Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement

Author(s): Arushi Anthal and Anu Sharma

Source: Journal of Strategic Security, 2025, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2025), pp. 169-186
Published by: University of South Florida Global and National Strategic Security Institute
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 Journal of Strategic Security

Volume 18 Number 3 Article 11

Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic

Alignments and Future Trajectories
Arushi Anthal
Amity University, Uttar Pradesh, India, [Link]@[Link]

Anu Sharma
Amity University, Uttar Pradesh, India, asharma37@[Link]

Follow this and additional works at: [Link]

pp. 169-186

Recommended Citation
Anthal, Arushi and Sharma, Anu. "Assessing India-Philippines Defence
Engagement: Strategic Alignments and Future Trajectories." Journal of
Strategic Security 18, no. 3 (2025) : 169-186.
DOI: [Link]
Available at: [Link]

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Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic
Alignments and Future Trajectories

Abstract
India and the Philippines signed the deal worth USD 375 million dollars for the BrahMos
supersonic cruise missiles in 2022, and the first batch of missiles was delivered in April of
2024. The growing defence cooperation between both nations marks a strategic shift in
India’s Act East Policy which was launched in 2014. Within the broader Indo-Pacific
framework, this engagement offers mutual advantages in maritime security, counter-
terrorism, and capacity building. This research paper explores and examines the strategic
relevance of this partnership in lines with the rising assertiveness of China, assesses
challenges and identifies potential areas of cooperation. It also investigates broader
implication of this partnership on the regional security of both the nations respectively.
Furthermore, this paper analyses as to how this partnership compliments India’s strategic
objectives in Southeast Asia through policies such as ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’. This study
points that the India-Philippines defence partnership has emerged as a critical pillar of
their engagement and while this might seem monumental, both the nations should work
towards further deepening this collaboration by exploring Philippines as an option for
defence exports under it Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: [Link]

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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

Introduction
The world today is substantially different from what it was at the turn
of the century. For a country, any foreign policy changes or shifts with
the international order unavoidably influence the country’s domestic
and foreign elements. The Indian government devised the Look East
Policy in 1992 against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War. Still,
two decades later, India launched the ‘Act East’ Policy for renewed
focus on “the extended neighborhood in the Asia Pacific region.”1
India’s foreign policy evolved in response to shifts in the global
landscape. It was under the then Prime Minister P. V. Narsimha Rao
that the structural reforms of liberalization, privatization, and
globalization were brought in the 1990s, and the ‘Look East’ policy,
which primarily aimed to strengthen India’s ties with Southeast Asia,
was launched. The fact that Narendra Modi switched from the Look
East Policy to the Act East Policy during his first term is evidence of
India’s continued commitment to engage with Southeast Asian nations
both economically and strategically.

Among the countries in Southeast Asia, the Philippines has emerged as

a crucial partner for India, especially in defense and security
cooperation. Both nations hold pivotal positions in the Indo-Pacific,
with India emerging as a powerhouse in the Indian Ocean Region and
the Philippines situated at the crossroads of the Pacific and South
China Sea. The relations between both nations can be traced back to a
region which was referred to as ‘Panyupayana’ 2015) by traders and
geographers, and the term was mentioned in the Puranas and other
Indian literature, such as Ramayana and Mahabharata.2 This
connection is also evident in the incorporation of Sanskrit vocabulary
into local languages, as seen in the example of “bana” (arrow) in
Sanskrit, which corresponds to “pana” in the Philippine language. Prof.
Dr. Juan Francisco discovered Maharadia Lawan: A Lanao Prose
Version of the Ramayana in 1968, noting that it was a condensed
version of the Ramayana.3

The diplomatic relations between the two nations were established in

1949. During the Cold War period, both countries were ideologically
distant from each other, especially due to geopolitical alignments. The
Philippines, being a stanch ally of the United States, was part of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) while India maintained a
policy of non-alignment. Therefore, the relationship between the two
was rather limited despite signing a Friendship Treaty in 1952. Some

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 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 18, No. 3

agreements during this period included the Bilateral Air Service

Agreement (1949), Cultural Agreement (1969), and Agreement on the
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (1969). The dissolution of the
ideological blocs during the Cold War allowed both nations to explore
avenues for cooperation. However, it was the inaugural Security
Dialogue in 2004 that marked a pivotal step in bilateral relations.4

Table 1. India-Philippines Trade in USD Million (2015-2024)5

Year India’s Export to India’s Imports Total Trade
the Philippines from the
Philippines
2015-2016 1353.34 542.16 1895.50
2016-2017 1482.52 494.62 1977.14
2017-2018 1692.83 764.36 2457.20
2018-2019 1743.64 581.10 2324.74
2019-2020 1525.96 523.83 2049.79
2020-2021 1457.30 572.47 2029.77
2021-2022 2107.24 729.08 2836.31
2022-2023 2094.15 959.59 3053.73
2023-2024 2097.17 1433.60 3053.77
Notes. The researcher compiled all the data from the Embassy of India, Manila,
Philippines, and PIB.
Source: Author.

Figure 1. India-Philippines Trade Statistics (2015-2024)

India-Philippines Trade Statistics (2015-2024)

3500

3000
Trade (in USD Million)

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024
Year

India’s Export to Philippines India’s Imports from Philippines Total Trade

Source: Illustrated by the Author from the Ministry of External Affairs, India6

As depicted in the above figure and Table 1, India and the Philippines
have experienced an upswing in relations because of regular diplomatic
engagement. In terms of trade, it was the first time that Indian-
Philippines trade crossed the USD 3 billion mark in 2022-23 (Ministry
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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

of External Affairs, India, 2023). The Indian exports to the Philippines

have seen a gradual increase, resulting in a trade surplus in India’s
favor. Except for the dip during the COVID-19 pandemic, there has
been a substantial increase in both imports and exports, indicating a
burgeoning economic partnership. A few priority areas that have
emerged in this engagement are financial technology, agriculture,
health and medicine, maritime security, infrastructure development,
and defense relations, which are at an all-time high.7

The increased militarization of the South China Sea and its ongoing
territorial disputes with China have made maritime security a priority
area for the Philippines. Recent examples include the passing of two
maritime laws based on the standards set by UNCLOS, vis-à-vis the
Philippine Maritime Zones Act and Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes
Act, which “identify the country’s internal water, archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental
shelf and sea lanes.”8

Col. Raymond Powell, a maritime security expert, termed the passage

of these laws as part of a long-term strategy against Beijing. He stated
that, “Passage of the Philippines’ new maritime laws is a necessary step
in its lawfare against China’s maritime aggression, which has reached
the scale of an occupation of large swaths of the West Philippine Sea.”9
On the other hand, India is facing Chinese assertiveness both at the
Himalayan borders and in the Indian Ocean region in the form of its
debt trap diplomacy. India and China are involved in a classical security
dilemma. China views India’s border infrastructure as part of the US’s
broader Indo-Pacific strategy, while India considers it necessary for its
security concerns.10

The primary objective of this article is to investigate the implications of

the India-Philippines defense partnership, particularly in the context of
India’s efforts in Southeast Asia through its policies such as ‘Look East’
and ‘Act East.’ This is analyzed by exploring defense agreements, joint
exercises, and trade dynamics between the two nations. Concerning
this, the study will investigate two research questions: first, how does
this defense partnership prove mutually advantageous, especially in
areas of maritime security and counterterrorism? Second, it is to
understand the role of the defense partnership between India and the
Philippines in the broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Both India and the
Philippines are important players in the Indo-Pacific; therefore, their
engagement in the defense sector counterbalances China’s growing
influence and maintains a balance of power by strengthening

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 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 18, No. 3

multilateral forums such as the ASEAN, Quad, and the ASEAN Defense
Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).11 The world’s strategic pivot has
shifted to the East in the twenty-first century, and India acknowledged
this reorientation by strengthening its ties with Southeast Asian nations
through ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East.’ India-Philippines defense
partnership is more than just a bilateral engagement as India seeks to
expand and enhance its role as a net-security provider. Therefore, this
article aims to examine the defense partnership between these nations
and investigate its impacts on regional security in the dynamic
geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific.

While India’s ‘Act East' policy marked a strategic shift from the existing
‘Look East’ policy, it called for greater economic, political, and security
engagement. Dr. David Brewster, a Senior Research Fellow at the
Australian National University, argues that India’s geopolitical
influence in the Indo-Pacific has been exacerbated by these policies,
particularly in light of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and
the Indian Ocean region.12 He points out that India’s increased
engagement with Southeast Asian nations is not only a shift in policy
but rather a part of India’s broader strategic objective in the Indo-
Pacific framework.

Even this shift from ‘Look East’ to ‘Act East’ highlights India’s
increased focus on defense diplomacy as one of its cornerstones.
According to Dr. S. Jaishankar (Minister of External Affairs, India), the
‘Act East’ policy not only aims for economic integration but also
defense partnerships to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-
Pacific.13 Now that the Indo-Pacific has become increasingly significant,
maritime security has become a priority concern for almost all nations,
as evident in India’s defense engagement with Indonesia, Vietnam, and,
most recently, the Philippines. This change is accompanied by India’s
growing participation in multilateral forums such as the Quad and
ADMM-Plus, which primarily aim for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Although historical ties have shaped India’s partnerships with these
nations, the focus is currently on countering China.

India’s relations with Southeast Asian nations, especially in defense,

are based on the Indian Navy’s outreach, according to Dr. Jaishankar.14
He notes that India’s position as a net-security provider in the region is
projected through military exercises such as MILAN and MALABAR
with ASEAN nations. However, it is important to note that most
literature on India’s defense engagement with ASEAN nations is

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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

focused on Vietnam or Indonesia, and the Philippines has just recently

gained scholarly attention. It is crucial to highlight that India’s defense
engagement with the Philippines is not episodic but systematic and
increasingly shaped by the need to balance China’s growing
assertiveness to contribute to a rules-based order. To further elaborate,
Table 2 presents a comparative overview of India’s key defense
partnerships in Southeast Asia and underscores varying levels of
strategic alignment.

Table 2. Overview of India’s Defense Partnerships with Southeast Nations

Country Partnership Level Key Areas of Defense Cooperation and
Notable Milestones
Vietnam Comprehensive • Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defense
Strategic Partnership Partnership toward 2030 (2022)
(2016) • Indigenously-built in-service Missile Corvette INS
KIRPAN gifted to Vietnam (2023)
• USD 300 Million Credit line for Coast Guard ships
and border patrols
• Close to finalizing a USD 700 Million BrahMos deal
Indonesia Comprehensive • “Shared Vision on Maritime Cooperation in the
Strategic Partnership Indo-Pacific between India and Indonesia” (2018)
(2018) • “India-Indonesia Defense Industry Exhibition-cum-
Seminar” was held on 30 April 2024
Philippines Emerging Strategic • BrahMos Cruise Missile delivered (USD 375 Million)
Partner • Joint Defense Cooperation Committee Meetings
Singapore Comprehensive • Joint Military Training Army
Strategic Partnership • Industry cooperation - Cyber security
(2024)
Malaysia Enhanced Strategic • Malaysia-India Defense Cooperation Committee
Partnership (2015) meetings
• Cyber Security and AI—emerging areas
Thailand • India-Thailand Defense Dialogue
Strategic Partnership
(2025) • Joint Working Group to be established and Subject
Matter Experts Exchange
Notes. The researcher compiled all the data from the Indian Embassies in the above nations, PIB,
MEA, India. Source: Author.

Simi Mehta, CEO and Editorial Director of IMPRI, in “India’s Pivot to

Southeast Asia,” identifies three key factors on which India’s
interaction with ASEAN rests, in terms of geopolitics, economics, and
socio-cultural aspects.15 Mehta posits that China is a key factor in the
strengthening of relations between India and ASEAN. She believes that
the strategic alignment between India and the Southeast Asian
countries will be mutually beneficial, as China’s assertiveness will be
countered by India’s commitment to regional security and prosperity.
Even Dr. Susanna Lobo, an independent researcher, enunciates that

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the rise of China has increased the significance of SEA for India. This
can be substantiated by the replacement of ‘Look East Policy’ with ‘Act
East Policy.’16 Lobo stresses that the rising assertiveness of China has
brought India and SEA closer because of converging security interests
and that it can help India to project its influence and power beyond
South Asia.

The Philippines’ defense modernization program has been a key

component of its national security strategy, especially in light of its
territorial conflicts in the South China Sea and internal security
challenges. Prof. Dr. Renato Cruz De Castro of De La Salle University
notes that the objective of the Philippines’ defense strategy is to
highlight the country’s efforts to modernize its military through
partnerships with powers such as the US, Japan, and, more recently,
India.17 The procurement of the BrahMos missile system from India
underscores the Philippines’ ongoing efforts to safeguard its territorial
waters and deter Chinese aggression. The BrahMos deal finalized with
India marks a crucial development in this bilateral defense partnership.

Security experts such as Dr. Rommel Banlaoi emphasized naval

capabilities to counter Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea
(SCS) and, therefore, consider maritime security as a focal point of the
Philippines’ defense policy.18 In addition to Chinese aggression in the
SCS, terrorism remains an important concern for the Philippines. A
Filipino American journalist, Maria Ressa, highlights the dangers of
terrorism in Mindanao’s southern area, where insurgent groups such as
Abu Sayyaf are active.19 To tackle terrorism, both India and the
Philippines have combined joint training exercises that aim to deal with
non-traditional internal security threats. Although the literature on the
Philippines’ modernization efforts is extensive, it primarily focuses on
its alliance with the US, as noted by former Singaporean diplomat
Barry Desker.20 Recently, the Philippines has diversified its defense
equipment acquisition, including with countries like India, marking a
strategic shift toward an autonomous foreign policy that seeks to
balance ties with both traditional and emerging partners.

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a geopolitical theater for strategic

competition among major powers, including the US, China, and
regional powers such as India, Japan, and ASEAN nations. In the
context of the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, China’s
assertiveness, particularly its expansionism in the SCS, has been a
source of tension. Director, International Security at Lowy Institute,

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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

Euan Graham, states that Chinese aggression in the SCS in the form of
militarization of artificial islands and heightened naval patrols has
pushed the ASEAN nations to seek partnerships with external partners
to fulfill their defense needs.21 This is also highlighted in Prof. Rory
Medcalf’s (Australian National University) work, wherein he argues
that one of the major components of the broader Indo-Pacific strategy
is aimed at countering Chinese expansionism.22 As a result, multilateral
forums such as the Quad have become key players in maintaining a
free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, which is governed by
rules. In addition to traditional threats of territorial claims, the
emergence of asymmetric warfare and non-state actors has forced both
India and the Philippines to bolster defense cooperation. Shedden
Professor at Australian National University, Dr. Evelyn Goh
underscores the significance of defense diplomacy to contribute to
regional stability and dissuade non-traditional threats.23

Although the defense cooperation between India and the Philippines

has been expanding, a noticeable gap remains in the literature on their
defense ties. As already stated, most existing literature on India’s
defense diplomacy with ASEAN nations focuses on Vietnam and
Indonesia. Additionally, while the Philippines’ defense cooperation
with countries such as the US and Japan has been well documented, its
engagement with India remains underexplored. Therefore, this gap
calls for more in-depth studies, especially in light of recent events, as
the strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific and evolving defense
relations between the two. The article aims to fill this research gap by
thoroughly analyzing the strategic ramifications of defense cooperation
between the Philippines and India in the dynamic Indo-Pacific
framework.

Methods

This research adopts a mixed-method approach to examine the

strategic implications of the India-Philippines defense partnership.
This article presents the cooperation between India and the Philippines
in a timeline format from 2019 onwards and thereby comprehensively
analyzes the evolving nature of defense cooperation between the two
nations. It also examines the naval engagements, the Philippines’
military expenditure, and its defense imports to evaluate its
effectiveness as a defense market destination for India under the
Atmanirbhar Initiative. This research employs both primary and
secondary sources. Primary sources comprise white papers and formal

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bilateral documents from the Embassy of India, the Philippines, and

the Ministry of External Affairs, India. Secondary sources include
scholarly articles from reputable journals, books, and reports. The
research methods employed in this study include a historical process to
trace India-Philippines relations, descriptive methods to outline
existing linkages, and analytical techniques to assess the research
findings critically.

Data

Table 3. Timeline of Engagements between India and the Philippines (Since 2019)
Mode of Engagement Year Scope of Cooperation
Visit of President Shri Ram
Nath Kovind to the October 17-21, 2019 70 years of diplomatic relations
Philippines
Telephone conversation
between PM Modi and HE June 09, 2020 COVID-19 pandemic
Rodrigo Duterte
4th India-Philippines Joint
To strengthen defense engagement and
Commission on Bilateral November 06, 2020
maritime cooperation
Cooperation
BrahMos is involved in a deal
with the Philippines for the Significant step toward defense exports
January 28, 2022
export of the Shore-Based (USD 375 Million deal)
Anti-Ship Missile System
Strengthening engagement in
Visit of EAM Jaishankar to February 13-15,
counterterrorism, defense, and maritime
the Philippines 2022
security,
Telephone conversation
Reiterated the Philippines’ role in India’s
between PM Modi and H. E. August 05, 2022
Act East Policy, India’s Indo-Pacific outlook
Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
13th Foreign Office
India-Philippines defense and security
Consultations and 4th August 17-18, 2022
cooperation discussed
Strategic Dialogue
4th Joint Defense Cooperation To enhance cooperation in the defense
March 31, 2023
Committee Meeting industry and the technology domain
5th India-Philippines Joint
Commission on Bilateral June 29, 2023 Bilateral relations discussed
Cooperation
Concerning defense, capacity building, joint
Visit of EAM Jaishankar to
March 25-27, 2024 exercises, and information exchange, these
the Philippines
are to be looked into
Completion of 75 years of diplomatic
14th India-Philippines Policy
relations between India and the
Consultation Talks and 5th September 10, 2024
Philippines. Special logo to mark this was
Strategic Dialogue
released on 13 Nov, 24

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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

Both sides affirmed their commitment to

5th Meeting of India- support self-reliance in defense production
Philippines Joint Defense September 11, 2024 (Self-Reliance Defense Posture Act of the
Cooperation Committee Philippines and Atmanirbhar Bharat of
India)
India-Philippines Maritime Discusses maritime challenges and ways to
December 13, 2024
Dialogue, Manila enhance maritime cooperation

Visit of MoS Shri Pabitra

January 14, 2025 Review bilateral relations
Margherita to the Philippines
Notes. The researcher compiled data from the Embassy of India in the Philippines, the Ministry of
External Affairs, India, and the Press Information Bureau. Source: Author

Table 4. Naval Engagement between India and the Philippines

Naval Engagements (2019-2024)
A visit of INS Sahyadri & Kiltan to the Philippines as a part of the Indian Navy’s October 23-
Overseas Deployment to Southeast Asia and Western Pacific 26, 2019

Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX) in the West Philippine Sea (INS Ranvijay August 23,
and INS Kora for the Indian Navy and BRP Antonio Luna of the Philippine Navy) 2021

MoU between Indian Maritime University and Batangas State University to November 11,
enhance the blue economy and maritime engagement 2022

Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX) in the West Philippine Sea (INS Kadmatt December 12,
and BRP Ramon Alcaraz) to foster maritime cooperation 2023

Visit of INS Delhi, INS Shakti, and INS Kiltan as a part of the Indian Navy’s May 19-22,
Operational Deployment to the SCS 2024
Notes: The researcher compiled all the data from the Embassy of India, Manila, Philippines, PIB, and
the Indian Navy. Source: Author.

Table 5. Philippines- Arms Imports and Military Expenditure

Philippines: Arms Imports and Military Expenditure
Military
Current Military
Arms Imports (in Expenditure
Years Expenditure (In Billion
Million USD) (Percentage of
USD)
GDP)
2010 3 2.44 1.2
2011 63 2.7 1.2
2012 21 2.9 1.1
2013 83 3.38 1.2
2014 12 3.1 1
2015 153 3.34 1.1
2016 228 3.33 1
2017 278 3.84 1.2
2018 17 4.11 1.2
2019 185 4.27 1.1
2020 350 4.69 1.3

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2021 337 5.55 1.4

2022 314 5.32 1.3
2023 225 5.45 1.2
Notes. The researcher compiled all the data using the World Bank Group Data. Source: Author. 24

Table 6. Philippines-China Trade (2019-2024) All figures in USD Billion

Year Total Trade Philippines Philippines Philippines
Exports to Imports from Trade Balance
China China
2019 35.31 9.81 25.50 -15.68
2020 30.70 9.83 20.87 -11.04
2021 38.36 11.56 26.80 -15.24
2022 39.20 10.98 28.22 -17.24
2023 40.32 10.93 29.39 -18.47
2024 42.28 9.44 32.83 -23.39
Notes. The researcher compiled all the data using the OpenSTAT Database of the Philippine Statistics
Authority.25 Source: Author.

Table 7: Philippines-India Trade (2019-2024) All figures in USD Billion

Year Total Trade Philippines Philippines Philippines
Exports to Imports from Trade Balance
India India
2019 2.37 0.55 1.83 -1.28
2020 2.19 0.55 1.63 -1.08
2021 2.99 0.74 2.25 -1.51
2022 2.82 0.72 2.10 -1.38
2023 3.08 1.10 1.98 -0.88
2024 3.33 1.10 2.23 -1.14
Notes. The researcher compiled all the data using the OpenSTAT Database of the Philippine Statistics
Authority.26 Source: Author.

Results

Table 3 depicts the timeline of engagements between India and the

Philippines from January 2019 to September 2024. This table shows
that the relationship between the two nations has evolved significantly,
and defense has emerged as a core pillar of this partnership. This table
presents us with two findings. First, the high-level visits and regular
dialogues indicate that maritime security is an important issue for both
nations, and the recent BrahMos deal has strengthened this
cooperation. In addition to this, counterterrorism has emerged as a
potential area of collaboration which can be worked upon through joint
efforts by both nations in military training and intelligence sharing
second, that the growing defense partnership will contribute to regional
stability in the Indo-Pacific wherein India’s engagement aligns with its
policies of ‘Act East’ and Philippines on the other hand benefits from
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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

technology transfers and industrial cooperation. The increased

collaboration between both nations, especially in the defense sector, is
also significant as it will help India to boost its indigenously developed
defense export and simultaneously make the Philippines self-reliant to
fend off Chinese aggression in the SCS.

Table 4 depicts naval engagement between India and the Philippines

from 2019 to 2024. This cooperation has also grown significantly,
reflecting a robust partnership that is based on the principles of a free,
open, inclusive, and international rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
While MPX primarily focuses on joint maritime patrols and enhancing
interoperability, there is also a shift toward improving collaboration in
the blue economy. These strategic shifts underscore India’s holistic
approach to a prosperous Indo-Pacific region. With the Operational
deployment of INS Delhi, INS Shakti, and INS Kiltan in SCS, India has
come forward in support of ASEAN nations and pushed for an Indo-
Pacific framework that safeguards freedom of navigation.

After assessing Tables 3 and 4, it is important to note that the

engagement between the two nations has not been consistent over the
years. For instance, the gap of around eight years between the third and
fourth JDCC meetings is a major drawback. In a region such as the
Indo-Pacific, which is evolving rapidly, a gap of this magnitude limits
the scope of cooperation between nations. Therefore, consistency is
key. Now that both countries have frequent dialogues and are having
structured engagements, it should continue, as it would address the
evolving challenges of both nations. Notably, since both India and the
Philippines belong to different regions, defense cooperation is key as
both are challenged by Chinese aggression in their respective regions.
Last, both nations should expand their scope to other areas of defense
cooperation, such as cybersecurity and space security, to make the
engagement holistic.

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Figure 2. Philippines Arms Imports (in Million USD)

Figures 2 and 3 (Table 5) illustrate a significant increase in arms

imports and overall military expenditure over the years, reflecting the
Philippines’ consistent efforts to modernize its defense capabilities. The
sharp upticks in 2017 and 2020-21 coincide with increased skirmishes
with China, particularly in the SCS. This sharp rise suggests a reactive
buildup to Chinese assertive maneuvers in the SCS.

Figure 3. Philippines’ Military Expenditure (in Billion USD and percentage of GDP)

Similarly, the long-term trend in military expenditure indicates a

consistent upward trajectory, rising from USD 2.44 billion in 2010 to
USD 5.4 billion in 2023. Although military spending as a percentage of
GDP has remained relatively modest, there has been a consistent
increase in light of evolving regional threats.

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The increase in expenditure reflects the Philippines’ renewed focus on

capacity building to address external threats. This data highlights that
spikes in military spending coincide with peaks in arms imports,
creating a significant opportunity for India’s defense exports under the
Act East Policy and Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. The BrahMos deal
exemplifies India’s potential to establish itself as a key defense partner
through competitive pricing and technology advancement. India’s
emerging role as a reliable arms supplier is in line with the Philippines’
defense modernization agenda. India’s partnership with the Philippines
can also serve as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese dominance and
assertiveness in the SCS and help enhance its strategic footprint in
Southeast Asia.

Figure 4. Comparative Total Trade of the Philippines with China and India (2019-
2024)

Tables 6 and 7 present a comparative snapshot of the Philippines’ trade

relations with China and India from 2019 to 2024. While India’s
bilateral trade with the Philippines only recently crossed the USD 3
billion threshold, the Philippines’ total trade with China has seen a
consistent upward trend and passed USD 42 billion. Moreover, the
Philippines’ trade deficit with China has widened from USD 15.68
Billion in 2019 to over USD 23.39 billion in 2024. On the other hand,
its trade deficit with India is below USD 1.5 billion annually. Philippine
exports to India have doubled over the past four years, from USD 0.55
billion in 2020 to nearly USD 1.10 billion in 2023 and 2024. These
figures suggest that although India’s economic footprint is modest in
comparison to China, India’s strategic and defense-driven engagement

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can serve as a complementary channel of influence expanding across

Southeast Asia.

Discussion and Findings

This article aims to address two key questions: why a defense

partnership is important and mutually advantageous for both nations,
and its role within the broader Indo-Pacific framework. This can be
looked into from the following perspectives. First, the implications of
this partnership extend beyond the bilateral relationship, as they affect
the overall security architecture of Southeast Asia. As both India and
the Philippines face Chinese aggression, this partnership contributes to
ensuring stability in the region. Most ASEAN nations rely on the US for
their security needs. However, with the India-Philippines defense
cooperation, other countries may consider diversifying their security
needs, gaining more flexibility. Meanwhile, India could further
promote its Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. This multilateral approach
also coincides with ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook.

Second, while this partnership has the potential, it faces challenges,

including resource limitations. For instance, although India has greatly
advanced in defense technology, its production capacity for export is
constrained due to its priorities. Similarly, the Philippines may aspire
to be self-reliant in defense, but it still faces financial constraints. Joint
military exercises and defense procurement are associated with high
costs.27 Third, any security involvement or agreement with the ASEAN
nations is likely to draw Beijing’s attention. While both India and the
Philippines are challenged by Chinese assertiveness in the region,
enhanced cooperation could complicate the security landscape for both
nations. For instance, the BrahMos deal could threaten China’s
strategic interests in the area. Therefore, both countries must delicately
balance this cooperation with avoiding any confrontation with
Beijing.28

The growing defense partnership between India and the Philippines

primarily emerges from China’s expansionist policies, particularly in
the SCS, and its aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific. This has led
regional powers, including India, Australia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines, to cooperate and form security partnerships. A similar
trend is observed in the relationship between India and the Philippines.
Although both countries are geographically distinct, Chinese maritime
assertiveness is perceived as a shared security challenge. Although

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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

circumstances in India and the Philippines do not directly impact each

other, China’s challenges to the international tribunal’s decision and its
construction of artificial islands affect nearly all Indo-Pacific nations,
particularly in a globalized and highly interdependent world. This has
led both countries to engage in strategic hedging, wherein both nations
deepen security ties without entering into any exclusive alliances. This
strategic alignment helps them to deter coercion and simultaneously
preserve strategic autonomy. The defense engagement between both
nations is not just an ideological alignment but a pragmatic tool to
manage regional upheavals.

Both India and the Philippines have pursued strategic autonomy within
different geopolitical frameworks. For instance, India’s policy of non-
alignment has evolved into multi-alignment, which helps it balance its
relations with major powers such as the US, Russia, and China, while
also retaining India’s independent decision-making. This diversified
strategy of India aligns with ASEAN’s emphasis on inclusive
regionalism. Therefore, the defense partnership between India and the
Philippines underscores the congruence of flexible strategic doctrines
that are embedded in sovereignty and regional-order building. It allows
both nations to strengthen their defense engagements without
impeding regional security.

The 2022 BrahMos missile deal between India and the Philippines
marked a significant shift in India’s defense export trajectory and
strategic diplomacy, particularly in Southeast Asia. The deal, valued at
USD 375 million, marked the first major export of high-value goods to a
foreign military, highlighting both technological advancement and
India’s step toward positioning itself as a net-security provider in
Southeast Asia. For India, this deal is not just a defense transaction;
rather, it is a manifestation of its will to be self-reliant through its
Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative and emerge as a reliable and
technologically advanced security partner in the Indo-Pacific.
Additionally, as illustrated in Table 2, India maintains formalized
defense partnerships with various Southeast Asian nations, such as the
enhanced partnership with Malaysia, to Comprehensive Strategic
Partnerships with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore. However, the
Philippines is still an emerging partner despite the BrahMos missile
acquisition. This underscores the unleveraged aspect of India’s defense
diplomacy, which could be a major factor in India’s outreach in
Southeast Asia.

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Despite the promising trajectory of bilateral engagement, both India

and the Philippines face structural limitations. For instance, India faces
a lack of R&D integration and export logistics, which could impact its
supply of high-end systems like the BrahMos. On the other hand, the
Philippines faces fiscal limitations, which can complicate its large-scale
defense procurements. Most importantly, the BrahMos deal and the
robust India-Philippines defense engagement have not gone unnoticed
by China, and it might also result in potential escalatory implications.
This dynamic creates a security dilemma, wherein any defensive
engagement could be perceived as offensive posturing by China.
Therefore, both nations must calibrate their defense cooperation in a
way that does not provoke countermeasures from Beijing.

Despite challenges, this partnership also presents significant

opportunities in areas such as joint military exercises and operational
coordination for maritime security. Military naval exercises should
incorporate air defense drills or anti-submarine warfare to demonstrate
the participating nations’ commitment to regional stability.29 In
addition to the BrahMos deal, future agreements in transferring
advanced technology, such as UAV and cyberspace, could be looked
into, as this will not only make the Philippines self-reliant but also
position India as a defense exporter, thereby providing opportunities to
other ASEAN nations to diversify their security needs.30 Even
multilateral engagements could be considered for future growth. This
partnership can serve as a viable alternative to overdependence on any
single major power and reinforce regional stability, which is based on a
multipolar world order. These middle-power coalitions can push
emerging powers to play a definitive role in regional security.

Although this article aims to assess the implications of the India-

Philippines defense partnership, it primarily focuses on engagement
from 2019 to 2024. Consequently, it does not trace the engagement
since the independence of both nations. Second, this article does not
explore non-traditional areas, such as cyber warfare, climate security,
and terrorism. Therefore, concerning future research directions, it
might examine non-traditional aspects and additionally assess the role
of middle powers in shaping the defense landscape in the Indo-Pacific
framework.
Conclusion

The defense partnership between India and the Philippines has

emerged as a pivotal pillar of their bilateral engagement. Although the

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 Anthal and Sharma: Assessing India-Philippines Defence Engagement: Strategic Alignme

diplomatic relations between the nations were established 75 years ago,

cooperation was limited due to ideological differences during the Cold
War years. However, in contemporary years, both countries are faced
with converging interests in the form of a challenge posed by
expansionist China, especially within the Indo-Pacific, and this has led
to more purpose-driven alignment.

Furthermore, both nations are combating terrorism and insurgencies;

for instance, Pakistan backed terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and
insurgent groups like Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao. India’s experience in
fighting terrorism and insurgencies equips it to be a valuable security
partner for the Philippines. There is no doubt that the defense
partnership, especially the BrahMos deal, marks a monumental
achievement in the bilateral relations. Still, this partnership can achieve
more, as both nations are also part of multilateral platforms that can
ensure regional stability and serve as a credible deterrent against
Chinese aggression in the region.

To conclude, this study argues that the defense partnership between

India and the Philippines, although evolving, holds significant promise
and could serve as a critical avenue for India’s defense exports under its
Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, as well as a viable model for cooperation
with ASEAN nations. Looking forward, this engagement is expected to
grow in the future with deeper collaboration in sectors such as the blue
economy, counterterrorism, and advanced technology within the Indo-
Pacific framework.

Endnotes
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