1.
Republic v Villasor
G.R. No. L-30671, November 28. 1973
Fernando, J.:
Facts:
A certiorari and prohibition challenged the validity of an order issued by the respondednt
Judge Guillermo Villasor of CFI Cebu, declaring a decision final and executory and of an
alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of
jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion.
Villasor confirmed the award amounting P1,712,396.40 in favor to P.J. Kienner Co., Ltd,
Gavino Uchuan, and International Construction Corporation, as final and executory.
Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB received notice of garnishment to use the allocated
payment of pension retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the AFP to cover the said due amount.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Villasor acted in excess of his jurisdiction with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution and notices of garnishment against the properties of AFP.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the State may not be sued without its consent and that
public funds cannot be the object pf a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previous granted and the state liability adjudged.
2. Department of Agriculture vs NLRC
G. R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
Vitug, J.:
On April 1, 1989, The Department of Agriculture (petitioner) entered into a contract with
Sultan Security Agency to provide them security services.
On September 13, 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint
before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City against Department of
Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13 th
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday and overtime pay, as
well as damages.
The Exceutive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding DA and SSA liable for the
payment of money claims aggregating P266,483.91. The DA and SSA did not appeal,
thus the decision became final and executory.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. The City Sheriff levied on the properties of
DA and SSA to wit: one unit Toyota, Hi-Ace, one unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one unit
Toyota Crown.
The DA filed for petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus before National Labor
Relations Commission alleging that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the
petitioner, and prayed that the writ issued be null and void. More importantly, the
petitioner asserted that the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability
of the State.
NLRC only ordered for temporary suspension for the enforcement and execution of the
Arbiter’s decision to give the petitioners time to source out funds, but dismissed the
petition of the DA for lack of basis. Hence, the petitioner herein prays before the
Supreme court to grant writ of certiorari against NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a
service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Ruling:
No. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of
its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property
of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby
enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution
issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
3. PHILIPPINE ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. Vs. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS
H. R. No. 84992 December 15,1989
Grino-Aquino, J.:
PHILROCK filed a complaint before RTC against Board of Liquidators paying that the
defective rock pulvurizing machine which they bought from REPACOM be replaced or
refunded. They also prayed for actual damages for losses it allegedly incurred ,
unrealized profits, exemplary damages, attorney fees and expenses and cost of the suit.
The Board of Liquidators’ answer alleged that REPACOM effected complete delivery of
the machinery and equipment to PHILROCK but no demand was made regarding any
hidden defect.n its counterclaim, the Board demanded payment by PHILROCK of the first
ten (10) amortizations in the sum of P 284,242, expenses of litigation, moral and
exemplary damages and costs.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHILROCK and ordered REPACOM and
the Board of Liquidators to reimburse Plaintiff Philrock for the expenses it had invested
and incurred in connection with its purchase of the said rock pulverizing plant from
REPACOM.
RTC also further ordered that the respondents pay for the compensatory damages for the
unrealized profits, expenses incurred for maintenance, exemplary damages, attprney’s
fees, and the cost of the suit.
Judge Natividad Adduru-Santillan issued a Writ of Execution. An order of Garnishment
was served to PNB against the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of
Liquidators to satisfy the judgment of P 34,894,607.45 in favor of PHILROCK
Issue:
Whether the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators in the
Philippine National Bank may be garnished to satisfy a money judgment against the
BOARD.
Ruling:
[Link] SC rules that the Board of Liquidators is a government agency under the direct
supervision of the President of the Republic created by EO 372, dated November 24,
1950 (p. 39, Rollo). Pursuant to PDs Nos. 629 and 635-A, it is tasked with the specific
duty of administering the assets and paying the liabilities of the defunct REPACOM. It
was not created for profit or to engage in business. Hence, when a suit is directed
against said unincorporated government agency which, because it is unincorporated,
possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal,
i.e., the State.
On the other hand, if the Government conducts a business through either a government-
owned and controlled corporation or a non- corporate agency set up primarily for a
business purpose, the entity enjoys no immunity from suit even if there is no express
grant of authority to "sue or be sued." Having a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporation
and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from
garnishment.
The sale of the rock pulverizing plant to PHILROCK by the Board of liquidators, although
proprietary in nature was merely incidental to the performance of the Board's primary and
governmental function of settling and closing the affairs of the REPACOM. Hence, its
funds in the Philippine National Bank are public funds which are exempt from
garnishment.
4. Republic vs Sandoval
G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993
Campos, Jr., J.:
Facts:
By reason of the Mendiola massacre, wherein 12 rallyists died in their quest for
―genuine agrarian reform, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No.11 which
created the Citizen‘s Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation for the disorders, death and casualties that took place. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and other victims of Mendiola
incident to be compensated by the government. Due to the recommendation, petitioners
filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the government to which the latter
did not take heed. The group then instituted an action for damages against the Republic
of the Philippines together with military officers and personnel involved in Mendiola
incident. Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as against the Republic
of the Philippines on the basis that there was no waiver by the state. Hence, the petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the State by virtue of the administrative order waived its immunity from suit?
Ruling:
NO. Firstly, recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the state. In effect, the same shall only serve as a cause
of action on the event that any party decides to litigate his or her claim. The commission
is merely a preliminary venue.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have said or done
the same are not tantamount to the state having waived its immunity from suit. The
principle of state immunity from suit does not apply in this case, as when the relief
demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the state nor the
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity,
even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by
virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.
5. VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. Vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992
Grino-Aquino, J.:
Facts: Done, diritso written sa record book
6. Begosa vs. Chairman, Phil. Veterans Adm.
G. R. No. L-25916. April 30, 1970
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts:
Gaudencio Begosa was an enlisted man in good standing of the Philippine
Commonwealth Army, became permanently incapacitated from work due to injuries he
sustained in line of duty.
He believed he was entitled to obtain benefits under the Veterans’ Bill of Rights for
disability pension, but there was an insistent objection on the part of the defendants, the
chairman and the members of the Philippine Veterans Administration.
The Defendants, disapproved the claim of Begosa on the ground of his having having
been “dishonorably discharged”, although such an event did not take place until almost
five years after the end of the war on November 7, 1950 and while he was in the service
of a different organization that such a penalty was imposed on him.
The lower court Judge Soriano ruled in favor of Begosa, but the defendants herein
appealed, relying once more on the principal grounds raised below that plaintiff should
have exhausted his administrative remedies before coming to court and that he was in
fact suing the State without its consent having been obtained.
Issues:
Did the lower court err in ruling that Begosa was entitled to his disability pension despite
the claim of dishonorable discharge?
Was the lower court correct in determining that Begosa did not need to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief?
Did the lower court properly interpret the statutory provusions regarding the amount of
pension Begosa was entitled to?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling in favor of Begosa on all
[Link] disapproval of Begosa's claim based on dishonorable discharge was deemed
an invalid reason for denying his pension.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable as the issue
was purely legal, and the defendants' actions were considered patently illegal.
The amounts awarded to Begosa were consistent with statutory provisions, and the court
had the authority to enforce compliance with veterans' benefits laws.
7. Republic vs. Purisima
H. R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
and others, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Purisima of CFI
Manila Branch 7 and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. initiated a civil suit against the Rice and Corn
Administration, a government entity, for a money claim due to an alleged breach of
contract.
On September 7, 1972, the Rice and Corn Administration filed a motion to dismiss the
case.
Judge Purisima denied the motion to dismiss on October 4, 1972.
The Republic argued that Judge Purisima failed to apply the doctrine of non-suability of
the State, which prevents the State and its agencies from being sued without its consent.
Issue:
Can the State, through its agencies, be sued without its explicit consent?
Did the respondent Judge err in denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn
Administration?
Ruling:
No, the State and its agencies cannot be sued without its explicit consent.
Yes, the respondent Judge erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and
Corn Administration.
8. Callado vs. IRRI
G. R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995
ROMERO, J.:
Facts:
Ernesto Callado, a driver of International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), met an accident
while driving an IRRI vehicle on his official trip to NAIA.
IRRI’s Human Resource Development Department Manager conducted a preliminary
investigation and found out that Callado was driving under the influence of liqour.
Eventually, he was terminated due to gross habitual neglect of duties.
Callado filed a complaint against IRRI before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and
was favored stating "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity,"
and ordered IRRI to reinstate Callado to his position and to pay his full backwages.
He further states that since the investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of
IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to due
process.
NLRC, On the other hand said that IRRI did not waive its immunity, and ordered Labor
Arbiter’s decision be set aside and the complaint be dismissed.
Issue:
Did the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this
dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?
Had Callado been denied to due process?
Ruling:
No. IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and
unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it
may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
No. It is not denied that he was informed of the findings and charges resulting from an
investigation conducted of his case in accordance with IRRI policies and procedures. He
had a chance to comment thereon in a Memorandum he submitted to the Manager of the
Human Resource and Development Department. Therefore, he was given proper notice
and adequate opportunity to refute the charges and findings, hereby fulfilling the basic
requirements of due process.
9. Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping
GR. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954
Paras, C.J.:
Facts:
On March 7, 1947, Fernando A. Froilan purchased the vessel MV/FS-197 from the
Shipping Administration for P200,000.00, with a P50,000.00 down payment.
The remaining balance was secured by a mortgage on the vessel, with a clause allowing
the Shipping Administration to rescind the contract and repossess the vessel if Froilan
defaulted, which he eventually did.
Despite several extensions and agreements, Froilan failed to settle his accounts,
prompting the Shipping Administration to repossess the vessel on February 18, 1949,
and re-register it in the government's name.
On February 22, 1949, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. (Pan Oriental) offered to charter the
vessel for P3,000.00 per month, which the Shipping Administration accepted on April 1,
1949, with conditions.
Froilan continued to seek reconsideration and offered to pay his overdue accounts, but
his requests were denied.
On June 4, 1949, a formal bareboat charter with an option to purchase was signed
between the Shipping Administration and Pan Oriental, but it lacked presidential
approval.
On September 6, 1949, the Cabinet revoked the cancellation of Froilan's contract and
restored his rights, subject to conditions that Froilan again failed to meet.
The Cabinet reconsidered and authorized the continuation of the charter contract with
Pan Oriental on December 3, 1949.
Froilan filed an action for replevin to recover possession of the vessel, which was granted
by the court upon his filing a bond.
The Republic of the Philippines intervened, seeking possession of the vessel to foreclose
the mortgage, but the complaint was dismissed after Froilan paid the outstanding
balance.
The lower court ruled in favor of Froilan, declaring the charter contract with Pan Oriental
null and void due to the lack of presidential approval and upheld Froilan's ownership of
the vessel.
Pan Oriental appealed the decision.
Issue:
Did the ownership of the vessel pass to Froilan upon delivery despite his defaults?
Was the rescission of the contract by the Shipping Administration without judicial action
valid?
Was the charter contract between the Shipping Administration and Pan Oriental valid and
enforceable?
Is Pan Oriental entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred on the vessel?
Ruling:
Yes, the ownership of the vessel passed to Froilan upon delivery.
Yes, the rescission of the contract by the Shipping Administration without judicial action
was valid.
No, the charter contract between the Shipping Administration and Pan Oriental was not
valid due to the lack of presidential approval.
Yes, Pan Oriental is entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred on the vessel.
10. US vs. Guinto
G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
The case "United States of America v. Guinto" involves several consolidated cases
where the United States and its officials were sued in Philippine courts.
Respondents included various judges and private individuals who filed complaints
against U.S. officials.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines heard the cases on February 26, 1990.
Incidents occurred in different locations: Angeles City, Baguio City, and Capas, Tarlac.
Complaints involved:
Barbershop concessions at Clark Air Base.
Dismissal of an employee at John Hay Air Station.
A buy-bust operation leading to a dismissal.
Alleged physical abuse by U.S. military personnel.
In the lower courts, U.S. officials moved to dismiss the complaints citing state immunity,
but motions were denied, prompting the petitions to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can the United States of America and its officials be sued in Philippine courts despite the
doctrine of state immunity?
Does the doctrine of state immunity apply to commercial activities conducted by the
United States Armed Forces?
Were the U.S. officials acting within their official capacities, thereby invoking state
immunity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the United States and its officials may be sued in
Philippine courts if they have impliedly waived their non-suability.
The Court held that the doctrine of state immunity does not apply to commercial activities
such as barbershops operated by the United States Armed Forces.
The Court found that in some cases, the U.S. officials were acting within their official
capacities and thus were immune from suit, while in other cases, further inquiry was
needed to determine their capacity.
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