MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)

MoSHE 11
1.3.2. The Definition and Nature of Ethics and Morality
A. What Ethics is?
Dear Students:
What do we mean by the term ‘ethics’? Before you read on, take a few moments to
write down a
definition of what you think the term means.
Ethics is a branch of philosophy that attempts to understand people’s moral beliefs
and actions
(these modules use the terms, ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’; ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’
interchangeably, although
traditionally ‘ethics’ described the process of thinking about people’s morality).
Ethics, or moral
philosophy, considers theories about what human beings are capable of doing,
alongside accounts of
what they ought to do if they are to live an ethically good life. Ethics also
explores the meaning and
the ranking of different ethical values, such as honesty, autonomy, equality and
justice, and it
considers ethical quandaries that human beings face in the course of living their
own independent
but, also, socially interdependent lives.
Ethics, or moral philosophy: considers theories about what human beings are capable
of doing,
alongside accounts of what they ought to do if they are to live an ethically good
life. Ethics may
share common ground with the law, religious belief, popular opinion, professional
codes and the
dictates of authority figures, but it is also broader than all of these and offers
a set of tools and
values against which their appropriateness can be evaluated.
Invariably all ethical questions involve a decision about what one should do in a
specific instance.
Notice the word should. Ethical questions are not concerned with what one would do
(an essentially
psychological concern) but what one ought to do. Judgments about such decisions are
generally
expressed with words like right and wrong, should and ought, or obligation and
duty.
Occasionally the term ethics is used interchangeably with morals. Business or
medical ethics, for
example, is generally synonymous with morals. Although this is acceptable, a
precise usage would
apply the term’s morals and moral to the conduct itself, while the terms ethics and
ethical would
refer to the study of moral conduct or to the code that one follows. Thus, the
specific act of telling
the caller you were home could be described as moral or immoral. But what makes any
act moral or
immoral, right or wrong fall within the province of ethics.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 12
When we speak of moral problems then, we generally refer to specific problems, such
as “Is lying
ever right?” or “Is stealing always wrong?” in contrast, we can look at ethical
problems as being
more general and theoretical. Thus, “what makes any act, such as lying or stealing,
right or wrong?”
and “what makes any entity good?” are ethical problems. In short, morality refers
to the degree to
which an action conforms to a standard or norm of human conduct. Ethics refers to
the
philosophical study of values and of what constitute good and bad human conduct.
In dealing with human conduct from the perspective of obligation and value, ethics
investigates a
variety of related concerns. Among them are whether a standard of morality exists
that applies to all
people at all times everywhere, the precise nature of moral responsibility, the
conditions under
which one is morally accountable or responsible, and the proper end of law. When
ethicists use
word like “good” or “right” to describe a person or action they generally means
that the person or
action conforms to some standard. A good person or action has certain desirable
qualities.
Ethicists often disagree about the nature of those standards and desirable
qualities and follow
different paths in establishing standards and discovering which qualities are
desirable. For purposes
of understanding, though, we can view ethics as divided into two fields; normative
ethics and non-
normative ethics.
Generally, Ethics is:
1. The critical examination and evaluation of what is good, evil, right and wrong
in human conduct
(Guy, 2001).
2. A specific set of principles, values and guidelines for a particular group or
organization (Guy,
2001).
3. Ethics is the study of goodness, right action and moral responsibility, it asks
what choices and
ends we ought to pursue and what moral principles should govern our pursuits and
choices
(Madden, 2000).
B. What is Morality?
Of course, morality is a complex concept. Though it is one of most frequently used
terms, it can
mean different things to different people. Morality is a commonly used word in most
cultures. Some
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 13
Scholars argued that if we do not know what morality is we cannot teach it. In
crucial ways we do
not know what morality is. Yet we must teach it because it is of prime importance
and must be
learned. Moreover, teaching must not be brainwashing; it must be moral. So, in
order to understand
Moral and Civics Education, the term “moral” needs to be understood
Morality can be viewed from different perspectives and let us start with the simple
definition of the
word itself. Morality from a dictionary definition (from Latin moralitas “manner,
character, proper
behavior”) refers to the concept of human action which pertains to matters of right
and wrong –
also referred to as “good and evil”. It can be used to mean the generally accepted
code of conduct in
a society, or within a subgroup of society. It relates to values expressed as: a
matter of individual
choice, those values to which we ought to aspire and those values shared within a
culture, religious,
secular, or philosophical community. This definition is clear when morality is
spelt out and agreed
upon by others. However, it becomes ambiguous when defined by different ethnic
groups, especially
in the multicultural society, like Ethiopians.
Morality has been a topic of discussion for a very long time. According to Socrates
“We are
discussing no small matter, but how we ought to live” when issues of morality are
discussed.
Class Activity:
Dear Student, Don’t you agree with Socrates? What is your view?
Socrates is rightly asserted that morality is not a small matter. In fact, moral
philosophy is the
attempt to achieve a systematic understanding of the nature of morality and what it
requires of us. In
Socrates’ words it’s “how we ought to live”. Living in a multicultural Ethiopia,
how we ought to live
can be very complicated because of the diversity of culture that is vast and
unique.
Morality is, at the very least, the effort to guide one’s conduct by reason that
is, to do what there are
the best reasons for doing while giving equal weight to the interest of each
individual who will be
affected by one’s conduct. It is important that in a countries like Ethiopia,
morality is shared as a
common goal to ensure harmony and integrity.
Terms such as morality and ethics are often used interchangeably in everyday speech
as referring to
justified or proper conduct. But ethics is usually associated with a certain
conduct within a
profession, for example, the code of ethics for the teaching profession. Morality
is a more general
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 14
term referring to the character of individuals and community. In other words,
Morality is used to
refer to what we would call moral conduct while ethics is used to refer to the
formal study of moral
conduct. It can be claimed that morality is related to praxis, but ethics is
related to theory.
Morality, whatever else may be said about it, is about things over which we have
control that lead to
“bettering human life”. It is different in every society, and is a convenient term
for socially
approved habits.
Ethics Morality
Is philosophical study of the code, standards or
norm of human conduct and it is more
theoretical and general one.
refers to the code of conduct one follows while
ethics is the study of moral conduct or the
study of the code that one follows
Ethics establish the standards, norms, or codes
to be followed by human beings are the study
of morality, moral principles, and moral
decision making.
is the conformity of human behavior to the
established code of conduct .If an action
conform to the established code, it is called
moral ,if not immoral
Is the development of reasonable standards and
procedures for ethical decision-making?
refers to the effort to guide one’s conduct by
reason while giving equal weight to the interests
of each individual who will be affected by one’s
conduct
Is a set of normative rules of conduct, a code, a
standards that govern what one ought to do
when the well-being, or duties to oneself,
others or institutions is at stake.
Has to do with what one should do, all things
considered, not what, in fact, any of us will so in
a particular instance
Morality is:
1. Those principles and values that actually guide, for better or worse, an
individual’s personal
conduct (Guy, 2001)
2. Morality is the informal system of rational beings by which they govern their
behavior in order
to lesson harm or evil and do good, this system, although informal, enjoys amazing
agreement
across time and cultures concerning moral rules, moral ideas and moral virtues
(Madden, 2000)
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 15
1.4. Ethics and Law
As against morals and ethics, laws are norms, formally approved by state, power or
national or
international political bodies. Many laws are instituted in order to promote well-
being, resolve
conflicts of interest, and promote social harmony. However, there are several
reasons why ethics is
not law. First, some actions that are illegal may not be unethical. Speeding is
illegal, but one might
have an ethical obligation to break the speed limit in order to transport someone
to a hospital in an
emergency. Second, some actions that are unethical may not be illegal. Most people
would agree that
lying is unethical but lying is only illegal under certain conditions, e.g. lying
on an income tax return,
lying when giving sworn testimony, etc. Third, laws can be unethical or immoral.
The United States
had laws permitting slavery in the 1800s but most people today would say that those
laws were
unethical or immoral. Although we have moral and ethical obligations to obey the
law, civil
disobedience can be justified when immoral or unethical laws exist.
Since we can appeal to morality and ethics to justify or criticize laws, many
writers maintain that the
main function of a legal system is to enforce a society’s moral and ethical
consensus. Fourth, we use
different kinds of mechanisms to express, teach, inculcate, and enforce laws and
ethics. Laws are
expressed publicly in statutes, penal codes, court rulings, government regulations,
and so forth.
Although ethics and morals are sometimes made explicit in religious texts,
professional codes of
conduct, or philosophical writings, many ethical and moral standards are implicit.
Finally, we use the
coercive power of government to enforce laws. People who break certain laws can be
fined,
imprisoned, or executed. People who violate ethical or moral standards do not face
these kinds of
punishments unless their actions also violate laws. Often we “punish” people who
disobey moral or
ethical obligations by simply expressing our disapproval or by condemning the
behavior.
1.5. The Importance/Goal of Moral and Civic Education
Civic education is a discipline that deals with virtue traits rooted in values of
respect and culture of
tolerance to make individuals responsible and efficient member of their community.
It teaches the
values and sense of commitment that define an active and principled citizen, how to
make
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 16
responsible decisions, solve problems, care about others, contribute to society,
and be tolerant and
respectful of diversity.
In higher educational institutions of Ethiopia, civics and ethics/moral education
is given with the
aim of educating students about democratic culture, ethical values and principles,
supremacy of
constitution, the rule of law, rights and duties of citizens. These elements are
imperative in the
process of producing self-confident citizens who decides on issues based on reason.
It is also aimed
at creating a generation who has the capability to shoulder family and national
responsibility. Ethics
has also become important in education, because education is a fundamental process
of human life.
Therefore, ethics is very important subject in education. We can easily reach all
knowledge by
technology. In education using technology reveals some ethical problems such as
plagiarism. In
order to understand the importance of ethics, ethics should be placed as a course
in educational
system. Generally, the necessity of delivering the course emanates from:
1) The need to instill citizens about their rights and duties: The two phrases
rights and duties
co-exist with each other (they are termed as the two sides of the same coin) that
regulate the values
and behavioral patterns of an individual. For instance, the State has the
obligation to provide health
care services because citizens have the right to access that service. However, the
State will be unable
to ensure that citizens led a healthy life unless citizens themselves act
responsibly with respect to
their own health, in terms of a healthy diet, exercise, and the consumption of
liquor and tobacco.
Similarly, the state will be unable to meet the needs of children, the elderly or
the disabled, if citizens
do not agree to share this responsibility by providing some care for their
relatives; the state cannot
protect the environment if citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle
waste byproducts in
their own homes; and attempts to create a fairer society will flounder if citizens
are chronically
intolerant of difference and generally lacking in what Rawls (1971) calls a sense
of justice. In short,
we need a fuller, richer and yet more subtle understanding and practice of
citizenship, because what
the ideal society needs and wants to be cannot be secured by coercion, but only
through its
members (citizens) who have a balanced understanding of rights and duties.
Class Discussion:
Discuss the values of having a balanced understanding about one’s rights and duties
as well as acting
accordingly.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 17
Sastry et al. (2011) presented four issues to look into the interplay between
rights and duties. First,
one's right implies the other's duty. This means every right of an individual
automatically imposes a
duty on others. For example, the right to freedom of movement imposes a duty on
others not to
interfere with the right of movement of any body, except regulated by law. Second,
one's right
implies one's duty to recognize similar rights of others. This implies that every
exercise of right is
subject to restrictions. For example, one has the freedom of speech and expression,
but, at the same
time, the practitioner has to bear in mind that the exercise of free speech and
expression in no way
affects the rights of others.
Third, one should exercise his rights for the promotion of social good. If any
person tries to misuse
the rights, which affect the rights of others or of the society or state, the
Government has a duty to
take appropriate legal action to prevent such acts. For example, if a person tries
to abuse his right to
freedom of speech and expression, the State can take legal action. Any such action
by the State is
justified. Fourth, the State being a nucleus organ needs to take care of the social
and legal interests
of all its individuals. From this point of view, the State has the obligation to
discharge duties towards
its citizens. As the State guarantees and protects the rights of everybody, one has
a duty to support
the State in its legal endeavors. Therefore, there is no doubt that there must be a
balance between
citizenship rights and obligations. For this reason, civics and ethics course
provides to citizens to
ensure that each individual become an informed citizen capable of thinking
effectively as well as
responsibly in carrying out their duties and observing rights.
2) The Need for Participant Political Culture: According to the International
Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences (1961) political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and
sentiments which give
order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying
assumptions and rules
that govern behavior in the political system. Taylor (1999) describes political
culture as the norms of
conduct both of and between the various political actors operating in society,
together with the
concomitant expectations and understandings of the rights and responsibilities of
citizens,
representatives, public servants and so on. Political culture shapes what people
expect of their
political system, what they see as possibilities for their own action, and what
rights and
responsibilities the various actors are perceived to have. Generally, political
culture defines the roles
which an individual may play in the political process.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 18
Almond and Verba (1963) construct three political cultures: parochial cultures,
subject cultures, and
participant cultures. In parochial cultures citizens have low cognitive, affective,
and evaluative
orientation regarding the political systems, government powers and functions and
even their
privileges and duties. In such political culture, the role of citizens in the
political sphere of their
countries is insignificant since individuals thinks of their families advantage as
the only goal to
pursue. In subject cultures, there is high cognitive, affective, and evaluative
orientation towards the
political system and policy outputs, but orientations towards input objects (like
political parties) and
the self as active participants are minimal. Thus, orientation towards the system
and its outputs is
channeled via a relatively detached, passive relationship on the part of the
citizen. Subject cultures
are most compatible with centralized, authoritarian political structures. In
participant cultures,
members of society have high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation to
the political system,
the input objects, the policy outputs, and recognize the self as an active
participant in the polity.
Largely, participant cultures are most compatible with democratic political
structures because the
qualities and attitudes of citizens determine the health and stability of a
country’s democracy.
Democracy can only thrive when citizens understand and participate actively in
civic and political
life from the perspective that participation is important, but informed and
educated participation is
more important.
Discussion Question:
Which political/civic culture best describes the Ethiopian political situations?
However, there are many factors challenging the democracy and democratization
process of
countries including Ethiopia. For instance, individual interests seem to be more
important and
dominant in the socio-economic and political structure of a given State.
Apparently, many citizens
lack the competences and knowledge to deal with the tensions between individually
and socially
centered norms and obligations. Besides, small parts of the population support the
norm that a
citizen should be politically active. That is, although many modes of political
participation are
available, most citizens still rely on voting only. But, it is clear that
democratic political activities
cannot be restricted to visiting a ballot box every five years. Likewise, the self-
understanding of
people as recipients/consumers instead of active citizens seems to be important
challenges in the
democratization process.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 19
That's why people in a democratic country are supposed to have in-depth
understanding on
democratic behavior and able to behave democratically: individuals sense of
identity and their ability
to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their
desire to
participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold
political authorities
accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal
responsibility in their
economic demands and in personal choices-which affect their health and the
environment. Without
citizens who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even
unstable. For this
reason, civics and ethics has been given to inculcate these competencies upon
learners and, in turn,
advance and strengthen the democratization process.
In active citizenship, also, participation is not restricted simply to the
political dimension rather it
also includes socio-cultural and environmental activities. This understanding of
active citizenship is
ethically-driven where activities should support the community and should not
contravene the
principles of human rights and the rule of law. The role to be played by civics and
ethics is,
therefore, acculturation learners with the attributes of active citizenship,
democracy and equip them
with the skills of participation in civil society, community and/or political life
to ensure that the
young possesses a combination of knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values at their
disposal. So that
they can develop and practice civic skills, offering opportunities for open
discussions about political
and social issues, fully discharges their role as citizens, and make informed and
educated decisions
about candidates and public policy. Generally, the subject plays undeniable role in
democratization
process through solving societal problems, socializing and re-socializing
individuals by instilling
desired values, helping individuals develop feeling of respect to others, develop a
sense of
belongingness and patriotism, and the like.
3) The Need for Relevant Knowledge, Skills and Positive Attitudes: Relevant
knowledge is a
type of knowledge which is useful in dealing with a particular problem at a period
of time. However,
knowledge would remain inert knowledge unless it is functional or put into practice
to achieve a
certain goal. Still knowledge would remain infirm if the person is not equipped
with right attitudes
and requisite skills which are basic to enable him/her perform his/her role as a
credible member of
a society. Hence, the State in question will do better in its bid for development
if most of her
citizens are skillful in one field or the other and also demonstrate positive
attitudes at the work place.
Right attitudes are very essential ingredients needed to ensure harmony and
peaceful co-existence
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 20
among people. It is reasonable to claim that skillful manpower is a pre-requisite
for every nation that
wishes to develop but a skillful manpower without positive attitudes to work is
likely to result in
counter production because vices like corruption, bribery, abuse of power, lateness
to and work
absenteeism among others will pop their ugly heads. For this reason, civics and
ethics is
acknowledged as an essential subject from the perception that it can be a useful
cure for the ‘social
ills’ often associated with young people: that is, tendencies for anti-social
behavior and political
apathy among young people, or, what Osler and Starkey (2006: 437) describe as
‘youth deficit’. At
the local community level, it is assumed that social and environmental problems can
best be resolved
through an understanding of what it means to be a citizen.
Group Discussion:
What would happen in a State if its citizens lack relevant knowledge, skills and
positive attitude?
4) The issue of fostering intercultural societies: The recognition of cultural
diversity is certainly
meritorious, but civics and ethics education could move a step forward by appealing
to the notion of
inter-culturalism, which explicitly asserts the need for relationship, dialogue,
reciprocity and
interdependence. Beyond differences of semantics, civics and ethics education is a
useful instrument
not only towards tolerating or celebrating each other, but also about nurturing
dynamic exchanges
based on interaction, openness and effective solidarity. The subject helps to
integrate the best
traditions of multicultural and intercultural education to develop political and
pedagogical strategies
that contribute to overcome discrimination and to nurture genuine, inclusive
dialogue among
cultural groups.
The issue of inclusiveness: By framing a universal concept of citizenship
constructed on the
attributes/identities and practices of male subjects, gendered relations and the
private sphere have
been neglected. Civics and ethics as a subject is thought to nurture new and
inclusive relations and
practices in both public and private spaces that recognize gender differences while
ensuring
inclusiveness and equity. It should also go beyond the idea of quotas for women in
formal politics,
or strategies to empower women to play male politics. Hence, promoting democracy
and
inclusiveness in public spaces as well as in families, workplaces, unions, and
other institutions
become the area of focus of civics and ethics.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 21
5) The issue of peace-building: in an environment characterized by increasing
militarization,
terrorism, civil wars and genocidal acts, it is urgent for citizenship education to
advance pedagogical
strategies to promote cooperation, dialogue, and a sustainable peace that is based
on justice. It is
obvious that civics and ethics alone cannot bring peace to our planet, yet it can
make a valuable
contribution to create the subjective conditions for more peaceful situations. This
includes the
development of competencies for peacemaking, conflict resolution, healing,
reconciliation and
reconstruction. It also includes an understanding of nonviolent civil disobedience
philosophies,
strategies and skills. A peace-oriented citizenship education can foster the
development of values,
attitudes and skills to nurture peace within ourselves and in our personal
relationships, and to create
the conditions for peace in our own communities and in the global community.
The aim of moral/ethical and civic education is to provide people to make decisions
by their free
wills. You can teach norms easily, but you cannot teach easily to obey these rules
unless you teach
ethics. Therefore, teaching ethics has an important and necessary place in
education. Students who
graduated from universities may be well educated persons in their professions but
it is not enough.
Aristotle also says, “Educating the mind without educating the heart is no
education at all.”
Moral and Civics Education is based on and seeks to promote in students core moral,
ethical,
democratic, and educational values, such as:
o Respect for life
o Respect for reasoning
o Fairness
o Concern for the welfare of others
o Respect for diversity
o Peaceful resolution of conflict
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 22
In sum the goals of teaching civics and ethics at any level of educational
institutions is to produce
competent, high moral standard society and responsible citizens who can ask and use
their rights
and fulfill their obligations in accordance with the laws of their respective
country.
Democracy doesn’t deserve its name without citizens’ participation. Ever since
Pericles this claim
has been defended and discussed. The question is not whether citizens should be
involved in
democratic decision-making processes, but how much engagement and participation is
required for a
vibrant democracy. Citizens’ involvement, however, cannot be taken for granted but
depends heavily
on resources, motivations, and social contacts. Orientations and activities of
citizens that strengthen
democracy and which, in turn, are strengthened by democratic experiences are
summarized under
the label active citizenship. Citizens cannot fulfill these ambitious tasks
adequately without specific
competences; that is, citizens need to have “a combination of knowledge, skills,
attitudes, and
values” at their disposal enabling them “to become an active citizen” (Hoskins et
al., 2011).
In the last ten to fifteen years we have witnessed some remarkable efforts to
‘revise’ or ‘revitalize’
the tradition of citizenship education within schools and education systems. There
have even been
demands to ‘reinvent’ or ‘revitalize’ civic education. Often they deplored the
still existing neglect and
disregard in the field of citizenship education and asked for a new and specified
form of “democratic
citizenship education” beyond just “civics,” for a new way of “teaching democracy”
beyond teaching
institutional political settings or a new “education of, for and through democracy”
beyond mere
teacher-centered instruction in politics (Lange, 2013).
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 23
Chapter Summary
Different authors define civic education in different ways. But the most cited
definition of civic
education is an education that studies about the rights and responsibilities of
citizens of a politically
organized group of people. Ethics is a branch of philosophy that deals with the
rightness and
wrongness of human actions. In this regard, Ethics is the study of morality.
Whereas morality is
defined as a set of personal and social values, rules, beliefs, laws, emotions, and
ideologies
collectively governing and arbitrating the rightness and wrongness of human
actions. In higher
institutions of Ethiopia, civics and ethics is given with the aim of educating
students about
democratic culture, ethical values and principles, supremacy of constitution, the
rule of law, rights
and duties of citizens. The major goal of civics and ethics is producing good
citizens, citizens who
obey the law; respect the authority; contribute to society; love their country;
believe in doing what is
right; stand up for the right of others; tries to serve the interest of others
before oneself. It is also
aimed at creating a generation who has the capability to shoulder family and
national responsibility.
Thus, in conclusion, it is important to state that the normative value of ethics in
life explores what is
our origin as human beings. It takes into consideration the fact ‘the unexamined
life is not worth
living;’ to quote the ancient sage, Socrates. Without the fundamental factors of
self-critique, of the
ethical questioning and practical engagement, of the fundamental factors of
tradition – something
lived out in the present that proposes and gives its reasons – the youth would
remain fragile,
doubtful and sceptical. Exposure to life’s experiences which is achieved beyond the
classroom is
risky. But it helps the student to become authentic, standing on one’s own feet and
daring the
current. This is not the domain of Ethics in Higher education but the normative
value of ethics and
life. It is confrontation with man’s real identity and the questions of
contradictions of life, yet
tackled beyond doubt.
The context of a new vision for education which calls for mindset shift from
reading and writing to
skills acquisition with relevance for daily life and society becomes imperative.
Ethics education is
opportunity for a new value orientation. Such education ensures the training of
both the teacher and
the student, develops new technologies and conclusively allows a new vision, a new
policy, a new
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 24
market, new resources and a new system. The normative value of this kind of
education is the
emergence of a new humanity of responsible leaders driven by values and virtues and
knowledgeable
enough to transform their environment and serve entire humanity in a new society
yearning for
ethical and fair minded leaders.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 25
References
Frankena, W. (1963) Ethics. Prentice-hall, Inc.
Guy, Jr., Alfred H. (n.d.). Successful Ways to Teach Ethics in any Discipline.
Madden, Theresa. (2000) A Compendium of Ideas and Resources for Using Ethics Across
the
Curriculum. Howard Community College.
Adams, F. H., and Quarshie, S. A. A. M. (2013). Effective Teaching of Citizenship
Education in
Primary Schools in Ghana
Al-Maamari, S. (2009). Citizenship education in Initial Teacher Education in the
Sultanate of Oman: An
exploratory study of the perceptions of student teachers of social studies and
their tutors, (Unpublished
.Ph.D thesis), The University of Glasgow, Faculty of Education, UK.
Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five
Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Alqatam, N., Almarzooq, A. and Alkhaja, K. (2002) ‘Citizenship education in
Bahrain’. Citizenship
Education Conference, April 28-30. Bahrain: Ministry of Education & British
Council.
Callahan, W. and Ronald A. (1990) Citizenship for the 21st Century. USA: Education
Resources
Information Centre.
Cecchini, M. (2004). Education for democratic citizenship in Europe: Concepts and
challenges for
action. In NECE Conference. Final version (Vol. 27, p. 2004).
Cogan, J.G. and Derricott, R. (2000) Citizenship for the 21st Century: an
International Perspective
on Education. London: Kogan Page.
Collado, M., & Atxurra, R. (2006). Democratic citizenship in textbooks in Spanish
primary
curriculum, Curriculum Studies, 38(2), 205-228.
Daview, I. (2005). Globalizing citizenship education? A critique of global
education and citizenship
education. British Journal of Educational Studies, 53(1-4), 66-89.
Deigh, Johan (2010). An Introduction to Ethics. Published in the United States of
America by
Cambridge University Press, New York, First published in print format 2010
Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education. New York: The Free Press.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 26
Eurydice Network (2012). Citizenship Education in Europe. Published by Education,
Audiovisual and
Culture Executive Agency, May 2012, ISBN 978-92-9201-264-9, doi: 10.2797/83012,
[Link]
Frazer, Elizabeth (2000), 'Citizenship education: Anti-political culture and
political education in
Britain', Political Studies, vol. 48 pp. 88-103.
Gibson, C, & Levine, P. (2003). The civic mission of schools. New York, NY and
College Park, MD:
Carnegie Corporation and CIRCLE: The Center for Information and Research on Civic
Learning and Engagement.
Griffith, R. (1998). Educational citizenship and independent learning, The United
Kingdom: Jessica
Kingsley Publishers Ltd.
Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (1994). Return of the citizen: A survey of recent work
on citizenship
theory. Ethics, 104(2), 352-381.
Marshall, T. H. (1977). Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press
Merrifield, J. (2001). Learning citizenship. Learning from Experience Trust. A
Discussion Paper
Prepared for Institute of Development Studies Participation Group, Society for
Participatory
Research in Asia (PRIA), August 2001
Patrick, J. (1999). The Concept of Citizenship in Education for Democracy. USA:
Education
Resources Information Centre.
Print, M. and Lange, D. (Ed.). (2013). Civic Education and Competences for Engaging
Citizens in
Democracies (Vol. 3). Springer Science and Business Media.
Wood, Bronwyn E. (2014b). Researching the Everyday: Young People's Experiences and
Expressions of Citizenship. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in
Education (QSE),
v27 n2 p214-232 2014.
Moore, John C. (2005). “Civic Virtue and Science in Prerevolutionary Europe|” in
Noretta
Koertge(editor),Scientific values and civic virtues. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, Inc.
Ellis, Robert P. (2005). ‘Tolerance’ In John Roth (editor), Ethics- Rev. Ed.
Pasadena, California:
Salem Press, Inc. PP.1494-1496
Dagger, Richard (1997). Civic virtues: rights, citizenship, and republican
liberalism. New York:
Oxford University Press
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 27
Kymlicka, Will (2001).Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and
Citizenship.
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chara, Paul J. (2005). ‘Virtue’ In John Roth (editor), Ethics- Rev. Ed. Pasadena,
California: Salem
Press, Inc. PP.1559-1563
Chapter Two: Approaches to Ethics
2.1. Chapter Introduction
Human beings ask questions about nature of morality. In the process of prescriptive
inquiry, we
employ a specific vocabulary. We also invoke theories to explain the nature of
morality. All moral
theories address the questions of what is Good, why it’s Good, and where the Good
is located? If
there is anything “easy” about moral inquiry it’s the fact that there are only
three basic kinds of
prescriptive moral theories: teleological theories, deontological theories, and
virtue-based theories.
Unfortunately, they often (but not always) provide different and mostly conflicting
answers to these
basic questions. This Chapter aim to introduce you to various ethical theories.
2.2. Chapter Objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to:
o Discuss ideas, feelings and questions about activities regarded as right or
wrong, good or bad.
o Explain why there are particular rules about what is right or wrong, good or bad
behavior for
different groups and situations.
o Analyze the ethical dimensions of various rules and codes of behavior.
o Examine the personal and community factors involved in defining beliefs about
what is right or
wrong, good or bad behavior.
o Analyze how different contexts and situations influence personal values,
attitudes, beliefs and
behaviors.
o Critically analyze how groups justify particular actions and behaviors.
Activity:
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 28
Are you the type of person who usually ‘does the right thing’? How do you know what
the ‘right
thing’ is?
2.3. Normative Ethics
We may now begin our review of problems and views in the area of normative ethics,
starting with
the theory of obligation and then going on to the theory of moral value and,
finally, to the theory of
nonmoral value. The ultimate concern of the normative theory of obligation is to
guide us in the
making of decisions and judgments about actions in particular situations. A main
concern, of course,
is to guide us in our capacity as agents trying to decide what we should do in this
case and in that.
But we want to know more than just what we should do in situations before us. We
also wish to
make judgments about what others should do, especially if they ask us about what we
or they should
have done, about whether what we or someone else did was right or wrong, and so on.
We are not
just agents in morality; we are also spectators, advisers, instructors, judges, and
critics. Still, in all of
these capacities our primary question is this: how may or should we decide or
determine what is
morally right for a certain agent (oneself or another, possibly a group or a whole
society) to do, or
what he morally ought to do, in a certain situation?
Normative ethics;
o Offers theories or accounts of the best way to live. These theories evaluate
actions in a
systematic way, i.e., they may focus on outcomes or duties or motivation as a means
of
justifying human conduct.
o Includes ethical theories or approaches such as utilitarianism, deontology,
virtue ethics,
principlism, narrative ethics and feminist ethics.
Normative ethics poses questions of the following kind:
✓ Are there general principles or rules that we could follow which distinguish
between right
and wrong? Or:
✓ Are there virtues and/or relationships that we can nurture, in order to behave
well?
2.3.1. Teleological Ethics (Consequentialist)
What is teleological/Consequentialist ethics?
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 29
It is referred as “the end justifies the means”. It believes in purpose, ends or
goals of an action, it
stress that the consequences of an action determines the morality or immorality of
a given action.
Which means an action is judged as right or wrong, moral or immoral depending on
what happens
because of it. One may have the best intention or follow the highest moral
principles but if the
result, moral act is harmful, or bad it must be judged as morally or ethically
wrong act.
Having agreed on one ground or another that the standard of right and wrong cannot
be simply the
prevailing set of moral rules, moral philosophers have offered us a variety of
alternative standards.
In general their views have been of two sorts: (1) deontological theories and (2)
teleological ones. A
teleological theory says that the basic or ultimate criterion or standard of what
is morally right,
wrong, obligatory, etc., is the non-moral value that is brought into being. The
final appeal, directly or
indirectly, must be to the comparative amount of good produced, or rather to the
comparative
balance of good over evil produced. Thus, an act is right if and only if it or the
rule under which it
falls produces, will probably produce, or is intended to produce at least as great
a balance of good over evil
as any available alternative; an act is wrong if and only if it does not do so. An
act ought to be done if and
only if it or the rule under which it falls produces, will probably produce, or is
intended to produce a
greater balance of good over evil than any available alternative.
It is important to notice here that, for a teleologist, the moral quality or value
of actions, persons, or
traits of character, is dependent on the comparative nonmoral value of what they
bring about or try
to bring about. For the moral quality or value of something to depend on the moral
value of
whatever it promotes would be circular. Teleological theories, then, make the
right, the obligatory,
and the morally good dependent on the nonmorally good. Accordingly, they also make
the theory of
moral obligation and moral value dependent, in a sense, on the theory of nonmoral
value. In order
to know whether something is right, ought to be done, or is morally good, one must
first know what
is good in the nonmoral sense and whether the thing in question promotes or is
intended to
promote what is good in this sense.
It should also be noticed, however, that teleologists may hold various views about
what is good in
the nonmoral sense. Teleologists have often been hedonists, identifying the good
with pleasure and
evil with pain, and concluding that the right course or rule of action is that
which produces at least
as great a balance of pleasure over pain as any alternative would. But they may be
and have
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 30
sometimes been non-hedonists, identifying the good with power, knowledge, self-
realization,
perfection etc. This fact must not be forgotten when we are evaluating the
teleological theory of
obligation. All that is necessary is that the teleologist have some view about what
is good or bad, and
that he determine what is right or obligatory by asking what is conducive to the
greatest balance of
good over evil.
Deontological theories deny what teleological theories affirm. They deny that the
right, the
obligatory, and the morally good are wholly, whether directly or indirectly, a
function of what is
nonmorally good or of what promotes the greatest balance of good over evil for
self, one's society,
or the world as a whole. They assert that there are other considerations that may
make an action or
rule right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its consequences --
certain features of the
act itself other than the value it brings into existence, for example, the fact
that it keeps a promise, is
just, or is commanded by God or by the state. Teleologists believe that there is
one and only one
basic or ultimate right-making characteristic, namely, the comparative value
(nonmoral) of what is,
probably will be, or is intended to be brought into being. Deontologists either
deny that this
characteristic is right-making at all or they insist that there are other basic or
ultimate right-making
characteristics as well. For them the principle of maximizing the balance of good
over evil, no
matter for whom, is either not a moral criterion or standard at all, or, at least,
it is not the only basic
or ultimate one.
To put the matter in yet another way: a deontologist contends that it is possible
for an action or rule
of action to be the morally right or obligatory one even if it does not promote the
greatest possible
balance of good over evil for self, society, or universe. It may be right or
obligatory simply because
of some other fact about it or because of its own nature. It follows that a
deontologist may also
adopt any kind of a view about what is good or bad in the nonmoral sense.
Teleologists differ on the question of whose good it is that one ought to try to
promote. Ethical
egoism holds that one is always to do what will promote his own greatest good --
that an act or rule of
action is right if and only if it promotes at least as great a balance of good over
evil for him in the
long run as any alternative would, and wrong if it does not. This view was held by
Epicurus,
Hobbes, and Nietzsche, among others. Ethical universalism, or what is usually
called utilitarianism, takes
the position that the ultimate end is the greatest general good -- that an act or
rule of action is right
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 31
if and only if it is, or probably is, conducive to at least as great a balance of
good over evil in the
universe as a whole as any alternative would be, wrong if it is not, and obligatory
if it is or probably
is conducive to the greatest possible balance of good over evil in the universe.
The so-called
utilitarians, for example, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, have usually been
hedonists in their
view about what is good, asserting that the moral end is the greatest balance of
pleasure over pain.
But some utilitarians are not hedonists, for example, G. E. Moore and Hastings
Rashdall, and so
have been called "Ideal" utilitarians. That is, utilitarianism is a certain kind of
teleological theory of
obligation and does not entail any particular theory of value, although a
utilitarian must accept some
particular theory of value.
It would also be possible, of course, to adopt teleological theories intermediate
between ethical
egoism and utilitarianism, for example, theories that say the right act or rule is
one conducive to the
greatest balance of good over evil for a certain group -- one's nation, class,
family, or race. A pure
ethical altruist might even contend that the right act or rule is the one that most
promotes the good of
other people. We shall, however, limit our coming discussion to egoism and
universalism.
2.3.2. Egoism: Ethical and psychological Egoism
[Link]. Ethical Egoism
We usually assume that moral behavior, or being ethical, has to do with not being
overly concerned
with oneself .In other words, selfishness is assumed to be unacceptable attitude.
Even among
scholars, there is disagreement about what constitutes ethical behavior. Since very
early in western
intellectual history, the view point that humans are not built to look out for
other people’s interests has
surfaced regularly. Some scholars even hold that proper moral conduct consist of
“looking out for
number one,” period. These viewpoints are known as psychological egoism and ethical
egoism
respectively.
We may focus on the consequences of our actions because we believe that those
consequences
justify our actions (in other words, that the end justify the means), but this does
not necessarily
imply that the consequences we hope for are good in the egoist sense that may
maximize happiness
for one self. We might, for instance, not agree with the Italian states man Niccolo
Machiavelli (1469-
1527) that if the end is to maintain political power for one self, ones king or
ones political party,
then this will justify any means that one might use for that propose, such as
force, surveillance, or
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 32
even deceit. Although this famous theory is indeed Consequentialist, it does not
qualify as utilitarian,
because it doesn’t have the common good as its ultimate end.
Dear Students, would you give your view on the following case?
Some years ago, a Good Samaritan stopped to help a man whose car had broken down on
the
freeway. The man shot and killed the Samaritan, stole his car, and proceeded to
lead the police, on a
high-speed chase. Eventually he ran out of gas and began a shoot-out with the
police, who
subsequently killed him. This, of course, didn’t bring the Samaritan back to life.
Although most
people would admire the Good Samaritan for what he did and although we may deplore
the fact that
few people now would be inclined to follow his example, the ethical egoist would
say that, the
Samaritan did the wrong thing. For ethical egoism there is only one rule. Look
after yourself you have
no business stopping for anybody on the freeway; indeed, the ethical egoist would
say, if you do stop
you are throwing your life away.
This theory is called ethical egoism simply because it is an ethical theory, a
normative theory about
how we ought to behave. The theory implies that we ought to be selfish. Or, to put
it more gently, we
ought to be self-interested. Calling the theory “ethical” does not suggest that
there might be a decent
way to be selfish; it just means that ethical egoism is a theory that advocates
egoism as a moral rule.
 You should look after yourself
Ethical egoist insisted that if you don’t take advantage of a situation, you are
foolish. The claim that
it makes good sense to look after yourself, and morality is a result of that self –
interest. If I mistreat
others, they mistreat me, so I resolve to behave myself. This is a rather twisted
version of the
Golden Rule (Do un to others as you would have them do unto you). It is twisted
because it is
peculiarly slanted toward our own self –interests. The reason we should treat
others the way we
would like to be treated is that it gives us a good chance of receiving just such
treatment; we do it
for ourselves, not for others. So, do unto others so that you will be done unto in
a similar way.
One argument for ethical egoism follows immediately from the theory of
psychological egoism,
which we examined in the previous section. If I am psychologically programmed to
act only in my
own best interest, then I can never be obligated to perform altruistic (that is,
selfless) acts toward
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 33
others. More formally the argument is this:
(1) We all always seek to maximize our own self-interest (definition of
psychological egoism).
(2) If one cannot do an act, one has no obligation to do that act (ought to implies
can).
(3) Altruistic acts involve putting other people’s interests ahead of our own
(definition of
altruism).
(4) But, altruism contradicts psychological egoism and so is impossible (by
premises 1 and 3).
(5) Therefore, altruistic acts are never morally obligatory (by premises 2 and 4).
So the ethical egoist might certainly decide to stop for a stranded motorist on the
freeway, not for
the sake of the motorist but to ensure that “what goes around, comes around.” The
Golden Rule
usually emphasizes others, but for the ethical egoist it emphasizes the self. Any
theory that looks
solely to consequences of actions is known as a Consequentialist theory.
The consequences that ethical egoism stipulates are good consequences for the
person taking the
action. Saying that people ought to look after themselves need not, of course, mean
that one should
annoy others whenever possible, step on their toes, or deliberately neglect their
interests. It simply
suggests that one should do what will be of long term benefit to one self, such as
exercising, eating
healthy food, avoiding repetitive argumentative situations, abstaining from over
eating, and so forth.
In conjunction, it suggests that other people’s interests are of no importance. If
you might advance
your own interests by helping others, then by all means help others but only if you
are the main
beneficiary. It is fine to help your children get a head in school, because you
love them and this love
is a rationale for you. But there is no reason to lend a hand to your neighbor’s
children, unless you
like them or you achieve gratification through your action.
This interpretation, which tells us to do whatever will benefits ourselves results
in a rewriting of the
Golden Rule, because, obviously, it is not always the case that you will get the
same treatment from
other that you give to them. Occasionally you might get away with not treating
others decently
because they may never know that you are the source of the bad treatment they are
receiving
.Ethical egoism tells you that it is perfectly all right to treat others in a way
that is to your advantage
and not to theirs as long as you can be certain that you will get away with it.
The following are some method to apply the principle of ethical egoism to a
particular situation.
•
List the possible acts
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 34
•
For each act, see how much net good it would do for you.
•
Identify the act that does the most net good for you
Some important things to notice about ethical egoism:
✓ It does not just say that, from the moral point of view, one’s own welfare counts
as well as
that of others. Rather, it says that, from the moral point of view, only one’s own
welfare
counts, and others’ does not, when one is making a moral decision about how to act.
✓ Ethical egoism does not forbid one to help others, or require one to harm others.
It just says
that whatever moral reason you have to help others, or not harm them, must
ultimately stem
for the way in which helping them or not harming them helps you.
✓ Ethical egoism does not say that one ought always to do what is most pleasurable,
or
enjoyable. It acknowledges that one’s own self–interest may occasionally require
pain or
sacrifice.
[Link]. Psychological Egoism
The main argument that has been used as a basis for ethical egoism is a
psychological one, an
argument from human nature. We are all so constituted, it is said, that one always
seeks one's own
advantage or welfare, or always does what he thinks will give him the greatest
balance of good over
evil. In Butler's terms, this means that "self-love" is the only basic "principle"
in human nature; in
one set of contemporary terms, it means that "ego-satisfaction" is the final aim of
all activity or that
"the pleasure principle" is the basic "drive" in every individual. If this is so,
the argument continues,
we must recognize this fact in our moral theory and infer that our basic ethical
principle must be
that of self-love, albeit cool self-love. To hold anything else is to fly in the
face of the facts.
It is usual here to object that one cannot logically infer an ethical conclusion
from a psychological
premise in this way. This objection has some force, as we shall see in Chapter 6.
But the egoist may
not be doing this. He may only be contending that, if human nature is as he
describes it, it is simply
unrealistic and even unreasonable to propose that we ought basically to do anything
but what is for
our own greatest good. For, in a sense, we cannot do anything but this, except by
mistake, and, as a
famous dictum has it. “Ought” implies “can”. Thus understood, the psychological
argument for
ethical egoism is at least reasonable, even if it is not logically compelling.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 35
Thus, ethical egoism has generally presupposed what is called psychological egoism
-- that each of us is
always seeking his own greatest good, whether this is conceived of as pleasure,
happiness,
knowledge, power, self-realization, or a mixed life. The question is not whether
egoism is strong in
human nature but whether we ever have any concern or desire for the welfare of
others except as a
means to our own, any concern for or interest in their welfare for its own sake,
which is not derived
from our concern for our own welfare. In dealing with this ethical theory;
(1) That the desire for one's own good presupposes or builds upon the existence of
more basic
desires for food, fame, sex, etc. If we did not have any of these "primary
appetites," we would
not have any good to be concerned about; our welfare consists of the satisfaction
of such
desires.
(2) It follows, that the object of these basic desires is not one's own welfare; it
is food, fame, sex,
etc., as the case may be. One's own good is not the object of all of one's desires
but only of one
of them, self- love.
(3) That in some cases the object of a basic desire is something for oneself, for
example, food or the
eating of food. But there is no necessity about this; the object may be something
for someone
else, for example, enjoying the sight of the ocean. In other words, there may be
altruistic
impulses. There may also be a desire to do the right as such. Whether there are
such desires or
not is a question of empirical fact.
(4) As a matter of fact, there are such altruistic interests in the welfare of
others (sheer malevolence,
if it exists, is a desire that another experience pain for its own sake), as well
as a desire to do the
right as such.
At this point it is usual for the psychological egoist to say, "Yes, we do things
for others, but we get
satisfaction out of doing them, and this satisfaction is our end in doing them.
Doing them is only a
means to this satisfaction. Hence, even in doing 'altruistic' things for others,
like taking them to see
the ocean, we are seeking our own good."
To this criticism, some argued that, of course, we get satisfaction out of doing
such things, but we
do not want to do them because of the satisfaction we expect to get out of them, we
get satisfaction
out of doing them because we wanted to do them. The psychological egoist is putting
the cart
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 36
before the horse. They confuses the object of B's desire (A's enjoying the ocean)
with the satisfaction
that results for B when this object is attained. Suppose B fails to get A to the
ocean or that A does
not enjoy seeing it. Then B will experience frustration, but it will not follow
that this frustration is
his goal; he experiences frustration because his goal is to have A enjoy himself.
Generally, Egoistic and particularistic consequentialism only takes into
consideration how the
consequences of an act will affect oneself or a given group – e.g. one’s family,
fellow
citizens/compatriots, class or race. Moral rightness depends on the consequences
for an individual
agent or a limited group.
2.3.3. Utilitarianism: Producing the best consequences
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest
numbers.
Activity:
Suppose you are at Jigjiga with a dying millionaire. With his final words, he begs
you for one final
favor: “I’ve dedicated my whole life to football and for fifty years have gotten
endless pleasure
rooting for the Ethiopian Coffee Club. Now that I am dying, I want to give all my
assets, $2
million, to the Ethiopian Coffee Club.” Pointing to a box containing money in large
bills, he
continues: “Would you take this money back to Addis Ababa and give it to the
Ethiopian Coffee
Club’ owner so that they can buy better players?” You agree to carry out his wish,
at which point
a huge smile of relief and gratitude breaks out on his face as he expires in your
arms. After
traveling to Addis Ababa, you see a newspaper advertisement placed by your favorite
charity, the
Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) (whose integrity you do not doubt), pleading for
$2 million
to be used to save 100,000 people dying of starvation. Not only will the $2 million
save their
lives, but it will also purchase equipment and the kinds of fertilizers necessary
to build a
sustainable economy. You decide to reconsider your promise to the dying Ethiopian
Coffee Club
fan, in light of this advertisement.
What is the right thing to do in this case?
Consider some traditional moral principles and see if they help us come to a
decision. One principle
often given to guide action is “Let your conscience be your guide.” Suppose your
conscience tells
you to give the money to the Ethiopian Coffee Club and my conscience tells me to
give the money
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 37
to the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS). How can we even discuss the matter? If
conscience is
the end of it, we’re left mute.
Another principle urged on us is “Do whatever is most loving”; Love is surely a
wonderful value. It
is a more wholesome attitude than hate, and we should overcome feelings of hate if
only for our
own psychological health. But is love enough to guide our actions when there is a
conflict of
interest? “Love is blind,” it has been said, “but reason, like marriage, is an eye-
opener.” Whom
should I love in the case of the disbursement of the millionaire’s money—the
millionaire or the
starving people? It’s not clear how love alone will settle anything. In fact, it is
not obvious that we
must always do what is most loving. Should we always treat our enemies in loving
ways? Or is it
morally permissible to feel hate for those who have purposely and unjustly harmed
us, our loved
ones, or other innocent people? Should the survivors of Auschwitz love Adolph
Hitler? Love alone
does not solve difficult moral issues.
A third principle often given to guide our moral actions is the Golden Rule: “Do to
others as you
would have them do to you.” This, too, is a noble rule of thumb, one that works in
simple,
commonsense situations. But it has problems. First, it cannot be taken literally.
Thus, the rule must
be modified: “Do to others as you would have them do to you if you were in their
shoes.” However,
this still has problems. Likewise, the Golden Rule doesn’t tell me to whom to give
the millionaire’s
money.
Conscience, love, and the Golden Rule are all worthy rules of thumb to help us
through life. They
work for most of us, most of the time, in ordinary moral situations. But, in more
complicated cases,
especially when there are legitimate conflicts of interests, they are limited.
A more promising strategy for solving dilemmas is that of following definite moral
rules. Suppose
you decided to give the millionaire’s money to the Ethiopian Coffee Club to keep
your promise or
because to do otherwise would be stealing. The principle you followed would be
“Always keep your
promise.” Principles are important in life. If you decided to act on the principle
of keeping promises,
then you adhered to a type of moral theory called deontology. As you will see so
far that
deontological systems maintain that the center of value is the act or kind of act;
certain features in
the act itself have intrinsic value. For example, a deontologist would see
something intrinsically
wrong in the very act of lying. If, on the other hand, you decided to give the
money to the Ethiopian
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 38
Red Cross Society (ERCS) to save an enormous number of lives and restore economic
solvency to
the society, you sided with a type of theory called teleological ethics. Sometimes,
it is referred to as
consequentialist ethics. The center of value here is the outcome or consequences of
the act. For
example, a teleologist would judge whether lying was morally right or wrong by the
consequences it
produced.
We have already examined one type of teleological ethics: ethical egoism, the view
that the act that
produces the most amount of good for the agent is the right act. Egoism is
teleological ethics
narrowed to the agent himself or herself. Unlike ethical egoism, utilitarianism is
a universal
teleological system. It calls for the maximization of goodness in society—that is,
the greatest
goodness for the greatest number—and not merely the good of the agent.
[Link]. Classic Utilitarianism
In our normal lives we use utilitarian reasoning all the time. As a formal ethical
theory, the seeds of
utilitarianism were sewn by the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (342–270 BCE),
who stated that
“pleasure is the goal that nature has ordained for us; it is also the standard by
which we judge
everything good.” According to this view, rightness and wrongness are determined by
pleasure or
pain that something produces. Epicurus’s theory focused largely on the individual’s
personal
experience of pleasure and pain, and to that extent he advocated a version of
ethical egoism.
Nevertheless, Epicurus inspired a series of eighteenth-century philosophers who
emphasized the
notion of general happiness—that is, the pleasing consequences of actions that
impact others and
not just the individual.
The classical expressions of utilitarianism, though, appear in the writings of two
English
philosophers and social reformers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill
(1806–1873).
They were the nonreligious ancestors of the twentieth-century secular humanists,
optimistic about
human nature and our ability to solve our problems without recourse to God. Engaged
in a struggle
for legal as well as moral reform, they were impatient with the rule-bound
character of law and
morality in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Great Britain and tried to make the
law serve human
needs and interests.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 39
[Link]. Jeremy Bentham: Quantity over Quality
There are two main features of utilitarianism, both of which Bentham articulated:
➢ The consequentialist principle (or its teleological aspect): states that the
rightness or
wrongness of an act is determined by the goodness or badness of the results that
flow from
it. It is the end, not the means that counts; the end justifies the means. and
➢ The utility principle (or its hedonic aspect): states that the only thing that is
good in
itself is some specific type of state (for example, pleasure, happiness, welfare).
Hedonistic utilitarianism views pleasure as the sole good and pain as the only
evil. An act is right if it
either brings about more pleasure than pain or prevents pain, and an act is wrong
if it either brings
about more pain than pleasure or prevents pleasure from occurring. Bentham invented
a scheme for
measuring pleasure and pain that he called the hedonic calculus: The quantitative
score for any
pleasure or pain experience is obtained by summing the seven aspects of a
pleasurable or painful
experience: its intensity, duration, certainty, nearness, fruitfulness, purity, and
extent.
Adding up the amounts of pleasure and pain for each possible act and then comparing
the scores
would enable us to decide which act to perform. With regard to our example of
deciding between
giving the dying man’s money to the Ethiopian Coffee Club or to the famine victims,
we would add
up the likely pleasures to all involved, for all seven qualities. If we found that
giving the money to
the famine victims would cause at least 3 million hedons (units of happiness) but
that giving the
money to the Ethiopian Coffee Club would cause less than 1,000 hedons, we would
have an
obligation to give the money to the famine victims.
There is something appealing about Bentham’s utilitarianism. It is simple in that
there is only one
principle to apply: Maximize pleasure and minimize suffering. It is commonsensical
in that we think
that morality really is about reducing suffering and promoting benevolence. It is
scientific: Simply
make quantitative measurements and apply the principle impartially, giving no
special treatment to
ourselves or to anyone else because of race, gender, personal relationship, or
religion.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 40
[Link]. John Stuart Mill: Quality over Quantity
It was to meet these sorts of objections and save utilitarianism from the charge of
being a pig
philosophy that Bentham’s successor, John Stuart Mill, sought to distinguish
happiness from mere
sensual pleasure. His version of the theory is often called eudaimonistic
utilitarianism (from the
Greek eudaimonia, meaning “happiness”). He defines happiness in terms of certain
types of higher-
order pleasures or satisfactions such as intellectual, aesthetic, and social
enjoyments, as well as in
terms of minimal suffering. That is, there are two types of pleasures. The lower,
or elementary,
include eating, drinking, sexuality, resting, and sensuous titillation. The higher
include high culture,
scientific knowledge, intellectuality, and creativity. Although the lower pleasures
are more intensely
gratifying, they also lead to pain when overindulged in. The higher pleasures tend
to be more long
term, continuous, and gradual.
Mill argued that the higher, or more refined, pleasures are superior to the lower
ones: “It is better to
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied.” Humans are the kind of creatures who require more to be truly happy.
They want the
lower pleasures, but they also want deep friendship, intellectual ability, culture,
the ability to create
and appreciate art, knowledge, and wisdom.
The point is not merely that humans wouldn’t be satisfied with what satisfies a pig
but that
somehow the quality of the higher pleasures is better. But what does it mean to
speak of better
pleasure? The formula he comes up with is this: Happiness … [is] not a life of
rapture; but moments
of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various
pleasures, with a
decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation
of the whole, not
to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing.
Mill is clearly pushing the boundaries of the concept of “pleasure” by emphasizing
higher qualities
such as knowledge, intelligence, freedom, friendship, love, and health. In fact,
one might even say
that his litmus test for happiness really has little to do with actual pleasure and
more to do with a
non-hedonic cultivated state of mind.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 41
[Link]. Act- And Rule-Utilitarianism
There are two classical types of utilitarianism: act- and rule-utilitarianism. In
applying the principle of
utility, act-utilitarians, such as Bentham, say that ideally we ought to apply the
principle to all of the
alternatives open to us at any given moment. We may define act-utilitarianism in
this way:
Act-utilitarianism argues that an act is right if and only if it results in as much
good as any available
alternative. One practical problem with act-utilitarianism is that we cannot do the
necessary
calculations to determine which act is the correct one in each case, for often we
must act
spontaneously and quickly. So rules of thumb are of practical importance—for
example, “In general,
don’t lie,” and “Generally, keep your promises.” However, the right act is still
that alternative that
results in the most utility. A second problem with act-utilitarianism is that it
seems to fly in the face
of fundamental intuitions about minimally correct behavior. The alternative to act-
utlitarianism is a
view called rule-utilitarianism—elements of which we find in Mill’s theory. Most
generally, the
position is this:
Rule-utilitarianism: An act is right if and only if it is required by a rule that
is itself a member of a
set of rules whose acceptance would lead to greater utility for society than any
available alternative.
Human beings are rule-following creatures. We learn by adhering to the rules of a
given subject,
whether it is speaking a language, driving a car, dancing, writing an essay, rock
climbing, or cooking.
We want to have a set of actionguiding rules by which to live. The act-utilitarian
rule, to do the act
that maximizes utility, is too general for most purposes. Often, we don’t have time
to decide
whether lying will produce more utility than truth telling, so we need a more
specific rule prescribing
truthfulness that passes the test of rational scrutiny.
Activity:
Debates between act- and rule-utilitarians continue today. To illustrate, suppose
you are the driver
of a trolley car and suddenly discover that your brakes have failed. You are just
about to run over
five workers on the track ahead of you. However, if you act quickly, you can turn
the trolley onto a
sidetrack where only one man is working. What should you do?
The Strengths of Utilitarianism
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 42
Utilitarianism has three very positive features. The first attraction or strength
is that it is a single
principle, an absolute system with a potential answer for every situation: Do what
will promote the
most utility! It’s good to have a simple, action-guiding principle that is
applicable to every
occasion—even if it may be difficult to apply (life’s not simple).
Its second strength is that utilitarianism seems to get to the substance of
morality. It is not merely a
formal system that simply sets forth broad guidelines for choosing principles but
offers no
principles—such as the guideline “Do whatever you can universalize.” Rather it has
a material core:
We should promote human (and possibly animal) flourishing and reduce suffering. The
first virtue
gives us a clear decision procedure in arriving at our answer about what to do.
The second virtue appeals to our sense that morality is made for people and that
morality is not so
much about rules as about helping people and alleviating the suffering in the
world. As such,
utilitarianism seems commonsensical. For instance, it gives us clear and reasonable
guidance in
dealing with the Kitty Genovese case: We should call the police or do what is
necessary to help her,
as long as helping her does not create more disutility than leaving her alone. And,
in the case of
deciding what to do with the dead millionaire’s $2 million, something in us says
that it is absurd to
keep a promise to a dead person when it means allowing hundreds of thousands of
famine victims
to die. Far more good can be accomplished by helping the needy than by giving the
money to the
Yankees!
A third strength of utilitarianism is that it is particularly well suited to
address the problem of
posterity—namely, why we should preserve scarce natural resources for the
betterment of future
generations of humans that do not yet exist. Expressed rhetorically, the question
is “Why should I
care about posterity; what has posterity ever done for me?” In Chapter 6, we saw
that the theory of
ethical egoism failed to give us an adequate answer to this problem. That is, the
egoist gains nothing
by preserving natural resources for future generations that do not yet exist and
thus can give no
benefit to the egoist. However, utilitarians have one overriding duty: to maximize
general happiness.
As long as the quality of life of future people promises to be positive, we have an
obligation to
continue human existence, to produce human beings, and to take whatever actions are
necessary to
ensure that their quality of life is not only positive but high.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 43
What are our obligations to future people? If utilitarians are correct, we have an
obligation to leave
posterity to as good a world as we can. This would mean radically simplifying our
lifestyles so that
we use no more resources than are necessary, keeping as much top soil intact as
possible, protecting
endangered species, reducing our carbon dioxide emissions, preserving the
wilderness, and
minimizing our overall deleterious impact on the environment in general while using
technology
wisely.
Criticism of Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism has been around for several centuries, but so too have been its
critics, and we need to
address a series of standard objections to utilitarianism before we can give it a
“philosophically clean
bill of health.”
Problems with Formulating Utilitarianism
The first set of problems occurs in the very formulation of utilitarianism: “The
greatest happiness
for the greatest number.” Notice that we have two “greatest” things in this
formula: “happiness”
and “number.” Whenever we have two variables, we invite problems of determining
which of the
variables to rank first when they seem to conflict. To see this point, consider the
following example:
Dear Students;
Suppose that I am offering a $1,000 prize to the person who runs the longest
distance in the shortest
amount of time. Three people participate: Abebe runs 5 km in 31 minutes, Kelbesa
runs 7 km in 50
minutes, and Obang runs 1 km in 6 minutes. Who should get the prize? Abebe has
fulfilled one
part of the requirement (run the longest distance), but Obang has fulfilled the
other requirement
(run the shortest amount of time).
This is precisely the problem with utilitarianism. On the one hand, we might
concern ourselves with
spreading happiness around so that the greatest number obtain it (in which case, we
should get busy
and procreate a larger population). On the other hand, we might be concerned that
the greatest
possible amount of happiness obtains in society (in which case, we might be tempted
to allow some
people to become far happier than others, as long as their increase offsets the
losers’ diminished
happiness). So should we worry more about total happiness or about highest average?
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 44
The Comparative Consequences Objection
Another crucial problem with utilitarianism is that it seems to require a
superhuman ability to look
into the future and survey a mind-boggling array of consequences of actions. Of
course, we normally
do not know the long-term consequences of our actions because life is too complex
and the
consequences go on into the indefinite future.
The Consistency Objection to Rule-Utilitarianism
An often-debated question about rule-utilitarianism is whether, when pushed to its
logical limits, it
must either become a deontological system or transform itself into act-
utilitarianism. As such, it is an
inconsistent theory that offers no truly independent standard for making moral
judgments. Briefly,
the argument goes like this: Imagine that following the set of general rules of a
rule-utilitarian system
yields 100 hedons (positive utility units). We could always find a case where
breaking the general rule
would result in additional hedons without decreasing the sum of the whole. So, for
example, we
could imagine a situation in which breaking the general rule “Never lie” to spare
someone’s feelings
would create more utility (for example, 102 hedons) than keeping the rule would. It
would seem that
we could always improve on any version of rule-utilitarianism by breaking the set
of rules whenever
we judge that by doing so we could produce even more utility than by following the
set.
The No-Rest Objection
According to utilitarianism, one should always do that act that promises to promote
the most utility.
But there is usually an infinite set of possible acts to choose from, and even if I
can be excused from
considering all of them, I can be fairly sure that there is often a preferable act
that I could be doing.
For example, when I am about to go to the cinema with a friend, I should ask myself
if helping the
homeless in my community wouldn’t promote more utility. When I am about to go to
sleep, I
should ask myself whether I could at that moment be doing something to help save
the ozone layer.
And, why not simply give all my assets (beyond what is absolutely necessary to keep
me alive) to the
poor to promote utility? Following utilitarianism, I should get little or no rest,
and, certainly, I have
no right to enjoy life when by sacrificing I can make others happier. Peter
The Publicity Objection
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 45
It is usually thought that moral principles must be known to all so that all may
freely obey the
principles. But utilitarians usually hesitate to recommend that everyone act as a
utilitarian, especially
an act-utilitarian, because it takes a great deal of deliberation to work out the
likely consequences of
alternative courses of action. It would be better if most people acted simply as
deontologists. Thus,
utilitarianism seems to contradict our requirement of publicity.
The Relativism Objection
Sometimes people accuse rule-utilitarianism of being relativistic because it seems
to endorse
different rules in different societies. In one society, it may uphold polygamy,
whereas in our society
it defends monogamy. In a desert society, it upholds a rule “Don’t waste water,”
whereas in a
community where water is plentiful no such rule exists. But this is not really
conventional relativism
because the rule is not made valid by the community’s choosing it but by the actual
situation.
Criticism of the Ends Justifying Immoral Means
Chief among the criticisms of utilitarianism is that utilitarian ends might justify
immoral means.
There are many dastardly things that we can do in the name of maximizing general
happiness: deceit,
torture, slavery, even killing off ethnic minorities. As long as the larger
populace benefits, these
actions might be justified. The general problem can be laid out in this argument:
(1) If a moral theory justifies actions that we universally deem impermissible,
then that moral
theory must be rejected.
(2) Utilitarianism justifies actions that we universally deem impermissible.
(3) Therefore, utilitarianism must be rejected.
The Lying Objection
William D. Ross has argued that utilitarianism is to be rejected because it leads
to the
counterintuitive endorsement of lying when it serves the greater good. Consider two
acts, A and B,
that will both result in 100 hedons (units of pleasure of utility). The only
difference is that A
involves telling a lie and B involves telling the truth. The utilitarian must
maintain that the two acts
are of equal value. But this seems implausible; truth seems to be an intrinsically
good thing.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 46
What is so important about truth telling or so bad about lying? If it turned out
that lying really
promoted human welfare, we’d have to accept it. But that’s not likely. Our
happiness is tied up with
a need for reliable information (that is, truth) on how to achieve our ends, so
truthfulness will be a
member of the rule-utility’s set. But where lying will clearly promote utility
without undermining the
general adherence to the rule, we simply ought to lie. Don’t we already accept
lying to a gangster or
telling white lies to spare people’s feelings?
The Justice Objection
The utilitarian response was that we should reconsider whether truth telling and
personal integrity
are values that should never be compromised. The situation is intensified, though,
when we consider
standards of justice that most of us think should never be dispensed with. Let’s
look at two
examples, each of which highlights a different aspect of justice.
First, imagine that a rape and murder is committed in a racially volatile
community. As the sheriff of
the town, you have spent a lifetime working for racial harmony. Now, just when your
goal is being
realized, this incident occurs. The crime is thought to be racially motivated, and
a riot is about to
break out that will very likely result in the death of several people and create
long-lasting racial
antagonism. You see that you could frame a tramp for the crime so that a trial will
find him guilty
and he will be executed. There is every reason to believe that a speedy trial and
execution will head
off the riot and save community harmony. Only you (and the real criminal, who will
keep quiet
about it) will know that an innocent man has been tried and executed. What is the
morally right
thing to do? The utilitarian seems committed to framing the tramp, but many would
find this
appalling.
As a second illustration, imagine that you are a utilitarian physician who has five
patients under your
care. One needs a heart transplant, one needs two lungs, one needs a liver, and the
last two each
need a kidney. Now into your office comes a healthy bachelor needing an
immunization. You judge
that he would make a perfect sacrifice for your five patients. Through a utility-
calculus, you
determine that, without a doubt, you could do the most good by injecting the
healthy man with a
fatal drug and then using his organs to save your five other patients.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 47
These careless views of justice offend us. The very fact that utilitarians even
consider such actions—
that they would misuse the legal system or the medical system to carry out their
schemes—seems
frightening.
However, the utilitarian cannot exclude the possibility of sacrificing innocent
people for the greater
good of humanity. Wouldn’t we all agree that it would be right to sacrifice one
innocent person to
prevent an enormous evil? Suppose, for example, a maniac is about to set off a
nuclear bomb that
will destroy New York City. He is scheduled to detonate the bomb in one hour. His
psychiatrist
knows the lunatic well and assures us that there is one way to stop him—torture his
10-year-old
daughter and televise it. Suppose for the sake of the argument that there is no way
to simulate the
torture. Would you not consider torturing the child in this situation? As the rule-
utilitarian would see
it, we have two moral rules that are in conflict: the rule to prevent widespread
harm and the rule
against torture. To resolve this conflict, the rule-utilitarian might appeal to
this second level conflict-
resolving rule: We may sacrifice an innocent person to prevent a significantly
greater social harm.
Or, if no conflict-resolving rule is available, the rule-utilitarian can appeal to
this third-level
remainder rule: When no other rule applies, simply do what your best judgment deems
to be the act
that will maximize utility. Using this remainder rule, the rule-utilitarian could
justify torturing the girl.
Thus, in such cases, it might be right to sacrifice one innocent person to save a
city or prevent some
wide-scale disaster. In these cases, the rule-utilitarian’s approach to justice is
in fact the same as the
above approach to lying and compromising one’s integrity: Justice is just one more
lower-order
principle within utilitarianism. The problem, clearly, is determining which kinds
of wide-scale
disasters warrant sacrificing innocent lives. This question invariably comes up in
wartime: In every
bombing raid, especially in the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the
noncombatant–combatant distinction is overridden. Innocent civilian lives are
sacrificed with the
prospect of ending the war. We seem to be making this judgment call in our decision
to drive
automobiles and trucks even though we are fairly certain the practice will result
in the death of
thousands of innocent people each year. Judgment calls like these highlight
utilitarianism’s difficulty
in handling issues of justice
Three-Step Action Formula:
Utilitarianism might be construed as offering a three-step action formula for
action:
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 48
1. On the basis of what I know, I must project the consequences of each alternative
option open
to me (e.g., taking different kinds of actions or taking no action).
2. Calculate how much happiness, or balance of happiness over unhappiness, is
likely to be
produced by anticipated consequences of each action or none.
3. Select that action which, on balance, will produce the greatest amount of
happiness for the
greatest number of people affected
Generally, utilitarianism is a moral theory which takes into account how the
consequences of an act
will affect all the parties involved. Moral rightness depends on the consequences
for all affected
people or sentient beings. The fundamental principle of utilitarianism is the
principle of utility:
The principle of utility
✓ The morally right action is the one that produces the best overall consequences
with regard
to the utility or welfare of all the affected parties.
✓ Jeremy Bentham’s slogan: The right act or policy is the one that causes ‘the
greatest
happiness of the greatest number’ – that is, maximize the total utility or welfare
of the
majority of all the affected parties.
Question for Students:
‘The end justifies the means’. Some commentators think that this policy allows
morally reprehensible
acts to be committed with the aim of achieving good ends.
A. On the basis of your experience, do you think that this habit of carrying out
unjust or
dishonest acts as means to achieve good ends is so unusual?
B. What about a doctor’s evasion to avoid breaking bad news to a very depressed
patient? What
about prescribing antibiotics for flu symptoms at the request of a patient?
C. What does the fairly common occurrence of such events tell us? That
utilitarianism is well-
suited to human behavior?
[Link]. Altruism
In altruism an action is right if the consequences of that action are favorable to
all except the actor.
Butler argued that we have an inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence
to others. This
view is called psychological altruism and maintains that at least some of our
actions are motivated by
instinctive benevolence.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 49
Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily other centered
and other motivated.
A parallel analysis of psychological altruism results in opposing conclusions to
psychological egoism,
and again arguably the theory is just as closed as psychological egoism. If both
theories can be
validly maintained, it follows that the soundness of either or both must be
questioned. Suppose, for
example, that Degu, who is not good at swimming, saves a child from drawing in Lake
Tana. What
ultimately motivated him to do this? It would be odd to suggest that it’s
ultimately his own benefit
that Degu is seeking. After all, he is risking his own life in the process.
Altruists are people who act so as to increase other people’s pleasure. They will
act for the sake of
someone else even if it decreases their own pleasure and causes themselves pain.
Activity:
Write a case study based on an individual or group you admire for its altruistic
motivation. Provide
background and outline the lessons we can learn from this person or persons.
We can differentiate egoistic and altruistic desires in the following way: One’s
desire is egoistic if (and
only if) it concerns (what one perceives to be) the benefit of oneself and not
anyone else. In the
contrary, one’s desire is altruistic if (and only if) it concerns (what one
perceives to be) the benefit of
at least someone other than oneself. Altruists reject the theory of psychological
egoism and argue
instead that humans are instinctively benevolent. And instinctive benevolence, they
argue, is the
feature of our human nature which is the basis of our altruistic moral obligations
2.3.4. Deontological Ethics (Non- Consequentialist)
Deontology: What duty asks of us?
What makes a ‘right’ act right? The utilitarian or consequentialist answer to this
question is that it is
the good outcome of an act which makes it right. Moral rightness or wrongness is
calculated by
determining the extent to which the action promotes values such as pleasure, well-
being, happiness,
etc. To this extent, the end justifies the means. In many respects, deontological
moral theory is
diametrically the opposite of utilitarianism.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 50
It is referred as “the means justifies the end”. It is coined as “deontics”. This
is a theory that the
rightness or wrongness of moral action is determined, at least partly with
reference to formal rules of
conduct rather than consequences or result of an action. It is an emphasis on the
intentions,
motives, moral principles or performance of duty rather than results, as the sign
of right
action/morality and immorality. It is a duty based and according to this theory,
the consequences or
results of our action have nothing to do with their rightness or wrongness.
Performance of One’s own Duty
The 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who classified dozens of
duties under
three headings: duties to God, duties to oneself and duties to others!
Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds: (1) a
theoretical duty to
know the existence and nature of God, and (2) a practical duty to both inwardly and
outwardly
worship God.
Concerning our duties towards oneself; these are also of two sorts: (1) duties of
the soul, which
involve developing one's skills and talents, and (2) duties of the body, which
involve not harming
our bodies, as we might through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself.
Concerning our duties towards others; Pufendorf divides these between absolute
duties, which
are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result of
contracts between
people.
Absolute duties are of three sorts: (1) avoid wronging others; (2) treat people as
equals, and (3)
promote the good of others.
Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal one of which
is the duty is to
keep one's promises.
[Link]. The Divine Command Theory
According to one view, called the divine command theory (DCT), ethical principles
are simply the
commands of God. They derive their validity from God’s commanding them, and they
mean
“commanded by God.” Without God, there would be no universally valid morality. We
can analyze
the DCT into three separate theses:
1. Morality (that is, rightness and wrongness) originates with God.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 51
2. Moral rightness simply means “willed by God,” and moral wrongness means “being
against the
will of God.”
3. Because morality essentially is based on divine will, not on independently
existing reasons for
action, no further reasons for action are necessary.
There are modified versions of the DCT that drop or qualify one or more of these
three theses, but
the strongest form includes all three assertions. We can characterize that position
thusly: Necessarily,
for any person S and for all acts A, if A is forbidden (required) of S, then God
commands that not-A
(A) for S. Likewise, if A is permitted for S, then God has commanded neither A nor
not-A for S.
Bringing out the implications of this, we may list four propositions:
1. Act A is wrong if and only if it is contrary to the command of God.
2. Act A is right (required) if and only if it is commanded by God.
3. Act A is morally permissible if and only if it is permitted by the command of
God.
4. If there is no God, then nothing is ethically wrong, required, or permitted.
We can summarize the DCT this way: Morality not only originates with God, but moral
rightness
simply means “willed by God” and moral wrongness means “being against the will of
God”. That
is, an act is right in virtue of being permitted by the will of God, and an act is
wrong in virtue of
being against the will of God. Because morality essentially is based on divine
will, not on
independently existing reasons for action, no further reasons for action are
necessary. So we may
ask, “If God doesn’t exist, everything is permissible?” If so, nothing is forbidden
or required.
Without God, we have moral nihilism. If there is no God, then nothing is ethically
wrong, required,
or permitted.
Problems with the Divine Command Theory
There are two problems with the DCT that need to be faced by those who hold it.
1. DCT would seem to make the attribution of “goodness” to God redundant. When we
say “God
is good,” we think we are ascribing a property to God; but if good simply means
“what God
commands or wills,” then we are not attributing any property to God. Our statement
“God is
good” merely means “God does whatever he wills to do” or “God practices what he
preaches,”
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 52
and the statement “God commands us to do what is good” merely is the logically
empty
statement “God commands us to do what God commands us to do.”
2. DCT is that it seems to make morality into some-thing arbitrary. If God’s decree
is the sole
arbiter of right and wrong, it would seem to be logically possible for such heinous
acts as rape,
killing of the innocent for the fun of it, and gratuitous cruelty to become morally
good actions—
if God suddenly decided to command us to do these things
[Link]. Rights Theory
A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a "right"
is a justified claim
against another person's behavior - such as my right to not be harmed by you.
Rights and duties are
related in such a way that the rights of one person imply the duties of another
person. For example,
if I have a right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay me $10.
This is called the
correlativity of rights and duties. The most influential early account of rights
theory is that of 17th
century British philosopher John Locke, who argued that the laws of nature mandate
that we should
not harm anyone's life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our
natural rights, given
to us by God. Following Locke, the United States Declaration of Independence
authored by
Thomas Jefferson recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.
Jefferson and others rights theorists maintained that we deduce other more specific
rights from
these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and religious
expression.
There are four features traditionally associated with moral rights.
✓ First, rights are natural insofar as they are not invented or created by
governments.
✓ Second, they are universal insofar as they do not change from country to country.
✓ Third, they are equal in the sense that rights are the same for all people,
irrespective of
gender, race, or handicap.
✓ Fourth, they are inalienable which means that I cannot hand over my rights to
another person,
such as by selling myself into slavery.
[Link]. Kant’s Categorical Imperative
The name of the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is identified with
the moral
theory known as deontology. Kant was adamantly opposed to the idea that the outcome
of an action
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 53
could determine its moral worth. For deontologists, it is not consequences which
determine the
rightness or wrongness of an act, but, rather, the intention of the person who
carries out the act.
The emphasis is on the correctness of the action, regardless of the possible
benefits or harm it might
produce. Deontologists maintain that there are some moral obligations which are
absolutely binding,
no matter what consequences are produced.
The Categorical Imperative
A Kant’s duty-based theory is emphasizes a single principle of duty. Kant agreed
that we have moral
duties to oneself and others, such as developing one’s talents, and keeping our
promises to others.
However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that
encompasses our
particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls
the “categorical
imperative.”
 A categorical imperative, he argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical
imperatives
that hinge on some personal desire that we have. For example, “If you want to get a
good job,
then you ought to go to college.” By contrast, a categorical imperative simply
mandates an
action, irrespective of one’s personal desires, such as “You ought to do X.”
To understand Kant’s thought, note the emphasis he places on the idea of good
intension. Kant
believed that nothing was good in itself except a “good will.” Intelligence,
judgment and all other facets
of the human personality are perhaps good and desirable, but only if the will that
makes use of them
is good. By will, Kant means the uniquely human capacity to act according to the
concepts behind laws, that is,
principles presumably operating in nature. A good will, therefore, acts in
accordance with nature’s
laws. For Kant a will could be good without qualification only if it always had in
view one principle:
whether the maxim of its action could become a universal law.
This standard is such a crucial part of Kant’s theory of ethics. Kant believed,
then, that there was
just one command or imperative that was categorical, that is, one that presented an
action as
necessary of itself, without regard to any other end. He believed that from this
one categorical
imperative, this universal command, all commands of duty could be derived. Kant’s
categorical
imperative states that we should act in such a way that the maxim or general rule
governing our action could be a
universal law.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 54
Consider his example of making a promise that you are willing to break if it suits
your purposes.
Your maxim can be expressed thus: this maxim could not be universally acted up on,
because it
involves a contradiction of wills. On the same hand, you are willing to make
promises and honor
them; on the other hand, you are willing to beak those promises. Notice that Kant
is not a utilitarian:
he is not arguing that the consequences of a universal law condoning promise
breaking would be
bad and the rule is bad. Instead he is claiming that the rule is self-
contradictory; the institution of
promise making would dissolve if such a maxim were universalized. His appeal is to
logical
consistency, not to consequences.
Kant gives at least three versions or formulations of the categorical imperative.
His categorical
imperative is a deontological ethical theory, which means it is based on the idea
that there are
certain objective ethical rules in the world. Kant’s version is possibly the most
well-known, and
relies heavily on his idea that all people are fundamentally capable of reasoning
in the same
manner and on the same level. Kantianism focuses more on intent and action in
itself, as opposed
to the consequentialist focus of utilitarianism.
 Hypothetical imperatives tell us which means best achieve our ends. They do not,
however,
tell us which ends we should choose. The typical dichotomy in choosing ends is
between ends
that are "right" (e.g., helping someone) and those that are "good" (e.g., enriching
oneself).
Kant considered the "right" superior to the "good"; to him, the "good" was morally
irrelevant.
In Kant's view, a person cannot decide whether conduct is "right," or moral,
through empirical
means. Such judgments must be reached a priori, using pure practical reason.
Reason, separate from all empirical experience, can determine the principle
according to which all
ends can be determined as moral. It is this fundamental principle of moral reason
that is known as
the categorical imperative. Pure practical reason in the process of determining it
dictates what
ought to be done without reference to empirical contingent factors. Moral questions
are determined
independent of reference to the particular subject posing them. It is because
morality is determined
by pure practical reason rather than particular empirical or sensuous factors that
morality is
universally valid. This moral universalism has come to be seen as the distinctive
aspect of Kant's
moral philosophy and has had wide social impact in the legal and political concepts
of human rights
and equality.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 55
Kant's theory is hinged by his beliefs on autonomy and his formulation of
categorical imperatives. He believed
that, unless a person freely and willingly makes a choice, their action has no
meaning (and certainly
no moral value). Autonomy allows us to be self-creating when it comes to our values
and morality.
Autonomy is one’s own beliefs, independence, and government: acting without regard
for anyone
else. Conversely, heteronomy is acting under the influence of someone else and
allows for an
individual to consistently place blame outside of self.
Kant believed that each individual is rational and capable of making free choices;
thereby relies on
autonomous thinking. Kant thought that every man, if using reason when looking at
moral
dilemmas, would agree with what he called the Categorical Imperative (the CI). So,
while the law is
objective, Kant thought that all people could come to understand and agree with it
after
autonomous reflection. So how, exactly, does the CI tell us how to act? How does it
work? The
decision-making procedure of the theory is actually quite straight forward, and one
that many people
should be able to grasp intuitively (which is exactly what Kant wanted to achieve).
Kant thought that when a moral action is being considered, one should ask the
following questions;
what would happen if everyone in the world did this, all the time? And would that
be the kind of
world I’d like to live in? We can look at the text-book example to illustrate this;
murder. So we want
to know whether murder is an ethically justifiable action. Well, what would happen
if everyone in
the entire world started killing people? Absolute chaos would ensue. It’s not the
sort of world many
people would like to live in. Therefore, according to the categorical imperative,
murder is wrong. A
core aspect of this theory is the concept of intent. To Kant, it was the intent
that mattered to him.
Let’s look at an example. Imagine you’re a murderer walking down the street, and
you see a
defenseless young man in front of you. It’s dark, and there’s no one else around.
You have a knife in
your pocket. It would be easy for you to kill him. So, you consider. Maybe, in the
end, you choose to
let the man live –not because you were worried about acting immorally, but because
you didn’t want
to take the risk of him screaming and drawing the attention of the police (or
something to that
effect). In the end, you do not kill.
According to Kant, you haven’t acted ethically. Your action does not make you a
better person. This
is because when you acted (or, rather, chose not to act), you weren’t considering
the action in terms
of its morality. You didn’t make a moral choice – you merely acted out of self-
preservation. However, if you
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 56
were to choose not to kill the man because you suddenly realized that it was wrong
to kill and didn’t
want to act unethically, then you would have acted morally, and would be a better
person for it.
Kant concludes that a moral proposition that is true must be one that is not tied
to any particular
conditions, including the identity of the person making the moral deliberation. A
moral maxim must
imply absolute necessity, which is to say that it must be disconnected from the
particular physical details
surrounding the proposition, and could be applied to any rational being. This leads
to the first
formulation of the categorical imperative:
A. The Principle of Universality
The first maxim states that we should choose our 'codes of conduct' only if they
serve perfect /
imperfect duty and are good for all. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you
can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law without contradiction." Kant divides the
duties imposed by this
formulation into two subsets: perfect and imperfect duty. Perfect duties are
blameworthy if not
met and are the basic requirements for a human being. According to his reasoning,
we first have a
perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we
attempt to
universalize them.
The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a
contradiction upon
universalisation. The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but
were A
universalized, then there could be no property, and so the proposition has
logically negated itself. An
example of perfect duty is the avoidance of suicide. Suicide is the end of life and
Kant believed that
"self-love impels the improvement of life;" if a person commits suicide,
improvement of life ceases.
Imperfect duties are those that do not achieve blame, rather they receive praise if
completed; they
are circumstantial duties such as cultivating talent. They are still based on pure
reason, but which
allow for desires in how they are carried out in practice. Because these depend
somewhat on the
subjective preferences of humankind, this duty is not as strong as a perfect duty,
but it is still morally
binding. As such, unlike perfect duties, you do not attract blame should you not
complete an
imperfect duty but you shall receive praise for it should you complete it, as you
have gone beyond
the basic duties and taken duty upon yourself. Imperfect duties are circumstantial,
meaning simply
that you could not reasonably exist in a constant state of performing that duty.
This is what truly
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 57
differentiates between perfect and imperfect duties, because imperfect duties are
those duties that
are never truly completed. Examples of imperfect duties are perfecting the ability
to write and
produce works.
B. The Principle of Humanity as an End, Never as Merely a Means
The second maxim states that we should not use humanity of ourselves or others as a
means to an
end. “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of
any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an
end.” Every rational
action must set before itself not only a principle, but also an end. Most ends are
of a subjective kind,
because they need only be pursued if they are in line with some particular
hypothetical imperative
that a person may choose to adopt. For an end to be objective, it would be
necessary that we
categorically pursue it. This principle has received more widespread approval than
any other part of
Kant’s moral philosophy. People, as rational beings, are ends in themselves and
should never be
used merely as means to other ends. We may use physical things as means, but when
we use people
simply as means, as in slavery, prostitution, or commercial exploitation, we
degrade them and violate
their innermost beings as people.
The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us
individually. For
example, Suicide would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the
alleviation of
my misery. The free will is the source of all rational action. But to treat it as a
subjective end is to
deny the possibility of freedom in general. Because the autonomous will is the one
and only source
of moral action, it would contradict the first formulation to claim that a person
is merely a means to
some other end, rather than always an end in themselves. On this basis, Kant
derives second
formulation of the categorical imperative from the first. By combining this
formulation with the
first, we learn that a person has perfect duty not to use the humanity of
themselves or others
merely as a means to some other end. An example of the second maxim would be that
of slavery.
Although it can be realized that a slave owner has the right to own property, they
do not have the
right to own a person. The right to not own a person stems from the ideals of
autonomy and free
will. A person who is owned does not have free will and therefore is not autonomous
and cannot be
held to duty; the concept of slavery contradicts the first maxim and Kant's theory
does not allow for
contradictions of the maxims.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 58
We should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments.
For Kant, we
treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent
value of that
person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this
acknowledges the inherent
value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever
we treat that
person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my
neighbor’s car since
I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness.
C. The Principle of Autonomy
The third maxim states that we should consider ourselves to be members in the
universal realm of
ends. Therefore, every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim
always a
legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends.
Because a truly autonomous will would not be subjugated to any interest, it would
only be subject to
those laws it makes for itself - but it must also regard those laws as if they
would be bound to others,
or they would not be universalizable, and hence they would not be laws of conduct
at all. Thus Kant
presents the notion of the hypothetical Kingdom of Ends of which he suggests all
people should
consider themselves both means and ends. We should consider our actions to be of
consequence to
everyone else in that our actions affect not only ourselves but that of others.
Everything we do
should not only be of benefit to ourselves, but benefit each other universally.
"Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that
of another,
always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means." We ought to act
only by maxims
that would harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends. We have perfect duty not to
act by maxims
that create incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs when we attempt to
universalize them,
and we have imperfect duty not to act by maxims that lead to unstable or greatly
undesirable states
of affairs.
The main problem with the categorical imperative is its rigidity. The famous
example that illustrates
this is that of a crazed axe-murderer coming to your front door and asking you
where your children
are. You could lie – many would say you should lie – but imagine if everyone in the
entire world lied
all the time. That would not be a nice place to live in, so the categorical
imperative says you can’t lie.
You have to tell the axe-murderer the truth, so he can go and kill your children.
Kant was asked
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 59
about this personally, and he said that this was indeed the case. It would be
immoral to lie to the
man. He did, however, say that you could also choose to lock your door and call the
police. Here’s
another example – you’re in a room with a man who’s holding a gun to your mother’s
head. You
know he’ll shoot her any second. Right next to you, there’s a button. If you press
the button, the
man will fall through a trap door and land in a spike pit, dying instantly. Your
mother will be saved.
According to the categorical imperative, this would be the wrong thing to do. You
can’t press the
button. But if you don’t, your mother will die. It’s in situations like this that
strict ethical systems
with specific decision procedures tend to fall apart. Morality is simply too
complex, too full of
exceptions for these theories to ever fully work.
Activity:
Review Kant’s rule of universality;
A. Can you give examples where you think this rule should not or could not be
observed?
B. Do you agree with Kant that the consequences of our actions are not fully in our
control and
so should not count in the moral appraisal of our actions?
[Link]. Ross’s Prima Facie Duties or Moral Guidelines
A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D.
Ross, which
emphasizes prima facie duties. Sir William David Ross (15 April 1877 – 5 May 1971),
usually cited as
W. D. Ross, was a Scottish philosopher, known for work in ethics. The term prima
facie means “at a
first sight” or “on the surface.” By prima facie duties, Ross means duties that
dictate what we should
do when other moral factors are not considered. Stated another way, prima facie
duties are duties
that generally obligate us; that is, they ordinarily impose a moral obligation but
may not in a
particular case because of circumstances. An actual duty is the action that one
ought to perform
after considering and weighing all the prima facie duties involved.
According to W. D. Ross (1877-1971), there are several prima facie duties that we
can use to determine
what, concretely, we ought to do. A prima facie duty is a duty that is binding
(obligatory) other
things equal, that is, unless it is overridden or trumped by another duty or
duties. Another way of
putting it is that where there is a prima facie duty to do something, there is at
least a fairly strong
presumption in favor of doing it. An example of a prima facie duty is the duty to
keep promises.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 60
Unless stronger moral considerations override, one ought to keep a promise made. By
contrast with prima facie duties, our actual or concrete duty is the duty we should
perform in the
particular situation of choice. Whatever one's actual duty is, one is morally bound
to perform it.
Prima facie duties relate to actual duties as reasons do to conclusions of
reasoning.
The term "duty" in "prima facie duty" is slightly misleading. The prima facie
duties are understood
as guidelines, not rules without exception. If an action does not correspond to a
specific guideline,
one is not necessarily violating a rule that one ought to follow. However, not
following the rule one
ought to follow in a particular case is failing to do one's (actual) duty. In such
cases it makes sense to
talk about violating a rule. The rule might be the same in words as a prima facie
duty (minus the
phrase "unless other moral considerations override"), but it would no longer be
merely a guideline
because it describes what one concretely should do.
Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are “part
of the
fundamental nature of the universe.” However, Ross’s list the following categories
of prima facie
duties is much shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:
•
Duties of Fidelity: the duty to keep promises and the obligation not to lie. Duties
of fidelity
are duties to keep one’s promises and contracts and not to engage in deception.
•
Duties of Reparation: This is a duty to make up for the injuries one has done to
others.
Ross describes this duty as "resting on a previous wrongful act". It is the duty to
compensate
others when we harm them. If, for example, I damage something that belongs to
someone
else, I have an obligation to make restitution.
•
Duties of Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us. Suppose, for example, an
especially good friend is suddenly in need of assistance, I am duty bound to do all
I can help
this individual, who in the past had acted so selflessly toward me.
•
Duties of Justice: The duty of justice requires that one act in such a way that one
distributes
benefits and burdens fairly. Ross himself emphasizes the negative aspect of this
duty: he says
that this type of duty "rests on the fact or possibility of a distribution of
pleasure or
happiness (or the means thereto) that is not in accord with the merit of the
persons
concerned; in such cases there arises a duty to upset or prevent such a
distribution". Thus
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 61
the duty of justice includes the duty, insofar as possible, to prevent an unjust
distribution of
benefits or burdens.
•
Duties of Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others. The duty to do
good
to others: to foster their health, security, wisdom, moral goodness, or happiness.
This duty,
says Ross, "rests upon the fact that there are other beings in the world whose
condition we
can make better in respect of virtue, or of intelligence, or of pleasure."
•
Duties of Self-improvement: The duty of self-improvement is to act so as to promote
one’s own good, i.e., one’s own health, security, wisdom, moral goodness, virtue,
intelligence
and happiness.
•
Duties of Non-maleficence: The duty of non-injury (also known as non-maleficence)
is
the duty not to harm others physically or psychologically: to avoid harming their
health,
security, intelligence, character, or happiness. We are obliged to avoid hurting
others
physically, emotionally and psychologically.
Jacques Thiroux (2001) claims that Ross' duty of non-injury includes a duty to
prevent injury to
others. This seems to be wrong regarding Ross, but it might be reasonable to add
such a prima facie
duty to the list. Non-injury in Ross' strict sense is distinct from the prevention
of harm to others.
Non-injury instructs us generally to avoid intentionally, negligently, or
ignorantly (when ignorance is
avoidable) harming others. Harm-prevention instructs us generally to make a real
effort to prevent
harm to others from causes other than ourselves.
In summary, Ross presents seven categories of prima facie duties, although there
may be more
categories. However, he does insist that we acknowledge and willingly accept the
seven categories
without argument. His appeal for their acceptance does not rely primarily on reason
and argument
but on intuition. When faced with a situation that presents conflicting prima facie
duties, Ross tells
us, the more obligatory, our actual duty. The actual duty has the greatest amount
of prima facie
rightness over wrongness.
Activity:
Join with classmates and imagine that you are the prime minister of Ethiopia. What
principles would
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 62
you use to govern Ethiopian society and the country?
2.3.5. Virtue Ethics
Virtue Ethics: Challenging the adequacy of rule-based theories
“Virtue ethics” is a technical term in contemporary Western analytical moral
philosophy, used to
distinguish a normative ethical theory focused on the virtues, or moral character,
from others such
as deontology (or contractarianism) and consequentialism. Imagine a case in which
it is agreed by
every sort of theorist that I should, say, help someone in need. A deontologist
will emphasize the
fact that in offering help, I will be acting in accordance with a moral rule or
principle such as “Do
unto others as you would be done by”; a consequentialist will point out that the
consequences of
helping will maximize well-being; and a virtue ethicist will emphasize the fact
that providing help
would be charitable or benevolent – charity and benevolence being virtues.
[Link]. Aristotle’s Ethics
The ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, (384-322 B.C.) first wrote a detailed
discussion of virtue
morality in the Nichomachean Ethics. ‘Virtus’ he understood as strength.
Correspondingly, specific
virtues are seen as strengths of character. But, many years after Aristotle’s
death, virtue theory came
to be over-shadowed by the development of utilitarianism and deontology.
In the past fifty years, however, virtue theory has resurfaced as a major moral
theory. But why is that
so? Virtue ethics has been restated and reinvigorated in the years since 1958 by
philosophers such as
Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre and Elizabeth Anscombe. They and many others
became
disillusioned with the promises of mainstream theories. They argue that how we
ought to live could
be much more adequately answered by a virtue-based theory than in terms of
calculating
consequences or obeying rules.
Key questions which virtue ethical systems ask include:
✓ What sort of person do I want to be?
✓ What virtues are characteristic of the person I want to be?
✓ What actions will cultivate the virtues I want to possess?
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 63
✓ What actions will be characteristic of the sort of person I want to be?
With respect to the good, right, happiness, the good is not a disposition. The good
involves
a teleological system that involves actions.
A. Good is that which all things aim. Something is good if it performs its proper
function. E.g., a
good coffee cup or a good red oak.
o A right action is that which is conducive to the good, and different goods
correspond to the
differing sciences and arts.
o "The god" or best good is that which is desired for its own sake and for the sake
which we
desire all other ends or goods. For human beings, eudaemonia is activity of the
soul in
accordance with arete (excellence, virtue, or what it's good for). Eudaemonia is
living well and
doing well in the affairs of the world.
B. The good of human beings cannot be answered with the exactitude of a
mathematical problem
since mathematics starts with general principles and argues to conclusions.
o Ethics starts with actual moral judgments before the formulation of general
principles.
o Aristotle presupposes natural tendencies in people.
C. Aristotle distinguishes between happiness (eudaemonia) and moral virtue:
o Moral virtue is not the end of life for it can go with inactivity, misery, and
unhappiness
o Happiness, the end of life, that to which all aims, is activity in accordance
with reason
(reason is the arete or peculiar excellence of persons).
a. Happiness is an activity involving both moral and intellectual arete.
b. Some external goods are necessary in order to exercise that activity.
The Good Character
A. People have a natural capacity for good character, and it is developed through
practice. The
capacity does not come first--it's developed through practice.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 64
o The sequence of human behavior raises the question of which is preeminent--acts
or
dispositions. Their interaction is broken by Aristotle's distinction between acts
which
create good dispositions and acts which flow from the good disposition once it has
been
created.
o Arete is a disposition developed out of a capacity by the proper exercise of that
capacity.
o Habits are developed through acting; a person's character is the structure of
habits and is
formed by what we do.
B. Virtue, arete, or excellence is defined as a mean between two extremes of excess
and defect in
regard to a feeling or action as the practically wise person would determine it.
The mean
cannot be calculated a priori.
o The mean is relative to the individual and circumstances. For example, consider
the
following traits:
Aristotelian Virtues And Vices Sphere Of Action
Vice Of Deficiency Mean Or Virtue Vice Of Excess
Fear cowardice courage foolhardiness
Pleasure and Pain insensibility temperance self-indulgence
Acquisition (minor) tight wad liberality spendthrift or prodigality
Acquisition (major) undue humility pride or proper ambition undue vanity
Anger unirascibility patience or good temper hotheadedness
Self-Expression Self-deprecating truthfulness boastfulness
Conversation boorishness wittiness buffoonery
Social Conduct cantankerous friendliness obsequiousness
Exhibition shamelessness modesty shyness
Indignation spitefulness righteous indignation envy
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 65
o The level of courage necessary is different for a philosophy teacher, a commando,
and a
systems programmer.
o Phronesis or practical wisdom is the ability to see the right thing to do in the
circumstances.
Notice, especially, Aristotle's theory does not imply ethical relativism because
there are
appropriate standards.
o In the ontological dimension, virtue is a mean; in the axiological dimension, it
is an extreme
or excellence. Martin Luther King, Jr. relates his struggle to understand this
difference in his
"Letter from Birmingham Jail" when he wrote, "You speak of our activity in
Birmingham as
extreme… But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an
extremist, as I
continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a measure of satisfaction
from the
label. Was not Jesus an extremist for love…? Was not Amos an extremist for
justice…? Was
not Paul an extremist for the Christian gospel…? Perhaps the South, the nation and
the
world are in dire need of creative extremists.''
o Some presumptively virtuous behaviors can be an extreme as when, for example, the
medieval philosopher Peter Abélard explains, No long time thereafter I was smitten
with a
grievous illness, brought upon me by my immoderate zeal for study. (Peter Abélard,
Historia
Calamitatum trans. Ralph Adams Cram (St. Paul, MN: Thomas A. Boyd, 1922), 4.)
o In the ontological dimension, virtue is a mean; in the axiological dimension, it
is an extreme
or excellence. E.g., Hartmann's Diagram:
➢ Pleasure and pain are powerful determinants of our actions.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 66
III. Pleasure is the natural accompaniment of unimpeded activity. Pleasure, as
such, is neither good
nor bad.
A. Even so, pleasure is something positive and its effect is to perfect the
exercise of activity.
Everything from playing chess to making love is improved with skill.
B. Pleasure cannot be directly sought--it is the side-product of activity. It is
only an element of
happiness.
C. The good person, the one who has attained eudaemonia, is the standard as to what
is truly
pleasant or unpleasant.
IV. Friendship: a person's relationship to a friend is the same as the relation to
oneself. The friend
can be thought of as a second self.
A. In friendship a person loves himself (egoism) not as one seeks money for
himself, but as he
gives his money away to receive honor.
B. The kinds of friendship:
➢ Utility
➢ Pleasure
➢ The Good--endures as long as both retain their character.
V. The Contemplative Faculty--the exercise of perfect happiness in intellectual or
philosophic
activity.
A. Reason is the highest faculty of human beings. We can engage in it longer than
other
activities.
B. Philosophy is loved as an end-in-itself, and so eudaemonia implies leisure and
self-sufficiency as
an environment for contemplation.
Aristotle on Pleasure
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 67
A summary of Aristotle's ethics clarifies several important distinction between
happiness and
pleasure.
I. Eudaimonia: the state of personal wellbeing, having self-worth; exhibiting a
zest for life;
radiating energy; achieving happiness, "good spirit," or self-presence.
II. Hence, happiness is activity of the soul in accordance with areté (excellence
or virtue).
A. I.e. Living well and doing well in the affairs of the world.
B. Picture yourself at your best. Compare Maslow's self-actualizing person or
Jung's
individuation of a person with Aristotle's description of eudaimonia.
III. Good is that to which all thing aim; i.e., the good is that which performs its
proper function.
A. What constitutes a good wrench or a good coffee cup? The peculiar areté of
excellence is established by its purpose. The peculiar excellence is teleological.
B. What constitutes a good person?"
1) Activity of the soul in accordance with reason (that capacity which is unique to
us as
persons).
2) This activity is both moral (doing the right thing at the right time)
and intellectual areté (practical wisdom or phronesis).
3) Aristotle notes that some external goods are necessary for the exercise of that
activity.
IV. Moral Virtue is not the end of life, for it can go with inactivity, misery, and
unhappiness.
V. What is good for a person cannot be answered with the exactitude of mathematics.
A. Ethics attempts to formulate general principles whose application is dependent
upon
the circumstances at hand (i.e., initial conditions). (Note that Aristotle's theory
does
not imply ethical relativism)
B. The doctrine of the mean is not a doctrine of relativism but doctrine applied to
specific circumstances. E.g., what and how much one eats differs for a weight-
lifter
and a ballerina--even so, proper diet has guidelines and standards which apply
differently according to different initial conditions.
VI. Pleasure, itself, is a side-product of activity; pleasure results from activity
without hindrance.
1) As Aristotle expresses it, pleasure is the natural accompaniment of unimpeded
activity.
2) Pleasure, as such, is neither good nor bad, but is something positive because
the effect of
pleasure perfects the exercise of that activity.
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 68
3) Even so, Aristotle emphasizes that pleasure is not to be sought for its own
sake. (Cf., the
hedonistic paradox.)
Activity:
Summary questions;
a. How do you understand the idea of ‘virtue’? Consider someone whom you think is
‘virtuous’.
How would you describe them? What kinds of behavior or attitudes of the person
would you
offer as moral indicators of virtue?
b. Does a ‘good’ doctor or nurse have certain characteristic ‘virtues’? If you had
to write a short
essay on ‘The Caring Professional: a Life of Virtue’, what would you have to say?
If you
believe that virtue is not relevant as a focus in healthcare, try and explain why?
2.4. Non-Normative Ethics/Meta-ethics
2.4.1. What is Meta-ethics?
Suppose I am debating with a friend the question whether or not we ought to give to
famine relief,
whether or not we are morally obliged to give to famine relief. The sorts of
questions philosophers
raise about this kind of debate fall roughly into two groups. First, there are
first order questions about
which party in the debate, if any, is right, and why. Then, there are second order
questions about what
the parties in the debate are doing when they engage in it. Roughly, the first
order questions are the
province of normative ethics, and the second order questions are the province of
metaethics. As one
recent writer puts it:
In metaethics, we are concerned not with questions which are the province of
normative ethics like 'Should I give to
famine relief?' or 'Should I return the wallet I found in the street?' but with
questions about questions like these.
Meta-ethics tries to answer question, such as:
 What does “good,” “right,” or “justice” mean?
 What makes something good or right?
 Is moral realism true?
 Is morality irreducible, cognitive, or overriding?
 Do intrinsic values exist?
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 69
It is important to be clear that in normative ethics we do not just look for an
answer to the question
'Should we give to famine relief?' we also look for some insight into why the right
answer is right. It
is in their answers to this latter sort of 'why?' question that the classic
theories in normative ethics
disagree. Examples of such theories include:
 act-utilitarianism (one ought to give to famine relief because that particular
action, of those
possible, contributes most to the greater happiness of the greatest number); rule-
utilitarianism (one ought to give to famine relief because giving to famine relief
is prescribed
by a rule the general observance of which contributes most to the greater happiness
of the
greatest number); and
 Kantianism (one ought to give to famine relief because universal refusal to give
to famine
relief would generate some kind of inconsistency).
Normative ethics thus seeks to discover the general principles underlying moral
practice, and in this
way potentially impacts upon practical moral problems: different general principles
may yield
different verdicts in particular cases. Meta-ethics, rather, concerned with
questions about the
following:
(a) Meaning: what is the semantic function of moral discourse? Is the function of
moral discourse
to state facts, or does it have some other non-fact-stating role?
(b) Metaphysics: do moral facts (or properties) exist? If so, what are they like?
Are they
identical or reducible to some other type of fact (or property) or are they
irreducible and sui
generis?
(c) Epistemology and justification: is there such a thing as moral knowledge? How
can we
know whether our moral judgements are true or false? How can we ever justify our
claims to
moral knowledge?
(d) Phenomenology: how are moral qualities represented in the experience of an
agent making
a moral judgement? Do they appear to be 'out there' in the world?
(e) Moral psychology: what can we say about the motivational state of someone
making a
moral judgement? What sort of connection is there between making a moral judgement
and
being motivated to act as that judgement prescribes?
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 70
(f) Objectivity: can moral judgements really be correct or incorrect? Can we work
towards
finding out the moral truth?
Obviously, this list is not intended to be exhaustive, and the various questions
are not all
independent (for example, a positive answer to (f) looks, on the face of it, to
presuppose that the
function of moral discourse is to state facts). But it is worth noting that the
list is much wider than
many philosophers forty or fifty years ago would have thought. For example, one
such philosopher
writes:
[Metaethics] is not about what people ought to do. It is about what they are doing
when they talk about what they
ought to do.
The idea that metaethics is exclusively about language was no doubt due to the more
general idea
that philosophy as a whole has no function other than the study of ordinary
language and that
'philosophical problems' only arise from the application of words out of the
contexts in which they
are ordinarily used. Fortunately, this 'ordinary language' conception of philosophy
has long since
ceased to hold sway, and the list of metaethical concerns – in metaphysics,
epistemology,
phenomenology and moral psychology, as well as in semantics and the theory of
meaning – bears
this out. Positions in metaethics can be defined in terms of the answers they give
to these sorts of
question. Some examples of metaethical theories are moral realism, non-cognitivism,
error-theory
and moral anti-realism.
2.4.2. Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism
Consider a particular moral judgement, such as the judgement that murder is wrong.
What sort of
psychological state does this express? Some philosophers, called cognitivists,
think that a moral
judgement such as this expresses a belief. Beliefs can be true or false: they are
truth-apt, or apt to be
assessed in terms of truth and falsity. So cognitivists think that moral judgements
are capable of
being true or false. On the other hand, non-cognitivists think that moral
judgements express non-
cognitive states such as emotions or desires. Desires and emotions are not truth-
apt. So moral
judgements are not capable of being true or false. (Note that, although it may be
true that I have a
desire for a pint of beer and false that I have a desire to see Ethiopia win the
World Cup, this does
not imply that desires themselves can be true or false.)
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 71
[Link]. Strong Cognitivism: Naturalism
A strong cognitivist theory is one which holds that moral judgements (a) are apt
for evaluation in terms
of truth and falsity, and (b) can be the upshot of cognitively accessing the facts
which render them
true. Strong cognitivist theories can be either naturalist or non-naturalist.
According to a naturalist, a
moral judgement is rendered true or false by a natural state of affairs, and it is
this natural state of
affairs to which a true moral judgement affords us access. But what is a natural
state of affairs? G. E.
Moore's characterization: “By 'nature', then, I do mean and have meant that which
is the subject matter of the
natural sciences and also of psychology.”
A natural property is a property which figures in one of the natural sciences or in
psychology:
examples might include the property of being conducive to the greatest happiness of
the greatest
number and the property of being conducive to the preservation of the human
species. A natural
state of affairs is simply a state of affairs that consists in the instantiation of
a natural property.
Naturalist cognitivists hold that moral properties are identical to (or reducible
to) natural properties.
The Cornell realists (e.g. Nicholas Sturgeon, Richard Boyd, and David Brink) think
that moral
properties are irreducible natural properties in their own right. Naturalist
reductionists (e.g. Richard
that moral properties are reducible to the other natural properties that are the
subject matter of the
natural sciences and psychology. Both the Cornell realists and the naturalist
reductionists are moral
realists: they think that there really are moral facts and moral properties, and
that the existence of
these moral facts and instantiation of these moral properties is constitutively
independent of human
opinion.
[Link].1. Strong Cognitivism: Non-Naturalism
Non-naturalists think that moral properties are not identical to or reducible to
natural properties.
They are irreducible and sui generis. We will look at two types of strong
cognitivist non-naturalism:
Moore's ethical non-naturalism, as developed in his Principia Ethica (first
published in 1903),
according to which the property of moral goodness is non-natural, simple, and
unanalysable; and the
contemporary version of non-naturalism that has been developed by John McDowell and
David
Wiggins (roughly from the 1970s to the present day). Again, both types of non-
naturalist are moral
realists: they think that there really are moral facts and moral properties, and
that the existence of
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 72
these moral facts and instantiation of these moral properties is constitutively
independent of human
opinion.
[Link].2. Strong Cognitivism without Moral Realism: Mackie's
'Error-Theory'
John Mackie has argued that although moral judgements are apt to be true or false,
and that moral
judgements, if true, would afford us cognitive access to moral facts, moral
judgements are in fact
always false. This is because there simply are no moral facts or properties in the
world of the sort
required to render our moral judgements true: we have no plausible epistemological
account of how
we could access such facts and properties, and, moreover, such properties and facts
would be
metaphysically queer, unlike anything else in the universe as we know it. A moral
property would have
to be such that the mere apprehension of it by a moral agent would be sufficient to
motivate that
agent to act. Mackie finds this idea utterly problematic. He concludes that there
are no moral
properties or moral facts, so that (positive, atomic) moral judgements are
uniformly false: our moral
thinking involves us in a radical error. Because Mackie denies that there are moral
facts or properties,
he is not a moral realist, but a moral antirealist.
[Link].3. Weak Cognitivism about Morals without Moral Realism: 'Best
Opinion' Theories
A weak cognitivist theory is one which holds that moral judgements
(a) are apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity, but
(b) cannot be the upshot of cognitive access to moral properties and states of
affairs.
Weak cognitivism thus agrees with strong cognitivism on (a), but disagrees on (b).
An example of a
weak cognitivist theory would be one which held that our best judgements about
morals determine the
extensions of moral predicates, rather than being based upon some faculty which
tracks, detects or
cognitively accesses facts about the instantiation of moral properties. (The
extension of a predicate is the
class of things, events or objects to which that predicate may correctly be
applied.)
Moral judgements are thus capable of being true or false, even though they are not
based on a
faculty with a tracking, accessing or detecting role - in other words, even though
true moral
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 73
judgements are not the upshot of cognitive access to moral states of affairs. This
view thus rejects
moral realism, not by denying the existence of moral facts (like the error-theory),
but by denying that
those facts are constitutively independent of human opinion.
2.4.3. Non-Cognitivism
Non-cognitivists deny that moral judgements are even apt to be true or false. Non-
cognitivists thus
disagree with both weak and strong cognitivism. We shall look at a number of
arguments which the
non-cognitivist uses against cognitivism. An example of such an argument is the
argument from moral
psychology.
Suppose that moral judgements can express beliefs, as the cognitivist claims. Being
motivated to do
something or to pursue a course of action is always a matter of having a belief and
a desire. For
example, I am motivated to reach for the fridge because I believe that it contains
water and I have a
desire for water. But it is an internal and necessary fact about an agent that, if
she sincerely judges
that X is good, she is motivated to pursue the course of action X. So if a moral
judgement expressed
a belief, it would have to be a belief which sustained an internal and necessary
connection to a
desire: it would have to be a necessary truth that an agent who possessed the
belief would inter alia
possess the desire. But no belief is necessarily connected to a desire because, as
Hume claimed,
'beliefs and desires are distinct existences', and it is impossible to have a
necessary connection
between distinct existences. So it cannot be the case that moral judgements express
beliefs. So moral
judgements are not truth-apt. If moral judgements cannot express beliefs, what do
they express?
We shall look at three versions of non-cognitivism which give different answers to
this question:
✓ J. Ayer's emotivism (1936), according to which moral judgements express emotions,
or
sentiments of approval or disapproval;
✓ Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism (1984), according to which moral judgements
express our
dispositions to form sentiments of approval or disapproval; and
✓ Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism (1990), according to which our moral judgements
express our acceptance of norms.
Perhaps the main challenge to non-cognitivism is what is called the Frege - Geach
problem. According
to emotivism, for example, judging that murder is wrong is really just like
shouting 'Boo for murder!'
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 74
(when I shout 'Boo!' I am evincing my disapproval; I am not attempting to describe
something). But
what about 'If murder is wrong, then it is wrong to murder your mother-in-law'?
This makes sense.
But on the emotivist interpretation it doesn't (what would it sound like on an
emotivist
interpretation?).
[Link]. Internalism and Externalism, Humeanism and Anti- Humeanism
One of the premises in the argument from moral psychology above is the claim that
there is an
internal and necessary connection between sincerely making a moral judgement and
being motivated
to act in the manner prescribed by that judgement. This claim is known as
internalism, because it
says that there is an internal or conceptual connection between moral judgement and
motivation.
Activity:
Make note of some of the ethical behavior you witness in your family. How would you
classify these
behaviors? What impact do they have on your life? Write up your findings.
Some cognitivist philosophers respond to the argument from moral psychology by
denying
internalism. They claim that the connection between judgement and motivation is
only external
and contingent. Such philosophers are known as externalists. Other cognitivist
philosophers
respond to the argument from moral psychology by denying another premise of the
argument, the
claim that motivation always involves the presence of both beliefs and desires
(this premise is known
as the Humean theory of motivation, since it received a classic exposition by
Hume). McDowell
and Wiggins advance an anti-Humean theory of motivation, according to which beliefs
themselves can be intrinsically motivating.
Generally, Meta-ethics:
•
Examines the meaning of moral terms and concepts and the relationships between
these
concepts.
•
Explores where moral values, such as ‘personhood’ and ‘autonomy’, come from.
•
Considers the difference between moral values and other kinds of values.
•
Examines the way in which moral claims are justified.
Meta-ethics also poses questions of the following kind:
✓ What do we mean by the claim, ‘life is sacred’?
MORAL AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION (MCED 1011)
MoSHE 75
✓ Are moral claims a matter of personal view, religious belief or social standard,
or, are they
objective in some sense?
✓ If they are objective, what make them so?
Is there a link between human psychology and the moral claims that humans make?