Harvard Business School 9-185-179
Rev. 3/21/91
Camelback Communications, Inc.
Camelback Communications, Inc. (CCI), located near Phoenix, Arizona, manufactured
radio and television antennas. The firm had four distinct product lines, each serving a different
aspect of the antenna market.
The first product line consisted of simple "rabbit ear" antennas. There were several models
in the line ranging from the simplest FM and TV antennas to more complicated designs that could
improve reception by rejecting multipath signals.
The second product line contained dipole antennas for FM and TV reception. These were
more sophisticated antennas than the "rabbit ear" line and were the type typically seen attached
to chimneys.
The third product line was rotators for the dipole line. Rotators consisted of an electric
motor that rotated the dipole and a controller that resided by the receiving unit (FM radio or
TV). There was little variation in the motors, but the controllers varied considerably from simple
controllers that were operated by turning a knob on the controller base to more sophisticated
versions that had present antenna positions keyed to the channel being received.
The final product line consisted of two electronic antennas, one for FM and the other for
TV. These were used in weak reception areas and, in addition to acting as antennas, amplified
the signal so that it was strong enough for the receiver to be able to reproduce it properly.
In the last five years, CCI had doubled the number of products offered, expanded the
production facility twice, and just recently introduced the electronic antenna line. While CCI was
very profitable, company president Lincoln McDowell was concerned about its ability to cost
products accurately. In particular, some product seemed exceptionally profitable, while other
potential products which the firm should have been able to make, appeared impossible to
manufacture at a profit. The production manager was convinced that his production processes
were as good as any in the industry, and he was unable to explain the apparent high cost of
producing these potential products.
Professor Robin Cooper prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or
ineffective handling of an administrative situation.
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This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Srinivas Mantripragada & Prof. Arjun Varadaraj 's Management Accounting for Decision Making. at Narsee Monjee Institute of Management
Studies (NMIMS) from Sep 2025 to Feb 2026.
185-179 Camelback Communications, Inc.
McDowell agreed with his production manager and was convinced that the cost accounting
system was at fault. He had just recently hired Glenn Peterzon, a management consultant, to
analyze the firm's cost system and to prepare a presentation to the senior management team.
Specifically, McDowell had asked Peterzon to prepare a simple example that demonstrated how
the cost system distorted the firm's knowledge of its product costs.
Peterzon had begun his study by documenting the existing cost system. It was a very
simple system that used a single burden rate for all overhead costs. The burden rate for the year
was determined by adding together the budgeted variable and fixed overhead costs and dividing
this sum by the number of budgeted direct labor hours. The standard cost of a product was then
found by multiplying the number of direct labor hours required to manufacture that product by
the burden rate and adding this quantity to the direct labor and material cost.
Peterzon became convinced that the cost system was partially to blame for some of the
problems the firm was experiencing. However, with over a hundred products, it was difficult to
understand how the cost system was distorting product costs.
To help illustrate the source of these distortions to senior management, Peterzon decided
to develop a simple four-product model. He decided it would be helpful if the actual production
costs of the four products were known a priori (see Table A).
Table A Product Costs
A B C D
Material cost $15.00 $ 5.00 $10.00 $ 5.00
Direct labor 30.00 5.00 15.00 10.00
Variable overhead 15.00 7.50 5.00 7.50
Variable cost $60.00 $17.50 $30.00 $22.50
Fixed Costa $10,000 $10,000 $12,500 $12,500
Product lines A and B used identical equipment that could each produce 1,000 units of A
a
or B. Product lines C and D used identical equipment that could each produce 1,000 units
of C or D.
He then calculated the direct labor allocation rate that the existing single burden rate cost
system would generate assuming that each product sold a thousand units, the maximum that could
be produced, and that each direct labor hour cost $5. Under this scenario, the costs incurred would
be:
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This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Srinivas Mantripragada & Prof. Arjun Varadaraj 's Management Accounting for Decision Making. at Narsee Monjee Institute of Management
Studies (NMIMS) from Sep 2025 to Feb 2026.
Camelback Communications, Inc. 185-179
Costs Incurred ($ thousands)
Variable Total
Labor Hours Overhead/ Total
Variable
Product Per Unit Unit No. Units Labor Hours
Overhead
A 6 $15.00 1,000 6,000 $15,000
B 1 7.50 1,000 1,000 7,500
C 3 5.00 1,000 3,000 5,000
D 2 7.50 1,000 2,000 7,500
Total 4,000 12,000 $35,000
and the new allocation rate:
Variable overhead 35,000
Fixed overhead 45,000
Total cost to be allocated $80,000
Labor hours ($60,000/5) 12,000
Allocation rate/hour $ 6.67
Using this allocation rate per hour, Peterzon calculated the standard cost of the four products.
Product A B C D
Material $15.00 $ 5.00 $10.00 $ 5.00
Labor 30.00 5.00 15.00 10.00
Allocated cost 40.00 6.67 20.00 13.33
Standard cost $85.00 $16.67 $45.00 $28.34
If the firm set out to make a 40% mark-on,b then it would want to charge the following prices for the
four products:
Product A B C D
Standard cost $85.00 $16.67 $45.00 $28.34
40% mark-on 34.00 6.67 18.00 11.34
Selling price $119.00 $23.34 $63.00 $39.68
bMark-on % = profit/cost
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Studies (NMIMS) from Sep 2025 to Feb 2026.
185-179 Camelback Communications, Inc.
If industry selling prices were established using actual production costs and a 40% mark-on, they
would be:
Product A B C D
Standard cost $70.00 $27.50 $42.50 $35.00
Mark-on 28.00 11.00 17.00 14.00
Selling price $98.00 $38.50 $59.50 $49.00
By comparing the "industry" prices to the firm's costs and assuming that the firm had to match
industry prices, Peterzon could determine which products would appear profitable.
Selling price $98.00 $38.50 $59.50 $49.00
Standard cost 85.00 16.67 45.00 28.34
Profit 13.00 21.83 14.50 20.66
Markup % 15% 131% 32% 73%
CCI had recently adopted a policy of discontinuing all products whose mark-ons were under 25%.
Under this policy, product A would be dropped and additional product B manufactured. Assuming
the firm could sell all of product B that it could manufacture, then the sales would be:
Budgeted A B C D
Current volume 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Actual volume 0 2,000 a 1,000 1,000
a
The unused production capacity was used to produce an additional 1,000 units of B.
The resulting product mix was so different from the starting mix that Peterzon decided to
recalculate the allocation rate per hour to determine if it had been affected:
Costs Incurred ($ thousands)
Variable Total
Labor Hours Overhead/ Total
Variable
Product Per Unit Unit No. Units Labor Hours
Overhead
B 1 7.50 2,000 2,000 $15,000
C 3 5.00 1,000 3,000 5,000
D 2 7.50 1,000 2,000 7,500
Total 4,000 7,000 $27,500
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This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Srinivas Mantripragada & Prof. Arjun Varadaraj 's Management Accounting for Decision Making. at Narsee Monjee Institute of Management
Studies (NMIMS) from Sep 2025 to Feb 2026.
Camelback Communications, Inc. 185-179
and the new allocation rate:
Variable overhead 27,500
Fixed overhead 45,000
$72,500
Labor hours ($35,000/5) 7,000
Allocation rate/hour $ 10.36
Questions
1. What will CCI now have to charge for each product to make a 40% mark-on?
If CCI maintains its rule about dropping products with a mark-on below 25%, which
additional products, if any, will it drop?
2. If you decide to drop additional product(s), recalculate the allocation rate per hour for
the new product mix. Repeat Question 1.
3. What is going on?
4. What would happen if the firm kept its existing cost system but differentiated between
variable and fixed cost and decided to maximize contribution?
5. What would happen if the firm modified its cost system so that all variable costs were
traced to the product accurately but fixed costs were allocated using the existing system?
6. What would happen if the firm modified its cost system so that it contained two cost
pools, one containing the overhead costs associated with Products A and B and the other
the overhead costs associated with Products C and D, and then allocated these overhead
pools on the basis of direct labor hours?
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This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Srinivas Mantripragada & Prof. Arjun Varadaraj 's Management Accounting for Decision Making. at Narsee Monjee Institute of Management
Studies (NMIMS) from Sep 2025 to Feb 2026.
