5TH CCI-NUJS NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND DIGITAL FORENSICS MOOT, 2025

TO-74
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5th CCI-NUJS NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND DIGITAL FORENSICS MOOT, 2025
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In the judicature of the Hon’ble COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDICANA

filed under section 3(4) of the Competition Commission Act of Indicana.

In the matters concerning:

Sunshare ………………………… (INFORMANT)

v.

Manufacturers ………………………… (OPPOSITE PARTIES)

MEMORANDUM FOR OPPOSITE PARTIES

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF OPPOSITE PARTIES

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENT

 5TH CCI-NUJS NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND DIGITAL FORENSICS MOOT, 2025

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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SL NO. CONTENTS PAGE NO.

I. TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ………………………. 3

II. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………. 4-5

III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………. 6

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………… 7-9

V. ISSUES RAISED ………………………………………. 10

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………... 11-12

VII. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………... 13-23

a. Whether there existed an Anti-competition
Agreement between the manufacturers…………. 13
b. Whether the formation of the Consortium was in
violation of §3(3)(a) & §3(3)(b) of the Act and
caused AAEC……………………………………. 17
c. Whether the evidence retrieved from the seized
devices are admissible and proper…………… 19

VIII. PRAYER ………………………………………………... 24

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENT

 5TH CCI-NUJS NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW AND DIGITAL FORENSICS MOOT, 2025

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
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1. AAEC Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition

2. CA Competition Act
3. CrPC Criminal Procedure Code
4. CCI Competition Commission of India
5. DG Director General
6. FTK Forensic Toolkit
7. GPS Global Positioning System
8. LTD. Limited
9. MD5 Message-Digest algorithm
10. PV Photovoltaic
11. PVT. Private
12. SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
13. SOP Standard Operating Procedure
14. v. versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
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LIST OF CASES:

DOMESTIC CASES-
1. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors. (2014) 10 SCC 473
2. Arjun Pandit Rao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2014) 10 SCC 473
3. Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 372
4. Eros International Media Ltd v Central Circuit Cine Association, Indore, 2012
CompLR 20(CCI)
5. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd v UOI, 1992(59) ELT505(BOM)
6. Mukesh & Ors v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2017 SC 2161
7. State v. Mohd. Afzal & Ors, 2003(71) DRJ178
8. TELCO v Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements, AIR 1977 SC 973

INTERNATIONAL CASES-
1. The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 1995 Cal.
LEXIS 3382
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STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

1. The Competition Act, 2002
2. The Information Technology Act, 2000
3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
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BOOKS & COMMENTARIES:

1. S.M. Dugar, Guide to Competition Law 423 (7th Ed. 2019)
2. Versha Vahini, Indian Competition Law (1st Ed. 2016)
3. Abir Roy & Jayant Kumar, Competition Law in India (Eastern Law House, 204)

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4. Avtar Singh, Competition Law (1st Ed. 2012)

5. Larry Daniel & Lars Daniel, Digital Forensics for Legal Professionals
6. Nishesh Sharma, Cyber Forensics in India: A Legal Perspective (Universal Law
Publishing 2022)
7. Aditya Bharadwaj & Rinki Singh, Dawn Raids under Indian Competition Law (2024)
8. ESSCI Solar Panel Installation Participant Handbook, Chapter 3, 88 (1st Ed. 2022)

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REPORTS:
1. Competition Law Report (2012) CompLR 0020 (CCI)
2. Raptor Maps Global Solar Report (2025)
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DATABASES:
1. www.barandbench.com
2. www.brillopedia.com
3. www.cci.gov.in
4. www.cleanenergybusinesscouncil.com
5. www.crawsec.com
6. www.drishtijudiciary.com
7. www.hawkeyeforensic.com
8. www.iblogpleaders.com
9. www.legitquest.com
10. www.legalserviceindia.com
11. www.livelaw.com
12. www.scconline.com
13. www.simplyforensic.com

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
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The Respondents being enterprises engaged in the manufacturing and distribution of Solar
PV modules are subject to the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002. The Hon’ble
Commission is vested with the jurisdiction to inquire into the alleged contraventions of §3
and §4 of the Act along with §19(1)(a) of the Act, upon receipt of information.

The Respondents humbly submit the Informant has failed to establish that there has been an
anti-competitive agreement under §3(4) of the Act.

It is humbly submitted that furthermore there have been procedural flaws in the process of
retrieving evidence from the seized devices questioning the integrity and admissibility of the
same.

Accordingly, the Respondents submit to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Commission to

decide the present matter while concurrently maintaining that the allegations set forth by the
Informants are unsubstantiated on the facts and must be dismissed.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

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CALL FOR RENEWABLES: THE INDICANA CONTEXT
In the late 2010s, the Republic of Indicana has been facing a shortage of electricity due to
reducing coal supplies. Therefore, in response the government adopted the National
Renewable Energy Roadmap (2025–2035) aiming for 50% of electricity from renewable
sources by 2030. The answer to this problem was solar photovoltaic cells or PV modules. The
leading domestic PV module manufacturers are Sunbright Solar Ltd, Radiant Modules Pvt
Ltd and Helio Tech Industries (referred to as Manufacturers).
SunBright one of the first to enter the market had done a vertical integration by creating a
subsidiary Sun Tech Installations Pvt Ltd to certify and monitor installations of PV modules.
Under Sun Bright’s standard contract, only those installations made by Sun Tech Pvt Ltd will
have warranty coverage.
RADIANT’S REPUTATION CRISIS
In October 2023, Radiant undertook a government contract to build a solar park in Aura
Pradesh. The regional government had insisted on a local consortium of uncertified
technicians who would install Radiant’s modules instead of certified ones. Radiant had given
detailed instructions and processes to install the modules but was waived by the government.
Radiant’s modules started malfunctioning and underperforming within months due to faulty
installation mounting panels at incorrect tilt angles causing water pooling and cell damage.
Radiant had to replace the affected modules at its own cost and suffered significant goodwill
damage. Radiant’s CEO Mr Jake Peralta met with SunBright’s CTO Ms Amy Santiago and
Suntech’s CEO Mr Charles Boyle. An agreement was made via which Radiant would then
use SunTech for all future installations of PV modules along with warranty coverage. In
March 2024 the quarterly industry meeting was held attended by CEOs of Radiant, SunBright
and HelioTech. Minutes of the meeting showed that the general consensus was mandatory
certified installation however no formal vote was taken.
THE NEW ENTRANT
During March -September 2024, a rural energy cooperative SunShare was created to enhance
local installations and SunShare proposed to purchase PV modules directly from the
manufacturers and install them using village technicians. Sun Share would train the
technicians themselves and provide warranty as well. On October 1, 2024 SunShare sent its
proposal to all Manufacturers.
COORDINATED BLOCKADE
The Manufactures rejected such proposition citing their reasons in respective emails.
SunBright had rejected the proposal because SunBright already had SunTech for the
installation job and SunShare’s proposal could affect the quality of the product. Radiant
rejected the proposal citing the reason that the modules of Radiant needed specialised
installations by trained technicians and they already have an existing installer. Helio Tech
rejected the proposal on similar grounds however Helio Tech had also opened an avenue for
further communication to reach a deal. SunShare viewed this rejection as a coordinated
refusal to deal amongst the Manufacturers and filed a petition with the CCI asserting that
§3(4) of the Competition Act 2002 has been violated.

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THE DAWN RAIDS

The CCI agreed that a prima facie case existed and therefore the DG started a formal
investigation. During the DG’ inquiry, investigators discovered a message exchange between
Jake Peralta and Rosa Diaz which read “Congratulations! We have successfully recouped
50% of our investments. The new modules have been selling like hotcakes LOL.” This raised
concerns regarding collusion amongst the Manufacturers.The DG secured a court order for
search and seizures under Section 41(8) of the Act. On 5th December, during the dawn,
simultaneous raids were made on all 3 Manufacturers, offices. Agents arrived at Sun bright’s
headquarters between 5:00 AM and 5:30AM seizing two office desktop computers and
executive laptop of SunBright CTO. Agents arrived at Helio Tech western office around
5:30AM seizing 2 employee laptops and 1 1 TB encrypted hard disk which was found in a
locked cabinet. Agents arrived Radiant’s eastern Aura Pradesh plant around 5:28 AM and
seized Jake Peralta’s laptop and an additional manager laptop.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
All devices were photographed in place and labelled with specifications about
make/model/serial numbers and subsequently sealed in tamper-proof bags. By 6:15AM the
DG and in-house counsel of the Manufacturers had signed a consolidated seizure memo
listing the items.All devices were placed in sealed boxes and transported to DG central digital
evidence vault in the city of Sauramandala within 6 hours. No GPS or tracking log was
maintained during the transit. A supervising officer was assigned for the devices however it
was later discovered that during transit, a junior officer had opened the sealed evidence box
to verify the contents. This was done without notification in chain of custody record. Four
days later, the forensic analysist of 99 Precinct Institute Lab performed a bitstream imaging
of each device using FTK Imager with hardware write blockers. The hashes generated for
each device pre and post imaging are MD5 and SHA 256. The report stated that the two
devices Jake Peralta’s laptop and Amy Santiago’s laptop initially failed the SHA 256 check.
They were once again imaged yielding matching hashes. However, the original failed hash
data along with the partial images from first few attempts were not preserved in lab archive.
During the preparation of the case, the DG relied on screenshot taken during the FTK imager
rather than using absolute metadata by exporting the email metadata or full header logs.
THE AFTERMATH
June 2022, manufacturers formed a PV Innovation Consortium to develop 44% efficient solar
modules, pooling ₹1000 crore R&D over 24 months.
A Finance & Cost Recovery Committee imposed a one‑year price floor of ₹450 per module
to share costs, after which competition would resume. Members exiting forfeited joint IP
rights and the ability to sell the ultra‑efficient modules. The DG found the coordinated refusal
to Sun Share’s proposal and the price‑flooring agreement raised concerns under Sections
3(3)(a), 3(3)(b), and 3(4) of the Competition Act, 2002. Annexures showed doubled solar
generation, consumer savings, and coal displacement, while Helio Tech filed a settlement
application before the CCI.

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ISSUES RAISED
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***************************************************************************
ISSUE 1: Whether there existed an anti-competitive agreement between the Manufacturers
with respect to the installation of solar PVs only by SunTech certified installers, leading to a
violation of § 3(4) of the Competition Act?
***************************************************************************

***************************************************************************
ISSUE 2: Whether the formation of the Consortium and the price floor resulted in the violation
of §3(3)(a) and § 3(3)(b) of the Act, and caused Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition,
and whether the Manufacturers were liable to be penalised?
***************************************************************************

***************************************************************************
ISSUE 3: Whether the evidence retrieved from the seized devices is admissible and proper?
***************************************************************************

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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ISSUE 1: WHETHER THERE EXISTED AN ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE MANUFACTURERS?
The requirement of the Manufacturers to employ the services of only SunTech certified
installers and the rejection of SunShare’s proposal of overseeing installations via its own
training program and providing third party warranty-servicing, do not constitute an anti-
competitive agreement in contraventions of § 3(4) of the CA, 2002.
The Manufacturers’ refusal to deal was commercially justified and did not constitute
cartelization in any manner. The concept of competition needs to be understood in a
commercial sense. Solar panels are complex integrated products the dependency of which lies
on the likes of module quality & installation precision. In the case of Radiant, the mounted
panels at incorrect tilt-angles had caused immense damage.
The requirement for certified installers is a reasonable vertical restraint to ensure the
product’s efficiency. The prior incident that had occurred with Radiant has been a lesson
where non-certified installation led to a massive loss of money as well as reputation while
also posing a threat to its future tender eligibility.
SunShare’s downstream model poses risks pertaining to quality of service that could damage
the reputation of the entire PV industry. SunTech certified installation requirement is
therefore in no way forming an AAEC.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE FORMATION OF THE CONSORTIUM AND THE

PRICE FLOOR RESULTED IN THE VIOLATION OF §3(3)(a) & §3(3)(b) OF THE
ACT?
The PV- innovation consortium and the temporary price floor were pro-competitive
collaborations that were formed with the primary aim of promoting innovation and mitigating
the risk of R&D. It was in no way a form of cartelization. According to the provisions of
§3(5) of the CA, 2002, the firms may collaborate to improve production and develop new
technology.
The creation of price floor was not an illegal cartel formation but was rather a protective
measure. The existence of the ‘one year only’ clause substantiates this point. The price-floor
arrangement was more like an investment recovery measure for the firm in order to birth a
revolutionary product and create its own niche.
There was no AAEC instead a surge in the demand & supply of the PV-modules which is a
sign of pro-active growth in the market.

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The technology introduced is one of its kind, aiming at 44% efficiency. Ironically, the
informant tried to procure those very modules instead of entering other PV module markets.
The claim of anti-competition is invalid as there did not exist any market of 44% efficient
modules prior to this one. The minimum price-floor was simply a costing policy for one year.
The core objective of the CA is to foster consumer welfare and drive innovation especially
within emerging sectors. Penalizing the manufacturers for their necessary collaboration on an
ultra-efficient module would directly contravene this spirit thereby setting a negative
precedent for future players.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE EVIDENCE RETRIEVED FROM THE SEIZED

DEVICES IS ADMISSIBLE AND PROPER?
The evidence retrieved from the seized devices is inadmissible and improper due to the
procedural lapses in the chain of custody as well as forensic procedures resulting in a
compromised situation with respect to the integrity of data.
The transport of the seized devices from the raid-sites to the digital evidence vault – a 6-hour
long journey—without any GPS-tracking system or log of interim stops hint at
irresponsibility and lack of integrity on behalf of the DG.
While in-transit, a junior officer had opened the evidence box to verify the packing integrity.
This crucial incident was not recorded in the chain of custody form which raises serious
questions as to the integrity of the data.
Furthermore, two crucial devices had initially failed the hash verifications done through MD5
and SHA256 hash values, both being the current market standard in the field of forensic
imaging. The team did not preserve the partial image files from these failed attempts. The
preservation of original evidence is a mandate, failing which raises questions on the integrity
& admissibility of the same.
The DG then went on to rely on screenshots of the indexed emails instead of using the
metadata exports of the source file, the latter being of paramount importance than the former.
Screenshots strip away certain metadata from the source which again raises questions on the
reliability of the data.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
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ISSUE 1: Whether there existed an anti-competitive agreement between the

Manufacturers with respect to the installation of solar PVs only by SunTech certified
installers, leading to a violation of § 3(4) of the Competition Act?

1.1.That there was no existence of an anti-competitive agreement.

1.1.1. SunBright, Radiant, and Helio Tech (collectively referred to as ‘Manufacturers’)

are enterprises as they are engaged in the activity of production, distribution,
supply and control of goods i.e. PV- module. 1 They are the players of upstream
market of solar energy value chain engaged with SunTech Installations Pvt. Ltd.
(SunTech), entrusted with certifying installers, supervising complex module
installations, and administering warranties 2 i.e. downstream market player
which entails them to constitute a Vertical Agreement.

1.1.2. Vertical agreements are agreements between enterprises that are at different
stages or levels of production chain and therefore are in the different markets.3

1.1.3. Under § 3(4) of Competition Act of 2002, vertical agreement is defined as

follows- ‘Any agreement amongst enterprises or persons at different stages or
levels of the production chain in different markets, in respect of production,
supply, distribution, storage, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of
services, including-(a) tie-in arrangement;(b) exclusive supply agreement;(c)
exclusive distribution agreement;(d) refusal to deal;(e) resale price
maintenance, shall be an agreement in contravention of sub-section (1) if such
agreement causes or is likely to cause an AAEC in India.

1.1.4. Based on the reading of the section, vertical agreements are only void if they
cause Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (herein referred to as
‘AAEC’) in India.4 To determine the AAEC we have to refer to §19(3) of
Competition Act of 2002.

1
Moot Proposition, pg. 2 ¶ 4
2
Moot Proposition, pg. 2 ¶ 4
3
ABIR ROY & JAYANT KUMAR, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA,125, (Eastern Law House 2014).
4
128 ABIR ROY & JAYANT KUMAR, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA ,128 , (Eastern Law House
2014).

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1.1.5. Vertical agreements relating to activities referred to under § 3(4) of the

Competition Act, 2002 on the other hand have to be analysed in accordance with
the rule of reason analysis under the Competition Act, 2002.5

1.1.6. ‘Rule of Reason’ where the agreement is not presumed per se illegal but is
assessed in its legal and economic perspective to determine whether the
agreement in question poses any real threat to competitive forces. Vertical
agreements can have pro-competitive effects also (Vertical Agreements, §3(4)).6

1.1.7. In the case of Eros International7 the Commission relied on the Rule of reason
enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Mahindra & Mahindra
Ltd v UOI8 which laid out: “It will thus be seen that the ‘rule of reason’
normally requires an ascertainment of the facts or features peculiar to the
particular business; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable; the history of the
restraint and the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
restraint and the purpose or end sought to be attained “and it is only on a
consideration of these factors that it can be decided whether a particular act,
contract or agreement, imposing the restraint is unduly restrictive of
competition so as to constitute restraint of trade”.9

1.1.8. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in TELCO v Registrar of Restrictive Trade

10
Agreements had also held that the question of competition cannot be
considered in vacuum or in a doctrinaire spirit. The concept of competition is to
be understood in a commercial sense. It needs to be established, whether such
an agreement has an AAEC, regarding all or any of the factors stated in section
19(3) of the Competition Act, 2002.11

1.1.9. De novo, my learned informant’s counsel states that there is blend of Tie-in
Arrangement, Exclusive Supply Agreement and Refusal to deal agreement
between Manufactures and Suntech Installations Pvt. Ltd. If we adhere with
doctrine of Rule of reason in our case, we can fairly conclude the following
inferences: Solar panel systems are complex integrated products whose
performance depends on both module quality and installation precision. Unlike,
mounted panels at incorrect tilt angles, causing water pooling and accelerated
cell microcracks in case of Radient’s project.12

5
SM DUGAR, Guide to Competition law, Chapter 2, Vol-1,260, LexisNexis,7th Edition,2019
6
SM DUGAR, Guide to Competition law, Chapter 2, Vol-1,247, LexisNexis,7th Edition,2019
7
Eros International Media Ltd v Central Circuit Cine Association, Indore, Film Distributors Association,
Kerala, Northern India Motion Pictures Association and Motion Pictures Association AND Sunshine
Pictures Put Ltd v Motion Pictures Association, 2012 Comp LR 20 (CCI).
8
AIR 1979 SC 798
9
SM DUGAR, Guide to Competition law, Chapter 2, Vol-1,250, LexisNexis,7th Edition,2019
10
AIR 1977 SC 973
11
SM DUGAR, Guide to Competition law, Chapter 2, Vol-1,250, LexisNexis,7th Edition,2019
12
Moot Proposition, pg. 2 ¶ 5

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1.1.10. The role of a solar panel installation technician is listed as follows-

 Assessment of installation site, get in-depth knowledge of installation pre-
requisites, gather materials required for installation, Installation and
mounting of solar panels at customer’s premises, Secure the solar energy
system post installation to ensure effective functioning, ensure effective
functioning of the system post-installation, Deliver quality work as per
standards despite constraints.13
 According to Global Solar Report: 2025 Edition by Raptor Map 14-The
average solar facility experienced $5,720 per MW of annual revenue
loss from equipment-driven underperformance in 2024, representing a 15%
increase from 2023 and 214% increase over five years. When extrapolated
globally, this indicates $10.0 billion in potential annual revenue
loss industry-wide.

1.1.11. Condition Before and After the Restraint Was Imposed

Before bundling: - Independent installers operated under varied training
standards, leading to frequent installation-related failures and warranty claims
that manufacturers could not properly diagnose or control, which caused
strained finances and led to a substantial decline in goodwill in case of Radient’s
Project.15
After bundling: - Manufacturer-certified installers implement standardized
processes, reducing failure rates and ensuring panel longevity. This can be
substantiated by growth in following parameters- 1) Rising Demand for 44%
Efficient PV Modules16, 2) Monthly Generation Gain & Coal Displacement 17,3)
Monthly Bill Savings per Household after Switching to 44% efficient
Modules18,4) Monthly Reduction in Rural Load-Shedding19.

1.1.12. Nature of the Restraint and Its Actual or Probable Effects-

Restraint- Warranty will be not given if installation is done by independent
installer other than SunTech certified technicians.
Actual or Probable Effects- Enhanced consumer confidence, improved system
reliability and doubled monthly solar generation and displaced twice as much
coal, which resulted in reduced cost of electricity for consumers, and improved

13
ESSCI Solar panel installation Participant Handbook, Chapter 3 , 88, First Edition, 2022
14
Raptor Maps, Global Solar Report: 2025,8,
https://pages.raptormaps.com/hubfs/Marketing%20Content%20for%20Website/2025%20Raptor%20
Maps%20Global%20Solar%20Report%20
15
Moot Proposition, pg. 2 ¶ 5
16
Moot Clarification, pg. 5 ¶ Annexure E
17
Moot Clarification, pg. 6 ¶ Annexure F
18
Moot Clarification, pg. 3 ¶ Annexure G
19
Moot Clarification, pg. 4 ¶ Annexure H

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supply of electricity with drastically reduced load-shedding. It also resulted in

increased demand for electricity. 20

1.1.13. History of the Restraint and the Evil Believed to Exist-

Radiant’s historical experience (water pooling, microcracks) demonstrates
the “evil” of installation defects masquerading as manufacturing faults,
resulting in escalating warranty costs and customer dissatisfaction.
Objective of restraint is to allocate risk appropriately and maintain brand
reputation by ensuring only qualified installers perform technically demanding
work.
Purpose or End Sought to Be Attained-
o Protect consumers from improper installation.
o Safeguard manufacturers against unfounded warranty claims
o Promote overall market growth through reliable, high-quality solar
deployments.
o Promulgation of National Renewable Energy Roadmap 2025–2035 of
Indicana, setting forth a bold objective: by 2030, at least fifty percent of
domestic electricity must derive from renewable sources.21

1.1.14. In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that Manufactures

agreement with SunTech Installations Pvt. Ltd. is not causing an AAEC under
§3(4) of Competition Act of 2002 instead of that it aligned with the provisions
of §19(3)(e), §19(3)(d), §19(f) i.e. accrual of benefits to consumers,
improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision of services,
promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of
production or distribution of goods or provision of services.
 Without prejudice to the preceding submissions, it is further submitted
that the allegations regarding exclusive supply agreement & refusal to
deal is a preventive measure to the following problems as mentioned in
Para 106 of the “EC Vertical Guidelines” recognises the positive effects
of vertical restraints.22 To solve a “free-rider” problem

 The “specific hold-up problem that may arise in the case of transfer of
substantial know- how”. Decoupling of warranty servicing and
maintenance is equivalent to technological transfer to third party which
is amounts to giving up the IP rights to other party.
 “Uniformity and quality standardisation”. A vertical restraint may help
to create a brand image by imposing a certain measure of uniformity and
quality standardisation on the distributors, thereby increasing the

20
Moot Proposition, pg. 5¶ 18
21
Moot Proposition, pg. 1¶ 3
22
SM DUGAR, Guide to Competition law, Chapter 2, Vol-1,251, LexisNexis,7th Edition,2019

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attractiveness of the product to the final consumer and increasing its

sales.

1.1.15. In view of the facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, it is submitted

that in light of the informant’s failure to establish the essential ingredients of
the offence, I respectfully submit that the accused deserves to be acquitted of all
charges.

ISSUE 2: Whether the formation of the Consortium and the price floor resulted in the
violation of § 3(3)(a) and § 3(3)(b) of the Act, and caused AAEC, and whether the
Manufacturers were liable to be penalised?

2.1. Pro-Competitive Policy

2.1.1. The Manufactures have created a lawful joint venture aimed at innovation and
efficiency, not an illegal cartel. § 3(5) of the CA, 2002 states that firms may
collaborate to improve production and develop new technology. Courts and CCI
recognise this as an agreement amongst competitors that enhances efficiency and
are not per se illegal. The Commission in its compliance guidelines states that joint
ventures which “increase efficiency in the production, supply, distribution… of
goods are not prohibited.” The Consortium qualifies under this principle as it was
created to curtail the enormous R&D cost and create a super-efficient PV module.
This was done in the public interest of Indicana due to the deficiency of coal
reserves.

2.1.2. The price floor condition was not a method to form a cartel but rather a protective
measure for a revolutionary product to be introduced. If such conditions were not
implemented then the firms would never have invested Rs 1000 crore which
resulted in the development of a game changing module. The sole objective of the
Consortium was to create a technology development pool to achieve efficient
module development. Such goals are allowed under § 3(3)b of the CA, 2002. The
agreement had a built-in termination as well which is proved by the ‘one year only’
clause. Therefore, this was not a market capturing tactic but more like an investment
recovery measure for firms. On its expiry every firm had its own autonomy to sell
modules at any rate.

2.1.3. Within weeks of launch the monthly solar generation doubled as proved by
Annexure E and F. Coal usage dropped and consumer electricity cost also reduced.

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These are direct result of the Consortium which must be considered while analysing
AAEC. §19(3)f of the Act states that the Commission has to consider any
“promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of
production or distribution of goods or provision of services while determining
AAEC.” To sum it up, there is no appreciable harm to competition and instead a
surge in demand and supply of solar energy which is a sign of pro-active
competition.

2.2. Absence of Consumer Harm

2.2.1. The Informant has tried to enter specifically into a patented technology which was
developed by the consortium. The Informant was completely free to enter into
existing PV module markets. Consumers always had the choice to not go for the 44%
efficient module or any alternatives. The Consortium is only interested with its own
in-house developed 44% efficient module. The “relevant market” which needs to be
determined by the Commission as per §19 of the Act is not even created but rather is
an emerging one. The claim of anti-competition is invalid as there is no market of
44% efficient module before its creation. An emerging market which is yet to evolve
and grow consisting of a single product can never hinder competition and is not the
entire solar module market which has not been affected at all. The minimum price
floor was a simple costing policy for one year. On the contrary an investment pool for
a single product expands the relevant market and opens avenues for growth. Other
firms are free to innovate their own modules to enter into the market.

2.2.2. The actual impact on market structure is very important in this regard. The supply of
solar panels has exploded and consumers have cheap options to purchase the modules.
There is no evidence provided by Informant of reduced output or high prices for
consumers. The above metrics are extracted from the given annexures. The data
proves that the Consortium has reached a 100% efficiency gain from a 22% old
module to 44% module. Within 6 months the order quantity reached 120,000 which
generated 90,000 Mwh additional power. This increase in clean energy is in
consideration with Indicana’s own energy goals. The increased energy reliability is
seen from the household savings and reduction in blackout which proves that the net
result of the Consortium was in fact pro-competitive. In CCI v. Co-Ordination
Committee of Artists, 23 the Supreme Court has also emphasized that the economic
and market impact must also be assessed while determining AAEC.

2.2.3. The Indian Business Law Journal writes that, “The CCI held that the parties must
prove the pro-competitive effects of the agreement or conduct, relying on factors
under § 19(3)(d) to § 19(3)(f)) to show that the conduct is not anti-competitive. These
decisions indicate a stricter approach towards cartelization and a narrowing of the
factor’s parties may use to rebut the presumption of AAEC.”

23
CCI v. Co-ordination Committee of Artists, AIR 2017 SC 1449

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2.2.4. The spirit of the Competition Act is to promote welfare and innovation in emerging
sectors. Punishing the manufacturers for a collaboration on a super-efficient module
would send the wrong message to future investors. Indicana has its own energy policy
of replacing 50% of all energy with renewable sources by 2030. The Consortium took
a step towards such goals.

2.2.5. Therefore, the Informants claim that the Consortium has violated § 3(3)(a) and
§3(3)(b) of the Act, and caused AAEC is invalid and should be rejected.

ISSUE 3: Whether the evidence retrieved from the seized devices is admissible and
proper?
It is respectfully submitted that evidence that has been retrieved from the seized devices are
inadmissible and improper. There was a flaw in the chain of custody with respect to the
dawn-raid conducted by the DG. Furthermore, the forensic procedures that followed were
faulty.

3.1. That the chain of custody was flawed and the integrity of seized devices have been
compromised.

3.1.1. In light of § 41 (8) of the Competition Act, 2002 24, DG in course of time has
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that information, books, papers, other documents that have
been ordered, filed, secreted can compel the DG to make an application to the CMM for an
order to seizure.
The Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer25 states that the
expression ‘reason to believe’ postulates the existence of the belief and the reasons but not
the sufficiency of such reasons will yet be justiciable. 26
The expression ‘reason to believe’ necessitates the presence of both the belief and its
underlying reasons. While the sufficiency of these reasons is not required, their justiciability
remains.

3.1.2. Prior to the commencement of the investigation, the Officer-in-charge of the Dawn
Raid shall call upon two or more witnesses, mandatorily independent in nature to attend and
witness the search as per §103(4) of BNSS.The following two provisos (i.e. §103(5) and
§103(6)) state that the search should be conducted in the presence of these witnesses. The two

24
Vasant Rajasekaran & Harshvardhan Korada, Strategic Insights into Dawn Raids: A crucial tool in India’s
Anti-trust Arsenal, LIVE LAW, August 31, 2023, available at https://www.livelaw.in/amp/law-firms/law-firm-
articles-/competition-commission-of-india-director-general-code-of-civil-procedure-competition-act-trinity-
chambers-236616, (Last visited on September 14, 2025)
25
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer (1961) 41 ITR 191 (S.C) ¶ 10 (as per Avory, J.)
26
Anindita Deb, At the Crack of Dawn: An Analysis of Dawn Raids in India, BRILLOPEDIA, July 14, 2022,
https://www.brillopedia.net/post/at-the-crack-of-dawn-an-analysis-of-dawn-raids-in-india, (Last visited on
September 14, 2022)

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independent witnesses are required to sign the list of documents seized along with the places
they’ve been found in, the said list having been prepared by the OIC27. It is humbly submitted
that during the dawn- raid no such witnesses were present in either of the offices of
SunBright, Radiant or HelioTech. This accounts for a flawed chain of custody.

3.1.3. ‘Chain of Custody’ is a legal term which refers to chronological sequence in which the
items of evidence are to be handled for the successful investigation of a case. It is essential to
prove in the Court that the evidence is handled through the correct chain of custody. Any
flaw in the chain leads to inadmissibility of the evidence in the Court.28 In the case of
Mukesh & Ors v. State (NCT of Delhi) 29 , the SC held that a DNA Sample is admissible in
the Court only when it is proved that there is no error in sampling and the sample is not
tampered. Similarly, in the famous case of The People of the State of California v.
Orenthal James Simpson, (popularly known as the O.J. Simpson’s case) 30 in the 1990s,
there was improper handling of evidence by the LAPD. There were concerns of several
police errors along with evidence tampering and mishandling of the same resulting in a
broken chain of custody. This played a major role in the acquittal of the accused. 31

3.1.4. ¶ It is respectfully submitted that apart from the absence of independent witnesses
during the raid there have also been procedural errors and evidence tampering of the seized
articles. There was neither any GPS tracking done while the seized articles were in transit nor
were there any log of interim stops recorded. Furthermore, the evidence box was opened by a
junior officer at the vault. Even though there was no ill-intention involved yet it defeats the
entire purpose of a tamper-evident bag which is to provide an unbroken seal from the point of
seizure to the point of analysis. To top it all, none of these lapses were mentioned in the
chain-of-custody form. 32 This signals to a brutal compromise on the integrity of the same.
The six-hour journey creates a significant gap in the chain of custody thereby posing a threat
to the security and integrity of these devices/articles.

3.1.5. §65(B) of the IEA lays down certain conditions that render digital evidence admissible.
In the case of State v. Mohd. Afzal & Ors,33 the Delhi High Court ruled that computer
generated electronic records are considered as evidence only if it follows the provisions of the
aforementioned section.
In the case of Arjun Pandit Rao v. Kailash Kushanrao 34, the Supreme Court ruled that
digital evidence can only be rendered admissible in the Court if it is in accordance with the
provisions laid down in §65B of IEA.
In the case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer35, it was held that a written and signed certificate
is mandatory for the admissibility of digital evidence. The authenticity and admissibility of
such evidence is of utmost importance with regards to the admissibility of the same.

27
Aditya Bhardwaj & Rinki Singh, Dawn Raids under Indian Competition Law, 3 (2024)
28
Priyal Jain, Chain of Custody, IBLOGPLEADERS, June 25, 2022, available at https://blog.ipleaders.in/chain-
of-custody/#Procedure_to_establish_chain_of_custody last visited on September 14, 2025
29
Mukesh & ORS v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2017 SC 2161 ¶ 12 (as per Dipak Mishra, J.)

30
People v. Simpson, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 3382
31
Simplyforensic, The O.J. Simpson Trial: Forensic Investigation, Controversies and Legal Impact,
SIMPLYFORENSIC, October 19, 2024, available at https://simplyforensic.com/the-oj-simpson-trial-forensic-
investigation-controversies-and-legal-impact/# last visited on September 14, 2025
32
Moot Proposition pg. 4
33
State v. Mohd. Afzal & Ors, 2003 VIIAD (DELHI)1 ¶ 272 (as per Pradeep Nandrajog, J.)
34
Arjun Pandit Rao v. Kailash Kushan Rao, AIR 2020 SC 4908 ¶ 24 (as per R.F. Nariman, J.)
35
Anwar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, AIR 2015 SC 180 ¶ 14 (as per Kurian, J.)

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3.2. That the Digital Forensic process failed to comply with established standards

3.2.1. An FTK Imager is a tool for creating disk images which helps to preview data and for
imaging. The reasons why an FTK Imager is necessary for forensic investigations are as
follows:
a. The FTK Imager ensures authenticity of the original data by taking bit-by-bit copy of
a storage device.
b. The images integrity is verified by matching with its corresponding hashing
algorithms. This makes the evidence admissible in Court.
c. It is compatible with a wide variety of file formats.
d. Involves other functions such as file analysis, metadata extraction and keyword
searches, in addition to imaging. 36
There are certain hashing algorithms like MD5, SHA1, SHA256, etc that are used in the
process of image creation. In the present case, the hash values used were MD5 along with
SHA256.

3.2.2. A hash value is a unique, fixed-length string of numbers and letters that is generated
through a hashing algorithm. These hash values play a significant role in forensic
investigations which mostly entail ensuring integrity of digital evidence, maintaining a chain
of custody, Court-authentication, detecting evidence tampering, etc. Of these, the most
important role that directly concerns this case is ‘maintaining the chain of custody’. Chain of
custody follows the entire process of seizure of the digital evidence to its presentation in the
courtroom. It is through the hash values obtained from these seized devices that forensic
experts can detect whether the evidence has been tampered with. 37 It is humbly submitted
before the Honorable Court that Jake Peralta’s desktop and Amy Santiago’s laptop initially
failed the SHA256 hash verification38. According to Forensic Law, any alteration in the data
of digital evidence so seized changes the hash values. 39 It can thus be inferred that there was
evidence-tampering resulting in a broken chain of custody.
The SHA256 is the current industry standard in digital forensics, popularly relied on by the
Courts and also more secure than the MD5 and SHA1 hash values.

3.2.3. May it please the Court, it is humbly submitted that post the occurrence of the hash
mismatch when imaging Jake Peralta’s desktop and Amy Santiago’s laptop, the forensic team
conducted a re-imaging of the same and ‘corrected’ hash matches were obtained. However,
the team did not preserve the original hashes and the partial image files from those failed
attempts which hint towards tampering of evidence while also undermining the integrity of
the ‘corrected’ hash verification.

36
Pawan Panwar, What is FTK Imager? A Cyber Forensics Tool in 2025, CRAW ACADEMY, September, 29,
2024, available at https://www.crawsec.com/ftk-
imager/#:~:text=A%20forensic%20software%20program%20called%20FTK%20Imager%20is,recover%20delet
ed%20files%20without%20changing%20the%20original%20data. (Last visited on October 12, 2025)
37
Ayushi Agrawal, The Role of Hash Values in Digital Evidence Integrity, HAWK EYE FORENSIC,
September 26, 2025, available at https://hawkeyeforensic.com/the-role-of-hash-values-in-digital-evidence-
integrity/ (Last visited on October 12, 2025)
38
Moot Proposition, pg 4
39
Apurva Neel, Digital Evidence: Correction, Preservation and Forensic Analysis, October 29, 2024, available
at https://www.legalbites.in/forensic-law/digital-evidence-collection-preservation-and-forensic-analysis-
1074008 (Last visited on October 12, 2025)

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3.3. That the reliance on screenshots is inadmissible and improper.

3.3.1. Metadata is referred to as ‘data that provides information about other data.’ It
generally includes information such as:
 date and time of creation,
 author or creator,
 file format and size,
 camera settings (for images),
 GPS location (for images),
 edit history,
 copyright information
Such metadata is crucial for forensic analysis and is generally stored in
various file types and formats. Metadata is either stored in the file’s
properties or within the file itself. 40

3.3.2. There are several types of metadata that are essential for forensic analysis such
as
a) File Metadata
b) Device Metadata
c)Network Metadata
d)User Metadata. 41
In order to get the best use of metadata in forensic analysis it is a mandate to
be able to handle and preserve the metadata efficiently. This forms the core of
the same. Certain guidelines to handle and preserve the metadata includes:
 Ensuring the metadata is collected in a forensically sound manner,
 Using tools and software that are reliable forensically
 Documenting all the steps of collection and analysis of the metadata.

3.3.3. According to §65B of the IEA, which governs the admissibility of digital
evidence, it has been stated that the Courts require a certificate ratifying the
integrity and origin of the digital evidence. It has been held that metadata, if
certified properly, proves to be of paramount importance in terms of
admissibility and the same establishes authenticity and maintains a chain of
custody.42 The requirement of a proper certificate for the purpose of
admissibility of such evidence has been held in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v.
Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal43.
3.3.4. Secondary evidence serves to be useful only in the absence of primary
evidence. It refers to a proof of fact which is not the original item but is a
substitute for the original. It can be referred to a reproduction and not the item
itself. §65 of the IEA explicitly states that a secondary evidence can be
produced only if the primary evidence is absent or unavailable.

40
Ronald Stark, The Metadata Mystery: Does screenshotting really remove metadata? SMALLUSEFULTIPS,
May 26, 2025, available at The Metadata Mystery: Does Screenshotting Really Remove Metadata? -
SmallUsefulTips (Last visited on October 14, 2025)
41
Sarah Lee, Metadata in Forensic Analysis, June 10, 2025, available at Metadata in Forensic Analysis
(Last visited on October 14, 2025)
42
LexVerge, Metadata’s Legal Power: Changing how Courts see Digital Evidence, July 25, 2025, also
available at Metadata’s Legal Power: Changing How Courts See Digital Evidence - LexVerge (Last Visited on
October 14, 2025)
43
(2014) 10 SCC 473

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3.3.5. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Commission that in the present case
despite the option of relying on metadata exports of the indexed emails (which
here is the primary evidence), the DG relied on screenshots of those emails.
What happens when a screenshot is obtained is that it strips away some
metadata from the source thereby vitiating the authenticity of the evidence. It
may be submitted that the DG has failed to adhere to the best forensic
practices which has mitigated the reliability of such evidence and has been
open to fabrication.
3.3.6. Screenshots are highly susceptible to challenge on the grounds of integrity of
data. The CCI cannot reliably ratify the accuracy of the same rendering such
evidence inadmissible and improper in Court.

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PRAYER

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IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE PRECEDING

ARGUMENTS, THE RESPONDENTS MOST HUMBLY PRAY THAT THIS
HON’BLE COMMISSION MAY BE PLEASED TO:
1. Hold that the agreement with respect to Solar PVs only by SunTech-
certified installers is not in contravention to §3(4) of the CA, 2002 as it
is justified on the basis of maintaining high quality controls and
ensuring warranty servicing.

2. Hold that the Manufacturers’ actions do not amount to an abuse of

dominant position under § 4(2)(c) of CA, 2002 by restricting market
access in the downstream installation.

3. Dismiss the allegations of formation of a consortium and causing

AAEC, thereby relieving them of all charges brought against them by
the informant.

4. Declare that the evidence retrieved from the seized devices is

inadmissible and improper and that there have been procedural lapses
along with a broken chain of custody resulting in vitiating the integrity
of the evidence.

5. Hold that the screenshots of emails as secondary evidence is

inadmissible under §65B(4) of the IEA.

6. Grant any other relief that the Hon’ble Commission may deem fit in the
interests of justice.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF FAIRNESS, THE RESPONDENTS SHALL REMAIN

EVER GRATEFUL.

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