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Assignment Legal Process

Legal process Assignment

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
62 views10 pages

Assignment Legal Process

Legal process Assignment

Uploaded by

Ronald Luipa
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

INTRODUCTION

Statutory interpretation refers to the process by which courts in Zambia and elsewhere
construes and apply legislation. Given that statutes are written in general terms, disputes
often arise as to their meaning. Judicial interpretation is therefore a central function of
the courts to ensure that justice is administered in accordance with the law. The
principal rules of statutory interpretation are the literal rule, golden rule and the
mischief rule. These rules, while originating in English common law, are firmly
entrenched in Zambian jurisprudence. This essay discusses the application of these rules
with reference to Zambian cases.

THE LITERAL RULE

The Introduction to Laws and Human Rights defines literal rule as the words in a
statute are given their plain ordinary, and literal meaning. While applying the literal
rule, the law is read word by word and withut diverting from its true meaning1.

In the case of Mutale v Attorney General (2007) literal rule, it was stated that in the
construction of the statute words should be taken in their literal meaning which is not
necessarily the dictionary sense but the sense in which the words are used in common
parlance2.

In the Sussex Peerage Case3 where the then Chief Justice of England stated: the only
rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed in the Act. If the words of the
statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than
to expound those words I their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone
do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.

The literal rule requires the courts to interpret statutory provisions according to the
plain, ordinary, and grammatical meaning of the words used. Under this approach, the
judiciary refrains from injecting policy preferences or purposive considerations,
focusing instead on the textual clarity of the enactment.

1
Introduction to laws and Human rights
2
(2007) ZMSC
3
The Interpretation & General Provisions Act, cap 2 of Laws of Zambia provides
that while it doesn’t expressly mention the rule, Section 3 of the Act provides that
words should be given their ordinary meaning unless context requires otherwise4.

In Attorney General and Movement for Multiparty Democracy v Akashambatwa


Mbikusita Lewanika and others,115 as a result of applying the literal rule in
interpreting Article 71 (2) of the Zambian Constitution, the High Court protected floor
crossing of the particular situation at hand. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
established that there was a void in that article which did not cover the situation which
was deemed not only to be unfair and unreasonable but also to be against Article 23
which prohibited discrimination. As a result, the Supreme Courts judgment was subject
to interpretation based on the golden rule in line with the words of Lord Denning who
proposed that interpretation of a statute gives rise to absurdity and unjust situation, the
judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it by reading words in, if
necessary so as to do what parliament would have done had they had the situation in
mind.

In the case of Citibank Zambia ltd v Dudhia6 in this case the supreme court
acknowledged that the provision appears clear; it mandates disposal of matters within
one year from filling. Further held that, strictly interpretation of Section 85(3)(b)(ii) as
causing loss of jurisdiction after one year (with no rescue or accommodation) would
lead to serious injustice, especially for complainants who are not at fault for delays, or
where delays are systemic.

In the case of Lungu v The People7 provide an example of the literal rule being
applied. In this case, the court strictly interpreted the language of a statute related to
electoral offenses, adhering to the exact words of the law, even though the outcome was
controversial.

In Attorney General v Roy Clarke (2008), the Supreme Court considered the offence
of defamation of the President under the Penal Code. Clarke had written a satirical
article describing government officials in unflattering terms. The court adopted a literal
approach to the statutory definition of defamation, holding that satire fell within its

4
Chapter 2 of the Laws of Zambia
5

6
Appeal No. 6 of 2022
7
(2015)
scope. Although controversial, this demonstrated the Zambian courts’ fidelity to the
literal rule when statutory language is clear8.

Similarly, in Mwansa v The People9, the court adopted a strict literal construction of
criminal provisions. The principle emphasises that criminal liability must be construed
strictly and according to the precise wording of the statute. This reflects the maxim
nulla poena sine lege – no one should be punished except in accordance with clear law.

Also, Mutale v Attorney General10 the court held that words must be given their
ordinary, popular meaning not dictionary, but common parlance. The statement given
did not meet this standard, so detention was unlawful. Specified in detail.’ J.S.,
Bweupe, as he was then, stated; it seems to me therefore, that in construction of the
statute words should be taken in their literal meaning which is not necessarily the
dictionary sense but the sense in which the words are used in common parlance. What
then is the popular sense of the phrase ‘specifying in detail? The popular sense of the
phrase, my view is therefore that the detaining authority must furnish sufficient
information which should enable the detainee to direct his mind to it when making his
representation.

In the case of Nkumbula v Attorney General [1972]11 the court stated that with the
plain meaning of the statute’s wording, though it eventually leaned purposive. It’s
useful to show how courts often begin with the literal rule.

In the case of Ntombizine Mudenda v. The Attorney General12 the court stated that
the meaning of the word "like" in the context in which it was used meant that the
precious stones were the "same as" or "similar to" emeralds.

In Chileshe v Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited13the appellant who held a


superior position in the Respondents company filed a complaint against them alleging
that they were dismissed on the ground of discrimination. Their claim was based on
section 108 of the industrial and labour relations Act4 which prohibits an employer

8
(2008)
9
[2012] ZMSC 67
10
(2007) ZMSC
11
[1972] ZR 1 HC
12
(1979) Z.R 245 ( H.C)
13
from dismissing an employee based inter alia on ‘social status.’ The appellant claimed
social status also meant ones rank or position in employment.

The court was invited to define what section 108 (1) meant by ‘social status,’ the
Supreme Court held that 'social status’ refers to one’s standing in the community. By
extension, it follows that one’s type of employment and position at a place of work are
natural and ordinary meanings attributable to one’s standing in the community

The comparative non-Zambia cases which are persuasive in nature also guides on literal
rule. In R v Judge of the city of London Court14 it was established that words must be
given their ordinary meaning.

Similarly In Fisher v Bell15 stated that literal meaning of offer for sale under statute,
even though outcome was absurd.

The literal rule remains a cornerstone of statutory interpretation in Zambia, valued for
its certainty and restraint, but its rigidity often compels courts to resort to the golden
rule or mischief rules to avoid injustice. Its continued application, especially in criminal
law, reflects the courts commitments to legality, even as constitutional cases embrace a
more purposive approach.

The literal rule’s strength lies in its promotion of certainty and predictability. However,
its weakness is that it may lead to unjust or absurd outcomes when applied rigidly. This
is why the golden and mischief rules are often invoked to balance justice.

The Golden Rule

The rule was adopted from English law but has been applied in Zambian jurisprudence.

In the Mulela Margaret Munalula – Legal Process: Zambian Cases, Legislation


and Commenraries (2004, UNZA press) defines the golden rule as a modification of
the literal rule which allows courts to depart from the ordinary meaning of words where
such meaning would produce an absurd or unjust result16.

14
[1892] 1 QB 273
15
[1961] 1QB 394
16
Munalula M, M, - Legal process: Zambian Cases, Legislation and Commentaries
(2004, UNZA PRESS)
Similarly, the book Joseph Chirwa – Legal Process in Zambia: Cases & Materials
(2022) explains that the golden rule is applied where literal interpretation would defeat
the intention of the legislature or lead to an absurdity17.

Also, although not Zambian, the definition of golden rule in the book of C. Botha,
(comparative, south African/English): Statutory Interpretation18 stated that the
golden rule permits a court to modify the ordinary meaning of a word to avoid an
absurdity, inconsistency or repugnance.

The Interpretation & General Provisions Act, cap 2 of Laws of Zambia provides
that while it doesn’t expressly mention the rule, Section 3 of the Act provides that
words should be given their ordinary meaning unless context requires otherwise19. This
statutory direction underpins use of the golden rule where the literal rule fails.

In Zambia, the case of Mwape v Attorney General20illustrates the application of the


mischief rule. The court looked beyond the literal wording of the law to understand the
underlying issue or mischief that the statute aimed to resolve, leading to a more
contextual and purposive interpretation.

In Chanda v The People, the court avoided a literal interpretation of provisions on


criminal liability that would have imposed an unreasonable burden on the accused. By
invoking the golden rule, the court reached a more just outcome consistent with
legislative intent21.

Another important case is Attorney General v Kakoma (1995)22, where the issue was
the scope of freedom of expression. The court held that a literal reading of the
Constitution would unduly restrict fundamental freedoms, and therefore applied a
purposive and golden rule interpretation to give effect to the spirit of the Constitution.
This shows the court’s willingness to go beyond strict textualism in order to avoid
injustice.

17
Chirwa J, Legal Process in Zambia: Cases & Materials.
18
C. Botha, Statutory Interpretation (comparative, South African/ English)
19
Chapter 2 of the Laws of Zambia
20
(2008)
21
SCZ
22
(1995) ZR 148 (SC)
Nkumbula v Attorney General23 cases it was demonstrated that while better known
for mischief rule, the court initially considered the literal reading of the Electoral Act
but rejected it because it would produce absurd results, showing a golden rule
application.

The persuasive English cases often cited in Zambia to further demonstrate application
of Golden rule interpretation. In the case of Adler v George24 Literal rule would have
excluded acts committed in the vicinity of a prohibited place; golden rule interpretation
extended to include in the place.

In Grey v Pearson25, Lord Wensleydale stated: the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that
absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

As illustrated in R v Allen26, the court noted that there were two primary connotations
of the word marry. The first involved a legal commitment to another person while the
other referred to involvement in a ceremony. It was noted by the judges that the first
meaning would create an ambiguity since the second marriage would be void, it would
be not possible to commit bigamy in a criminal sense. Therefore, the court was prepared
to read marry as to go through a ceremony of marriage.

Also, in the case of Re Sigsworth27 son who murdered his mother could not inherit
under literal wording of inheritance statute; golden rule applied to prevent absurdity.

Conclusion, the golden rule thus serves as a corrective to the rigidity of the literal rule,
ensuring that statutes achieve fair results. The golden rule remains an essential
corrective tool in Zambia statutory interpretation. By allowing courts to depart from
literal meaning only where necessary to avoid absurdity or injustice, it ensures a
balance between fidelity to legislative wording and demands of justice, particularly in
constitutional and criminal law.

23
[1972] ZR 1
24
[1964] 2 QB 7
25

26

27
[1935] CH 89
The Mischief Rule

The mischief rule originates from Heydon’s Case28, where the court held that judges
must interpret statutes so as to suppress the mischief the law was intended to cure. This
approach is more purposive, focusing on legislative intent.

States further that the rule requires courts to look at the mischief and defect in the
previous law which Parliament intended to remedy and to construe the statute so as to
suppress that mischief and advance the remedy.

In the Chirwa J- Legal Process in Zambia: Cases & Materials (2022) defines the
Mischief rule as the approach where courts interpret legislation with the aim of curing
the problem the statute was designed to address, rather than sticking rigidly to literal
meaning.

In the People v Shamwana and Others29, the accused were charged with treason.
Proving the case was dependent on Act no 35 of 1973. Prior to this Act, the law
provided that one could be convicted of treason unless there are two witnesses to an
overt act or two witnesses who each observed a separate overt act of the same kind of
treason. This was the law in England and Zambia. Act No. 35 of 1973 changed the law
in Zambia ensuring that there is no requirement as to a specific number of witnesses to
prove the offence of treason. The offence could/can be proven like any other criminal
offence.

The court held; in order properly to interpret any statute it is necessary now as it was
when Lord Coke reported Haydon’s case to consider how the law stood when the
statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was which the old law did not
provide and the remedy provided by the statutes to cure that mischief.

It went further to state: In interpreting an Act of Parliament you are entitled, and in
many cases bound to look to the state of the law at the date of the passing of the Act –
not only the common law, but the law as it then stood under the previous statutes in
order properly to interpret the statute in question.

Essentially, the court emphasized that the courts are given license to interpret a statute
while keeping in mind the gap that the statue was intended to fill up. In this case the

28
(1584)
29
court found Act No. 35 of 1973 was a law that was intended to deal with culprits
rallying against the republic, therefore, the statute eradicated the requirement of needing
3 witnesses in order to properly achieve or conveniently prove a case against
individuals involved in treason.
In Nkumbula v Attorney General30, the court considered the purpose of the Electoral
Act in determining whether certain electoral practices were lawful. The mischief rule
guided the interpretation towards preventing electoral malpractice.
Similarly, in Lewanika & Others v Chiluba31, the Supreme Court interpreted
constitutional provisions on presidential qualifications. The mischief rule was applied to
ensure that the Constitution was not circumvented through technicalities. The court
emphasised the need to interpret the Constitution in a manner that promoted democratic
governance and safeguarded the integrity of elections.

In the Re Mwanawasa v Attorney General32, the court referred to the Mischief


Parliament intended to cure after previous succession crises, applying the rule to ensure
smooth constitutional transfer of power.

In Attorney General v Stephen Luguru33, after his request to buy a government house
(as he was a sitting tenant) was rejected, the respondent a Tanzanian national employed
in the Zambian civil service, brought an action in the lands tribunal which succeeded
ordered the sale of the house a decision which was appealed. The court held that despite
being a sitting tenant, the respondent was not entitled to the house as the intention the
Government was to empower Zambians to own real property through the Civil Service
Home Ownership Scheme as declared in the preamble of the handbook. Hence in this
instance, the meaning of the sitting tenant was pointed out to mean a Zambian.

In the same Case of Citibank Zambia Ltd v Dudhia34 the mischief was identified was
long delays in handling labor / industrial relations mattes, which had been common. But
the court found that to interpret the law as causing dismissal or nullification or loss of
jurisdiction automatically would defeat access to justice.

30
[1972] ZR 1 (HC)
31
[1998] ZMSC
32
(2003)
33

34
Abid
Smith v Hughes35 stated that the soliciting in a street included women calling from
windows, because the Act was designed to stop solicitation, not just physical presence
in the street.

But in contrast to the aforementioned case, in DPP V Bull36, The court held that the
word prostitute was limited to female prostitutes and therefore was not applicable to a
man who had been charged with loitering or soliciting in a street or public place for the
purpose of prostitution,as a result, the defendant was not convicted.

Similarly in the Royal College of Nursing v DHSS37 interpreted the Abortion Act
purposively, applying the mischief rule to extend lawful abortion to nurses, since the
mischief was unsafe backstreet abortions.
The mischief rule thus provides a purposive approach, allowing courts to align statutory
interpretation with the broader objectives of justice and social order.

In conclusion the mischief rule has played a central role in Zambia’s constitutional and
electoral jurisprudence, ensuring that statutory and constitutional provision are
interpreted to suppress legislative defects and promote democratic values. While its
open- ended nature may attract criticism, it continues to underpin the purposive
approach that now dominates modern Zambian Interpretation.

The rules of statutory interpretation – literal, golden, and mischief – are central to the
judicial function in Zambia. The literal rule provides certainty but may lead to harsh
results; the golden rule allows flexibility to avoid absurdity; and the mischief rule
emphasizes legislative purpose. Zambian courts have applied these rules across diverse
areas, balancing fidelity to statutory text with the demands of justice. The trend in
constitutional and human rights cases indicates a growing preference for purposive and
mischief-oriented interpretation, ensuring that the law evolves in line with democratic
value.

35
[1960] 1 WLR 830
36

37
[1981] AC 800
BIBLIOGRAPHY

CASES

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