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Decision theory and game theory
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QYHoveveevseveuHyvvovvrvwvrrr”
+H Decision Theory:
Whenevey we have to take, decision , we have to
Altewnative oy Strategies oy Courses of acton. Then we
Have +0 consider what ane the possible events that
Ent occu }
N +he future and what will be the e¢tet
Of selection of altennatives when +his event occuns. Adies!
Studing fhe situation
TO Select Hest a tere!
hence ony decision problem we
have to follow 4 Steps
HEP 11- Foy given prcblem voxite down tne possible
alermative. Let they one "Aa2, As..... An"
SFP 22- Tn Cudure Some event ace
ane known as State
State of natuye.
Step 3.
Can be
Le+ aiy
“ym
Of nature. let theiy sist '
ond it's denoted ‘
Covresponding 40 each Cornp}
Cost O% Pxofi't matyrx
Denote the
Pat
by "51,52... 6 6m"
nation of Stretegy .
Payot# when we select" tm" ¢
NENT then payoff matyix con be written as
Altesnatives [Acton s
Ai Az An
S On 21 ans
Stare of $2 Ai2 22 an2
Natu) Soy aim ae am
Bent
SEEP YH. Select the best Stage all altemative using the
Payott mataix
@]A company want +o Produce one of the +hsee Produdl
[Link]- The cost associatedt with . The
Product ONe classity
in90 tO catgony Ax COSt ond voniable ws}.
T+ 15 given in a Table.[Tec » NC > Low Demand
lal i |
pA {25 | 2 | Medium Demon
18 138 +4 .
bc | 53! 2 |—— 4 High Demand
The Futuye clemand is lightly to be a pooy-demene
hat mM 1-@ 3000 event rnedium demand i-€ Joco units
And High demond ig tooo unyts .
Tne selling Price for each unit
1s 25. write +ne
Payoft matrix
Product ‘A’
Low Profit = 6P —¢.p
= Bove x28) - (12.3000) +25
= 36995
Medium Profit = 5p -¢.p
= (7000x285) - (12% Fo00) +25
= 4097's;
High Oxofit = $.p~O-P
Ctiooe x25)- Ciioo0x12) 426
142995
wo
Product ’
Low profit = §.P-cpP
= (B000x 25) - (4x3000) +35
= 49965
Medium Profit = $P-cCP
(Fov0x25) - (4x3000) + 35
= WIG6S
High Profit = 5.P~c.p
(Itcoox 25) - [4K 000) +35
(954965
v
wt
Product’ c’
Low Prof4 = §-P- cp=@000x25) - (9x 3000)+ $3
= 6347
Medium Psofit = $.p -¢.p
= (ooo x25) ~ (4 X 9000) +53
> \259u9
High Puofit = $-p-cp
= (ooo x25) - (9 x1N000) +53
)
) = 1999uq7
> tt Decision Making
.
. We have to taxe decision under differen} cond i Hons,
> de vending on the diffesent nature of tne Situation
> decision making ond situations Me Classified into
Be THeee Categories
@ Decision making vundes cestainty
WB Nese we know ime Under in future what will be tne
outcome oy Payof4 causes Ponding +o each al texnetive.
~ 9) Decision Making onder uncertainty _
pe Hese We nave 45 Select that best alternative under!
r. Different Situation wwe one identivéy different Stare
T. Of Moduse but sufvicient pont data 1S not available.
@ 3) Decision Making undes Risk.
- We con identiyfy for dif€enent Stcrte ot nature only
w Wtosmaton 46 tye associate the Probeibitity association
Dp each state of nature. since the probabi
5 OF patuse avalible, we
lities ond State
Calculate the expectect
Payoff.
To take the clé&isron
Y de Decision making undex uncertainty
y Let Ar,A2---*» An ono At Féenen+ Strategies Ow alterreiv:
P ond §$1,$2----
Sm one the Affenens State Of nature!
ae Of. The pale Of rratetx Ke given ly
DPA Az An
S an a2 an
Se On, a2 an2
Sen
Quen azm anm
'5 40 Select the best altematives. There
ONE different methods ox appsoches +o obtain the
best sStecrtegy |
1] Pessimistic appsoach Conservative)
T+ 16 also krown as max!
tO Calculate the minimum value
to each Alternative and seleg
the maximum value omong the minimum Selected = max~meon
ApPscach Should be usecl when pajr of Med etx 1S parotid
Matix bub when ibis COSt matsix we USE meon -
Max Principle
MEAN Cyitexia here we have
to The paix oF Corsesponding
Ft the steategy which ‘S having
Pwotit mnoteix = max-min
COSF matsix
=> min-max
2) Ophmistic Approach :-
| T+ 18 aso known as max
We have paie of mertwix a¢
rmrax-max Principle j£ iy
mak .
Os minterin approach when
a Profit matix we use
1S C COSt-matei x WE LSE Mmmin” |
Psindple =
S] Laplace's Carteria’.
— Laplace has suggested to allocate equal
all sto#@ of natyye ond find the expecte,
(min) corresponding +40 exch Alterranve 4g
alternative which 1S having maximum 2x,
+ 1S a px0lt mataix but pair of rmateix
then we select minimum expected Pale
PrObabNFeS. Fey
‘ol Payotes
Pecteel. Daily oy
1S & (054 matic
INA Selected the
St
Iwwe
>
>
>
Eb bELELEKELELEDEUY OH
/
UJ Huwwit2 Criteria + -
I+ 6 also known as Criteria OF realize Coxsesponeling
to each Strategy ox alternative we have to calculate
the value of Amin + (I-ad)max for Cost matsrx for
PrOFit matyix olmax+ Cl-a)min. where Oo’ Ts known as
Coefticent Of Optimism when XY 1 huywit2 Cxttersg
APPwches 10 OpHmistic carterra
Approcnes +0 pessimistre
be nesura) ox
When “=o then (+
Carteriq AwL Cb IS Sata to
&nbiasecl approches
SJ Savage Ceiteria :
It "5 known as min-max wegret CBiteria we have 40
Calulate opparstunity joss #0 each combination of
Stratery ond event OPPOstimity fo $s
loss Meusd fxr nor
Pale Of medsix has +o be Convertedl +9 OPpoytunity
loss matetx then We have to p ,
USE min~ ma nel
to obtain the X Pwinciple
'S defined as the
Selecting the best Strategy. The
Example :-
A fasmex has to decide which of the theee Coops
"A.B.C" be Ghould cultivate. The profit depencls on
amount OF wainfall. The pais Of rnatyix is given as
fMowlng Suggest the bes} Strategy oundex pesimish Cater
OPhmistic Gitesia Laplace
Caitertag « Huxwite Citexia (A=06
SAVAGE Cyiteria .
Cvop
Rain fal) A 8B C Ma xX
High gooo 3500 S000 S000
Medium u5s00 US00 S006 S000
Low 2000 SOO 4000 S000i] Pessimistic :- min = 2000 3500 4ooo
martmin = uooo Cc)
2] Ophmistic : Max = 8000 Sooo 5000
max-max = 2000
3] Laplace “Expected profit
MAX = 4833.33
For A €od= 3 nei (P,)
Gi
U1 Ploas) + 22 Plo) +23 P(r)
Fox A $000 + 4SEH 4+ 2000
3 3 3
4833-33 4333.3 4666-69
= 4833.33
For B E(x)= 3500 +4500 4 S000 - 333.2
3 3 3
Fore E(x) = 5000 + 5000 + HOOD = 4666.69
3 = 3
© U7 odmax +} —d)enin 5606 4U00 Ub00 max = 56004)
A (4000 x0-6)+ (2000x044) = 6600
B (5000 X 0:6) + (3506 xo) = YU00
C C5000 X06) + (Y Hoo xov)= Ub600
SD Oppostunity Loss mertaix Colm)
Rainfa |! A B c
High 0 4S00 3000
medium 500 500 0
Low 2000 6 1006
max 3000 4US0O 3000
mins 3000 CA orc)@] under optimistic Laplace. Huxwit> Fasmer Shou lo
Cultivate Cop 4.
Under savage Caiteria Fam
mer shoul Cultivate CxOp A ow
Ce
| EX. A Company is Cons tde xin g intooducing ane the toys
» A.B.C. The Petit depends on. Acceptance by tHe
> CUstomen suggest the best Steategy using pay ort rneri
> Onder. on methods o£ decision Making Unde ON Cordainity
> ok =Os
>
> Acceptance 4 B C Max
> hood \20 loo 66 '26
> Mediury Bo 60 SO 80
> Poor “300-30 -30
eo
e i) min “30° -30 6 Max=min =¢=¢
® ii) May {20 100 66 Max-max > 9=)20
SND Expected 56-69 3-35 36-67
DS Pay ote
5S jy) us 35 30
S Opportunity Cost madtyix
9
SS Acceptonce A B c
5 66
— food ° ae
9 . O 20 8930
_» Medium
» POOr 30 30 0
+ Max 30 30 60
2 OJ under pessjmistic OpPrcach Company should Mn tyclu ce
DP Toy c.
S? ndex optimistic , Laplace . Huawit2 Company shou id
U Pp
- intsoduce toy A.
FF ndey Sovage Qitexia Company should npeoauc e
[2 -wy A ond per Ex. A company is considering 4 location 40 set up
new Worsehouse. The Paoti+ value on lakhs under
MasKe+ COnchtHon ane given below whet ane the =o)
best Staategy fsom out Ele me thools ‘
Location
Grow Li le La Ly :
High 50 uo Fo 60 +
Stable 30 40 2 25 é
Low lo UO eens
| Simin 0 @®) 40 5
| J
it) Ma x 50 4O 70) 60 a
MN) Expectect 30 Wo) 6? 30 €
Payoft4 S
iv) 30 G0 30 325 €
OpPPOrtenity — COS+ mertrsix €
Growth Location S
High Ly Lo Cs Ly 4
Stable 20 82 0 16 7
10 oO 20 15 =
ra 30 0 §0 3c =
max 36 30 90 35 S
. &
at Decision undes wisk'- u
' =
Most Busmess clecision may have +o be mode oundes &
Condition gf mSk, Here more then One State oF reture
exist ond decision makes has suppicient UN Pormation ty
assign . Probability to each of these state of rature.
Trvs Probability Ould be obtained fyroyn Me past
secovds ox SimPly te subjective judgement of Aecis joy i.
make Ondes condition of xisk , he number OF dedston
Ceevia of zisk . the number of decision cies iq oe
Qvatlable . vohich con be feIP Jo 4ake decision.FYbbSbEELELKEKEKEDED OC YEMYYNY ~~ ~
nae |
Expected monetary value CE muy
Wes Critexian vequirves 40 Calculate e xPectedd Value of
facn decision alternative “Which 16 SUM oF the Wweignha
Payolt foxy that abemctive Where the werghts ane
Probability assign 4o the state o£ nature that con
happen it 1S congig+ Of Some steps
Step 1 Construct o
conditionc | Payoff fable isting. The
Altemative decision ond the Vanious State Of netuse
Enter 4ne Conditional profi+- Fox each cledsion event
Combination
ANY with assocater! Probability -
Step 2° culculote the EmMy Fox each decision alserner've
conditional Profits by
Ond adding +he wesul4ting — Conditone)
SHEP 3. Select the alesnative the YIELDS the highest
[Link].
by mulHelying the assign Peotabilits
Value .
Ex”. A Newspapex has following Probability oF Selling
@ magzine.
No. of Copies Sold Probability
10 O1
a ONG
12 0-2
13 aoe
(4 Oe
Cost Of Copy in 39 paige
50 palse he connot+ yetusn
Copies Should he oxdex
ond selling Paice rs
UNSOIE! Copies How rmenye
> condition) Profit Table
Possible Stock .
Demand Probability 10 11 12 12 re
lo ol 200 170 WO 10 80
uy O15 200 220 140 166 130
pa O2 200 220 240 2IO 160
‘3 0-26 200 220 26 266 230
‘ a 200 2206 20 266 2¢0
EMV 200 216 992-5 220 208
Shopkeeper Shoutcl ovdex I2 Copies,
Q@J A shopkeeper of gme highly pesrsiable - type oF
Fouts. Sees that DLE Derond % of these feust in
his anea- Given is gris Probability ists bution .
DLE Demond C dexzon}
Probability
ol
3 03
o-Y¥
| 4 Or2.
| He Sells for © 100 per dexzon white buys each
| des20n at =F UO unsold fsuit one traded on next day
OF S20 devon - How mony dexzon does Shopkee peas
buys So That the expected! Prodit 15 maximum
Possible Stock
DLE Demond Probability 6 F 8 4g
a ot 360 340 320 300
| 4 0-3 360 420 Yoo 380
6 oY 360 420 480 460
4 0-2 360 u20 WO suo
EMV B60 UZ YY «3S
a
no
ptt
ntoh
Shopeeepey Should by ¢ dleyzon fauits for max rm
Expected oppoxtnity toss (EoL}
An alternative approach +0 Emy Lexpecteot, Monitexing
Value} which i$ 40 minimize expected opportunity loss
Ow’ expected yalue of Seguet wepresent the amount
bY Which the miximum POSSible PavAt will be
Teduced wemove undey vanious Possible Stock action
The Pode
Step 15 Prepare the
Aecision event
Proba bility
+0 calculate EOL
conditional Profit table for each
combinat"on ong wgnt the assocate
Step 2 Fox each event Oetesmine me conditioneg!
OPPostunity lose by Subtsacting the Payot from me
mQ rimum Poy-off fox that event.
Step 3> calculate For fox each decision alternative by
MultiPlyng the COndiHonal oppoes¥rty joss 64 associate
Probabi ities ang adding the value.
Step 4 > Select the alesnative which teats Gielcls
minimum EoL .
Stock
OL Matrix lo ' 12 13 ey,
O14 10 0 30 66 40 26
aa " 20, © @0 66
0-2 12 40 20 6 CO Gs
Os acummnies 66 4 20 6 ay
0-3 he BO 66 4 20 «6
Eol S6 35 27.5 30 us
Mivy Eol> 29-5Expected Profit with pexfect Infox ration [EPP I]
EPPI 1S the ynaximum EM\ based on pextect
infoernation about the state of naduye, Tre EPPI
'S the sum of Product OF the bast State oF
Natuxe Comzesponding +0 each Optimal couxse of
AHO ond He Probabi
"ty. EPeT iS also known ag
Expected prosi+ Undey
Cestarnity (fp ve)
Expected value of Pex fect
iNfoxmation EVvPI is
the price
One would be Welling +0 Pay to Sal)
( exess te PewsFect in fosrnation
EVPL = Minimum EOL
EVPL = EPVC - Maximum (Em y)
Demana Prob Max
lo ot 200 26
Wy os 220 33
12 0-2 240 ug
Iz 0-25 260 65
14 0-3 220 gy
250
EVPL= Epuc -
y Should pay ZS 29-5 exteg
tO Get pexfecy in Foemation .
Examp jes
A daisy foxrn wants to
butter i} Should Produce
TeCOvd have Shown tne
determine th e
tO meet
Following de.
Luanthy o-¢
the Aemond. Pasy °
mand pay ertn .Quontity yequred No: of days Pxob
in (kg) demond otcuy
15 6 0-03
20 14 O07
16 20 ot
30 a 80 o4
2G 4o 0-2
) Yo 30 OS
b 50 lo 0-05
; The Stock level one distyict +O the eOnGe 15-50 kg
7 Aue to OMavaibility of Stowage faciNties Bubex ws
3 EU Perkg ond 45 SOld S S50 kg
2x Co
MStauct tne Conditiona |
OCHON alternative O ssociated
Profit table, detesmine the
eA Pected progit detesmine
With maxim
ZoHion OF
EWL .
yn
2
3
Possible Stock
fis ‘20! 25 30 20/35 | luo | Iso]
150 ~$0-260 = “450-60 0-5
40, 6.00-1on9)
Produce elthey 25kyg
day
butter ox 30kg butter Pe
L&wbSLOEEBEEEDOEDEO OU WHH@® ol matsix
Demand — Prob
15, O03
zo o-oo!
275) o-1
30 oy
35 0-2
4o 0-15
SO 0-08
ts
oO
5O0
100
1S0
200
250
3S0
Lo
200
o
50
100
Iso
200
300
25 30 35 UO 50 Max
406 600
200 400
© 400
50 oO
loo 50
1s0 100
256 200
i r— roel a
goo [00 !HO0} Iso
G00 $00 (L00| 200 >
{00 600 1000} 250
ry een
7 7
1200 400 8a | 300
® 5 00 600 | 350 ai
© 400/ Yoo .L
Isc 100 © }soo _ [
mor
nong
7
)
pea om
nn
| es]
nop i
= = SPP
[=
Ff bs ff
7
7
a
7? F%
,
yzUnit 2: Game The oy.
while solving no: of Pxoblems. T+ is wequired to onayrise
the situation .When these ane
2 Opposite Panties where
the ackon
Of one Playess depends on the ackon taken
by opponent. Then the situaton is called as conf iwerng
Undes this sMuation each of tne Pasty fakes all availope
' Mmeasuves 30 prevent tne opponent Fsum succeeding.
Ta con€iicHng situation each of the decision which
taren in tne field must be
ik is
Is
calculated to ensure that
least advontageous fo the opponent .
Example. Planning of
Theosy Of a gome
OF a eHélicting situ
military openation. 3
iS nothing but a yvrethernatice) theory
‘achony
To Make +the psoper onalysis of such situation ft is
Necessany +o weite a
Simple osynulize ynodel of he
situation » This model
iS known ag game.
& Assumptions
OR Rules of Game theosy
\) The Player
acts satonaly ond imelligently
i 2 Each Player has a finite set of all
“ Cousse Of action.
>> The Player tries to maximize the gain ond minimize tne
= lose:
5 UD Relevont infoxmation is known
® 5> The Playes makes its own decision without Communication,
SS 6> Me Player Simultaniously selects thely sespective Statevoy
BP he payott 16 Fixed ond f+ 95 determine in advance.
HPUewwwUuUnvvw~ ~
Possible Statergies ar
+0 each player:
7 home is on actvHy between two o* more Players
i MVoluing activities by each
Player accourding Yo g Sed of
end: g& which e€0ch Ployer recives 2 Pesson gome:- Tf no. of Players S 2 then the geome
1S known as 2 person game.
Un pesson gome :
known ag
p
wv r
KR eee
- Tf no. of Players is
NN Pexson game.
5) 0 sum game!- TE tne
the players in the game
known as
N then gome ts
a
addition of gain made by al]
{S$ Zero. then tne game "5
© Sum game. loss of 1 Players /s the galy L
Profit of omer. TH game
1S non-zero Sum gome.
Is Not O sum gome +hen + Lt
6) 2 Person zexo sum game. In oa game i# these one 2 a
pasticiponts tne gain Of one
Player ig the oss 0 F
Other playex - Then the game fs known as
gome I+ is known ag Rectongulan game
PayoF# mettx Con be written in Fectangulan format tl
A> Payotf !- The outcome o£ te game is called ag pyre
ond it 15 the net gome. ol
2 Pexon gesum ©
because the ©
Suppose there one 2 Players A ond BR.
A has © stotoy sl
Ai, Ar... Axe ond player B&B hag
es |
3 Statengies :, Bi, Ba. Re =
and rf Playes A js maximizing Playes then we can write ol
Payof! prateiX as :
B Be 83 ...... Bs
. Ay an a2 3 2... Gis es
Az a2 a22 O23 2 _ .. A025 =
AZ arr a32 G33... Gas a
De ows|
whese ij denotes net gain fos Player A when olayes B
Select = Ar ond Players B Sebct Bj where j21,2,..0
ond grt
5
Tf azo
(3 Tf aij >0 peofit gain fos player a
loss fos player a undes ne statengy Ar ond Bj
| Wexefose the Payof¥ matstx
JE we wont Jo Write tne
have +o interchonge
is With wespect +O Player A.
Payoff fox Playes RB then ue
Statesgies and multiply all Payoté
) Values by =)
» SStatexgy - T+ isa Peedetenmine sule designed by a
> Player dunivg the game.
p P Statexgy for a player is define as a set of sules 06
BD okermative aos aise of actions avaiable fo him I)
@ Advance by which Player decides the course of ACHON tha
Be WE should accepy
DD use Statesgy:- when tne playes decides in aclvance that
B Ne will select only ore cunse cf action that means i's
\ Players Select come statergy each time, tren it is
me veyed to ag pure Statesgy gain
10> Mixed Statergy. A mixed Statesgy
iS decision making
Bin advance fy all the
Players to choose of statergies
SB in acesdence with. q Partculan Probability disteibution .
Tat means a player decide in advance +0 select either
SCX Some of tne Statesgy iS Same Alved PsoporH'on then)
BOs Say that he is ageing mixed Statesgy .
BW opimum stotergy!+ The Statergy O~ course of action
N MOSt Preferd position
Statergy selected by his Opponent.
# Fy Value of the game: The value
e which puts the player
la sespective
Sof ime
of the gome is tne
# exoected Payot of the play when the all tne players
# Of Mme game follows thers optimum statengies,
* Tne game is called ag faly game if the value of gane
Le ar :
i is O- orrerwise i+ 16 called gs yon-£als game .
i—————_—E——————
‘ me where
'D Saddle Point: consider ¢ pesson O Sun gome ,
Plager A is maximizing player with x statesgies Suc
AS AL AL... Ax and player Bis minimizing player ond
has ¢ Siadesgies Such as 81, By. --- Bs
‘Me Maximizing — players Mes at Hs optimum sterlergy
On ME basis C4 maximum - minimum Principle and
maninizing player Selects i+s OpHirnurn Statexrgy on the
basis Of minmnax principle .
Tt max-min ig ec
quals to min-Max then we Say that
the game is Solved
ond tre valve of the gome js
Max-Min = min Max = Value o¢ the game.
T# dre vawe o£ the game
Point is Ci,3) ond the Optimu
Ai ond fos Player QB is By
Ss ay then the Sacid le
mM Statesgy tox Player A is
+ Solve the following
Q4 8 B82 Bs Ba Min
A 4 same eee CHEE <))
i i a i
43 6 ce en
44 7 =) -q 5 —F Max-Min=~5
Max 7 q ©) eo
Min-max=-5
Max Min= Min Max = Value OF the gome =-5
Saddle point exists ono Saddie Point
Value of the gome 16-5. There foye
(5 iw favour of Playes B
'S C13) ona
the comeJ
\ a2 B® B2 Bs By Bs min
a) zy ! 8 Oo 0
) m 6 5 4 6 9 @
S As 2 a s % 2 Max-min = 4
-Min =
Au 3 6 2 Z { | v
> Max 6 & 8 8
> Min Max=4
> > Maxmin = min max Valve of the gome=4
~
S Sadd\e point exist and Bactle Point 16 (2,3) ond valve
5 ma the ame '5 U. MWerefose the gome is In favour of
> Yew
> a3 &® Be 63 Bu min
e A 4 2 3 § @
8 42 -2 -l 4 3 -3
= Max Min=2
i 43° 5 a 3 3 @
3 ° I oO
a Ay oY o
_ Max 5 @ 4 5S
2 Min Max =2.
~~ => Maxmin = Min max = valve of tne gome=2
[, Saddie point exist ana Saddle point $s (1,2) or(3@)
Lg, On the Nalwe Of te game is 9
lg Mese fore the Player A has 2 Optimum statengres Guy
ls Raves B only nas one optimum Statesgy B
lo - Me game ig in favouy oO € Playey 4
Sen Find the wonge of ab in the following payote
Ts mrateix When i+ 15 known thet (2,2) "SQ sacledle pom
Ts, Be 8a Bs Bre
" Ay 2 4 5 2
az 16 q 6 2
a3 a q 6 ae) Max mine inom.
i» Max 10 FT 629& marchivg =
r @S Two Playess A ond B play the game o ; & tle”
: a
Points -T# the coin matches playey A will ger vuve <
. x Mabyiy «
Playes B will get yupees 5. waite dean the payof
ond sole the
gome 8 ~
Bn T Min
a5: ano
a a 2 Max-Min =-S
T -§ § -s
Max 5 5
Heve minmax # max-min
Saddle Point does not exist and if 1S mixed Stotergy.
HK Domi nonce Psoperty .
© The pxincipie of
Stotergy
OTe Psindpie o¢ dominance States thes
Of 4 Player dommeates ONey Fhe 0 they
aN) edition then the ib latesy Statergy can be ignore
PH wi pox ASsect the Solithion |
x Rules © Dominance.
|
OT the playe a
ceminance con be use jn Puse and mbed
if the Statesgy
Players Statesgy in
PeDAIVTVTVA TTD
ip
Maximizing Play ey
A is Witten as
alement is eth wow OF tne Pay
(1855 thon equals 40 Al @vvesponaing 9)
fh
ond the payoke =
Caisdmxry
Th Ip Tp
OFF poater x ane
ement jin Sth sew
On Zaiy then eth -
TOW CON be Neglected On tem
| SHatengy AK aon be ignosed . pe
@ H +e all the elements’ in th coloumn Peete thy =
equal +O al) tre Clements
in S** column Air dats
fren player B will psefey 5 Statengy gs Ovex xm 8
STOAIY OED By. By can be Neglectect Faom the
praca -Py dVdEXOPRBBUVUwZZEw~ ~~
@. save the game
6 82 Bz By Bs Be rn
eee
Ar uy 2 0 :
Ag uy ss | 32
- 1 2 5
ww 4 3B 7-5
one macnn gees
AG uy 3 F-22222 -2
Mex 4 a) 322
Min Max =2
Max min= minmax
I+ 6 mixed Stettengy game
B Re Rs Bu Bs we rain
A Ue Bee
Az ‘
AZ 1 |
Ay ; ; A
As 5
“ (es -2
Max Sb
Bo Bs Bu Rs Be
Ar oO 2 |
AR \ 302 °«2
AY 7 -5 2
As 4 a eee
2
Ab 7-2 2A3
Ay
As
As
Ag
Ay
As
Az
Au
As
‘Tf Saddle Point exists then
gome Otherwise
is mix ed Statengsy
ond we cannot seduce
PayoLé matyix Ff Usthey.
Bs Bu Bs By
O24 —_
( 3 2 2
q =o) ' 2
4 \ CZ
3——2—_2 2
B3 By a. Be
1 z 2
q -5 y
4 I 2
ES % 50 this
Ee dome
7 7-5 1
2
4 \
The gome
Ones wise Max rnin
Mean $
I+ also
Is
is
Mev
give -4tnhe songe
Zxorple t. Reduce the
by Using dominance
mixed
iS Said 4to be
les ¢
re
"S pune Statengy
Stat engy gome
determinable if V=U=v
fos value o¢ the gomoe
following gome
PrOPery ond Solve
tog 2x2 game
m@ a) 4
4
7
Tp
hp gD
the game
B Bz Bs By Bs min
A |
3 02 49 «& I
m2 2 4 ) 5 6 [max min og
| 98 6 65 5 6 5 5
44 2 0 6 3 J ©
My 6 S 37 5 ¢hh RA PI I I IIIIIIUGUUUUU UUM OY
_
=
@
a
es
Min max= maxrmin= valve of the Gome=s
Bu
8 B2 Bs
A 4 39
a 3.4!
48 6 5 4
44 2—o—6—
Bie Boe 8s
md 5) 4
fAns= 5
tt solution With
ConsidO +wo players
Bs
Mixed Stoatmgy gome.
A ond B we payoff matrix
When Player A 15 a maximizing Playes given by
a 8. ke Sinre, the saddle point does not
1
se >] €x1515, WE have +o considen
ArLaz: aa Mixed Strategy game.
Ler PlA)=p & P(B)=¢,
Pla) = P, P(B=G2
hae P4+pr ond Zi+¢2 are eguals to 1
i eoete ee oo ear
Cantaa2) ~ (ai2ta2))
G1 = _Ca22-a12) ©
Cau +422) ~ (q\2 4021)
Value of the
ond g221-d2
gome
N= Qna2z2 ~ aaa,
(a114a2) ~ (ar2 +42) )Fg) Reduce the following gome 2x2 gome by using
clominonce Peopety Gnd solve the yome .
8, B82 Bs By
A Lig =p ¢
Ar 3 1 2 3
aa -\ 3 2 7
Au -~—2—_6—=3
B. Ba
Ar 3!
| Ag -l 3
bp fagp-aar) = 6-60) = BH ey
(on+a22)~ (anrtar) (+3) -€1-) 6 cS
= 2
3
si- eiebad
Pori-Pi e z
Ay) = G22-aIT oe 2
(@u +02) —(ae+an1 C :
Sr¢qis l-L =
dr -
ap
u
— NS _@ua29= 41202) PABIIK-) 2 10 =
(an +422) ~ (a,ora2)
Q SoWwe the game with following Pay of motny =
Bee eere Cio\me Bienes 1
a 6 Ly a 3 S
Ar 6 a 5 q 5
A3 =) S F 5) 3
Ay 3 qa 3 a
Max a a > U= 5
\, I+ 15 med sratmgy gome
> aus7 air=3
» an=3 Qn 1)
> Py = dQ22-a2) Palla eaee Bene ner
y (an14422) - Cay2 4421) 1B-6 ae 7
»
~~ Poe t-p, 2 i 2 2b
® 3 2
. Lr= 992-03) 2 U3 22
S (int@22) -(ar24021) 12 7
; GZr21-G1 - grein
— Value of ome
3 $
VS anazz -a1292) - JA-9 = 6f =19
12 2 8
(Qn +a22) — (ai 4a22)
Conclusion: The optiraum Statesy fox player rs
/" (0, 23.13,0) Ond optimurn statagy Of player B
(4.3% 100) Gnd value of He gome 75 5 Plover
A is -+ve .
The gome is favourable to game A.
e/a) e/a)
Ak Grsophica) Method '
4) 2xXN Gome: When the Payoff matsix 1S Beducect
jnto 2XN ow Mx2 gome. we have +O Psoceed WIth
a Qgropritak method to reduce the Payote matsrx
+O 2X2 Matesx
—> Ler us ceonsidm a 2X4 gome
6B B2 B3 By
Al i 4 oe oats,
Ar] 2 ] 4s
WOBEEEEED EET aConduston . The The age oe fox player A s_Co, atte,
Ond \ 45 Ca. a3 a and me valve
Gi) _of _rme_game _%s_5/a (os ine
Favour of ployer A. _ ——
tt —Gropnicai Memos s ; el
A230 Gomes uihen_tme Royo marth 1s retuced
Soto_ax0_or mx game. weve 40 proceed fits
-O_Qraprical _mernod — 40 _reduice re pay ok matrix
‘o__ax0 manfa- gee
Jet ud __Conside, o o04 Pe
Si. _9}5__ 8
}
ttt tt
ae a. ee. peas tonsil
Digs a