11 Singapore

The quest for survival, order, and prosperity is a dom

politics. Surrounded by countries hundreds of tim
50 times greater, this island city-state is in many res
even tiny Hong Kong is twice its size. As an urban
Singapore stands alone, bereft of the resources and
Singapore's principal resource is its people. M
5.9 million total residents are about 75 percent Ch
and 3 percent other minorities. Enjoying a per capi
for PPP), Singaporean citizens are the wealthiest,
population in Southeast Asia. Interestingly, only
populated island are officially citizens, the remaini
resident foreign workers or permanent residents.'
In 1999, B. J. Habibie, then president of Indones
"little red dot," just a speck on the map compared to
at the time, Singaporeans began to consider the conte
of the republic's remarkable economic success. The
optation and state-propagated narratives of existentia
Singaporeans inside and outside of goverrunent now
Ironically, despite its achievements, Singapore h
the world. In 1990, about 36,000 Singaporeans lived
émigrés had formally registered foreign addresses w
often Singapore's young and most talented who lea
leaving are advanced education and job oppoities
of spirit, heart, and vitality, characteristics that have
symbolized by the nation's ubiquitous rules and proh
emigration threatens Singaporean identity as "the co
No noncommunist society in Southeast Asia
as Singapore. Regulations related to traffic, stree
spitting, e~cigarettes, flushing public toilets, pigg
feeding, and a pet cat ban for most residences ar
rigorously followed. Regulation extends to resident
and Development Board manages a large-scale prog
multistory buildings. Since the 1960s, Singaporean
allocations to diffuse ethnic-based residential clus
live among each other in government-controlled, b
ernment's Central Provident Fund, derived from m
278 Singapore

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as a compulsory savings program that supports the
and retirement pensions.
One might expect such bureaucratization would
less corruption exists in Singapore than in any oth
ruption scandals surface from time to time and the
powerful, official fraud and petty corruption by lo
clean reputation is rehected in Transparency Intema
is regularly listed among the ten least corrupt countr
To achieve order, Singapore has fashioned one
governments. Fronted by a facade of democratic in
tally an authoritarian order. Singapore's governmen
People's Action Party (PAP), since full independen
1990, Singapore had laiown only one leader, Lee Ku
Only two others, including Lee's own son, have rule
The themes of survival, prosperity, and order ha
a unique style of politics and economic life.4 The f
British controlled Singapore, malting it dependent o
ing limited independence in 1957, Singapore granted
security matters out of fear of a seizure of power b
To achieve full independence, the Singaporean eco
in the global economic system, and the country allied
complemented Singapore economically.
The concern for survival was the major impetus
to forge the Federation of Malaysia in September
Turku Abdul Rah ran, Malaysia's founding prime
War-era Singapore might become communist, an "A
city-state as a member of the federation. From the S
hiral resources were necessary for their own develop
believe that Singapore was viable by itself
The federation lasted only two years. It fell apar
ernment in Kuala Lumpur perceived that Singapore's
political position. Lee Kuan Yew had called for a "M
that all Malaysians, regardless of race, could particip
was contrary to Tunku Abdul Rahman's belief that
interest. Unable to reconcile, the parties agreed to re
Yew famously cried in public over the expulsion.
On its own, Singapore faced the challenge of s
stemmed mostly from the global Cold War and the
than seek a complementary alliance to attain securit
achieve rapid and far-reaching economic developm
government had consolidated the republic's indepen
tion that continues to the present. This success has
rent and the inculcation of values that unify people f
on hard work and the development of human capital
When Lee Kuan Yew stepped down as prime m
his protégé Goh Chok Tong to be his replacement
after becoming the nation's leader, Goh called a s
son. Goh needed to step out of the shadow of Lee
280 Singapore

"senior minister." In contrast to Lee's more authoritarian style, Goh used a more consensual
approach to governing. He did not yet have a popular mandate and wanted to take advan-
tage of the country's excellent economy to ensure widespread support for the PAP.5
The August 1991 election resulted in a decisive victory for the PAP, only four of the 81 seats
were won by the opposition Singapore Democratic Party. To shore up his administration even
more, in December 1992, Goh stood in a by-election and won a significant victory, capturing 73
percent of the vote in his own constituency. There was special poignancy in this victory because
in the previous month he had informed the populace that his two deputy prime ministers were
both suffering from cancer. The better known of these two was Lee Hsien Loong, minister of
trade and industry, the son of Lee Kuan Yew and presumed heir apparent to the position of prime
minister. Indeed, Goh served only as a de jure interim leader until Lee Hsien Loong was ready
to assume the top position.
In the mid-1990s, both Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong engaged in a series of libel suits
against their political adversaries, winning every case and thus again demonstrating that the
Singaporean judiciary has little autonomy from the executive branch. The PAP routinely wins
multimillion-dollar defamation awards against political opponents and has even imprisoned
some opposition candidates without charge.
In 1995, New York Times columnist William Satire described Singapore as a family dictator-
ship, characteristic of"old-fashioned European totalitarianism." Goh responded with rhetorical
shots of his own, and a trans-PaciNo debate about "Asian values" played out for months on
newspaper editorial pages and in academic circles. Goh, Lee, and others (including Malaysia's
Mahathir bin Mohamad) claimed Asian superiority over Western societies, where crime, disor-
der, and corruption tainted economic success. They argued that a cultural emphasis on order,
family, individual sacrifice, and hard work explained Asia's rising status. Critics responded
by claiming that rule of law in Singapore was a sham and that "Asian values" justified strong-
armed "authoritarian capitalism." During this time, the formerly impeccable Lee Kuan Yew
and his son Lee Hsien Loong were revealed to have received discounts on two exclusive private
condominiums. Lee explained that "it is an unfair world," which did little to mollify those who
had supported the governrnent's claim to meritocracy.
Election results in 1997 and 2001 perpetuated PAP legislative dominance, with winning mar-
gins of 64 percent and 75 percent, respectively. In both elections opposition parties only man-
aged to win a single seat in Parliament. Goh interpreted election results as a sign that voters had
rejected Western-style liberal democracy. In 2004, Lee Hsieh Loong unsurprisingly took over as
prime minister. Goh, credited for sound economic management and for bolstering education and
medical assistance during his tenure, stayed on as senior minister. Lee Kuan Yew, ever present,
took on yet another new cabinet title as "minister mentor." In 2006, with Lee Hsieh Long at the
helm, the PAP won yet another election with 67 percent of the vote but, notably, lost a record six
seats to the opposition Workers' Party.
The political effects of the 2008 global financial crisis later produced what Lee Hsieh Loong
described as a "watershed election" in 201 l. Problems in the real estate market, rising inmation,
and Singapore's worst recession since independence turned a record number of voters away
from the PAP. Returning one of its worst election results since 1965, the PAP garnered only
60 percent of the vote. The opposition Workers' Party maintained its six seats in Parliament
(the PAP retained 81). Somewhat symbolically, after the election, 87-year-old Lee Kuan Yew
resigned from his cabinet post as minister mentor, claiming the time had arrived for a new gen-
eration of leaders to guide the country.
Lee Hsieh Loong's goveminent issued 3 "white paper" on immigration policy that gener-
ated shock waves throughout Singapore. The official report lamented the country's declining
birth rate and aging demographic profile. Most alarm
Singaporean ancestry dating before 1965-the repo
immigration would be needed to maintain satisfacto
of the country's projected 6.9 million people would
rallies followed and social media erupted over the w
that immigrants push down salaries and erode natio
with fresh attacks on the govemrnent and called
Observers wondered if the PAP's grip on electoral p
Nonetheless, in a new round of legislative el
resoundingly defeated a record number of oppositio
The victory was especially impressive because prio
deal to specifically avoid "three-comer rights" in mo
arid pitting only one opposition candidate against t
parties sought to avoid taking anti-PAP votes from
results proved the PAP had little trouble defeating
possible reason for the PAP's resurgence was Lee
earlier, at the age of91. Although the official mour
ing of grief within Singapore continued for month
tional accolades from world leaders and diplomats
Political controversy re-emerged, however, two
new president after an uncontested '*walkovel*' ele
tionally, since a 1991 amendment, Singapore's head
lar vote. Singapore's presidency, a largely ceremon
subject to an ethnic formula to ensure each of Sing
the titular presidency at least once every five term
2017 election was to be a contest among Malay-Sin
ment's Presidential Election Committee rejected th
candidates on the grounds of managementinexper
and Parliament Speaker, was named the country's F
cried foul. Social media erupted with #NotMyPres
lowed, a rare site in Singapore.
Singapore's next general election came in July 20
to wear masks and gloves while allotted timed voti
country's compulsory voting law to choose a new
results demonstrated a growing degree of public di
won an unprecedented 10 seats to PAP's 83 total. E
vote, the PAP lost seats due in large part to local
response. Although Singapore's response proved co
at first, Singaporeans knew precisely who to blame
on. Younger voters too were upset over new limits
"fake news" law empowering single ministers with
Public frustration with the government's Covid
missteps and reversals. Misguidance offered to Si
spread, for example, led to a sudden U~turn on ma
pandemic. Following this reversal came a mask
cramped migrant worker dormitories, and a clum
TraceTogether, an intrusive government app. These
of public mistrust in the PAP.' Extended lookdown
282 Singapore

and airport terminal closures naturally affected all sectors of the economy. Economic growth
plummeted to a historical low -~4.l percent in 2020. In hindsight, the PAP might count itself
fortunate it did not delay the scheduled 2020 poll as the worst effects of the pandemic hit
Singapore in 2021 and 2022.
At 66, Lee Hsieh Loong had declared in 2018 he would hand over the reigns of the PAP and
premiership before he turned 70. In a much-awaited announcement, he later named Deputy
Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat as his designated successor. But then came the Covid-I9
pandemic and the 2021 election. Curiously, during the weeks and months of government policy
announcements regarding pandemic response, Heng was largely absent. His exclusion from an
inter-agency government task force was also notable. Then, after a near 8-point drop in voting
support in his own constituency in 2021, Heng announced his decision to withdraw from any
consideration from the world's highest paying government job." At 59 he claimed, "I this it
is better for someone who is younger, with a longer runway, to take on this job."" Speculation
immediately followed that Hong had been pressured into malting a surprise announcement.
Lee Hsien Loong's seventieth birthday came and went in 2022. He remained at the helm.
Citing a desire to manage the country's post-pandemic economic recovery, he talked ever
more about transitioning to Singapore's "4G" (fourth generation) leaders. Russia's invasion of
Ukraine added further strain on Singapore as a global hub ofiinance, trade, and shipping. Most
wary of opening a global re~examination of historical territorial claims, sovereignty-sensitive
Singapore condemned Russia's invasion. Lee made the tough financial decision to side with US
sanctions. Russia followed with reciprocal restrictions naming Singapore an "unfriendly" actor.
Lee eventually named his 49+year-old Harvard-trained finance minister, Lawrence Wong, as
4G prime minister-designate. Succession plans had been re-set. With no timetable announced,
Singaporeans continued into 2023 yet awaiting a prospected handover. A scheduled 2025 gen-
eral election may prove the opportune moment. Barring another surprise, it will then be Wong's
burden to guide Singapore's political economy and execute the PAP's proven formula of one-
party dominance, technocracy, and meritocracy, teamed up with an unapologetic focus on order,
security, and material prosperity.

Institutions and Social Groups

The Lee Family

Lee Kuan Yew and the Lee family have dominated Singapore's politics since its .independ-
ence from Malaysia in 1959. Few leaders in Southeast Asia have had the impact on their
societies that Lee Kuan Yew has had in Singapore. Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno, Suharto, Ne Win,
and Norodom Sihanouk had comparable postcolonial inituence, but none ruled a society
with as much effectiveness. Lee, who won a Queen's Scholarship to study law at Cambridge,
proved to be a brilliant and pragmatic politician with more sustained popular support than
perhaps any other world leader of his day. From his earliest years in office his effectiveness
was observable.
By placing highly educated and technically proficient officials in charge of his development
programs, Lee relied on his subordinates to establish [Link] policies free from clientelist
corruption. By combining select advantages of Western-style democratic institutions with an
Asian-style hegemonic political party system, Lee was able to dominate the country's politics
and achieve almost universal support and legitimacy in Singapore's early decades.
In the late 19805, Lee's constunmate political skill lost some of its edge as he moved toward
authoritarianism and away from open and pragmatic policies. In a series of decisions concerning
the _jailing of dissident politicians and the restrictio
his administration, Lee veered from the careful bala
and order during the previous decades. Lee rationa
as necessary for the continued stability of the cou
Singapore's fiercest critics at the time claimed po
loyalty and sycophancy surrounding Lee."
Following his resignation as prime minister in 1
visible statesman as its "senior minister." He trave
advising developing nations on how to achieve the
importance of discipline and denigrated Western~sty
ing countries. He also gave up his position as secret
to develop needed legitimacy.
In November 1991, the Parliament passed the
a stronger presidency but retained the cabinet hea
believed that Lee would be nominated for the pres
he judged too subordinate. When his son, Lee Hsien
2004, Lee Kuan Yew preferred to stay on as ministe
age of 87. Forever in the shadow of his late father, L
right, has yet to fully exhibit his father's magnetism
In 2015, a year after Lee Kuan Yew's death, a ne
future leadership. During a public rally on National
Lee Hsien Loong dramatically collapsed at the podi
discussion about succession and debate over dynas
degree from MIT and works for the Singaporean go
a third generation of Lee family leaders. According
Singaporeans oppose Lee family's dynastic rule."
eventually becoming prime minister, Lee Hsieh Loo
One person committed to preventing such a scen
criticizes her brother for seeldng dynastic politics.
Facebook in 2016, Lee Hsien Loong claimed tha
posted: "Meritocracy is a fundamental value olilsocie
Li Hongyi under a formal mentoring scheme to tran
in Singapore's military, the millennial Li followed hi
and then as a civil servant for GovTech, a Singapore
of the Prime Minister. .
Further complicating Lee family politics is a na
and his younger brother Lee Hsieh Yang over th
home, a consequence of their father's ambiguous w
to demolish the home even while some family me
heritage site. Spilling beyond the family, the ongoi
and lawyers but also Parliament, disciplinary trib
of Lee's extended family. Embroiled in disputed
related to the matter, Lee Hsien Yang and his wife
public spat opened further in the run up to the 2020
of the newly formed Progress Singapore Party. T
seat, but being first among losers, it managed to si
peculiar election rules." Speculation continued as
Singapore's elected presidency.
284 Singapore
Political Parties

The People's Action Party (PAP) is virtually synonymous with Lee Kuan Yew, his legacy, and
the Lee family. It has been in power since 1959. Among parliamentary systems globally, it
currently boasts the longest ruling tenure of any party in the world. More striking than its unit
terrupted rule may be that the PAP has won all but a few eligible parliamentary seats in every
election since 1968, garnering as high as 84 percent of the vote.
The only party ever to provide credible opposition was the left-wing Barisan Sosialis (SociaI~
is Front), which split thorn the PAP in the 1960s. Since that time, opposition parties have been
allowed to function, but none have provided meaningful competition to the PAP. The reasons
for the PAP's dominance include the effectiveness and incorruptibility of most PAP politicians,
a fractured opposition, and the rigid rules that circumscribe the activities of political parties and
opposition groups. These rules were especially important in the late 1980s when newspapers
were censored and suspected leftists and communists arrested.
Unlike most hegemonic parties, the PAP does not have a large staff to carry out research or
stage functions.18* Instead, civil bureaucrats outside the party perform these functions, leaving
the PAP visible only before general elections. To ensure its continued dominance, the PAP has
prepared for succession through a self-renewal program, choosing young candidates who are
more in tune with the electorate. Between 1980 and 2020, the PAP's winning percentage in leg-
islative elections fell below 60 percent only once. Over 50 years since its first victory in 1959,
'the PAP maintains control of 83 of the assembly's 89 total seats. So overwhelming is PAP's
dominance that opposition parties, such as the Workers' Party and Singapore Democratic Party,
consider winning three or four Seats an electoral success in most contests. Winning ten seats, as
did the Workers' Party in 2020, was considered a historic success.
As an opposition voice, the Workers' Party recent electoral ascent follows decades of practice
of wielding no power. Its stated goal is modest: to win a third of legislative seats. That propor-
tion would grant it a stake in any changes to the Singapore Constitution. Part of its recent attrac-
tion, argue experts, is that it fashions itself as a moderate and capable alternative, as opposed to
a radial one. PAP critics even quip that the Workers' Party seeks to become "PAP-lite."'9
One of Singapore's most visible opposition politicians is Chee Soon Juan, a labor rights
advocate and secretary-general of the Singapore Democratic Party. Chee's activities are mostly
extraparliarnentary, as he has spent more time locked up than in elected Parliament. He regularly
launches verbal attacks and stages publicity events alleging PAP corruption and undemocratic
practices. Legal tangles with all three of Singapore's prime ministers have landed Chee and his
activist sister, Chee Soik Chin, in and out of jail, facing charges of defamation or refusing to
pay court~imposed tines. Sometimes barred from international travel or running for office, Chee
Soon Juan draws support from Amnesty International and other rights groups who document
how Singapore's leaders undemocratically restrict political speech and abuse the judiciary to
crush PAP opponents.

Legislature

Singapore's parliamentary system is a legacy of British colonialism, even though its practice is
very different from that ofltoday's Great Britain. In contrast to the British bicameral system, the
Singaporean parliamentary system is unicameral and has presented no meaningful opposition to
the administration. Legislators are elected to five-year terms unless the prime minister dissolves
Parliament before the term ends. To presumably enhance legitimacy, voting is compulsory for
all citizens who face fines for failing to vote. In practice, Singapore's electoral system is often
characterized as "free but not fair," as it systematical
various institutional mechanisms."
In 1984, to generate a semblance of bipartisans
position seats to be awarded if opposition candidate
races. These three nonconstituency members (later c
from among the highest-polling opposition candidate
attained at least 15 percent of the votes cast in the con
uency Members of Parliament (NCMPs) were not a
Despite constitutional reforms that now allow NCM
practice as a form of tokenism rather than a meanin
Another institutional feature of parliamentary ele
constituencies, the electorate votes for a team of cand
constituencies are declared Group Representation C
sented by three members of Parliament. No more tha
can be GRCs. At least one of the three candidates in
(non-Chinese). The team that wins a plurality of the
of group representation is to institutionalize multi-
will be represented in Parliament by getting them ele
the scheme facilitates PAP-favored gerrymandering.
In another cosmetic attempt to bring alternative ide
uals from the community, academia, the military, the
to serve as independent members, or Nominated M
members are technically unaffiliated with any party, b
appointment. Voting rights ofNMPs are restricted. W
disallowed from voting on legislation related to publi
Singapore's institutional Mkering to add opposit
ent experts has done little to develop a consequent
The country's opposition remains effectually powerle
of single-party rule have "reduced the parliament
government budget and malting new laws," with e
on PAP leadership and performance.2"' Differences
demographic challenges can produce intense public d
legislature is characterized more by technical poli
difference. Analytical studies of Singapore's illiber
representation, nominated, and "best~lose1" noncons
to produce any genuine horizontal accountability of

Foreign Workers and Permanent Residents

As indicated by the controversy surrounding the pop

government in 2015, few issues animate Singaporea
only 16 percent of Singapore's active labor force was
increased to 38 percent by 2023. Alongside every s
three foreign workers and one permanent resident. T
tensions, and human rights concerns.
One in five foreign workers comes to Singapor
economy in business, finance, or other white-collarjo
286 Singapore

permits to employ as construction laborers, factory workers, or, increasingly, as service workers
in homes, restaurants, nightclubs, and discotheques. Many nonresident workers are Chinese,
others are Indian, Sri Lankan, Indonesian, and Filipino. As Singapore has grown wealthier,
meeting demand for low-skill work has led to rapid, though largely legal, immigration. Today,
the increased presence of foreign workers animates much of Singapore's Internet chatter and
social media. Public debatesover job competition, workers' rights, wages, and even the smell
of cooking curry have created a new type of social turbulence in the multi-ethnic city-state. In
2013, the country experienced a rare spate of ethnically charged public riots after a bus lolled a
migrant pedestrian in Singapore's Little India district.
Although foreign workers are powerless in representative politics, NGOs are emerging to
address issues related to disadvantaged nonresidents. Advocacy by such groups began to make
a difference. For example, a 2013 law established that all nonresident domestic workers must
be given at least one day off each week." Even so, foreign workers remain barred from join-
ing unions and lack the same labor protections as legal citizens. Such progress on workers'
rights also took a step back during the Covid-19 pandemic when disproportionate restrictions
on migrant workers continued for a 26-month period. Confined only to their worksites and
substandard dormitories during this time, employers became de facto state agents by enforcing
strict limits on the freedom of movement of their legally employed migrants. Unreasonable
restrictions affected workers' ability of workers to access basic health services, groceries, and
telecommunications, drawing the attention of the international human rights coInrnunity." Half
of an estated 300,000 workers housed in such dormitories succumbed to coronavirus during
this period." .

State-Society Relations and Democracy

Debate exists about how to best characterize the Singaporean state. Through a Chinese cultural
lens, Singapore can be viewed as a "patriarchal state," where traditional elders wield influence
over a compliant society. The country is also frequently characterized as a developmental state
due to the state's active management over investment and trade-oriented sectors. Its critics label
it an authoritarian state, pointing to its high degree of centralization and power over dissenting
voices. The island's own leaders may implicitly see their state, in Hegelian terms, as an altruistic
state prioritizing solidarity and order over interest-group competition." Debate notwithstand-
ing, analysts agree that Singapore is, if nothing else, a strong state.
Upon first glance, Singapore does not have the requisites to be a strong state. Geographically,
the country is minuscule arid has no important natural resources. Although it boasts the high-
est per capita income in Southeast Asia, its total GNP is far smaller than that of fellow dragons
South Korea, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. Singapore's military, once capable of only minor defen-
sive operations, has only modernized recently.
Nevertheless, using standard criteria, Singapore's state can be considered strong. Its leaders
use the agencies of the state to get Singaporeans to do what they want them to do. In no other
Southeast Asian society do the citizens follow the state's dictates with the same regularity as in
Singapore. Taxes are paid, young men accept compulsory military conscription, and traffic rules
are followed. Few autonomous groups compete for influence in the society. Indeed, the state has
co-opted the bureaucracy, the military, and interest groups, while the hegemonic PAP-itself a
creature of Lee Kuan Yew-has co-opted the state.
In explaining or understanding the high capacity of the state in Singapore, it becomes appar-
ent that the country's small size is a major advantage in strengthening the state. Although Singa-
pore is heterogeneous in the ethnic sense, more important is that its society is quite homogeneous
culturally. Singaporeans are urban and largely unite
fewer than 225 square miles, citizens have little roo
Singapore developed a strong sense of the politic
from Malaysia and its subsequent Cold War experie
ment during the Vietnam War strengthened the role o
the PAP was factionalized into left-wing and modera
Left was interpreted as a victory over communism a
the country's capitalist system. Lee justified his "ad
irate power and repress the state's internal and exte
Lee were among the most educated and skilled in
they remain autonomous from any particular societa
The case of Singapore also raises the question of
From a Western perspective, the governmental syst
of fUll civil liberties and competitive choices of lead
the government's paternalistic nature is appropriate,
as economic achievement without relying on exces
Sukarno's rationale for guided democracy in Indone
rule leads to chaos, instability, dissension, and ine
tion is sought not through democracy but through p
matter. In Singapore, the critical factor in politics is
government's ability to ideologically mobilize its c
acterize Singapore's hegemonic electoral authoritar
Singapore is the most disciplined society in Sou
being fined or punished and because these same c
to be in the public interest." Certainly, the govemi
measures to ensure orderly behavior (such as install
elevators that, if the rider urinates, lock the eleva
riously, Singapore's strict drug laws, and the deat
draw international condemnation from human rights
circumscribed in Singapore. It took the country u
criminalized homosexuality. Although increasing
media is putting new pressures on the government o
its liberal use of the death penalty and prohibition o
From its inception, the Singaporean state has exp
achieve its aims of survival, economic development,
is a lack of meaningful popular participation in the a
lost much of its soul. While building Singapore, Pri
tradition there was no concept of a loyal opposition.
an opposition candidate without withdrawing total s
stemmed from Confucian philosophy, which stres
Obligation to those in authority was the cement of th
were meeting the people's needs and leading accord
ered to have the mandate ofheaven and was therefore
cultural perspective, a strong one-party system is mo
One-party systems can provide policy alternative
the party leaders. In Singapore, a high degree of in
points of view aired publicly, differences, neverthele
In addition, the PAP has established grassroots orga
 »

288 Singapore

Committees, designed to elicit ideas from the public. These corporatist groups do provide in-
put but do not lead to the development of an autonomous civil society, which the government
views as potentially destabilizing. The government's claim to moral authority rests on public
recognition omits performance record. Public compliance within this one-party system is rooted
in a "broad-based recognition that politics is the business of the government, not the people.7»33
Consistent with its traditions and history and supportive of the goals of development, order,
and merit, Singapore's technocracy has provided the republic with effective, but not always
accountable, government. Singapore's capacity to deliver on these goals over time is the ti1nda~
mental question going forward. Lee Kuan Yew admitted to this fact in 2008 to a large crowd of
Singaporeans and international delegates at the World Cities Summit. Speaking extemporane-
ously, Lee fretted that the island's voters might soon become bored and vote for a "vociferous
opposition" out of"light-heartedness, fickleness, or sheer madness." A non-PAP government, he
claimed, would ruin the city-state in as little as five years. "When you're Singapore," he clari-
lied, "your existence depends on performance--extraordinary performance, better than your
competitors--when that performance disappears because the system on which it's been based
becomes eroded, then you've lost everything.7334

Economy and Development

It is impossible to make comparative generalizations about Singapore's economic development

because the nation's status as a city-state sets it Mdamentally apart from its neighbors. With no
agricultural base, Singapore is destined to become increasingly interdependent with the global
economic system to ensure its survival.
Singapore is a mixture of market-capitalism and state-led economics, with emphasis on the
former. The PAP leadership inherited a market economic system from the British but has since
created state institutions to manage key aspects of the economy including housing, transporta-
tion, and shipping. Home to the world's busiest transshipment port, Singapore leverages its geo-
graphic location as its greatest economic asset. Although Singapore typically ranks among the
world's most free economies, its government also controls large, state-owned holding companies
that invest in manufacturing, communications, and foreign securities markets. Its two sovereign
wealth funds, GIC and Temasek, regularly rank in the top 10 globally in terms of total asset value.
Singapore has consistently posted the region's highest growth rates. These growth rates are
the result of an outward-looldng, export-oriented strategy begun after 1965 to accelerate the
manufacture of consumer products, reduce unemployment, and obtain vital outside capital.
Transport, shipbuilding, ship repair, and manufacturing led the way in Singapore's early eco-
nomic rise. From 1965 until the 1997 Asian economic crisis, Singapore's annual GDP growth
averaged above 8 percent. Since that time, growth has fluctuated and then moderated as its
economy has matured. Relatively low rates of inflation and unemployment have accompanied
much of this growth.
In anticipation of changes in the world economy, Singapore launched its "Second Industrial
Revolution" in 1979, designed to restructure the economy toward high-tech industries. The plan
was to manufacture exports of superb quality, win higher salaries for workers, upgrade job sldlls,
and reduce dependence on foreign workers. The economy emphasized automotive components,
machine tools, computers, electronic inst entation, medical instruments, and precision engi-
neering. The inflows of foreign capital that followed reached staggering levels. Foreign invest-
ment ballooned from $300 million in 1967 to over $62 billion in 2017 (infth in the world).35
Not content with the level of economic development, Lee Kuan Yew set forth a controver»
sial program in the l990sto improve the country's gene pool. He determined that the quality
of the people was the most important factor in a co
a program to encourage the marriage and procrea
incentives for educated mothers to have more chi
resolved Singapore's demographic challenges, gove
through high standards and high pay for teachers ha
man capital development. A 2015 report from the O
Development (OECD) comparing K-12 educational
ranked Singapore number one in the world, far ah
United States (28th).36
The worldwide economic slowdown that followe
challenging for globalized Singapore. Singapore slipp
further economic stress in 2002 due to a regional he
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) throughout Asia cr
malls, and devastated Singapore's Asian-based touris
economic crises was to double down on pushing f
financial services, and promoting cross-regional trade
had paid off For the first time in the country's histor
ance services surpassed manufacturing as the largest
More financially connected than ever, the 2008 g
recession. This time, leaders opted for an expans
mulaic neoliberal austerity. Initiatives included a $3
employers' wage bills, a cash subsidy to low-incom
plan for the public sector, among other measures. T
quick recovery to growth and showed the flexibili
matically to economic stress through its embrace of
Trade openness remains the life blood of Singapor
with neighboring Malaysia are of vital significance
supply from Malaysia, a fact Malaysian leaders freque
investments throughout Southeast Asia are extensive
bought ShinCorp, Thaksin Shinawatra's telecommtu
to trigger the 2006 military coup in Bangkok that lef
Internationally, Singapore has negotiated over
with major economic players and many smaller c
joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, and, more recentl
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnershi
In recent decades, Singapore has also pursued c
close relations is mutual and supported by Confuci
that oil will stow freely through Singapore's ports.
waters near Singapore each year, and only the port c
petroleum. To create greater economic links to Ch
2020 the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partne
led by China that connects 45 percent of the world
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and all ten ASEA
With its connected and diversified economy, hi
structure, superb medical care, and peaceful relation
for long-term economic growth remain excellent.
as the third largest financial center in the world, b
290 Singapore

economy continues to mature, it may never return to the high growth rates of its formative
period. Its leaders must respond to new policy challenges familiar to advanced economies else-
where. The rising cost of housing, for example, is creating pockets of "First World poverty" in
the city characterized by an aging population stuck in low-income neighborhoods and an "ex-
cessive development of shoebox apaments" by greedy developers and landlords." Moreover,
with high emigration rates, managing the coLuitiy's ever-increasing demand for migrant workers
and foreign professionals is another issue that will define Singapore's economy going forward.

Foreign Relations

Singapore did not take charge of its foreign relations Luitil 1965 when the republic was expelled
from the Federation of Malaysia. Since then, the basic theme of foreign policy has been sur-
vival. As a small city~state with only minimal military capacity, Singapore looked to Western
powers and Japan during the Cold War to balance the inituence of the Soviet Union arid China
in Southeast Asia. Unabashedly anticommunist, Singapore helped to support the US war in
Vietnam and was a principal advocate for a hard-line policy toward the Vietnamese government
as a founding ASEAN member. More recently, Singapore has become a major investor in the
Vietnamese economy and sought closer economic relations with China.
Despite its pro-US stance, Singapore often enunciated a policy of neutrality, avoiding
embroilment in major power conflicts. Nevertheless, certain issues have strained Singapore-
US relations. 111 1988, Singapore accused Washington of interfering in its domestic affairs and
expelled a US diplomat who allegedly encouraged a bligh-profile dissident to organize a group
of opposition candidates. Bad feelings also arose when President Ronald Reagan removed
Singapore from the Generalized System of Preferences. This had allowed selected goods to
enter the United States duty~free, but Singapore had attained the status of a newly industrialized
country (NIC) and was no longer eligible for this benefit.
Relations between Singapore and the United States reached a low in 1994 over the unique
case of Michael Fay, an expat American teenager who was sentenced to be caned in a Singapore
court for juvenile acts of vandalism. US public opinion polls indicated that most Americans
supported Singapore's corporal punishment for the delinquent youth. The Clinton administra-
tion campaigned for a pardon for Fay, but Singapore's contemptuous response was to reduce his
sentence 1 orn six lashes to four.
By the beginning of the millennium, Singapore had achieved its goal of survival. It was no
longer threatened by internal insurgency or external intervention, and it was surrounded by large
countries that had no capacity or desire to intervene in the republic's affairs. But the events of
September 11, 2001, reopened old concerns and caused Singapore's leaders to imagine new ones.
As a porous hub of trade, oil shipments, and transportation, Singapore developed a renewed
sense of vulnerability in 2001, which resulted in a warming of relations with the United States.
in December 2001, an al-Qaeda sleeper cell with plans to terrorize Western embassies was dis-
covered in Singapore. A year later, President George W. Bush traveled to the republic to sign a
bilateral Free Trade Agreement. The post-9/ll United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
(US SFTA) would alter more than just economic relations between the two countries.
During the war on terrorism, Singapore became a vital staging ground for US operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq (although it has prohibited the permanent establishment of a US base).
Goh Chok Tong even sent a token military unit to the Persian Gulf as part of US Secretary
of Defense Donald Rurnsfeld's "Coalition of the Willing." Then, adding to its existing array
of F-16s, Apache helicopters, and Harpoon missiles, purchased in the l990s, Singapore later
signed an arms deal with Washington in 2005 worth
to the purchase of 12 Boeing F~l5SGs and millions o
other supplies.*° Singapore's defense posture has gr
into an ambitious upgrading its military in recent y
parisons with militarized Israel. By overlaying its thr
with a new Digital and Intelligence Service, Singap
for digital surveillance, protection against cyberattac
defense." In 2023, Singapore also procured its first tw
diesel-electric submarines with enhanced maneuvera
In addition to economic benefits and coordination
pursuit of stronger cross-regional relations with th
increasingly assertive China. Like its neighbors, Sin
rise. Singapore has become the world's leading foreig
States, Japan, and South Korea. The massive Sing
Province, negotiated at the highest levels by the
growing economic relations. Singapore also fits prom
strategy ofcreatin2 a "Maritime Silk Road" connectin
Belt, One Road" policy. Singapore was also among
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AHB).
Ln an evolving world order, "PAP leaders have ye
today's era of deglobalization and heightened Great
to interpret China to the United States and the Unite
against the other. It is a deft strategy for a small state
for example, Singapore signed a strategic partnersh
trade opportunities in every direction, Singapore wo
an "unrepentant China beachhead.7743 Over a few sh
Administration's unrealized Trans-Pacific Partnershi
CPTPP trade agreement that replaced it, joined Chin
Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with co-pa
During the Trump Administration trade war with
taldng sides." It visibly hosted the high-profile (ye
2018 and then later embraced the Biden Administr
Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Su
President Bider invited Prime Minister Lee Hsien L
discuss unity on the matter arid Indo-Pacific security.s
security interests between the United States and a risi
international order, Singapore continues its strategy f

Conclusion

Singapore's singularity does not always allow for m

tries. Indeed, the "little red dof' is an exception in So
geography, state capacity, and level of economic dev
standard of living in Southeast Asia. With respect to t
city-state ranks in the top 15 globally. Singapore's s
location remains significant. The trade entrepot-cum-
role in international trade, commerce, and finance as
292 Singapore

transport food, manufactures, and oil between Asia and the world. New trade agreements with
major trading partners are likely to reap economic results in the future for Singapore. Neverthe-
less, the extent to which Singapore and its 4G PAP leaders can thrive beyond the guidance and
mentorship of its paternal founder, Lee Kuan Yew, and his eldest son remains an open question.

1
Notes

1 Beyond Singapore's main island, which has grown over time due to expansive land reclamation, only
2 of the territory's remaining 60 islands house residents.
2 "Population in Briefl2018." Singapore Department of Statistics, September 2018.
3 Prashanth Parameswaran, "Can Singapore Overcome Its Furore Challenges'?" The Diplomat, July 2,
2015, [Link] l5/07/can-singapore-overcome-its-fixture-challenges.
4 Lee Boon Hiok, "Political Institutionalization in Singapore," in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato,
and Jusuf Wanandi, Asian Political Institutionalization (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies,
University otlCalifornia, 1986), 202.
5 Shee Poon Kim, "Singapore in 1991," Asian Survey, 32, no. 2 (February 1992), 119-125, and Hussin
Mutalib, "Singapore in 1992," Asian Survey, 33, no. 2 (February 1993), 194-199.
6 William Satire, "Honoring Repression," New York times, July 10, 1995, A13.
7 Christopher Lingle, Singapore S Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions and
Political Dependency (Fairfax, VA: The Locke Institute, 1996).
8 "Singapore's Election: Does the Political Shake~up Change Anything?" BBC, July 21, 2020, www.
[Link]/news/world-asia-53471536.
9 "Singapore's Covid Review Spotlights Mask U-Tum, ConfusiNg Reopening Measures among Areas
to Improve," South China Morning Post, March 8, 2023, [Link]/news/asia/southeast-asia/
article/3212774/5ingapore-coVid-review-spotlights-mask-u-tum~confi1sed-reopening-among~areas~
improve.
10 Singapore's prime minister earns a salary of$l.61 million, an annual compensation greater than presi-
dent of the United States, chancellor of Germany, prime minister of the United Kingdom, prime min-
ister of Japan, prime minister of India, and president of Brazil, combined.
II Nile Bowie, "Singapore Leadership Succession Back to Square One," Asia times, April 9, 2021,
[Link]
12 Lingle, Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism.
13 Nicolas Yong, "A Grandson of Lew Kuan Yew in Politics?" Yahoo News Singapore, January 27, 2019,
[Link]
survey-2219 [Link].
14 Toh Yong Chuan, "No Political Ambitious for My Son, Says PM Lee," The Straits Times, June 15,
2017.
15 Nyshka Chandran, "Sister ofSingapore Prime Minister Lee Accuses Him of Dynastic Politics," CNBC.
com, April II, 2016, [Link]/2016/04/11/5ister-of-singapore-prime-minister-lee~accuses~him~
[Link]
16 Bowie, Nile, "Singapore's Lee Family Feud Take a Bitter Tum," Asia Times, March 27, 2023, https://
[Link]/2023/03/singapores-lee-farnily-feud-takes~a~bitter-'uurn/.
17 See the section "Legislature" below for an explanation of Nonconstituency Members of Parliament
(NCMPs). .
18 Lee, "Political Institutionalization in Singapore," 207.
19 Simon Vincent, "PAP Realism in an Endangered World," New Mandala, April 6, 2020, [Link]-
[Link]/pap-realism-in-an~endangered-world/.
20 Netina Tan and Cassandra Preece, "Democratic Backsliding in Illiberal Singapore," Asian
Journal of Comparative Politics, (OnlineFirst), December 6, 2022, https//[Link]/10.l177/
20578911221141090.
21 Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP in the Nineties: The Politics of Anticipation," in Karl D. Jackson,
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, and J. Soedjati Djiwandono, ASEAN in Regional and Global Context (Berke-
ley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California 1986), 173.
22 Thomas Bellows, "Singapore in 1989," Asian Survey, 30, no. 2 (February 1990), 146.
23 Lee Lai To, "Singapore in 1987," Asian Surve/, 28, no. 2 (February 1988), 203.
24 Chua Beng Huat, "Singapore in 2006: An irritating
47, no. l (January/February 2007), 208, Cho~Oon K
Managing Conformity," in Muthiah Alagappa, Politic
Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University P
25 Netina Tan and Cassandra Preece, "Democratic Bac
Rodan, Participation without Democracy: Containin
University Press, 2018).
26 This above section draws from Brenda Yeoh and
Immigrant Population Brings Challenges," Migra
[Link]/article/rapid~growth-singapores~i
27 "Lessons from Singapore's COVID Lockdown," Ins
17, 2022, [Link]/focus~areas/migrant~workers
28 "Singapore's Covid Review Spotlights Mask U-Tum,
Improve."
29 Terrence Chong, "Why Labels for the Singaporean S
30 Khong, "Singapore: Political Legitimacy through Ma
31 Donald K. Emmerson, "Beyond Zanzibar: Area Studie
State in Indonesia" paper presented to the Associatio
32 Asia Yearbook, 1991 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Econo
33 Khong, "Singapore: Political Legitimacy through Ma
34 Lydia Lim, "5 Years All It Takes to Ruin Singapore,"
35 Figures from die Singapore Department of Statistics a
Development.
36 Nicole Chang, "Global School Rankings," The In
[Link]/news/education/education-news/global-school-
education-across~the-world- l0247405 .html
37 Narayanan Ganesan, "Singapore in 2009," Asian Surv
38 See Global Financial Center Index (GFCI), [Link]
global~financial-centres-index/.
39 "Singapore Revises Rules to Counter 'Shoebox Ap
[Link]/article/us-singapore-property/si
aparhnent~problem-idUSKCN I MRI FH.
40 Eul-Soo Pang, "Embedding Security into Free Trade
Trade Agreement," Conlemporaljy Southeast Asia, 29
41 Balachander Palanisamy, "Singapore's Military Mode
The Diplomat, March 10, 2022, [Link]
program-is-ambitious-but-feasible/.
42 Bridget Welsh, "Singapore's 'NotNorma1' Election," N
org/singapores~not~normal-election/.
43 Ibid., 22.
44 Karishma Vaswani, "Singapore PM: 'Considerable
March II, 2021, [Link]/news/business-56318