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Decision theory and game theory

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86 views26 pages

VSC Notes

Decision theory and game theory

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kiran118019
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© © All Rights Reserved
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QYHoveveevseveuHyvvovvrvwvrrr” +H Decision Theory: Whenevey we have to take, decision , we have to Altewnative oy Strategies oy Courses of acton. Then we Have +0 consider what ane the possible events that Ent occu } N +he future and what will be the e¢tet Of selection of altennatives when +his event occuns. Adies! Studing fhe situation TO Select Hest a tere! hence ony decision problem we have to follow 4 Steps HEP 11- Foy given prcblem voxite down tne possible alermative. Let they one "Aa2, As..... An" SFP 22- Tn Cudure Some event ace ane known as State State of natuye. Step 3. Can be Le+ aiy “ym Of nature. let theiy sist ' ond it's denoted ‘ Covresponding 40 each Cornp} Cost O% Pxofi't matyrx Denote the Pat by "51,52... 6 6m" nation of Stretegy . Payot# when we select" tm" ¢ NENT then payoff matyix con be written as Altesnatives [Acton s Ai Az An S On 21 ans Stare of $2 Ai2 22 an2 Natu) Soy aim ae am Bent SEEP YH. Select the best Stage all altemative using the Payott mataix @]A company want +o Produce one of the +hsee Produdl [Link]- The cost associatedt with . The Product ONe classity in90 tO catgony Ax COSt ond voniable ws}. T+ 15 given in a Table. [Tec » NC > Low Demand lal i | pA {25 | 2 | Medium Demon 18 138 +4 . bc | 53! 2 |—— 4 High Demand The Futuye clemand is lightly to be a pooy-demene hat mM 1-@ 3000 event rnedium demand i-€ Joco units And High demond ig tooo unyts . Tne selling Price for each unit 1s 25. write +ne Payoft matrix Product ‘A’ Low Profit = 6P —¢.p = Bove x28) - (12.3000) +25 = 36995 Medium Profit = 5p -¢.p = (7000x285) - (12% Fo00) +25 = 4097's; High Oxofit = $.p~O-P Ctiooe x25)- Ciioo0x12) 426 142995 wo Product ’ Low profit = §.P-cpP = (B000x 25) - (4x3000) +35 = 49965 Medium Profit = $P-cCP (Fov0x25) - (4x3000) + 35 = WIG6S High Profit = 5.P~c.p (Itcoox 25) - [4K 000) +35 (954965 v wt Product’ c’ Low Prof4 = §-P- cp =@000x25) - (9x 3000)+ $3 = 6347 Medium Psofit = $.p -¢.p = (ooo x25) ~ (4 X 9000) +53 > \259u9 High Puofit = $-p-cp = (ooo x25) - (9 x1N000) +53 ) ) = 1999uq7 > tt Decision Making . . We have to taxe decision under differen} cond i Hons, > de vending on the diffesent nature of tne Situation > decision making ond situations Me Classified into Be THeee Categories @ Decision making vundes cestainty WB Nese we know ime Under in future what will be tne outcome oy Payof4 causes Ponding +o each al texnetive. ~ 9) Decision Making onder uncertainty _ pe Hese We nave 45 Select that best alternative under! r. Different Situation wwe one identivéy different Stare T. Of Moduse but sufvicient pont data 1S not available. @ 3) Decision Making undes Risk. - We con identiyfy for dif€enent Stcrte ot nature only w Wtosmaton 46 tye associate the Probeibitity association Dp each state of nature. since the probabi 5 OF patuse avalible, we lities ond State Calculate the expectect Payoff. To take the clé&isron Y de Decision making undex uncertainty y Let Ar,A2---*» An ono At Féenen+ Strategies Ow alterreiv: P ond §$1,$2---- Sm one the Affenens State Of nature! ae Of. The pale Of rratetx Ke given ly DP A Az An S an a2 an Se On, a2 an2 Sen Quen azm anm '5 40 Select the best altematives. There ONE different methods ox appsoches +o obtain the best sStecrtegy | 1] Pessimistic appsoach Conservative) T+ 16 also krown as max! tO Calculate the minimum value to each Alternative and seleg the maximum value omong the minimum Selected = max~meon ApPscach Should be usecl when pajr of Med etx 1S parotid Matix bub when ibis COSt matsix we USE meon - Max Principle MEAN Cyitexia here we have to The paix oF Corsesponding Ft the steategy which ‘S having Pwotit mnoteix = max-min COSF matsix => min-max 2) Ophmistic Approach :- | T+ 18 aso known as max We have paie of mertwix a¢ rmrax-max Principle j£ iy mak . Os minterin approach when a Profit matix we use 1S C COSt-matei x WE LSE Mmmin” | Psindple = S] Laplace's Carteria’. — Laplace has suggested to allocate equal all sto#@ of natyye ond find the expecte, (min) corresponding +40 exch Alterranve 4g alternative which 1S having maximum 2x, + 1S a px0lt mataix but pair of rmateix then we select minimum expected Pale PrObabNFeS. Fey ‘ol Payotes Pecteel. Daily oy 1S & (054 matic INA Selected the St I wwe > > > Eb bELELEKELELEDEUY OH / UJ Huwwit2 Criteria + - I+ 6 also known as Criteria OF realize Coxsesponeling to each Strategy ox alternative we have to calculate the value of Amin + (I-ad)max for Cost matsrx for PrOFit matyix olmax+ Cl-a)min. where Oo’ Ts known as Coefticent Of Optimism when XY 1 huywit2 Cxttersg APPwches 10 OpHmistic carterra Approcnes +0 pessimistre be nesura) ox When “=o then (+ Carteriq AwL Cb IS Sata to &nbiasecl approches SJ Savage Ceiteria : It "5 known as min-max wegret CBiteria we have 40 Calulate opparstunity joss #0 each combination of Stratery ond event OPPOstimity fo $s loss Meusd fxr nor Pale Of medsix has +o be Convertedl +9 OPpoytunity loss matetx then We have to p , USE min~ ma nel to obtain the X Pwinciple 'S defined as the Selecting the best Strategy. The Example :- A fasmex has to decide which of the theee Coops "A.B.C" be Ghould cultivate. The profit depencls on amount OF wainfall. The pais Of rnatyix is given as fMowlng Suggest the bes} Strategy oundex pesimish Cater OPhmistic Gitesia Laplace Caitertag « Huxwite Citexia (A=06 SAVAGE Cyiteria . Cvop Rain fal) A 8B C Ma xX High gooo 3500 S000 S000 Medium u5s00 US00 S006 S000 Low 2000 SOO 4000 S000 i] Pessimistic :- min = 2000 3500 4ooo martmin = uooo Cc) 2] Ophmistic : Max = 8000 Sooo 5000 max-max = 2000 3] Laplace “Expected profit MAX = 4833.33 For A €od= 3 nei (P,) Gi U1 Ploas) + 22 Plo) +23 P(r) Fox A $000 + 4SEH 4+ 2000 3 3 3 4833-33 4333.3 4666-69 = 4833.33 For B E(x)= 3500 +4500 4 S000 - 333.2 3 3 3 Fore E(x) = 5000 + 5000 + HOOD = 4666.69 3 = 3 © U7 odmax +} —d)enin 5606 4U00 Ub00 max = 56004) A (4000 x0-6)+ (2000x044) = 6600 B (5000 X 0:6) + (3506 xo) = YU00 C C5000 X06) + (Y Hoo xov)= Ub600 SD Oppostunity Loss mertaix Colm) Rainfa |! A B c High 0 4S00 3000 medium 500 500 0 Low 2000 6 1006 max 3000 4US0O 3000 mins 3000 CA orc) @] under optimistic Laplace. Huxwit> Fasmer Shou lo Cultivate Cop 4. Under savage Caiteria Fam mer shoul Cultivate CxOp A ow Ce | EX. A Company is Cons tde xin g intooducing ane the toys » A.B.C. The Petit depends on. Acceptance by tHe > CUstomen suggest the best Steategy using pay ort rneri > Onder. on methods o£ decision Making Unde ON Cordainity > ok =Os > > Acceptance 4 B C Max > hood \20 loo 66 '26 > Mediury Bo 60 SO 80 > Poor “300-30 -30 eo e i) min “30° -30 6 Max=min =¢=¢ ® ii) May {20 100 66 Max-max > 9=)20 SND Expected 56-69 3-35 36-67 DS Pay ote 5S jy) us 35 30 S Opportunity Cost madtyix 9 SS Acceptonce A B c 5 66 — food ° ae 9 . O 20 8930 _» Medium » POOr 30 30 0 + Max 30 30 60 2 OJ under pessjmistic OpPrcach Company should Mn tyclu ce DP Toy c. S? ndex optimistic , Laplace . Huawit2 Company shou id U Pp - intsoduce toy A. FF ndey Sovage Qitexia Company should npeoauc e [2 -wy A ond pe r Ex. A company is considering 4 location 40 set up new Worsehouse. The Paoti+ value on lakhs under MasKe+ COnchtHon ane given below whet ane the =o) best Staategy fsom out Ele me thools ‘ Location Grow Li le La Ly : High 50 uo Fo 60 + Stable 30 40 2 25 é Low lo UO eens | Simin 0 @®) 40 5 | J it) Ma x 50 4O 70) 60 a MN) Expectect 30 Wo) 6? 30 € Payoft4 S iv) 30 G0 30 325 € OpPPOrtenity — COS+ mertrsix € Growth Location S High Ly Lo Cs Ly 4 Stable 20 82 0 16 7 10 oO 20 15 = ra 30 0 §0 3c = max 36 30 90 35 S . & at Decision undes wisk'- u ' = Most Busmess clecision may have +o be mode oundes & Condition gf mSk, Here more then One State oF reture exist ond decision makes has suppicient UN Pormation ty assign . Probability to each of these state of rature. Trvs Probability Ould be obtained fyroyn Me past secovds ox SimPly te subjective judgement of Aecis joy i. make Ondes condition of xisk , he number OF dedston Ceevia of zisk . the number of decision cies iq oe Qvatlable . vohich con be feIP Jo 4ake decision. FYbbSbEELELKEKEKEDED OC YEMYYNY ~~ ~ nae | Expected monetary value CE muy Wes Critexian vequirves 40 Calculate e xPectedd Value of facn decision alternative “Which 16 SUM oF the Wweignha Payolt foxy that abemctive Where the werghts ane Probability assign 4o the state o£ nature that con happen it 1S congig+ Of Some steps Step 1 Construct o conditionc | Payoff fable isting. The Altemative decision ond the Vanious State Of netuse Enter 4ne Conditional profi+- Fox each cledsion event Combination ANY with assocater! Probability - Step 2° culculote the EmMy Fox each decision alserner've conditional Profits by Ond adding +he wesul4ting — Conditone) SHEP 3. Select the alesnative the YIELDS the highest [Link]. by mulHelying the assign Peotabilits Value . Ex”. A Newspapex has following Probability oF Selling @ magzine. No. of Copies Sold Probability 10 O1 a ONG 12 0-2 13 aoe (4 Oe Cost Of Copy in 39 paige 50 palse he connot+ yetusn Copies Should he oxdex ond selling Paice rs UNSOIE! Copies How rmeny e > condition) Profit Table Possible Stock . Demand Probability 10 11 12 12 re lo ol 200 170 WO 10 80 uy O15 200 220 140 166 130 pa O2 200 220 240 2IO 160 ‘3 0-26 200 220 26 266 230 ‘ a 200 2206 20 266 2¢0 EMV 200 216 992-5 220 208 Shopkeeper Shoutcl ovdex I2 Copies, Q@J A shopkeeper of gme highly pesrsiable - type oF Fouts. Sees that DLE Derond % of these feust in his anea- Given is gris Probability ists bution . DLE Demond C dexzon} Probability ol 3 03 o-Y¥ | 4 Or2. | He Sells for © 100 per dexzon white buys each | des20n at =F UO unsold fsuit one traded on next day OF S20 devon - How mony dexzon does Shopkee peas buys So That the expected! Prodit 15 maximum Possible Stock DLE Demond Probability 6 F 8 4g a ot 360 340 320 300 | 4 0-3 360 420 Yoo 380 6 oY 360 420 480 460 4 0-2 360 u20 WO suo EMV B60 UZ YY «3S a no ptt nt oh Shopeeepey Should by ¢ dleyzon fauits for max rm Expected oppoxtnity toss (EoL} An alternative approach +0 Emy Lexpecteot, Monitexing Value} which i$ 40 minimize expected opportunity loss Ow’ expected yalue of Seguet wepresent the amount bY Which the miximum POSSible PavAt will be Teduced wemove undey vanious Possible Stock action The Pode Step 15 Prepare the Aecision event Proba bility +0 calculate EOL conditional Profit table for each combinat"on ong wgnt the assocate Step 2 Fox each event Oetesmine me conditioneg! OPPostunity lose by Subtsacting the Payot from me mQ rimum Poy-off fox that event. Step 3> calculate For fox each decision alternative by MultiPlyng the COndiHonal oppoes¥rty joss 64 associate Probabi ities ang adding the value. Step 4 > Select the alesnative which teats Gielcls minimum EoL . Stock OL Matrix lo ' 12 13 ey, O14 10 0 30 66 40 26 aa " 20, © @0 66 0-2 12 40 20 6 CO Gs Os acummnies 66 4 20 6 ay 0-3 he BO 66 4 20 «6 Eol S6 35 27.5 30 us Mivy Eol> 29-5 Expected Profit with pexfect Infox ration [EPP I] EPPI 1S the ynaximum EM\ based on pextect infoernation about the state of naduye, Tre EPPI 'S the sum of Product OF the bast State oF Natuxe Comzesponding +0 each Optimal couxse of AHO ond He Probabi "ty. EPeT iS also known ag Expected prosi+ Undey Cestarnity (fp ve) Expected value of Pex fect iNfoxmation EVvPI is the price One would be Welling +0 Pay to Sal) ( exess te PewsFect in fosrnation EVPL = Minimum EOL EVPL = EPVC - Maximum (Em y) Demana Prob Max lo ot 200 26 Wy os 220 33 12 0-2 240 ug Iz 0-25 260 65 14 0-3 220 gy 250 EVPL= Epuc - y Should pay ZS 29-5 exteg tO Get pexfecy in Foemation . Examp jes A daisy foxrn wants to butter i} Should Produce TeCOvd have Shown tne determine th e tO meet Following de. Luanthy o-¢ the Aemond. Pasy ° mand pay ertn . Quontity yequred No: of days Pxob in (kg) demond otcuy 15 6 0-03 20 14 O07 16 20 ot 30 a 80 o4 2G 4o 0-2 ) Yo 30 OS b 50 lo 0-05 ; The Stock level one distyict +O the eOnGe 15-50 kg 7 Aue to OMavaibility of Stowage faciNties Bubex ws 3 EU Perkg ond 45 SOld S S50 kg 2x Co MStauct tne Conditiona | OCHON alternative O ssociated Profit table, detesmine the eA Pected progit detesmine With maxim ZoHion OF EWL . yn 2 3 Possible Stock fis ‘20! 25 30 20/35 | luo | Iso] 150 ~$0-260 = “450-60 0-5 40, 6.00-1on9) Produce elthey 25kyg day butter ox 30kg butter Pe L&wbSLOEEBEEEDOEDEO OU WHH @® ol matsix Demand — Prob 15, O03 zo o-oo! 275) o-1 30 oy 35 0-2 4o 0-15 SO 0-08 ts oO 5O0 100 1S0 200 250 3S0 Lo 200 o 50 100 Iso 200 300 25 30 35 UO 50 Max 406 600 200 400 © 400 50 oO loo 50 1s0 100 256 200 i r— roel a goo [00 !HO0} Iso G00 $00 (L00| 200 > {00 600 1000} 250 ry een 7 7 1200 400 8a | 300 ® 5 00 600 | 350 ai © 400/ Yoo .L Isc 100 © }soo _ [ mor nong 7 ) pea om nn | es] nop i = = SPP [= Ff bs ff 7 7 a 7? F% , yz Unit 2: Game The oy. while solving no: of Pxoblems. T+ is wequired to onayrise the situation .When these ane 2 Opposite Panties where the ackon Of one Playess depends on the ackon taken by opponent. Then the situaton is called as conf iwerng Undes this sMuation each of tne Pasty fakes all availope ' Mmeasuves 30 prevent tne opponent Fsum succeeding. Ta con€iicHng situation each of the decision which taren in tne field must be ik is Is calculated to ensure that least advontageous fo the opponent . Example. Planning of Theosy Of a gome OF a eHélicting situ military openation. 3 iS nothing but a yvrethernatice) theory ‘achony To Make +the psoper onalysis of such situation ft is Necessany +o weite a Simple osynulize ynodel of he situation » This model iS known ag game. & Assumptions OR Rules of Game theosy \) The Player acts satonaly ond imelligently i 2 Each Player has a finite set of all “ Cousse Of action. >> The Player tries to maximize the gain ond minimize tne = lose: 5 UD Relevont infoxmation is known ® 5> The Playes makes its own decision without Communication, SS 6> Me Player Simultaniously selects thely sespective Statevoy BP he payott 16 Fixed ond f+ 95 determine in advance. HPUewwwUuUnvvw~ ~ Possible Statergies ar +0 each player: 7 home is on actvHy between two o* more Players i MVoluing activities by each Player accourding Yo g Sed of end: g& which e€0ch Ployer recives 2 Pesson gome:- Tf no. of Players S 2 then the geome 1S known as 2 person game. Un pesson gome : known ag p wv r KR eee - Tf no. of Players is NN Pexson game. 5) 0 sum game!- TE tne the players in the game known as N then gome ts a addition of gain made by al] {S$ Zero. then tne game "5 © Sum game. loss of 1 Players /s the galy L Profit of omer. TH game 1S non-zero Sum gome. Is Not O sum gome +hen + Lt 6) 2 Person zexo sum game. In oa game i# these one 2 a pasticiponts tne gain Of one Player ig the oss 0 F Other playex - Then the game fs known as gome I+ is known ag Rectongulan game PayoF# mettx Con be written in Fectangulan format tl A> Payotf !- The outcome o£ te game is called ag pyre ond it 15 the net gome. ol 2 Pexon gesum © because the © Suppose there one 2 Players A ond BR. A has © stotoy sl Ai, Ar... Axe ond player B&B hag es | 3 Statengies :, Bi, Ba. Re = and rf Playes A js maximizing Playes then we can write ol Payof! prateiX as : B Be 83 ...... Bs . Ay an a2 3 2... Gis es Az a2 a22 O23 2 _ .. A025 = AZ arr a32 G33... Gas a De ows | whese ij denotes net gain fos Player A when olayes B Select = Ar ond Players B Sebct Bj where j21,2,..0 ond grt 5 Tf azo (3 Tf aij >0 peofit gain fos player a loss fos player a undes ne statengy Ar ond Bj | Wexefose the Payof¥ matstx JE we wont Jo Write tne have +o interchonge is With wespect +O Player A. Payoff fox Playes RB then ue Statesgies and multiply all Payoté ) Values by =) » SStatexgy - T+ isa Peedetenmine sule designed by a > Player dunivg the game. p P Statexgy for a player is define as a set of sules 06 BD okermative aos aise of actions avaiable fo him I) @ Advance by which Player decides the course of ACHON tha Be WE should accepy DD use Statesgy:- when tne playes decides in aclvance that B Ne will select only ore cunse cf action that means i's \ Players Select come statergy each time, tren it is me veyed to ag pure Statesgy gain 10> Mixed Statergy. A mixed Statesgy iS decision making Bin advance fy all the Players to choose of statergies SB in acesdence with. q Partculan Probability disteibution . Tat means a player decide in advance +0 select either SCX Some of tne Statesgy iS Same Alved PsoporH'on then) BOs Say that he is ageing mixed Statesgy . BW opimum stotergy!+ The Statergy O~ course of action N MOSt Preferd position Statergy selected by his Opponent. # Fy Value of the game: The value e which puts the player la sespective Sof ime of the gome is tne # exoected Payot of the play when the all tne players # Of Mme game follows thers optimum statengies, * Tne game is called ag faly game if the value of gane Le ar : i is O- orrerwise i+ 16 called gs yon-£als game . i —————_—E—————— ‘ me where 'D Saddle Point: consider ¢ pesson O Sun gome , Plager A is maximizing player with x statesgies Suc AS AL AL... Ax and player Bis minimizing player ond has ¢ Siadesgies Such as 81, By. --- Bs ‘Me Maximizing — players Mes at Hs optimum sterlergy On ME basis C4 maximum - minimum Principle and maninizing player Selects i+s OpHirnurn Statexrgy on the basis Of minmnax principle . Tt max-min ig ec quals to min-Max then we Say that the game is Solved ond tre valve of the gome js Max-Min = min Max = Value o¢ the game. T# dre vawe o£ the game Point is Ci,3) ond the Optimu Ai ond fos Player QB is By Ss ay then the Sacid le mM Statesgy tox Player A is + Solve the following Q4 8 B82 Bs Ba Min A 4 same eee CHEE <)) i i a i 43 6 ce en 44 7 =) -q 5 —F Max-Min=~5 Max 7 q ©) eo Min-max=-5 Max Min= Min Max = Value OF the gome =-5 Saddle point exists ono Saddie Point Value of the gome 16-5. There foye (5 iw favour of Playes B 'S C13) ona the come J \ a2 B® B2 Bs By Bs min a) zy ! 8 Oo 0 ) m 6 5 4 6 9 @ S As 2 a s % 2 Max-min = 4 -Min = Au 3 6 2 Z { | v > Max 6 & 8 8 > Min Max=4 > > Maxmin = min max Valve of the gome=4 ~ S Sadd\e point exist and Bactle Point 16 (2,3) ond valve 5 ma the ame '5 U. MWerefose the gome is In favour of > Yew > a3 &® Be 63 Bu min e A 4 2 3 § @ 8 42 -2 -l 4 3 -3 = Max Min=2 i 43° 5 a 3 3 @ 3 ° I oO a Ay oY o _ Max 5 @ 4 5S 2 Min Max =2. ~~ => Maxmin = Min max = valve of tne gome=2 [, Saddie point exist ana Saddle point $s (1,2) or(3@) Lg, On the Nalwe Of te game is 9 lg Mese fore the Player A has 2 Optimum statengres Guy ls Raves B only nas one optimum Statesgy B lo - Me game ig in favouy oO € Playey 4 Sen Find the wonge of ab in the following payote Ts mrateix When i+ 15 known thet (2,2) "SQ sacledle pom Ts, Be 8a Bs Bre " Ay 2 4 5 2 az 16 q 6 2 a3 a q 6 ae) Max mine inom. i» Max 10 FT 629 & marchivg = r @S Two Playess A ond B play the game o ; & tle” : a Points -T# the coin matches playey A will ger vuve < . x Mabyiy « Playes B will get yupees 5. waite dean the payof ond sole the gome 8 ~ Bn T Min a5: ano a a 2 Max-Min =-S T -§ § -s Max 5 5 Heve minmax # max-min Saddle Point does not exist and if 1S mixed Stotergy. HK Domi nonce Psoperty . © The pxincipie of Stotergy OTe Psindpie o¢ dominance States thes Of 4 Player dommeates ONey Fhe 0 they aN) edition then the ib latesy Statergy can be ignore PH wi pox ASsect the Solithion | x Rules © Dominance. | OT the playe a ceminance con be use jn Puse and mbed if the Statesgy Players Statesgy in PeDAIVTVTVA TTD ip Maximizing Play ey A is Witten as alement is eth wow OF tne Pay (1855 thon equals 40 Al @vvesponaing 9) fh ond the payoke = Caisdmxry Th Ip Tp OFF poater x ane ement jin Sth sew On Zaiy then eth - TOW CON be Neglected On tem | SHatengy AK aon be ignosed . pe @ H +e all the elements’ in th coloumn Peete thy = equal +O al) tre Clements in S** column Air dats fren player B will psefey 5 Statengy gs Ovex xm 8 STOAIY OED By. By can be Neglectect Faom the praca - Py dVdEXOPRBBUVUwZZEw~ ~~ @. save the game 6 82 Bz By Bs Be rn eee Ar uy 2 0 : Ag uy ss | 32 - 1 2 5 ww 4 3B 7-5 one macnn gees AG uy 3 F-22222 -2 Mex 4 a) 322 Min Max =2 Max min= minmax I+ 6 mixed Stettengy game B Re Rs Bu Bs we rain A Ue Bee Az ‘ AZ 1 | Ay ; ; A As 5 “ (es -2 Max Sb Bo Bs Bu Rs Be Ar oO 2 | AR \ 302 °«2 AY 7 -5 2 As 4 a eee 2 Ab 7-2 2 A3 Ay As As Ag Ay As Az Au As ‘Tf Saddle Point exists then gome Otherwise is mix ed Statengsy ond we cannot seduce PayoLé matyix Ff Usthey. Bs Bu Bs By O24 —_ ( 3 2 2 q =o) ' 2 4 \ CZ 3——2—_2 2 B3 By a. Be 1 z 2 q -5 y 4 I 2 ES % 50 this Ee dome 7 7-5 1 2 4 \ The gome Ones wise Max rnin Mean $ I+ also Is is Mev give -4tnhe songe Zxorple t. Reduce the by Using dominance mixed iS Said 4to be les ¢ re "S pune Statengy Stat engy gome determinable if V=U=v fos value o¢ the gomoe following gome PrOPery ond Solve tog 2x2 game m@ a) 4 4 7 Tp hp gD the game B Bz Bs By Bs min A | 3 02 49 «& I m2 2 4 ) 5 6 [max min og | 98 6 65 5 6 5 5 44 2 0 6 3 J © My 6 S 37 5 ¢ hh RA PI I I IIIIIIUGUUUUU UUM OY _ = @ a es Min max= maxrmin= valve of the Gome=s Bu 8 B2 Bs A 4 39 a 3.4! 48 6 5 4 44 2—o—6— Bie Boe 8s md 5) 4 fAns= 5 tt solution With ConsidO +wo players Bs Mixed Stoatmgy gome. A ond B we payoff matrix When Player A 15 a maximizing Playes given by a 8. ke Sinre, the saddle point does not 1 se >] €x1515, WE have +o considen ArLaz: aa Mixed Strategy game. Ler PlA)=p & P(B)=¢, Pla) = P, P(B=G2 hae P4+pr ond Zi+¢2 are eguals to 1 i eoete ee oo ear Cantaa2) ~ (ai2ta2)) G1 = _Ca22-a12) © Cau +422) ~ (q\2 4021) Value of the ond g221-d2 gome N= Qna2z2 ~ aaa, (a114a2) ~ (ar2 +42) ) Fg) Reduce the following gome 2x2 gome by using clominonce Peopety Gnd solve the yome . 8, B82 Bs By A Lig =p ¢ Ar 3 1 2 3 aa -\ 3 2 7 Au -~—2—_6—=3 B. Ba Ar 3! | Ag -l 3 bp fagp-aar) = 6-60) = BH ey (on+a22)~ (anrtar) (+3) -€1-) 6 cS = 2 3 si- eiebad Pori-Pi e z Ay) = G22-aIT oe 2 (@u +02) —(ae+an1 C : Sr¢qis l-L = dr - ap u — NS _@ua29= 41202) PABIIK-) 2 10 = (an +422) ~ (a,ora2) Q SoWwe the game with following Pay of motny = Bee eere Cio\me Bienes 1 a 6 Ly a 3 S Ar 6 a 5 q 5 A3 =) S F 5) 3 Ay 3 qa 3 a Max a a > U = 5 \, I+ 15 med sratmgy gome > aus7 air=3 » an=3 Qn 1) > Py = dQ22-a2) Palla eaee Bene ner y (an14422) - Cay2 4421) 1B-6 ae 7 » ~~ Poe t-p, 2 i 2 2b ® 3 2 . Lr= 992-03) 2 U3 22 S (int@22) -(ar24021) 12 7 ; GZr21-G1 - grein — Value of ome 3 $ VS anazz -a1292) - JA-9 = 6f =19 12 2 8 (Qn +a22) — (ai 4a22) Conclusion: The optiraum Statesy fox player rs /" (0, 23.13,0) Ond optimurn statagy Of player B (4.3% 100) Gnd value of He gome 75 5 Plover A is -+ve . The gome is favourable to game A. e/a) e/a) Ak Grsophica) Method ' 4) 2xXN Gome: When the Payoff matsix 1S Beducect jnto 2XN ow Mx2 gome. we have +O Psoceed WIth a Qgropritak method to reduce the Payote matsrx +O 2X2 Matesx —> Ler us ceonsidm a 2X4 gome 6B B2 B3 By Al i 4 oe oats, Ar] 2 ] 4s WOBEEEEED EET a Conduston . The The age oe fox player A s_Co, atte, Ond \ 45 Ca. a3 a and me valve Gi) _of _rme_game _%s_5/a (os ine Favour of ployer A. _ —— tt —Gropnicai Memos s ; el A230 Gomes uihen_tme Royo marth 1s retuced Soto_ax0_or mx game. weve 40 proceed fits -O_Qraprical _mernod — 40 _reduice re pay ok matrix ‘o__ax0 manfa- gee Jet ud __Conside, o o04 Pe Si. _9}5__ 8 } ttt tt ae a. ee. peas tonsil Digs a

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