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RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS
Singapore | 13 September 2024
The Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement:
Complementing and Cementing the Hub-and-Spokes System
Aries A. Arugay & Mico A. Galang*
From L-R: Japan’s Defence Minister Minoru Kihara, Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, Philippine
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Philippine Defence Minister Gilberto Teodoro, and Philippine Foreign Minister
Enrique Manalo pose for a photo following the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement at the Malacanang
Palace in Manila on 8 July 8, 2024. (Photo by LISA MARIE DAVID / POOL / AFP).
* Aries A. Arugay is Visiting Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Philippine Studies Programme,
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman.
Mico A. Galang is a member of the Young Leaders Program, Pacific Forum (Hawaii, United States).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Signed in July 2024, the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) between Japan and the
Philippines aims to facilitate regular exchanges and activities between the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF).
• Similar to a visiting forces agreement, the RAA is the third cooperative defence
undertaking for both nations given years of closer security cooperation as well as a
response to increased regional geopolitical uncertainty.
• Since embarking on a strategic partnership in 2015, Japan and the Philippines have
expanded security cooperation that includes Japan’s assistance in the modernisation of
the Philippine coast guard, a military hardware transfer agreement, Japan’s provision
of Official Security Assistance (OSA), and the forging of a new trilateral with the
United States (US).
• Heightened geopolitical uncertainty in the region involving multiple flashpoints has
accelerated security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines.
• Despite possible domestic political challenges in both countries, it is expected that the
RAA will be ratified speedily and act as a security buffer especially at a time when the
regional commitment of the US hangs in the balance in light of its upcoming
presidential elections.
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INTRODUCTION
On 8 July 2024, Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko and Philippine Defense Secretary
Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) 1 between their
countries. The monumental agreement was hailed as a critical watershed in the “shared
endeavour to ensure a rules-based international order to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-
Pacific”.2 The RAA rode on the current momentum of security initiatives undertaken by the
Marcos Jr. administration which include the historic inaugural Japan-Philippines-US trilateral
summit held last April 2024, 3 and the second Australia-Japan-Philippines-US quadrilateral
defence ministers’ meeting held in May 2024.4 In both meetings, the leaders expressed concern
over the “dangerous and aggressive behaviour”5 of the People’s Republic of China in the South
China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS), as well as their commitment towards a “free,
open, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific.”6
For the Philippines, Japan is only the third country with which it has such an agreement. Manila
signed visiting forces agreements respectively with Washington in 1998 7 and Canberra in
2007.8 In view of the geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region, this paper examines
the salient points of the RAA, how the agreement complements the US-led hub-and-spokes
alliance system, and challenges to its effective implementation.
THE RAA AND JAPAN-PHILIPPINES SECURITY COOPERATION
Although the formal negotiations for the RAA commenced in November 2023, initial
discussions for a similar agreement began as early as November 2015, during the final months
of the late Philippine President Benigno Aquino III’s administration.9 Six months later, the
populist leader Rodrigo Duterte was elected as Aquino’s successor. Duterte upended Philippine
foreign policy by forging closer relations with China despite the latter’s aggressive and
unlawful behaviour in the SCS. It was not until the final year of the Duterte administration that
Manila began to recalibrate its foreign policy. During the First Japan-Philippines Foreign and
Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in April 2022, the two countries underscored their
commitment to discuss “frameworks to facilitate reciprocal visits as well as reciprocal
provision of supplies and services in order to further enhance and facilitate cooperation such
as exercises between the JDSF and the AFP”.10
During Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit to Japan in February 2023, Manila
and Tokyo reaffirmed their commitment to an RAA. 11 Negotiations for the RAA took off
following Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to the Philippines in November 2023.
This coincided with Japan’s provision of the coastal surveillance radar system under its Official
Security Assistance (OSA) framework.12
Under its preambular provisions, the RAA underscores the two countries’ “shared interests in
regional and global peace and stability and international order based on the rule of law.”
Composed of 29 articles, the RAA will serve as the legal framework for “mutually determined
cooperative activities conducted” 13 by the Japanese and Philippine armed forces. The
agreement also outlines three principles in which such activities would be conducted: “(a) do
not adversely impact upon the national interests of the Receiving State, or the readiness or
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capabilities of the Force of the Receiving State; (b) are carried out with due regard for public
safety; and (c) do not interfere unnecessarily with navigation, aviation, telecommunication, or
land travel to, from or within the Receiving State.”14
As the name of the agreement suggests, the provisions of the RAA are applicable when
cooperative activities are conducted in either the Philippines or Japan. The agreement provides
that clearances shall be “expeditiously grant[ed]” by the receiving state to the sending state for
access by the vessels or aircraft of the latter to the ports or airports of the former.15 Manila and
Tokyo also agreed to exempt their forces “from any requirements to apply for a visa on entering
and departing” the receiving state.16 For purposes of cooperative activities, the two countries
also agreed that the visiting force may “temporarily use” the public utilities and services of the
receiving state.17 The parties likewise agreed to “make reasonable efforts” to address requests
“for access to and use of facilities, areas and related services” vis-à-vis cooperative activities.
Mindful of the sensitives in both countries, Manila and Tokyo explicitly provided in the RAA
that the agreement shall not be “construed as providing a basis for a [p]arty to establish its
military facilities in the territory of the other [p]arty.”18 Neither does the RAA create a joint
command and control structure for the forces of the two countries.19 In addition, the agreement
also outlines the guidelines for protection of cultural and indigenous people’s heritage and
human health safety, as well as that of the environment.20 Moreover, the RAA has provisions
on disciplinary jurisdiction,21 accidents and incidents,22 and dispute settlement.23
Cognizant of the guidelines in the RAA, the agreement established a joint committee to serve
“as a means for consultation between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation
regarding the implementation” of the pact. The agreement also opened the possibility of
creating working groups under the joint committee. The RAA will take affect following
ratification by the Japanese Diet and the Philippine Senate.24
THE RAA: COMPLEMENTING THE US “HUB-AND-SPOKES” ALLIANCE
SYSTEM
The RAA is a significant step in advancing the Japan-Philippines strategic partnership.
Historically, after World War II, Japan-Philippines relations were focused on economic and
development cooperation. While the same still figures prominently, the relationship began to
focus on the strategic dimensions starting from the 2010s.25
Beyond the bilateral relationship of Japan and the Philippines, it is important to view the RAA
in the broader context of the regional security architecture. Traditionally, the regional security
architecture in the Indo-Pacific region has been viewed as comprising of two major
components: the US-led system of alliances, and multilateral platforms of dialogue and
cooperation, particularly those led by ASEAN. For much of the Cold War and beyond, the
US-led system of alliances – often characterised with the US as the “hub” and its allies as the
“spokes” – has played a crucial role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. The
security provided by the US and its allies allowed countries in the region, including China, to
develop their respective economies.
As the regional security environment continues to evolve, the US-led system of alliances also
needs to adapt to the shifting balance of power between Washington and Beijing and their
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heightened strategic competition. Although continued US presence in the region is welcomed,
the same may not be sufficient in countering China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China
Sea and elsewhere. This therefore entails increased cooperation between and among US allies
in the region. After all, there is no NATO-like structure in the Indo-Pacific that provides for an
overarching collective deterrence and defence system as is the case in Europe.
As China became more aggressive in pushing for an expansionist policy, using a whole range
of military and non-military tools at its disposal, countries with shared interests began to forge
closer security relations with each other. In 2017, Australia, India, Japan, and the US agreed to
resume the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) with the aim of preserving “a free,
open rules-based order, rooted in international law to advance security and prosperity and
counter threats to both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond”. 26 In 2021, the trilateral security
partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (AUKUS) was formed wherein
London and Washington will help Canberra in “acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the
Royal Australian Navy”.27 In 2023, Japan, South Korea, and the US convened their first stand-
alone trilateral summit28 with the aim of ensuring that the three countries are “aligned in [their]
objectives and in [their] actions, generating the common capacity required to ensure that the
Indo-Pacific is thriving, connected, resilient, stable, and secure”.29 In April 2024, Japan, the
Philippines, and the US also convened their first trilateral summit in which they agreed, among
other things, to launch a Luzon Economic Corridor.30 The summit was preceded by a Maritime
Cooperative Activity (MCA) between Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US.31
Amidst these various minilateral platforms of cooperation and dialogue, the RAA between the
Philippines and Japan could complement the US-led hub-and-spokes system of alliances in
advancing a rules-based international order in the following ways.
First, the RAA will solidify defence diplomacy between the two US allies. By having a legal
framework in which the JSDF can visit the Philippines, Tokyo has a better opportunity to
mutually enhance its capabilities with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through joint
exercises and training. The JSDF could also potentially boost cooperation with the AFP in other
areas such as intelligence, maritime domain awareness, and contingency planning. Since the
RAA is a reciprocal agreement, similar cooperative initiatives can also be conducted by AFP
personnel in Japan.
Second, the RAA could also strengthen the links with the US and other allies and partners. As
noted earlier, the RAA is the third such agreement that the Philippines has with other countries.
Indeed, Manila’s VFA with Washington has served as the legal basis for the conduct of the
Balikatan and other military exercises of the two countries. With the VFA with Canberra
coming into effect, Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel have been able to take part in
the Balikatan exercises as an actual participant and not a mere observer – which has been the
status of Japan and other countries. With the RAA, however, Japan could likewise be an actual
participant in this and other exercises – thus providing an avenue to strengthen ties and
capabilities with the US and other allies. In the future, the RAA could potentially allow Tokyo
to take part in initiatives under the Philippines-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA), should Manila and Washington agree to it.
Third, the RAA would allow Japan to support the Philippines in times of crisis – and vice versa.
In 2013, the US was able to mobilise its forces and aid the Philippines quickly in the aftermath
of super typhoon Haiyan. This was in large part because a legal framework was already in place
that allowed such help to come into the country. In the event that future devastating incidents
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take place in Japan or the Philippines, both can easily allow their respective militaries to send
aid relatively easily due to the clear parameters set by the RAA.
The cumulative effect of the above points is that the RAA provides the mechanism through
which Japan and the Philippines can mutually strengthen their capacities in countering the
threats and security challenges that China presents to both countries, especially in the maritime
domain. Not unexpectedly, China has criticised the RAA, viewing the agreement as a move
towards “bloc confrontation or a new Cold War”.32 The Global Times, a Chinese propaganda
outlet, alluded that the RAA is another move by the US, which has “used the South China Sea
issue as a means to contain China” with Japan and the Philippines as its “pawns”.33 Beijing is
implying that the RAA is nothing more than an orchestrated move by Washington to coerce its
allies – Japan and the Philippines – in its strategic competition with China.
China’s propaganda overlooks the critical fact that the RAA is an exercise of agency on the
part of Japan and the Philippines. Both countries have legitimate interests – which happened to
be shared by Washington – to protect against China’s aggressive behaviour in the maritime
domain. The Philippines and China have overlapping maritime and territorial claims in the
SCS, while Japan and China have a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (known as the
Diaoyu Islands in China) in the East China Sea. Both Japan and the Philippines also have shared
concerns over a contingency in the Taiwan Strait and its potential to escalate to a region-wide
conflict. More broadly, Japan and the Philippines – along with Taiwan – are part of the first
island chain which China seeks to dominate to alter the power equilibrium to its favour. Thus,
by forging the RAA, Manila and Tokyo do not merely yield to the supposed demands of another
power. Rather, both are exercising their strategic autonomy to help each other address shared
security challenges.
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
The RAA is a significant milestone in the strategic partnership of Japan and the Philippines.
However, there are significant challenges ahead facing its effective execution.
The RAA must be ratified by the legislatures of both countries. In the case of the Philippines,
the RAA will likely achieve the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate with members of the
upper chamber already expressing support for the agreement. 34 Thus far, there has been
minimal domestic opposition to the RAA invoking Japan’s war crimes, controversies tied to
its ‘comfort women’ issue, and the prospect of increased militarisation.35 Polling shows that
Japan enjoys relatively high levels of trust among the Filipino public.36 A similar sentiment is
shared with Philippine practitioners and scholars, based on the 2024 State of Southeast Asia
survey carried out by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 37 The Marcos Jr. administration will
likely nudge its allies in the Senate for speedy ratification of the RAA, before the May 2025
midterm elections. On Japan’s part, it is anticipated that Kishida’s recent exit as prime minister
will not significantly affect Japan’s commitment to the RAA.
China would likely try to undermine the implementation of the RAA through influence
operations in the Philippines. The election of pro-China Philippine officials in both national
and local levels could potentially hinder the implementation of the RAA. In 2020, for example,
then-President Duterte ordered the abrogation of the VFA with the US although he reversed
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his decision the following year.38 Nonetheless, the decision led to some degree of uncertainty
over the future of the Philippines-US alliance. Also, in 2023, then-Cagayan Governor Manuel
Mamba led a campaign to oppose the establishment of an EDCA site in his province while
calling for closer ties with China.39 While the campaign did not succeed, the incident showed
the extent of China’s influence operations to alter Philippine foreign policy.40
The RAA between Japan and the Philippines is a historic agreement. After all, it is the first
such agreement that Japan has with an Asian country. The RAA is further proof that the
Philippines is a test case of Japan’s gradual expansion of its regional security role in Southeast
Asia. It is the sustained implementation of the agreement that could make an impact in
enhancing the two countries’ defence and deterrence capabilities, thereby complementing
efforts to preserve the rules-based international order and reinforcing the agency of small and
middle powers within the ongoing intense superpower rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.
ENDNOTES
1
The “Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines concerning the facilitation of Reciprocal
Access and Cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the Philippines,”
hereafter referred to as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) can be accessed here:
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100694772.pdf
2
Philippine Department of National Defense, “Teodoro – RAA with Japan is a ‘milestone’ toward peace,
stability in the Indo-Pacific,” 8 July 2024, https://www.dnd.gov.ph/Release/2024-07-08/2200/Teodoro-
%E2%80%94-RAA-with-Japan-is-a-%E2%80%98milestone%E2%80%99-toward-peace,-stability-in-the-Indo-
Pacific/
3
White House, “Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States,” 11
April 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/11/joint-vision-statement-
from-the-leaders-of-japan-the-philippines-and-the-united-states/
4
US Department of Defense, “Joint Readout From Australia-Japan-Philippines-United States Defense Ministers'
Meeting,” 3 May 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3765061/joint-readout-from-
australia-japan-philippines-united-states-defense-ministers/
5
The White House, “Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States.”
6
US Department of Defense, “Joint Readout From Australia-Japan-Philippines-United States Defense Ministers'
Meeting.”
7
US Department of State, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Philippines signed at
Manila, 10 February 1998, and Agreement Between the United States of America and the Philippines signed at
Manila, 9 October 1998,” no date, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12931-Philippines-
Defense-Status-of-Forces-10.9.1998.pdf
8
Senate of the Philippines, “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of Australia,” no date,
https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/15th_congress/treaties/agreement%20govt%20rp%20and%20govt%20of%20austral
ia%20visiting%20forces.pdf
9
Alex Romero, “Philippines, Japan vow closer defense ties,” The Philippine Star, 19 November 2015,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/11/19/1523839/philippines-japan-vow-closer-defense-ties
10
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “First Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting
(‘2+2’),” 9 April 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003111.html
11
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting,” 9 February 2023,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/page1e_000569.html
12
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio's Visit to the Philippines (November
3),” 3 November 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/page1e_000794.html
13
RAA, Article IV, Paragraph 1.
14
RAA, Article IV, Paragraph 2, Sub-Paragraphs a-c.
15
RAA, Article V, Paragraph 1.
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16
RAA, Article VI, Paragraph 2.
17
RAA, Article IX, Paragraph 1.
18
RAA, Article VIII, Paragraph 3.
19 RAA, Article XXI, Paragraph 1.
20
RAA, Article XX, Paragraphs 1-4.
21 RAA, Article XXI, Paragraphs 2-10.
22 RAA, Article XXIV, Paragraphs 1-2.
23 RAA, Article XXVIII, Paragraph 1. .
24
Sebastian Strangio, “Philippines, Japan Sign Reciprocal Access Agreement Amid China Tensions,” The
Diplomat, 9 July 2024 https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/philippines-japan-sign-reciprocal-access-agreement-
amid-china-tensions/
25
Aries A. Arugay and Mico A. Galang, “The Philippines-Japan Security Relationship: A New Golden Age?,”
Fulcrum, 16 November 2023, https://fulcrum.sg/the-philippines-japan-security-relationship-a-new-golden-age/.
26
The White House, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad,’” 12 March 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-
spirit-of-the-quad/
27
The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” 15 September 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/
28
Tongfi Kim, “By Any Other Name? The Camp David Summit, US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Security
Cooperation and Military Alliances,” Brussels School of Governance, 22 January 2024,
https://csds.vub.be/publication/by-any-other-name-the-camp-david-summit-us-japan-south-korea-trilateral-
security-cooperation-and-military-alliances/
29
The White House, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the
United States,” 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-
states/
30
The White House, “Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States,”
11 April 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/11/joint-vision-
statement-from-the-leaders-of-japan-the-philippines-and-the-united-states/
31
US Department of Defense, “Joint Statement: Australia – Japan – Philippines – United States Maritime
Cooperative Activity,” 5 April 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3733095/joint-
statement-australia-japan-philippines-united-states-maritime-cooperative/
32
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference,” 8
July 2024,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202407/t20240708_11450025.html
33
Xu Keyue and Guo Yuandan, “Japan-Philippines RAA 'encourages Tokyo's historical revisionism,'” Global
Times, 8 July 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1315643.shtml
34
“Senators back signing of Reciprocal Access Agreement between Philippines, Japan,” Manila Bulletin, 8 July
2024, https://mb.com.ph/2024/7/8/senators-back-signing-of-reciprocal-access-agreement-between-philippines-
japan
35
Helen Flores and Pia Lee-Brago, “Japan-Philippines access agreement signed today,” Philippine Star, 8 July
2024, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/07/08/2368497/japan-philippines-access-agreement-signed-
today.
36
“Pulse Asia survey: Filipinos trust US the most; China, Russia the least,” Philippine Star, 29 July 2022,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/07/29/2198843/pulse-asia-survey-filipinos-trust-us-most-china-russia-
least.
37
The full report can be accessed here: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/The-State-of-
SEA-2024.pdf
38
Jim Garamore, “Philippine President Restores Visiting Forces Agreement With U.S.,” US Department of
Defense, 30 July 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2713638/philippine-
president-restores-visiting-forces-agreement-with-us/
39
The Philippine Star, “Cagayan Governor retains opposition for establishment of EDCA sites, gains support
from constituents,” 27 April 2023, https://www.philstar.com/other-
sections/supplements/2023/04/27/2261819/cagayan-governor-retains-opposition-establishment-edca-sites-gains-
support-constituents
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40
Aries A. Arugay, “The Curious Case of Cagayan: Localisation of U.S.-China Rivalry in the Philippines,”
Fulcrum, 6 April 2023, https://fulcrum.sg/the-curious-case-of-cagayan-localisation-of-u-s-china-rivalry-in-the-
philippines/
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