"A Theory of Rescue to the Palestinians within the Israeli

Citizenship?"

Discussion of Ayman Odeh's book: "Patriotism and Citizenship

– A Vision for Renewing the Political Project for Palestinians in
Israel", 2023.

Ameer Fakhoury

The Polonsky Academy, Van Leer Institute

Author’s e-mail: [Link]@[Link]

Abstract

The publication of a book by a Palestinian politician who is an Israeli

citizen is a significant event, as it contributes to the politicization of
their audience and promotes a political culture based on a body of
literature, debate, and political deepening. The central part of Odeh's
book deals with the need for the mobilization of Palestinians with
Israeli citizenship to end occupation and realize the right to Palestinian
national self-determination. This "rescue theory," if it can be called
that, becomes more critical now than ever in light of the mass killings,
domicide, and widespread war crimes being committed by the Israeli
government in Gaza and against its people. In this article, I will present
and discuss three main themes from the book. In the first part of the
article, I will attempt to show that Odeh adopts a specific version of bi-
nationalism, based both on the rejection of what I will call "colonial bi-
nationalism," and—at the same time—by embracing what I will call
"toned-down nationalism." In the second part, I will place Odeh's
principle of bi-nationalism within a broader context of triangular
politics, which consists of adherence to the two-state solution and
viewing Israeli Palestinians as a distinct minority. In the third part, I will

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focus on Odeh's politics of alliances, especially the justification regime
and the theory of change at its core.

Introduction

Focusing on Palestinian citizens of Israel through a critique and

discussion of a vision proposed by one of their prominent leaders
might seem out of place at this time. The October 7th attack mainly
affected Israeli Jews, and the subsequent Israeli military attack is
sowing death and destruction among Palestinians in Gaza, with the
West Bank experiencing it to a lesser degree. These differing life
experiences challenge more than ever the claim made by large parts
of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, certainly the claim of their elites, to
belong to the Palestinian nation and people. On the other hand, it is
impossible to ignore that the Palestinian disaster unfolding in Gaza is
stirring within this same group powerful feelings of solidarity,
frustration, anger, and, above all, pain and shame for their suffering
people—emotions that reflect a sense of belonging to that group.

It is important to clarify that pointing out the existence of different life

experiences based on the degree of exposure to Israeli violence does
not mean disregarding the police violence and unprecedented
McCarthyite persecution directed at Palestinian citizens of Israel since
October 7th, both by the state and by large segments of the Jewish-
Israeli civil society. Certainly, there is no intention to ignore or
downplay the fact that the state allows the rule of crime, as a pattern
of violence, to spread among Palestinian citizens of Israel. The
intention, therefore, is to highlight the significant differences in
experience and fate between this group and the Palestinians in the
West Bank, and especially in Gaza, as an expression of the complexity

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of the situation. Indeed, the fact that Palestinian citizens of Israel are
not part of the catastrophic Palestinian experience of suffering and
destruction is not only part of the Palestinian story but in itself
represents the Palestinian fragmented ‘national being’ of different
fates imposed on a national group in its homeland.

Above all, the aim is to argue that the discussion about Palestinian
citizens of Israel is relevant and justified at this time only within the
context of examining and debating whether they have the ability and
moral and political obligation to contribute to ending the suffering and
oppression of their people—primarily, and the suffering of both nations
—secondarily. Indeed, although Odeh's book was published before
October 7 and the war that followed, the central part of his thesis deals
with the mobilization of Palestinian citizens of Israel to end the
occupation and realize the right to Palestinian national self-
determination. This "rescue theory," as it stands at the heart of Odeh's
book, if it can be called that, becomes more critical than ever in light of
the mass killings, domicide, and widespread war crimes being carried
out by the Israeli government in Gaza and against its people. These
crimes are fueled by genocidal rhetoric and acts suspected to
constitute genocide by the highest legal forum in the world (the ICJ).
Odeh explicitly articulated this moral and national motivation by
comparing it to other minorities:

"Contrary to the comparison supported by some of the political

elite, the situation of Arab citizens is not like that of the citizens of
Quebec in Canada, or like that of the German minority in Italy, or
the Flemish (Dutch-speaking) or Walloon (French-speaking) people
in Belgium. The Arab citizens are not just a national and
indigenous minority but also part of the Palestinian people,

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 whose state of citizenship occupies a large portion of their
nation and is responsible for the displacement of much of
it. As part of their patriotic duties, Arab citizens must use their
political weight for these general matters..." (p. 64;=my
transalation) (emphasis added)

Odeh is correct. Despite the research, political, or discursive focus on

this group as a national, indigenous, or homeland minority, the
Palestinian citizens of Israel, as described by the Israeli anthropologist
Daniel Rabinowitz, are a "trapped minority" (Rabinowitz, 2001). More
precisely, they are a "a trapped post-partition minority." A post-
partition minority finds itself on the "wrong side" of a partition
boundary, drawn to separate two ethnonational groups into two as
homogeneous as possible nation-states (Yehuda, 2023; O'Leary, 2018).
Historically, partition has been one of the mechanisms for resolving
ethnonational conflicts, and it was applied in Palestine/Israel based on
the same logic of partition as in India/Pakistan (1948), Ireland (1921),
and Cyprus (1974) (Dubnov & Robinson, 2019).

Typically, the political status of a post-partition minority is debated in

the context of arguments for or against partition as a tool (Dubnov &
Robinson, 2019; O'Leary, 2016; Yehuda, 2023). Brubaker suggested
approaching such minorities with a triadic perspective that considers
the dynamics between minority nationalism, the state of citizenship,
and the parent nation (what Brubaker called the "external homeland")
(Brubaker, 1995). However, there is little to no literature on the
potential rescuing role of a post-partition minority toward its "parent
nation". Additionally, there is almost no systematic writing proposing a
"rescue theory" available to a post-partition minority, especially one in

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the conflicted position of Palestinian citizens of Israel. Odeh, while
adopting a comparative perspective, acknowledges the uniqueness of
this issue, which only serves to reinforce and validate his insight.

With the justification for the discussion established, it is worth noting

that the publication of a book by a Palestinian politician who is a citizen
of Israel is a significant event, as it contributes to the politicization of
his audience and promotes a political culture based on a body of
literature, debate, and political depth. This book thus joins a shelf that
includes different works such as those of Abdallah Nimr Darwish,
founder of the Islamic Movement in Israel, Raed Salah, leader of the
Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, as well as
numerous texts by the prominent intellectual, founder of Balad, and
former Knesset member Azmi Bishara. Bishara recently published a
comprehensive and in-depth discussion on the Palestinian issue under
the title “Palestine: Matters of Truth and Justice” (Bishara, 2022). To a
large extent—and certainly in light of the aspiration contained in the
word "vision" in the title—this book also connects to the seminal
document "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel,"
published by the Palestinian elite in Israel in 2006 (for more on the
future vision, see Agbaria & Mustafa, 2012).

Odeh's book consists of five chapters. The first chapter deals with
diagnosing the political situation in Israel; the second chapter focuses
on the history of Palestinian institutions in Israel, primarily with
proposals to establish new institutions that align with the political
agenda proposed by the author; the third chapter focuses on the issue
of Jewish-Arab partnership; the fourth chapter addresses internal
Palestinian social issues; and the final chapter discusses Palestinian

5
culture. However, the critique here will not be divided according to the
book's parts but will be presented thematically, focusing on three main
topics. In the first part, I will attempt to argue that Odeh adopts a
certain version of bi-nationalism, based on the rejection of what I will
call "colonial bi-nationalism" and—simultaneously—by embracing what
I will call "toned-down nationalism." In the second part, I will place
Odeh's bi-nationalism within a broader context of triangular politics,
rooted in adherence to the two-state solution and viewing Israeli
Palestinians as a distinct minority. In the third part, I will focus on
Odeh's politics of alliances, especially the regime of justifications and
the theory of change at its core, which is so closely associated with
him and forms a central part of the vision he presents in the book
under review.

First theme: Negating ‘Colonial bi-nationalism’

Palestinians with Israeli citizenship find themselves situated along

various axes of identification, which often intersect or conflict, leading
to tension, reconciliation, or contradiction. These axes include
West/East; city/village; secularism/religiosity;
conservatism/liberalism;cosmopolitanism/localism and
Palestinianhood /"Israeliness. The axis of identification with Israeli
citizenship at one end—including its psychological and experiential
dimensions as "Israeliness"—and Palestinian nationalism at the other
end is the primary political, cultural, and experiential axis shaping the
discourse, perceptions, and political currents among this group.
Typically, as one of the representatives of Arab Palestinian politics in
Israel, Odeh is positioned much closer to the Palestinian end of this

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axis. Accordingly, he writes from a Palestinian national political,
emotional, and self-identifying standpoint.

Despite this, Odeh did not—and probably could not—choose to replace

the word "patriotism" in the title of his book with the word
"nationalism." In other words, this choice, as I will later delve into,
already reveals in the book's title the influence of communist thought
and the materialist-class analysis accompanying it. To place this in a
broader context, I note, for example, that in the decision made at the
25th conference of the Israeli Communist Party, to which Odeh is
connected, it was stated: "We have always analyzed Israeli society as a
class society. The Jews in Palestine, and later in Israel, did not coalesce
into a unified colonialist stratum but were characterized by class
division and internal class struggle. Therefore, a class analysis is
more suited to the Israeli reality than the post-colonial model,
according to which the fundamental struggle is, ultimately, the
national struggle " (CPI, 2009: 88) (emphasis added). This means
that the Communist Party's rejection of the "post-colonial model" as a
tool for analyzing and understanding reality, as well as for changing it,
is also a rejection of the "vision and division" 1 based on national terms.
In Odeh's thesis, there is indeed no trace of the post-colonial model as
an analytical, descriptive, or explanatory framework. Consequently,
Odeh does not employ the analytical language or tools based on the
binary opposition of Indigenous/settlers, and he certainly does not
propose transformative political actions based on this framework.

Expanding on this notion, Palestinian-Israeli political scientists

Mohanad Mustafa and Asad Ghanem write that "the colonial model
contributed to a return to the starting point of the Palestinian
1
According to Bourdieu,the concepts of "vision and division" refer to the processes by
which social actors perceive and classify the world, particularly in terms of power,
social structures, and symbolic systems (Bourdieu, 1989).

7
collective's formation in Israel, namely to 1948" (Ghanem and Mustafa,
2017: 157). In other words, while the discussion on the constitutional
structure of Israel might revolve around the 'face of the newborn,' the
discussion from the perspective of the colonial model centers on the
'wrongful birth' of Israel as a colonial state, and the political
implications of this on the modes of identification and politics of the
Palestinian native, according to the described paradigm. Sabagh
Khoury and Rouhana further analyzed the centrality of the colonial
model among Palestinians in Israel, noting in 2011: "In the last two
decades, the political and academic focus of Palestinians in Israel has
shifted from the pursuit of equal rights and full citizenship to questions
related to Palestinian identity, and after its establishment, to
fundamental questions regarding the Nakba, the history of the
establishment of the State of Israel, and the colonial nature of the
Jewish state..." (Sabagh Khoury and Rouhana, 2011: 12). However,
these observations regarding the centrality of colonial theory in the
Palestinian political consciousness are far from being an accurate
description of Odeh’s thesis, which, as noted, does not directly or
indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, engage with this theory.

As I mentioned earlier, the Israeli Communist Party rejects the colonial

model to reject the national analysis of the relations between the two
nations within the same citizenship or homeland. However, more than
simply rejecting binational analysis, Odeh dismisses what I call here
"colonial bi-nationalism"; that is, the engagement with bi-nationalism
as a byproduct of Zionist colonial structure and practices. Colonial bi-
nationalism is the central, if not exclusive, theory embraced by
Palestinian academic and intellectual elites, as well as by the radical
Jewish left (Bashir & Busbridge, 2019; Zreik, 2011; Frasakh, 2021;
Tzoreff, 2023). According to this theory, bi-nationalism in

8
Palestine/Israel is just one layer—albeit necessary and inevitable—
within the broader recognition and confrontation of Zionism’s settler-
colonial structure. For instance, colonial bi-nationalism underpins the
"Vision Document" drafted by the Palestinian elite in Israel in 2006.
Accordingly, this document begins by characterizing Israel as "the
result of a colonialist action" and proceeds with a demand for
recognition of bi-nationalism (albeit within Israel’s borders). The
recognition of colonial bi-nationalism led, for example, Palestinian-
Israeli jurist Raef Zreik to suggest that Palestinians should take an
active role in "rescuing the national flesh from the colonial bone" of
Zionism (Zreik, 2018).

Odeh is likely well aware of the historical, social, and political fact that
Israeli society cannot be understood without recognizing that Zionism
is a settler movement, whose deep logic, embedded in a myriad of
institutions and practices, is the displacement and dispossession of
Palestinians from as much land as possible for Jewish settlement.
Therefore, his avoidance of the colonial theory can be understood, in
line with the aforementioned decision of the Communist Party, as a
concern about the "political translation" of the theory. Following
October 7, the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of translating
this theory into the political field has resurfaced, especially in terms of
forming an ethical judgment regarding Palestinian violent resistance to
Israeli oppression.

In this context, at a conference of the Israeli Sociological Association

held six months into the Israel-Gaza war, sociologist Ori Schwartz
articulated a critical stance in these words:

"Although it is not necessary, this theory tends to be

translated into a binary language that sees politics as a
zero-sum game; this obscures the real cost that the eternal
war and the settlement project exact on Jewish-Israelis; and

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 makes it very difficult to point out the common interests
between Palestinians and Jews and to build a Jewish-Arab
political subject around promoting those interests. If in the
academic field, the colonial language helps understanding,
in the political field it becomes an obstacle that hinders
decolonization, ironically contrary to the hopes of its
advocates" (Schwartz, 2024: 24)

Alongside Schwartz's "translation warning" regarding settler-colonial

theory, there are other strategies for dealing with this serious
challenge. For example, Ugandan scholar Mahmood Mamdani proposes
abandoning the political categories of "settler" and "native" in favor of
adopting egalitarian citizenship that establishes an inclusive political
community (Mamdani, 2021). Similarly but not identically, Rachel
Busbridge suggests addressing the gap between the academic
diagnosis and the political translation of the theory by emphasizing the
transformative power of the diagnosis, focusing on the joint creation of
a political community. Busbridge wrote in the context of the
decolonization debate visa-vie Israel that "the entrenchment of
polarized discourse means that we often miss alternative models of
political community that may better serve the project of
decolonization" (Busbridge, 2017:17). Additionally, Svirsky has dealt
extensively, specifically, and in detail with Schwartz's concern about
the colonial model becoming "an obstacle that hinders decolonization"
(Svirsky, 2014).

The aim here is not to exhaust the debate, let alone resolve it, but
rather to highlight the Palestinian confusion and deliberation, of which
Odeh is an early symptom, regarding the "political translation" of

10
colonial theory. This confusion and deliberation have only grown after
October 7. If this interpretation is correct, then Odeh is wrong by
ignoring colonial bi-nationalism due to fear of its political translation,
which does not allow for significant binational political alliances.
Alternatively, if he indeed believes that this theory's translation is
politically harmful, it would have been better to write this explicitly,
directly, and thoroughly, to foster a constructive discussion with
Palestinian intellectual elites who, as noted, hold an opposing view. In
other words, this discussion should have been at the center of the
debate.

Odeh not only rejects colonial bi-nationalism, but he also adopts what I
will refer to here as "toned-down nationalism." He achieves this in two
main ways: first, by choosing patriotic rhetoric over nationalist
language, and second, and much more centrally, by directing criticism
at the symbolic economy associated with national analysis. To advance
the de-emphasis of nationalism, Odeh systematically chooses the word
"patriotism" rather than "nationalism." In this context, a patriot is
necessarily an Arab subject who defines themselves as Palestinian.
Furthermore, patriotism in this usage is a political sentiment and
ideology that transcends political divisions. Communists, Islamists,
nationalists, and pan-Arabists alike can all proudly wear the label of
patriot, signifying active political belonging to the homeland and
national group without being identified with any particular party
ideology, and especially without being linked to a national ideology.

In Israel, patriotism marks the boundaries of the imagined Palestinian

Arab community. Thus, even though there may be difficult
disagreements between secular and religious or traditional people, or
between nationalists and communists, such disagreements are viewed
as internal disputes within the same cultural-political group, with
legitimate adversaries, as long as the disputants consider their

11
opponents to be "patriots." Hence, like members of Hadash and the
Communist Party of Israel, who ascribe significant importance to a
class-based worldview, Odeh uses the term "patriot" but rarely, if ever,
uses the word "nationalist" (especially not in his "identity talk").
However, members of this political stream may use the word "national"
in legal contexts, such as the common phrase "national rights."
Therefore, Odeh's choice to title his book “Patriotism and Citizenship”
rather than “Nationalism and Citizenship”—despite writing from within
a Palestinian national framework—is not coincidental. It reflects both
his positioning in a particular ideological discourse and party field, as
well as a perspective that views nationalism as a limited social and
political organizing principle. It represents a choice to promote a form
of politics that I will refer to here as 'toned-down bi-nationalism’.

More centrally, the reduction in the emphasis on national analysis is

reflected in Odeh's critique of the symbolic economy associated with
nationalism. Odeh writes on this matter: "I noticed that the right, any
right, is in love with symbols, whereas I believe it is the duty of the left
to focus on the substance to move forward, without neglecting
symbols, but certainly without stopping at them" (p. 84; my
translation). Here, "symbols" serve as a code for the national approach
to analyzing relations between Palestinians and Jews, which
emphasizes symbolic resources and the just distribution of recognition.
In contrast, "substance" refers to a materialist approach to analyzing,
understanding, and resolving inequality between social groups.
According to the "substance" approach, as Odeh terms it, distributive
justice takes precedence over and is more important than, recognition.

In this way, Odeh echoes a well-known critique of liberal nationalism,

which focuses on identity politics and recognition more than on
distributive material justice. However, in this statement, Odeh

12
overlooks the connection between recognition and distributive justice,
or—as described by Bourdieu, who has greatly contributed to the
symbolic understanding of inequality— through outlining the
relationship between three questions: Who is who? That is, which
identities are recognized and have significance? What is what?—
namely, what is the symbolic hierarchy in the field, and how is it
determined what is deserving and what is not. The answer to third
question – Who is entitled to what political goods? - derives from the
answer to the two previous questions (Bourdieu, 1989, 1992—on the
relationship between the symbolic and the material, see also Lamont
et al., 2014). Among Palestinian social scientists, Amal Jamal has often
emphasized this connection, which Odeh ignores. In his writing, Jamal
situates this connection within a triadic transformative framework,
stating:

"Despite the internal differences within Arab society, it seems

that any future solution to Arab problems in Israel must address
the political exclusion, distributive injustice, and national–
cultural misrecognition to which they are subjected" (Jamal,
2007:489).

In our context, while Odeh addresses the aspect of distributive justice

and political exclusion, he fails to do the same regarding what Jamal
refers to as national–cultural misrecognition. In our case, the
importance of developing the connection between the symbolic and
the material—here, between recognition of the Palestinian nationalism
of the Arab minority in Israel and the deep material inequality from
which it suffers—becomes more acute, considering that it involves not
only a lack of recognition but also "hostile recognition". That is the
recognition of the national Palestinian affiliation of Arab citizens and

13
the attaching of negative values, primarily threat and hostility (Saban,
2021), to this affiliation.

However, Odeh's position is far from consistent on this issue, as

alongside the above, he indirectly emphasizes the importance of the
symbolic in the context of political inclusion or effective participation in
the political community. In his book, he does this by describing a
meeting with the late Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell, from which he
learned, according to his description, that the high occupational status
of Jews in Europe did not protect them from racism, exclusion, and
political violence directed at them. Odeh concludes from this meeting
that "the professional and economic development of a national
minority without a democratic climate fuels incitement against them
and may even turn against them" (pp. 74-75; my translation). Odeh
has noted his impressions from this meeting in many interviews
conducted with him before and after the publication of the book, and
this excerpt also appears on the book's outer cover, indicating the
importance he attributes to this meeting and the insights he gained
from it. However, he does not specify—certainly not explicitly—that the
"democratic climate" whose role is to prevent "reversal" (which could
manifest as oppression and discrimination at best, and ethnic
cleansing or even genocide at worst) is the positive symbolic
recognition (as hostile recognition is also possible) whose realization
requires focusing, among other things, on "symbols" and not just on
"substance"—if one is to correspond with the division he proposes.

It is worth noting that Odeh's important conclusion, stemming from his

meeting with the late Sternhell, that without a "democratic climate,"
the economic advancement of the minority may turn against them,
contradicts his earlier position on this aspect. In an interview
conducted with him in 2019, regarding the Israeli town Nazareth

14
Illit/Nof HaGalil, Odeh was quoted as saying: "One of the important
philosophical questions of the 19th century is who will win in the event
of a clash between racism and capitalism... Next to us is Nazareth Illit,
which was built to Judaize the area, meaning the rationale behind the
city's establishment was racist. And what happened? 31 percent of the
residents of Nazareth Illit are Palestinians. Why? Because the market
wins over ideology" (Younes, 2019).

To broaden the scope, the discussion on the interplay between

material advancement and symbolic inclusion or exclusion has become
more pronounced in Israel, particularly concerning Palestinian citizens,
in light of Plan 922, which Odeh himself claims to be one of its
prominent architects. Plan 922 is the well-known government decision
to promote a five-year plan for Arab society by correcting distortions in
government allocation mechanisms, adopted in 2015, at the cost of 15
billion shekels.

Long before Plan 922, Amalia Sa’ar wrote about the "neoliberal deal,"
in which certain individuals among Palestinian citizens of Israel gain a
position of advantage due to their education while being discriminated
against because of their identity. In this situation, she argues, they can
try to improve their lives, even if only slightly, in exchange for
internalizing the epistemology of the hegemonic group, the liberal
modes of thought and knowledge, and the modernization discourse
that makes it difficult for them to adopt a critical stance (Sa’ar, 2005).
Accordingley, Haidar argues that Plan 922 is part of a government
policy adopted by right-wing governments within a neoliberal
framework to bring about a deeper integration of Palestinians into
Israeli citizenship (Haidar, 2020: 94). Behind this policy, Hidar adds,

15
lies the proposal to strengthen the economy of Arab citizens in Israel at
the expense of relinquishing national claims. Or in short: 922 instead of
48’; that is, material, economic, and class strengthening instead of
symbolic recognition and inclusion

Indirectly and not within a tight thesis, Odeh has justifiably examined
the complex and even problematic relationship between 922 and 48’.
To some extent, this observation undermines his choice to promote, as
mentioned, toned-down nationalism that focuses on material rather
than symbolic economics, although it does not necessarily contradict
it, and it certainly does not negate this conception of nationalism that
Odeh chooses to promote.

Second theme: Triangulation as a Foundational Paradigm

Ian Lustick argues that " Paradigms in politics and in science are
functionally equivalent: they are shared beliefs strong enough to guide
thinking about difficult problems for long periods of time " (Lustick,
2022: 68). The subtitle of the book, "A Vision for Renewing the Political
Project for Palestinians in Israel", may easily appear banal, but it is far
from it, as it expresses the primary paradigm held by Odeh, according
to which the audience to whom the book is directed has a distinct fate
compared to other Palestinian groups due to their status as part of
Israeli citizenship. Complementarily, Odeh explicitly writes on this
matter that the significance of the Palestinian affiliation of Arab
citizens is not belonging to a liberation project or to the project of
establishing a Palestinian state, despite their support for it.

16
A distinct fate creates a self-perception of a minority, such that the use
of the term "minority" is not merely a theoretical decision but also, and
perhaps primarily, a product of a transformative imagination that
expresses understanding but also—perhaps more importantly—the
construction of existing as well as desired reality. In other words, it is
more of a "minoritizing" approach through which Odeh, and any
Palestinian politics that uses that same discourse, describes not only
the present but also the ongoing imagined future. This decision is
based on two other prior decisions that are interwoven with each
other: the first is the internalization of Israeli citizenship, and the
second is the adoption of the 'two-state solution' (in its prevailing
version).

As many researchers have pointed out, Israel has effectively erased

the Green Line or at least blurred it, and in both cases, it has made
itself a de facto sovereign between the sea and the river (Lustick,
2022; Bishara, 2022; Yiftachel, 2023; Tilley, 2015). However—as
sociologist Yael Berda recently pointed out—the erasure (or blurring) of
the Green Line has not led to a unification between the Palestinians
"there"—in the occupied territories—and the Palestinians "here"—in
‘Israel proper’ (Berda, 2023). Instead, it has made Israeli citizenship
the main if not the sole dividing line between "there" and "here," or
between Palestinian subjects and Palestinian citizens. This division is
not limited to legal status; it also encompasses differences in lived
experiences. Thus, in the absence of an effective geographical division
(in the absence of a Green Line), given the de facto annexation of the
West Bank, citizenship—not the Green Line—becomes the boundary
that creates a difference that makes a difference within the Palestinian
national group.

17
This citizenship, therefore, cleaves the Palestinian national body, no
less than it divides between subjects and citizens under the same
Israeli regime. If this is indeed the case, Odeh's "minoritizing" that
creates and describes Palestinians with Israeli citizenship as a minority
with a distinct fate from the rest of their people is impossible without
internalizing Israeli citizenship as a socio-legal site of status and lived
experience.

Complementarily, in one of the more emphatic statements in his book,

Odeh warns against abandoning the two-state solution. He explicitly
writes: "I warn against neglecting the profound accumulated
achievements and replacing them with a forward escape towards a
'one-state solution' that does not receive support from the majority of
both peoples nor does it have international support" (p. 108). As the
Palestinian jurist Hassan Jabareen aptly diagnosed regarding Palestinian
politics post-Oslo, Odeh's "minoritizing" is not possible without the
adoption of a transformative imagination of two states. Jabareen
states:

"The 'two-state solution' was perceived as a viable and

legitimate political track. In this framework, within the 1967
lines, Jews and Palestinians would constitute the legitimate
citizens of the political community; the former constitutes the
majority, and the latter is a national minority. Based on this
conceptualization, the Palestinians in Israel began to claim not
only civil liberties but also group rights, and for the first time,
they began to refer to themselves as a 'national minority'"
(Jabareen, 2014: 206)

(see also the internalization of this logic in Nasasra, 2021, and

Rekhess, 2002).

18
This means that if the imagined future is one of two states, where
internalized Israeli citizenship becomes a "Palestinian internal" border
and not just a border between Israelis and Palestinians, it paves the
way for the formation and promotion of the self-perception of
Palestinians in Israel as a minority. There is no doubt that Odeh is
aware that his choice of the two-state solution does not merely support
a political, diplomatic model but constitutes the 'beginning of
beginnings' and a foundational paradigm at the heart of a broader,
more general, and triadic paradigm composed of two additional
components—namely: the internalization of Israeli citizenship and the
"minoritizing" of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship.

As early as the early 1990s, Azmi Bishara wrote that "historically and
theoretically, the Arabs in Israel are part of the Palestinian Arab
people. Their designation as 'Israeli Arabs' was created simultaneously
with the emergence of the Palestinian refugee question and the
establishment of the State of Israel on the ruins of the Palestinian
people" (Bishara, 1993: 7). This perception was described by Jamal as
an "epistemology of continuity" (Jamal, 2020: 26). The triadic paradigm
that Odeh adopts, as described above, updates—though imperfectly—
the epistemology of continuity. This update is reflected in the fusion of
the principle of bi-nationalism with the triadic paradigm that generates
and assumes three "core groups" relevant to the imagination and
delineation of any transformative future of peace: Israeli Jews,
Palestinian subjects, and the Palestinian minority within Israeli
citizenship. Accordingly, this triangulation creates a paradigmatic
tension since it intersects, if not clashes, with the dyadic nature
inherent in the principle of bi-nationalism, which states that any just

19
solution for Palestine/Israel must take into account that there are two
national groups entitled to self-determination.

To avoid leaving this point ambiguous, we can add that it is the

intersection between the principle of binationalism, which is inherently
dyadic, and a national geography that refuses to align with a
homogeneous partition between here and there that creates tension
and even contradiction in Odeh’s [Link] clear manifestation of
which is the emergence of a post-partition minority that finds itself on
the “wrong side” of the partition . Odeh does not explicitly raise this
tension, but he does attempt to address it by adopting what I will
describe here as "asymmetrical constitutional bi-nationalism" as a
constitutional framework for Israel within the context of the
transformative imagination of two states. Odeh explicitly writes in this
regard:

"In my experience over the past few years in discussions with

Jewish groups, I have noticed that most of them understand
national equality as a binational constitutional structure, similar to
Canada or Belgium, in the sense that there are two parliaments—
one for Jews and one for Arabs—or autonomy for Arabs alongside
a single parliament. The foundation of our understanding of
national equality is the recognition of us as a national minority
and the acknowledgment of the Arabic language as an official
language in practice. The right to significantly influence the
content of education through the establishment and support of
independent national institutions, as well as recognition of past
injustices..." (p. 83; my translation)

To complete this point, Odeh argues that Palestinians with Israeli

citizenship have the right to demand and receive recognition for past

20
injustices, cultural rights such as influencing their curricula, and even
rights of a sovereign/self-management nature, such as electing
representatives and establishing independent institutions. Kymlicka
diagnoses three types of collective rights packages: the right to self-
management, the right to representation, and polyethnic rights
(Kymlicka, 1996). The package of rights that Odeh demands on behalf
of the group he represents includes a blend of these three rights.
However - and a manner consistent with his triadic paradigm, Odeh
explicitly states that he does not demand the establishment of Israel
as a symmetrical bi-national democracy.

The question of whether national or indigenous minorities have the

right to internal self-determination is one of the more complex and
contentious legal questions (Yehuda, 2023). Odeh adopts the
interpretation that, even in the maximal version of self-management,
national minority rights will not amount to self-determination, meaning
that one state will include one self-determination, which in this case
belongs to the Jewish Israeli collective. In contrast, a system of
consociational democracy based on power-sharing, as proposed for
axample in the vision documents earlier mentioned, is essentially an
acknowledgment of two self-definitions within the same state.
Although Odeh does not explicitly state this, within the grammar,
imagination, and post-partition reasoning equally based on the
principle of bi-nationalism and the principle of partition, there seems to
be no escape from his resolution. If this is indeed his proposal, then it
represents a new offering in the political ideological landscape, serving
as a kind of intermediate pathway between 'full' and 'symmetrical' bi-
nationalism, and 'ethnocracy,' as defined by political geographer Oren
Yiftachel (Yiftachel, 2009), which currently exists and is mainly

21
manifested in the imposition of a single-national politics on a bi-
national demographic and civic reality.

In the third part of this article, I will focus on Odeh's alliance politics,
but I will already note at this stage that Odeh's asymmetrical bi-
nationalism model, as part of his post-partition triadic reasoning, is a
central component of the platform upon which his alliance politics
stands. For him: "There is room to advance with those who desire a
Jewish state in its symbolic meaning, limited in application to self-
determination for the Jewish people, without this contradicting national
and civic equality, in contrast to the notion that advocates ethnic
superiority, as enshrined in the 'Nation-State Law'" (Odeh, 2023: 69).
This position resonates to a significant extent with similar proposals
from researchers and intellectuals at the far left of Zionist thought and
with writings associated with Jewish leftism in Israel. The writing of
political philosopher Chaim Ganz is a clear example in this regard. In
his book "Equitable Zionism," Ganz writes that "the status of Jews
actualizing full nationalism here is not a status of domination. The right
of Jews to self-determination in the land derives from the equal right of
native nations to self-determination in their homelands. By itself, this
right cannot grant Jews any advantages over Arabs" (Gnaz, 2014: 94).
In contrast, this position significantly distances itself from the
mainstream thought of Palestinian intellectuals and, presumably,
political elites on this matter.

The room that allows for advancement according to Odeh's alliance

approach can also be found in the rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court,
which emphasizes, declaratively it should be noted, interpreting the
Jewishness of the state in a way that does not conflict with the right to
equality and even allows for the recognition of collective rights for
Palestinian citizens of Israel. For example, former Supreme Court

22
President Esther Hayut recently ruled on the constitutionality of what is
commonly referred to as the "Nationality Law” that: "The founding
legislator would have done well to integrate these two foundations in
the Basic Law and anchor not only the values reflecting the identity of
the State of Israel as a Jewish state but also a declaration regarding the
value of equality" (The Nation-State Law Verdict, HCJ 5555/18, decided on July 8, 2021:
56). She added Also, "Expression of the value of equality must also
come through the recognition of the collective rights of the minority"
(ibid: 173). De facto, Palestinian citizens of Israel suffer from deep and
comprehensive discrimination, much of which occurs in sophisticated
ways outside the legal umbrella or through 'state parallel' institutions
like the Jewish National Fund (Binbinshati, 2012). De jure, the
recognition of collective rights does not equate to national equality.
However, the declared position of the Israeli Supreme Court likely falls
into the category of what Odeh identifies as a "room" that allows for
the advancement of a political alliance.

It is worth adding that while parts of the Zionist left rhetorically strive
to reconcile the desire to maintain a Jewish state with the wish to
uphold the value of equality (theoretically), the center on central-left in
Israel hardly makes an effort to do so. For example, in a programmatic
article published in Haaretz in 2020, Yair Lapid – one of the prominent
leaders of that center – wrote: "A Jewish state cannot exist without a
Jewish majority. It must continuously act to preserve that majority. This
has implications for its actions toward the Arab minority, immigrants,
and Jews abroad. Some of these actions contradict principles of
equality or international agreements" (Lapid, 2020). Odeh hardly
addresses the differences between the Zionist left and the center in
this regard, and this gap is very concerning both in light of his
attempts to promote partnerships with the center and given the limited
power of the Zionist left, which renders discussions of alliance politics

23
limited to it as entirely marginal. Notwithstanding, A hint at the
possibility of establishing an alliance with the center that aligns with
the aforementioned criterion may perhaps be found in Odeh's mention
of the possibility of allying with "Jewish-Israeli groups that are agnostic
regarding the contents and meaning of national equality, or even
regarding the meaning and dimensions of the right to self-
determination for Jews" (Odeh, 2023: 71).

Third theme: Politics of Alliances

In a manner typical of the Palestinian intellectual elite in Israel, Azmi

Bishara described the notion that Arab Palestinians could be part of
Israel's decision-making regarding war or peace as a "fantasy" that
"diminishes the central importance of Zionism and the Jewish character
of the state while exaggerating the assessment of Israeli democracy"
(Bishara, 2022: 269). In contrast, Odeh presents an opposing view,
stemming from both the role of rescue, as previously mentioned, which
he attributes to Palestinians with Israeli citizenship "as part of their
patriotic duties," and from his internalization of Israeli citizenship—as
explained earlier. Accordingly, a central part of his vision deals with the
feasibility, necessity, justifications, and estimated benefits of a politics
of alliances with Israeli Jews.

One unique feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that the conflict

also involves a dispute over the identity of the parties in the imagined
reconciliation. As recently articulated by center leader Yair Lapid:
"...everything the world asks of us is to say that if the Palestinians
prove to us that they are as peaceful as the Swiss, as peace-loving as

24
the Dutch, and as calm as the Australians, we will be willing to consider
separating from them..." (Shoken, 2024). Simultaneously, and in a
relational but asymmetrical manner, a significant number of
Palestinians imagine reconciliation with post-Zionists or anti-Zionists,
even though they understand that their conflict is with Zionists. In
other words, both sides hold the position that reconciliation requires a
change in the identification and categorical affiliation of the other side,
not just a change in meaning, content, including ethical frameworks.

Within his politics of alliances, and contrary to this prevailing notion

among Palestinians, Odeh explicitly argues that it is necessary,
possible, and feasible to strive for political partnership with Zionist
Jews. To legitimize his position, Odeh relies on decisions made by the
Israeli Communist Party in it’s 18th and 25th confrences. In both of
these confrences, it was determined that the Democratic Front for
Peace and Equality can and should include, among others, Zionists
"willing to cooperate in the struggle against the prevailing policies of
occupation and annexation, the denial of the national rights of the
Palestinian Arab people, and in favor of just and stable peace" (p. 88;
my translation). The political alliance is not offered to all Zionist Jews
but rather to those who agree both to end the Israeli occupation by
replacing it with a two-state solution and to advocate for 'internal
Israeli' national equality (or at least be agnostic towards it) within the
outlined parameters (self-determination for the Jewish majority and
national equality for all, or at least agnosticism regarding this).

It is important to note that Odeh does not take this opportunity to

deeply examine the question of whether Zionism can exist without
supremacy, or whether it is possible to strive for the decolonization of
Zionism, and if so, what the role of the Palestinian partner would be in
this. Recently, in his book “Kedma-Mizraha: R. Binyamin, Binationalism

25
and Counter-Zionism” (Tzoreff, 2023), historian Avi Ram Tzoreff
pointed to an anti-colonial Zionist formula in the writings of Yehoshua
Radler-Feldman, also known as R. Benjamin. In this regard, in a fairly
brave and perhaps unprecedented argument, Palestinian jurist Raef
Zreik even calls for Palestinians to take an active part in unraveling the
Gordian knot between Jewish nationalism and colonial Zionism;
between the "national flesh" and the "colonial skeleton," according to
Zreik's description (Zreik, 2018). Thus, Odeh had the opportunity to
delve into this topic much beyond pragmatic political considerations,
although this opportunity was not utilized in his current book.

In general, and as I will demonstrate shortly, the justification

framework that Odeh employs is pragmatic-utilitarian rather than
cultural-identity-based or moral. This justification framework can be
summarized in the following two central arguments: First, in terms of
political weight and power, Palestinians within the Israeli citizenship
cannot save their plaestenian brothers in thr OPT alone and need
political alliances; second, the interactive bi-national dialectic involved
in partnership creates a political dynamic that works to the advantage
of the Palestinian side. Below, I will focus on the second justification.

Generally, minorities tend to adopt the position known as "autonomy

before contact" (Svirsky, 2014), according to which equality should be
achieved before establishing partnerships with the dominant side in
that political system. This position stems from the fear that the
external power balance will infiltrate internally and shape the
interaction of the partnership in a way that reproduces the inequality
within the process that aims to achieve equality. Odeh does not hold
this view, as he believes that Palestinians in Israel enjoy both "cultural

26
resilience" and "moral superiority" over their Jewish co-citizens that
prevent the reproduction of power in a way that will negate the
purpose of the partnership.

In the cultural aspect of the justification framework, Odeh believes that

Palestinians are 'culturally resilient' and are not prone to assimilation
or identity dilution. His approach resonates with that of cultural legal
scholar Totry-Jubran, who sees the routine of bi-national interaction in
structured environments that operate as shared spaces positively due
to what she calls, among other things, the 'cultural thickness' of
Palestinian identity (Totry-Jubran, 2021). To substantiate this
argument, Odeh highlights bilingual schools, which he presents as the
cultural and political basis for the vision he proposes. Odeh states in
this regard: "There are tens of thousands of Jews within civil society
institutions, particularly about 3,000 people from families who sent
their children to bilingual schools, learning about shared lives and
recognizing the Palestinian narrative; they also practice, to some
extent, a kind of shared life as far as the spaces of justice and
mutuality allow" (p. 85; my translation).

I wish to place the thesis on 'cultural resilience' that enables political

alliances in a broader context. In developing and refining the model
proposed by Palestinian historian Emil Touma under the name
"Cooperation and Independence," Odeh suggests framing the
Palestinian existence in the imagined future of Israel in terms of
"together and apart". Accordingly, his demands move away from any
indication of complete political closure, as well as—simultaneously—
from any indication of complete assimilation. This balance point
between the Israeli 'together' and the Palestinian 'apart' finds clear

27
expression in Odeh's proposal to establish professional unions intended
for Palestinians so that they can also operate within the framework of
general Israeli unions. In other words, the Palestinian apartness in
Odeh's vision cannot be separated from the space and experience of
Israel (from the 'together'), as its purpose is to consolidate and
empower the Palestinian presence as distinct, different, and equal
(within the framework distinguishing between self-determination and
national equality—as mentioned), but not isolated within it.

If we return to the example of bilingual schools upon which Odeh bases

his argument in this aspect, these schools are a clear expression of the
"together and apart" model. More than that, this model reflects the bi-
national "ours" (as something shared and an object of identification)
that Odeh seeks to create for the benefit of the political alliances he
promotes.

To broaden the scope, the "ours" that Odeh proposes is a dynamic and
functional understanding of identity in its sense of commonality and
connectedness. In a foundational article in the field, Brubaker and
Cooper (2000) offer a comprehensive critical framework on the use of
the concept of identity, which is used both to describe 'strong' forms of
identification that include emotional aspects and to describe 'weak'
forms of identification that do not include emotional aspects. According
to them, identity should be understood in its 'weak' sense as a sense of
commonality, meaning a feeling that a person shares something with
another, as well as a sense of connectedness, which expresses a
person's being rooted in a web of relational ties that connect them to
others. In this sense, commonality and connectedness reflect an
affiliative self-understanding, one that does not equate to a feeling of

28
belonging to a distinct and bounded solidarity group and is looser in
emotional terms compared to a 'group' self-understanding (Brubaker &
Cooper, 2000).

Commonality or connectedness alone does not produce a sense of

groupness, which is a feeling of belonging to a distinct and bounded
solidarity group; however, they have the potential to provide a
possibility of belonging that is not emotional to an expanded identity
category that does not compete with or detract well-established and
'strong' identity categories. The creation of "ours" in Odeh's conception
—the "us-ing," if we can call it that—is therefore based on a weak
understanding of identity as a product of connectedness and
commonality.

The "ours" in question is not only an identity based on spatial

interactive sharedness but also a tool and method for changing the
Zionist Jewish allies. To substantiate this argument, Odeh asserts that
the managers of Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam, Sikkuy-Opok and Hand
in Hand, all of which are bi-national association, have confirmed to him
that within these frameworks, Israeli Jews are changing more than
Palestinian Arabs. Although Odeh does not state this explicitly, it is
hard not to be impressed by his belief that the Palestinian citizen
possesses "moral superiority" over the Jewish-Israeli citizen, thereby
granting the former greater influence over the latter, provided an
equal encounter.

Odeh's theory of change draws from broader interactive, dynamic,

relational theories of change. For example, the American sociologist

29
Randall Collins demonstrated that a ritual in which different people
share the same distinct situation and are in the same emotional state,
while focused on a third goal that is not themselves and concentrated
on each other, generates among the participants in the ritual a sense
of belonging and group solidarity, individual emotional energy, group
symbols, and a shared sense of justice (Collins, 2005). More
concretely, Svirsky argues that:

"The practices of protest against the Wall in the West Bank, the
Israeli BDS chapter, the Arab–Jewish bilingual schools, the Popular
Committee for Boycotting the Knesset Elections, the Jaffa chapter
of the global One Democratic State organization, just to mention a
few, are all social products that in their functions carve
existential territories that defy and put behind the fate
binarism assigns to each of us" (Svirsky, 2014:441) (emphasis
added).

This belief in Palestinian "cultural resilience" and "moral superiority" in

the context of ongoing and equal encounters with their Israeli-Jewish
counterparts leads Odeh to the firm and critical conclusion that "those
who lack confidence in the stability of their national identity and their
just positions can be understood in their choice to remain in the
comfort zone where they nurture and reinforce their identity and
confidence in their ideas and the righteousness of their path, and
where they continue to engage in discourse only with those Jews who
fully agree with them, among the anti-Zionist Jews" (p. 98; my
translation).

Final remarks

It is impossible to conclude this critique without noting what is

strikingly absent from the book. One can assume that readers of the

30
book will be surprised by Odeh's choice not to address the thesis that
has become most associated with him, namely, that Palestinian politics
can and should strive to join the Israeli political community, one of the
main hosts of which is a government coalition. As a reminder, in 2019,
Odeh caused an uproar when he was interviewed by Yedioth Ahronoth
and declared that he was willing (conditionally) to be part of a
government coalition (Barnea, 2019). Over time, this thesis has
evolved into his far-reaching assertion that "there is no democracy
without equality and no equality without power" which is achieved
through joining a political coalition (Younis, 2019). Given all this, it is
worth questioning Odeh's choice not to discuss this central thesis. If it
were to be addressed, and one hopes that Odeh will work on its
development and refinement in future opportunities, it would be
necessary to ask the critical question: Is the process of Palestinian
politics entering the political community a process of decolonization, or
is it a process that potentially leads to decolonization? Of course, this
question is inherently related to the type and quality of participation in
the power structure.

In conclusion, even though it is evident that Odeh has not fully

explored the main theses presented in his book, there is no doubt that
it constitutes an important invitation for serious and profound political
thought regarding Palestinian as well as bi-national considerations
about the shared space, lives, and society of the two peoples here, and
for all the groups and individuals they encompass. One hopes that this
important book will contribute to refreshing both the local Palestinian
discourse and the local bi-national discourse.

31
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