly complex and multi-layered
In this instance, NGOs effectively contributed to a change in nature of transnational relations, the term 'international'
governments' perceptions about landmines. itself should be rejected in favour of terms that capture the
International environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, nature of change, such as global politics or politics on a
have fought successfully to raise awareness about environ- global scale (Rosenau, 2000: 171). In addition, processes of
mental issues. Human Rights Watch, or Transparency Inter- globalization and governance should lead international
national, are other examples of NGOs that have contributed relations scholars to focus less on internecine warfare, and
to a change in public and media awareness in the areas of instead turn their attention towards ways of governing
human rights and corruption. Transparency International has complex relations and effectively addressing pressing
successfully set corruption on the global agenda (Rosenau problems such as drug-trafficking, pollution, corruption or
and Wang, 2001). Human rights organizations, such as terrorism. When addressing such issues, reliance upon
Amnesty International, have regularly succeeded in pressur- top-down, hierarchic solutions are not likely to help; rather,
izing governments to release political prisoners or to place inclusion of transnational NGOs, in networks comprising a
important human rights issues, such as the death penalty, on multiplicity of actors who rely on dialogue, is a wiser strat-
the agenda. Some networks are loose and flexible at the egy. The emergence of a global civil society, involved in global
beginning, but gradually acquire a more institutionalized politics and pressurizing for a global agenda, is a change that
form. Some governance forms resemble corporatism at a should be taken seriously and incorporated into our view of
global level because they include representatives of govern- international relations.
ments (for example, the World Bank), business and global
civil society. An example would be the World Commission on Liberalism/solidarism: visions of global governance
Dams, an independent Commission set up to discuss envi-
ronmental consequences of large irrigation projects, with par- The liberalist paradigm in international relations theory is not
ticipation by all three types of actors (Ottaway, 2001). j Particularly concerned with setting up visions of global
90 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 91
governance. Liberalists' main concern is to analyse how int e mething broader than government. However, this is not a
national institutions function and how they may he designed ' ( ,ndamental disagreement. It is rather a matter of different
They analyse the impact of international institutions in t h ' c i Solidarists are concerned with human security and there-
social and economic realms, such as trade regimes or human ire focus on the enforcement of international law. Such
rights organizations. nforcement occurs through the action of states. Liberalists
Solidarists look more to the military than to the social re more concerned with how globalization is governed in
or economic realms.10 They argue that cases of global go- \\\, and they therefore adopt a broader analysis of
vernance already exist, where humanitarian intervention has governance.
promoted human security rather than guarded the sovereign The critique of solidarists and liberalists has come from
rights of states. For instance, although the intervention in n vo camps. The neo-realist critique of solidarism that it
Kosovo can be interpreted as a failure of the UN to provide would not be in the national interest of a state to delegate
a basis for global governance, the intervention nonetheless power to supranational organs, such as the security council,
took place with reference to the minimum standards of does not favour a decision to abandon the veto-right. In addi-
humanity as contained in international law, for instance, the tion, prioritizing human rights over sovereignty rights would
UN Charter, the 1948 Genocide Convention and the Geneva put international order at risk. The neo-realist critique of
Conventions. There are principles in international law on liberalism would emphasize that international regimes are
which humanitarian intervention can be based (Knudsen, dependent upon a hegemon, a strong power, and therefore
2001). Solidarism builds on the assumption of solidarity of they are not indicators of global governance J)ut rather in-
states when it comes to law enforcement. struments of one power to promote its national interests.
Contrary to pluralists, who believe that enforcement of Although neo-realists recognize that transnational activities
international law in favour of human security is not realistic, occur, they attribute importance to them only to the extent
solidarists believe that it is both realistic and desirable to set that they affect state behaviour, not as processes that
up a system in which the international community has an could potentially affect norms and rules outside the reach of
obligation to support any state or group of individuals whose states.
rights have been violated (ibid.; see also Wheeler and Dunne, Another critique has come from the neo-Marxist, or the
1996). Thus, solidarists often argue for a reform of the United 'structuralist' camp (Strange, 1983, 1996). This critique finds
Nations, especially the abandonment of the veto-right in the that the liberal approach to global governance neglects power
Security Council. Removal of the veto-right will make deci- differences among actors. The liberal approach sees mostly
sions about humanitarian intervention easier. In addition, harmonious relations and benefits from free trade rather than
many argue that the membership of the council should be conflict. It sees mutual dependence rather than skewed eco-
expanded and made geographically equitable, to avoid the nomic dependence relations. It finds that the focus is still
tendency for intervention to occur only when it is in the inter- overwhelmingly on state authority and regrets the lack of
est of the Western powers (Ayoob, 2001). attention to economic forces and non-state sources of author-
In sum, liberalists are concerned with the rise of institu- ity. Thus, rather than a system of global governance, we have
tions of global governance regarding a plurality of issues, a 'ramshackle assembly of conflicting sources of authority'
while solidarists are more concerned with the enforcement of (Strange, 1996). Alternative sources of authority could be the
international law, and with military interventions. They have firm or a social movement. Firms and big corporations have
different conceptions of what global governance is about. a large say, and sometimes a larger say than states, in who
Solidarists focus on global governance as the collective action gets what in the international economy.
of states. They make no mention of non-state actors, unlike Thus, when neo-realists and pluralists maintain a focus on
liberalists, who clearly consider governance as referring to l)rder, strong liberalists such as James Rosenau focus more
 92 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 93

on efficiency and how to steer in a situation of increased -mally impede global democracy. This is because global
complexity and disaggregated authority, while the 'stru c | u tions should be implemented without the obstruction of
turalist' approach represented by Susan Strange brings to the ' rl tes claiming the right of non-intervention.
fore issues such as justice and legitimacy. Global democracy is not about abolishing nation-states
The final model to be considered takes up the question of nd removing the sovereignty right (Archibugi, 1998; Held,
democratic legitimacy and focuses as much on the input as '1998). Rather, it is about democratization at three political
on the output side of global policy-making. It discusses the levels: democracy inside states, democracy between states,
normative but relevant question of how democratic account- uid global democracy. 'Democracy inside states' builds on
ability is strengthened within the structure of the politics r|ie premise that the state exists at the consent of its citizens,
taking place at the global scale. and that the state should be the caretaker of individual
human rights (Archibugi, 1998; see also O'Byrne, 2003). It
is difficult to imagine a democratic international system con-
Democratic global governance sisting of only autocratic states. 'Democracy among states'
requires respect for reciprocal sovereignty, but also strength-
ened inter-state cooperation. Finally, the concern of 'global
Globalization presents modern democratic theory with a
democracy' is to address global problems and find a way
daunting task: how to reconcile the principle of rule by the
people with a world in which power is exercised increasingly
in which all citizens can be represented in global affairs
on a transnational, or even global scale. (McGrew, 1997: 231) (Archibugi, 1998: 211). David Held and Daniele Archibugi
use the term 'cosmopolitan democracy' to create a vision for
a democratic world order.
Democracy means rule by the people. However, the increase In a cosmopolitan democracy, cosmopolitan institutions
of global policy problems raises concerns about how to define would coexist with a system of states but would override
'the people'. According to Robert Dahl (1989), 'the demos' states in certain clearly defined spheres of activity (Archibugi,
should be all those who are affected by a decision. The 1998: 216). Sovereignty would in some cases be subordinate
point is that the nature of some decisions means that the to international law. The individual is a global citizen who
demos cannot be confined to a certain nation or a few spe- has rights and duties, not only in relation to a state but in
cific nations. To combat terrorism, to control greenhouse relation to a global institution. The cosmopolitan system
gases, or to combat diseases such as AIDS and malaria, envisages not only the existence of universal human rights
involves political decisions that affect people of many protected by states, but also the creation of a mandatory core
nations. When the American government decides to defect of rights which individuals may claim, as well as duties vis-
from the Kyoto agreement, for example, gas emissions may a-vis global institutions' (Archibugi, 1998: 217).
not be reduced enough to avoid floods in Bangladesh. When The most important institutional features of a cosmo-
the demos include all citizens around the world, in theory, politan democracy are listed below (Held, 1993, 1998;
they should all have an opportunity to influence a decision Archibugi, 1998; Falk, 1995):
affecting them.
Due to these concerns, it has been argued that democracy • A strengthened regional level, with a democratic European
should be rethought at the global level. Democratic global Union, but also strengthening and democratizing other
institutions are, according to this argument, a pre-condition regions in the world to give them independent adminis-
for democracy at the local or national levels (Held, 1993: 27). trative and political resources.
From a normative democratic point of view, rather than being • A strengthened global level with resources independent
a guarantee of international peace, the sovereignty norm may from the states and more administrative capacity.
94 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 95

• Civil society to be represented in an elected global par Ottavvay, 2001; Cox, 1996; Strange, 1996). One angle is to
liament with consultative powers. A first step could be the ,clls on the nature of the international political economy,
election of a UN second chamber. ^-holars adopting this viewpoint generally argue that the
• International court of justice and of human rights, and vorld economy is becoming ever more unequal, with an
a criminal court with compulsory jurisdiction and sanc- increasing gap between rich and poor. The locus of economic
tionary powers. power has moved away from states towards firms and big
• Growing shift of coercive capacity from nation-states to multi-lateral corporations (Cox, 1996; Strange, 1996). It
regional and global institutions, and the establishment of is difficult to know how to ameliorate this problem, but
a standing and accountable international military force. Robert Cox sees the rise of self-help organizations and the
• Reform of the UN security council to include more states strengthening of the international labour movement as
and removal of veto-power. potential counter strategies to the neo-liberal wave (Cox,
1996: 516-34). Also Gerald Helleiner (2001) sees the world
In sum, the vision of global democracy rests on the notion economy as severely under-governed. He views current gov-
that global institutions have to be built because some regional ernance arrangements as being dominated by the interests of
and global processes easily escape democratic control and are the industrial countries, and is concerned that sustainable
beyond the reach of national states. development and global poverty will be low on the global
These visions have been criticized as naive and idealistic, agenda. Although he is sceptical about reform, he nonethe-
and neo-realists as well as pluralists would argue that subor- less argues that current international economic institutions,
dinating sovereignty rights to human rights means sacrificing such as the G7, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO,
international order, which is a precondition for any democ- should become more representative, to reflect the interests of
ratization efforts to take place at all. Also, the problem of all nations rather than merely the rich.
representation at a global level is difficult to solve. The rule A slightly different angle is to focus more narrowly at
of one state, one vote is not democratic because small states specific international organizations, such as those just
with a few million inhabitants would have as large a say as mentioned, and examine their degree of accountability and
very populous states. However, to treat the world as a single the feasibility of increasing their reform. These institutions
global constituency with majority rule would mean that more cannot be characterized as generally illegitimate. They have
than 2 billion Indians and Chinese could usually get their way had some degree of success in securing efficient outputs. After
(Nye, 2001). Additionally, in a multi-centred and complex the Second World War, the IMF secured stability on interna-
world a global parliament may not be the answer to prob- tional financial markets, and the GATT was successful in
lems of accountability. Adding another political layer could setting up rules that served to avoid trade wars and a finan-
even increase the steering problems posed by globalization. cial crash like the one in 1929. Thus, output legitimacy prob-
Finally, constructing democratic institutions at the global ably is or has been quite high. However, regardless of their
level presupposes the existence of one global locus of popular success, these institutions have been characterized by a low
decision-making (Hirst, 2000: 16). Yet the very essence of degree of accountability. They have not been responsible
modern globalized society is that there is no one political to a particular body when taking a decision. Their input
community, but multiple centres and layers of authority. legitimacy is therefore probably quite low. The lack of
Hence, we might be better off exploring ways to increase accountability is partly a consequence of a lack of clear
the democratic accountability of existing institutions and net- knowledge about to whom or what these organizations
works. A growing literature does address this important issue should be accountable - for example, to member states,
but from somewhat different viewpoints (Masicotte, 1999; People directly affected by decisions, or a global civil society
Woods, 1999; Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Helleiner, 2001; (see chapter 7).
96 Governance in International Relations Governance in International Relations 97

The degree of accountability of these organizations diff er , international scene and that they are rational and unitary
In a sense, the WTO is more accountable than the World rors. This model was questioned by liberalists, who argued
Bank or the IMF because it is based on consensus and there ,c t interdependence challenged many of the core assump-
fore cannot implement decisions without the consent of a )11S of neo-realism. With the entry of globalization on the
its member states (Woods and Narlikar, 2001). The World r t >nda, 'strong' liberalists (and neo-Marxists) claim that the
Bank and the IMF are both primarily accountable to their icreased importance of multinational actors and transna-
shareholders, of which the largest is the United States. This tional networks weakens the authority of states. International
means that they tend to support pro-capitalist economic regimes govern transnational relations in a range of issue
strategies and policies. ir ciis from landmines to trade. Some IR scholars still see gov-
It can thus reasonably be argued that the poorer member ernments as the components of regimes, but others stress the
states of the World Bank and the IMF should have a larger multi-centred and multi-layered nature of the global political
say in policy decisions. Also, attention could be paid to the space, rejecting the centrality of nation-state as the sole locus
views of people who are affected by programmes of these of governance. While neo-realists equate global governance
institutions. For instance, World Bank support for big infra- with global government and therefore dismiss it as unrealis-
structural projects, such as dams, can be questioned on the tic, strong liberalists often describe global governance taking
grounds that they involve moving thousands of human beings place without government.
who live in the area. There is thus disagreement about the importance of - and
But focusing on the issue of listening to people affected by rhe amount of attention which should be given to - nation-
programmes also raises the question of exactly who is states. However, using the concept of global governance does
affected and who should represent such people. Lots of not necessarily imply neglecting the centrality of states, but
NGOs who fight for 'good' causes are not necessarily repre- rather questions the actors involved in setting, applying and
sentative of the groups of people they claim to represent. The enforcing the rules of the game. A concern with governance
third angle on accountability in global politics is thus the one does not presume a decline of the state, rather it leaves open
pointing to transnational NGOs. The fact that NGOs act for to empirical investigation the extent to which the authority
particular constituencies is good in the sense that they give of states increases or decreases.
voice to groups who often lack the resources to organize on Additionally, it seems important to distinguish between
their own. Yet, it is the second-best solution in that the NGOs sectors. In the security area, states still tend to act unilater-
act as a substitute for the imperfect way in which states rep- ally when they perceive a threat, and hence the neo-realist
resent their own peoples. Further, there is no knowledge approach rejecting global governance may have a case.
about which NGOs actually represent marginalized groups However, in other areas, such as the environmental or the
and which NGOs are financially motivated or represent pow- economic, governance is much more realistic and, no matter
erful groups. Thus, international NGOs should be subject to how faulty, it is already a feature of the modern world. The
the same standards of transparency that many of them globalization juggernaut has not run entirely loose, the direc-
demand from international institutions (Nye, 2001). tion it takes is affected by state and non-state actors alike.
The main issue for global governance theory has been
output-efficiency: how to make nation-states comply with
Conclusion: governance in international rules, and how to find better solutions to global
problems. However, an increasing number of scholars have
international relations been concerned with the input-side, on how to establish pro-
cedures of global democracy. Some have created visions of
The neo-realist model of international relations builds upon cosmopolitan democracy. While this is an important norma-
the assumption that states are the most important actors on tive discussion, the literature on cosmopolitan democracy
98 Governance in International Relations

tends to presume that a global political locus of decis'

making exists. However, the very nature of the modern wj
is one of multiple centres and fragmented authority. The
fore, a more realistic way to promote democracy in
twenty-first century may be to explore how the democrat
accountability of existing international institutions can
increased. European Governance:
Between International
Relations and Public Policy

What will happen to the nation-state in the emerging Euro-

pean Community? 'There will be a continued drift toward
supra-nationality,' answered Ernst B. Haas in the 1960s
(Haas, 1964: 492). 'No,' sounded the reply from others, 'the
nation state is far from obsolete, it is preserved as the basic
unit in Europe' (Hoffman, 1966: 862, 910).
The two answers are representative of a long-standing
debate on European integration between, on the one hand,
neo-functionalism, which maintains that integration is a
process that naturally follows increasing interdependence and
will eventually result in a new political community that
obscures current state boundaries, and, on the other hand,
intergovernmentalism, arguing that European integration can
best be seen as a successful intergovernmental regime, in
which national leaders only give away as much sovereignty
as they consider to be in their interest. The debate is parallel
to the general debate in IR theory between liberalism and
realism; it has the same opposing views about the fate of the
nation-state.
The governance approach to studying the European Union
represents a move away from the IR debate. Scholars focus-
ing on multi-level governance in Europe consider this debate
to be stuck in opposing trenches, without contributing much
to the understanding of the character of policy-making in
the EU. Instead of perceiving European integration as a