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Human Rights in Peaceful Protests

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Human Rights in Peaceful Protests

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sandeepwork129
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
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United Nations A/HRC/50/42

General Assembly Distr.: General


16 May 2022

Original: English

Human Rights Council


Fiftieth session
13 June–8 July 2022
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development

Protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests


during crisis situations

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful


assembly and of association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule*

Summary
The present report is prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 44/20 of
17 July 2020.
The Special Rapporteur has examined key global trends that seriously impede the
protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests in crisis situations. They include
stigmatization, abuse of emergency measures, militarization and use of unlawful force to
stifle peaceful protests, compounded by endemic impunity for serious violations. The Special
Rapporteur reaffirms the importance peaceful protest has for democratic, just and peaceful
society and as a means to ensure people’s voices are heard and taken into account. Based on
numerous global consultations and submissions by States, law enforcement and non-State
actors, the Special Rapporteur offers practical recommendations to enhance facilitation and
protection of human rights during peaceful protests in crisis.

* Agreement was reached to publish the present report after the standard publication date owing to
circumstances beyond the submitter’s control.

GE.22-07320(E)
A/HRC/50/42

Contents
Page
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3
II. Legal and conceptual framework .................................................................................................. 3
III. Role of protests in building peaceful and inclusive societies ........................................................ 4
IV. Restrictions on peaceful protest during crisis situations................................................................ 5
V. Respecting peaceful protest during armed conflict ....................................................................... 14
VI. Ending impunity and ensuring accountability ............................................................................... 15
VII. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 16
VIII. Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 16

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I. Introduction
1. On 17 July 2020, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 44/20 on the
promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests. Concerned with
the expansion of human rights violations in the context of peaceful protest, exacerbated in
the context of such crises as the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the Council
requested the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, to prepare the present report.
2. Between June 2021 and April 2022, the Special Rapporteur conducted regional and
global consultations with various stakeholders, including eight regional consultations with
hundreds of civil society representatives from the Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin
America and the Caribbean, and Middle East and North Africa regions; a global online
consultation with national human rights institutions; a virtual consultation with law
enforcement personnel, with the cooperation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC); and a global consultation with States’ permanent missions in Geneva. In
addition, the Special Rapporteur interacted with regional human rights systems and consulted
experts, including academics, lawyers and members of civil society who were working on a
variety of subjects addressed by the report. The report also draws from the panel discussion
on peaceful protest held at the forty-eighth session of the Human Rights Council, in which
the Special Rapporteur called on States to implement all relevant instruments to strengthen
the promotion and protection of human rights during peaceful protests. The Special
Rapporteur received 95 submissions that informed the report: 11 from States, 9 from national
human rights institutions, and 75 from civil society.1
3. Among the actors consulted were activists and experts in monitoring peaceful
protests, participants in protests, human rights defenders, peace-building actors, humanitarian
actors, women’s rights and racial discrimination activists and others. Specific attention was
paid to gender aspects of protests during crisis and to the impact of measures on different
groups.

II. Legal and conceptual framework


4. Protests can take many forms. They can be spontaneous or organized, individual or
collective. They can have many objectives: expressing dissent, dissatisfaction or opposition;
raising concerns or awareness about particular issues, including human rights violations;
demanding accountability; calling for better work conditions; or any combination of the
above. Protests are especially important as a means of enabling the expression of popular
perspectives during crises, when inequalities and marginalization worsen. Protests are also
an important avenue to protect and achieve other rights.2 Accordingly, restrictions on and
lack of protection of peaceful protest contribute to violations of the other human rights
protesters seek to promote, achieve and defend.
5. The conduct of peaceful protests is protected by numerous international and regional
human rights instruments. In particular, article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights protects the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Protests are also protected
by the right to freedom of association, the right to freedom of expression and the right to
participate in public affairs (articles 19, 22 and 25 of the Covenant). These rights are widely
considered foundational to free and democratic societies. Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly regardless of their status. The protection continues whether the protest
is in support of “contentious ideas or goals” or not. 3 States have an obligation under
international human rights law to respect, protect and fulfil individuals’ right to freedom of
peaceful assembly.
6. That right is subject only to limitations provided by human rights law. First,
limitations must pass the test of legality, meaning that they are laid out clearly in the laws, in

1 Submissions are on file with the Secretariat.


2 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly.
3 General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 7.

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advance and according to the appropriate procedures, and that they do not confer unfettered
or sweeping discretion on those charged with their enforcement. In addition, as set out in
article 21 of the Covenant, they must be aimed at legitimate purposes, including national
security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, and the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Any restrictions imposed must be the least
intrusive among the measures that might serve the relevant protective function, and must not
be disproportionate to the legitimate aim the measure achieves. All of the above must be
considered in accordance with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, political pluralism
and human rights.4
7. Peaceful protests often arise as a result of or in relation to crises, and States often
impose illegitimate restrictions on assemblies in those contexts, resulting in violations of
numerous rights. Situations that may be labelled “crises” in which protests arise and are at
risk of suppression include situations of armed conflict, political instability, coups d’état and
major political contestations, mass violence linked to terrorism or organized crime, health
crises, environmental and natural disasters, climate change, economic crises, situations of
food insecurity, situations of large-scale poverty and inequality and situations involving
systematic discrimination against particular groups.
8. Irrespective of the existence of a “crisis”, States are obliged to protect human rights.
Under article 4 of the Covenant, States are allowed to derogate only to a limited extent from
some of their human rights obligations, such as the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, in
exceptional circumstances, and where the life of the nation is threatened. Any restrictions
must be of an exceptional and temporary nature, proportionate in the light of the emergency
situation and maintained only for as long as the emergency exists, and must comply with the
parameters set out by international human rights law.5 States must not rely on derogation
from the right of peaceful assembly if they can attain their objectives by imposing lesser
restrictions in line with the provisions of article 21.6 During states of emergency, other rights
and principles relevant to peaceful protests, such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture
and the principle of legality in criminal law, are non-derogable in all circumstances.7
9. During an armed conflict, measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only
if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation.8 In addition,
international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
Additional Protocols thereto, applies and provides protections to the civilian population in
the context of peaceful protests during international or non-international armed conflicts, or
military occupation.

III. Role of protests in building peaceful and inclusive societies


10. The Special Rapporteur has observed a widespread tendency on the part of States to
view protests as a threat and magnifier of crises. In contrast, he emphasizes that protests are
vital to the life of healthy societies, allowing underrepresented viewpoints and the voices of
those otherwise excluded to be taken into account. Protests have been particularly important
in facilitating participation of otherwise excluded groups such as youth, ethnic, racial and
other minorities, women, children, LGBTQI+ persons and other marginalized communities
and victims’ groups. Protests are also often essential to holding Governments, and rights
violators in general, accountable. Where States adopt securitized, hostile approaches to
protests, rather than welcoming them as an important part of democratic life, the result is
often to deepen underlying crises.

4 Ibid., paras. 36−40.


5 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 29 (2001) on derogations from provisions of the
Covenant during a state of emergency; and Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Siracusa Principles)
(E/CN.4/1985/4, annex).
6 General comment No. 37 (2020) and general comment No. 29 (2001), para. 5; and CCPR/C/128/2,
para. 2 (c).
7 Siracusa Principles; and general comment No. 29 (2001), para. 7.
8 General comment No. 29 (2001), para. 3.

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11. Crises can be both the consequence and cause of human rights violations. They are
often rooted in complex combinations of factors, including systemic exclusion and
discrimination, unequal distribution of wealth and exploitative economic systems,
environmental degradation and lack of access to basic services or protection. Identifying and
effectively addressing the underlying drivers of crises requires multiple perspectives and
inclusive dialogue.
12. Fulfilment of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly – as part of an ecosystem of
public participation in decision-making – contributes to more transparent and responsive
policies. The ability of different segments of society to voice their disagreement and
grievances publicly, including in particular in crisis situations, represents an important means
to facilitate dialogue and prevent further destructive conflict. It is also important that children
be able to participate in protests, given their exclusion from political processes.
13. It is of concern that in crisis contexts, protests are often perceived or misrepresented
as threats to national security, public order or the like, eliciting, in response, repressive laws,
policies and force. Such repression often drives further grievances and social unrest.
14. It is important to recall the historic role protests have had in driving change in relation
to advancing human rights and social justice; ending slavery, colonial rule, authoritarian
regimes and apartheid; supporting transitional justice processes; advancing women’s rights;
preventing destructive conflict and bridging differences; and advancing the global fight for
climate justice. Protests have led to innumerable vital institutional and legal changes,
including constitutional reforms, changes in government structure and other institutional
arrangements, the reform of abusive laws and practices, increased social protection and
greater inclusion of vulnerable groups.

IV. Restrictions on peaceful protest during crisis situations


15. States have too often responded to both genuine and invented crises through a range
of unlawful measures that violate the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. States often
attempt to justify restrictions on, or the use of unlawful force against, peaceful protesters by
branding them as “rioters,” “bandits”, “provocateurs”, “terrorists” and with other such
stigmatizing labels. Such practices are extremely dangerous, create a climate hostile to the
exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and can lead to serious human rights
violations.

A. Use of emergency laws and measures

16. States have a long history of misusing emergency measures in crises, imposing severe
restrictions or blanket bans on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Not every crisis,
however, reaches the threshold to justify the imposition of a state of emergency. States are
obliged to provide careful justification for the proclamation of a state of emergency, and to
provide clear evidence, including scientific evidence where appropriate (as in the case of
health crises), that the situation meets the threshold of an emergency. In addition, all
derogating measures must be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 9 This
requirement relates to the duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the state of
emergency and any related derogations.10 Furthermore, States should provide evidence that
the emergency is actual, grave and imminent.11 A state of emergency may not be used to stifle
dissent, as expressed through protest. To ensure compliance with the principle of legality and
the rule of law, an official proclamation is required when a state of emergency is declared
and, if extended, of any derogations of rights thereunder.12
17. States have often declared an emergency during crises in a manner and under
circumstances that are inappropriate, and for overly lengthy periods, and have relied on those

9 Ibid., paras. 4−5.


10 Ibid.
11 Siracusa Principles, paras. 40−41.
12 General comment No. 29 (2001), para. 2.

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declarations to impose unnecessary restrictions on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly,


in violation of their international legal obligations. They have included bans on assemblies,
sanctioning the use of unlawful force, including through military engagement, arbitrary and
unlawful arrest, Internet and communications shutdowns and other abusive measures aimed
at supressing peaceful protests. States have also used declarations of “emergency” as a cover
to justify attacks on critics of the Government, while fostering a sense on the part of military
and law enforcement personnel that they may violate human rights with impunity in
implementing emergency measures in response to peaceful protests.
18. In response to the global COVID-19 pandemic, an unprecedented number of States
around the world have adopted sweeping emergency and other public health-related
measures, imposing nationwide lockdowns and broad restrictions on movements and
gatherings, including bans on peaceful assemblies.13 States are required to comply with the
above regulations when declaring states of emergency in the context of pandemics. However,
many States imposed states of emergency without formally declaring them. Some States have
imposed emergencies or de facto emergency measures, such as strict lockdowns and
prohibitions on gatherings, through presidential decrees and declarations, circumventing
legislative review and judicial oversight.
19. While the Special Rapporteur understands the urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic
situation and States need to protect the right to health and life of all within their jurisdictions,
many measures adopted during the pandemic have been unjustified, disproportionate and
overly punitive. The concentration of power in executive authorities, with minimal or no
legislative or judicial oversight, the lack of clarity of the status and content of emergency
measures, and the decision of some States to approach the pandemic not as a health issue but
through a securitized lens, increasing the strength of security and at times military forces, has
led to serious violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. The Special Rapporteur
has received numerous reports of excessive use of force, arbitrary detention and attacks on
protesters during the COVD-19 pandemic. Many States appear to have utilized the measures
imposed as a pretext to expand militarization and executive power and attack oppositional
figures and movements. In several States, restrictions on assemblies have been vigorously
applied relative to rallies held by opposition political parties and to anti-government protests,
while pro-government demonstrations, ruling party political gatherings and election rallies
have been allowed to proceed free from limitation. Some emergency measures have not
included any sunset clause, raising concerns over prolonged erosion of rights and freedoms.
In some States, bans on assemblies have remained in place even after restrictions were lifted.
20. Moreover, many States banned assemblies as part of COVID-19 emergency measures
without performing an assessment as to whether other less invasive restrictions permitted
under article 21 would have served the public health objective, such as evaluating whether
assemblies subjected to certain restrictions required to limit the spread of the pandemic
(distancing guidelines, mask wearing requirements, limitations on the number of participants
and/or other measures) could suffice.14 Such assessments are important, as any restrictions
imposed must be no more than necessary in a democratic society. For example, the European
Court of Human Rights found that anti-COVID-19 measures imposing blanket bans on
assemblies for a lengthy period, backed by severe penalties, were disproportionate to the aims
pursued and violated the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.15
21. Emergency measures suspending freedom of assembly have also been imposed
following protests seen as challenging the Government, for example, protests against rising
gas prices in Peru in April 202216 and anti-COVID-19 vaccine protests in Canada in February
2022. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that States must tolerate a certain level of disruption

13 International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law and others, COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, available
at [Link] and European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) (CDL-AD(2020)018, 8/10/2020).
14 Submission of Public Ombudsman of Georgia.
15 European Court of Human Rights, Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,
Case No. 21881/20, Judgment, 15 March 2022.
16 See [Link]

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to everyday life caused by demonstrations, unless they are “serious and sustained”. 17
Furthermore, imposing states of emergency in response to protests is counterproductive to
solving underlying social and political disputes. States should seek to foster dialogue with all
affected groups, and to address the root causes of the protests, as well as strengthening
democratic functions to address any social disputes.
22. It is of concern that some States have prolonged and normalized emergency powers
initially adopted in response to crisis, suffocating civic space. Judicial oversight is essential
to limiting the potential for abuse of emergency measures, including of any derogations
related to the right to peaceful assembly.

B. Use of ordinary laws and measures to restrict freedom of peaceful


protest

23. States have also utilized restrictive laws to supress protests in the context of crises.
States have imposed blanket bans on peaceful assemblies,18 which they argue are justified in
response to certain crises. Blanket restrictions are presumptively disproportionate.19
24. The Special Rapporteur has previously expressed his concern with legal measures,
including measures concerning “critical infrastructure”, that effectively ban certain forms of
protest. 20 The Special Rapporteur reiterates that interruptions, for example to traffic, and
inconveniences to certain business activities must be tolerated if the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly is not to be deprived of meaning. While road blocking may be subject to
certain limited restrictions, it may not be subjected to a blanket ban.21
25. Many States have adopted measures to address, or putatively designed to address,
security challenges connected to terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and other
national security or public safety concerns. While certain measures to combat such concerns
are appropriate, many measures adopted in practice have been used to stifle peaceful protests.
Frequently, such measures include overly broad and vague terms that allow for
criminalization of the actions of peaceful protesters.22
26. In many other cases, laws lacking a legitimate aim and/or overly broad general
criminal law measures, such as sedition laws, are used to suppress protests expressing dissent.
For instance, lèse-majesté and sedition laws have been widely used by Thai authorities to
criminalize and disperse pro-democracy protests.23
27. States often disperse assemblies on the ground that no notification of the assembly
was provided. Notification must not be required for spontaneous assemblies, for which there
is not enough time to provide notice and which is often the case during crises. Lack of
notification alone never constitutes grounds to disperse an assembly or justify the use of
force, the criminalization or arrest of protesters. States remain obligated to facilitate such
assemblies and protect the participants.24
28. Any limitations imposed must allow for judgment on a case-by-case basis, and the
onus is on the authorities to justify any restrictions. Where this responsibility is not met,
article 21 is violated. Whenever a limitation is reasonably imposed, the authorities should
explore steps to ensure the right can be enjoyed through alternative means.

17 General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 85.


18 “United Nations rights experts raise alarm over Russia’s ‘choking’ media clampdown at home”, UN
News, 11 March 2022.
19 A/HRC/20/27, paras. 39 and 54; and general comment No. 37 (2020), para. 38.
20 A/76/222.
21 General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 44.
22 See communication BRA 6/2021. All communications mentioned in the present report are available
from [Link]
23 Consultations with civil society actors, Asia and Pacific region (see para. 2); see also communication
THA 6/2021.
24 General comment No. 37 (2020), paras. 70−73.

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29. The Special Rapporteur has received positive reports for certain measures taken by
some States to facilitate forums and assemblies during the COVID-19 pandemic, countering
challenges posed by the pandemic. For example, some States have created spaces to listen to
children’s views during the pandemic through organized press conferences.25 Moreover, the
constitutional courts in some States have played an important role in ensuring that authorities
continue to respect the right to freedom of assembly when applying relevant measures.26

C. Increasingly militarized approaches

30. There has been a disturbing global tendency towards militarized policing of protests
in the context of crisis situations.
31. As a general rule, the military should not be used to police assemblies, as deployment
of the military for such a purpose often leads to serious human rights violations.27 It is not
the mandate of the military to police protests, nor it is trained in protection and de-escalation
techniques, nor does it have the appropriate equipment for policing protests. 28 Whereas
military techniques typically aim at using force and weaponry to achieve maximum impact,
protest policing requires the use of the minimum force necessary. Broadly, deployment of
the military casts a shadow of fear and intimidation, and creates a chilling effect that in and
of itself violates the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.
32. In conflict and post-conflict situations, armed groups have often been incorporated
into the security forces without being vetted on the basis of their previous conduct or held
accountable for human rights violations. Where such forces are deployed to police protests,
the potential for rights violations and impunity is magnified. In some cases, a combination of
security forces has been deployed to manage protests, providing additional potential for
violations to be committed, including violations due to the lack of clear command structure.
The deployment of foreign military forces to police protests is of even greater concern, such
as in Kazakhstan where troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organization were
brought in to supress large-scale protests. 29 Deployment of external forces increases the
potential of violations and impunity. In all circumstances, the deployment of military or
militarized forces to police protests tends to undermine efforts to build community trust and
create the potential for the escalation of violence.30
33. In exceptional circumstances, where it is absolutely necessary for the military to be
deployed in the context of protests, they must be under civilian command and oversight, have
clearly defined responsibilities and be held accountable by civilian justice systems. They
must be trained in human rights-based law enforcement, 31 including de-escalation
techniques; must be equipped with and trained in the use of “less-lethal” weapons; and must
comply with applicable law enforcement standards, including the Basic Principles on the Use
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. 32 At the same time, States must
proactively put into place measures aimed at ensuring that it will not be necessary to deploy
the military to police protests.
34. The Special Rapporteur is alarmed that military courts have been used to try protesters
in several States.33 For example, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela used military courts
to try protesters on charges of crimes such as “rebellion”, “terrorism” and “treason”. 34

25 Submission of Child Rights Connect.


26 Submission of European Centre for Not-for-Profit Law.
27 See communications MMR 1/2021, UGA 5/2018 and LBN 6/2019.
28 See [Link]
29 See communication KAZ 1/2022.
30 Virtual consultation with law enforcement personnel (see para. 2).
31 A/HRC/31/66, para. 66; and A/66/330, para. 96.
32 See UNODC and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Resource Book on
the Use of Force and Firearms in Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Handbook Series (Vienna and
Geneva, 2017).
33 International Commission of Jurists, “Lebanon: the military has no role in policing public protests, let
alone in arresting, detaining and prosecuting ordinary civilians”, 10 February 2021.
34 See communication VEN 4/2017.

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Military courts should not try civilians. Such courts are structurally non-independent and lack
the necessary due process guarantees.
35. There has also been a trend towards the militarization of law enforcement personnel
deployed to police protests, leading to the development of quasi-military police units that
rely on military-style tactics and are armed with military-style equipment and weaponry. This
trend was visible during protests over police violence against people of color in the United
States of America.35

D. Use of unlawful force

36. The Special Rapporteur has observed the widespread use of unlawful or excessive
force during crises to prevent people from joining protests, when arresting protesters, to
disperse protests and as a form of retribution against those who have joined protests and their
family members.
37. States must ensure that any use of force is in accordance with the principles of legality,
necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, precaution and accountability. 36 States are
obliged to comply with these principles at all times. Excessive use of force is never justified.
Using force with the aim of punishing people taking part in protests is unlawful and a grave
violation of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and to bodily integrity.
38. During the COVID-19 pandemic, representatives of law enforcement in many States
have reportedly used unlawful force to enforce restrictions on freedom of movement and
curfews. Excessive force has also been used against those taking part in peaceful protests
regarding COVID-19 measures. Enforcement of such health regulations does not justify the
use of force likely to cause more than negligible injury.37
39. Women, children, LGBTQI+ individuals, indigenous peoples, migrants, persons of
African descent and other groups subjected to discrimination are particularly vulnerable to
unlawful police force while taking part in protests. 38 Addressing such violence requires
institutional changes to eliminate structural systems of discrimination, including enhancing
diversity within law enforcement and the administration of justice, legislative measures that
enhance equality and targeted training.39
40. State practice reveals misunderstanding as to the protections owed to protests. States
often declare protests violent despite an absence of evidence of widespread violence. Violent
conduct by some individuals is not sufficient to declare an assembly non-peaceful in general,
nor may the violent acts of particular individuals be attributed to other participants in the
assembly.40 Where isolated instances of violence take place in the context of a protest, law
enforcement personnel must make all efforts to locate and remove the violent individuals, to
allow other protesters to exercise their rights to assemble peacefully and express
themselves.41 In situations where acts of violence are more widespread, law enforcement
must continue to follow the principles of knowledge, communication, facilitation and
differentiation.42 When there are legitimate grounds to disperse a protest, law enforcement
must exhaust all non-violent means before resorting to force to disperse an assembly, and
must give clear warnings and an opportunity to disperse before force is deployed.43 Only the

35 See communication USA 31/2020.


36 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms; and UNODC and OHCHR, Resource Book.
37 See
[Link]
38 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reports on Chile
([Link] Colombia
([Link] and
United States
([Link] (2018).
39 Virtual consultation with law enforcement personnel (see para. 2).
40 General comment No. 37 (2020).
41 See UNODC and OHCHR, Resource Book.
42 Ibid.
43 General comment No. 37 (2020), paras. 85−86.

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minimum force necessary to achieve a legitimate law enforcement purpose may be used, and
once the need for any use of force has passed, such as when a violent individual is safely
apprehended, no further resort to force is permissible.44 Law enforcement authorities must
assess the presence of vulnerable groups, including pregnant women, children, the elderly
and people with disabilities, and limit force accordingly.45 The authorities must also take into
consideration any risk of escalating violence or harm or increasing health risks.

E. Misuse of less-lethal weapons

41. The Special Rapporteur has received numerous reports of security forces’
intentionally misusing less-lethal weapons as tools of punishment and repression of protests,
including tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets and batons. The use of less-lethal weapons
is also bound by the above-mentioned principles on the use of force, including necessity and
proportionality, and must also be used as a measure of last resort while ensuring minimum
harm.46 The use of less-lethal weapons is likely to cause a certain degree of injury and hence
can be considered proportionate only if their use is to counter the threat of a similar or graver
harm. Unnecessary or excessive use of such weapons may amount to torture or ill-treatment,
or violate the right to life.47
42. Particular restraint must be exercised when using less-lethal weapons with wide-area
effects, such as tear gas and water cannons, owing to their inherently indiscriminate nature.
To avoid disproportionate harm, tear gas should be used only in response to widespread
violence, when it is not possible to contain the violence by dealing with violent individuals
alone. When violence has not reached that threshold, other more targeted measures must be
taken. It is unacceptable that some State authorities have deliberately and indiscriminately
used excessive quantities of tear gas in residential areas and hospitals in the context of
protests.48
43. Less-lethal weapons must not be abused to maximize harm, such as by targeting
protesters with tear gas canisters, which has been increasingly observed at times of crisis
situations. Such a practice has led to life threatening injuries, including loss of eyes and
eyesight, and death.49
44. Water cannons are also inherently indiscriminate and have caused serious injury and
even death.50
45. Rubber bullets have also been frequently misused, aiming to harm protesters. Rubber
bullets should never be fired randomly at a crowd, or aimed at protesters’ torsos or heads.
Batons have also been regularly misused to punish protesters, as well as deployed where such
a level of force was not strictly necessary.
46. It is important that States not deploy overly harmful weapons in response to
assemblies. Stun grenades, for instance, should never be used in the context of assemblies.

F. Use of firearms

47. Firearms should not be used for the policing of assemblies.51 Firearms may be used
only in self-defence or to defend others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury,
and only if all other less lethal means have been exhausted.52

44 General Assembly resolution 34/169, annex, art. 3; and general comment No. 37 (2020), para. 79.
45 See UNODC and OHCHR, Resource Book.
46 General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 87.
47 See [Link]
48 See communication CHN 2/2020.
49 See communications SDN 6/2021 and PER 8/2020.
50 See A/HRC/32/36/Add.2.
51 A/HRC/26/36, para. 75.
52 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms.

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48. States have frequently used firearms unlawfully against protesters, justified due to a
“crisis”. Hundreds of peaceful protesters calling for democracy and constitutional order have
been injured and killed owing to the use of deliberate, indiscriminate and/or disproportionate
force, including firearms, following the military coups that took place in Myanmar53 and in
the Sudan54 in 2021. Security forces have also used lethal force in response to large-scale
protests triggered by social and economic crises, including in Kazakhstan, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Lebanon and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.55
49. It is of great concern that some States have issued “shoot to kill” orders in response
to mass protests, including in Kazakhstan, where protesters were labelled “terrorists”,56 and
in the Philippines, where the President suggested security forces might shoot to kill anyone
violating COVID-19 quarantine measures.57
50. Shoot to kill orders must never be issued, as they constitute authorization for
extrajudicial executions. States must not grant law enforcement agents unrestricted power to
“use all necessary measures” for dispersing assemblies.58

G. Sexual and gender-based violence

51. Women, girls and LGBTQI+ persons have often been the target of sexual and gender-
based violence, including rape, in the context of protests, especially during crisis situations.
Women are often at the forefront of mobilizing communities and conducting peaceful
protests, often for supporting victims. Sexual and gender-based violence has reportedly been
used by State agents as a weapon to discourage women and communities from taking part in
protests and as a tactic of control and domination.59 Such acts, in addition to representing a
serious violation of women, girls and LGBTQI+ persons’ rights, constitute forms of cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment and may constitute torture.
52. The Special Rapporteur is encouraged by States that have undertaken institutional and
legislative reforms to prevent sexual and gender-based violence, and to provide remedy
through specialized mechanisms and by adopting protocols on the gender-sensitive policing
of protests. The involvement of more women in law enforcement and in the facilitation of
protests, including in decision-making and at command levels, are important steps adopted
by some States to combat sexual and gender-based violence.

H. Unjustified arrests and other forms of punishment

53. Emergency declarations and other restrictive laws adopted in the context of “crises”
are often linked to criminalization and violations of individuals’ right to liberty through
unjustified arrests and detentions. National security, anti-terrorism, public order, criminal
defamation and “incitement” laws have been widely misused to criminalize protests and to
arbitrarily arrest and detain protesters. In India, authorities have increasingly used broad and
vague colonial-era sedition and anti-terrorism laws to convict peaceful protesters, including
in the context of large-scale farmers’ protests.60 Members of civil society from all regions
have reported arbitrary arrests of protest leaders and participants, including through mass
arrests and preventive detentions, prior, during and after protests.61 Enforced disappearances,
torture and ill-treatment and sexual abuse in detention as well as denial of access to due
process and fair trial rights of protesters are widespread in the context of crises.

53 See communication MMR 1/2021; and submission of Asia Justice Coalition.


54 See communication SDN 6/2021.
55 See communications KAZ/1/2022, IRN 17/2019, LBN 2/2020, VEN 2/2017 and VEN 4/2017.
56 Human Rights Watch, “Kazakhstan: cancel ‘Shoot without warning’ order”, 7 January 2022.
57 Amnesty International, “Philippines: President Duterte gives ‘shoot to kill’ order amid pandemic
response” 2 April 2020.
58 General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 79.
59 See [Link]
60 See communication IND 2/2021.
61 See communication BLR 1/2021.

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54. The arrest and detention of individuals on the basis of exercising their rights to
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, within the bounds recognized by
human rights law, constitute arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 62 Mass arrests related to
peaceful assemblies amount to indiscriminate and arbitrary arrests, violations of the right to
liberty of the person63 and collective punishment. The imposition of administrative detention
also presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and must not be used against
peaceful protesters.64
55. During the COVID-19 pandemic, while certain measures limiting public gatherings
have been reasonable, authorities have often conducted arbitrary arrests and detentions,
including of individuals taking part in assemblies. Moreover, quarantine measures have been
misused as a form of punishment against protesters. In Sri Lanka police allegedly arrested
activists and forcibly transferred them to government quarantine centres, without a court
order and contrary to the health guidelines in place.65 Protesters arrested during the pandemic
have often been put into crowded police vehicles and detention centres, exposing them to a
high risk of infection, contrary to the public health objectives which the dispersal of the
protests in theory aimed to achieve. When lawful arrests are necessary in the context of
protests during a pandemic, non-custodial measures should be sought to avoid spreading the
pandemic due to the poor conditions and hygiene in detention centres. Disproportionate
punishments, including criminalization, for breaking quarantine rules, including participation
in protests, must not be imposed.

I. Use of technology

56. Online spaces are particularly important when individuals face restrictions operating
in physical spaces.66 Through social media, people have found innovative ways to initiate
and sustain protest movements, reach out to wider audiences and achieve solidarity. The right
to freedom of peaceful assembly online should be respected and protected at all times. States
cannot derogate from the obligation to respect the right to freedom of opinion, even during
states of emergency.67
57. States have imposed partial and/or full Internet shutdowns68 and blocked social media
applications during crisis situations, attempting to prevent social mobilization or the
amplification of dissent. Internet shutdowns have significantly limited individuals’ ability to
report and access information on human rights violations and to provide help to those harmed
as a result of the use of force, and have impeded access to vital services. Blanket internet
shutdowns violate the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, association and expression.
The Special Rapporteur reiterates that access to Internet and mobile telephone services should
be maintained at all times, including during times of civil unrest, 69 and that victims of
shutdowns should enjoy effective remedies and redress.
58. States have employed various new technologies during protests in the context of
crises, including surveillance technologies such as CCTV cameras, body cameras and aerial
surveillance vehicles, and face recognition technology. Surveillance technologies have
frequently been deployed without transparency and accountability, and have been used to
crack down on peaceful protests. The use of surveillance technology has expanded
dramatically during the COVID-19 pandemic, in a manner that has serious implications for
State monitoring and suppressing of protests and dissent. While camera surveillance may be
helpful to identify those instigating or committing violence, it must be used in a transparent
manner, according to strict legal safeguards and in accordance with privacy laws complying

62 CCPR/C/MKD/CO/3, para. 19.


63 A/HRC/31/66, para. 45; and CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6, para. 15.
64 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person,
para. 15.
65 Consultations with civil society actors, Asia and Pacific region (see para. 2).
66 A/HRC/35/28, para. 58.
67 General comment No. 29 (2001), para. 11.
68 See communication SDN 6/2021.
69 A/HRC/41/41, para. 74.

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with human rights standards.70 Authorities have also engaged in online surveillance with
particular intensity in times of crisis, often resulting in arrests and charges under overly broad
and vague laws penalizing “fake news”, “attacking the image of the State”, incitement and
other purported crimes.
59. People using social media to mobilize and assemble have often been attacked by both
State and non-State actors, 71 including through smear campaigns, stigmatization, abuse,
threats and hate speech. These measures appear designed to delegitimize their activities,
undermine their advocacy campaigns, intimidate them, and potentially expose them to violent
reprisals. Such online attacks exert a wide chilling effect and have an even more severe
impact on groups that are disproportionately vulnerable and targeted, including women,
LGBTQI+ persons, and ethnic and racial groups subjected to discrimination. Moreover, they
must take measures to protect individuals’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly, including
measures that protect individuals against incitement to hatred, violence and discrimination,
in accordance with articles 19 and 20 of the Covenant and article 4 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.72
60. Of further concern is the targeted restriction of content relating to protests, which often
increases during “crises”, as States pressure social media companies to block accounts and
content related to critical protests.73 The Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has
called on companies to revise their business models to ensure redress mechanisms and
transparency of content moderation.74

J. Attacks on observers and medics

61. The presence of journalists, monitors, lawyers and other observers contributes to the
full enjoyment of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Monitoring is important for
transparency, providing a disincentive to the commission of rights violations and ensuring
accountability. Medics are crucial in ensuring that any physical harm suffered can be
promptly addressed and limited to the extent possible.
62. Unfortunately, journalists, monitors, lawyers and other observers, and medics have all
frequently been targeted while engaging in their legitimate activities during protests. The
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has documented 125
instances of attacks on or arrests of journalists covering protests, mostly attributed to State
agents, including the killing of 10 journalists, in 65 countries. In the context of social and
political polarization during crises, journalists face attacks both from States, including
through the criminalization of journalists for “misreporting”, incitement or sedition, and from
non-State actors who resent certain media messages. 75 Access by journalists, monitors,
lawyers and other observers has been especially restricted in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic. Persons involved in monitoring or reporting on protests must not be prohibited
from, or unduly limited in, exercising those functions, including with respect to monitoring
the actions of law enforcement officials. They must also not be subjected to reprisals or other
harassment. 76 Protection must be extended whether or not the individuals in question are
accredited journalists or freelancers, including community media workers and citizen
journalists and others who may be using new media as a means of reaching their audiences.77
63. National human rights institutions and ombuds institutions play an important role in
monitoring peaceful protests, reporting on violations and restrictions and ensuring that the
Government improves laws, policies and protocols according to international human rights

70 See UNODC and OHCHR, Resource Book.


71 Consultations with civil society actors in all regions.
72 See also A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix.
73 See [Link]
evidence/.
74 See A/HRC/47/25.
75 Council of Europe, “Journalists covering public assemblies need to be protected”, 30 April 2021; see
also [Link]
76 General Assembly resolution 66/164.
77 [Link]

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obligations and standards to prevent violations from recurring. Those institutions can also act
as a valuable intermediary, helping to ensure fluid, responsive communication between
protesters and the authorities. Their role is especially important during crisis situations. The
staff of the institutions have themselves been attacked and subjected to reprisals, however,
including the removal of commissioners and resource cuts, on the basis of critical reporting.78
64. In a number of volatile crisis situations, State forces have indiscriminately or directly
targeted medical staff operating at protests; attacked health-care facilities, including by firing
tear gas directly into hospitals; deliberately obstructed health-care workers’ access to protest
sites; misused health-care facilities, services, uniforms and insignia; detained wounded
protesters from hospitals; occupied hospitals; and arrested, criminalized and imprisoned
medical staff. All of these acts violate medical neutrality and international law.79 States have
a non-derogable obligation to ensure access to health care and ensure effective protection for
health-care workers at all times, and must refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with
the enjoyment of the right to health.80 The right to health is important for and dependent on
the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.81

V. Respecting peaceful protest during armed conflict


65. Peaceful protests have been held in situations of international and non-international
armed conflicts, and in contexts of military occupation. The Special Rapporteur received
reports of the use of unnecessary or excessive force, including lethal force, against peaceful
protesters in such contexts. These actions may constitute war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
66. In times of armed conflict, both international human rights law and international
humanitarian law apply as complementary.82 The Human Rights Committee, in its general
comment No. 37 (2020), reaffirmed that in a situation of armed conflict, the use of force
during peaceful assemblies remained regulated by the rules governing law enforcement under
international human rights law.83 Similarly, in situations of military occupation, all forces
should comply with the legal rules on the use of force and firearms for law enforcement
officials when policing assemblies, under human rights law and domestic law.84
67. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry investigating violations during
the protests in the Gaza Strip, Occupied Palestinian Territory, in 2018, concluded that, as the
demonstrations were civilian in nature, had clearly stated political aims and, despite some
acts of significant violence, did not constitute combat or a military campaign, the legal
framework applicable to policing them was that of law enforcement, on the basis of
international human rights law. The conclusion applied regardless of affiliation with or
membership of peaceful protesters in an armed group. 85 Peaceful protesters, including
children, across the Occupied Palestinian Territory continue to suffer human rights violations
owing to the unlawful use of force applied by Israeli forces.86
68. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) investigative
mission to Ukraine found possible violations by the Russian Federation in respect of the use
of force when dispersing protesters in the newly occupied towns since 24 February 2022,
using live ammunition against peaceful protesters resisting the occupation. It reaffirmed that
the occupying forces may and must maintain law and order in the occupied territory while

78 Consultations with national human rights institutions (see para. 2).


79 ICRC, “Respecting and protecting health-care in armed conflicts and in situations not covered by
international humanitarian law” (Geneva, 2021).
80 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 14 (2000), para. 33.
81 Ibid., para. 3.
82 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal
obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 11.
83 See also Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 on the right to life; and ICRC,
Handbook on International Rules Governing Military Operations (Geneva, 2013).
84 ICRC, Handbook on International Rules Governing Military Operations.
85 A/HRC/40/74, para. 32.
86 See, for example, communication ISR 12/2020.

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respecting international human rights law applicable to law enforcement. That obligation is
triggered when a State exercises effective control over an area; during an invasion phase, the
rules of occupation apply from the very moment the enemy assumes control over a person or
an object in an invaded territory.87
69. In all decisions on the use of force, the safety and protection of assembly participants
and the broader public should be taken into consideration.88 Unless undertaken lawfully in
self-defence, intentionally killing a civilian not directly participating in hostilities is a war
crime.
70. Peaceful protests have been severely repressed in areas where armed non-State actors
have assumed control. Armed groups, as parties to an armed conflict, are bound by
international humanitarian law. There is also a growing recognition that armed groups are
bound by the obligation to respect and protect human rights, including in the context of
peaceful protest, when they exercise either government-like functions or de facto control over
territory and populations. 89 Gross human rights violations and serious violations of
international humanitarian law in relation to protests could entail criminal responsibility for
members and leaders of non-State armed groups. However, States carry legal obligation for
violations committed by armed groups acting in support of or as an agent of the State.90

VI. Ending impunity and ensuring accountability


71. States have a responsibility to ensure prompt, impartial and thorough investigations
and provide remedies to the victims of human rights violations91 and abuses in the context of
protests and to hold those responsible to account, be they State agents or non-State actors.
During states of emergency, States remain responsible for providing effective remedies and
fair trials,92 including reparations for harm suffered; fulfilling their right to truth regarding
the violations; and take necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations,93 including
sexual and gender-based violence during protests. Where appropriate, criminal and/or civil
sanctions must be applied, prioritizing liability of officers with command control.94 Where
States do not comply with these obligations, a state of impunity arises, encouraging
recurrence of violations against people taking part in peaceful protests.
72. However, impunity for human rights violations committed in the context of protests
remains widespread, particularly for protests arising during crises. In several contexts, no
accountability has yet been achieved for widespread and serious human rights violations,
including violations that may constitute crimes against humanity.
73. Some States have initiated investigations into violations committed against persons
taking part in peaceful protests, but they have often been inconclusive and partial, with many
perpetrators never brought to justice.95 For example, in Iraq, various bodies and committees
were set up to investigate alleged violations committed against persons associated with the
large-scale Tishreen (October) demonstrations. Little progress has been made, however,
towards accountability, particularly for perpetrators on the command level.96 A number of
investigations have been opened by the International Criminal Court into war crimes and

87 [Link]
88 General comment No. 37 (2020), para. 97.
89 [Link]
rights-experts-human-rights.
90 OHCHR, International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict (United Nations
publication, 2011).
91 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004).
92 General comment No. 29 (2001), paras. 14 and 16.
93 General Assembly resolution 60/147.
94 A/HRC/31/66, para. 90.
95 See [Link]
relatives-still-waiting-justice.
96 See communication IRQ 5/2021.

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crimes against humanity committed in the context of protests in Burundi,97 Israel and the
State of Palestine,98 and Libya.99 The Special Rapporteur urges all parties to cooperate with
these processes to deter serious violations during protests.
74. The Special Rapporteur has set out guidelines for lawyers, aimed at supporting their
work of providing access to justice in the context of assemblies.100
75. It is crucial to ensure that judicial mechanisms continue to function, even when a
crisis, such as COVID-19, poses challenges, to ensure effective remedy for human rights
violations in relation to emergency measures affecting peaceful protests.

VII. Conclusion
76. Deepening crises worldwide create the potential for an increase in protests,
including spontaneous protests. Responses to peaceful protests must be grounded in
respect for international human rights standards, irrespective of the challenges a crisis
involves. Peaceful protests should be seen as public forums where individuals,
communities and marginalized groups can safely mobilize to voice their views and
opinions. Peaceful protests provide an avenue for everyone to participate in public
debate and seek inclusive and meaningful responses to crisis situations. Where the right
to peaceful assembly is fully enjoyed, democratic, stable and peaceful societies that
respect and protect human rights can thrive.

VIII. Recommendations
77. The Special Rapporteur offers the following recommendations, recognizing the
importance of all actors working together to protect individuals engaging in peaceful
protests during crises and prevent violations of their human rights.

A. Recommendations to States

78. In regard to respecting and enabling peaceful protest during crisis situations,
States should:
(a) Halt hostile rhetoric that stigmatizes peaceful protests, such as portraying
them as destabilizing and as a threat. States must create an enabling environment,
including by facilitating a dialogue with protesters and inclusive processes to ensure
meaningful participation of all groups in society when seeking solutions for resolving a
crisis;
(b) Respond to crises in a human rights-based manner, ensuring that peaceful
protests are not subjected to undue restrictions, and embed protection and facilitation
of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in crisis response, following consultations
with civil society;
(c) Refrain from imposing blanket bans on peaceful protests, and
unconditionally release and compensate anyone detained or criminally sanctioned
under blanket bans;
(d) In the context of public health crises, where restrictions on physical
assemblies are justified in accordance with international human rights law standards,
facilitate alternative forms of participating in assemblies, including by ensuring that the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly is fully enjoyed online;

97 International Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, No. ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp,


Decision, 25 October 2017.
98 Ibid., Situation in the State of Palestine, No. ICC-01/18, Decision, 5 February 2021.
99 Ibid., Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, No. ICC-01/11-01/11-3, Warrant of arrest, 27 June
2011.
100 A/HRC/47/24/Add.3.

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(e) Ensure that quarantine measures are never used to punish or prevent
people joining peaceful protests;
(f) Amend all measures that require, in law or practice, prior permission to
conduct protests, ensure that lack of notification does not lead to criminalization or
dispersal of protests and respect spontaneous protests, removing any legislation
criminalizing such protests;
(g) Amend laws criminalizing certain forms of protests, such as those related
to road blocking or critical infrastructure, to ensure that they do not unduly restrict
peaceful protests or penalize or criminalize protestors, and ensure that any restrictions,
including on civil disobedience, comply with the legality, legitimate purpose, necessity
and proportionality requirements;
(h) Bring all legislation related to national security, public order and public
health into line with international standards, including by providing clear and narrow
definitions to prevent undue criminalization or bans on peaceful protests;
(i) Ensure that everyone, including women, LGBTQI+ persons, children,
racial, ethnic and indigenous groups, migrants and refugees, and other marginalized
groups, enjoys their right to peaceful assembly equally and safely;
(j) Provide protection for peaceful protesters, including those expressing
critical views, from attacks and threats from non-State actors, including armed groups;
(k) Take into account the specific role and vulnerability of journalists, media
workers, monitors and lawyers observing, monitoring, recording and reporting on
protests, as well as of medics working to provide health services, and take steps to
ensure their safety, even if the protest is dispersed; and ensure that all attacks and
violence against those groups are promptly and effectively investigated, that the
perpetrators are brought to justice and that remedies are provided to victims;
(l) Cease Internet shutdowns and repeal any laws and policies that allow
network disruptions and shutdowns, including in the context of protests during crises,
and ensure that any individual site-blocking measures comply with international
human rights standards and are subject to judicial review;
(m) Refrain from the use of biometric identification and recognition
technologies, such as facial recognition, for arbitrary surveillance of protesters, both
offline and online;
(n) Strengthen the capacity of national human rights institutions to monitor
and document human rights violations, including in the context of protests, during
crises, by providing them with adequate resources, refraining from interfering with
their work and providing special exemptions from movement restrictions imposed
during pandemics.
79. In regard to states of emergency, States should:
(a) Ensure emergency measures do not impose illegitimate, unnecessary or
disproportionate restrictions on the ability of people to organize, take part in, monitor,
report or provide assistance to peaceful protests. Any emergency measures must be
justified, transparent and adopted in line with international human rights standards,
including the Siracusa Principles. Any measures of derogation from the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly must be strictly required by the necessity of the situation.
States must not declare a state of emergency in relation to protests, unless they meet the
strict threshold of emergency under article 4 of the Covenant;
(b) Conduct a case-by-case assessment of each assembly and seek ways to
facilitate it, and assess, based on evidence, whether lesser restrictions could achieve the
pursued objective. If restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly are deemed
necessary, ensure that they are temporary, subject to regular review by the highest
judicial authority and promptly ended when no longer necessary;
(c) Immediately restore the unhindered exercise of all rights and freedoms
related to peaceful assembly following the end of an emergency situation, conduct a

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review of the consequences of the derogation measures, adopt preventive measures and
compensate those who have suffered injustice due to protest restrictions, including due
to COVID-19-related emergency measures.
80. In regard to armed conflict and occupation, States should respect the freedom to
peaceful assembly, including in the context of armed conflict and military occupation.
Any use of force in such contexts must strictly be in compliance with international
human rights standards, including the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
81. In regard to facilitating peaceful protests, States should:
(a) Outlaw the unnecessary, excessive or unwarranted use of force, and
ensure that legislation and other measures adopted to address crises narrowly
circumscribe law enforcement authorities’ ability to disperse assemblies;
(b) Issue protocols on the facilitation of peaceful protest for law enforcement,
compatible with international standards regarding the use of force, laying out measures
to protect peaceful protesters, bystanders, monitors, lawyers and medics, including
from counter-protesters and other targeted forms of violence, during a variety of crisis
situations, and providing for graduated use of force, setting clear limitations on the use
of lethal and less-lethal weapons. Such protocols must take into account a gender
perspective and address the vulnerability of different groups;
(c) Provide extensive training of law enforcement personnel on limiting the
use of lethal and less-lethal weapons, on community-based policing methods and on de-
escalation and negotiations strategies, and ensure that all protocols are strictly
followed; and provide representatives of law enforcement who are policing protests
with necessary self-protection equipment, including for protection during pandemics;
(d) Ensure a clear chain of command in the facilitation of protests and that
the appropriate civilian authority authorizes any order for the use of force, and consider
deploying experts in public order management, trained in human rights-based handling
of protests;
(e) Strictly avoid involving the military in policing protests and prohibit the
prosecution of protesters in military courts, and where, in exceptional circumstances,
armed forces are deployed to police protests, ensure that they are trained in human
rights and human rights-based law enforcement, especially in protest facilitation and
de-escalation techniques, and that they are placed under civilian command and
oversight, have clearly defined responsibilities and are accountable under civil law;
(f) Ensure proper vetting of individuals joining law enforcement agencies
and ensure adequate training of integrated armed groups. Exclude from the policing of
protests any officials alleged to have committed human rights abuses;
(g) Prohibit and cease unlawful arrests in relation to protests. When lawful
arrests are necessary, ensure that they are carried out in line with international human
rights law; in the context of protests during a pandemic, pursue non-custodial measures
to avoid spreading the disease; and ensure that detained protesters have the right to
legal assistance from the moment of deprivation of liberty at all times, whether the
detention is undertaken under criminal law or is a form of administrative detention.
Ensure that protective mechanisms are in place, including proper sanitary facilities, for
women in detention;
(h) Implement proactive community-oriented policing to prevent the
unlawful use of force and escalation of violence in the facilitation of public protests,
through building a strong positive connection and relationship of trust with
communities;
(i) Ensure that authorities regularly review the equipment and weapons
provided to law enforcement personnel involved in facilitating protests and the
standard operating procedures for their use, and that training and equipment are in
full compliance with the international standards on law enforcement and the use of
force.

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82. In regard to accountability, States should:


(a) Ensure independent, thorough and impartial investigation of human
rights violations in the context of protests, including sexual and gender-based violence;
and proactively investigate all instances of unlawful use of force and firearms, hold
perpetrators accountable and provide remedies to victims;
(b) Collect disaggregated information on violations against youth, children,
women and girls, LGBTQI+ persons and other groups subjected to discrimination, to
address their specific protection needs during protests;
(c) Establish and strengthen independent police oversight and investigatory
bodies, including by providing sufficient resources, and ensure that they are able to
effectively investigate allegations of unlawful use of force against protesters;
(d) Set up victim-centred independent commissions of inquiry to investigate
cases of serious violations of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, including
cases of sexual and gender-based violence, to support accountability and provide
reparations to victims;
(e) To ensure prompt access to justice in times of pandemic, such as COVID-
19, resource courts with robust necessary equipment for online hearings, ensuring that
proceedings meet the international standards guaranteeing fairness, impartiality and
equality of arms. Judges must be well-trained in using such equipment, confidential
access of the accused or defendant to their lawyer must be guaranteed before and
during the hearing, and judges must individually assess and reason on whether
substituting videoconferencing for physical presence is compatible with the character
of a particular hearing, especially in criminal cases;
(f) Ensure the admissibility of material and information generated by protest
monitors and journalists in accountability processes;
(g) Ensure that the rights of detained protesters’ to habeas corpus, due
process, equality before the law and a fair trial are respected, and ensure that the
principle of individuality of liability is always fully respected;
(h) Ensure unobstructed access to legal aid for individuals alleging violations
of their human rights during protests.

B. Recommendations to the international community

83. The international community should:


(a) Support arms embargos relative to States involved in serious repression
of the rights of peaceful protesters.
(b) Support international investigations and prosecutions in cases of serious
human rights violations, including through regional courts, international tribunals and
universal jurisdiction, in line with the principle of complementarity.
(c) Ensure that refugee victims of repression related to protests have effective
access to remedies, including reparations, for all harm suffered, including sexual and
gender-based violence.

C. Recommendations to national human rights institutions

84. National human rights institutions should:


(a) Support authorities in reviewing and improving laws, policies and
protocols, in line with international human rights obligations and standards, to prevent
violations from recurring;
(b) Act as a bridge between the State and peaceful protesters, to facilitate
better communication channels and de-escalate tension;

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(c) Support authorities in ensuring compliance with international and


regional human rights frameworks, and bring cases of violations of human rights to the
attention of international human rights bodies where national remedies are unable or
unwilling to take action;
(d) Establish protection desks to support at-risk peaceful protesters.

D. Recommendations to non-State actors

85. The business sector should:


(a) Comply with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and
conduct enhanced due diligence to identify, prevent and address human rights abuses
in the context of peaceful protests that may be linked to the company’s activities,
products, services or business relations;
(b) Identify, prevent and mitigate against business relationships that might
contribute to adverse human rights impacts in relation to peaceful protests, and
terminate business relationships with companies that do not respect peoples’ right to
peaceful assembly; and refrain from stigmatizing peaceful protests, including workers’
strikes;
(c) Ensure private security personnel and company subcontractors are held
fully accountable for any violations against protesters;
(d) Immediately halt trading of digital surveillance equipment, and of lethal
and less-lethal weapons and related equipment, to States involved in repression of
peaceful protests and other serious human rights violations.
86. Media companies should incorporate a human right perspective when reporting
and covering peaceful protests, and refrain from using language that stigmatizes or may
promote hatred against peaceful protesters. Social media platforms should:
(a) Monitor hate speech and assess how it affects the right to freedom of
assembly on their platforms, in consultation with affected groups;
(b) Promptly moderate and remove content inciting violence or
discrimination linked to protests, address smear campaigns and vilification of peaceful
protesters on social media platforms, and designate human rights defenders and
protesters as protected groups in countries that are characterized by State-coordinated
or State-condoned persecution of protesters;
(c) Provide transparency in content moderation policy and decision-making,
to ensure that enforcement of policies is fair, unbiased, proportional and respectful of
users’ rights, in line with the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and
Accountability in Content Moderation, and that moderation does not have a harmful
impact on peaceful protests online or offline;
(d) Refrain from arbitrarily removing posts or blocking pages linked to
peaceful protests;
(e) Establish inclusive appeal systems for moderation of content, including
moderation related to hate speech.
87. Armed groups should respect the freedom of protest of the population under
their de facto control and authority, and comply with international human rights law
and international humanitarian law.

E. Recommendations to the bodies, specialized agencies and organizations


of the United Nations system

88. The following recommendations are made with regard to entities of the United
Nations system:

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A/HRC/50/42

(a) UNODC, in collaboration with the Special Rapporteur, should work to


improve policing of protests during crises, by developing specific technical tools, based
on international standards and promising practices, and provide relevant technical
assistance to member States, upon request;
(b) Relevant entities of the United Nations system should strengthen
assistance to Member States, prioritizing States affected by crisis where peaceful
protests have been under threat, with the aim of improving police oversight,
accountability and integrity to ensure prompt independent investigations, especially of
cases involving the use of lethal force and serious harm inflicted during protests;
(c) Relevant entities of the United Nations system should develop a
comprehensive action-oriented strategy on protest, based on robust interagency
cooperation, including with the World Health Organization (WHO), in the context of
health crisis. The strategy should pay particular attention to the prevention of serious
human rights violations against protesters and the deepening of crises in regard to
protests;
(d) The United Nations peace and security pillar, in cooperation with relevant
entities within and outside the United Nations system, should develop specific guidance
for peacekeepers, mediators and peacebuilders to ensure that peaceful protests are
facilitated and an enabling environment is fostered, including in transitional, armed
conflict, military occupation and post-conflict environments;
(e) The United Nations human rights system, through the Human Rights
Council, including the universal periodic review process, should monitor compliance
with the recommendations contained in the present report, including progress on
accountability for violations against protesters;
(f) When providing guidance in response to a pandemic, WHO should
collaborate with the human rights bodies of the United Nations, including the Special
Rapporteur, to ensure that such guidance does not result in unnecessary and
disproportionate restrictions and violations of the rights to freedom of assembly.

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