5.

Legal text as literature for analytical study

1. Balaji raghvan v. Union of India [ AIR 1996 SC 770]

Q1 Discuss the facts & application of laws in Balaji raghvan v.Union of India -
15m
2.Analyse Balaji raghvan v. Union of India with reference to the arguments
mentioned in it - 15m

In a the case of Balaji raghvan/ s.p. Anand v. Union of India, a five - judge Bench
of the Supreme Court comprising the then chief Justice of indict A. M. Ahmadi,
Justice kuldip Singh, Justice B.p. Jeevan reddy, Justice N. P.
Singh & Justice S. Saghir Ahmed litigated the
Constitutionality of National awards like Bharat Ratna,
. Padma Vibhushan & Padma shri in response to petitions
Filed against their constitutional legitimacy. This
Judgment was delivered by Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi for
Himself & on behalf of Justice b.p.jeevan reddy, Justice
N.p. Singh & Justice s. Saghir Ahmed

Factual Matrix
In the present case, two writ petitions were filed by Balaji Raghavan (Petitioner 1)
in the Kerala High Court and S.P. Anand (Petitioner 2) in the Madhya Pradesh
High Court (Indore Bench) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. These
petitions sought, by way of mandamus, to prevent the Union of India (Respondent)
from conferring any individual with the National Awards. Interestingly, it was the
Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) that, through an ex-parte order, issued
notice to the Union of India and restrained it from conferring any National Award
on any individual or individuals. When the matter was tabled before a Division
Bench of the Supreme Court, the Bench directed the matter to be placed before a
Bench presided by the then Chief Justice of India. Hence, these petitions clubbed
together were taken up by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
The National Awards were introduced in 1954 by two Presidential Notifications.
These were in the form of medals namely Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma
Bhushan and Padma Shri. The names of the Padma awards are announced every
year on the eve of Republic Day. They seek to recognise achievement in all fields
of activities or disciplines where an element of public service is involved.
According to the Padma Awards portal maintained by the Union Home Ministry,
any citizen of India irrespective of race, occupation, position or sex is eligible for
these awards. But government servants, including those working with PSUs, are
not eligible for these awards although an exception has been made for doctors and
scientists. Awardees can be chosen from
Any field like arts, social work, public affairs, science and engineering, trade and
industry, medicine, literature and sport, etc. The Government tarted that the said
civilian awards shall not be used as suffixes or prefixes to the name of awardees so
as to give them the appearance of titles. However, it was noticed that the awards
were misused by the awardees by using the awards as titles qualifying their names.
It is pertinent to mention here that back in 1969 and 1970, the late Acharya J.B.
Kriplani, a Member of the then Lok Sabha, had endeavored to move a nonofficial
bill titled "The Conferment of Decoration on Persons (Abolition) Bill, 1969" in the
Parliament that sought to abolish titles on the premise that although Article 18
abolishes titles, they were brought in by the backdoor in the form of decorations. It
was also reasoned that these decorations were not awarded according to merit and
the Government was not the best judge of the merit or eminence that a person
holds. However, the Bill failed to sail through and was never passed by the
Parliament.
Issues in a similar alignment were raised in this case. Firstly, the Court dealt with
the question "Whether the Awards, Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, and Padma
Shri (National Awards) are 'Titles' within the meaning of Article 18(1) of
Constitution of India. Secondly, the Court was to also determine whether
conferment of National Awards violates the mandate of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India that guarantees equality of status to every person.
As mentioned above, in the present case, the petitioners challenged the
constitutional validity of National Awards and requested the Court to prevent the
Government of India from conferring these Awards. It was contended that the
National Awards are titles within the meaning of Article 18 of the Indian
Constitution. It was also argued that these awards are being grossly misused and
the purpose for which they were instituted has been diluted and they are granted to
persons who are undeserving of them.

Application of laws-
Article 18 of the Constitution of India reads as,
"Abolition of titles
1. No title, not being a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred
by the State
2. No citizen of India shall accept any title from any foreign State.
3. No person who is not a citizen of India shall, while he holds any office of
profit or trust under the State, accept without the consent of the President any title
from any foreign State.
4. No person holding any office of profit or trust under the State shall
without the consent of the President, accept any present, emolument, a office of
any kind from or under any foreign State."

Interpretation and Objective of Article 18:

In lucid terms, Article 18 provides for abolition of files, except military or
academic distinctions. This exemption ensures that persons in the military and
academic fields are incentivised to work towards perfection he their respective
fields so as to further strengthen the country's military service and enhance
scientific academia. It further provides that no citizen shall accept any title from
any foreign state. Additionally, it also prohibits a foreigner, holding any office of
profit under the name of the State from accepting any title from a foreign State
without the President's consent nor does it allow the acceptance of any gift,
emolument, title, or office of any kind from any foreign State by any person
holding an office of profit under the State without the President's consent. This
fundamentally, and rather strategically, ensures the loyalty of a person working
under the banner of the State to the Government he tentatively serves and closes
the doors for any form of foreign influence in the Government affairs or
management. Article 18 forms one of the many prongs of the right to equality. Its
application heralds the principle of democratic equality and promotes the equality
of status as intended in the Preamble to the Constitution of India. Last, but not the
least, it seeks to prevent the power to confer titles from being abused or misused.

Arguments advanced by the Petitioner :

1. While Article 18(1) prohibits the conferment of 'titles' by the State with
the exception of military and academic distinctions, it does not define the words
"titles" and "distinction".
 2. According to him, the framers of the Constitution had intended not to
follow the British of conferring titles upon Indian citizens who indulged in
sycophancy.
3. The practice was frowned upon by people of pre-independent India &
hence such a practice was proposed to be prohibited in Independent India through
this provision.
4. Viewed against this background the word 'title should be given the widest
possible meaning and amplitude in order to give effect to the legislative intent.
Since the only exception to this rule has been carved out in respect of military and
academic distinctions, it follows that all
other distinctions are impliedly prohibited.
5. The dictionary meaning of the word 'title' is wide enough to encompass all other
similar concepts.
6. The National Awards make a distinction according to rank, they are divided into
superior and inferior classes and the holders of the Bharat Ratna have been
assigned the 9th place in the Warrant of Precedence ( which indicated the rank of
different dignitaries and high officials of the state)
7. Hence their conferment is violative of Article 14, read with the Preamble to the
Constitution which guarantees equality of status to every citizen.
8. Several recipients were following the practice of appending these awards to their
names, (as suffixes and prefixes) using them as titles in their letter-heads,
publications, and at public functions. This practice continued unabated despite the
fact that the Government had issued a Press Note in 1968 prohibiting such conduct.
9. No objective guidelines were provided for the selection of recipients.
10. Awards had degenerated to rewards to those who serve the political ends of the
incumbent governments.
11. All these factors have resulted in the creation of a rank of persons on the basis
of recognition by the State, in the same manner as was achieved by the conferment
of nobility during the British rule.

Arguments advanced by the Respondent:

1. Ordinary meaning of "title" is honour, rank, function or office in which
there is a distinctive appellation ( name, title by which a person is called or known)
2. Article 18(1) seeks to interdict titles of nobility such as 'Maharaja','Nawab'
etc.
 3. National Awards do not confer titles of nobility, cannot be prefixed or
suffixed, hence not prohibited by Article 18(1)
4. The words "not being a military or academic distinction" in Article 18
have been used ex abundanti cautela. (abundant caution). Since military and
academic distinctions, such as, General, Colonel Professor, etc. do carry suffixes or
prefixes, the framers of the Constitution, by way of abundant caution, expressly
mentioned that they would be exempted.
5. Distinctions that do not carry suffixes or prefixes will not be affected o the
interdiction in Article 18(1). The relevant parts of the discussion; in the Constituent
Assembly that led to the framing of Article 18(1) also support the aforesaid stance.

6. Almost every counting, including those those with republican and socialist
constitutions, follows the practice of conferring awards for meritorious service
rendered by its citizens.

Arguments Advanced by Amicus Curiae, Mr. Santosh Hegde:

. He began by stating that the fact that a writ petition of this sort had been initiated
showed that these awards were being misused.
1. It is clear that the Constitution does envisage a situation where
meritorious services rendered by individuals are to be recognised by the State,
through the conferment of awards. However, to avoid the criticism of creating a
separate class, it needs to be ensured that these awards are not used as prefixes or
suffixes.
2. He concurred with the learned Attorney General that the words, "military
or academic distinction" had been used by "way of abundant caution.”
3. The maximum number of awards that can be conferred should be
specified and ordinarily, public servants and civil servants should not be eligible
for these awards, unless there are extraordinary
reasons.

judgment of the Bench:

1. After analysing Assembly Debates, the Hon’ble Supreme Court agreed that the
constitution makers certainly had the intention to allow the State to award citizens
for their exemplary services in various fields. However, constitution-makers were
unanimous on the point that, these awards should not be used as tiles of nobility.
2. The Court observed that during British rule, power to confer titles was being
abused for imperialistic purposes and for corrupting public life.
3. In recent years, the conferment of these awards without any firm guidelines and
a fool-proof method of selection is bound to breed nepotism, favouritism,
patronage, and even corruption.
4. Thus, an extremely high standard should be prescribed for conferring these
awards and the total number of such awards should not exceed 50 every year. "The
exercise of such restraint is absolutely necessary to safeguard the importance of
these awards", said Justice Ahmadi.
5. To curb the misuse of this power, the court suggested that a high-level
committee may be appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the
President who will ensure that only deserving persons are bestowed with these
decorations.
6. Justice Kuldip Singh in his separate but concurring judgment suggested that the
committee may include the Speaker of Lok Sabha, the Chief Justice of India, and
the leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
7. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India disposed of both petitions challenging
the constitutional validity of the conferment of national awards and upheld the
constitutional validity of the same.

The Bench concluded that-

1. The National Awards are not violative of the principles of equality as
guaranteed by the provisions of the Constitution.
2. The theory of equality does not mandate that merit should not be
recognised. Article 51A(j) exhorts every citizen "to strive towards excellence in all
spheres of individual and collective activity, so that the nation constantly rises to
higher levels of endeavour and achievement."
3. It was, therefore, held that it was necessary that there should be a system
of awards and decorations to recognise excellence in the performance of these
duties.
4. The National Awards do not amount to "titles" within the meaning of.
Article 18(1) and they should not be used as suffixes or prefixes.
Subsequent to this decision, the Union Government appointed a 'High-Level
Review Committee chaired by the Vice-President, to go into the existing
guidelines and fix the criteria for the selection of persons for 'Padma Awards So
that it would enhance respect for these awards. This Committee suggested the
setting up of State-level Committees to forward recommendations to the Centre.
The recommended names were to be reviewed by the Centre, by a Committee
including the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary, and Secretary to the
President of India. Thereafter, the finalised names were to be submitted to the
Prime Minister's office and finally sent to the President. There are no guidelines for
'Bharat Ratna' awards.

Observations:
As pronounced by Justice Ahmadi: "An extremely high standard should be
prescribed for conferring these awards." This has been substantially proved that
these awards are conferred only on meritorious persons as the involvement of
ordinary citizens in the nomination process in the "Padma Awards" have not only
made the awards more transparent but also reflect the real choice of the masses.
This has made the Awards truly democratic in nature while ensuring that only the
best get nominated. People at the grassroots level, selfless people whose only focus
was their dedicated work for society have been recognized.
The inspiring stories of some winners - from the barefoot environmentalist
from Karnataka Tulasi Gowda and transgender folk artist Manjamma Jogati to
"elephant man" Dr. Kushal Konwar Sarma and orange seller and school
builder Harekala Hajabba - prove that the awards truly honour significant
achievements and have been conferred to people who have inspired the whole
country by their extraordinary accomplishments.

2. S Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996 SCC (4) 596)

Q.Analyse S Gopal Reddy v.State of Andhra Pradesh with reference to the

argumentative skills in it-15M
factual Matrix
(a) The marriage between V and Accused No 1 was being arranged. Accused no. 2
engaged in negotiations with the Complainant (a lawyer by profession) who was
the father of the bride.The demands made by the groom’ s family, inter alia,
included: (a) a house in Hyderabad, (b) Jewels, (c) cash and clothes worth Rs. 1
Lakh, and (d) cash amounting to Rs. 50,000/- for purchase of a car. This cash
demand was raised to Rs.1 Lakh later and Accused No. 2 insisted that it be paid
prior to the marriage. It was alleged that the Appellant, after consultation with
Accused No. 2, informed Prosecution Witness 1 ("PWl") that instead of Rs. 1
Lakh, he ought to pay Rs.50,000 in cash prior to marriage and Rs.25, 000 / - within
one year after the marriage.
(b) PWl claimed to have celebrated Varapuja at the house of Accused No. 2.
During the purported celebration, it was alleged that PWl handed over a document
purporting to settle a single-story house in the name of "V". Accused No.2 became
furious at this and stated that the house was supposed to be a "Double Storey"
building and not a single-storey building. this led to differences and the marriage
broke off. The groom's family returned all the articles and materials. -
(c) Complainant/PWl being aggrieved by the re-call/cancellation of the marriage
proposal, sent a letter to the Director of National Police Academy where Accused
No. 1 was undergoing training and filed a report with the concerned police station.
Both the brothers (Accused No. 1 and 2) were tried for offences under Sections
420 (Punishment for cheating) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Judgment of the Trial Court: The Ld. Trial Court convicted them and sentenced
them to undergo nine months of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees five
hundred each and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for four months for
the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and to rigorous
imprisonment for six months and a fine of rupees one thousand each and in default
simple imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.

( e)Appeal : The Ld. Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge held that

the accused persons had not committed any offence under Sections 420 of the
Indian Penal Code and acquitted the~ of the same. However, the Ld Sessions Judge
approved and confirmed the Trial Court's conviction under Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
(f) Revision before Hon'ble High Court: Both accused persons did not succeed in
the Revision Petition filed by them before the Hon'ble High Court. The Accused
No.2 independently challenged the said order passed in the Revisional jurisdiction
by the High Court before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave
Petition which came to be rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
(g) The instant Judgment has been passed in the Special Leave Petition filed by
Accused No.1 challenging the order passed in the Revisional Jurisdiction by the
Hon'ble High Court.

Issues/Questions for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court

(a) Whether "demand" for articles made prior to the marriage amount to "dowry"
or/and an offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961?
(b) Whether the courts below were correct in appreciating the evidence before
them leading to the Appellant's conviction?

Submissions/Arguments made by Parties in brief-Appellant's submissions in

brief:
1. Appellant argued that Courts below had committed an error in not correctly
interpreting the ambit and scope of Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,
read with the definition of 'dowry' under Section 2 of the said Act.
2. For the 'Demand' of dowry to become an offence under Section 4 of the Act, it
must be made at the time of marriage. Negotiations prior to marriage do not attract
the offence since the expressions used in Section 4 are 'bride' and 'bridegroom' and
not "boy/man" of "girl"/"woman". Therefore, no offence is committed merely for
negotiating a demand.
3. Courts below had heavily relied on certain letters purportedly addressed by
Accused No.1/Appellant (Proposed Groom) to the proposed bride which contained
discussions on alleged dowry demands. The Appellant denied authorship of these
letters and stated that there is no sufficient evidence to connect him with those
letters save and except inconclusive and uncorroborated evidenced of a Hand-
Writing expert who had also not conclusively drawn a conclusion with respect to
the authorship of the said letters
Respondent's/State's submissions in brief:
1. Interpretation of Appellant on Section 4 of the Act would defeat the very
object of the Act, which was enacted to curb the practice of
'demand' or acceptance and receipt of 'dowry' and that the definition of 'dowry' as
contained in Section 2 of the Act included the demand of dowry "at or before or
after the marriage".
2. Object behind enactment of the Act was to prohibit the giving or taking of
dowry, a prevalent social evil. The Act makes its
'demand' by itself also an offence under Section 4 of the Act. Even the abetment of
giving, taking or demanding dowry has been made an offence.
3. An agreement for giving or taking of dowry shall be void and the offences
under the Act have also been made non- compoundable vide Section 8 of the Act.
4. Respondent relied on L. V. Jadhao o. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar?, wherein, a
three judges bench of Supreme Court opined that the expression 'Dowry' wherever
used in the Act must be liberally construed. Respondent submitted that in view of
the above judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court should not accept the strict
interpretation of the definition sought to be made by the Appellant.
5. Based on the above judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.V Jadhav case, the
Respondent argued that the aforesaid interpretation/ argument of the Appellant
herein, was earlier sought to be made in the LV Jadhav case and the said
interpretation was already rejected by the Court. Therefore, LV Jadhav case holds
the field and is applicable in the present case.

Findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

(a) Court interpreted the following provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961:
Section 2: 'Dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party
to the marriage; (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or after
the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not
include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) applies. (Emphasis added )
Section 3: Penalty for giving or taking dowry.-If any person, after the
commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry,
he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the
amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more: Provided that the Court
may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years (substituted for the
words 'six months').

Section 4: Penalty for demanding dowry.- If any person demands, directly or

indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom,
as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years
and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court
may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months." (Emphasis supplied)

(b) The Hon'ble Apex Court interpreted Section 4 in consonance with and along
with other provisions of the Act, more particularly Section 2 and 3 of the Act
which have been reproduced herein above. The Court dismissed the submission of
the Appellant that any "demand" or negotiation prior to the marriage does not
constitute "dowry" as Section 4 refers to " bride" and "bridegroom" and that a boy
or girl would become and can be referred as "bridegroom" and "bride" respectively
only at the time of marriage or thereafter. The Court relied upon the settled
principle of interpretation that a Statute ought to be read as a whole. A particular
provision/ section ought to be interpreted in the context of other provisions
contained in the same statute. The Court relied on Reserve Bank of India v.
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.3 to reiterate the position of law
with respect to interpretation of statutes that no part of a statute Or no word of a
statute can be construed in isolation. The Court also relied on N.K. Jain and others
v. C.K. Shah and others, 4 to signify that legislative purpose is significant to
interpret a statute and that the words in the statute ought to be interpreted bearing
in mind the context in which the word has been used in the statute.
(c) The Appellant referred to dictionary meaning of "Dowry" to define and
interpret "Dowry" as an article/property given during or at the marriage by the wife
to the husband. The Court referred to the rule of
interpretation that "internal aid of interpretation" be looked into prior to referring to
"external aid of interpretation" such as dictionaries or journals or encyclopedia.
The Court stated that where the definition has been given in a statute itself, it is
neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc., to find out the meaning
of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the determinative factor.
(d)The Court also stated that where there is a demand prior or at or later to
marriage and the said demand is not properly referable to any legally recognized
claim and is relatable only to the consideration of marriage, then the same amounts
to "dowry" under Section 2 of the Act.
( e)The Court held/stated that marriage includes "Proposed Marriage", more
particularly where the non-fulfillment of the "demand of dowry" leads to the ugly
consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The Court stated that the
liberal interpretation be given in view of the fact that the statute ie., Dowry
Prohibition Act was enacted to remove and deal with the mischief of "dowry", and
any other interpretation would render the Act futile. Further, the Act is a social
welfare legislation which ought to be construed liberally.
(f)The Court stated that keeping in view the alarming increase in cases relating to
harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides,
the Statute must be interpreted realistically so as to empower the courts to eradicate
this social evil and further the object of the statute/act i.e., to abolish dowry.
(g)It is pertinent to note that the Court held that the interpretation of
"dowry" under Section 4 as argued by the Appellant herein was earlier argued in
L.V. Jadhav and was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
(h)The Court further opined that though the act is a social welfare legislation, it is a
penalizing statute having penal punishments therefore, is a penal statute. It is a
cardinal rule of interpretation that penal statutes must be interpreted strictly and
that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond any reasonable
doubt.
Accordingly, the court valued and appreciated the evidence against the Accused
1/Appellant with respect to the offences allegedly committed by him.
(I)The Court held that since PW1 is the only sole witness, his evidence has to be
carefully scrutinized. The Court stated that PWI did not State that the Appellant
sought for any dowry or cash amounting to Rs.75,000/- for purchase of car in his
Report marked as Exhibit P20 filed with the police station. He also did not mention
the aforesaid in his two complaints against the Appellant to the National Police
Academy prior to filing Exhibit P20. Further, one Mr. Narasingha Rao in whose
presence the alleged dowry talk took place was not examined. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the said story was merely an after-thought and cooked- up by the
PW1 / Complainant against the Appellant to implicate him.
(j)With reference to the Complainant's allegation that the Appellant had made/re-
iterated his demands during the "Varapuja", the court concluded that the evidence
of the Complainant is contradictory. The Complainant had stated that he did not
take any Poojari for the Varapuja, no photograph was taken during that occasion
and no invitation was printed for wedding. The Complainant also stated that in
October he received a letter from Appellant-Groom to cancel the marriage,
therefore, if the marriage had to be cancelled in October, it was doubtful and
illogical as to why Varapuja would have been conducted during the same period.
(k) The Court concluded that there was no satisfactory evidence on record to show
that the appellant cancelled the marriage on account of non-fulfilment of dowry
demand allegedly made by him. The Complainant also did not produce the
purported letter which he claimed that the Appellant had written to him cancelling
the marriage.
(l) The Court noted that the Complainant was a lawyer and he had not produced
certain letters, knowing the implications thereof and may be with an intention to
take advantage of the absence of the said letters. The fact that there were no
allegations against the Appellant in the FIR/ Report and the 2 complaints addressed
by Complainant to the National Police Academy and the failure to explain its
absence alongwith the fact that the Complainant / PW1 made conscious
improvements at the trial to implicate the appellant by indulging in exaggerations,
indicated that the Complainant/ PW1 was not a reliable witness.
(m) The Court noted that various letters written/ addressed by the Accused
No.1/Appellant were addressed to Ms. Vani. In order to prove these letters, the
prosecution did not examine Ms.
Vani. Further, the alleged demand of dowry has allegedly been made in the
presence of Ms. Vani and Shri Narasinga Rao.
Yet, both of them were not called as witnesses and examined.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the failure to examine them
was a serious lacuna in the prosecution's case and was fatal to the prosecution.
lay further, the Coupta to die alege the testimony of a handurtng. expert with
respect to the alleged letters written by the Appelin as the Expert opined in his
report that:
"when all the writing characteristics are considered collectively, they led to the
conclusion that there are similarites indicating common authorship between the
standard writings marked S-12 to 5-25 and the questioned writings marked 04 lo
34
standards"
But no definite opinion can be given on the basis of the present
Laboratory, Hyderabad.
PW 3 Assistant Director in the State Forensic & Science
The expert himself testified that it cannot be concluded that the Appellant can be
said to be the author of the letters produced and relied upon by the prosecution.
(6) The Court also opined that in view of the fact that PWI admittedly did not
receive any of those letters, he had no occasion to be familiar with the handwriting
of the appellant on those letters and there is nothing on record to evidence that
PW1 was familiar with the handwriting of the Appellant. In such circumstances,
PWI possibly could not have testified regarding the veracity of the identity of the
handwriting of the Appellant and more specifically on those purported letters
allegedly written by Appellant.
(p) The Court emphasised on the grammar of Section 67 of the Evidence Act,
1872, which mandates that before a Court looks into a document, the same has to
be proven. The Court stated the proposition that the document can be proved by
comparing the handwritings as envisaged under Section 73 of Evidence Act, 1872,
or through the evidence of the handwriting expert under Section 45 of Evidence
Act or by way of an admission by the author himself or the receiver of the
document if he is familiar and acquainted with the handwriting of the author of the
document may also prove it. The Court held that it was not satisfied, in the facts
and circumstances of this case, that the prosecution has established either the
genuineness or the authorship of the disputed letters allegedly written by the
appellant from the evidence of PW 1 or PW 3. The Courts below appear to have
taken a rather superficial view of the matter while relying upon the evidence of PW
1 and PW 3 to hold the appellant guilty. The Court categorically stated that it was
unsafe to base the conviction of the appellant on the basis of the evidence of PW 1
or PW3 in the absence of substantial independent corroboration, internally or
externally, of their evidence, which in the case was totally wanting.
(q) Accondingly, the Court held that the evidence on the record does not establish
the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt that any demand of dowry
within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the Act was made by the
appellant. The Court opined that: "May be the appellant was in agreement with his
elder brother regarding 'demand' of 'dowry' but convictions cannot be based on
such assumptions without the offence being proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The courts below appear to have allowed emotions and sentiments, rather than
legally admissible and trustworthy evidence, to influence their judgment"
(Emphasis supplies). The Appeal was allowed and the Appellant was acquitted.

Observations on the Judgment:

1. The Judgment which came to be passed around 25 years ago, was a
decision in the right path when dowry was prevalent, and still is, in most parts of
the country.
2. The judgment has interpreted the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961, in letter as well as spirit. The judgment has been passed keeping in
mind and being well-cautious about the deep-rooted practice of dowry across the
length and breadth of the country and the adverse impacts of the same such as
dowry deaths, dowry induced violence and dowry related domestic violence cases.
3. The judgment strikes a balance while interpreting the Act. While the
Hon'ble Court stated that Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, must be interpreted
liberally and not strictly since it is a social welfare legislation, the Hon'ble Court
rightly relied upon the well-known principles of interpretation that a penal statute
ought to be interpreted strictly. Though the Act is a social welfare legislation, it
provides for penalty, imprisonment and penal punishments. Hence, the Court had
aptly interpreted the criminal provisions of the Act strictly and sought for strict
proof/evidence against the Appellant, in order to put him behind bars or punish
him.
4. The Judgment had re-iterated the settled principles of law pertaining to
Evidence. It re-iterated the law relating to hand writing experts and proof of
documents.
5. The judgment is a well-written judicial precedent which has taken into
account the socio-economic fabric and structure of indian society.
The judgment has also dwelled into the intention of the Parliament in enacting the
Act and the need of the hour then to enforce the same by the judiciary.