Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

Religion, the State and Politics

In Saudi Arabia
Jonathan Hoffman

Mr. Hoffman is a political science PhD student at George Mason

University. His research focuses on Middle East politics and the role
of global powers within the region. His work has been published in the
Cornell International Affairs Review and the Chicago Journal of Foreign
Policy, among other platforms.

T
he purpose of this analysis is domestic political concerns and regional
to critically examine the rela- geopolitical developments have converged
tionship between the al-sahwa in such a manner that they should be
al-islamiyya (Islamic Awakening) viewed as interconnected strategic theaters.
movement and the Saudi state following The aftermath of the Arab uprisings
the 2011 Arab uprisings. Typically re- (2011-19) has provided new impetus for
ferred to as the “Sahwa,” this organization opposition within the Saudi state. “Is-
is a hybrid of Wahhabi Islamic theology lamist opposition” within Saudi Arabia is
and the political ideology of the Muslim unique, primarily due to the absence of a
Brotherhood. This research argues that the secular state against which the movements
Sahwa and Sahwa-like or Sahwa-linked are protesting. The Saudi state claims to
groups and individuals serve as one of already be “Islamic,” rendering any sort of
the greatest legitimate threats to the Saudi “Islamist opposition” paradoxical. What is
government’s monopoly over the domes- at issue, however, is both the monopoly the
tic political and religious spheres. While regime claims over religion, and the mo-
the history of the relationship between the nopoly on power it claims over the politi-
Sahwa and the Saudi state comprises both cal sphere. Islam is the primary language
cooptation and repression, the period fol- in which social and political rivalries are
lowing the Arab uprisings has witnessed expressed. It is the legacy language of
a dramatic increase in the latter. This is opposition established by the Sahwa that
particularly true of the years dominated by continues to provide the frame of refer-
King Salman and Crown Prince Moham- ence for contentious mobilization within
med bin Salman (MBS). Recent arrests Saudi Arabia today.1 Since the majority of
coupled with the Saudi government’s non-jihadi Sunni Islamist movements are
policies and rhetoric demonstrate that the constituted by Sahwa-affiliated groups and
issue of the Sahwa remains a challenge to individuals, it represents the force most
its authority. This work also argues that likely to threaten the regime.2
© 2019, The Author Middle East Policy © 2019, Middle East Policy Council

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

A decent amount of material has been to the shifting political landscape at a given
written on the Sahwa’s origins, evolution time.”5
and intellectual diversity pre-2011. How-
ever, little research has been conducted on BACKGROUND
the post-2011 period and the evolution of The backdrop to the formation of the
the group and those individuals who have Sahwa was the increased repression of the
been influenced by their message. Even Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots at
less has been written following the com- the hands of secular nationalist regimes in
ing to power of King Salman and Crown countries such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq. As
Prince Mohammed. Political parties Pascal Menoret notes, “Numerous Egyp-
remain banned in Saudi Arabia, making ac- tian, Syrian, and Iraqi Muslim Brothers
cess to information on underground move- fled to Saudi Arabia from the 1950s to the
ments exceedingly difficult. Most material 1970s to escape the nationalist crackdown
is concerned with the country’s Shia mi- on Islamic activism.”6 The migration of
nority, particularly the attempt by the state Brothers increased and was supported by
to propagate the “Iranian fifth column” the Saudis as the “Arab Cold War” devel-
narrative as justification for repression. oped against Nasser’s pan-Arab socialism.
This literature is largely unhelpful here, for With the Yemeni revolution in 1962 —
the Sahwa compete with the regime within and the subsequent establishment of the
the nexus of Sunni Islam. This research, Yemen Arab Republic — King Faysal of
then, is one of the first academic analyses Saudi Arabia utilized the Brothers in his
of the Sahwa movement in the post-Abdul- propaganda war against the forces of pan-
lah era. The majority of current develop- Arabism. A significant number of these
ments are so recent that they still belong to individuals were trained professionals and
the realm of journalism. intellectuals, finding positions within the
The nature of the relationship be- Saudi education system, including in both
tween Islam and politics is fluid. This secondary schools and universities. These
analysis builds upon the argument that Brotherhood members “affected the edu-
Islamism can “change, mutate and de- cational system not only as teachers but
velop in reaction to specific challenges and also by acting as a major force in reconfig-
opportunities.”3 Rational actors adapt to uring it and redefining its curricula.”7 They
shifting political landscapes, vying for a were able to establish in Saudi Arabia a
particular strategic goal. Within this frame- hybrid political theology comprising the
work, we can view Islamism as “embedded Wahhabi tradition and the political activ-
in controversy, debate and transforma- ism and awareness of the Muslim Brother-
tion, each of which is grounded in specific hood. This presence within the sphere of
historical contexts and power relations.”4 education was critical for institutionalizing
Any analysis of the Sahwa movement, the influence of the Sahwa. As Lacroix
then, should account for this fluidity and explains, “Because Saudi graduates were
recognize the paramount significance of distributed throughout nearly all fields, the
shifting domestic, regional, and global Sahwa was able to establish a presence
political contexts, as well as the ability of throughout Saudi society.”8 However, due
the group to “appropriate, de-appropriate, to the taboo against political organizations,
and re-appropriate narratives…in response any explicit mention of the Brotherhood

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 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

was banned, and “Sahwa” prevailed as the transpired.

name for the movement resulting from its After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
influence. 9
the mass deployment of U.S. troops to
The Sahwa did not translate its influ- Saudi Arabia, to quell Saddam’s possible
ence into tangible mobilization until the advance, eventually pushed his forces
1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subse- back into Iraq. While this deployment was
quent mass deployment of U.S. troops to meant to be “temporary,” immediately
Saudi Arabia. Before this spark, however, following the liberation of Kuwait, the
there were two sources of grievance worth United States announced it would main-
mentioning. The first is the escalation in tain its bases in Saudi Arabia. This move
violent confrontation between the Syrian generated tremendous backlash throughout
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi society against the regime, includ-
Baathist regime of President Hafez al- ing among the Sahwa, who “linked Saudi
Assad, culminating in the 1982 Hama mas- failings to the submission and incompe-
sacre that killed roughly 10,000 people. tence of 1990-91, and American support
When the Saudis appeared to take a neutral for Saudi despotism.”13 The Sahwa move-
position vis-à-vis the conflict, Syrian ment immediately protested by attacking
Brothers the regime
in Saudi The Sahwa did not translate its influence directly, argu-
Arabia saw ing that “the
it largely as
into tangible mobilization until the 1990 Al Saud have
a betrayal.10 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent abused religion
The second mass deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi by turning it
grievance Arabia. into a tool of
was more power.”14 The
widespread period of mobi-
throughout the Sahwa and Saudi Arabia lization from 1991 to 1994 — termed the
more generally: the economic recession of “Sahwa Insurrection” (intifadat al-sahwa)
1982-91. Due to the continuing drop in the — witnessed inflammatory sermons by
price of oil, Saudi petroleum revenues fell Sahwa clerics denouncing the American
from $109 billion in 1981 to $70 billion in presence as the stigma of a moral and
1982 and $16 billion in 1986.11 This dra- political failure of the Saudi “system,” as
matic recession occurred simultaneously well as petitions signed by members of
with the emergence of the first genera- the intellectual and religious elite within
tional product of the Sahwa’s educational the kingdom demanding radical reforms,
transformation and dominance. As Lacroix street protests, and the incarceration of
details, this “Sahwa generation” (jil al- several hundred oppositionists.15 This
sahwa) — endowed with a strong sense of seminal event represented the first instance
identity — saw its aspirations hindered, of modern Islamic activism against the
resulting in “powerful resentment against Saudi state. Several major figures served
the previous generation, embodied by as its “vanguard,” particularly Salman al-
the intelligencia, who dominated almost Awda, Safar al-Hawali, Aid al-Qarni and
all government administrations.” It was
12
Hasan al-Maliki. They gained significant
within this context that the first Gulf War prominence both before and during the

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

insurrection and would continue to serve the religious legitimacy of the state. Facing
as the principal actors around which future the threat posed by radical salafi jihadists
opposition would coalesce, particularly al- and lacking the charisma and legitimiz-
Awda (discussed below). ing power of Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthayman,
As a result of the “Sahwa Insurrec- the Saudi state turned to the clerics of the
tion,” the regime cracked down hard Sahwa to bolster their authority. This shift
against the organizing and supporting from repression to cooptation was signaled
clerics as well as protesters, with hundreds, by the pardoning of Sahwa ulema includ-
perhaps thousands, being arrested. While ing Salman al-Awda, Safar al-Hawali and
the Sahwa Insurrection did not succeed in Nasir al-Omar, all of whom were released
its goal of catalyzing meaningful reform, from prison and utilized by the regime to
it served to further entrench the Sahwa counter the salafi-jihadi narrative.17
movement within the public sphere. While The situation intensified dramatically
the regime did enact three reforms in between 2003 and 2008 as the Saudi state
1992 — the establishment of the Advisory witnessed numerous domestic acts of ter-
Council (majlis al-shura), the adoption of rorism. It was during this period that the
a basic released leaders
law (al- The immediate denunciation of protests of the Sahwa
nidham by invoking religious principles movement
al-asai), submitted more
and a law foreshadows the “war of narratives” than 12 petitions
of regions that would develop within the kingdom, to the regime
(nidham evolving primarily within the lexicon of calling for a
al- constitutional
Sunni Islam.
manatiq) monarchy and
— these respect for civil,
were “in no way an adequate response to political and human rights, arguing that the
the opposition’s demands” and “changed lack of these rights was the driving factor
nothing in the nature of the political sys- behind the wave of violence.18 While the
tem or the balance of power.”16 This period petitions did not bring about the changes
of imprisonment would last throughout they sought, and many of the individuals
the late 1990s until two paramount devel- involved in writing them were imprisoned,
opments that served to rapidly alter the the ideas and language of rights that these
regime’s calculus. The first was the death reformers propagated slowly gathered
of two of the most respected and influential support and would be a critical foundation
figures in the Saudi religious establish- for the Arab uprisings.19 Also notewor-
ment, Sheikh Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthayman. thy during this time frame were the 2005
These two individuals were essential to the municipal elections in Riyadh, Jeddah,
Saudi regime for their ability to lend reli- Dammam, Mecca, Taef and Tabuk (the first
gious legitimacy to the state. The second since the early 1960s). While the elections
development was the attack on the World did not signal any legitimate political open-
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and ing — voters elected only half the mem-
the subsequent rise to global notoriety of bers of municipal councils, which are only
the salafi jihadi movement that challenged advisory bodies — the Sahwa performed

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 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

exceedingly well, capturing the majority of would develop within the kingdom, evolv-
open seats.20 ing primarily within the lexicon of Sunni
By the end of the first decade of the Islam. Both during and after the uprisings,
twenty-first century, the Sahwa movement the discourse established by the “new”
had undergone numerous transformations. or “neo” Sahwis can best be described as
The term “Sahwa” now best represents an what Muhammad Qasim Zaman defines
umbrella for those who constitute a fu- as the attempt to “rethink Islamic norms,
sion of Wahhabi theology and the political reinterpret foundational Islamic texts, and
activism of the Muslim Brotherhood, and reform particular Muslim institutions in
those who have their roots in the Sahwa ways that aim to align them more closely
movement and advocate for reform — pri- with both the spirit of Islam and the cur-
marily at the societal level (often termed rent needs and sensibilities of society.”26
“Islamic liberals”).21 As a result of this This demonstrates the previously
diversity and the different forms of repres- mentioned fluidity of Islamism and the
sion and cooptation employed by the re- ability of these actors to construct and
gime, Lacroix argues that what we see now use different narratives as dictated by the
is the “new Sahwa” and “neo-Sahwis,” political landscape. Leading the emerging
who are a product of the organization’s discontent within the Saudi state during
mobilization and educational system but do this period would be veteran Islamists
not necessarily label themselves “Sahwa.”22 associated with the Sahwa such as Salman
Toby Matthisen explains that Sahwa now al-Awda, Abdullah al-Hamid, Suleiman
represents “an umbrella term for a group al-Rushoudi and Muhammad al-Ahmari.
that was heavily influenced by Muslim Many others were younger, whose names
Brotherhood networks in the kingdom and “only became known after 2010, when
fused Brotherhood [political] ideology with they began to publish their books.”27
local Wahhabi tradition.”23 This generational diversity represents the
presence of grievances throughout broad
THE DOMESTIC UPRISINGS swaths of the population.
When the 2011 Arab uprisings erupted Protests soon emerged within Saudi
throughout the region, the Sahwa in Saudi Arabia following the regional wave of
Arabia represented the largest and best- mobilization: street demonstrations, sit-ins
organized nonstate group, with a strong at symbolic places such as the Ministry of
mobilizing capacity and, arguably, hun- Interior, prisons, governates, or branches
dreds of thousands of members.24 Immedi- of the government-sponsored human-rights
ately following the outbreak of protests in association. Petitions were the modus
Tunisia and Egypt, Saudi Grand Mufti Abd operandi of the opposition.28 Of particular
al-Aziz Ibn Abdullah Al al-Sheikh de- interest are those signed by high-profile
nounced them as “planned and organized individuals and their widespread dissemi-
by the enemies of the Umma” and warned nation through social-media platforms.
that “Islam strictly prohibits protests in the “The Declaration of National Reform,”
kingdom because the ruler here rules by advocating the gradual evolution of the
God’s will.”25 This immediate denunciation regime into a constitutional monarchy,
of protests by invoking religious principles contained 12 points demanding fundamen-
foreshadows the “war of narratives” that tal political, economic, social and judicial

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

change.29 “Towards a State of Rights and provided veteran activists new avenues
Institutions” expressed its commitment through which to reach different social
to Islamic principles while calling for an groups. Second, young people have begun
elected national assembly, separation of their own “intellectual production” cover-
the offices of king and prime minister, and ing topics such as the relationship among
an end to administrative corruption — as religion, governance and protest; notable
well as freedom of speech, independent examples are Muhammad al-Abd al-
associations, release of all political prison- Karim’s Deconstructing Tyranny and The
ers, and the lifting of the travel ban im- Awakening of Tawhid, Abdallah al-Maliki’s
posed on activists.30 The petition, thanks The Sovereignty of the Umma Comes
to social media, reached a large segment Before the Implementation of Sharia, and
of the populace and attracted over 9,000 Nawaf al-Qudaymi’s Longing for Free-
signatories, including “big names” such as dom: An Approach to the Salafi Stance on
Salman al-Awda, Sulieman al-Rushoudi, Democracy. This intellectual production
Muhammad al-Ahmari and Abdullah among younger reformers demonstrates
al-Maliki.31 that the articulation of grievances tran-
“Demands of the Saudi Youth” is scends the generational divide and will
unique. It originated from unknown youth likely continue.
activists calling for the government to deal Another key development is the
with unemployment, increase benefits and universal focus on the plight of political
a minimum wage, lift the ban on indepen- prisoners, an issue that transcends the ideo-
dent associations, allow an elected national logical divide. Furthermore, as Lacroix
assembly, release political prisoners — and emphasizes, the plight of political prison-
more.32 The petition garnered over 10,000 ers is also an issue for which there exists a
signatories.33 “Call for Reform” considers core group who are easy to mobilize: the
the current state to have deviated from ap- prisoners’ relatives. “Some of [them], after
plying Sharia as derived from the original years of waiting, are ready to do whatever
Saudi-Wahhabi state model, and is cen- it takes to get their loved ones back,” as
tered on fighting corruption, freeing politi- was demonstrated during the 2013 “Buray-
cal prisoners, dealing with unemployment, da sit-in,” when 176 people were arrested
and protecting property and lives, among for protesting extended political sentences
other things.34 The petition was signed by without trials.37 However, the most signifi-
a mixture of clerics and youth activists, cant development is arguably the com-
notably the famous Salafi sheikh, Nasir bined efforts of Islamists and more liberal-
al-Omar.35 Also crucial during this period minded actors. As al-Rashed argues, the
was the creation, despite the legal ban, of reformers’ petitions proved that, while
the kingdom’s first political party — the ideological divisions may persist, both
Islamic Umma Party — and the emergence non-Islamists and reformist Islamists were
of the Association for Civil and Political concerned with fundamental questions
Rights (ACPRA).36 about the future of Saudi Arabia. Their
Several internal developments made combined push towards an elected national
this new form of opposition possible. First, assembly “called into question the widely
as previously mentioned, social media accepted view that the two camps never
— particularly Facebook and Twitter — agree on a common set of demands.”38

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 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

More than any other individual during the suppression of peaceful protests: “If
this period, Sheikh Salman al-Awda has revolutions are suppressed they turn into
arguably emerged as the vanguard. Further, armed action, and if they are ignored they
al-Awda represents the most paradigmatic expand and spread. The solution is in wise
“case study” of the ideological evolu- decisions and in being timely, to avert any
tion among Saudi Islamist oppositionists, spark of violence.”43 This fusion of Islam
embodying the ability of Islamist actors to and modern political concepts, coupled
appropriate different narratives according with the demonstrated ability of individu-
to the context they face. Arguably one of als such as al-Awda to work with actors
the most popular Saudi sheikhs — with of different ideological views, will occupy
the third-largest Twitter following (13.5 a central role in Saudi activism moving
million) among religious figures — is al- forward.
Awda, whose discourse has been crucial The government did not stay silent
following the strategic opportunity offered during this new wave of opposition,
by the Arab uprisings.39 Al-Rasheed argues cracking down hard against protesters and
that “al-Awda’s appreciation and justifica- carrying out widespread arrests. While
tion of peaceful protest,…blends Islamic physical repression has remained impor-
theological tant, the regime
concepts The fusion of Islam and modern political also mobilized
with a
concepts, coupled with the demonstrated a campaign of
sociopoliti- virtual propa-
cal analysis ability of individuals to work with actors ganda, spread-
of current of different ideological views, will occupy ing counterar-
conditions a central role in Saudi activism moving guments and
of oppres- rumors against
sion and
forward. calls for pro-
marginal- test such as the
ization.…thus creating a hybrid discourse exaggeration of calamities, crime and
that has the potential of appealing to a chaos in areas where the uprisings were
wide audience of young Saudis search- gathering momentum.44 The regime also
ing for a language to articulate political frequently pointed to violence taking place
change.”40 Al-Awda’s praise for peaceful in other countries in order to warn people
protest is articulated in his 2012 book, against mobilizing, despite the obvious
Questions of Revolution, in which he paradox that many of the armed uprisings
argues that people don’t provoke revolu- in the region were funded by the Saudi
tions, but rather “repression, oppression, state. Repression was also complemented
corruption, backwardness, and poverty by cooptation, specifically the deploy-
provoke revolutions.”41 He claims that ment of oil revenues to quell unease. In
the “Islamic state” is based on a civil February and March 2011, King Abdullah
contract, arguing that repression occurs announced two economic packages target-
when authoritarian rulers instrumentalize ing the poor and the youth, amounting to a
religion to cover or justify oppression.42 In total of around $130 billion.45 The gov-
2013, al-Awda issued “An Open Letter to ernment also gave civil servants (roughly
the Saudi People,” in which he denounces two-thirds of the workforce) a 15 percent

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

raise in wages and a bonus of an extra two now, there are some elements left. It will
months’ pay.46 be a short time until they are all eradicated
However, repression escalated fol- completely.”50
lowing a declaration in 2014 labeling the This “eradication” has taken place in
Muslim Brotherhood — and therefore the the form of mass-arrests of veteran Sahwa
Sahwa — a terrorist organization, putting clerics and their acolytes, along with nu-
it on par with groups such as al-Qaeda and merous other individuals under the excuse
Daesh (ISIS).47 While regional contextual of “terrorism.” Instrumental to this cam-
factors were the primary immediate driver paign was the consolidation of counterter-
behind this designation, it had significant rorism and domestic intelligence under
repercussions domestically, as mainstream a new security body, the “Presidency of
opposition voices could now be labeled a State Security,” which has been granted
terrorist threat to the state and dealt with sweeping authority by MBS.51 Those
accordingly. Also pivotal was the ascen- Sahwa-related individuals who were
sion to power of King Salman and his arrested include numerous high-profile fig-
newly appointed heir, Mohammed bin ures: Farhan al-Maliki, Mostafa Hassan,52
Salman (MBS), who has set out to consol- Aid al-Qarni,53 Ali al-Omari,54 Safar
idate power al-Hawali,55
across all sec- Sahwa-affiliated personnel also supported Ahmed
tors, arrest- al-Amari
ing potential
the Saudi and UAE mission in Bahrain (died while
challengers to to quell the domestic uprisings against detained),56
his authority the Al-Khalifa and would also go on to Ibrahim Nass-
in what has support the Saudi intervention in Yemen er, Ibrahim
been termed al-Fares and
the Saudi against the Houthi movement. Salman al-
“purge.” 48
Awda.57 Con-
While this has been presented as a legiti- cerning al-Awda, the Saudi state is seeking
mate reform campaign against “corruption the death penalty, charging him with being
and terrorism,” MBS is instead picking connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and
off influential figures from all sectors the Qatari government, as well as inciting
of society, targeting religious clerics, people against the ruler. Al-Awda’s trial in
fellow royals, cabinet members, senior an antiterrorism court has been postponed
administrators and financers.49 MBS has until December 2019, after nearly two
also been attempting to promote his im- years of pre-trial detention.58 This charge
age of “reformer” abroad to gain support of being associated with “Muslim Brother-
for his policies, including an appearance hood terrorism,” however, has not been
in 2018 on CBS’s “60 Minutes.” Dur- limited to Sahwa-linked or -influenced in-
ing this interview, MBS referenced the dividuals. A striking example is that of Es-
Sahwa, stating “Saudi schools have been sam al-Zamil, a Saudi economist detained
invaded by many elements of the Muslim for alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood
Brotherhood organization [referring here but more likely arrested for his criticism
to the Sahwa’s origins in the educational of MBS’s “Vision 2030.”59
system], surely to a great extent. Even

52
 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

REGIONAL CONTEXT Yemen against the Houthi movement.63 The

The developments within the Saudi Saudis, ironically, continue to support and
state did not take place in a vacuum but fund tribal and military forces that cooper-
were shaped by regional phenomena. It is ate directly with Yemen’s branch of the
here that the regime’s domestic concerns Muslim Brotherhood, Islah.64 This demon-
strategically intersect with its foreign-poli- strates that, rather than combating the Mus-
cy agenda. As Kristian Ulrichsen explains: lim Brotherhood for a particular “terrorist”
ideology, the relationship is largely based
on contextual power relations.
The regional and global developments Conditions changed, however, in 2013,
in the 1990s and the 2000s eroded the when the Egyptian military overthrew
thin marker between the national and
the elected Muslim Brotherhood govern-
international spheres of policy in a
region already heavily penetrated by ment of Muhammad Morsi. The Saudis
supra- and sub-state ideational and immediately moved to support the new
material processes. The outbreak of government, promising $5 billion in aid
the Arab Spring in 2011 and regional and endorsing the crackdowns against
responses to the broader political up- Brotherhood members protesting Morsi’s
heaval …gave urgency to the porous ouster, characterizing it as legitimate ac-
relationship between internal and tion against “terrorists.”65 Sahwa-affiliated
external security.60 persons within Saudi Arabia were out-
raged at the removal (and Saudi support),
Indeed, as Philbrick Yadav argues, prompting a new “wave of criticism.”66
“The search for a clear distinction between Numerous Sahwa clerics came out to
the causal impact of domestic and inter- publicly denounce the coup. Nasir al-
national actors is more a function of the Umar argued that it is “forbidden to rebel
dominance of the methodological approach against a Muslim ruler.”67 Fifty-six sheikhs
of political scientists, than reflecting em- condemned “the removal of a legitimately
pirical realities on the ground.”61 elected president,” which violates “the will
Veteran and “neo/new”-Sahwis enthusi- of the people.”68 They added, “We express
astically embraced the uprisings in Tunisia our opposition and surprise [at actions]
and Egypt, especially the electoral victories taken by some countries who have given
of Islamist Ennahda and the Muslim Broth- recognition to the coup…thereby taking
erhood, respectively. The government, part in committing a sin and an aggres-
however, watched in panic as popular sion forbidden by the laws of Islam, and
uprisings calling for an overthrow of the there will be negative consequences for
status quo swept through the region. In ad- everyone if Egypt enters a state of chaos
dition to supporting the Egyptian and Tuni- and civil war.”69 Salman al-Awda tweeted,
sian revolutions, Sahwa-affiliated personnel “It is clear who is driving Egypt to its
also supported the Saudi and UAE mission destruction out of fear for their own selves
in Bahrain (Operation Peninsula Shield) #EgyptMassacre.”70 These opposing voices
to quell the domestic uprisings against the did not go unanswered. Brotherhood mem-
Al-Khalifa and supported, more or less, the ber Tareq al-Suwaidan was removed from
Syrian uprising.62 The Sahwa would also al-Risala TV for being part of the “terrorist
go on to support the Saudi intervention in Brotherhood movement,” and Suwaidan’s

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

and al-Awda’s books were banned.71 and old-regime officials during the elec-
Central to the new regional context is tions. This strategic rivalry culminated in
understanding counterrevolution and the Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain sever-
formation of new strategic “blocs.” The ing diplomatic relations with Qatar — and
“counterrevolutionary” bloc consists of a subsequent blockade of the country.74
Saudi Arabia, post-Morsi Egypt and the The rivalry is central to Saudi Arabia’s
UAE. These states view the uprisings as an relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood,
existential threat to their survival and the both domestically and regionally.
regional balance of power. Israel can also The ultimate goal of the counter-
be added to this bloc, for there has been an revolutionary bloc remains threefold: (1)
unprecedented rapprochement between the preventing the Brotherhood from maintain-
Zionist state and these three powers in the ing power and establishing an alternative
name of shared strategic interests, primarily Sunni political order; (2) preventing the
combating Islamism and Iran.72 The other Brotherhood (or any other group) from
bloc consists of those that actively backed creating a democratic precedent, thereby
the revolutionary movements throughout threatening the authority of counter-
the region: revolutionary
Turkey, The Trump administration is clearly regimes; and
Qatar and signaling that its priorities in the Middle (3) preventing
the Muslim the revolution-
Brotherhood
East lie solely with securing U.S. strategic ary bloc from
itself. interests, as opposed to promoting upending the
Of par- democracy and popular legitimacy. regional bal-
ticular inter- ance of power.75
est here is The Sahwa
the Saudi-Qatari rivalry, which continues is viewed as a domestic extension of this
to play out in various theaters, especially overall Brotherhood “threat matrix.”
Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. In Egypt, Qatar
enthusiastically supported the ascension of THE U.S. ROLE
the Muslim Brotherhood, while the Saudis Unique within these new competitive
backed the military coup overthrowing regional dynamics and domestic threat
Morsi and the installation of El-Sisi as calculations is the position of the United
president. In Libya, Qatar has continued States. The policies and rhetoric of the
to fund and support Muslim-Brotherhood- Trump administration demonstrate that
connected parties, while the Saudis have it is fully behind the counterrevolution-
thrown their weight behind strongman ary bloc. Trump has reiterated his support
Khalifa al-Haftar. Indeed, General Haf- for Egypt’s El-Sisi regime,76 supported
tar recently made a trip to the kingdom Saudi Arabia and its friends in the rift
to meet with King Salman, who report- with Qatar,77 and recently indicated that
edly offered millions of dollars to aid his he spoke with Haftar in Libya and backed
campaign to move on the capital, Tripoli.73 his assault on Tripoli.78 The Trump
In Tunisia, Qatar put its weight behind the administration is clearly signaling that
Brotherhood-aligned Ennahda, while the its priorities in the Middle East lie solely
Saudis supported a coalition of secularists with securing U.S. strategic interests, as

54
 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

opposed to promoting democracy and Jr., to portray Khashoggi as connected with

popular legitimacy.79 terrorism and opposed to democracy.82
The commitment of this administra- Encouraged by allies among the
tion to the Saudi regime was demonstrated counterrevolutionary bloc, the Trump ad-
in the aftermath of the killing of Saudi ministration re-signaled its desire to push
journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the for a “global terrorist designation” for the
Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Shortly before Muslim Brotherhood as a whole.83 Such a
his death, Khashoggi wrote a piece for the broad designation would serve to eliminate
Washington Post titled, “The U.S. is wrong legitimate opposition, not just in Saudi
about the Muslim Brotherhood — and the Arabia, but in Egypt and the UAE. Further,
Arab world is suffering for it.”80 The article this designation would likely serve as a
argued that “the eradication of the Muslim “green light” to pursue more violent forms
Brotherhood is nothing less than an aboli- of repression of oppositionists without the
tion of democracy and a guarantee that Ar- objection of the United States. A similar
abs will continue living under authoritarian case is that of the Shia, whom the Saudis
corrupt regimes. There can be no political have successfully portrayed to the United
reform and democracy in any Arab country States as monolithic agents of Iran that
without accepting that political Islam is a need to be repressed.84
part of it.” This domestic U.S. campaign, then,
While there is debate surrounding is inexorably linked to the Saudi state’s
exactly why Khashoggi was murdered, larger strategy of eliminating domestic op-
one thing is certain: the near-unconditional position and challenges to regional allies,
U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the under the veneer of fighting “terrorism.”
subsequent campaign to link Khashoggi Such a designation would consider Sahwa
with the Muslim Brotherhood and portray personnel — already considered terrorists
him as an “enemy of the state.” An official within Saudi — as “global terrorists.” It is
White House opinion was issued entitled: here that the words of Khashoggi serve as
“Statement from President Donald J. a much-needed warning: “There are efforts
Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia:” here in Washington, encouraged by some
Arab states that do not support freedom
Representatives of Saudi Arabia say and democracy, to persuade Congress to
that Jamal Khashoggi was an “enemy designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a
of the state” and a member of the terrorist organization. If they succeed, the
Muslim Brotherhood.…In any case,
designation will weaken the fragile steps
our relationship is with Saudi Arabia.
They have been a great ally in the toward democracy and political reform
fight against Iran. The United States that have already been curbed in the Arab
intends to remain a steadfast partner world. It will also push backward the Arab
of Saudi Arabia to ensure the interests countries that have made progress in creat-
of our country, Israel, and all other ing a tolerant environment and allowing
partners in the region.81 political participation by various compo-
nents of society, including the Islamists.”85
Furthermore, there has been a sig- Another component of this push by the
nificant effort by conservatives within the counterrevolutionary bloc and the Trump
United States, including Donald Trump, administration to label the Muslim Broth-

55
Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

erhood a terrorist organization also directly of legitimate, peaceful opposition, which

pertains to the Sahwa. Newly elected includes the Sahwa, these two members of
Congresswomen Ilhan Omar and Rashida Congress are challenging the regime’s nar-
Tlaib have been accused by academics, rative that they are fighting “terrorists.”
media outlets and commentators close to
the counterrevolutionary regimes of being THE ROAD FORWARD
secret members of the Muslim Brother- The battle between the Sahwa and
hood.86 Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya published the Saudi state can be thought of as a
a piece insinuating that Omar and Tlaib are war of narratives: the Saudis claim they
part of an alliance between the Democratic are fighting against religious “terrorists,”
party and Islamist groups to control Con- while the Sahwa denounces the regime’s
gress, arguing the two are “anti-Trump and use of religion as a means of control and
his political team and opinions, especially argues for social, political and economic
his foreign policy, starting from the sanc- justice. There is currently significant
tions on Iran to the isolation of the Muslim change underway within the Sahwa, most
Brotherhood and all movements of politi- evident in figures such as Salman al-Awda
cal Islam.”87 Conservative U.S. officials who openly endorse the call for peaceful
and media outlets have echoed a similar change.91 It is critical to note, however,
criticism of these two congresswomen. that while petitions have been issued and
Several conservative media outlets have demonstrations held, they have not gone as
insinuated that Omar’s call for the release far as other Arab Uprising revolutionaries
of a Muslim Brotherhood official suggest- who demanded the downfall of the regime.
ed her connection with the organization.88 Instead, they are calling for what they see
President Trump also tweeted a video of a as desperately needed reforms. If, howev-
speech by Omar intercut with footage from er, their basic requests are not heeded, and
the 9/11 attacks.89 One individual even repression continues to increase, will that
called Omar’s Washington, D.C., office mean more “radical” demands come next?
and stated to the answering staff member: That question suggests that the opposition-
“Do you work for the Muslim Brother- ist voices among the subaltern will not
hood? Why are you working for her? She’s disappear anytime soon.
a (expletive) terrorist. I’ll put a bullet in Several key issues will continue to af-
her (expletive) skull.”90 fect the Sahwa’s relationship with the state.
Again, these events appear on the sur- The first consists of rivalries within the
face, like the plight of Jamal Khashoggi, to royal family, particularly as MBS has set
have little to do with the Sahwa movement out to marginalize all dissenting voices and
or its acolytes in Saudi Arabia. However, possible alternatives to his authority. The
Omar and Tlaib have criticized the Saudi Sahwa has strategically observed rivalries
government for its authoritarian tendencies within the royal family, seeking at times to
and policies, and represent liberal Muslim capitalize on its internal fragmentation.92
voices that challenge its stances. They also Considering the intense rivalries within
represent individuals in powerful positions the Al Saud, it is not unthinkable that this
willing to call out U.S. policies towards scenario could present an opportunity for
the Middle East beneficial to Saudi Arabia reformists to put their support behind a
and its allies. By recognizing the presence particular faction.93 In a phone interview

56
 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

with a member of the Sahwa in Jeddah, tions, massively increased arms spending,
Jon Alterman and William McCants report- and a collapsed oil price.96 This trend of
ed that many in the group are “biding their regional interventionism among the coun-
time” and watching internal competitive terrevolutionary bloc seems to be continu-
dynamics within the royal family.94 ing, as evinced by ongoing developments
Another issue to watch closely is within Sudan. Following the ouster of
the continuing strategic rapprochement President Omar al-Bashir, the interim
between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This military government has largely refused
increasingly open relationship has the protesters’ demands for immediate civil-
potential to generate considerable backlash ian rule and has been bolstered by support
from Sahwa and non-Sahwa clerics alike. from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The two
The trend has arguably already begun, countries pledged $3 billion to the military
with the arrest of influential Sahwa cleric government, including a $500 million cash
Safar al-Hawali for his criticism of MBS’s injection and transfers of food, fuel and
growing relationship with the Israelis.95 medicine (a package that protesters have
Also pivotal will be the verdict determin- angrily rejected).97
ing whether Salman al-Awda will face the The United States will remain a
death penalty, a ruling that could have the critical piece of this overall puzzle. The
potential to spark widespread discontent Saudi campaign against its own domestic
due to his vast popularity. opposition — as well as its geopolitical
The state of the Saudi economy will maneuvering abroad — is beginning to
also continue to play a significant role in affect U.S. domestic politics. The recent
the relationship between the regime and vote by Congress to end support for Saudi
oppositionists. As previously mentioned, intervention in Yemen demonstrates that
one of the primary grievances leading up perceptions are currently in flux. This type
to the “Sahwa Insurrection” in 1990-91 of action makes the Saudis fear individuals
was the nationwide recession. During the like Omar and Tlaib even more. The veto
post-2011 Arab uprisings, the financial by the administration, however, demon-
resources that allowed the government to strates that, for the time being, the foreign-
protect itself and bail out its allies are rap- policy agenda of the United States is firmly
idly being drained by domestic spending aligned with the counterrevolutionary bloc.
commitments, expensive foreign interven-

1
Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Har-
vard University Press, 2011).
2
Stephane Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring”. Kuwait Programme on Development, Gover-
nance, and Globalisation in the Gulf states (36), London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014.
3
Madawi Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists: The Struggle Over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia, (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2015).
4
Ibid.
5
Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Religious Statecraft: The Politics of Islam in Iran, (Columbia University

57
 Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

Press, 2018).
6
Pascal Menoret, “Saudi Arabia,” in The Middle East, ed. Ellen Lust (CQ Press, 2017), 737-754.
7
Lacroix, Awakening Islam.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Abir Mordechai, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, and the Gulf Crisis (Routledge, 1993).
12
Lacroix, Awakening Islam.
13
John Chalcraft, Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press,
2016).
14
Pascal Menoret, “Repression and Protest in Saudi Arabia,” Brandeis University: Crown Center for Middle
East Studies, 2016, [Link]
15
Lacroix, Awakening Islam.
16
Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia.
17
Lacroix, Awakening Islam.
18
Donald Emmerson, “Inclusive Islamism: The Utility of Diversity,” in Islamism: Contested Perspectives on
Political Islam, eds. Martin and Barzegar, (Standford University Press, 2019), 17-32.
19
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
20
Pascal Menoret, “The Municipal Elections in Saudi Arabia, 2005,” Arab Reforms Initiative, December,
2005, [Link]
21
Peter Mandaville, Islam and Politics, (Routledge, 2014).
22
Lacroix, Awakening Islam.
23
Toby Matthisen, “Saudi Arabia,” in Rethinking Political Islam, eds, Shadi Hamid and William McCants
(Oxford University Press, 2017).
24
Stephane Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists and the Potential for Protest,” Foreign Policy, June 2, 2011, [Link]
[Link]/2011/06/02/saudi-islamists-and-the-potential-for-protest/.
25
Caryle Murphy, “Heavy Police Presence Deters Protesters in Saudi Arabia,” Public Radio International,
March 11, 2011, [Link]/stories/2011-03-11/heavy-police-presence-deters-protesters-saudi-arabia.
26
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Islamic Modernism and the Sharia in Pakistan (Yale Law school Occasional
Papers, 2014).
27
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
28
Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring,” 36. Many of the protests can be seen on the Youtube ac-
count “e3teqal”: [Link]
29
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
30
Ibid.
31
The petition can be accessed at [Link] (as of May 1, 2019).
32
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
33
The petition can be accessed at [Link] (as of May 1, 2019).
34
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
35
The petition can be accessed at [Link]
&id=21468&Itemid=33 (as of May 1, 2019).
36
Stephane Lacroix, “Is Saudi Arabia Immune?” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 48–59.
37
Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring.”
38
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
39
Stephane Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring.”
40
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
41
Salman Al-Awda, As’ilat al-thawra (Beirut: Markaz Inma lil-Buhuth wa al-Dirasat, 2012.)
42
Ibid.
43
Angus McDowall, “Saudi Cleric Issues Rare Warning in Call for Re-
form,” Reuters, March 16, 2013, [Link]/article/us-saudi-cleric/
saudi-cleric-issues-rare-warning-in-call-for-reform-idUSBRE92F0DI20130316.
44
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists.
45
“Saudi Stocks Soar after King’s Spending Spree,” Agence France-Presse, March 20, 2011, [Link]

58
 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

[Link]/NewsContent/3/12/8119/Business/Economy/Saudi-stocks-soar-after-kings-spending-spree.
aspx.49.
46
Ayesha Daya and Vivian Salama, “OPEC’s $1T Cash Quiets Poor as $100 Oil Fills Cof-
fers,” Bloomberg, September 20, 2011, [Link]
opec-s-1t-cash-quiets-poor-on-longest-ever-100-oil.
47
Sebastian Usher, “Saudi Arabia Declares Muslim Brotherhood ‘Terrorist Group’,” BBC News, March 7,
2014, [Link]/news/world-middle-east-26487092.
48
For an overview of the “Saudi purge” and a list of jailed individuals with weblinks to sources verifying their
detention, see [Link]
49
“The Prince: On How Many Fronts Can Mohammad Bin Salman Act Simultaneously?” Open-
Democracy, November 6, 2017, [Link]
prince-on-how-many-fronts-can-mohammad-bin-salman-act-simultan/.
50
“Saudi Arabia’s Heir to the Throne Talks to 60 Minutes,” CBS News, March 19, 2018, [Link]/
news/saudi-crown-prince-talks-to-60-minutes/.
51
Hadeel Al Sayegh, “Saudi King Overhauls Security Services Following Royal Shake-
up,” Reuters, July 20, 2017. Retrieved from: [Link]/article/us-saudi-decrees/
saudi-king-overhauls-security-services-following-royal-shakeup-idUSKBN1A52N9?il=0.
52
“More Arrests in Apparent Saudi Campaign against Critics: Activists.” Re-
uters, September 12, 2017, [Link]/article/us-saudi-security-arrests/
more-arrests-in-apparent-saudi-campaign-against-critics-activists-idUSKCN1BN2TU.
53
“Saudi Arabia: Prominent Clerics Arrested,” Human Rights Watch, September 15, 2017, [Link]/
news/2017/09/15/saudi-arabia-prominent-clerics-arrested.
54
“Saudi Clerics Detained in Apparent Bid to Silence Dissent,”
Reuters, September 11, 2017, [Link]/article/us-saudi-security-arrests/
saudi-clerics-detained-in-apparent-bid-to-silence-dissent-idUSKCN1BL129.
55
“Saudi Arabia Arrests Islamic Scholar over Criticism of Bin Salman’s Ties
with Israel,” Middle East Monitor, July 13, 2018, [Link].
com/20180713-saudi-arabia-arrests-islamic-scholar-over-criticism-of-bin-salmans-ties-with-israel/.
56
“Saudi Cleric Detained in Crackdown Dies: Activists,” Reuters, January 21, 2019, [Link]/
article/us-saudi-arrests/saudi-cleric-detained-in-crackdown-dies-activists-idUSKCN1PF1QM.
57
“Saudi Arabia: Prominent Cleric May Face Death Penalty,” Human Rights Watch, September 12, 2018,
[Link]/news/2018/09/12/saudi-arabia-prominent-cleric-may-face-death-penalty.
58
“Trial of Saudi Scholar Salman al-Awdah Postponed, says son,” Al-Jazeera, July 28, 2019, [Link]
[Link]/news/2019/07/[Link].
59
“Saudi Economist Who Criticized Aramco IPO Charged with Terror-
ism,” Reuters, October 1, 2018, [Link]/article/us-saudi-arrests/
saudi-economist-who-criticized-aramco-ipo-charged-with-terrorism-activists-idUSKCN1MB3OI.
60
Kristian Ulrichsen, “Links between Domestic and Regional Security,” in The Changing Security Dynamics
of the Persian Gulf, ed. Kristian Ulrichsen (Oxford University Press, 2017).
61
Courtney Freer et al, “The Future of Political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa un-
der the Changing Regional Order,” Jadaliyya, 2018, [Link]
The-Future-of-Political-Islam-in-the-MENA-under-the-Changing-Regional-Order.
62
Toby Matthiesen, “The Domestic Sources of Saudi Foreign Policy: Islamists and the State in the Wake of
the Arab Uprisings,” Brookings Institution, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, August 2015,
[Link]/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Saudi-Arabia_Matthiesen-[Link].
63
Matthiesen, “Saudi Arabia.”
64
Daniel L Byman, “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates Have a Disastrous Yemen Strat-
egy,” Brookings Institution, July 18, 2018, [Link]/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/17/
saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-have-a-disastrous-yemen-strategy/.
65
Tariq Al-Homayed, “Opinion: King Abdullah’s Egypt Speech Was Like a Surgeon’s Scal-
pel,” Asharq al-Awsat, August 19, 2013, [Link]
opinion-king-abdullahs-egypt-speech-was-like-a-surgeons-scalpel.
66
Mark Lynch, “Gulf Islamist Dissent over Egypt,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2013, [Link]

59
Middle East Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 2019

com/2013/08/18/gulf-islamist-dissent-over-egypt/.
67
Bayan hawla ahdath masr, [Link]
68
Bayan hawla al-mawaqif al-siyasiyya li-hizb al-nur, [Link]
69
Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring.”
Al-Rashed, Muted Modernists; for the statement, see Bayan al-ulama al-sa’udiyyin hawla ahdath
masr, [Link]
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8
%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-
%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1.
70
Salman Al-Awda, Twitter Post, August 15, 2013, [Link]
tus/368022839666167808.
71
“Muslim Brotherhood-Affiliated Authors’ Books Pulled in Saudi Arabia,” Gulf News, June 2, 2014,
[Link]
bia-1.1342080.
72
For a thorough explanation, see Jonathan Marcus, “Israel and Saudi Arabia: The Relationship Emerging
into the Open,” BBC News, April 3, 2018, [Link]/news/world-middle-east-43632905.
73
Jared Malsin and Said Summer, “Saudi Arabia Promised Support to Libyan Warlord in Push to Seize
Tripoli,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2019, [Link]/articles/saudi-arabia-promised-support-to-libyan-
warlord-in-push-to-seize-tripoli-11555077600.
74
Mohammed Tawfeeq, “Qatar Rift: Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt Cut Ties,” CNN, July 27, 2017, [Link].
com/2017/06/05/middleeast/saudi-bahrain-egypt-uae-qatar-terror/[Link].
75
Toby Matthiesen, “Renting the Casbah: Gulf States’ Foreign Policy Towards North Africa since the Arab
Uprisings,” in The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf, eds. Kristian Ulrichsen (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2017).
76
Betsy Klein et al, “Trump Says Egyptian President Doing a ‘Great Job,’” CNN, April 9, 2019, [Link].
com/2019/04/09/politics/donald-trump-egypt-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-meeting-white-house/[Link].
77
Patrick Wintour, “Donald Trump Tweets Support for Blockade Imposed on Qa-
tar,” The Guardian, June 6, 2017, [Link]/world/2017/jun/06/
qatar-panic-buying-as-shoppers-stockpile-food-due-to-saudi-blockade.
78
Samer Al-Atrush, “Trump Backed Libyan Strongman’s Attack on Tripoli, U.S. Officials Say,” Bloomberg,
April 24, 2019, [Link]/news/articles/2019-04-24/trump-libya-haftar-tripoli.
79
Jonathan Hoffman, “The Strategic Convergence of Sectarianism and Geopolitics: The Case of Bahrain,”
Cornell International Affairs Review, 12, no. 1, (2018): 54-81, [Link]
cornell-international-affairs-review/12/1.
80
Jamal Khashoggi, “The U.S. Is Wrong about the Muslim Brotherhood — and the Arab World Is Suf-
fering for It,” Washington Post, August 28, 2018, [Link]/news/global-opinions/
wp/2018/08/28/the-u-s-is-wrong-about-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-the-arab-world-is-suffering-for-it/?utm_
term=.0bb0aeaf7118.
81
“Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia.” The
White House, November 20, 2018, [Link]/briefings-statements/
statement-president-donald-j-trump-standing-saudi-arabia/.
82
See, for example, Robert Costa and Karoun Demirjian, “Conservatives Mount a Whisper Campaign
Smearing Khashoggi in Defense of Trump,” Washington Post, October 19, 2018, [Link]/
powerpost/conservatives-mount-a-whisper-campaign-smearing-khashoggi-in-defense-of-trump/2018/10/18/
feb92bd0-d306-11e8-b2d2-f397227b43f0_story.html?utm_term=.d05fc1ed6ec3; John Bradley, “Death of a
Dissident: Saudi Arabia and the Rise of the Mobster State,” The Spectator, October 10, 2018, [Link].
[Link]/2018/10/death-of-a-dissident-saudi-arabia-and-the-rise-of-the-mobster-state/; Tony Badran and Michael
Doran, “Why the Saudis Despised Jamal Khashoggi,” New York Post, December 17, 2018, [Link].
com/2018/10/18/why-the-saudis-despised-jamal-khashoggi/; Will Sommer, “Trump Jr. Boosts Smear Tying
Missing Journalist Jamal Khashoggi to Islamic Terrorism,” The Daily Beast, October 12, 2018, [Link]-
[Link]/trump-jr-boosts-smear-tying-missing-journalist-jamal-khashoggi-to-islamic-terrorism?ref=scroll.
83
Charlie Savage et al, “Trump Pushes to Designate Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group,” New York
Times, April 30, 2019, [Link]/2019/04/30/us/politics/[Link].

60
 Hoffman: religion, the state and the politics

84
Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
85
Khashoggi, “The U.S. Is Wrong about the Muslim Brotherhood.”
86
Ola Salem, “Saudi Arabia Declares War on America’s Muslim Congresswom-
en,” Foreign Policy, December 11, 2018, [Link]/2018/12/11/
saudi-arabia-declares-war-on-americas-muslim-congresswomen/.
87
Huda Al-Saleh, “Details of Calls to Attack Trump by U.S. ‘Muslim Sisters’ Allied to Brotherhood,” Al
Arabiya English, December 9, 2018, [Link]/en/features/2018/12/08/Details-of-calls-by-
[Link].
88
See, for example: Jordan Schachtel, “Ilhan Omar Pushes for Release of Jailed Muslim Broth-
erhood Leader,” Conservative Review, April 3, 2019, [Link]/news/
ilhan-omar-pushes-release-jailed-muslim-brotherhood-leader/.
89
Gabriela Resto-Montero, “Democrats Unite to Condemn Trump Tweet Linking Ilhan Omar and 9/11,” Vox,
April 13, 2019, [Link]/2019/4/13/18309127/democrats-trump-ilhan-omar-tweet-9-11.
90
Kevin Bohn, “New York Man Charged with Threatening to Assault and Kill Rep. Ilhan Omar,” CNN, April
6, 2019, [Link]/2019/04/06/politics/ilhan-omar-new-york-threat/[Link].
91
Lacroix, Stephane. “Is Saudi Arabia Immune?” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 48–59.
92
Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam.
93
Lacroix, “Is Saudi Arabia Immune?”
94
Jon Alterman and William McCants, “Saudi Arabia: Islamists Rising and Falling,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, May 21 2019, [Link]/analysis/saudi-arabia-islamists-rising-and-falling.
95
“Saudi Arabia Arrests Islamic Scholar over Criticism of Bin Salman’s Ties
with Israel,” Middle East Monitor, July 13, 2018, [Link].
com/20180713-saudi-arabia-arrests-islamic-scholar-over-criticism-of-bin-salmans-ties-with-israel/.
96
Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East Public Affairs, 2016).
97
Declan Walsh, “Amid U.S. Silence, Gulf Nations Back the Military in Sudan’s Revolution,” New York
Times, April 26, 2019, [Link]/2019/04/26/world/africa/sudan-revolution-protest-saudi-arabia-
[Link].

61