The Rome Statute: A Definitive Analysis

of the Legal Framework, Operational

Impact, and Geopolitical Context of the
International Criminal Court
1. Introduction: The Rome Statute as a Cornerstone of
International Law
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) stands as a landmark international
treaty, establishing the world's first permanent international criminal court. Adopted on July 17,
1998, and entering into force on July 1, 2002, the Statute provides the foundational legal
framework for the ICC's mission. Its core purpose is to end impunity for the most serious crimes
of international concern, thereby contributing to the prevention of such atrocities and upholding
global peace and security. The document is a comprehensive legal text, comprising a Preamble
and 13 Parts, which delineate the Court's jurisdiction, administration, and procedural rules for
investigations and trials.

1.1. A Court of Last Resort: The Principle of Complementarity

A central tenet of the Rome Statute is the principle of complementarity, which fundamentally
shapes the relationship between the ICC and national legal systems. This principle establishes
the ICC as a "court of last resort," asserting that national courts hold the primary responsibility
and authority to investigate and prosecute the most serious international crimes. The Statute
dictates that the ICC may only exercise its jurisdiction when a State Party is "unwilling or
unable" to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution itself.
The application of this principle is a highly nuanced and sensitive process, requiring a
case-by-case assessment by the ICC. The concept of "unwillingness" is legally defined to
include instances where a state's investigation is not conducted in good faith, such as when it is
used as a pretext to shield an individual from criminal responsibility. An example of this would be
a "sham trial" designed to produce an acquittal rather than deliver justice. Conversely, a state is
considered "unable" to proceed when its national justice system has suffered a total or
substantial collapse, making it impossible to bring the accused to trial. This framework creates a
continuous and potentially contentious dialogue between the Court and its member states, as
the ICC is required to make highly sensitive judgments about the integrity and capacity of a
nation's legal infrastructure. The principle of complementarity is not merely a procedural rule but
a profound legal and political compromise that attempts to balance the imperatives of national
sovereignty with the global demand for accountability, serving as a critical mechanism for the
Court's legitimacy and function.

2. Historical Context and Antecedents to the ICC

The establishment of the ICC did not occur in a vacuum but is the culmination of centuries of
evolving international law and justice.

2.1. From Piracy to the Laws of War: Early Strands of International

Criminal Law
The historical roots of international criminal law (ICL) can be traced back for centuries, drawing
on four main traditions: prohibitions against piracy, the regulation of slavery, the theory of just
war, and international humanitarian law. In the 18th and 19th centuries, piracy was one of the
earliest international crimes that states collectively criminalized and prosecuted. Because it was
committed on the high seas, it could be prosecuted by the courts of any nation that was able to
apprehend the perpetrators. This early form of universal jurisdiction established a precedent for
holding individuals accountable for transnational crimes. Efforts to abolish slavery and the slave
trade in the 19th century also advanced the concept of treaty-based universal jurisdiction, where
states coordinated through treaties to prosecute slave traders. Concurrently, the
once-theological "just war" theory (jus ad bellum) evolved, attempting to define the conditions
under which the resort to armed force was morally and legally permissible, a tradition that would
later be codified in the UN Charter's prohibition of aggression.

2.2. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Birth of Modern

International Justice
A pivotal, albeit temporary, breakthrough in the modern era of international justice came in the
aftermath of World War II. Following a proposal for an international court to try German war
criminals after World War I, which was never fully realized, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals
were established to prosecute leaders of Germany and Japan. These tribunals, while criticized
as a form of "victor's justice" by some, were groundbreaking in their time. They affirmed the
fundamental principles that individuals could be held criminally responsible for international
crimes, regardless of their official position, and that following superiors' orders was not a valid
defense. However, these were ad hoc tribunals, created to address specific historical situations.
The Cold War subsequently halted progress on the creation of a permanent international judicial
body for several decades, a testament to the political constraints of the ad hoc model. The long
journey from these post-war tribunals to the ICC reveals a fundamental shift in the international
community's approach: from a reactive, politically-constrained model to a proactive, permanent,
and rules-based system designed to prevent crimes rather than merely punish them after the
fact.

3. The Legal Framework of the Rome Statute

The ICC's jurisdiction is not universal but is strictly defined and limited by a series of legal
parameters established in the Rome Statute.

3.1. Temporal, Territorial, and Personal Jurisdiction

The Court's power to prosecute is governed by three key jurisdictional principles.
●​ Temporal Jurisdiction: The ICC has jurisdiction only over crimes committed after the
Statute's entry into force on July 1, 2002. If a state becomes a party after this date, the
 Court's jurisdiction applies only to crimes committed after that state's ratification date,
unless the state explicitly accepts retroactive jurisdiction.
●​ Territorial Jurisdiction: The Court can exercise jurisdiction if the alleged crime took
place on the territory of a State Party.
●​ Personal Jurisdiction: The Court has jurisdiction over a person if they are a national of a
State Party, regardless of where the crime occurred. The Statute is explicit that no one is
exempt from prosecution due to their position as a head of state, government, or military
leader. A state that is not a party to the Statute may also decide to accept the Court's
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. These jurisdictional requirements are circumvented,
however, when a situation is referred to the Court by the UN Security Council.

3.2. Admissibility and the "Unwilling or Unable" Test

Admissibility is a further legal hurdle that must be cleared for a case to be heard by the ICC. In
line with the principle of complementarity, a case is inadmissible before the Court if a state with
primary jurisdiction is already genuinely investigating or prosecuting the matter. This provision is
a significant legal and political safeguard, ensuring that the ICC does not supersede capable
national judicial systems. The Statute further protects against double jeopardy (ne bis in idem),
preventing a second prosecution before the ICC if an individual has already been tried for the
same conduct by a state, except in cases where the national prosecution was a "sham trial"
intended to shield the accused from criminal responsibility. These legal mechanisms, particularly
the emphasis on complementarity and due process protections, were concessions deliberately
negotiated during the Statute's drafting to secure the buy-in of states with powerful militaries,
such as the United States. The goal was to protect their interests while still allowing for a
functional international court. The fact that these safeguards, while extensive, were ultimately
insufficient to convince major powers to ratify the treaty highlights the enduring political
opposition to any form of external jurisdiction over national citizens.

4. Definitional Analysis of the Core Crimes

The Rome Statute provides the ICC with jurisdiction over four distinct and heinous crimes, which
are not subject to a statute of limitations. The concepts of these crimes have evolved
significantly since the end of World War II.

4.1. The Crime of Genocide

The crime of genocide is uniquely defined by the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. This intent distinguishes genocide from other mass
atrocities. The acts that constitute genocide are explicitly enumerated and include killing
members of the group, causing serious physical or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions
of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction, imposing measures to prevent
births within the group, or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

4.2. Crimes Against Humanity

Crimes against humanity are defined as acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population. A key distinction is that these crimes can be
committed during peacetime as well as wartime, whereas war crimes are always committed in
the context of an armed conflict. The Rome Statute lists 15 forms of crimes against humanity,
including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual
slavery, and enforced disappearances.

4.3. War Crimes

War crimes are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of the
laws and customs of war committed in the context of an armed conflict, whether international or
non-international. This category includes acts such as murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and
torture of civilians or prisoners of war. It also covers attacks intentionally directed against civilian
populations, hospitals, historic monuments, or religious buildings, as well as the use of child
soldiers, hostage-taking, and pillaging.

4.4. The Crime of Aggression: Evolution and Activation

The crime of aggression, defined as the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, or political independence of another State, was included in the Rome Statute
at its inception but was not fully operational at that time. States had not reached a consensus on
the definition or punishment for this specific crime. The definition and the conditions for the
Court's jurisdiction over it were finally adopted at the 2010 Kampala Review Conference , with
jurisdiction activated as of July 17, 2018. This long delay highlights the political difficulty of
extending international legal authority to a state's decision to use military force, a matter
traditionally viewed as a core component of national sovereignty. The eventual activation of this
jurisdiction represents a major conceptual leap in international law, extending the principle of
individual criminal responsibility from the means of warfare to the decision to wage war itself.

Table 1: The Core Crimes of the Rome Statute

Crime Formal Definition Key Elements & Examples

Genocide The specific intent to destroy, in Killing members of the group;
whole or in part, a national, causing serious physical or
ethnic, racial, or religious mental harm; deliberately
group. inflicting conditions to bring
about physical destruction;
forcibly transferring children.
Crimes Against Humanity Acts committed as part of a Murder, deportation, torture,
widespread or systematic enslavement, sexual violence,
attack directed against any and enforced disappearances.
civilian population. Can occur in peacetime or
wartime.
War Crimes Grave breaches of the Geneva Use of child soldiers; killing or
Conventions and serious torture of civilians/prisoners of
violations of the laws and war; attacks on hospitals or
customs of war in the context of historic monuments;
armed conflict. hostage-taking; pillaging.
Crime of Aggression The use of armed force by a An act of aggression committed
Crime Formal Definition Key Elements & Examples
State against the sovereignty, by a State's political or military
integrity, or independence of leadership. Jurisdiction
another State. activated in 2018.
5. The International Criminal Court: Structure,
Operations, and State Cooperation
As the world's first permanent international criminal court, the ICC operates with a distinct
institutional structure and process.

5.1. The Court's Organigram and Roles

The ICC is governed by four principal organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office
of the Prosecutor, and the Registry. The Presidency is responsible for the overall administration
of the Court. The Judicial Divisions, comprised of judges, are tasked with conducting fair judicial
proceedings and upholding defendants' rights. The Office of the Prosecutor is an independent
organ responsible for conducting preliminary examinations and investigations. The Prosecutor is
the only entity with the authority to bring cases before the Court. The Registry handles the
non-judicial aspects of the Court's administration and provides support to victims and witnesses.
The ICC's victim and witness protection program utilizes both operational and procedural
protective measures to ensure the safety of those involved in proceedings.

5.2. Initiating Investigations and Prosecutions

The Rome Statute provides three avenues for initiating an investigation :
●​ A State Party can refer a situation to the Prosecutor, regardless of their own involvement.
●​ The UN Security Council can refer a situation.
●​ The Prosecutor can initiate an investigation on their own motion (proprio motu) based on
information from various sources, including United Nations bodies, intergovernmental or
non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources.

5.3. The Imperative of State Cooperation for Arrests and Evidence

A fundamental challenge for the ICC is its reliance on state cooperation. The Court does not
possess its own police force or enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, it is entirely dependent
on States Parties to execute arrest warrants and facilitate the transfer of suspects to The
Hague. This operational dependency creates a critical vulnerability. As of a recent count, the
Court has detained 22 people while 30 remain at large. The stark difference in outcomes
between cases where cooperation is secured and those where it is not, demonstrates that the
ICC's ability to deliver justice is not inherent but is a function of the political will of sovereign
nations. The case of Joseph Kony, the fugitive Ugandan rebel leader who has eluded capture
for decades, is a prime example of this constraint, highlighting how high-profile suspects can
evade justice if states are unwilling to cooperate. The existence of arrest warrants for individuals
like Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, who are highly unlikely to be surrendered by their
respective states, illustrates a core paradox of the Court: it can issue warrants to signal a global
commitment to accountability, but it can only enforce justice when that commitment is backed by
concrete state action.

6. The Geopolitics of State Participation

The Rome Statute has achieved significant global reach, yet its authority is limited by the fact
that many of the world's most powerful nations have not joined the Court.

6.1. The Global Membership of the Assembly of States Parties

As of early 2025, 125 states are parties to the Rome Statute, representing a significant portion
of the international community. The Statute has been ratified by nearly all countries in Europe,
all of South America, most of Oceania, and roughly half of Africa. This widespread participation
underscores a broad global commitment to the Court's mission of ending impunity. However, a
number of countries, including major global powers, are not party to the Statute. Some former
member states, such as Burundi and the Philippines, have also withdrawn from the Court.

6.2. Rationales for Non-Ratification and Withdrawal: A Case Study of

the United States, Russia, and Other Major Powers
The non-participation of major powers is a profound philosophical and geopolitical statement
about the limits of international law and the primacy of national sovereignty. The reasons for
their opposition are not merely procedural but are rooted in core national interests and legal
principles.
●​ United States: The United States, which voted against the adoption of the Statute,
signed the treaty but later informed the UN that it no longer intended to become a State
Party. The core reason for its opposition is the concern that the ICC might one day subject
a U.S. citizen, particularly a member of its armed forces or government, to its jurisdiction.
The U.S. also feared that the ICC would deny its citizens the procedural due process
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. maintains a controversial legal
position, arguing that the ICC has no jurisdiction over its nationals, even for actions
undertaken on the territory of a State Party. This "immunity interpretation" is widely
rejected as defying the core principle of territorial jurisdiction and rewarding a non-party
with impunity.
●​ Russia: The Russian Federation signed the treaty in 2000 but never ratified it, and it
officially withdrew its signature in 2016. This decision was announced just hours after the
ICC Prosecutor released a preliminary report classifying the situation in Crimea as an
"international armed conflict" between Russia and Ukraine. Russia's Foreign Ministry
stated that the ICC had "failed to live up to its promises" and was not a "truly independent
and authoritative judicial body". The timing of the withdrawal demonstrates the direct link
between the Court's legal determinations and the political interests of powerful states.
●​ China and India: These countries have not signed the treaty and cite concerns that the
ICC would infringe on their national sovereignty. Analysts note that their leaders could
also face investigation if they joined the Court.
The collective non-participation of these key nations undermines the Court's claim to be a
universal institution and creates a legitimacy problem. It reinforces the perception that
international justice is a system that applies primarily to "weaker states" while powerful nations
can protect themselves from its reach. This dynamic reveals a systemic inequality inherent in a
justice system based on state consent.

Table 2: Rome Statute State Status for Select Countries

Country Status (Early 2025) Rationale for Status

United States Signatory, but no longer intends Fear of politically motivated
to ratify prosecutions of military and
government officials; concerns
about due process rights
guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution.
Russian Federation Withdrew signature in 2016 Withdrawal followed an ICC
report on Crimea; accused the
Court of not being a "truly
independent" body.
China Non-signatory Argues the ICC would infringe
on national sovereignty; could
face investigations if it joined.
India Non-signatory Argues the ICC would infringe
on national sovereignty; could
face investigations if it joined.
Philippines Withdrew, effective 2019 Withdrew after the Court's
preliminary examination into its
"war on drugs" campaign.
7. Landmark Cases and the Evolution of ICC Case Law
The ICC's track record is a mix of legal successes, notable acquittals, and ongoing challenges
in securing justice.

7.1. From Convictions to Acquittals: A Review of Significant

Outcomes
The Court's first conviction was against Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who
was found guilty of the war crime of using child soldiers. Another significant conviction was that
of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, who admitted guilt to the war crime of destroying historical and
religious monuments in Mali, a first for an international trial. The ICC has also demonstrated its
judicial independence through acquittals, such as in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,
whose conviction for war crimes and crimes against humanity was overturned on appeal. These
cases showcase the Court's dual role in securing convictions and upholding the rights of the
accused.

7.2. The Challenges of In-Absentia Proceedings: The Joseph Kony

Precedent
A major operational challenge for the ICC is the prosecution of individuals who remain fugitives
from justice. This is highlighted by the case of Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), who has been at large since a warrant was issued for his arrest in 2005. In a
landmark step, the Court held its first in-absentia hearing to confirm charges of war crimes and
crimes against humanity against Kony. While this procedure allows the Court to formally outline
its case, it cannot proceed to a full trial unless the accused is in custody. This hearing serves a
symbolic purpose, but it also underscores the Court's limitations and its dependence on states
to execute arrests. The case has been identified as a precedent for dealing with other
high-profile fugitives like Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu should they continue to evade
justice.

7.3. Recent Developments: The Rodrigo Duterte Case and Its

Implications
A recent and highly significant development is the case of Rodrigo Duterte, the former president
of the Philippines. In March 2025, an arrest warrant was issued against him for the crime
against humanity of murder, and he was subsequently arrested and surrendered to the ICC by
Philippine authorities. His initial appearance before the Court was held on March 14, 2025, with
a hearing for the confirmation of charges provisionally scheduled for September 23, 2025. This
case is a critical test for the Court's ability to prosecute high-level officials and demonstrates a
successful example of state cooperation. The arrest of a former head of state by their own
country and his surrender to the ICC stands in stark contrast to the stalemate in the Kony case
and highlights a central truth: the ICC's effectiveness is profoundly situational and contingent on
the political will of the states involved.

Table 3: Significant ICC Cases and Status

Accused Person Country/Situation Charges & Outcome Current Status

Joseph Kony Uganda, Democratic War crimes, crimes At large.
Republic of Congo, etc. against humanity.
Charges were
confirmed in an
in-absentia hearing.
Rodrigo Duterte Philippines Crime against humanity In ICC custody.
of murder. Arrested and
surrendered by
Philippine authorities.
Thomas Lubanga Democratic Republic of War crimes. Convicted Convicted, prison
Dyilo Congo for using child soldiers. sentence.
Jean-Pierre Bemba Democratic Republic of War crimes, crimes Acquitted, case closed.
Gombo Congo against humanity.
Acquitted on appeal.
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mali War crime of destroying Convicted, prison
Mahdi historical and religious sentence and
monuments. Pleaded reparations.
guilty and was
convicted.
8. A Critical Examination of the ICC
The ICC has faced significant criticism since its inception, including accusations of political bias,
questions about its effectiveness as a deterrent, and debates on the interplay of peace and
justice.

8.1. The "African Bias" Debate: A Statistical and Contextual Analysis

A major controversy surrounding the Court is the accusation that it disproportionately targets
leaders in Africa. A statistical analysis reveals that while a majority of the Court's investigations
have been in Africa, many of these cases were initiated by African States themselves through
"self-referrals". For example, the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda,
Mali, and the Central African Republic all arose from such referrals. This fact challenges the
simple narrative of institutional bias and suggests that the Court's focus on the continent is, in
many cases, a symptom of "African enthusiasm" and a reflection of the "impunity gap" in
countries with weak judicial systems. The more profound issue is why the Court has been
unable to exercise jurisdiction over situations in powerful non-member states where similar
atrocities have occurred. The "African bias" critique, while a public relations challenge, ultimately
distracts from the more fundamental issue that powerful states have deliberately protected
themselves from the Court's jurisdiction, while weaker states, vulnerable to violence, have
voluntarily opened themselves up to it.

8.2. Deterrence vs. Symbolic Justice: Assessing the Court's

Effectiveness
A central debate about the ICC concerns its effectiveness as a deterrent to future crimes. The
argument for deterrence posits that the threat of prosecution and international opprobrium can
prevent individuals from committing mass atrocities. Some empirical evidence suggests that the
Court does have a "conditional deterrence effect," particularly on governments that are
dependent on foreign aid or rebel groups seeking international legitimacy. Furthermore,
ratification of the Rome Statute is correlated with improvements in domestic laws and a
reduction in hostilities. However, a counter-argument holds that the connection between
prosecutions and deterrence is a "largely untested assumption" and that the Court's low number
of convictions may not be sufficient to create a credible threat. The low probability of arrest for
high-profile suspects also diminishes the deterrent effect. The Court's work, therefore, may be
more symbolic than a direct deterrent, serving to assert global norms and end impunity in
individual cases rather than prevent future conflicts.

9. The ICC's Relationship with the United Nations

The Rome Statute established the ICC as an independent judicial body, separate from the
United Nations. However, the Statute also dictates that the Court shall be in a formal
relationship with the UN system.

9.1. An Independent, But Linked Institution

The ICC's independence is a core pillar of the Statute, designed to protect the Court and its
Prosecutor from political influence. The Court recognizes the UN's responsibilities under the UN
Charter, and the two institutions cooperate closely to avoid duplication and facilitate their
respective responsibilities. The UN and the ICC have a formal relationship agreement that
provides for cooperation on administrative matters, information sharing, and even the temporary
interchange of personnel. UN peacekeeping missions, for example, have been mandated to
support host states' cooperation with the ICC by providing logistical assistance, preserving
evidence, and providing security.

9.2. The Role of the UN Security Council in Referrals and Deferrals

A critical element of the ICC-UN relationship is the power of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to
refer situations to the ICC Prosecutor. This is a vital mechanism that allows the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over situations in states that are not parties to the Rome Statute, as seen in
the referrals of Libya and Sudan. However, this power also links the Court's agenda directly to
the geopolitical interests and veto power of the UNSC's permanent members. Russia, for
instance, has used its veto to block a referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC Prosecutor,
demonstrating how the ability of the Court to act in the most serious and politically sensitive
situations can be curtailed by the very body designed to facilitate its work. This paradox
highlights the enduring tension between the Court’s legal mandate to end impunity and its
operational dependence on a political body that includes states that have actively rejected its
jurisdiction.

10. Conclusion: The Evolving Role and Future

Trajectory of the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute represents a monumental achievement in international law, establishing a
permanent institutional mechanism to hold individuals accountable for the most egregious
crimes of international concern. The Court's very existence sends a powerful message that
impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression is no
longer a given. The Statute's focus on complementarity, while a source of legal and political
complexity, has also helped to catalyze domestic legal reforms in many States Parties. It has
established a clear normative standard that has influenced national laws and practices,
demonstrating a ripple effect beyond its direct legal proceedings.
However, the ICC is far from a perfect institution. Its effectiveness is inherently constrained by
its dependence on state cooperation, a factor that has led to a significant number of high-profile
fugitives remaining at large. The non-participation of major world powers, rooted in a
fundamental defense of national sovereignty, creates a legitimacy problem and reinforces the
perception that international justice is a system that applies differently to powerful and weaker
states. The future of the Rome Statute hinges on the Court's ability to navigate these
geopolitical realities. To strengthen its position, the international community must work to ensure
that investigations in all regions, not just Africa, are not blocked and that perpetrators are held
accountable regardless of their country of origin. The ICC, as a symbol of hope for victims and a
court for future generations, must continue its mission to make international criminal justice a
consistent and predictable reality. The Statute may stumble, but its full potential can still be
realized by an international community committed to defending its mandate and ensuring its
effective operation.

Works cited
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | International ...,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/publications/core-legal-texts/rome-statute-international-criminal-court 2.
About the Court - | International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court 3. The
International Criminal Court (ICC) | International peace and ...,
https://www.government.nl/topics/international-peace-and-security/international-legal-order/the-i
nternational-criminal-court-icc 4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-crimin
al-court 5. Understanding the International Criminal Court,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/understanding-the-icc.pdf 6. 20 ICC
benefits | Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/20-icc-benefits 7. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court - Missing Persons Global Response - ICRC,
https://missingpersons.icrc.org/library/rome-statute-international-criminal-court 8.
complementarity | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/complementarity 9. International Criminal Court - Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court 10. The Principle of Complementarity
and the International Criminal Court: The Role of Ne Bis in Idem - Scholarly Commons,
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=facultyarticles
11. A Concise History of International Criminal Law,
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1629&context=facpubs 12.
Evolution of International Criminal Justice,
https://www.aba-icc.org/about-the-icc/evolution-of-international-criminal-justice/ 13. Crimes -
Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/international-criminal-court 14. A Global Court? U.S.
Objections to the International Criminal Court and Obstacles to Ratification - Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of,
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=hrbrief 15.
The United States Should Ratify the Rome Statute - Lieber Institute - West Point,
https://lieber.westpoint.edu/united-states-should-ratify-rome-statute/ 16. Core International
Crimes (As Defined by the Rome Statute, 1998) (PART IIA),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/international-and-transnational-crime-and-justice/core-int
ernational-crimes-as-defined-by-the-rome-statute-1998/70491A42195BEE9BBB11228FC20ADA
33 17. How the Court works - | International Criminal Court,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works 18. War crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide - AFP,
https://www.afp.gov.au/crimes/breaches-international-law/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-a
nd-genocide 19. What is the International Criminal Court (ICC) and what is its ...,
https://ask.un.org/faq/97157 20. Joseph Kony case in The Hague begins with accounts of
alleged ...,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/09/joseph-kony-icc-hearing-the-hague-alleged-atr
ocities 21. ICC opens war crimes case against Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony,
https://apnews.com/article/court-icc-uganda-rebel-leader-kony-61ecf7a96de7357f9ced448e015
ce4ea 22. Rome Statute - Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rome_Statute 23. The Role of
the ICC | Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-icc 24. Russia:
Decision to pull out of the Rome Statute is a blow to international justice,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/11/russiadecision-to-pull-out-of-the-rome-
statute-is-a-blow-to-international-justice/ 25. Russia pulls out from International Criminal Court |
Vladimir Putin News - Al Jazeera,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/16/russia-pulls-out-from-international-criminal-court
26. The International Criminal Court: biased or simply misunderstood? - UNA-UK,
https://una.org.uk/magazine/2018-1/international-criminal-court-biased-or-simply-misunderstood
27. Cases - | International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases 28. cases | International
Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases?page=1 29. An African Bias at the ICC? A
Discussion in Two Parts - HKS Student Policy Review,
https://studentreview.hks.harvard.edu/an-african-bias-at-the-icc-a-discussion-in-two-parts/ 30.
Protection, Justice, and Accountability: Cooperation between the International Criminal Court
and UN Peacekeeping Operations,
https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/IPI-E-RPT-Protection-Justice-ICC.pdf 31.
The International Criminal Court & Deterrence A Report to the Office of Global Criminal Justice,
US Department of State - Stanford Law School,
https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Philips-The-International-Criminal-Court-an
d-Deterrence-A-Report-to-the-U.S.-Department-of-State.pdf 32. Atrocities, Deterrence, and the
Limits of International Justice,
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1676&context=ilj 33. Relationship
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court,
https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/unga/2004/en/14383 34. Negotiated Relationship
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Preamble,
https://www.un.org/sites/www.un.org.ola/files/documents/2018/10/un-icc-relationship-agreement
.pdf