COMMON INTENTION- GROUP LIABILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Constructive liability means the liability of a person for an offence he has not himself
committed. Offence committed by groups of persons is of frequent occurrence and courts are
called upon to determine the liability of each member for the crime committed by the entire
group or by any member or members thereof. Where parties go with a common purpose to
execute a common object, each and every one becomes responsible for the acts of each and
every other in execution and furtherance of the common purpose; as the purpose is common,
so must be the responsibility as was observed in Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja, (1869).

The principle of group liability is invoked only when the specific conditions of the provision
providing for it are satisfied. There is no presumption to group liability. Prosecution has to
prove that the case of the accused is squarely covered in the four corners of the provision
providing for group liability or vicarious liability.

The basic justification for making provision of group liability in criminal law is twofold:
Firstly, offences committed in groups give encouragement to the accomplices and, secondly,
in offences committed in groups the job of the prosecution becomes difficult to ascertain
specific role played by each member of the group. Therefore, to deter people from
committing offences in groups and to spare the prosecution from the onerous task of proving
specific actus reus of each member of the group, the legislature in its wisdom has made
provisions providing for group liability making each member of the group vicariously liable
for the acts done by others. The BNS contains a few provisions laying down principles of
joint and constructive liability in this behalf.

Supreme Court in Raju Pandurang Mabale v. State of Maharashtra observed that a person
may be constructively liable for an offence which he did not actually commit by reason of:
(1) his being a member of a conspiracy to commit such an offence (S. 120-B);9 and (2) the
common intention of all to commit such an offence (S. 34); (3) his being a member of an
unlawful assembly, the members whereof knew that an offence was likely to be committed
(S. 149).
 Sec 3(5) of BNS- When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the
common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it
were done by him alone.”

II. Essentials-
To attract the principle of joint liability under S. 3(5) there should be (a) a criminal act which
is jointly committed by several persons, and (b) a common intention animating all of them in
furtherance of which the criminal act is committed as was observed in Hari Ram v. State
ofU.P., (2004).
Section 3(5) was discussed at length in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, by the
Privy Council. It was held: Section 34 deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or
diverse, by several persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person
is liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself; for 'that act' in the latter
part of the section must include the whole section covered by the criminal act 'in the first part
because they refer to it. Common intention, as defined under Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, implies a pre-arranged plan or prior meeting of the minds to commit an act, according
to legal resources. Similar intention, on the other hand, refers to individuals having the same
or similar intentions but without a prior agreement or pre-arranged plan.
In Mehbub Shah v. Emperor, it was held that to invoke the aid of S. 3(5) successfully, it
must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused
persons in furtherance of the common intention of all; if this is shown, the liability for the
crime may be imposed on any of the persons in the same manner as if the act was done by
him alone... it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the
prearranged plan... it is difficult if not impossible to procure direct evidence to prove the
intention of an individual, in most cases it has to be inferred from his act or conduct or other
relevant circumstances of the case.
In Dhaneshwar Mahakud and Ors vs State Of Orissa, the court after relying on catena of
judgements concluded that there is no restriction on conviction of the accused with AID of
section 34 IPC if the evidence on record shows the presence of common intention. However,
it is a rule of evidence and can’t be implemented alone therefore it is not a substantive
offence.
In Kripal Singh v. State of U.P., it was held that common intention can emerge on the spot
between a number of people, and this must be inferred from the accused’s actions and
conduct, as well as the facts and circumstances of the case
III. Furtherance of Common Intention
The principle of ‘act in furtherance of such common intention’ is clearly illustrated by the
well-known case Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, wherein one Allah Dad was shot dead by a
bullet from the gun used by one of the accused who came to rescue their cousin who had been
attacked by Allah Dad and shouted for help. The two accused were armed with guns, and
each one of them aimed at two different individuals shot from the gun of Wali Shah, the latter
only received injuries from a bullet shot by Mahboob Shah.
Of the three accused, Wali Shah, whose shot killed Allah Dad absconded and could not be
brought to trial, and the other two were prosecuted for murder under section 302 read with
section 34, I.P.C. Lahore High Court held that the case fell within the ambit of section 34, and
as to their "common intention", it was said that "common intention to commit the crime
which was eventually committed by Mahboob Shah and Wali Shah came into being when
Ghulam Qasim Shah shouted to his companions to come to his rescue and both of them
emerged from behind the bushes and fired from their respective guns."
The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act
perpetrated by several persons arises under section 3(5) if such criminal act is done in
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime.
Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only
be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the
proved circumstances.
In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was a plan or meeting of minds of all
the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of section
3(5), be it prearranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime.
The true contents of the section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly,
the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself;
Harbans Singh v. State of Haryana

IV. Common object and Intention

 Common intention is defined under Section 3(5) of BNS and Common object is defined
under Section 190 of BNS.
 Common intention refers to the agreement among a group of people to commit a criminal act,
while common object refers to the goal or objective that the group collectively aims to
achieve through their actions.
 Common intention is an agreement or understanding among the group members,
while common object is the purpose or objective of their actions.
 Common intention is typically inferred from the actions and statements of the group
members, while common object can be inferred from the nature of the group's actions and the
circumstances surrounding them.
 Proving common intention is necessary to hold all members of the group liable for the
criminal act, while proving common object is necessary to establish the group's liability for
certain types of offenses.
 Example: Common intention would be if a group of people planning a robbery together,
while common object would be the goal of committing robbery.
 All members of the group can be held liable for the criminal act if common intention is
proved, while only certain members of the group may be held liable if common object is
proved.
 The charge framed under Section 149, IPC, disregards the intention of the individual
members of the assembly altogether, and concentrates merely on the common object of the
assembly as a whole. The result of this position is that there may be cases in which a person
might be guilty of an offence under Section 149, IPC though he himself had no intention to
commit it or was even unaware of its commission.”, the court observed. “On the other hand,
under Section 34, IPC, a mere agreement, although it might be a sufficient proof of the
common intention, would be wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction with the application of
Section 34, IPC, unless some criminal act is done in furtherance of the said common
intention and the accused himself has 19 in some way or the other participated in the
commission of the said act.”, the court added- VASANT @ GIRISH AKBARASAB
SANAVALE & ANR VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Citation : 2025 LiveLaw
(SC) 218
V. Caselaws
a. If common intention by meeting of minds is established in the facts and circumstances
of the case, there need not be an overt act or possession of weapon required to
establish common intention Rajkishore Purohit vs State of Madhya Pradesh 2017
b. Common intention consists of several persons acting in unison to achieve a common
purpose, though their roles may be different. The role may be active or passive is
irrelevant, once common intention is established. There can hardly be any direct
evidence of common intention. It is more a matter of inference to be drawn from the
facts and circumstances SUBED ALI vs. THE STATE OF ASSAM 2012
c. Common intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates the existence
of a prearranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common object
does not necessarily require proof of prior meeting of minds or preconcert. Though
there is a substantial difference between the two sections, they also to some extent
overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case Chandra
Pratap Singh v. State of MP 2023
d. Even if it is assumed it is true, it cannot be denied that common intention and the pre-
meeting of minds can take place at the spur of the moment itself during the course of
the incident STATE OF KARNATAKA VERSUS BATTEGOWDA & ORS. 2025