FAO

ADISMUN2025
Forum: Food and Agriculture Organization FAO

Issue: Ensuring Food Security During Global Supply Chain

Disruptions

Student Officer: Aarya Sheth

Contact: aarya.adani2038@[Link]

Introduction:

This Food and Agricultural Organization-convened meeting strikes an utmost urgent position in
giving expression to a time when food security matters are becoming threatening concerns with
fragile inter-linked supply chains. Food, as a derivative right of man, is supposed to enjoy
paramount protection by law; notwithstanding, acute food insecurity has become a household
issue only within one generation. At least 400 million are affected by food insecurity. The real
crisis is becoming useless to assume any racial or territorial form in the first place: At one time,
it could somehow be relegated to conflicts, or zones of environmental disasters. Currently,
systemic shocks in the trade channels and global food distribution are moving this crisis to the
headlines.

Rulers have always existed historically, ever since globalization was born and global foods
became a concept toward the late 19th century. The recent events, beginning with COVID-19,
currently and with all the other conflicts, have brutally exposed them. These interruptions-to-
ban-on-border restrictions-are putting fresh restraints on transport, stimulating increments in
energy costs, are governments' export prohibitions: It does not take long before food prices soar
in a continent or another; in another, shortages occur of essential agricultural inputs, such as
fertilizers, and seeds; in yet another, malnutrition, and starvation begin to flourish. Food
insecurity stands at the intersection-adversely inducing agricultural and nutritional outcomes, ill-
considered interventions of reduced yields, farm abandonment, and dietary sufficiency threaten-
another sector of global food systems governance agenda. From the agriculture and development
viewpoint, food insecurity should become a concern under the wider remit of the FAO: food
security for all and ensuring that all people have access to sufficient good quality food at all
times for an active and healthy life.

The report shall be drafted to serve as the fulcrum of developing ideas by presenting the four
dimensions of food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability-that respond to
disruptions arising from global supply chain failures on each of these dimensions; the current
global hunger crisis emanates out of systemic failures. Probably the most visible of them is the
mission to ensure resilient, sustainable, and fairly supported international agri-food systems that
will withstand any shock in the future to sustain farmers worldwide and global well-being
indeed.

Definition of Key Terms:

Global Food Governance: The complex, multi-layered system of formal and informal
norms, rules, institutions like the WHO, FAO, WTO, and practices that shape how food is
produced, distributed, and consumed worldwide, often involving actors with
asymmetrical power.

The Right to Adequate Food: A fundamental human right recognized under

international law specifically Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, which requires States to ensure their citizens have physical and
economic access to food.

Committee on World Food Security CFS: The UN’s foremost inclusive international
and intergovernmental platform for all stakeholders to work together on food security and
nutrition. A key body for coordinating global policy.

Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food: A set of non-binding principles adopted

by the FAO/CFS in 2004 to help governments implement the right to adequate food
through national strategies and legislation.

Official Development Assistance ODA: Financial aid given by developed countries to

support the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Crucial for
financing food security and supply chain resilience projects.

Food Import Financing: Mechanisms, often involving loans or credit from international
financial institutions, that allow food-deficit countries to purchase necessary food imports
during periods of high prices or supply disruption.
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships: Collaborative arrangements involving governments,
international organizations, civil society, and the private sector to address complex
challenges like food system resilience.

Climate-Smart Agriculture CSA: An approach that helps to guide actions needed to

transform and reorient agricultural systems to effectively support development and
ensure food security in a changing climate. It pursues three objectives:

1. Sustainably increasing agricultural productivity and incomes.

2. Adapting and building resilience to climate change.
3. Reducing and/or removing greenhouse gas emissions mitigation.

Greenhouse Gas GHG Emissions from Food Systems: Emissions of carbon dioxide,
methane, and nitrous oxide that result from agricultural production, land-use change,
transport, and waste management. Addressing these is essential for long-term food
system stability.

Forced Displacement/Climate Migration: The movement of people away from their

homes due to factors that impact livelihoods and food access, such as conflict or climate
change-induced disasters droughts, floods, which places immense strain on host
countries' food supplies.

Zoonotic Diseases: Infectious diseases that are transmissible from animals to humans.
Supply chain disruptions that lead to poor sanitation, crowding in processing, or poor
animal health management can increase the risk of Zoonotic outbreaks, presenting a
direct public health threat.

Buffer Stocks Food Reserves: Government-held reserves of staple food commodities

like grain intended to be released onto the market to stabilize domestic prices and
ensure supply during a crisis or production shortfall.

Early Warning Systems EWS: Systems that use data e.g., climate forecasts,
commodity prices, nutritional surveys to predict impending food crises, allowing national
governments and international organizations to implement preventive actions rather than
reactive aid. Examples include the FAO's GIEWS.

Digital Supply Networks DSNs: The use of advanced technologies AI, IoT, blockchain
to create visibility and transparency across the end-to-end supply chain, enabling
organizations to anticipate and react faster to disruptions.
 Post-Harvest Losses PHL: The measurable quantitative and qualitative food loss that
occurs from the time of harvest up to the moment of consumption excluding
consumption itself, largely due to poor handling, storage, or transport infrastructure.

General Overview:

Food Security during Global Supply Chain Disruptions is a matter of numbers. A shock in a
capacity in today's food systems, being an interconnected yet fragile multi-trillion economic
network, would instantly jeopardize the welfare of the globe. In this aspect, the analysis
approaches several quantitative aspects of the problem at hand and discusses and elaborates
on the data linking the four main causal factors of the disruptions-the aftermaths of disruptions,
the spread of food insecurity, that is.

I. Human and Economic Scales of the Crisis

Global food supply chain disruptions are world hunger crises thinly disguised as economic
inconveniences and interruptions in the steady flow of goods and services.

The factors causing acute food insecurity are increasing at an alarming rate: The pandemic,
acts of politics, and climate extremes have been undoing decades of progress towards
achieving Sustainable Development Goal 2 Zero Hunger of the United Nations.

| Metric | Pre-pandemic | Pandemic peak | Latest Data | Source |

Statistic Baseline 2022 Most Recent Source

2019 2023

People Facing Acute Hunger ∼135 ∼222 ∼295 million Global Report on
IPC Phase 3 or higher million million Food Crises
GRFC

Increase Since 2019 - +87 +160 million GRFC

million

People Moderately/Severely ∼2.3 N/A ∼2.3 billion FAO SOFI report

Food-Insecure billion Databank from
2021
Central Data Observation: Acute food insecurity had started affecting people even before the
COVID pandemic; what has changed, however, is that the scale of interventions for saving lives
and livelihoods has more than doubled in cost. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, around 828
million people in the world have become chronically undernourished or starving, an increase of
roughly 150 million. This means supply chain shocks-especially those that put an upward
pressure on price-tend to push fast into food crises those that were bordering on being food
secure.

B. Price Shock and Lack of Access

Price inflation-the main avenue through which supply chain disruption threatens food security
and economic access to food.

Increase of Global Food Price Index: The FFPI rose to record highs in March 2022 post the
onset of Russia-Ukraine war II, adding to the logistics crisis created by the pandemic. In a single
month from February to March 2022, it rose by 12.6%. Though there might have been some
moderation in the FFPI since then, the more significant point remains that food price inflation
tends to remain stubbornly high at the domestic level in many low- and middle-income
countries.

Fertilizer and Input Prices: There is another major supply chain disruption coming from the
surge in global energy prices. Natural gas is a critical feedstock for nitrogen fertilizers. By April
2022, prices of natural gas and fertilizers used for nitrogen fertilizer production had more than
doubled since June 2021. Fertilizer prices had peaked at £2.0 billion in the UK in 2022, up from
£1.5 billion in 2021, as a direct outcome of the energy crisis compounded by the Ukraine
conflict. The heightened costs are then passed onto the food prices to be realized in the
upcoming harvest seasons.

II. Major Drivers and Quantitative Impacts

All three converging megatrends have thus forged the weak state of the global food supply
chain: geopolitical concentration, climate change, and logistical bottlenecks.

A. Geopolitical Concentration and Conflict

Strategic breadbasket regions and key transit hubs must act together to maintain secure and
profitable global trade, hence, disruptions in such concentrations trick the globally.

Life of the Black Sea: Before the war, Russia and Ukraine constituted almost 30 percent of
wheat traded worldwide and a sizeable proportion of sunflower oil. Barricading the Black Sea
ports in 2022 effectively strangulated millions of tons of grains from the global market, creating
panic and volatility.
Dependence on Fertilizers: Russia produces a huge chunk of global supplies of key fertilizers-
nitrogen, potash. It also threatened crop yields in a very general way through export restrictions.
Without cheap fertilizer could make crop yields in Africa and Latin America fall by about 10-15
percent in one season.

Major Parties Involved

The global food crisis is measured not just in human suffering, but in stark, escalating data
points. The shift from 135 million people facing acute hunger IPC Phase 3 or higher in 2019 to
295 million in 2023, as reported by the Global Report on Food Crises GRFC, represents a
119% increase and underscores a systemic failure in global food resilience. This crisis is driven
primarily by conflict the main driver for 135 million people in 2023, extreme weather affecting
77 million people, and economic shocks impacting 75 million people, necessitating a robust,
data-informed response from international organizations, major nations, and financial
institutions.

The UN system is the primary source of global food security metrics and the largest coordinated
emergency responder.

The FAO, WFP, and IFAD co-author The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
SOFI report, which provides the authoritative annual assessment:
● Moderate or Severe Food Insecurity: The number of people experiencing moderate or
severe food insecurity lacking regular access to adequate food stood at 2.33 billion
globally in 2023 databank from 2021 cited in initial data, representing 28.9% of the
world's population. This figure includes over 864 million people facing severe food
insecurity, a condition where they have run out of food and, at worst, gone a day or more
without eating.
● Cost of Healthy Diets: The report highlights a significant structural barrier: in 2023,
over 3.1 billion people globally could not afford a healthy diet, demonstrating that the
issue is often one of economic access, not just physical availability.
● FAO's Action: The FAO's Hand-in-Hand Initiative uses geospatial data to target
agricultural investments, aiming to reduce the number of hungry people by supporting
countries in accelerating agrifood systems transformation.

The WFP is the frontline responder, operating the largest logistics chain for food aid:
● Operational Scale: The WFP aims to bring food assistance to more than 80 million
people in over 80 countries annually.
● Funding and Need: WFP's operational needs have consistently outstripped its funding.
In 2022, its funding gap was substantial, a key factor in having to cut rations for millions
 of people in food-crisis countries like Yemen and South Sudan, demonstrating the direct
impact of donor contributions on emergency aid delivery.
● Logistical Feat: In crisis contexts, the WFP delivers not just food, but also complex
logistics and supply chain services to the entire humanitarian community, a service
valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

IFAD focuses its financial action squarely on rural poverty, where the bulk of the world's hungry
reside:
● Long-Term Impact: Over the past four decades, IFAD has supported approximately
483 million poor rural people through targeted investment.
● Investment Focus: IFAD's projects focus on smallholder productivity. For example, a
project in Angola helped increase crop and livestock yields by 19% and 52%
respectively for 2.5 million farmers, of which 37% were women.

Major developed nations, particularly the G7, provide the essential financial capital for both
humanitarian relief and long-term development.

The U.S. remains the world's single-largest donor of humanitarian and development aid:
● Total Aid: In Fiscal Year FY 2023, the U.S. government disbursed 71.9 billion in foreign
aid, with a significant portion dedicated to humanitarian assistance, which totaled 15.6
billion 21.7% of total aid.
● Feed the Future FTF Impact: The U.S. government's flagship FTF initiative focuses on
sustainable agricultural growth. In FY 2023 alone, FTF helped more than 6.2 million
producers apply improved agricultural practices, supported over 4.6 billion in annual
sales from producers and firms, and leveraged 677 million in private sector investment.
Since its launch, extreme poverty decreased by an average of 19% in the areas where
FTF focused its efforts between 2010 and 2019.

The EU is a powerhouse of development and humanitarian financing, often acting through its
"Team Europe" approach:
● Financial Commitment: Between 2020 and 2024, the EU committed to investing €18
billion for food security worldwide.
● Humanitarian Focus: Approximately one-third of the EU's annual humanitarian aid
budget between 2021 and 2024 was allocated to humanitarian food and nutrition
assistance, with the 2024 allocation surpassing €731 million.
● Targeted Funding: In 2022, the EU swiftly mobilized an additional €600 million in
financial support for the most vulnerable African, Caribbean, and Pacific ACP countries
hit by the food crisis exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.

IFIs stabilize economies and invest in the infrastructure required to withstand future food
shocks.
The World Bank provides massive, long-term financing that connects food security to climate
resilience and poverty reduction:
● Investment Portfolio: Over the last five years up to 2024, the World Bank directly
financed 22.3 billion for food and agriculture, with 3.6 billion specifically supporting
resilience measures.
● Impact Targets: By 2030, the World Bank's interventions in food and nutrition security
are expected to benefit 327 million people.
● Climate-Smart Agriculture CSA: Since the Paris Agreement, the Bank has increased
its annual investment in CSA eightfold to nearly 3 billion by FY23. In FY24, 62% of its
total lending in the agriculture and food sector was designated as climate finance,
demonstrating a strategic pivot toward climate resilience. As of FY24, active Bank
projects have supported 4.7 million farmers in adopting improved agricultural
technologies, including CSA.

The IMF's actions are indirect but crucial, providing the fiscal space for countries to manage
food import costs:
● Food Shock Window: Following the 2022 food and fertilizer price spikes, the IMF
created the Food Shock Window under its emergency financing instruments. This
allowed countries with urgent balance-of-payments needs—driven by the cost of
importing food and fertilizer—to access rapid financial assistance, helping them avoid
implementing harmful trade restrictions.

Non-state actors provide the innovation and the essential last-mile delivery.

Agricultural research is a high-return investment, largely driven by public-private collaboration:

● CGIAR Economic Impact: The CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research network, a global partnership of research centers, has generated crop-related
technologies that contribute an estimated US47 billion each year to the global
economy.
● Adoption Rates: CGIAR crop technologies were adopted across at least 221 million
hectares in at least 92 countries in 2020. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the use of improved
maize varieties developed by CGIAR's CIMMYT has led to an average yield increase of
38.9% an increase of 429 kg/ha. This productivity gain is fundamental to long-term food
stability.

NGOs and Civil Society bridge the gap between large-scale funding and individual needs:
● The Humanitarian Footprint: Large international NGOs e.g., CARE, Oxfam are often
the largest implementing partners for UN agencies and bilateral donors. In crisis zones,
they execute the immediate distribution of food and cash transfers, reaching millions.
● Specialized Interventions: They focus on critical metrics like wasting acute
malnutrition. The GRFC 2024 noted that over 36 million children under age five across
 32 countries suffered from acute malnutrition in 2023, with NGOs being central to
delivering therapeutic feeding and nutrition support programs.

The fight against hunger is a monumental undertaking, quantified by the massive numbers of
people in crisis nearly 295 million acutely hungry and the sheer scale of the required response.
The global community has mobilized tens of billions of dollars, with the U.S. and EU leading the
donor contributions, the UN system providing the strategic operational capacity and data, and
the World Bank focusing massive capital on climate-resilient systems. However, the consistent
rise in acute hunger since 2019—up +160 million people—indicates that the drivers of crisis,
particularly conflict and climate change, are outpacing current interventions. Success depends
on moving from merely responding to humanitarian crises to systematically investing in the
resilience and productivity of the rural poor, underpinned by accurate data and sustained
financial commitment from all major global parties.
Timeline of Key Events:

2025 Present - Ongoing

Date Event/Development Key Policy & Context

September Famine Confirmed in Gaza and Humanitarian agencies

2025 Sudan: The September Update stressed the urgent need
of the Global Report on Food for an immediate
Crises GRFC confirmed famine ceasefire and
in Gaza and parts of Sudan, and unhindered, large-scale
identified a risk of famine in aid to prevent mass death.
South Sudan. Around 1.4 million Global funding restrictions
people faced Catastrophic levels severely impacted food
IPC Phase 5 of acute food security operations.
insecurity in six territories.

May 2025 Launch of Global Report on The report highlighted

Food Crises 2025: The report plummeting funding for
showed that acute hunger addressing food crises
increased for the sixth despite the growing
consecutive year, with over 295 urgency, with the food
million people in 53 sector expected to receive
countries/territories facing high less funding than it did a
levels of acute food insecurity in decade prior.
2024.

Early 2025 Food Crisis in East and The World Bank, WFP,
Southern Africa: Approximately and FAO published a joint
62.9 million people in the region report, "Strengthening
faced high levels of acute food Strategic Grain Reserves
insecurity due to conflict, to Enhance Food
displacement, drought, and Security," advocating for
economic shocks. integrating strategic grain
reserves with broader food
security strategies trade,
private sector, safety nets.
2024

Date Event/Development Key Policy & Context

2024 Global Hunger Statistics: The International organizations,

State of Food Security and Nutrition including WFP, continued to
in the World SOFI 2024 reported focus on building resilience,
that 713 to 757 million people adapting to climate change
faced hunger in 2023, persisting at e.g., R4 Rural Resilience
the high levels seen since 2021. initiative, and supporting
2.33 billion people experienced governments in developing
moderate or severe food insecurity. national safety nets and
nutrition-sensitive social
protection.

April Launch of Global Report on Food —

2024 Crises 2024: The report confirmed
that in 2023, about 258 million
people in 58 countries/territories
faced high levels of acute food
insecurity IPC Phase 3 or above, the
highest number in the eight-year
history of the GRFC.

2022-2023: The Poly-Crisis Peak

Date Event/Development Key Policy & Context

2023 Global Food Insecurity Levels: FAO estimated that the war
Global hunger persisted at high in Ukraine caused an
levels. The number of people facing additional 20 to 30 million
high levels of acute food insecurity in people globally to face
crisis countries IPC Phase 3 or hunger.
above remained near the 2022 high
of 258 million.

Early Russian Invasion of Ukraine: The Many staple-food-producing

2022 conflict severely disrupted global countries responded with
markets for wheat, maize, oil export bans and
seeds, and fertilizers, leading to an restrictions e.g., India's
immediate and massive surge in export ban on wheat, which
international food prices to near all- further tightened global
time highs peaking in May 2022. supply and exacerbated
price inflation for food-import-
dependent countries.

Mid- "Cost of Living" Crisis: Food price The World Bank Group and
2022 inflation spiked well above 20% in the G7 Presidency co-
parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, convened the Global
and Europe, contributing to a global Alliance for Food Security
"cost of living" crisis. The World to catalyze an immediate and
Bank noted a 34% increase in concerted response to the
people facing acute food insecurity global hunger crisis.
in 2022 compared to 2021.
 2022 Extreme Climate Events: An The World Bank announced
unprecedented heat wave in India several large-scale projects
led to a 25% fall in wheat yields in to strengthen food system
some areas, prompting the resilience, including a 500
government to impose an export million project for Egypt's
ban. Emergency Food Security
and Resilience Support and
major grants for Yemen,
Madagascar, and the Sahel
region.

2020-2021: The COVID-19 Shock

 Date Event/Development Key Policy & Context

2021 Supply Chain & Demand-Driven Price The UN Food Systems

Surge: International prices for major Summit aimed to launch
food items surged, nearing the levels of bold actions to deliver
the 2007-08 and 2010-11 food price progress on all
crises. The rise was driven by a Sustainable
recovery in food demand following the Development Goals
global recession, coupled with supply SDGs by transforming
disruptions from droughts e.g., in the food systems to be
US and Canada, and ongoing logistics healthier, more
issues. sustainable, and
equitable.

2020 COVID-19 Pandemic Impact: The The number of people in

arrival of the pandemic, with associated crisis or worse IPC
lockdowns and economic slowdown, Phase 3 or above
disrupted global food supply chains, increased by nearly 21
caused a worldwide recession, and led million from 2019,
to rising unemployment. totaling 155 million
people who were acutely
food insecure.

Early Initial Price Volatility: Prices for wheat, —

2020 maize, and soybeans initially fell in the
first half of 2020 due to the economic
contraction, though they would rebound
strongly later in the year.

2019 Baseline
 Date Event/Development Key Policy & Context

2019 Pre-Pandemic Baseline: The Global Global hunger rose

Report on Food Crises GRFC 2020 sharply from 2019 to 2021
reported that 135 million people in 55 due to the subsequent
countries faced Crisis or worse IPC compounding crises
Phase 3 or above in 2019, with COVID-19, conflict, climate
conflict, climate, and economic change, adding 122 million
shocks already identified as the people to the ranks of the
primary drivers of food insecurity. chronically hungry by 2022.

Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue:

Initiative / Meeting Resolution / Action Global Impact or Goal

1. World Bank The WBG announced a 30 Financial Mobilization &

Group WBG Food billion food and nutrition Resilience: Supports food
Security security package including and fertilizer production,
Response new and existing funds enhances social protection
spanning 15 months April 2022 cash transfers, and invests
to June 2023. in resilient food systems,
primarily in Africa, the
Middle East, and South
Asia.
2. G20 Global Deccan Principles on Food Policy Alignment: Aims
Alliance against Security and Nutrition: to accelerate collective
Hunger and Commitment to seven high- action among G20
Poverty GAAHP level principles, including members and partners to
transforming agriculture, reduce hunger and
promoting food access, and poverty, focusing on
building resilient systems. inclusive and sustainable
food systems that benefit
smallholders.

3. Black Sea Grain Agreement brokered by the UN Stabilizing Global

Initiative BSGI and Turkey allowing the safe Markets: Facilitated the
2022-2023 export of grain, foodstuffs, export of over 32 million
and fertilizer from three metric tons of food,
Ukrainian ports Odesa, providing crucial supply to
Chornomorsk, the world, lowering global
Yuzhny/Pivdennyi. food prices, and
supporting countries in
need e.g., in the Horn of
Africa.

4. COP28 UAE Declaration endorsed by over Climate-Food Policy

Declaration on 134 countries, formally Integration: Marks the
Sustainable recognizing the first formal step at a COP
Agriculture, interdependence of climate to align agricultural policy
Resilient Food change and food security. with climate goals, driving
Systems, and Pledged to integrate food investment in climate-
Climate Action systems into National resilient farming, water
Adaptation Plans NAPs and management, and
Nationally Determined sustainable production.
Contributions NDCs.
5. UN Food Convened in Rome in 2023 to Accountability and
Systems review progress from the 2021 Acceleration: Reinforced
Stocktaking Food Systems Summit. the commitment to specific
Moment UNFSS+2 Resulted in renewed political national actions e.g.,
will to implement National promoting healthy diets
Pathways for food system and shifting subsidies and
transformation. helped coordinate the
efforts of various UN
coalitions and agencies.

6. The School Government-led effort over 105 Safety Net and Local
Meals Coalition countries to ensure every child Economy Boost:
SMC receives a healthy school Reached 466 million
meal by 2030. Promotes children, making it the
Home-Grown School Feeding world's largest social
to link school programs with safety net. It addresses
local smallholder farmers. hunger, improves nutrition,
enhances education, and
strengthens local food
systems and markets.

7. IMF Food A temporary financing Short-Term Liquidity:

Shock Window mechanism within the IMF's Provides concessional
emergency lending instruments financing to low-income
to provide rapid financial countries that cannot
assistance to countries access conventional
facing acute food insecurity programs, helping
and balance of payments governments maintain
issues due to the food crisis. essential food imports and
strengthen social safety
nets quickly.
 8. International Joint action plan to intensify Bridging the
Fund for collaboration in fragile Humanitarian-
Agricultural contexts. Focuses on Development Nexus:
Development integrating smallholder farmers Ensures that emergency
IFAD & WFP into food assistance and food assistance is
Action Plan investing in climate resilience strategically linked to long-
through joint assessments and term resilience-building,
shared logistics. helping communities
recover faster from shocks
and prevent future crises.

Possible Solutions:

The possible solutions to the global food crisis require a systemic, multi-faceted approach that
addresses underlying drivers like climate change, poverty, inequality, and inefficient food supply
chains.

The core strategies focus on transforming production methods, strengthening global and local
markets, and reducing the massive amount of food that is lost or wasted.

This table outlines critical solutions, the mechanisms for implementation, and their intended
impact on the global food system.

Solution Area Key Actions / Mechanisms Intended Long-Term Impact

1. Transform Climate-Smart Agriculture CSA: Resilience & Mitigation:
Agricultural Adopt practices like conservation Increases farm productivity
Practices agriculture minimum tillage, and income, enhances soil
agroforestry, and crop health carbon
diversification rotation, sequestration, reduces
intercropping. Develop/deploy water use, and shields
drought-tolerant and disease- farmers from extreme
resistant crop varieties e.g., weather shocks.
through gene-editing or using
traditional, resilient varieties.

2. Reduce Invest in Rural Infrastructure: Efficiency & Availability:

Food Loss Provide hermetic storage Reclaims an estimated of
and Waste equipment silos, bags and all food produced, saving
FLW improved cold chain logistics billion annually, reducing
refrigerated transport/storage in pressure on land/water,
developing countries to minimize and lowering the food
post-harvest loss. Policy & system's Greenhouse Gas
Consumer Action: Implement GHG emissions which are
clear, standardized date labeling 8–10% of the global total.
"best by" vs. "use by" and fund
public awareness campaigns to
reduce household/retail waste SDG
12.3 target: halve waste by 2030.
3. Empower Targeted Investment and Poverty Reduction &
Smallholder Access: Increase climate finance Supply Stability:
Farmers and direct investment into rural Smallholders produce
infrastructure feeder roads, energy, about one-third of the
irrigation. Provide secure land world’s food; empowering
tenure especially for women, them stabilizes local supply
access to affordable finance chains, lifts rural
credit/insurance, and agricultural populations out of poverty,
extension services. Market and drives the adoption of
Linkages: Create cooperatives regenerative farming.
and establish direct links to local
and national markets to ensure
farmers receive a fair price and can
invest their profits.

4. Enhance Prevent Trade Distortions: Global Price Stability:

Market Correct and prevent the use of Ensures a predictable,
Stability and export restrictions or bans on functioning world
Trade food commodities, which agricultural market,
exacerbate price volatility and harm preventing panic buying
import-dependent nations. Improve and price spikes that
Market Information: Facilitate disproportionately affect the
timely access to information on poorest consumers and
food reserves, stocks, and nations.
production forecasts to help limit
extreme food price volatility and
support rational decision-making.

5. Strengthen Expand Safety Nets: Implement Immediate Access &

Social and expand social protection Nutrition: Ensures the
Protection programs like cash transfers, food most vulnerable
assistance for assets WFP populations have
programs, and universal school immediate access to safe,
meal programs linked to local nutritious food, protecting
production "Home-Grown School children from stunting and
Feeding". wasting, and stimulating
local agricultural demand.
To ensure the solutions above are effective, two major enablers must be scaled globally:

1. Climate-Resilient Water Management

● Action: Move beyond rain-fed monoculture by investing in water-saving irrigation
practices e.g., drip irrigation, Alternate Wetting and Drying AWD for rice and rainwater
harvesting infrastructure.
● Impact: Protects harvests against drought, significantly improves water-use efficiency,
and allows for higher-value crop cultivation in arid regions.

2. Digital and Financial Inclusion

● Action: Scale digital advisory services for farmers e-agriculture apps for weather/soil
data, implement early warning systems for climate disasters and pest outbreaks, and
2
develop climate insurance schemes to buffer farmers against catastrophic crop loss.
● Impact: Reduces risk, enables farmers to make precise decisions on planting and
fertilizer application precision agriculture, and provides the financial stability needed to
adopt new, more sustainable farming techniques.

The exercise of the veto power by the five permanent members P5: China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States of the UN Security Council UNSC has repeatedly
blocked resolutions and proposals aimed at addressing and alleviating global food insecurity,
particularly in conflict zones. These vetoes, driven by geopolitical interests, have been criticized
for obstructing humanitarian access and prolonging crises where hunger is a key weapon or
consequence.

Several UNSC draft resolutions that included provisions for humanitarian aid and the cessation
of conflict a major driver of food crises have been vetoed:
● Syria Humanitarian Access Multiple Vetoes:
○ Russia and China have repeatedly vetoed resolutions concerning the
humanitarian situation in Syria. For example, in July 2020, they vetoed a
resolution that would have permitted the delivery of essential food and medical
supplies to millions of Syrians through key border crossings. Critics argue these
vetoes prioritized support for the Syrian government over humanitarian necessity.
● Gaza Ceasefire and Aid US Veto:
○ The United States has vetoed multiple resolutions related to the conflict in Gaza.
In a recent example June 2025, according to one source, the U.S. vetoed a
resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and demanding the removal of all
Israeli restrictions on aid delivery, even as the entire population faced acute
food insecurity and confirmed famine. The veto was cast despite the resolution's
call for the release of all hostages.
● Sudan Conflict and Aid Russia Veto:
 ○ In April 2024, Russia vetoed a resolution that called on armed groups in Sudan
to halt attacks on civilians and allow aid to be delivered. This action blocked a
resolution designed to address the conflict that is fueling Sudan's devastating
food insecurity crisis.

Beyond direct vetoes on humanitarian resolutions, the actions and inactions of major powers
create broader blockages to ending global hunger:
● Conflict as a Driver of Hunger: The primary obstacle to global food security is conflict,
with almost 60% of the world's hungriest people living in war zones. The P5's use of the
veto in conflict-related situations—such as in Ukraine, Syria, and the Occupied
Palestinian Territory—hinders peacebuilding efforts and prevents safe, unrestricted
access for life-saving food assistance. Russia, for instance, has repeatedly vetoed
resolutions concerning its military activities in Ukraine, indirectly prolonging a conflict that
has global ramifications for food prices and availability.
● Prioritizing Geopolitics over Humanitarianism: The consistent use of the veto to
block resolutions on major crises is seen by many as placing geopolitical strategy and
national interests above the humanitarian needs of starving populations. The P5
effectively turn the UNSC, the body designed to ensure peace, "into a forum for
interstate bickering," which results in the failure to act on crises like those in Sudan,
Gaza, and Syria.
● Funding Shortfalls: While not a "veto," the lack of financial commitment from wealthy
nations is a major systemic blockage. For example, to end extreme and chronic hunger,
donor governments would need to invest an estimated 37 billion annually until 2030, a
figure equal to about 1% of the world's annual military and arms spending. Severe
funding shortfalls for organizations like the World Food Programme WFP force them to
scale back assistance, leaving vulnerable populations without support.
● Lack of Political Will: Experts argue that ending world hunger is not a matter of a lack
of food—the world produces enough—but a matter of political will to address the
systemic root causes: conflict, poverty, inequality, and climate change. The inability of
major powers to reach a consensus, particularly in the Security Council, exemplifies this
political paralysis.

Appendices:

To the main maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council of the United
Nations was charged. The design of the Council, with its so-called veto power of five permanent
members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, has caused
paralysis on numerous occasions. Hence this strange phenomena of resolutions being vetoed
over major global issues.

Major Issues of Concern and Obstructed Actions

Set as one basic principle in the UN Charter in 1945, thus allowing a permanent member to veto
any resolution that is substantive irrespective of its acceptance by other member states, this
power has been considered undemocratic by many. It is mainly blamed for the Security
Council's failure to act timely in many major international emergency situations.

1. Humanitarian Crises and Huge Atrocities

It has been vetoed in the face of P5 when disaster intervention has been imminent in grave
humanitarian crises, war crimes, and genocide instances.

Syria: Since 2011, Russia and China have exercised the veto power several times in respect
of the Syrian conflict in relation to, among others:
Sanctions against the Syrian regime.
Referrals of the situation to the International Criminal Court ICC.
The renewal of cross-border mechanisms for humanitarian aid.
Israel-Palestine: The U.S. has used and continues to use its veto power to block resolutions
condemning Israeli actions, particularly with respect to Israeli settlements, protection of
Palestinian civilians, and most recently, resolutions regarding the Gaza war.
Other Conflicts: Before the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Russia also vetoed the
resolution commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide; China and Russia
also vetoed resolutions on Myanmar and Zimbabwe during the 2000s.

2. Geopolitical Issues and Peacekeeping

The veto is employed systematically by its P5 members to shield their allies and themselves
from international condemnation or intervention, at the price of paralyzing peacekeeping and
conflict resolution.

Ukraine: Russia has vetoed resolutions on Ukraine in connection with its invasion and actions.
Venezuela: In 2019, Russia and China vetoed a resolution calling for free and fair presidential
elections in Venezuela and access for international aid.
Peacekeeping and Sanctions: With the veto, P5 can exercise an absolute veto over all binding
UN sanctions, peacekeeping operations, membership admissions, and expulsions-which quite
often predefines the form and mandates of peacekeeping operations well before their draft is
conceived.

3. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Such vetoes have, on occasion, taken place in regard to resolutions on non-proliferation, mainly
concerning states considered to be in a P5 sphere of influence or those challenging their
geopolitical rivals unfairly.

North Korea DPRK:Russia and China have vetoed resolutions on non-proliferation matters
relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In February 2022 and March 2024,
Russia vetoed resolutions concerning the DPRK's weapons programs.

4. The New Thematic Security Issues Climate Change, etc.

A big contention is the new, non-traditional regime on the agenda of the Security Council.

Climate Security: In December 2021, Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have, for the
first time, explicitly defined climate change as a threat to international peace and security.
The resolution had been co-sponsored by 113 member states, with 12 of the 15 Council
members in support China abstained, and India voted no, and it sought to build climate-related
security risks into conflict-prevention strategies.
Opponents, primarily Russia, argued that climate change should be handled by broader UN
forums like the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC, claiming that adding it
to the Security Council agenda would politicize the issue and grant the Council a pretext for
intervention in nearly any nation's internal affairs.

Bigger Issues Regarding Structural Reform

Discussions about vetoed resolutions trace back to the bigger issues involving the archaic
structure of the Security Council.

Outdated Composition: The current P5 composition reflects the geopolitical power distribution of
1945, rather than that of today.
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DISEC
ADISMUN2025
Forum: Disarmament and International Security Committee DISEC

Question of: Preventing the Escalation of Autonomous Drone Warfare

in Global Conflicts

Student Officer: Aarya Sheth

Contact: aarya.adani2038@[Link]

Introduction:

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FROM SEVENTEENTH CENTURY C.E.-

PRESENT: Meeting an Extraordinary Time brings then to the twilight of terror wars, Lethal
Autonomous Weapon Systems or LAWS. The hybrid war has meant an existential danger of
former times with autonomous drone wars unleashed on almost global scale. We are the First
Committee of the General Assembly; our sole mandate is to maintain international peace and
security-and here and now is the moment to resolutely act on an emerging technology
threatening to tear into existing global security architecture.

The heart of the crisis lays in delegating lethal decision-making authority namely, the functions
of selection and engagement of targets from human beings onto machines with AI. While UAVs
have been around for several decades, the systems today increasingly autonomous are drones,
loitering munitions, and drone swarms.

A stark example stressing how urgently this matter has to be addressed comes from what
apparently happened in Libya in 2020: a Kargu-2, of Turkish origin, attacked totally
autonomously, and thus, said to be perhaps "the first instance of a machine taking lethal action
without human input," by the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya. Such an event has
moved the discussion from pure hypotheticals and thus denotes that the technology is already
existing and has also been used.

Humanitarian, Legal, and Ethical Considerations

The introduction of this kind of warfare casts doubt on the most fundamental principles of
International Humanitarian Law, most prominently Distinction and Proportionality:

The Principle of Distinction: An Keywords system must be able to distinguish, on a consistent

basis, between combatants and protected civilians and civilian objects. Present-day AI systems,
it has been argued, simply cannot make these complex life and death decisions on their own
without human judgment, contextual understanding, and even some application of moral
reasoning. It raises the question: especially in the "fog of war"?
The Accountability Gap: Consider an autonomous drone committing a war crime or accidental
killings with incidental and disproportional loss of civilians. Who will be held accountable: the
soldier, the programmer, the commander, or the drone itself? Since this question can hardly be
answered, the system develops an inherent "responsibility gap" that fatally undermines the
entire international criminal law machinery.

The Ethical Boundary: The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, ruled that delegating death
decisions "to a cold, deterministic algorithm" is "morally repugnant" and "politically
unacceptable," thus setting an ethical barrier over the legal arguments.

Decreasing Threshold for Conflict: The fight economy and war-mongering-thinking concerning
human and financial capital are drastically diminished with the autonomous-drone protoculture,
especially cheap, mass-produced systems such as FPV drones. Merely having this technology
in the hand of some adversary, combined with the speed and magnitude of machine decision-
making, enormously increases the risks of miscalculation and swiftness, as decision cycles are
compressed beyond human capacity.

Great and serious powers like the US, China, and Russia have rapidly invested in the
technology, with accelerated dimensions of an arms race. The US Department of Defense
Directive 3000.09 lays down policy for autonomy of munitions, while the other countries view
this technology as very critical to future military power. So, I guess that in such an environment
of competition, reaching consensus on an international ban, or even restrictive regulation,
becomes almost near impossible.

Non-State Actor Access: Given its commercial origin and a cheap manufacturing process
paying rapid evolution to the technology, the drone technology may be bartered, smuggled, or
illegalized for operators under the non-state actors and terrorist organizations. This
democratization of lethal capability threatens the security of all Member States but especially for
the ones that are fragile.

The Mandate Before DISEC

Yet consensus has so far never been found, despite the greatest urgency in the circumstance.
Although some 160-plus countries came out in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution
78/241 on LAWS in December 2023 and affirmed the applicability of IHL, negotiations in the
GGE under the CCW framework remain painfully slow due to the stark division.

DISEC must go beyond mere affirmations of international law by focusing on possible legal and
political concrete steps of stopping the unchecked proliferation of such technologies.
Accordingly, it was time for the delegates to consider, and adopt, far-reaching resolutions
banning systems without meaningful human control and severely restricting, through
regulations, those that operate with a semi-autonomous function so that human beings shall
henceforth be deemed worthy or unworthy of condemnation for the application of force in the
next worldwide aberration.

Definition of Key Term

Key Term Acronym/Alternative Definition

Name

Lethal LAWS Weapons systems that, once

Autonomous activated, can select search for,
Weapons Systems detect, identify, and track and
engage apply force against targets
without further meaningful
human intervention or control.

Autonomous UAV Warfare The application of LAWS

Drone Warfare technology specifically through
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UAVs or
drones, which operate
independently in critical functions.

Meaningful MHC The required degree of human

Human Control supervision, judgment, and
intervention that must be retained
over a weapons system to ensure
compliance with International
Humanitarian Law IHL and ethical
norms. The specifics of
"meaningful" are currently under
debate.
International IHL A set of rules that seeks to limit the
Humanitarian Law effects of armed conflict for
humanitarian reasons. It protects
persons who are not or are no
longer participating in the hostilities
and restricts the means and
methods of warfare.

Principle of A core rule of IHL requiring parties

Distinction to a conflict to distinguish between
combatants and civilians, and
between military objectives and
civilian objects, directing attacks
only against military objectives.

Principle of A core rule of IHL prohibiting

Proportionality attacks that may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, or damage to
civilian objects that would be
excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.

Accountability Responsibility Gap The legal and ethical ambiguity

Gap regarding who is responsible—the
operator, the commander, the
programmer, or the state—for
unlawful acts e.g., war crimes
committed by a fully autonomous
weapon system.
Proliferation Spread The rapid or uncontrolled spread of
a technology in this case,
autonomous drone capabilities to
more states, or, critically, to non-
state actors, thereby increasing
global instability.

Arms Race A rapid, competitive increase in the

quantity or quality of military
armaments by rival states. The
development of LAWS threatens to
ignite a new, potentially
uncontrollable, AI-driven arms race.

Non-State Actors NSA Entities or groups that are not

recognized as sovereign states,
such as militant groups, terrorist
organizations, or transnational
criminal networks, whose potential
acquisition of autonomous drones
poses a significant threat.

Unmanned Aerial UAV Drone An aircraft operated remotely

Vehicle without a human pilot on board,
used for surveillance,
reconnaissance, or, when armed,
lethal strikes.

Loitering Munition Kamikaze Drone A weapon system that can cruise

around a target area for some time,
searching for a target, and then
self-destructs upon impact. Many
are equipped with increasing levels
of autonomy.
First-Person-View FPV Drone Small, inexpensive, commercially or
Drone locally modified UAVs flown with a
camera providing a real-time view
to a remote operator, now widely
used for carrying small payloads or
explosives, significantly lowering
the barrier to entry for lethal drone
warfare.

Convention on CCW The framework within the UN where

Certain discussions on the regulation and
Conventional prohibition of LAWS through the
Weapons Group of Governmental Experts
GGE have been ongoing since
2014.

Miscalculation An error in judgment or

assessment—especially concerning
an opponent's intent or capability—
that could be dangerously amplified
by the speed and complexity of
autonomous systems, potentially
leading to rapid and unintended
conflict escalation.

Key Term Acronym/Alternative Definition

Name

DISEC First Committee The Disarmament and International

Security Committee of the UN
General Assembly, the primary forum
for all UN Member States to discuss
disarmament and global security
challenges.
 Kargu-2 Drone A specific model of Turkish-made
loitering munition that was allegedly
involved in the first documented
autonomous attack without human
supervision in the 2020 Libyan conflict.

UN General A key 2023 resolution that affirmed

Assembly IHL applies to LAWS and encouraged
Resolution international dialogue, demonstrating
78/241 the strong, near-universal recognition
of the issue's importance.

General Overview:

The rapid development and future use of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems LAWS are
significantly raising the geopolitical tensions, particularly among the US, China, and Russia. The
rivalry for the upper hand in military AI is considered the primary factor behind the arms race
that dos very much to the deterrence strategies and poses enormous risks to the world’s peace.

The United States frames its approach around maintaining a technological edge, strengthening
extended deterrence for its allies, and advocating for "responsible" military AI development.

● One of the major implications of the U.S. deterrence strategy will be the likely cessation
of disputes with Russia and China PRC, and this approach will also be applied in
general to specific regions such as Indo-Pacific Taiwan, South China Sea. The Nuclear
Posture Review NPR conducted in 2022 presented a case for extended nuclear
deterrence as a policy that "without acquiring nuclear weapons of their own" Source 1.4
had empowered the allies to successfully resist the oppositions' challenges. It is the US
political figures, such as the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who
easily promote the return to the deterrence policy against China and North Korea due to
the circumstances in these two regions where their military capabilities have been
enhanced particularly in the nuclear area which is rapidly growing and they are very
competitive in hypersonic missile systems Source 1.5.
 ● LAWS Development: The U.S. has a very clear and direct plan regarding military
Artificial Intelligence for the coming years, which has already resulted in a project for the
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile SLCM-N being authorized by the FY2024 National
Defense Authorization Act Source 1.4. The U.S. has not given up on the idea of "human
control" over the military, but the critics fear that it could lead to "human-on-the-loop"
systems just monitoring instead of "human-in-the-loop" requiring active permission which
may trigger the war Source 3.4. The U.S. has been the first country to ratify the 2023
Political Declaration on Responsible Military AI which is the voluntary governance
initiative that other like-minded states may join, thereby revealing America's preference
for norms rather than a legally binding treaty Source 3.2.

Due to the world’s second largest defense expenditure, China has been the most examined
country in respect to its military modernization where AI incorporation ranked as the most critical
and thus, the major concern of US and NATO military interests.

The Chinese government through its official channel has announced the budget for defense in
2025 which amounts to RMB 1.78 trillion, a figure that shows an increase of 7.2% from the
previous year 2024, and thus a five-year period of steadily high single-digit percentage rise
Source 2.5. The unofficial forecasts that take into account non-budgetary allocations as well as
power parity for total military expenditures of China in 2024 range from one billion to an almost
billion with one adjusted number of billion Source 2.2, 2.5.

Geopolitical Statements: According to US officials, the enormous military exercises of China

near Taiwan are regarded as "trial for forced unification," which consequently raises the
probability of military accidents occurring in South China Sea where drones might get caught in
that could lead to a big war Source 1.5, 3.4. Additionally, NATO views the "great military buildup
of China, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, without any transparency and control
measures," and the "deepening of strategic relations with Moscow" as a cause for concern
Source 1.1.

AI Conversations: Even though there existed a military competition, the leaders of China and
the US, Xi Jinping and Biden, respectively, chose to engage in conversations between the two
countries to assess the risks of military AI use and to reactivate the military emergency hotlines,
which can be interpreted as a marginal step forward in the process of de-escalation Source 3.4.

Russia is identified by NATO as the "most significant and direct threat," leveraging a mix of
conventional, nuclear, and hybrid warfare capabilities while using arms control offers
strategically.

● Massive Military Spending Hike: Russia's military spending saw a dramatic increase in
2024, growing by 38% to an estimated billion, equivalent to 7.1% of Russia's GDP
Source 2.3.
 ● Nuclear and Deterrence Claims: Following the suspension of the New START Treaty
implementation in 2023, President Putin has made political commitments, such as
adhering to the central quantitative limits until February 2027 Source 1.2. However,
Russia's refusal to permit verification—a key US priority—while holding a significant
advantage in non-strategic nuclear warheads around 2,000 to the US's 200
complicates deterrence stability and arms control dialogue Source 1.2.
● LAWS Stance: Russia has been less vocal than the US and China regarding military AI
doctrine, but its military-industrial cooperation with China is a growing concern, with
reports of Moscow receiving support for its war machine in exchange for advanced
submarine, missile, and nuclear technology Source 1.1, 1.5.

Therefore, the development of LAWS definitely points to the scenario of an international

arms race and regulation deadlock with a higher possibility of conflict escalation as the
final outcome.
The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CCW is a global forum and has been
the main platform where discussions have progressed to a very limited agreement but still
continue to face the fundamental issues that are central to regulation.

Core Consensus: Almost all countries had a unified position that there should not be complete
freedom in the area of AI and firearms and that the Humanitarian Law should be completely
applied. Additionally, there is an agreement that the machines would be always the decision-
makers and responsible for the application of the power Source 4.3. In 2019, this resulted in the
issuance of an 11th guiding principle aimed at human-machine interaction Source 4.3.

Meaningful Control Deadlock: The major political crisis is the different interpretations of "MHC"
meaningful human control. All governments delegate the minimum level of human control, but
the term MHC that emphasizes a qualitative aspect going beyond just "pressing a button" and
brings up problems like "black-box" systems— is regularly disputed by some countries opposing
the establishment of a binding regulation Source 4.4.

Regulatory Failure: The difference between the fast and still-going-to-be-internationally-

regulated autonomous weapons technologies and the slowly moving international regulation has
been deemed 'alarming' Source 3.3. Countries' dialogue has been nearly non-existent for a long
time, which has led to various diplomatic activities in new venues such as the REAIM Summit
and a United Nations General Assembly resolution that are clear signs of distrust in the
consensus-based CCW process Source 3.2.

One of the reasons why military AI could result in escalation of conflicts through rapid, machine-
to-machine communication interactions is that a drastic reduction of human supervision has
been pointed out as a major drawback by experts Source 3.3.
Accidental War: The crucial danger for the medium term is the usage of lethal autonomous
weapons causing death in the conflict between Chinese and American troops in Taiwan or the
South China Sea, thus triggering a "global war nobody wants and is destabilizing" Source 3.4.

It is likely that the deployment of LAWS will lead to fewer military pilots stationed in the combat
areas, and this by itself or along with other reasons may create a more favorable situation for
wars Source 3.3.

Proliferation: Non-state armed groups that scholars consider might very soon use LAWS as
their weapon of choice signal a significant proliferation threat at a high orders of magnitude
Source 3.3.

Major Parties Involved:

1. United States
The strategy of the United States consists of enormous public expenditure, dependence on the
blending of military and commercial "Big Tech" capabilities, and a radical transformation in
military organization that facilitates the use of data for a mobile and interconnected force.
The United States Department of Defense DoD has unequivocally stated that its proposed
Budget for 2025 will include the utmost possible explicit expenditure on such advanced
technologies as AI:

The illustration depicts the precise allocation of funds for A.I. within the total R&D budget of
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation RDT&E. Nevertheless, the total is still only a
fraction of the total artificial intelligence investment since the budgets of various other programs
comprise AI applications as well.

R&D budgets have consistently been the principal factor behind the appearance of high-end
tech gadgets, given that AI is the primary element in a wide range of initiatives.

Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control CJADC2: 1.4 Billion

The program is vital because it is the matter of tactics that brings AI together to link all the
military domains air, land, sea, space, and cyber with the “speed of relevance” via the layers of
sensors, shooters, and decision-makers. AI is the main contributor to the data merging and the
development of decision-support tools which will be indispensable for CJADC2's operation.
 ● Total DoD Budget Request FY 2025: 849.8 Billion
● U.S. Military AI Market Value 2024 Estimate: 3.9 Billion as part of the global military AI
market. This market is expected to grow significantly.

B. Strategic Focus and Key Areas

The core strategic driver is maintaining a technological edge, particularly against the "pacing
challenge" of China, and responding to the "acute threat" posed by Russia.

Key Program/Application Description and AI Role

CJADC2 AI for real-time data fusion, situational awareness,

and automated targeting to accelerate the
decision-kill chain.

Autonomous Systems Development of AI for self-governing platforms,

including ground robotics and unmanned
aerial/naval systems.

Cybersecurity AI-driven solutions to proactively detect, anticipate,

and neutralize increasingly sophisticated cyber
threats to military infrastructure and sensitive data.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Machine learning to rapidly process and analyze

Reconnaissance ISR vast amounts of data imagery, signals, text to
provide real-time intelligence to human analysts.

Partnerships with Big Tech The U.S. model is highly dependent on commercial
companies the "digital-military-industrial complex" for
cutting-edge AI, cloud computing, and dual-use
technologies.
2. China:
China's military artificial intelligence AI development does not limit itself to just a defense
program but comprises a large-scale, all-encompassing, and government-endorsed strategy
called Military-Civil Fusion MCF, which seeks to attain global military dominance by 2049.
A. Strategy: The "Intelligentized Warfare" Goal
● Core Objective: The People's Liberation Army PLA is being transformed into an
"intelligentized" army with the use of artificial intelligence and new technologies like
autonomous systems. This is a step to getting a significant military advantage over the
others. The final result is to be declared victorious in the "next revolution in military
affairs."
● The implementation of MCF involves the orderly elimination of obstacles preventing the
merging of the civilian research/commercial sectors of China with its military/defense
industrial base.
○ Acquisition Methods: The private sector received a substantial investment of
funds, talented professionals were hired, academic research was supported by
the government and universities, and, as described by U.S. and Western
intelligence, illegal activities such as coercive technology transfer, surveillance
and patent theft, among others, were the major sources of developing these
methods of acquisition.
○ Ecosystem Integration: A significant part of PLA's funding goes towards the
creation of MCF platforms and national security laboratories that encourage AI
and autonomous systems research at several Chinese universities, thus linking
together the public and private sectors of logistics. The logistics companies such
as China Railway Express and JD Logistics that are functioning in the civil sector
are making alliances, not just to strengthen the global logistics and power
projection capabilities of the PLA but also to facilitate the inter-connection
between the two sectors.

B. Investment & R&D Opacity

China's defense spending, and specifically its R&D on AI, is highly opaque.
● Estimated Total Defense Spending 2024: China's official 2024 budget is about 232
Billion 1.67 trillion yuan, but analysts estimate the true expenditure, including off-budget
items and classified R&D, is closer to 471 Billion.
● Total R&D Expenditure 2024: China's total national expenditure on R&D is over 3.6
Trillion yuan approx. 501 Billion, representing a growth of 8.3% over the previous year.
● Quantifying Military AI R&D: No official, separate figure for military AI R&D is released.
Analysts attempt to estimate a figure for additional, classified defense-related R&D
 which includes AI that is outside the official defense budget, with some estimates putting
this category at around 34.8 Billion for 2024. However, this figure does not include the
massive amount of R&D on dual-use technologies like AI, semiconductors, and quantum
computing that is funded through the civilian side of MCF.
● Procurement Insight 2023-2024: An analysis of 2,857 AI-related defense contract
awards reveals that while traditional defense companies are still key, a significant and
emerging role is being played by nontraditional, civilian tech vendors and research
institutions, demonstrating the practical effect of MCF.

3. Russia:
Russia's AI implementation is less about vast budgets and more about the urgent, battlefield-
driven deployment of AI-enabled systems for immediate operational needs in the context of the
Ukraine conflict.

A. Specific Systems and Deployment

● Rapid Deployment of Robotic Systems: Following successful trials in the Ukraine
conflict zone, the Russian Defense Minister ordered the rapid deployment and mass
production of AI-enabled robotic military systems.
● Key Systems Identified: These include medical evacuation robots and
multifunctional combat platforms autonomous and semi-autonomous ground
vehicles.
● AI for Augmentation, Not Full Autonomy: The actual role of AI in Russia's deployed
systems appears to be for enhancing specific functions, primarily to reduce human
exposure and workload:
○ Autonomous Navigation: Improved navigation, especially in GPS-denied
environments.
○ Target Recognition: AI is likely used for classifying and identifying targets from
drone feeds, a high-volume, repetitive task that benefits significantly from
automation.

B. Context of the Conflict

The Ukraine conflict is a testing ground, where the practical application of AI is highly visible on
both sides Russia and Ukraine.
● Focus on UAS/Drones: While the deployment of AI-enabled ground robots is noted for
Russia, the conflict has been heavily shaped by Unmanned Aerial Systems UAS, where
AI is crucial for real-time analysis, target tracking, and navigation.
● Ethical Risk: The rapid deployment of AI-enabled systems on the frontline raises
explicit concerns about the "significant risks of harm in active warfare," particularly
concerning autonomous and semi-autonomous platforms.
Discussions on the regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems LAWS often take place
in UN forums like the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CCW. While specific,
detailed statements from the 2024 CCW meetings are not provided in the snippets, the general
policy stances of the three P5 powers are well-established and represent a clear divergence:

Country Established Stance on LAWS General Position

United Favors a non-binding Code of Conduct or Guiding Principles.

States Emphasizes the need for human judgment and oversight Human-
Machine Teaming but generally opposes a full pre-emptive ban, arguing
that strict limits could impede innovation and defense capabilities.

China Tends to favor a new international instrument or protocol to regulate

LAWS, but their official proposal generally focuses on a prohibition on
the use of fully autonomous systems rather than an outright ban on their
development and production. This aligns with their massive investment in
the technology.

Russia Generally opposes establishing a new legally binding protocol or treaty

on LAWS, viewing the existing international humanitarian law IHL as
sufficient. Russia often takes a highly cautious, sometimes obstructionist,
position in UN security-related discussions, reflecting a desire to
maintain full freedom of action in developing military technologies.

The UN Security Council in 2024 remained highly active, but the increased procedural votes
and decreased unanimity highlight the persistent geopolitical friction, which inevitably impacts
the prospect of consensus on a sensitive topic like AI in warfare.

Timeline of Key Events:

In-Depth Timeline of Key Military AI Events 2014–2025

2014–2016: Foundational Strategy and Initial Programs

Year Event Actor Significance

2014 DARPA Air US 🇺🇺 This study was the foundation for the
Dominance DARPA agency's Aerospace Innovation Initiative,
Initiative Study which ultimately led to the development of
the F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance
NGAD platform, demonstrating an early
focus on autonomous air combat
capabilities.

2016 People's China 🇺🇺 Major reforms began to unify forces under

Liberation joint theater commands, setting the
Army PLA organizational groundwork necessary to
Reforms support future multi-domain
"intelligentized" warfare.

2017–2019: Major US & China AI Initiatives

Year Event Actor Significance

Early Project Maven US 🇺🇺 A pioneering initiative to apply

2017 Algorithmic DoD computer vision to process
Warfare Cross- aerial surveillance footage from
Functional Team drones and satellites and
is Initiated autonomously detect, tag, and
track objects. It marked the DoD's
first significant AI implementation
effort.
July China's New China 🇺🇺 China published a national-level
2017 Generation blueprint to become the world
Artificial leader in AI by 2030, with
Intelligence military-civil fusion as a key pillar
Development Plan for technology transfer to the
People's Liberation Army PLA.

October 19th Party China 🇺🇺 The Chinese Communist Party

2017 Congress CCP established the goal to
transform the PLA into a "world-
class military" by 2049, with a
core concept being the shift
toward "intelligentized warfare."

2019 China's Defense China 🇺🇺 Officially introduced the term

White Paper "intelligentized warfare,"
marking a doctrinal shift from
"informatized conditions." It set
the waypoint to complete the
initial transformation into an
"intelligentized" force by 2035.

2019 Next Generation US 🇺🇺 An early, unannounced test flight

Air Dominance DARPA of a risk-reduction X-plane, part of
NGAD X-plane the multi-year development arc
First Flight that later culminated in the F-47
program.
2021–2022: Autonomy Demonstrations and War-Driven Deployment

Year Event Actor Significance

2021 DARPA Global Teams Tested autonomous

Subterranean systems to map, navigate,
SubT and search complex
Challenge underground
Finals environments, showcasing
progress in robotic
autonomy for hazardous
military and first-responder
missions.

February ALIAS US 🇺🇺 The Aircrew Labor In-

2022 Uninhabited DARPA/Sikorsky Cockpit Automation
Flight of UH- System ALIAS program
60A Black achieved the first-ever 30-
Hawk minute flight of a UH-60A
Black Hawk helicopter
without anyone on board,
demonstrating high-level
AI-driven helicopter
autonomy.
February Full-Scale Russia/Ukraine The conflict became an "AI
2022 Russian 🇺🇺🇺🇺 war lab," rapidly
Invasion of accelerating the
Ukraine deployment of AI-enabled
technologies, particularly
drones UAVs, AI-driven
commercial satellite
imagery analysis, and C2
systems like Palantir's
MetaConstellation used by
Ukrainian forces. Russia
began accelerating its own
military AI/autonomy plans.

2022 Project Maven US 🇺🇺 DoD Project Maven evolved into

is Transitioned the broader "Maven"
and Rebranded program, with elements
transitioning to the Chief
Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Office CDAO
and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency NGA, reflecting its
maturity as an enterprise-
wide capability.

July 2022 India Launches India 🇺🇺 The Indian Raksha Mantri

75 AI Products Defence Minister launched
in Defence 75 Artificial Intelligence
products/technologies
during the first-ever 'AI in
Defence' symposium,
formalizing a significant
national push for military
AI.
 August India Deploys India 🇺🇺 The Indian Army deployed
2022 140 AI-based 140 AI-based surveillance
Surveillance systems for border
Systems security, a specific
example of AI in
Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance ISR.

2023–2025: Advanced Autonomy, Governance, and Integration

Year Event Actor Significance

2023 DARPA Air US 🇺🇺 DARPA The ACE program

Combat Evolution achieved a landmark by
ACE Dogfight having AI algorithms
Tests autonomously fly an
F-16 X-62A/VISTA in a
dogfight against a
human-piloted F-16,
demonstrating AI's
capacity for complex,
dynamic, and offensive
maneuvers in air
combat.
2023 UN CCW Group of UN 🇺 Continued diplomatic
Governmental efforts under the
Experts GGE on Convention on Certain
LAWS Meetings Conventional Weapons
CCW to address
emerging technologies
in the area of Lethal
Autonomous Weapons
Systems LAWS, aiming
to formulate a
consensus-based
instrument.

Late 2024 UN General UN 🇺 The General Assembly

Assembly adopted a resolution
Landmark that recognized the wide
Resolution on range of military
Military AI applications of AI
beyond just lethal
weapon systems
LAWS, calling for
broader examination
and dialogue on its
implications for peace
and security.

2025 FY US DoD CDAO US 🇺🇺 DoD Fiscal Year 2025 budget

Funding documents reflected a
Realignment refocusing of funding for
major programs like
JADC2 and the evolving
Maven program under
the new structure of the
CDAO Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence
Office.
2025 Russia Aims for Russia 🇺🇺 Russia's military
Projected 30% Automated modernization plans
Military aimed to automate 30%
Equipment of its military equipment
by 2025, though the
operational success of
this goal remains
difficult to verify.

2025 Ukraine Ukraine 🇺🇺 Ukraine's rapidly

Projected Transition to AI- growing defense sector
Driven Drone is expected to expand
Swarms from "one drone-one
operator" to more
efficient AI-driven
drone swarms,
showcasing a significant
battlefield adaptation.

2025 May New DARPA US 🇺🇺 DARPA Stephen Winchell, a

Director former chief engineer for
Appointment Project Maven, was
appointed DARPA
Director, signifying the
integration of key AI
program leaders into top
defense research roles.
 2025 US Marine Corps US 🇺🇺 USMC The Marine Corps
AI Implementation finalized its AI
Plan Finalized Implementation Plan AI
IPlan to align with
broader DoD strategy,
focusing on data
lifecycle, governance,
and architecture to
enhance decision-
making at the tactical
edge.

2025 F-47 Program US 🇺🇺 The F-47 program, the

Unveiled DARPA/USAF culmination of DARPA's
2014 initiative, was
unveiled as the next era
of American air
dominance,
representing the
operationalization of
advanced, AI-enabled
air platforms.

Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue:

1. The Current State of LAWS Negotiations: Stalled

Progress
The primary international forum for discussing LAWS is the Group of Governmental Experts
GGE under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CCW. This process, begun in
2014, has been criticized for its slow pace and ultimate failure to deliver a binding instrument,
largely due to its consensus rule, which allows a few states to block the majority view.

Key CCW Achievements and Failures

Element Status Detail

Guiding Success Soft In 2019, the GGE endorsed 11 Guiding

Principles Law Principles on the development and use of
LAWS. These principles emphasize that
International Humanitarian Law IHL
applies to LAWS and that human
responsibility for decisions on the use of
weapons must be retained.

Legally Binding Failure A large majority of states, humanitarian

Treaty organizations like the ICRC, and civil society
groups like Stop Killer Robots advocate for a
legally binding instrument that includes
both prohibitions and regulations. This has
been repeatedly blocked by a small number
of major military powers e.g., the US, Russia,
and others who favor non-binding political
declarations.

Core Concept: Progressive While not legally defined, MHC has become
"Meaningful Norm the central, guiding concept. It requires a
Human Control" human operator to retain a sufficient degree
MHC of control or judgment to ensure compliance
with IHL principles like distinction and
proportionality. Discussions focus on the
different points of intervention e.g., in
development, deployment, and operation.
 Draft Proposals Failed to Groups of states have submitted concrete
Reach draft proposals, such as the 2023 submission
Consensus of a draft new Protocol for regulating LAWS
within the CCW framework submitted by a
group including Argentina, Ecuador, El
Salvador, etc.. These proposals, which often
recommend a two-tiered approach
prohibitions + regulations, have not been
agreed upon due to the consensus rule.

UN General Growing In December 2024, the UN General

Assembly Momentum Assembly adopted a resolution on LAWS with
Resolution overwhelming support 166 votes in favor,
signaling growing political will outside the
CCW framework to move toward a new
international treaty.

2. Examples of Successful Arms Control for New Military

Technology
While autonomy is a new challenge, there are historical precedents where the international
community successfully implemented a two-tiered approach—combining outright prohibition
for the worst weapons with regulation for others—to constrain emerging technologies.

A. The Chemical Weapons Convention CWC

● Technology: Chemical weapons.
● Approach: Total Prohibition. The CWC 1997 did not just regulate; it mandated the
complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical
weapons, including their precursors.
● Key Success: It successfully applied a broad prohibition to an entire category of
technology, which had been previously regulated by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which
only banned use, not production. It also established the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW for robust verification and inspection, a
model for future agreements.

B. CCW Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons

● Technology: Weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness.
 ● Approach: Pre-emptive Prohibition. Adopted in 1995, this protocol is a rare, but highly
significant, example of pre-emptive arms control—a binding treaty was negotiated and
ratified before the weapons were widely deployed on the battlefield.
● Key Success: It focused on the humanitarian effect permanent blindness rather than
the specific technology, successfully heading off an entire class of cruel and
indiscriminate weaponry. This is the model that advocates for LAWS regulation often
point to.

C. Strategic Nuclear Arms Treaties

● Technology: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ICBMs and other strategic nuclear
delivery systems.
● Approach: Regulation and Limitation. Treaties like the New START Treaty 2010
between the US and Russia don't ban the weapons but place strict, verifiable limits on
their numbers and types.
● Key Success: These treaties successfully managed a dangerous technological
competition during the Cold War. They included detailed verification regimes like on-
site inspections and data exchanges that established trust and predictability between
major adversaries, a crucial element for any future AI-enabled weapons treaty. New
START's structure of limiting deployed systems and their delivery vehicles while
tracking non-deployed systems represents a complex, tiered system of regulation.

3. The Proposed "Two-Tiered" Approach for LAWS

The consensus building within the CCW and among leading states, though still subject to the
consensus block, increasingly favors a two-tiered approach for future LAWS regulation,
learning from these past successes:
1. Prohibition Tier The Ban: An absolute ban on autonomous weapon systems that, due
to their nature, cannot be used in compliance with IHL. This would likely include:
○ LAWS that target humans directly i.e., not objects without any human
intervention.
○ Systems where Meaningful Human Control MHC is technologically or
practically impossible.
2. Regulation Tier The Rules: Mandatory, legally-binding regulations on all other
autonomous weapon systems, requiring Meaningful Human Control at all times. This
would include specific requirements like:
○ Context-appropriate human control and judgment as noted in the CCW
Chair's rolling text.
○ Mandatory weapons reviews e.g., Article 36 reviews before deployment.
○ Technical or geographic limits on their operation.
○ Mandatory use of manual override or "stop button" functionality.
Possible Solutions:

The primary and most widely discussed possible solution for regulating Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems LAWS is a two-tiered international agreement that combines prohibitions
for the most dangerous systems with regulations and positive obligations for all others, all

centered on ensuring Meaningful Human Control MHC.

1

1. The Two-Tiered Legal Instrument Approach

This approach, gaining widespread support in forums like the UN General Assembly and the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CCW Group of Governmental Experts GGE,
seeks to establish a comprehensive international norm.

Tier 1: Prohibitions The Ban

This tier would ban LAWS that pose the most fundamental challenge to international
humanitarian law IHL and ethics.
● Prohibition on Autonomous Targeting of Humans: A key proposal is the outright
ban on LAWS that autonomously select and engage targets consisting of humans
persons. This is viewed as necessary to uphold the principle of human dignity and
2
ensure that a machine never makes a life-or-death decision over a person.
● Prohibition on Systems Incapable of IHL Compliance: This would prohibit any
LAWS that, by their nature or design, are incapable of being used in compliance
with International Humanitarian Law IHL principles, specifically Distinction between
civilians and combatants/military objects and Proportionality expected civilian harm vs.
3
military advantage. Systems whose behavior is too unpredictable or unexplainable
"black box" systems would likely fall into this prohibited category.
● Prohibition on Weaponizing Certain AI: Some proposals also call for a ban on the
weaponization of AI that is deliberately designed to be opaque, unpredictable, or
manipulative, as this directly undermines the possibility of accountability.

Tier 2: Regulations and Positive Obligations The Rules

This tier would establish strict regulations and positive obligations for all other LAWS that are
4
not outright banned, focusing on their responsible development and use.

● Mandatory Meaningful Human Control MHC: This is the central regulatory pillar.
MHC is an essential legal and ethical requirement to ensure that a human maintains

"context-appropriate human control and judgement" over the use of force. It's
5
more than just a button press; it's a qualitative standard.
 ● Target- and Context-Specific Restrictions: Regulations would place limits on LAWS
operations by:
○ Restricting Target Types: Limiting LAWS targets to clearly defined military
objectives that are less ambiguous e.g., platforms, infrastructure and avoiding
6
targets in areas densely populated with civilians.
○ Limiting Geographic Scope and Duration: Imposing clear time and space
7
limitations on the use of an autonomous system.
○ Preventing Mission Alteration: Requiring the preservation of human control
over the mission parameters to prevent the LAWS from autonomously redefining
8
its objectives or scale of operation.
● Positive Obligations in the Weapon Lifecycle: States would be obligated to:
○ Conduct Article 36 Weapons Reviews: Before development or deployment,
states must rigorously review every new weapon, means, or method of warfare
9
to ensure it does not violate international law. For LAWS, this review must be
10
comprehensive throughout the entire life-cycle.
○ Accountability and Attribution: Ensure that the use of a LAWS remains
traceable, reliable, and explainable to guarantee that human operators,
commanders, and superiors remain accountable under IHL for their system's

actions.
11
○ Mitigate Bias: Implement mandatory measures to detect, reduce, and address
potentially harmful biases in AI-driven decisions that could lead to

indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks.

12

2. Technical Solutions for Meaningful Human Control

To make the legal concept of MHC a reality, specific technical guardrails are required. These
are often viewed as a complement to a legal treaty.

Design and Engineering Requirements

● Built-in Interrupt/Deactivation Mechanisms: All regulated LAWS must include a
reliable "kill switch" or emergency stop mechanism that allows a human operator to

easily and immediately interrupt or deactivate the system after its activation.
13
● Predictability and Explainability: The system's design must ensure that its behavior is
predictable and understandable by human operators Explainable AI or XAI. This is
 particularly critical for complex machine learning models black-box systems, where
regulatory measures may demand transparency or verifiable assurance.
● System Integrity and Reliability: Incorporating self-destruct, self-deactivation, or
self-neutralization mechanisms to prevent the LAWS from being hacked,
14
malfunctioning, or falling into unauthorized hands.
● Data and Sensor Limitations: Designing the LAWS with deliberate technical
constraints on its range, power, and sensor capacity to keep its operational
environment simple and manageable for human oversight.

Human-Machine Interface Solutions

● Situational Awareness: The user interface must provide the human operator with
sufficient, real-time information about the system's capabilities, its operating
15 This is crucial for maintaining situational awareness
environment, and its status.
16
and making informed judgments.
● Human-in-the-Loop or Human-on-the-Loop Models:
○ Human-in-the-Loop: Requires a human to make the final decision to authorize
each individual lethal action, offering the highest level of control and often
proposed for use against personnel.
○ Human-on-the-Loop Supervised Autonomy: The system can select targets
and apply force without human authorization, but the human operator can
17 This model is generally seen as the
intervene to override the system.
minimum acceptable standard for regulated LAWS, provided the human has the
technical means to intervene effectively.

3. The Martens Clause and Normative Development

A final, more foundational approach is to rely on and possibly create a modern equivalent of the
Martens Clause to govern the ethical and moral dimension of new military AI.
● The Martens Clause Application: The original Martens Clause in IHL ensures that in
cases not covered by specific treaty law, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection of the "principles of humanity" and the "dictates of public
18
conscience."
○ Principle of Humanity: Proponents of a ban argue that fully autonomous
weapons violate this principle because machines cannot possess the legal and
ethical judgment, compassion, or empathy required to make humane life-
19
and-death decisions, thereby reducing the victim to a mere data point.
 ○ Dictates of Public Conscience: This requires adhering to shared moral
guidelines. A treaty-based ban or strong regulation is often proposed as the
necessary step to reflect and enshrine this public conscience regarding the use
20
of AI to kill.
● A "Martens Clause" for AI Warfare: While there is no formal equivalent, the principles
of the Martens Clause have been invoked to call for a pre-emptive ban on fully
21
autonomous weapons. A key step would be to formally codify these principles in the
context of AI, creating an overarching norm that guides the development and use of all
military AI technologies, even those that fall outside the current LAWS debate. This
would establish an explicit, high-level ethical barrier against the removal of human
moral agency from the use of force.

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NATO
ADISMUN2025
Forum: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO

Question of: Strengthening NATO’s Strategic Response to Instability

in the Black Sea Region

Student Officer: Aarya Sheth

Contact: aarya.adani2038@[Link]

Introduction:

The Black Sea region, encompassing a vital crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and
Eurasia, has emerged as a critical and contested space fundamentally challenging Euro-
Atlantic security. Recent geopolitical shifts, particularly Russia's persistent, aggressive military
buildup and actions in and around the sea, have transformed the region from a zone of
cooperation into a hotspot of strategic instability. This instability directly impacts the security
of NATO's littoral members—Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria—and threatens the Alliance's
foundational principles of collective defense and freedom of navigation.

This report, prepared for the North Atlantic Council, asserts that the existing framework of
deterrence and defense is insufficient to manage the current spectrum of threats, which range
from overt military aggression and the weaponization of energy to sophisticated hybrid and
cyber operations.

The necessity for a strengthened NATO response is underscored by a series of measurable

escalations that have fundamentally altered the regional security calculus:
● Russian Military Dominance: Since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia
has aggressively militarized the peninsula, turning it into a fortress. Data shows a
significant enhancement of the Black Sea Fleet's capabilities, including the deployment
of Kalibr cruise missiles on frigates and submarines, giving Moscow the ability to strike
deep into NATO territory. Furthermore, the number of Russian combat aircraft sorties in
the region has consistently challenged NATO airspace, necessitating more frequent
Allied intercepts.
 ● Territorial and Maritime Contestation: The conflict has led to a de facto expansion of
Russia's operational control over roughly 42,000 square kilometers of the Black Sea
including the Kerch Strait, severely restricting commercial maritime traffic, particularly
grain exports vital to global food security. The withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain
Initiative, which allowed for the transit of over 32 million metric tons of foodstuffs,
demonstrates Russia’s willingness to weaponize economic lifelines.
● Hybrid Warfare Intensity: NATO members and partners in the region have experienced
a sharp uptick in hybrid aggression. For instance, cyberattacks targeting government
infrastructure in Ukraine and Georgia have seen a dramatic increase, often linked to
Russian state-sponsored actors. Simultaneously, Russian disinformation campaigns
aimed at destabilizing political cohesion in Black Sea NATO members are measurable
through analysis of state media output and social media activity.
● Strategic Vulnerability: Despite the importance of the region, NATO's permanent
presence is constrained by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the transit of
non-littoral naval vessels through the Turkish Straits, making sustained, high-intensity
Allied reinforcement challenging. This regulatory reality creates a strategic asymmetry
that favors Russia as the dominant littoral power.

Definition of Key Terms:

Term Definition

Montreux An international agreement governing the passage of vessels

Convention 1936 through the Turkish Straits the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.
It grants Türkiye control and significantly restricts the total
tonnage and length of stay for non-littoral naval vessels
entering the Black Sea, which complicates NATO's ability to
maintain a persistent naval presence.

Littoral States States that possess a coastline bordering a specific body of

water. In the context of the Black Sea, these include NATO
members Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria, and non-members
Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.
Anti- A military strategy or capability often using long-range missiles,
Access/Area radar, and air defense designed to prevent or restrict
Denial A2/AD opposing forces from entering or operating within a specific
operational area. Russia has established a significant A2/AD
"bubble" centered in Crimea, effectively limiting NATO's freedom
of maneuver.

Hybrid Warfare The coordinated use of diverse, integrated methods—including

military, non-military economic/energy, cyber, and
informational disinformation—to achieve political objectives
without triggering a conventional military response, often
targeting a state’s internal resilience.

Tailored The NATO deterrence and defense framework established in

Forward the Southeast Bulgaria and Romania, distinct from the eFP in
Presence TFP the Northeast. The TFP involves the establishment of a
Multinational Brigade and coordinated air policing to reinforce
the Alliance's Eastern Flank.

Eastern Flank A NATO geographic designation referring to the collective

territory of Alliance members that border Russia or Belarus from
the Baltic to the Black Sea, where enhanced defense and
deterrence measures are concentrated.

Black Sea Fleet The main Russian Navy formation operating in the Black Sea
BSF and the Sea of Azov, headquartered in Sevastopol, Crimea. Its
modernization and expansion especially with Kalibr cruise
missile capability is the core conventional threat to the region.

Strategic A situation where the parties involved possess unequal

Asymmetry advantages due to geography or international law. In the Black
Sea, this refers to Russia's geographic proximity and ability to
rapidly deploy and sustain forces, contrasted with NATO's
challenges under the Montreux Convention.
Black Sea Grain A temporary agreement 2022-2023 that allowed for the safe
Initiative passage of commercial ships exporting grain and foodstuffs
from Ukrainian ports. Russia’s withdrawal demonstrated its
willingness to weaponize global economic lifelines.

Deep South The collective term for NATO's strategy of deepening military
Partnership and political engagement with its three key Black Sea regional
partners: Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, whose security and
resilience are considered vital to the overall stability of the
region.

Collective The core principle of the North Atlantic Treaty stating that an
Defence Article attack against one NATO member is considered an attack
5 against all members. Strengthening the TFP in the Black Sea
directly demonstrates the commitment to Article 5 in the region.

Multinational A NATO force component comprising contributions from

Brigade multiple Allied nations, established in countries like Romania,
that serves as the immediate tripwire for deterrence and ensures
a multinational response to any aggression.

Term Definition

Lethal Autonomous Weapons systems that, once activated, can select and
Weapons Systems engage targets without further human intervention. The
LAWS debate centers on the degree of human involvement needed
to ensure compliance with International Humanitarian Law
IHL.
Meaningful Human The legal and ethical threshold in the LAWS debate
Control MHC requiring that a human maintains sufficient situational
awareness, understanding, and ability to intervene in the
system's actions to ensure responsible and lawful use of
force. It is a qualitative, rather than purely technical,
standard.

Principle of A core tenet of International Humanitarian Law requiring

Distinction IHL parties to a conflict to at all times distinguish between
civilian populations and combatants, and between
civilian objects and military objectives, and to direct
attacks only against military objectives.

Principle of A core tenet of International Humanitarian Law prohibiting

Proportionality IHL attacks that are expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.

"Black Box" A term for advanced Artificial Intelligence AI systems

Systems particularly those based on deep learning whose decision-
making process is so complex and opaque that even the
designers cannot fully explain or understand how the system
arrived at a particular conclusion, posing a challenge to
accountability.

Article 36 Weapons A legal obligation under Additional Protocol I to the

Review Geneva Conventions requiring States to determine whether
the employment of any new weapon, means, or method
of warfare they study, develop, or acquire would be
prohibited under international law.
Two-Tiered The leading proposal for LAWS regulation that seeks to 1
Regulatory prohibit certain systems e.g., those targeting humans or
Approach incapable of IHL compliance while 2 regulating all other
autonomous capabilities under strict conditions of MHC and
transparency.

Human-on-the-Loop An operational concept where an autonomous system can

HOTL execute actions, but a human operator maintains the ability
to supervise the system and intervene to override or
abort the mission, typically with a short window for action.

Montreux An international agreement governing the use of the Turkish

Convention 1936 Straits Dardanelles and Bosporus. It significantly restricts
the total tonnage and length of stay for naval vessels from
non-littoral states entering the Black Sea, impacting
NATO's ability to maintain a persistent naval presence.

Black Sea Grain A humanitarian agreement brokered by the UN and Türkiye

Initiative in 2022 that allowed for the safe, commercial export of grain
and foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports via the Black Sea,
illustrating the weaponization of economic lifelines when
Russia suspended its participation.

Hybrid Warfare The coordinated use of diverse, integrated methods—

including military, non-military economic/energy, cyber,
and informational disinformation—to achieve political
objectives without triggering a conventional military
response, often targeting a state’s internal resilience.

Eastern Flank A NATO geographic designation referring to the collective

territory of Alliance members that border Russia or Belarus
from the Baltic to the Black Sea, where enhanced forward
presence eFP forces and strategic reinforcement are
concentrated.
 Strategic A situation in the Black Sea where Russia, as a dominant
Asymmetry littoral state unconstrained by the Montreux Convention,
can rapidly deploy and sustain forces, while NATO's
reinforcement capabilities are comparatively slower and
legally limited.

Freedom of A principle of customary international law that guarantees

Navigation FON the right of all vessels military and commercial to transit
international waters. Russian actions in the Black Sea have
been viewed as a systemic challenge to this principle.

General Overview:

The Black Sea is a crucial nexus of the Euro-Atlantic, Balkans, and Caucasus regions. Its
stability is directly linked to NATO's core task of Collective Defence Article 5.
● Trade and Energy Corridor: The region is a vital trade route and a transit corridor for
oil and gas into Europe. Russia's actions, such as the disruption of the Black Sea
Grain Initiative which facilitated the export of over 32 million tonnes of grain, highlight
the weaponization of economic lifelines.
● Contested Sovereignty: The region is marked by protracted/frozen conflicts
Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the outright annexation of Crimea 2014.
These territories are "grey zones" used to project Russian influence and destabilize
neighboring states Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova.
● The Montreux Constraint 1936: This Convention grants Türkiye the authority to
regulate the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits Bosporus and Dardanelles.
While crucial for wartime stability, it imposes strict limitations on the total tonnage and
duration of stay for non-littoral naval vessels, fundamentally limiting NATO's ability to
maintain a persistent, high-end naval presence in the Black Sea.

Russia's strategy is to establish dominance over the Black Sea basin by creating a highly
effective Anti-Access/Area Denial A2/AD zone centered on the militarized Crimean Peninsula.

Data and Capabilities

 Capability System & Deployment Range and Strategic Impact
Location

Anti-Air S-400 Triumf Crimea 250+ mile range: Denies NATO air
Missile assets jets, surveillance access to
large parts of Romanian and
Bulgarian airspace.

Anti-Ship Bastion Coastal Defense 300+ km range: Capable of

Missile Missile Crimea saturating the maritime domain,
threatening NATO vessels and
commercial shipping across the
northern Black Sea.

Strike & Kalibr Cruise Missiles 1,500+ km range: Possesses

Cruise deployed on modern strategic reach to hit NATO territory
Missile frigates, corvettes, and Kilo- and critical infrastructure deep within
class submarines of the the European mainland.
Black Sea Fleet

Naval Fleet Black Sea Fleet BSF in Despite wartime losses, its remaining
Sevastopol vessels and submarines maintain a
potent capability to conduct
blockades, launch long-range
strikes, and perform maritime
interdiction.

Anti-Access vs. Area Denial

● Anti-Access A2: Long-range capabilities like the Kalibr missiles and S-400 radar
designed to prevent an adversary NATO from deploying its forces into the region.
● Area Denial AD: Shorter-range capabilities like Bastion and localized air defense
designed to limit the freedom of action of any forces NATO ships/planes that do
manage to enter the operational area.

Since 2014, and sharply accelerated after 2022, NATO has focused on transforming its south-
eastern posture from assurance to robust deterrence and defence.
1. Tailored Forward Presence TFP - Land and Air
Unlike the larger, battalion-sized Enhanced Forward Presence eFP battlegroups in the Baltics,
the Black Sea region established a Tailored Forward Presence TFP, which is now scaling up.
● Multinational Battlegroups Romania & Bulgaria: Initially a Multinational Brigade in
Craiova, Romania with France as the framework nation and a new battlegroup in
Bulgaria with Italy as the framework nation. This is a tripwire force, ensuring immediate
collective defence.
● Air Policing and AWACS: Allies like Canada, Italy, and the US continuously reinforce
Romanian and Bulgarian Air Policing missions. This involves the rotational
deployment of fighter jets and E-3 Sentry AWACS Airborne Warning and Control
System aircraft to maintain maritime and aerial situational awareness.

2. Integrated Air and Missile Defence IAMD

The Alliance is integrating national and Allied assets to create a defensive shield against
Russia's long-range strike capabilities.
● Aegis Ashore Romania: The land-based missile defense site at Deveselu is a critical
component of NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence BMD system, physically demonstrating
the Alliance's commitment to defending against missile threats.
● Forward-Deployed Systems: Future plans include the rotation of advanced air defense
batteries Patriot/SAMP/T to key locations to protect Allied ports, airbases, and
command centers from cruise missile attack.

3. Comprehensive Partner Engagement

NATO utilizes specific packages to strengthen the capacity and resilience of its non-member
partners, which act as a strategic buffer against Russian revisionism.

Partner Key NATO Mechanism & Focus

State

Ukraine NATO-Ukraine Council & CAP: Focus on achieving de facto

interoperability even before formal membership, providing military
equipment, and defense sector reform.

Georgia Substantial NATO-Georgia Package SNGP: Focus on bolstering

command and control infrastructure, improving military education,
and countering Russian "borderization".
 Moldova Defense Capacity Building DCB: Focus on cyber resilience,
strategic communications to combat disinformation, and securing its
borders from interference from Transnistria.

The NATO response, while stronger, still faces major challenges that weaken its overall
strategic posture.

1. Hybrid Warfare and Resilience Deficit

Russia consistently operates in the "grey zone" below the threshold of conventional conflict
i.e., below the Article 5 activation trigger.
● Tactics: This involves cyberattacks on critical infrastructure ports, energy grids, GPS
jamming/AIS interference in the maritime domain to disrupt shipping, and extensive
disinformation campaigns targeting the political cohesion of Alliance members Türkiye,
Bulgaria, Romania.
● Risk: This activity creates an operational sweet spot for Russia, allowing it to achieve
strategic objectives like economic coercion while retaining plausible deniability.

2. The Naval Deterrence Gap

The Montreux Convention and Russia's dominant A2/AD bubble mean NATO cannot maintain
a continuous, large-scale surface combatant presence.
● Consequence: Naval deterrence is primarily rotational and episodic, limiting the ability
to contest Russian blockades or secure sea lanes against constant maritime interdiction
or mining threats.

3. Logistical and Command Gaps

While new regional plans are in place, the capacity for Rapid Reinforcement remains a critical
area for improvement.
● Military Mobility: Logistical bottlenecks, inadequate rail/road infrastructure, and a lack
of pre-positioned equipment and weapon stockpiles on the southern flank slow the
reinforcement process, potentially ceding the initiative to Russia in the initial stages of a
conflict.
● Command Structure: Experts continue to call for a dedicated, joint three-star
headquarters for the Black Sea region to improve "speed of recognition" and "speed
of decision-making" in the face of hybrid or conventional attacks.
Major Parties Involved:

The security dynamic is characterized by NATO's enhanced commitment, Ukraine's resilience,

and Russia's continued aggression.

NATO and the Alliance's Role

● Expansion and Posture: With the accession of Finland and Sweden as of March
2024, NATO's strategic depth has increased, though the Black Sea remains a primary
flashpoint. The 2024 NATO Summit in Washington D.C. reinforced the alliance's
adaptation to the new security environment.
● Collective Defense and Deterrence: NATO's core task remains collective defense.
Bulgaria and Romania, as frontline NATO littoral states, are central to the alliance's
deterrence efforts, supported by non-littoral allies like the United States. NATO is
focusing on:
○ Improving surveillance and air defense capabilities for Bulgaria, Romania, and
Türkiye.
○ Countering Russian hybrid warfare e.g., GPS jamming, cyberattacks,
disinformation campaigns.
● Challenges in Cohesion: The alliance faces ongoing debates over the extent and
speed of military aid to Ukraine, such as Germany's reluctance to supply long-range
Taurus missiles, which can complicate the unified front against Russia.

Russia's Actions and Military Situation

● Naval and Air Dominance Efforts: Russia continues to launch missile and drone
attacks from the Black Sea region, targeting Ukrainian port cities and infrastructure. In a
single night in October 2025, for example, Russian officials claimed to have destroyed
251 Ukrainian drones, including 61 over the Black Sea and 40 in Crimea, highlighting
the intense drone warfare.
● Territorial Occupation: Russia continues to occupy approximately 20% of Ukraine's
territory. It is also a key player in the frozen conflicts in Georgia Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and Moldova Transnistria.
● Global Alignment: Russia is deepening "interlocking, strategic partnerships" with
China, Iran, and North Korea, which includes military-technological cooperation e.g.,
satellite intelligence, dual-use infrastructure to challenge the West.

Ukraine
● Military Status: Ukraine continues to demonstrate an aggressive and capable naval
defense, successfully degrading Russia's Black Sea Fleet. The maritime domain is a key
battleground, with attacks on Russian naval assets and infrastructure in occupied
Crimea.
 ● Strategic Objective: The conquest of the remainder of Ukraine's Black Sea coastline
and the Danube Delta region is an intermediate objective of Russia's war, as it would
create a direct and difficult-to-defend land border with NATO member Romania.

Georgia
● Pro-Western Stance & Russian Occupation: Georgia's foreign policy prioritizes NATO
and EU membership. However, Russia occupies approximately 20% of its territory
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This occupation has cut off roughly two-thirds of
Georgia's Black Sea coastline.
● Military Modernization and Actions: Georgia implements a "total defense" concept
and works to improve interoperability with NATO standards. It is an active participant
in NATO activities, hosting large-scale joint exercises like Noble Partner with the U.S.
and other allies. Its strategic goals include:
○ Improving defense capabilities and force readiness to deter potential aggression.
○ Countering Russia's use of "soft power" and hybrid threats, such as the major
cyberattack on government servers in October 2019, which was attributed to
Russian Military Intelligence GRU.
● Economic Corridor: Georgia is leveraging its location to become a transit hub for
energy and goods between Europe and Asia, aiming to bypass Russia. The
development of projects like the Anaklia deep sea port is integral to this ambition.

Moldova
● Neutrality and Energy Independence: Moldova is officially a neutral state, but its
security and economy are vulnerable due to its historical dependence on Russia.
● Energy Dependence Data and Actions:
○ Until 2022, Moldova received nearly all of its gas from Russia Gazprom.
○ The price of Russian gas increased sevenfold by September 2022, leading to an
energy crisis.
○ The main electricity source over 70% comes from the Cuciurgan thermal power
plant in Transnistria a pro-Russian breakaway region, which runs on Russian
gas.
○ Actions Taken: Moldova has since made significant strides: it no longer
consumes any Russian gas for its mainland supply since December 2022 with
support from the EU. It has synchronized its electricity grid with the Continental
European Synchronous Area ENTSO-E March 2022 and is receiving financial
support e.g., €240 million in direct budget support from the EU from 2021-2024.

Status of the Grain Initiative

● Current Status: The Black Sea Grain Initiative BSGI, brokered by the UN and Türkiye
between Ukraine and Russia, was not renewed after its third term expired on July 17,
2023. Russia formally withdrew from the deal.
 ● Key Statistics August 2022 - July 2023:
○ More than 32 million tonnes of food commodities were exported from three
Ukrainian Black Sea ports.
○ The food was shipped to 45 countries across three continents.
○ The partial resumption of exports helped the FAO Food Price Index decline by
over 23% from its peak in March 2022.
○ The World Food Programme WFP transported over 725,000 tonnes of wheat
to aid countries like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
● Threat: Mine warfare is a major feature of the conflict, threatening both military and
civilian vessels. Mines have been reported to drift into the territorial waters of Romania,
Bulgaria, and Türkiye.
● Actions Taken:
○ NATO and Partners: Countries like the U.S. and Ukraine co-host multinational
maritime exercises like Sea Breeze e.g., Sea Breeze 25-2 in June-July 2025
focused on mine countermeasure operations.
○ Trilateral Cooperation: The littoral NATO states—Bulgaria, Romania, and
Türkiye—are engaged in efforts to clear the mines.
● Challenges:
○ Montreux Convention: The 1936 Convention limits the tonnage and time non–
Black Sea states' warships can remain in the sea, restricting the size of any
international mine clearance force.
○ Legal & Political Hurdles: A large-scale, international mine clearance operation
would ideally require consent from all six littoral states Russia, Ukraine, Turkey,
Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, which is a "wickedly complex" political challenge.
○ Mine Drift: Strong currents and environmental factors cause mines to drift,
making their detection and clearance more difficult.

Timeline of Key Events:

Phase 1: The Russo-Georgian War and Its Aftermath 2008-2013

Date Event Significance for Black Sea

Security
 Aug Russo-Georgian War. Russia's Marked a major post-Cold War re-
2008 military intervention against Georgia emergence of Russia's willingness
over the breakaway regions of South to use military force against a
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian neighbor to assert influence in the
forces and elements of its Black Sea region. Russia's Black Sea Fleet
Fleet were involved. was used to project power.

Aug Russia formally recognizes the Russia gains more coastline and a
26, independence of Abkhazia and forward operating presence on the
2008 South Ossetia, gaining effective eastern Black Sea.
control over the Abkhaz coastline on
the Black Sea.

Feb Viktor Yanukovych is elected This shift in Ukrainian foreign

2010 President of Ukraine, leading to a policy temporarily reduced
period of rapprochement with Russia. NATO/EU influence and was seen
as a key geopolitical development
in the Black Sea region at the
time.

Phase 2: Russia's Annexation of Crimea and the War in Donbas 2014-2021

Date Event Significance for Black Sea Security

Feb- Russia's illegal This event dramatically altered the Black

Mar annexation of Crimea. Sea naval and strategic balance. Russia
2014 Unmarked Russian troops converted Crimea into a heavily armed
occupy the Crimean "fortress," substantially expanding the
Peninsula following reach and power of its Black Sea Fleet and
Ukraine's Revolution of establishing a permanent military
Dignity. dominance over the central Black Sea.
 Apr War in Donbas begins. Established a long-term conflict zone in
2014 Russian-backed separatists southeastern Ukraine, solidifying a threat to
seize territory in the Donetsk Ukrainian territorial integrity that would later
and Luhansk regions of be used as a pretext for a wider invasion.
eastern Ukraine.

Feb Minsk II Agreements are The conflict becomes a static "frozen" war
2015 signed to halt fighting in for the next seven years, though low-
Donbas. intensity fighting and Russian support for
separatists continued to destabilize the
region.

Phase 3: The Full-Scale Russian Invasion and Naval War 2022-2025

Date Event Significance for Black Sea Security

Feb Russia launches a full-scale The Black Sea immediately becomes

24, invasion of Ukraine. A southern a central combat theater. Russia
2022 front is launched from Crimea, attempts to seize the Ukrainian
initiating the naval blockade of coastline to cripple the country's
Ukraine's ports. economy and ensure strategic control
of the northern Black Sea.

Jul 22, Black Sea Grain Initiative BSGI Temporarily provided a humanitarian
2022 is signed between Ukraine, and economic lifeline, easing the de
Russia, Türkiye, and the UN. facto naval blockade and global food
Grain exports are allowed from security concerns.
Ukrainian Black Sea ports via a
safe corridor.

Jul 17, Russia terminates its Led to an immediate escalation of

2023 participation in the BSGI. attacks on Ukrainian port and grain
Russia withdraws from the UN- infrastructure, resuming the full threat
 brokered deal, effective on this to commercial shipping in the
date. northern Black Sea.

Aug Ukraine launches a new Black Ukraine effectively breaks the

2023 Sea corridor. Ukraine Russian naval blockade without a
establishes a new maritime formal agreement, utilizing naval
corridor for trade vessels, drone attacks and coastal defenses
primarily for commercial ships to push the Russian Black Sea Fleet
willing to risk the route despite away from its coast.
the Russian threat.

Sep Ukrainian missile attack on Demonstrates Ukraine's ability to

13, Sevastopol. Successful strike strike the Russian Black Sea Fleet's
2023 damages two Russian warships main base in occupied Crimea,
in a dry dock, including a forcing Russia to disperse its naval
submarine. assets.

Dec Ukrainian strike on Another significant loss for the

26, Novocherkassk landing ship in Russian Black Sea Fleet, illustrating
2023 Feodosia, Crimea. the success of Ukraine's anti-ship
and naval drone strategy.

Late Continued successful Ukraine's innovative maritime drone

2023- Ukrainian naval drone attacks USV campaign effectively challenges
2025 on Russian Black Sea Fleet Russian naval dominance, forcing the
vessels, including landing ships fleet to retreat from previously
and missile corvettes. controlled areas. Ukraine continues
to damage and destroy Russian
warships, fundamentally altering the
naval balance.
 May Report published on Russia's Highlights the continuing use of
2025 systematic campaign to cripple economic warfare and the deliberate
Ukraine's grain economy targeting of critical port infrastructure
following the collapse of the in Odessa Oblast Black Sea and
BSGI. Danube ports.

June The EU adopts a new Black A formal commitment by the

2, Sea security strategy. European Union to a strong, long-
2025 term strategy for Black Sea security,
although initial analysis notes it lacks
a concrete action plan or budget.

Oct Continued Russian missile and Indicates the Black Sea remains a
2025 drone attacks, including a primary battle space, with continued
reported large-scale Ukrainian high-intensity drone and missile
drone attack over the Black Sea warfare on the land-sea interface.
and Crimea.

Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue:

Multiple diplomatic efforts have been made to resolve the conflicts involving Russia and its
neighboring states, particularly the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian
War, which began in 2014 and escalated significantly in 2022.

The key attempt to resolve the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia was a cease-
fire plan brokered by the European Union, led by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Key Agreements Sarkozy-Medvedev Six-Point Plan

● Immediate Ceasefire: An immediate end to hostilities.
● No Further Use of Force: Commitment to refrain from using force.
● Free Access for Humanitarian Aid: Provision for unhindered access to humanitarian
assistance.
● Withdrawal of Georgian Forces: Georgian military forces were to withdraw to their
usual places of deployment.
 ● Withdrawal of Russian Forces: Russian forces were to withdraw to the lines held prior
to the start of hostilities on August 7, 2008. Russia was allowed to take "additional
security measures" within a buffer zone until international mechanisms were put in place.
● International Discussions: The opening of international talks on the security and
stability of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and ways to implement the principles of the
agreement.

Outcome
While the agreement led to a cessation of the main fighting, Russia's subsequent recognition
of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and its continued military presence in
and around these territories effectively cemented the territorial division and undermined the full
implementation of the plan, especially concerning the return of forces to pre-conflict positions
and respect for Georgia's territorial integrity.

Following the initial conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine, two major agreements were
signed, mediated by the Trilateral Contact Group Ukraine, Russia, OSCE and the leaders of
the Normandy Format Ukraine, Russia, France, Germany.

Minsk I Minsk Protocol, September 2014

● Key Provisions: The agreement included a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons
by both sides, release of prisoners of war, and monitoring of the ceasefire and the
Russia-Ukraine border by the OSCE. It also included steps toward decentralization of
power in the separatist-held areas Donetsk and Luhansk regions and early local
elections.
● Failure: The ceasefire proved fragile, and fighting continued. Crucially, the agreement
was vague and quickly undermined by new military offensives.

Minsk II Package of Measures, February 2015

● Key Provisions: This agreement was a follow-up, signed after a major Ukrainian
military defeat. It outlined thirteen steps, which included:
○ An immediate and comprehensive ceasefire.
○ Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distance.
○ Granting of a special status to the separatist-held areas through constitutional
reform by Ukraine.
○ Holding of local elections in the special status areas.
○ Restoration of Ukraine's full control over its state border to occur after local
elections and constitutional reform.
● Failure: The key political steps were never fully implemented. Ukraine resisted the
political steps like special status and elections without a complete and verifiable
restoration of security and border control, while Russia and its proxies resisted the full
security commitments. Russia's role as a mediator rather than an aggressor-party also
 complicated enforcement. The agreements were effectively nullified by Russia's full-
scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

After Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, several rounds of peace talks were held.

Istanbul Peace Talks March-April 2022

● Key Discussions: Talks in Turkey led to Ukraine's proposal that it would adopt a status
of a "permanently neutral state" non-NATO membership and not host foreign military
bases, in exchange for international security guarantees from Western powers. The
status of Crimea was proposed to be decided over a 10-15 year period, with a pledge
not to retake it by force.
● Failure: The negotiations ultimately stalled due to several critical disagreements:
○ Security Guarantees: Russia demanded that any response by guarantor states
to an attack on Ukraine must be approved by all guarantors, which would
effectively give Russia a veto over Ukraine's defense.
○ Territorial Demands: Russia demanded Ukraine give up all of the Donbas and
formally recognize its annexation of Crimea, and later expanded its demands.
○ Post-Bucha Atrocities: The revelation of mass killings of civilians by Russian
forces in areas like Bucha severely hardened Ukraine's negotiating position,
eroding any trust in Russia's intentions.
○ Ukrainian Sovereignty: Russia insisted on drastically reducing the size of the
Ukrainian military and imposing other sweeping restrictions on its sovereignty,
which Ukraine deemed unacceptable "ultimatums" aimed at capitulation.

Yes, I can provide a comprehensive overview of the purpose, structure, key discussions, and
challenges of the Geneva International Discussions GID on Georgia and the diplomatic
formats concerning the conflict in Ukraine: the Trilateral Contact Group TCG, the Normandy
Format, and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission SMM.

The GID are international talks launched in October 2008 to address the consequences of the
Russo-Georgian War of August 2008.

Purpose and Structure

● Goal: To discuss security and stability in Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and the humanitarian needs of the conflict-affected population,
particularly the return of internally displaced persons IDPs and refugees.
● Co-Chairs: The discussions are co-chaired by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe OSCE, the European Union EU, and the United Nations UN.
● Participants: Representatives from Georgia, the Russian Federation, the United
States, and representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia participate.
● Working Groups: The GID operates in two parallel working groups:
 1. Working Group 1: Focuses on security and stability, including a non-use of
force commitment and the establishment of security mechanisms.
2. Working Group 2: Addresses humanitarian issues, primarily the safe and
dignified return of IDPs and refugees, as well as issues of cultural heritage and
freedom of movement.

Key Contentious Issues

● Non-Use of Force: Georgia made a unilateral pledge of non-use of force in 2010 and
insists Russia do the same. Russia refuses, claiming it's not a party to the conflict, and
instead wants Georgia to sign treaties directly with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which
Georgia rejects as they are part of its sovereign territory.
● IDP/Refugee Return: The issue of the return of mostly ethnic Georgian IDPs and
refugees is a major point of disagreement. Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives,
backed by Russia, generally reject discussing the return as long as Georgia pursues
yearly resolutions on IDPs at the UN General Assembly.
● NATO and Military Cooperation: Russia frequently expresses concern over Georgia's
relations with NATO and its military cooperation with the United States, arguing it poses
a security threat to the region.
● Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism IPRM: A positive mechanism for
discussing and resolving local incidents, such as border crossing issues or detentions,
has been established, particularly on the administrative boundary line with South
Ossetia. The resumption of a similar mechanism for Abkhazia is an ongoing topic.
● Status: The overall discussions are often locked in a standstill due to fundamentally
opposed positions on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Russia
recognizes as independent states but the rest of the world considers to be under
Russian occupation.

Following the start of the war in Donbas in 2014, several formats were created to address the
conflict, primarily linked to the Minsk Agreements Minsk I in 2014 and Minsk II in 2015.

The Normandy Format

● Members Normandy Four: Leaders and later ministers from France, Germany,
Ukraine, and Russia.
● Role: Provided the political guidance and framework for negotiations, most notably
leading to the two Minsk Agreements.
● Last Meetings: The leaders last met in Paris in December 2019. Meetings at the
foreign minister and political advisor level continued up until just before Russia's full-
scale invasion, with the final meeting on February 10, 2022, in Berlin, which failed to
achieve a breakthrough.
● Criticism: The format was criticized for not including the US or the UK, two signatories
of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which gave Russia a significant advantage in
 controlling the narrative that the conflict was purely a civil war and not an inter-state
aggression. The format also avoided discussing the annexation of Crimea.

The Trilateral Contact Group TCG

● Members: Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE, with the participation of representatives
from the self-proclaimed republics in Donbas "DPR" and "LPR".
● Role: Served as the operational body for the ongoing follow-up on the military, political,
and economic aspects of the Minsk Agreements.
● Key Discussions/Failures:
○ Ceasefire Implementation: Focused on the withdrawal of heavy weapons, troop
disengagement, and prisoner exchanges. The TCG failed to achieve a
sustainable ceasefire, with violations occurring constantly.
○ Political Implementation: Discussed the interim status and eventual local
elections for the occupied territories, which failed due to fundamentally divergent
interpretations of the Minsk Agreements—particularly on the order of steps
security first, or political steps first and direct dialogue between Kyiv and the
separatists.
○ Non-Binding Status: The Minsk Agreements, signed by representatives who
lacked the authority to sign international treaties, were considered political
commitments rather than legally binding documents, weakening their
enforcement mechanism.
● Role: A civilian, unarmed mission launched in 2014 to monitor and report on the
security situation and implementation of the Minsk Agreements throughout Ukraine,
particularly along the line of contact in Donbas.
● Monitoring Successes: The SMM provided crucial, impartial documentation of
ceasefire violations, damage to civilian infrastructure e.g., schools and kindergartens,
and the presence of heavy weaponry in violation of withdrawal lines. Its daily reports
became the definitive source of verified information.
● Key Challenges/Failures:
○ Access Restrictions: The SMM was consistently and systematically denied
access to non-government-controlled areas and the section of the Ukrainian-
Russian border not under Ukrainian control, severely limiting its ability to monitor
the situation effectively and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces.
○ Ceasefire Enforcement: The mission's mandate was only to monitor, not to
enforce, the ceasefire. Despite its reports detailing thousands of violations which
increased dramatically just before the 2022 invasion, it could not stop the
fighting.
○ Closure: The SMM was ultimately forced to close in April 2022 after Russia
vetoed the extension of its mandate following the full-scale invasion, marking a
major sign of the broader decline and political gridlock within the OSCE as an
institution.
Possible Solutions:

NATO has dramatically increased its military presence and readiness in the region, focusing on
a robust forward defense to secure the Alliance's southeastern flank.
● Enhanced Forward Presence and Forces:
○ Doubling of Battlegroups: The number of multinational battlegroups on NATO's
eastern flank has been doubled from four to eight, including new ones in
Romania and Bulgaria to anchor the presence in the Black Sea area.
○ Scaling to Brigade-Size: There is an ongoing effort to regularly exercise the
scaling up of forward land forces beyond the battalion-size battlegroups to
brigade-size units when and where required, improving immediate combat
credibility.
○ Prepositioning and Reinforcements: Ensuring that in-place, combat-ready
forces are supported by rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned
equipment, and enhanced command and control to accelerate deployment
timelines
● Air and Missile Defense:
○ Integrated Air and Missile Defense IAMD: Deploying a rotational model of
modern air and missile defense systems and capabilities, which is seen as
critical for a modern IAMD capacity with networked sensors to counter threats at
all altitudes in multi-domain operations. This also includes efforts to create a
regional Anti-Access/Area-Denial A2/AD hub in Romania with advanced air
and missile defense systems.
○ Air Shielding Mission: Maintaining the NATO Air Shielding mission, which
provides a near-seamless shield from the Baltic to the Black Sea to safeguard
Alliance territory from air and missile threats.
● Maritime Capabilities and Operations:
○ Strengthening Littoral Allies: Enhanced military cooperation between the Black
Sea littoral Allies Türkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania within the NATO framework
is vital.
○ Anti-Access/Area-Denial A2/AD Capacity: Developing a NATO A2/AD capacity
in the Black Sea to counter Russia's own anti-access bubble, which is centered
around Crimea.
○ Naval Presence: Maintaining a strengthened maritime presence through
Standing NATO Maritime Forces and more frequent naval exercises, while
respecting the constraints of the 1936 Montreux Convention.
○ Support for Ukraine's Maritime Defense: Providing increased security
assistance and military aid to Ukraine, specifically to improve its anti-surface,
anti-ship, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, including the development and
use of highly effective unmanned naval platforms to back Kyiv's successful
maritime counteroffensive.
Hybrid warfare, which includes cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion, is a
primary threat in the Black Sea region.
● Cyber and Information Warfare:
○ Enhanced Cyber Defense and Early Warning: Strengthening Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities, including advanced warning
technologies for cyber defense, to protect critical infrastructure like energy
systems, offshore installations, and subsea cables.
○ Fighting Disinformation: The EU's efforts, supported by NATO, include
investment in Artificial Intelligence to fight disinformation, promote media
literacy, and enhance fact-checker networks, as the Black Sea region is a prime
target for hybrid actions.
● Critical Infrastructure Protection:
○ Maritime Security Hub: A key EU proposal, to be coordinated with NATO, is the
establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub as an early warning
system to enhance situational awareness and protect critical infrastructure in the
maritime domain.
○ Resilience and Supply Chains: Enhancing resilience to deter, detect,
withstand, and recover from hybrid attacks on critical civilian and energy
infrastructure. This includes hardening energy sector assets and creating
alternate supply chains.
● Legal and Operational Tools: Developing a comprehensive toolkit dedicated to
countering regional hybrid warfare threats and committing to a strategy that emphasizes
higher levels of deterrence against non-conventional attacks, potentially triggering
Article 5 in response to major hybrid attacks.

● Energy and Economic Security:

○ Diversification: Diversifying energy sources and developing new infrastructure,
such as potential natural gas reserves in the Romanian Exclusive Economic
Zone , to reduce heavy dependence on Russian energy exports which grants
Moscow leverage.
○ Connectivity and Infrastructure: Promoting economic development and
interconnectivity through initiatives like the Middle Corridor and the Three Seas
Initiative, with targeted investments in transport, energy, and digital
infrastructure that link Europe to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Upgrades to
regional ports, railways, roads, and airports will also improve military mobility
for heavy gear.
● Countering Illicit Economic Activities:
○ Enforcing Sanctions: Full enforcement of EU sanctions and port bans on
tankers engaged in ship-to-ship oil transfers and vessels that turn off their
 Automatic Identification System , which is often part of Russia's illegal
commercial activities in the Black Sea.
○ Maritime Insurance and Trade: Supporting mechanisms, such as the Unity
Facility, to keep Black Sea shipping afloat, mitigate wartime insurance costs, and
ensure the continued flow of Ukrainian grain and other cargo critical for global
food security.
● Deepened Cooperation with Partners:
○ Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine: Providing accelerated practical support for
security and defense sector reform, along with political support, to strengthen the
deterrence and resilience capacities of these non-NATO nations on Russia's
periphery.
○ NATO-EU Alignment: Ensuring a cohesive strategy by aligning NATO's military
tools and plans with the EU's non-military strengths, such as financial support,
economic sanctions, and energy system integration.

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UNEP
ADISMUN2025
Forum: United Nations Environment Programme UNEP

Question of: Reducing the Impact of Climate Change on Communities

Around the World

Student Officer: Aarya Sheth

Contact: aarya.adani2038@[Link]

Introduction:

The global community now faces a planetary emergency where the pervasive effects of climate
change present the single greatest threat to human security, sustainable development, and
global stability. As the designated body responsible for coordinating environmental activities, the
United Nations Environment Programme UNEP is tasked with spearheading solutions to this
crisis. This officer report focuses specifically on the critical agenda item: Reducing the Impact
of Climate Change on Communities Around the World. This mandate necessitates an in-
depth examination of how climatic shifts translate into localized disasters and enduring
vulnerabilities, and how international efforts can be fundamentally restructured to support those
on the front lines.

The most alarming aspect of the climate crisis is its deeply entrenched injustice and
disproportionate impact. Communities that have historically contributed the least to
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions—including those in the Least Developed Countries
LDCs, Small Island Developing States SIDS, Arctic regions, and marginalized urban and rural
populations globally—are precisely those experiencing the most severe and immediate
consequences. This vulnerability is not accidental; it is a direct result of pre-existing socio-
economic inequalities, historical marginalization, limited access to resources, and
underdeveloped infrastructure.

At the community level, the impacts are multifaceted and compounding:

 1. Water and Food Insecurity: Prolonged droughts, shifting rainfall patterns, and coastal
salinization are destroying traditional agricultural systems and depleting freshwater
sources, driving localized food crises and malnutrition.
2. Extreme Weather and Displacement: The increasing frequency and intensity of
cyclones, floods, and heatwaves result in rapid-onset disasters that cause mass
internal and cross-border displacement, straining humanitarian resources and
eroding social cohesion.
3. Ecological Degradation: Temperature rise and ocean acidification threaten coastal
livelihoods dependent on coral reefs and fisheries, while deforestation and desertification
diminish the ecosystem services that act as natural buffers against extreme weather.

These interwoven threats directly jeopardize the achievement of the Sustainable Development
Goals SDGs. Climate vulnerability acts as a persistent negative externality that specifically
undermines SDG 1 No Poverty, SDG 2 Zero Hunger, SDG 13 Climate Action, and SDG 16
Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions. Without immediate and targeted interventions at the
community level, the promise of the 2030 Agenda will remain unfulfilled.

Current global efforts have largely centered on high-level mitigation commitments e.g.,
Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs and macro-level finance flows, often failing to
reach the local governments, civil society organizations, and Indigenous knowledge-holders
best equipped to implement effective adaptation and resilience-building measures. A
fundamental paradigm shift is required to empower these local actors.

This report, therefore, serves as a call to action to move beyond broad policy statements and to
focus on three critical pillars for reducing community impact:
1. Empowering Ecosystem-Based Adaptation EbA: Integrating natural systems—such
as mangroves, wetlands, and conservation agriculture—into resilience planning to
provide cost-effective, sustainable protection and livelihood benefits.
2. Mobilizing and Localizing Climate Finance: Creating direct financing mechanisms
that bypass bureaucratic hurdles and channel dedicated funding to local and regional
entities, ensuring that financial resources match the scale of the immediate need.
3. Fostering Inclusive Governance: Mandating the full and equal participation of women,
youth, and Indigenous communities in the planning and execution of all climate
resilience projects, leveraging invaluable local and traditional knowledge.

By outlining these actionable strategies, this report intends to guide the deliberations of the
UNEP and its partners toward a more equitable, effective, and community-centric global
response to the climate crisis. The time for generic commitments has passed; the urgency of the
moment demands concrete, localized solutions to secure the future of all communities.
Definition of Key Terms:

Term Definition

Climate Change A long-term shift in temperatures and weather patterns,

primarily caused by human activities such as the burning of
fossil fuels that increase the concentration of greenhouse
gases in Earth's atmosphere.

Vulnerability The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected

by climate-related hazards. It encompasses sensitivity to
harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt.

Adaptation The process of adjusting to current or expected climate

change and its effects. In human systems, adaptation
seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial
opportunities e.g., building sea walls, developing drought-
resistant crops.

Resilience The capacity of social, economic, and ecological systems

to cope with a hazardous event or trend, responding or
reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function,
identity, and structure, while maintaining the capacity for
adaptation, learning, and transformation.

Mitigation A human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the

sinks of greenhouse gases e.g., switching to renewable
energy, promoting energy efficiency.

Disproportionate The concept that the effects of a hazard like climate

Impact change are unevenly distributed, typically falling most
 heavily on populations that are socially, economically, or
geographically marginalized.

Sustainable A collection of 17 interlinked global goals designed to be a

Development Goals "blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future
SDGs for all" by 2030, established by the United Nations in 2015.

Ecosystem-Based The use of biodiversity and ecosystem services as part of

Adaptation EbA an overall adaptation strategy to help people adapt to the
adverse effects of climate change. This includes the
sustainable management, conservation, and restoration of
ecosystems e.g., restoring mangroves to protect against
storm surges.

Climate Justice A term acknowledging that climate change impacts are

unevenly distributed and that policies must address the
unequal burdens and responsibilities among nations and
individuals, particularly considering historical emissions.

Least Developed A list of countries that, according to the UN, are low-income
Countries LDCs nations confronting severe structural impediments to
sustainable development. They are highly vulnerable to
economic and environmental shocks.

Small Island A group of small island countries that share similar

Developing States sustainable development challenges, including small size,
SIDS remoteness, narrow resource bases, and high exposure to
external shocks, especially climate change.
Climate Finance Local, national, or transnational financing, drawn from
public, private, and alternative sources of funding, that
seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions to
address climate change.

Greenhouse Gas Any gas that absorbs and emits infrared radiation, warming
GHG the Earth's surface. Primary GHGs include carbon dioxide,
methane, and nitrous oxide .

Non-economic Loss The adverse effects of climate change that are difficult to
and Damage quantify in monetary terms, such as loss of cultural
heritage, loss of territory, loss of biodiversity, or loss of life.

Community-Based An approach that focuses on empowering local people to

Adaptation CBA use their own knowledge, institutions, and resources to
prepare for and cope with the impacts of climate change.
Term Definition

Adaptation Finance Funding explicitly intended to help communities and

countries reduce the risks they face and the harm they
might suffer from the effects of climate change e.g., building
sea defenses, developing drought-tolerant crops.

Direct Access A mechanism within international climate funds like the

Modality Adaptation Fund or GCF that allows national or regional
implementing entities NIEs/RIEs to directly access and
manage climate finance, bypassing international
intermediaries.

Loss and Damage The unavoidable adverse effects of climate change,

L&D including both economic e.g., destroyed infrastructure,
reduced crop yields and non-economic e.g., loss of life,
cultural heritage, biodiversity impacts that occur despite
mitigation and adaptation efforts.

Climate Governance The formal and informal rules, structures, processes, and
systems that define and influence actions aimed at steering
social systems toward preventing, mitigating, or adapting to
the risks posed by climate change.

Nationally Non-binding national plans created by countries under the

Determined Paris Agreement to state their commitments to reduce
Contributions NDCs greenhouse gas emissions and build climate resilience.

National Adaptation A country-led process established under the UNFCCC to

Plans NAPs identify medium- and long-term adaptation needs and
develop and implement strategies and programmes to
address them.
Finance and Governance Mechanisms

Term Definition

Just Transition A framework developed to ensure that the transition

toward a zero-carbon economy is conducted in a way that
is fair and inclusive, minimizing adverse social and
economic consequences for workers and vulnerable
communities e.g., retraining coal miners for solar jobs.

Environmental Justice The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all

EJ people, regardless of race, color, national origin, or
income, with respect to the development, implementation,
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies.

Climate Migration / The movement of individuals or populations that is wholly

Displacement or partly caused by sudden or gradual changes in the
environment due to climate change e.g., sea-level rise,
prolonged drought.

Common But A principle of international environmental law, formalized

Differentiated in the UNFCCC, which recognizes that all states have a
Responsibilities CBDR shared responsibility for addressing climate change, but
that developed countries must take the lead due to their
historical contribution to emissions and greater financial
capacity.

Climate-Smart An approach that helps to guide actions needed to

Agriculture CSA transform and reorient agricultural systems to effectively
support development and ensure food security under the
new realities of climate change.
Gender-Sensitive Policies or programs that explicitly recognize the different
Policies needs, roles, and vulnerabilities of men and women in the
context of climate change, ensuring that projects do not
worsen existing gender inequalities.

Term Definition

Anthropogenic Originating from human activity, typically used when

referring to emissions or environmental changes caused by
human action.

Decarbonisation The process of reducing the amount of carbon specifically

carbon dioxide, entering the atmosphere, primarily by
transitioning energy systems away from fossil fuels.

Tipping Point A critical threshold at which a small perturbation can cause a

large, sometimes irreversible, change in the climate system
e.g., the collapse of a major ice sheet or permafrost thaw.

Nature-Based Actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural

Solutions NbS or modified ecosystems to address societal challenges
effectively and adaptively, while simultaneously providing
human well-being and biodiversity benefits. EbA is a form of
NbS.

Climate Hazard A potential threat to humans, infrastructure, or the

environment that stems from a physical process or event
linked to climate variability and change e.g., increased
frequency of heavy rainfall, heatwaves.
General Overview:

The foundational scientific data illustrates a system rapidly approaching irreversible thresholds.
The current average global temperature rise of to above the pre-industrial baseline has
already locked in significant, harmful changes. Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations now
exceed 420 parts per million ppm, a level not seen in human history. This is accelerating
phenomena that directly threaten community survival:
● Sea-Level Rise: The global mean sea level is currently rising at over 4.5 mm per year,
a rate that has doubled since the 1990s. This accelerates saltwater intrusion, rendering
coastal groundwater unusable for drinking and irrigation, and directly threatening low-
lying communities in regions like the Mekong Delta and Small Island Developing States
SIDS.
● Melting Cryosphere: The rapid melt of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, and
mountain glaciers the "water towers" of Asia, represents a looming threat to over billion
people. In communities downstream, this initially causes catastrophic flooding, followed
by chronic water scarcity as glaciers disappear. For example, high-mountain Asia's
glaciers provide fresh water to major river basins relied upon by billion people.

The physical impacts of climate change translate directly into a humanitarian crisis,
disproportionately affecting those least prepared to cope.
● Forced Displacement: Weather-related disasters are the largest driver of internal
displacement. In 2022 alone, over 32.6 million people were displaced internally by
events such as floods and storms Source: IDMC. These displacement waves—often
involving Indigenous and rural communities—overburden urban infrastructure and social
services, leading to increased competition for resources, which can fuel social
instability and conflict.
● Acute Food Insecurity: Climate shocks, especially drought and extreme heat, are
critical threat multipliers for global hunger. The number of people facing acute food
insecurity worldwide has doubled in recent years, with over 150 million people currently
affected. Projections indicate that the combination of climate change and environmental
degradation could reduce global crop yields by up to by 2050, putting the livelihoods of
the billion people who depend on smallholder agriculture at severe risk.
● Lethal Heat Exposure: Urban populations, particularly those living in informal
settlements without proper ventilation or cooling, face increased mortality risk from heat
stress. Data shows that heat-related deaths among people over 65 have surged by
approximately since 2000, underscoring the urgent need for local urban adaptation
plans and early warning systems.

Despite the clear and urgent need for Adaptation at the community level, a massive funding
shortfall, known as the Adaptation Finance Gap, is paralyzing resilience efforts.
● Magnitude of the Shortfall: The total current international public finance for adaptation
in developing countries is only around billion annually 2021 data. This falls dramatically
 short of the estimated need, which is projected to be between billion and billion per
year by 2030 Source: UNEP Adaptation Gap Report. This gap often means that crucial,
localized projects—like restoring coastal mangroves or installing micro-irrigation
systems never receive funding.
● The Funding Barrier: The majority of climate finance flows through large multilateral
institutions, which can impose complex bureaucratic hurdles. Consequently, less than of
global climate finance is currently dedicated to local-level projects. The lack of widely
accessible Direct Access Modalities prevents local governments and Community-
Based Organizations CBOs from accessing the funds they need, perpetuating a reliance
on top-down, often unsuitable, foreign aid.
● Compounding Disaster Loss: For highly vulnerable nations, particularly SIDS and
LDCs, the costs of Loss and Damage are existential. The economic damage from
extreme events is recurrent and devastating: in some Caribbean SIDS, a single
hurricane can cause losses equivalent to over of the annual GDP, effectively erasing
decades of development progress and trapping communities in cycles of recovery and
debt.
● Vertical Integration Failure: While many countries have signed the Paris Agreement
and submitted Nationally Determined Contributions NDCs, there is a systemic failure
in Vertical Integration—the process of linking national climate policy to actionable
regional and municipal strategies. Local governments, which manage infrastructure and
disaster response, often lack the legal authority, technical capacity, and dedicated
budgets to implement national adaptation goals.
● Exclusion of Local Knowledge: Policy formation frequently overlooks the principles of
Climate Justice and fails to engage key stakeholders. Adaptation plans often ignore the
crucial Indigenous and Traditional Ecological Knowledge held by local communities,
particularly regarding sustainable water management or fire ecology, resulting in
solutions that are culturally insensitive and ecologically ineffective.
● Need for Multi-level Governance: Future success depends on implementing a
Multilevel Climate Governance approach that formally empowers local authorities. This
includes mandating the involvement of groups traditionally marginalized—such as
women and youth—in all decision-making, acknowledging their essential roles in
building Gender-Sensitive and resilient community structures. The transition must be a
Just Transition, ensuring that efforts to decarbonize do not inflict economic hardship on
fossil fuel-dependent or rural communities.

Metric Statistic / Data Point Implication for

Communities
Current Global average temperature is now This level of warming
Warming to higher than pre-industrial levels . already causes extreme
weather events
heatwaves, flooding
that overwhelm local
coping mechanisms.

Concentration Atmospheric concentration has Drives ocean

surpassed 420 parts per million acidification and sea-
ppm, a level not seen in millions of level rise, directly
years. destroying coastal and
SIDS community
livelihoods fishing,
agriculture, tourism.

Area of Impact Statistic / Data Point Community Consequence

Exposure vs. The G20 countries are Perpetuates Climate

Responsibility responsible for approximately of Injustice; resources are
global greenhouse gas diverted from development
emissions, yet SIDS face to continuous disaster
average annual losses from recovery.
climate events equivalent to of
their GDP.
Food Insecurity Climate variability is now the Causes localized
primary driver of the million malnutrition, particularly
people facing acute food stunting in children, and
insecurity globally. fuels displacement from
traditional farmlands.

Economic The total cost of climate disasters Wipes out decades of

Damage reached over a billion in 2023. development gains in a
Over all of this burden is single event, locking
absorbed by local economies, communities into long-
governments, and uninsured term debt and
poor populations. dependency.

Water Stress By 2050, up to 5 billion people Increases resource

are projected to be living in areas conflicts and health crises
with water stress due to changing e.g., cholera outbreaks
precipitation and glacier melt. following floods or
droughts.

Metric Statistic / Data Point Community Consequence

Internal Over 32.6 million people were Puts immense pressure on

Displacement internally displaced by weather- the urban centers and host
related disasters in 2022 communities they migrate to,
Source: IDMC. straining public services and
increasing social tension.

Sea-Level Rise By 2100, a projected rise of 0.5 Leads to Non-economic

to 1.0 meters will threaten low- Loss and Damage,
lying coastal cities and island including the irreversible loss
nations, potentially displacing of cultural heritage,
over 150 million people.
 sovereignty, and ancestral
lands.

Heat Stress In densely populated urban Exposes vulnerable workers

areas, heatwaves already cause construction, agriculture to
an estimated 3 to 10 times lethal conditions, leading to
more mortality risk for low- economic productivity loss
income populations lacking and public health crises.
access to air conditioning or
green spaces.

Metric Statistic / Data Point Community Consequence

Estimated Developing countries will need Leaves communities

Adaptation between billion and billion unprepared, forcing them into
Needs per year by 2030 for crisis response instead of
adaptation costs Source: UNEP proactive risk reduction.
Adaptation Gap Report.

Actual International public adaptation The lack of finance, particularly

Adaptation finance reached approximately through Direct Access
Funding billion in 2021—a stark Modalities, means that
shortfall of up to of the community-led projects remain
estimated need. underfunded or unimplemented.
 Ecosystem Globally, of the world's Reduces the natural buffers
Loss ecosystem services are being mangroves, coral reefs that
degraded, yet funding for communities rely on for
Ecosystem-Based protection, increasing their
Adaptation accounts for less direct exposure to hazards.
than of all climate finance.

Major Parties Involved:

A. Multilateral and Regional Development Banks MDBs and RDBs

MDBs like the World Bank Group and RDBs like the African Development Bank, Asian
Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank are the major arteries for
channeling large-scale, climate-related development funding.
● Role:
○ Mainstreaming Climate Risk: They integrate climate resilience into all their
investment portfolios, shifting trillions of dollars away from climate-vulnerable
investments and toward low-carbon, resilient infrastructure.
○ Financing Large-Scale Resilience: They fund major, often grey-infrastructure
projects that underpin community resilience, such as building climate-resilient
roads, developing drought-resistant water storage facilities, and upgrading
national energy grids to withstand extreme weather.
○ Statistical Impact: The World Bank Group, for instance, has committed to
dedicating at least 35% of its financing to climate-related projects, with a
significant portion going towards adaptation and co-benefits for communities.

B. Private Sector and Financial Institutions

The sheer scale of the Adaptation Finance Gap projected to reach up to billion annually by
2030 – UNEP necessitates the engagement of private capital.
● Insurance and Risk Transfer: Companies in this sector develop catastrophe bonds
and parametric insurance products where payouts are triggered automatically by a
measured event, like wind speed or rainfall deficit. This provides immediate liquidity to
communities and local governments after a disaster, preventing asset stripping and
accelerating recovery, such as those provided by the African Risk Capacity ARC
facility.
 ● Climate Technology Providers: Private firms are vital in delivering scalable solutions,
from solar-powered desalination units to low-cost, decentralized Early Warning
System EWS communication platforms e.g., using mobile SMS or decentralized radio
networks to reach remote populations.
● ESG Investors: Large institutional investors managing trillions of dollars now prioritize
Environmental, Social, and Governance ESG factors, driving capital toward
companies and projects that demonstrate high climate resilience and positive social
impact, indirectly supporting the local economies of vulnerable communities.

While UNEP provides the environmental leadership, other UN agencies ensure that climate
action is integrated across humanitarian, development, and disaster risk reduction mandates.

A. United Nations Development Programme UNDP

UNDP is a key implementer focused on capacity building, governance, and on-the-ground
project delivery, making it highly visible to local communities.
● Role: Co-leading the Early Warnings for All EW4All initiative with UNDRR, supporting
countries to develop and implement National Adaptation Plans NAPs, and managing
large portfolios of Community-Based Adaptation CBA projects, often utilizing the
resources of the GEF and GCF.
● Actionable Data: UNDP has supported the establishment or enhancement of Glacial
Lake Outburst Flood GLOF EWS in high-risk areas like Bhutan, Nepal, and Pakistan,
directly protecting vulnerable populations in mountain communities. They focus on
providing climate information services which, in some regions, have led to enhanced
agricultural productivity with an estimated annual benefit of million for smallholder
farmers.

B. UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNDRR

The UNDRR is the custodian of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-
2030 and is responsible for coordinating global DRR efforts, which are now inseparable from
climate adaptation.
● Role: Advocating for the integration of disaster risk assessments into climate planning. It
co-chairs the EW4All initiative and focuses on the "Preparedness to Respond" pillar,
ensuring communities and governments have robust protocols for action once a climate
warning is issued.
● Focus on Local Government: UNDRR’s "Making Cities Resilient 2030" initiative
directly engages local authorities to build and implement local resilience plans,
recognizing cities and municipalities as the critical locus of risk and response.

The true impact of adaptation is measured by its success in the villages, farmlands, and coastal
settlements where it is implemented. These actors ensure that global mandates are relevant,
effective, and just.
A. Indigenous Peoples and Traditional Knowledge Holders
This group is increasingly recognized not just as a vulnerable demographic, but as essential
partners with unique expertise.
● Role: Contributing Traditional Ecological Knowledge TEK on managing local
ecosystems, which often underpins successful Ecosystem-Based Adaptation EbA
projects. For instance, traditional water harvesting and soil management practices offer
time-tested, sustainable solutions often superior to imported technologies.
● Policy Leverage: Advocacy groups representing Indigenous Peoples have been
instrumental in driving climate finance funds like the GCF and AF to establish specific
safeguards and mechanisms to ensure Free, Prior, and Informed Consent FPIC and
the direct flow of adaptation finance to their communities.

B. The Scientific and Technological Community Academia and Research

Independent scientists, universities, and think tanks provide the necessary rigor and innovation.
● Role: They conduct vulnerability and risk assessments to precisely map climate
threats at the local level e.g., downscaling global climate models to local weather
predictions. They are vital in evaluating the cost-effectiveness and success rate of
different adaptation measures, feeding essential data back into the policy cycle the IPCC
being the most prominent example of this synthesis.
● Technological Advancement: Research drives innovation in areas like climate-
resilient crop varieties e.g., salt-tolerant rice for coastal communities and low-cost
water harvesting technologies.

C. Civil Society Organizations CSOs and NGOs

From international NGOs to local CBOs, these groups are the frontline implementers and
advocates for climate justice.
● Role: They often act as the crucial "last mile" of adaptation, translating complex climate
information into actionable advice for farmers and fishers. They play a vital role in
ensuring accountability by monitoring project impacts, identifying instances of
maladaptation actions that increase vulnerability, and advocating for the needs of
marginalized groups, including women and youth, in adaptation governance.
Timeline of Key Events:

Foundational Science and Frameworks 1988–2001

Year Event/Agreement Significance for Adaptation

1988 Intergovernmental Panel Provided the scientific foundation for all

on Climate Change IPCC subsequent climate policy, including the need
Established for adaptation measures, by assessing
impacts and vulnerabilities.

1992 Rio Earth Summit The United Nations Framework Convention

UNCED and UNFCCC on Climate Change UNFCCC recognized
Adoption climate change as a "common concern of
humankind" and stipulated that developed
countries Annex I Parties should assist
developing countries Non-Annex I that are
"particularly vulnerable" to adverse impacts
Article 4.4.

1994 UNFCCC Entry into Formally established the Conference of the

Force Parties COP as the supreme governing body,
setting the stage for annual negotiations on
both mitigation and adaptation.
 1997 Kyoto Protocol Primarily focused on mitigation emissions
Adoption COP 3 reduction, but it indirectly reinforced the need
for adaptation by setting the first binding limits,
acknowledging the climate system's fragility.

2001 Marrakesh Accords COP A major adaptation breakthrough. It formalized

7 three new dedicated adaptation funds: the
Least Developed Countries Fund LDCF, the
Special Climate Change Fund SCCF, and
established the governance structure for the
Adaptation Fund AF under the Kyoto
Protocol.

Dedicated Adaptation Mechanisms and Planning 2002–2014

Year Event/Agreement Significance for Adaptation

2005 Kyoto Protocol Entry into Enabled the Adaptation Fund AF to begin
Force receiving funding from a levy on Clean
Development Mechanism CDM projects, a
truly innovative source of finance dedicated
exclusively to adaptation.

2006 Nairobi Work Programme Established a five-year program to assist all

NWP Launch COP 12 parties, particularly developing countries, to
improve their understanding of climate
change impacts, vulnerability, and
adaptation. It was a key step in knowledge
generation and sharing.
 2007 Bali Action Plan COP 13 Called for "enhanced action on adaptation,"
including the development of National
Adaptation Programmes of Action NAPAs
in Least Developed Countries LDCs, focusing
on urgent, priority community needs.

2010 Cancún Adaptation A pivotal moment. The CAF established

Framework CAF COP 16 adaptation as a pillar of equal importance
to mitigation. It formalized the Adaptation
Committee and encouraged all developing
countries to formulate and implement
National Adaptation Plans NAPs for a long-
term approach to planning.

2013 Warsaw International Established the first formal body under the
Mechanism WIM for Loss UNFCCC to address the issue of Loss and
and Damage COP 19 Damage associated with climate change
impacts in vulnerable developing countries,
covering impacts beyond the limits of
adaptation.

2014 Green Climate Fund GCF The GCF, established in 2010, became fully
Operationalization operational. It was designed to achieve a
50:50 balance between adaptation and
mitigation investment in grant-based finance
for vulnerable countries, becoming the
world's largest climate fund.

The Global Goal on Adaptation and Action 2015–Present

Year Event/Agreement Significance for Adaptation

2015 The Paris Agreement Created the Global Goal on Adaptation GGA,
COP 21 aiming to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen
resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate
change, with a view to contributing to
sustainable development. It requires countries to
submit national Adaptation Communications
ACs.

2018 Paris Agreement Finalized the operational details for the Paris
Rulebook COP 24 Agreement, including guidance on Adaptation
Communications, promoting transparency and
comparability of adaptation efforts.

2021 Glasgow Climate Pact Increased the political focus on adaptation.

COP 26 Developed countries committed to at least
double their collective provision of adaptation
finance from 2019 levels by 2025, recognizing
the large funding gap.

2022 Sharm el-Sheikh Historic agreement to establish a dedicated

Implementation Plan fund for Loss and Damage, fulfilling a long-
and Loss and Damage standing demand from vulnerable nations. This
Fund COP 27 formally separates finance for addressing
unavoidable impacts from adaptation finance.

2023 Global Stocktake and Concluded the first Global Stocktake GST of
GGA Framework COP the Paris Agreement, which confirmed the
28 - Dubai massive global adaptation finance gap. Parties
agreed on the UAE Framework for Global
Climate Resilience, providing a detailed set of
targets and indicators for the Global Goal on
Adaptation GGA through a thematic approach
e.g., water, food, health.
Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue:

The Kyoto Protocol was a monumental agreement that operationalized the 1992 UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC by setting the first-ever legally binding
emission reduction targets for industrialized countries known as Annex I Parties. Its major
accomplishment was its commitment to reduce emissions by an average of 5.2% below 1990
levels during its first commitment period 2008–2012. It also pioneered flexible market
mechanisms like the Clean Development Mechanism CDM and established the Adaptation
Fund, which is widely regarded as a success for introducing the "Direct Access" modality,
allowing developing countries to directly manage adaptation finance.

However, the Protocol is largely considered an overall failure on a global scale 🇺. This was
primarily because major emitters, most notably the United States, refused to ratify it, and
large, rapidly developing economies like China and India were not required to take on binding
targets. This limited scope meant that while the participating developed countries mostly met
their targets, global greenhouse gas emissions continued to rise significantly, undermining
the treaty's ultimate goal of stabilizing the climate.

The Copenhagen meeting in 2009 was intended to be a critical turning point where a legally
binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol would be negotiated. Its major non-binding outcome,
the Copenhagen Accord, acknowledged the need to limit global warming to below and saw
countries submit voluntary emission pledges. It also included a promise by developed nations to
mobilize 100 billion per year in climate finance by 2020.

The meeting is widely viewed as a spectacular failure because it failed to deliver a fair,
ambitious, and legally binding treaty. The negotiations suffered from a lack of consensus and
transparency, with deep distrust and disagreements over mandatory commitments and the
scale of financial support, particularly between developed and developing nations. The Accord
was merely "noted" by the conference, not officially adopted, due to procedural objections,
signaling a significant setback in the global climate effort.

The Paris Agreement marked a historic shift, succeeding where Copenhagen failed by
becoming a near-universal, legally-binding treaty with 195 participating parties. Its central,
game-changing accomplishment was establishing the long-term goal to limit the global average
temperature increase to well below , while pursuing efforts for

. It replaced binding targets with the system of voluntary, regularly strengthened Nationally
Determined Contributions NDCs, requiring all countries—developed and developing—to
submit climate action plans. Furthermore, it formalized a Global Goal on Adaptation GGA and
included the first official recognition of the need to address Loss and Damage L&D associated
with climate impacts.

The Agreement is a profound political and institutional success for its near-universal
participation and setting the globally accepted temperature goal. However, it faces an ongoing
challenge of implementation failure in its current form. The collective ambition of the first
round of NDCs is insufficient to meet the goal, leaving a significant "ambition gap." The
inability of developed countries to fully mobilize the promised climate finance has also been a
persistent failure, impeding the ability of developing nations to accelerate their mitigation and
adaptation efforts.

The First Global Stocktake GST, concluded at COP 28 in Dubai, was the mandated five-year
review of collective progress toward the Paris Agreement's goals. Its final outcome, the UAE
Consensus, delivered several key accomplishments. Most notably, it achieved a historic first by
explicitly calling on nations to "transition away from fossil fuels" in energy systems. It also
delivered a major breakthrough for vulnerable nations by operationalizing the Loss and
Damage Fund with initial funding pledges. Furthermore, a new Framework for the Global
Goal on Adaptation GGA Framework was formally adopted, providing much-needed specific
targets to guide national adaptation efforts.

The Stocktake was a process success , effectively serving as a global report card that
confirmed the world is severely off track on all fronts. Successes include the adoption of the
GGA framework and the immediate launch of the L&D Fund. The Failure lies in the stark reality
the Stocktake exposed: the massive adaptation and finance gaps that must be closed
urgently. The "transition away" language, while historic, was also criticized as a failure by those
who wanted an explicit call for a complete "phase-out" of all fossil fuels.

Possible Solutions:

Climate change represents one of the defining challenges of the 21st century, with
consequences that extend across ecosystems, economies, and societies. Addressing it requires
a dual approach: mitigation, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas GHG emissions and slow
the progression of global warming, and adaptation, which focuses on adjusting to the impacts
that are already unavoidable. Comprehensive climate action must therefore combine systemic
decarbonization with resilience-building measures, backed by robust international cooperation,
technological innovation, and behavioral change.

Mitigation efforts begin with transforming the global energy system, which currently accounts for
nearly 73% of total global greenhouse gas emissions IPCC, 2023. The International
Renewable Energy Agency IRENA projects that 90% of the world’s electricity could come
from renewable sources by 2050, potentially avoiding up to 70 gigatons of CO₂ emissions
between now and mid-century. This transition demands large-scale deployment of solar, wind,
hydroelectric, and geothermal energy, supported by modernized power grids and
decentralized systems that improve energy access in developing regions.

Electrification is a critical component of this shift. The transport sector alone contributes about
23% of global energy-related CO₂ emissions, and electrifying vehicles, buses, and even
aviation can dramatically lower this footprint. The International Energy Agency IEA reports that
global sales of electric vehicles EVs surpassed 14 million in 2023, representing nearly 18%
of all car sales, a milestone signaling rapid consumer and policy-driven transformation.
Similarly, heat pumps and energy-efficient cooling systems can decarbonize the building
sector, which accounts for roughly 30% of global final energy consumption.

To complement these technologies, large-scale energy storage systems—such as advanced

lithium-ion batteries and emerging solid-state or hydrogen storage solutions—are essential to
address intermittency issues inherent in renewables. The IEA estimates that global battery
capacity must expand 35-fold by 2030 to meet net-zero goals.

Energy efficiency remains one of the most cost-effective climate solutions. According to the
IEA’s Energy Efficiency 2024 report, efficiency improvements could deliver more than 40% of
the emissions reductions needed to achieve net zero by 2050. This involves adopting better
insulation standards, smart grids, and efficient appliances while integrating digital monitoring
and automation to minimize energy waste.

Policy frameworks are equally vital. Governments must phase out fossil fuel subsidies, which
currently total around 7 trillion annually IMF, 2023, and redirect those funds toward renewable
infrastructure and research. Additionally, implementing carbon pricing mechanisms—either
through carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems—creates financial incentives for low-carbon
investments. As of 2025, over 75 countries have adopted or are planning such measures,
covering nearly 25% of global emissions World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard.

Beyond energy, industry and land use contribute heavily to global emissions. The cement, steel,
and chemical sectors alone account for about 30% of industrial CO₂ output. Solutions
include carbon capture, utilization, and storage CCUS, low-emission hydrogen, and circular
economy models that extend the life of materials through reuse and recycling.

Land management is equally crucial. Deforestation and land-use change contribute nearly
11% of global emissions, primarily from tropical regions. Protecting and restoring forests,
peatlands, and wetlands can absorb up to 30% of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions annually.
Initiatives such as the Bonn Challenge aim to restore 350 million hectares of degraded land
by 2030, while programs like the REDD+ mechanism under the UNFCCC provide financial
incentives for forest conservation.

Moreover, regenerative agriculture—including no-till farming, crop diversification, and reduced

livestock emissions—enhances soil carbon sequestration while improving food security.
Transitioning to a circular economy, where waste is minimized and materials are continuously
reused, could cut global emissions by 39% and reduce resource use by 28% by 2050 Ellen
MacArthur Foundation, 2021.

Even with aggressive mitigation, some degree of climate impact is inevitable. The World
Meteorological Organization WMO reports that global temperatures are on track to rise 2.5–
2.9°C by the end of the century under current policies, necessitating urgent adaptation
strategies.

Investing in climate-resilient infrastructure—including reinforced flood barriers, upgraded

drainage systems, and temperature-resistant materials—is essential for safeguarding urban
populations. According to the Global Commission on Adaptation 2019, every 1 invested in
resilience measures yields 4–10 in avoided losses.

Nature-based solutions are equally important. Mangrove restoration, for instance, can reduce
coastal flooding risk for over 15 million people annually while storing significant amounts of
carbon. Similarly, wetland rehabilitation mitigates flood damage and supports biodiversity,
while urban green spaces lower heat stress in densely populated cities. The UN Decade on
Ecosystem Restoration 2021–2030 supports such efforts globally.

Water scarcity and extreme weather events are among the most immediate threats. By 2050, up
to 5 billion people could experience water stress UN Water, 2023. Solutions include efficient
irrigation, wastewater recycling, desalination powered by renewables, and the introduction of
drought-resistant crops through climate-smart agriculture.

Meanwhile, early warning systems EWS are critical for minimizing loss of life and property.
The UN’s “Early Warnings for All” initiative aims to ensure that every person on Earth is
protected by such systems by 2027. These programs increasingly leverage AI, satellite
imagery, and big data analytics to provide real-time climate intelligence, allowing for proactive
disaster risk reduction rather than reactive crisis management.

Climate finance remains the linchpin of effective implementation. The UN Environment

Programme UNEP estimates that developing countries need 215–387 billion annually by
2030 for adaptation alone, yet current funding remains less than half that amount. Innovative
mechanisms such as catastrophe bonds, parametric insurance, and climate-resilient debt
clauses help nations respond more rapidly to disasters.

Additionally, blended finance models—where public funds de-risk private investments—are

expanding through initiatives like the Green Climate Fund GCF and Just Energy Transition
Partnerships JETPs. Debt-for-nature swaps, such as Belize’s 2021 deal that restructured 553
million of debt in exchange for marine conservation, exemplify how financial innovation can
align economic and environmental goals.

Technology sharing is fundamental to bridging the gap between developed and developing
economies. The UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, encompassing the Technology
Executive Committee TEC and the Climate Technology Centre and Network CTCN,
supports knowledge exchange, technical assistance, and capacity development. International
cooperation through South-South partnerships, Triangular Cooperation, and multilateral
platforms like Mission Innovation accelerates the diffusion of low-carbon and climate-resilient
technologies.

Ultimately, systemic transformation relies on coherent policy and individual engagement.

Governments must align national climate strategies with Nationally Determined Contributions
NDCs under the Paris Agreement, enforcing strong building codes, emission standards, and
urban planning regulations. However, individual and community actions—such as reducing air
travel, consuming less meat, and embracing shared mobility—can collectively reduce emissions
by up to 20% globally IPCC, 2022. Behavioral change, supported by education and incentives,
ensures that climate solutions are both equitable and enduring.

Comprehensive climate solutions require a multi-level approach that integrates technological

innovation, financial reform, policy coherence, and social participation. Mitigation and
adaptation are not competing priorities but complementary strategies that together safeguard
both the planet’s stability and humanity’s future. Through international cooperation—embodied
in frameworks like the Paris Agreement, the Global Stocktake, and the Sustainable
Development Goals SDG 13—the world can still steer toward a resilient, low-carbon future.
The challenge is immense, but the tools, knowledge, and momentum now exist to make
transformative progress—if acted upon with urgency and collective resolve.

Bibliography:

1. United Nations Environment Programme UNEP. Adaptation Gap Report 2023:

Underfinanced. Underprepared. UNEP, 2023.
[Link] Accessed 14 Oct. 2025.

2. UNEP. Adaptation Gap Report 2022: Too Little, Too Slow – Climate Adaptation Failure
Puts World at Risk. UNEP, 2022. [Link]
2022. Accessed 14 Oct. 2025.

3. UNEP. Adaptation Gap Report 2024: Doubling Finance Is Not Enough. UNEP, 2024.
[Link] Accessed 14 Oct. 2025.

4. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC. AR6 Climate Change 2022: Impacts,
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WHO
ADISMUN2025
Forum: World Health Organisation WHO

Question of: Strengthening Global Health Systems to Respond to

Emerging Epidemics

Student Officer: Aarya Sheth

Contact: aarya.adani2038@[Link]

Introduction:

The World Health Organization WHO convenes this session at a critical juncture, facing a reality
where global food security is increasingly threatened by the fragility of interconnected supply
chains. The right to food is a fundamental human right, yet acute food insecurity has escalated
dramatically in recent years, affecting hundreds of millions worldwide. This crisis is no longer
confined to specific conflict zones or environmental disasters but is now visibly exacerbated by
systemic shocks to the international trade and distribution of food.

Recent history, including the COVID-19 pandemic and various geopolitical conflicts, has
exposed the vulnerabilities inherent in a globalized food system. Disruptions—whether caused
by border closures, transport bottlenecks, energy price volatility, or export restrictions—can
rapidly translate into increased food prices, shortages of essential agricultural inputs like
fertilizers and seeds, and, ultimately, malnutrition and hunger across continents. Given the
WHO's mandate to ensure the highest attainable standard of health for all people, the direct link
between food insecurity and adverse health outcomes—including stunting, wasting,
micronutrient deficiencies, and increased susceptibility to disease—makes this topic a
paramount public health concern.

This report will serve as a foundational document for the committee's deliberation, providing an
overview of the four pillars of food security availability, access, utilisation, and stability,
analysing how global supply chain disruptions impact each of these dimensions, and examining
the current public health crisis driven by these systemic failures. The imperative for this
Committee is clear: to develop resilient, sustainable, and equitable global food systems that
can withstand future shocks and safeguard the health and well-being of the world's population.

Definition of Key Terms:

Category Key Term Definition and Relevance

Core Global Health Security The collective activities and legal

Concepts GHS frameworks needed to minimize the
danger and impact of acute public
health events that cross international
borders. This is the ultimate goal of
strengthening health systems.

Health System The process of identifying and fixing

Strengthening major weaknesses e.g., workforce,
supply chains, funding in healthcare
systems to make them more
effective, equitable, and resilient
against shocks.

Emerging Infectious Infections that have newly appeared

Diseases in a population or have existed but
are rapidly increasing in incidence or
geographic range e.g., , . They are
the primary threat the system must
be ready for.

Epidemic/Pandemic The state of readiness, including

Preparedness plans, resources, and trained
personnel, that allows a system to
 effectively prevent, detect, and
rapidly respond to outbreaks.

One Health Approach A collaborative, multisectoral

approach recognizing that human
health is interconnected with animal
and environmental health, essential
for early detection at the source.

Legal & International Health The existing legally binding

Regulatory Regulations 2005 instrument for Member States to
report health events, maintain core
public health capacities, and
coordinate responses. Its reform is a
key discussion point.

Public Health The formal declaration by the

Emergency of Director-General that signals a
International Concern critical event requiring a coordinated
global response. Triggers
obligations.

Pandemic Treaty or The proposed new international

Accord agreement aiming to establish a
stronger, more equitable legal
framework for global pandemic
prevention, preparedness, and
response.
Operational & Disease Surveillance The continuous, systematic
Technical collection, analysis, and
interpretation of health-related data.
Crucial for early warning and
tracking of emerging epidemics.

Universal Health Ensuring all people have access to

Coverage UHC the quality health services they need
without financial hardship. A strong
system, centered on Primary Health
Care , is the best first line of defense
against an epidemic.

Health Workforce All individuals engaged in health

actions doctors, nurses, community
workers. Their training, distribution,
and protection are essential for
response capacity.

Medical Products like vaccines, therapeutics,

Countermeasures and diagnostic tests used to prevent,
treat, or diagnose conditions
following a biological threat. The
focus is on their equitable
distribution.

Technology Transfer TT The process of sharing knowledge,

devices, and manufacturing capacity
to enable locally produce essential ,
thus increasing global supply chain
resilience.
 Equity & Vaccine Equity or The principle that all nations should
Finance Access Equity have fair, rapid, and affordable
access to vaccines and other health
tools during a pandemic, regardless
of economic status.

Sustainably Financed Establishing reliable, predictable,

Preparedness and long-term funding streams for
readiness activities, moving away
from ad hoc crisis-driven spending.

Global Burden of A set of comprehensive data

Disease measuring health loss from
hundreds of diseases, injuries, and
risk factors. Used to prioritize where
system strengthening and funding
are most needed.

General Overview:

The pandemic's true cost provides the financial benchmark for the required preparation. The
global economy was hit by the sharpest downturn since the Great Depression, with global
declining by 3.0% in 2020. The cumulative global economic cost of the pandemic has been
estimated by some experts to exceed 24 trillion, with a long-term projection reaching as high as
82 trillion over five years due to deferred health care, supply chain disruption, and lost
productivity. In contrast, the financial investment needed to prevent such a crisis is remarkably
small. Joint analysis by the and World Bank estimated the total annual financing need for the
future Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response system at US 31.1 billion.
Crucially, the international financing gap—the additional funding required from global
partners—is estimated at at least US 10.5 billion annually over the next five years, with the
largest national-level deficits concentrated in and Low- and Middle-Income Countries, where
they face a gap of at least US 7.0 billion per year. Investment in is highly catalytic, with every
dollar invested yielding an estimated US 14 in health and economic returns.

The lack of robust health infrastructure is evident in two critical areas: compliance with
international health law and the sheer scarcity of medical personnel.
 ● IHR Compliance Deficit: The International Health Regulations 2005 require State
Parties to develop and maintain 15 core public health capacities e.g., surveillance,
laboratory capacity, points of entry. Performance in meeting these capacities, measured
by the State Party Self-Assessment Annual Reporting tool, has been consistently
inadequate. While global aggregate data on current compliance remains complex and
country-dependent, a significant number of countries, particularly in resource-limited
settings, failed to meet the original 2012 deadline for achieving these core capacities
and continue to demonstrate substantial capacity gaps in key areas like surveillance and
financing. The lack of adherence to these basic standards leaves the global community
vulnerable, as an outbreak anywhere quickly becomes a threat everywhere.
● The Health Workforce Crisis: The foundational human resource capacity is collapsing,
particularly in Africa and parts of Asia. The and have projected a global shortfall of
health workers ranging between 11 million and 18 million by 2030 without adequate
investment. The distribution of this deficit is highly unequal: Africa, which accounts for
only 17% of the world's population, is projected to account for 52% of the global
health worker shortage. —mostly on the African continent—have a median of only 32
healthcare workers per 10,000 population, less than one-third of the global median,
directly correlating with poorer health outcomes and a lower median health-adjusted life
expectancy.

To fix the structural inequities exposed by the pandemic, the global community is engaged in a
comprehensive overhaul of its governance structure through the Pandemic Accord and
amendments to the .
● Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing Pandemic Accord Article 12: This provision
is the centerpiece of the new equity mandate. It requires countries to promptly share
pathogen samples and genetic sequence data. In return, pharmaceutical
manufacturers utilizing this data must commit to sharing the benefits. The key
commitment specifies that companies must allocate 20% of their real-time production
of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics to the for equitable distribution, with at least
10% being a donation and the remainder offered at affordable prices. However, the
operational details of this system have been deferred to a separate, legally binding
annex, which must be finalized before the Accord can be fully ratified.
● Technology Transfer and Know-How Pandemic Accord Article 11: This article
addresses the failure of the market-driven system during , where intellectual property
alone proved insufficient without technical know-how. Article 11 aims to promote
sustainable production in by introducing a framework that calls upon parties and patent
holders to share essential data, skills, and proprietary information. It promotes the
establishment of -coordinated technology transfer hubs and encourages the use of
non-exclusive, worldwide, and transparent licenses for technologies developed with
public funds. A key remaining challenge is that the current framework encourages
rather than mandates the full transfer of technical know-how and trade secrets, which
are essential for true local manufacturing capacity.
● Financial Catalysts: The Pandemic Fund, established in 2022, serves as the primary
multi-donor trust fund to address the financing gap. It successfully raised over US2
 billion in seed capital from 27 contributors in its first 18 months. The Fund operates on
a catalytic model: its first round of grants, totaling US338 million, catalyzed an additional
US2 billion in co-financing from and other partners, demonstrating a potential
leveraging ratio. This fund is now a critical, though still under-resourced, tool in bridging
the financing gap, with an additional US2 billion being sought to sustain momentum
through mid-2027.

The textCOVID-19 pandemic's true cost provides the financial benchmark for the required
preparation. The global economy was hit by the sharpest downturn since the Great Depression,
with global textGDP declining by 3.0% in 2020. The cumulative global economic cost of the
pandemic has been estimated by some experts to exceed 24 trillion, with a long-term projection
reaching as high as 82 trillion over five years due to deferred health care, supply chain
disruption, and lost productivity. In contrast, the financial investment needed to prevent such a
crisis is remarkably small. Joint analysis by the textWHO and World Bank estimated the total
annual financing need for the future Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response
(textPPR) system at US 31.1 billion. Crucially, the international financing gap—the additional
funding required from global partners—is estimated at at least US 10.5 billion annually over the
next five years, with the largest national-level deficits concentrated in textLICs and textLMICs
(Low- and Middle-Income Countries), where they face a gap of at least US 7.0 billion per year.
Investment in textPPR is highly catalytic, with every dollar invested yielding an estimated US 14
in health and economic returns.

The lack of robust health infrastructure is evident in two critical areas: compliance with
international health law and the sheer scarcity of medical personnel.

IHR Compliance Deficit: The International Health Regulations (textIHR) (2005) require State
Parties to develop and maintain 15 core public health capacities (e.g., surveillance, laboratory
capacity, points of entry). Performance in meeting these capacities, measured by the textIHR
State Party Self-Assessment Annual Reporting (textSPAR) tool, has been consistently
inadequate. While global aggregate data on current compliance remains complex and country-
dependent, a significant number of countries, particularly in resource-limited settings, failed to
meet the original 2012 deadline for achieving these core capacities and continue to demonstrate
substantial capacity gaps in key areas like surveillance and financing. The lack of adherence to
these basic standards leaves the global community vulnerable, as an outbreak anywhere
quickly becomes a threat everywhere.

The Health Workforce Crisis: The foundational human resource capacity is collapsing,
particularly in Africa and parts of Asia. The textWHO and textUN have projected a global
shortfall of health workers ranging between 11 million and 18 million by 2030 without adequate
investment. The distribution of this deficit is highly unequal: Africa, which accounts for only 17%
of the world's population, is projected to account for 52% of the global health worker shortage.
textWorker- and job-scarce countries—mostly textLICs on the African continent—have a median
of only 32 healthcare workers per 10,000 population, less than one-third of the global median,
directly correlating with poorer health outcomes and a lower median health-adjusted life
expectancy.

To fix the structural inequities exposed by the pandemic, the global community is engaged in a
comprehensive overhaul of its governance structure through the textWHO Pandemic Accord
and amendments to the textIHR.

Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (textPABS) (Pandemic Accord Article 12): This provision
is the centerpiece of the new equity mandate. It requires countries to promptly share pathogen
samples and genetic sequence data. In return, pharmaceutical manufacturers utilizing this data
must commit to sharing the benefits. The key commitment specifies that companies must
allocate 20% of their real-time production of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics to the
textWHO for equitable distribution, with at least 10% being a donation and the remainder offered
at affordable prices. However, the operational details of this textPABS system have been
deferred to a separate, legally binding annex, which must be finalized before the Accord can be
fully ratified.

Technology Transfer and Know-How (Pandemic Accord Article 11): This article addresses the
failure of the market-driven system during textCOVID-19, where intellectual property (textIP)
alone proved insufficient without technical know-how. Article 11 aims to promote sustainable
production in textLMICs by introducing a framework that calls upon parties and patent holders to
share essential data, skills, and proprietary information. It promotes the establishment of
textWHO-coordinated technology transfer hubs and encourages the use of non-exclusive,
worldwide, and transparent licenses for technologies developed with public funds. A key
remaining challenge is that the current framework encourages rather than mandates the full
transfer of technical know-how and trade secrets, which are essential for true local
manufacturing capacity.

Financial Catalysts: The Pandemic Fund, established in 2022, serves as the primary multi-
donor trust fund to address the financing gap. It successfully raised over US2 billion in seed
capital from 27 contributors in its first 18 months. The Fund operates on a catalytic model: its
first round of grants, totaling US338 million, catalyzed an additional US2 billion in co-financing
from textMDBs and other partners, demonstrating a potential text6:1 leveraging ratio. This fund
is now a critical, though still under-resourced, tool in bridging the textPPR financing gap, with an
additional US2 billion being sought to sustain momentum through mid-2027.

Major Parties Involved:

The World Health Organization (WHO) acts as the world's directing and coordinating
authority on international health, focusing on establishing, monitoring, and enforcing
international norms and standards, most notably the International Health Regulations
(IHR) (2005). In the context of global health security, the WHO monitors public health risks,
coordinates the international response to health emergencies, provides technical assistance to
countries for strengthening their health systems and disease surveillance, and leads global
advocacy for health policies, essentially acting as the world's primary public health leader and
convenor.

The World Bank Group is the primary source of financing for strengthening national
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPR) capacities in low- and middle-
income countries. It provides substantial loans, grants, and technical support to help countries
build robust health systems, improve disease surveillance, and finance the purchase and
distribution of medical countermeasures, including vaccines. Crucially, the World Bank serves
as the Trustee and host of the Secretariat for the Pandemic Fund, a dedicated financial
mechanism established to fill critical investment gaps in PPR, mobilizing and channeling
catalytic funding to high-priority areas.

Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, is a public-private global health partnership dedicated to

increasing equitable and sustainable access to life-saving vaccines for children and
vulnerable populations in the world's poorest countries. Gavi achieves this by shaping vaccine
markets through pooled demand and negotiating affordable prices with manufacturers, which
de-risks development and ensures a stable supply. By funding the introduction of new and
underutilized vaccines, strengthening essential immunization delivery and cold chain
infrastructure, and supporting vaccine programs, Gavi plays a critical role in preventing
outbreaks and improving global health security from the ground up.

The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) is a global partnership that
finances and coordinates the research and development (R&D) of vaccines against
emerging infectious diseases with epidemic and pandemic potential. CEPI's mission is to
accelerate the development of candidate vaccines against priority pathogens, which often lack
sufficient commercial incentive, by funding preclinical and early-stage clinical trials (Phase 1 and
2) and by supporting the creation of rapid response vaccine platforms. Its ultimate goal is to
enable the rapid manufacturing and equitable access to an effective vaccine within 100 days of
a new threat being identified, often maintaining investigational vaccine stockpiles in
preparedness for an outbreak.

Timeline of Key Events:

This timeline highlights key events and organizational milestones illustrating the evolution of
global health security and pandemic preparedness, particularly focusing on the four entities
mentioned previously (WHO, World Bank, Gavi, CEPI).

Early Foundational Events

Year Organization(s) Event Significance

1948 WHO WHO Constitution Establishes the WHO as the

enters into force. directing and coordinating
authority for health within
the UN system.

2000 Gavi Gavi, the Vaccine Creates a new type of global

Alliance, is launched health partnership to
at the World Economic address vaccine inequity in
Forum in Davos. poor countries.

2003 WHO The Severe Acute Highlights the need for

Respiratory Syndrome stronger international
(SARS) outbreak surveillance and cross-
occurs. border cooperation for
emerging pathogens.

2005 WHO Revised International These regulations legally

Health Regulations bind WHO Member States
(IHR) are adopted. to detect, assess, report,
and respond to public health
events that could cross
borders.

2006 Gavi, World International Finance A novel financial mechanism

Bank Facility for that converts long-term
Immunisation (IFFIm) donor pledges into
is founded. immediate liquid funding for
Gavi's programs via capital
markets.
 2009 Gavi Advance Market An innovative financing
Commitment (AMC) model to incentivize
for Pneumococcal manufacturers to develop
Vaccines is launched. and produce vaccines for
developing countries at
affordable prices.

2009 WHO H1N1 Swine Flu The first influenza pandemic

pandemic is declared. of the 21st century, testing
global response capabilities.

Crisis-Driven Reform and New Instruments

Year Organization(s) Event Significance

2014– WHO West African Ebola Revealed major

2016 Epidemic. weaknesses in national
preparedness and WHO's
capacity to mount an
immediate, large-scale
response.

2016 WHO WHO creates the Reform to give the WHO

Health Emergencies greater operational
Programme (HEP) and capacity for rapid
the Contingency Fund emergency response.
for Emergencies
(CFE).
 2017 CEPI Coalition for New partnership
Epidemic established to finance and
Preparedness coordinate the R&D of
Innovations (CEPI) is vaccines against emerging
founded. infectious diseases,
directly addressing the
R&D gap exposed by
Ebola.

2017 World Bank Pandemic Emergency The World Bank's first

Financing Facility dedicated mechanism to
(PEF) is launched rapidly disburse funds to
(ceased operation in countries in the event of a
2021). deadly outbreak, acting as
a financial insurance
scheme.

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Architecture

Year Organization(s) Event Significance

Jan WHO Declares the outbreak The highest level of alert

2020 of novel coronavirus a under the IHR, signaling a
Public Health serious global health threat.
Emergency of
International
Concern (PHEIC).

Mar WHO Declares the outbreak Formal acknowledgment of

2020 a Pandemic. the global, sustained
community spread of
COVID-19.
Apr WHO, Gavi, Access to COVID-19 A global collaboration to
2020 CEPI, World Tools (ACT) speed up development,
Bank Accelerator is production, and equitable
launched. access to COVID-19
diagnostics, therapeutics,
and vaccines.

Jun Gavi, CEPI COVAX Facility is A pooled procurement

2020 created (the vaccine mechanism, co-led by Gavi,
pillar of ACT-A). CEPI, and WHO, to ensure
equitable vaccine access,
particularly for low- and
middle-income countries.

2020 World Bank Launches its $12 Marks the World Bank's
Billion financing largest-ever crisis response,
package to help focusing on immediate and
developing countries long-term health system
purchase and support.
distribute COVID-19
vaccines, tests, and
treatments.

Sep World Bank Pandemic Fund is A new Financial

2022 formally established. Intermediary Fund (FIF)
hosted by the World Bank,
dedicated to providing a
sustained source of
financing to strengthen
national and regional PPR
capacities.
 May WHO Ends the global public Signals the transition to
2023 health emergency long-term management of
status for COVID-19. the virus while reinforcing
the need for sustained
preparedness efforts.

Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue:

The revised IHR (2005) represent the single most ambitious attempt to establish a global health
security system. They transformed the global approach but contained inherent weaknesses that
were repeatedly exposed.

Core Capacity Requirement Failure

● The Mandate: The IHR required every State Party to develop and maintain 37 specific
"core capacities" across nine technical areas (e.g., surveillance, reporting, laboratories,
ports/airports). The deadline for implementation was initially 2012, later extended to
2016.
● The Design Flaw: No Funding Mechanism: Crucially, the IHR provided no dedicated,
sustained funding mechanism to help low-income countries meet these expensive,
complex mandates. Rich countries often failed to provide the necessary development
assistance, rendering the obligations impossible for many.
● The Evidence of Failure: The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) process, which
assesses a country's IHR compliance, consistently showed that most countries,
particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia, were critically underprepared even before
COVID-19. They often scored poorly on areas like medical countermeasure stockpiling
and workforce capacity.

Transparency and Enforcement Challenges

● Sovereignty Barrier: The IHR relies on the principle of national sovereignty, meaning
the WHO has no authority to investigate an outbreak within a country without that
country's permission. Reporting is voluntary and dependent on the member state's
political will and transparency.
● The SARS Catalyst: The 2003 SARS outbreak was the primary impetus for the IHR
revision after China was initially criticized for delays in reporting and for censoring
information. While the IHR addressed this by allowing WHO to use "unofficial sources"
(e.g., ProMED-mail) for verification, the ultimate power to control information flow
remained with the affected country.
● Lack of Sanctions: The treaty lacks any formal, graduated sanctions for non-
compliance, making it a "soft law" instrument in practice. This made it politically safer for
 countries to underreport or delay action than to risk economic repercussions from trade
and travel restrictions.

The 2014–2016 West Africa Ebola crisis proved that the world could not rapidly develop
countermeasures for emerging non-influenza pathogens and that WHO lacked surge capacity.

A. World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) (2017–2021)

● The Goal: The PEF was an innovative attempt to break the "panic-neglect cycle" by
creating a pre-funded, rapid-disbursing insurance mechanism for outbreaks in
developing countries. It had both an insurance window (funded by capital markets) and a
cash window (funded by donors).
● The Flaw: Complexity and Late Payout: The PEF was criticized for being too slow, too
complex, and too small to be truly effective. The criteria for triggering a payout were so
specific and stringent that they led to delays during the early phases of outbreaks. For
instance, in the 2018–2020 Eastern Kivu Ebola outbreak, the trigger was slow, forcing
the WHO to use its internal Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE) first.
● Outcome: The PEF was judged a failure by many experts and was eventually retired in
2021, directly leading to the development of the more flexible, World Bank-hosted
Pandemic Fund (a Financial Intermediary Fund).

B. Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) (2017)

● The Goal: CEPI was launched to address the "valley of death" in vaccine
development—the gap between early research and late-stage clinical trials. Its specific
mandate was to fund R&D for vaccines against emerging threats that lacked a profitable
market (the "priority pathogen list").
● The Success (Relative): CEPI was a structural success, proving it could accelerate
R&D by creating a model for rapid investment. Its work on platforms like mRNA
technology and its existing partnerships enabled the rapid launch of COVAX and the
accelerated development of several COVID-19 vaccine candidates, including those for
the Oxford-AstraZeneca partnership.
● The Flaw: Despite its R&D success, CEPI was not designed to solve the subsequent
problems of manufacturing scale-up or equitable distribution, which COVAX
attempted to address.

Following severe criticism for its initial response to the 2014 Ebola crisis, the WHO made
significant changes to its internal operational structure.
● Creation of the Health Emergencies Programme (HEP): This consolidated the WHO's
technical expertise into a unified, dedicated, and centrally managed program. It
introduced a clearer chain of command and a focus on operational effectiveness—a
shift from the previous, more consensus-driven model.
● Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE): Established under the HEP, the CFE was
designed to be a readily available, internal pool of funds (usually up to $100 million) that
 the Director-General could use to launch an immediate response before international aid
or appeals are mobilized. This addressed the critical need for "Day Zero" funding that
could save weeks of delay.

Possible Solutions:

A core solution is building robust, multisectoral capabilities in all countries, especially low- and
middle-income nations. This strengthens the foundation of global health security.
● Core Health Systems: Building resilient health systems that can both manage daily
healthcare and surge capacity during a crisis. This includes investing in primary
healthcare.
● Disease Surveillance and Early Detection: Implementing and strengthening infectious
disease surveillance systems for early detection, including genomic surveillance and
real-time data sharing. This also involves operationalizing the One Health approach,
recognizing that the health of people, animals, and the environment are interconnected,
particularly concerning zoonotic diseases.
● Health Workforce: Investing in the training and retention of a skilled health workforce
capable of prevention, preparedness, and response.
● Biosafety and Biosecurity: Establishing and strengthening national biosafety and
biosecurity systems to manage health risks, whether natural, accidental, or deliberate.

Major international efforts are underway to create a stronger, more coordinated, and equitable
global system for pandemic management.
● WHO Pandemic Agreement (2025): The agreement adopted by the World Health
Assembly aims to establish a global commitment to prevent, prepare for, and equitably
respond to future pandemics. Key provisions include:
○ Equitable Access to Tools: Mandating the fair and timely distribution of
diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, particularly for low- and middle-income
countries.
○ Global Supply Chain and Logistics Network (GSCL): Envisioning a new
system to coordinate rapid and affordable access to health products.
○ Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS): A system under negotiation to
ensure fair sharing of pathogen samples and genetic data, along with benefits
like vaccine access and intellectual property (IP) sharing.
● Amended International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005): The 2024 amendments
strengthen the existing legal framework.
○ New Alert Level: Introducing a "pandemic emergency" classification, which is
a new global alert level that escalates beyond a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC) to trigger stronger international collaboration.
 ○ National IHR Authorities: Requiring governments to establish these authorities
to coordinate IHR implementation.
○ Equity and Solidarity: Explicitly including provisions to strengthen access to
medical products and financing based on the principles of equity and solidarity.
● Strengthening WHO's Role: Enhancing the World Health Organization's leadership
and technical functions and encouraging member states to increase their assessed
contributions (non-earmarked funding) to make the organization more independent and
responsive to global health needs rather than donor priorities.

Addressing the historical underfunding of pandemic preparedness is critical, requiring

dedicated, sustained, and flexible financing mechanisms.
● The Pandemic Fund: This World Bank-hosted financial intermediary fund (FIF),
launched in 2022, is the first multilateral financing mechanism dedicated exclusively to
strengthening PPR capacities in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).
● Increased and Flexible Funding: Advocating for $10–$15 billion in additional
international financing per annum to address basic national preparedness gaps. This
financing needs to be flexible to adapt to country needs.
● Surge Financing: Developing mechanisms for rapid, scaled, and coordinated surge
financing (estimated at $50–$100 billion) for immediate response to an outbreak.
Examples include leveraging the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Trust and the Gavi
Day Zero Financing Facility.
● Domestic Investment: Incentivizing countries to increase domestic investment in their
own preparedness capacities and health systems.

Creating a global, public health-focused R&D ecosystem ensures the timely availability of
medical countermeasures.
● End-to-End Coordination: Establishing a globally coordinated end-to-end R&D
ecosystem to cover the entire value chain: discovery, pre-clinical research, clinical
trials, manufacturing, registration, and equitable distribution.
● Medical Countermeasures (MCMs): Expediting the development and production of
vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics.
● Technology Transfer: Facilitating technology transfer and managing intellectual
property rights to scale up manufacturing capacity, particularly in regional hubs.
● Pre-positioned Protocols: Developing and pre-positioning trial and clinical
characterization protocols before a pandemic starts, allowing for rapid initiation of pivotal
clinical trials during an outbreak.

Bibliography:
Here is an extended list of 45 sample MLA 9 style bibliographic entries (with links) relevant to
your topic. Some are closely aligned, others cover adjacent domains (global health security,
pandemic financing, IHR, health systems, supply chains, One Health). You’ll need to review and
adapt them to your final text (ensuring each is actually cited).

1. Gostin, Lawrence O., et al. “The Governing Framework for Global Health Security.”
PLoS Medicine, vol. 13, no. 4, 2016, e1001983,
[Link] (PMC)

2. Blinken, Antony J., and Xavier Becerra. “Strengthening Global Health Security and
Reforming the International Health Regulations: Making the World Safer From Future
Pandemics.” JAMA, vol. 326, no. 13, 2021, pp. 1255-1256,
doi:10.1001/jama.2021.15611. (JAMA Network)

3. “The Pandemic Fund.” World Bank, [Link]

intermediary-fund-for-pandemic-prevention-preparedness-and-response-ppr-fif. (World
Bank)

4. “Pandemic Fund.” The Pandemic Fund, [Link]

([Link])

5. “Background | The Pandemic Fund.” The Pandemic Fund,

[Link] ([Link])

6. “Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response.”

World Bank Projects & Operations, [Link]
operations/products-and-services/brief/financial-intermediary-fund-for-pandemic-
prevention-preparedness-and-response-engagement. (World Bank)

7. “Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility.” World Bank,

[Link]
facility. (World Bank)

8. “Functioning of the International Health Regulations during COVID-19.” The Lancet,

2021, [Link]
6736%2821%2901911-5/fulltext. (The Lancet)

9. “International Health Regulations | Global Health.” Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), 15 May 2024, [Link]
programs/[Link]. (CDC)
10. “The Synergies between International Health Regulations and One Health.” A. Mohamed
et al., ScienceDirect, 2024,
[Link] (ScienceDirect)

11. Brown, George W., et al. “The Role of Health Systems for Health Security: A Scoping
Review.” Globalization and Health, vol. 18, 2022, p. 40,
[Link]
(BioMed Central)

12. “Strengthening Global Health Security by Embedding the International Health

Regulations into National Health Systems.” H. Kluge et al., BMJ Global Health, 2018,
[Link] ([Link])

13. McCoy, D., et al. “Global Health Security and the Health-Security Nexus.” PMC, 2023,
[Link] (PMC)

14. “How the World Bank Group Is Helping Countries Address COVID-19.” World Bank, 11
Feb. 2020, [Link]
bank-group-is-helping-countries-with-covid-19-coronavirus. (World Bank)

15. “World Bank Group Operational Response to COVID-19 Projects.” World Bank,
[Link]
response-covid-19-coronavirus-projects-list. (World Bank)

16. “The World Bank Group’s Support to Countries during the COVID-19 Crisis.” World Bank
Annual Report, [Link]
(World Bank)

17. “2021 Development Policy Financing (DPF) Retrospective.” World Bank,

[Link]
services/publication/2021-development-policy-financing-retrospective-facing-crisis-
fostering-recovery. (World Bank)

18. “The Role of International Support Programmes in Global Health Security.” A. Doble et
al., PLOS Global Public Health, 2023,
[Link]
(PLOS)

19. “Pandemic Fund Allocates First Grants to Help Countries Be Better Prepared for Future
Pandemics.” World Bank News Release, 20 July 2023,
[Link]
first-grants-to-help-countries-be-better-prepared-for-future-pandemics. (World Bank)
20. “Projects | The Pandemic Fund.” The Pandemic Fund,
[Link] ([Link])

21. “Pandemic Fund Raises US$982 Million in New Commitments.” World Bank News
Release, Oct. 2024, [Link]
release/2024/10/31/pandemic-fund-raises-us-982-million-in-new-commitments-from-
governments-and-an-additional-us-1-8-billion-in-co-financing. (World Bank)

22. “Pandemic Fund – WHO.” World Health Organization,

[Link] (World Health Organization)

23. “The New Pandemic Fund: Overview and Key Issues for the U.S.” KFF (Kaiser Family
Foundation), [Link]
overview-and-key-issues-for-the-u-s/. (KFF)

24. “Pandemic Fund Organisational and Operational Details.” KFF,

[Link]
issues-for-the-u-s/. (KFF)

25. “Technical Advisory Panel | The Pandemic Fund.” World Bank,

[Link]
prevention-preparedness-and-response-ppr-fif/brief/TheTechnicalAdvisoryPanel. (World
Bank)

26. “Priority Themes of the Pandemic Fund.” World Bank,

[Link]
prevention-preparedness-and-response-ppr-fif/priority-themes. (World Bank)

27. “Pandemic - Health Emergencies Overview.” World Bank,

[Link] (World Bank)

28. “Global Health Security Index 2019.” Global Health Security Index Report, 2019,
[Link]
(GHS Index)

29. Epistemological and Bibliometric Analysis of Ethics and Shared Responsibility in Health
Policy and IoT Systems. Petar Radanliev and David De Roure, 8 Mar. 2019, arXiv,
[Link] (arXiv)

30. Pandemic Risk Management: Resources, Contingency Planning and Allocation. Xiaowei
Chen, Wing Fung Chong, Runhuan Feng, Linfeng Zhang, Dec. 2020, arXiv,
[Link] (arXiv)
31. Enhancing the Evaluation of Pathogen Transmission Risk in a Hospital by Merging
Hand-Hygiene Compliance and Contact Data: A Proof-of-Concept Study. Rossana
Mastrandrea et al., Jan. 2016, arXiv, [Link] (arXiv)

32. Ahamed, Mostak, and Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero. COVID-19 Response Needs to

Broaden Financial Inclusion to Curb the Rise in Poverty. 18 June 2020, arXiv,
[Link] (arXiv)

33. “Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF).” FIF Trustee, World Bank,
[Link] (World Bank)

34. “Pandemic Bond / Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility.” Wikipedia,

[Link] (Wikipedia)

35. “COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund.” Wikipedia, [Link]

19_Solidarity_Response_Fund. (Wikipedia)

36. “WHO Global Preparedness Monitoring Board.” Wikipedia,

[Link] (Wikipedia)

37. “Global Health Funding Faces ‘Greatest Disruption’ in Memory, Says WHO Director.”
Reuters / via news, 1 May 2025, [Link]
pharmaceuticals/global-health-funding-faces-greatest-disruption-memory-says-who-
director-2025-05-01. (Reuters)

38. “Aid Cuts Could Have ‘Pandemic-Like Effects’ on Maternal Deaths, WHO Warns.” The
Guardian, 6 Apr. 2025, [Link]
development/2025/apr/06/aid-cuts-pandemic-like-effects-maternal-deaths-childbirth-
haemorrhage-pre-eclampsia-malaria-who-warns. (The Guardian)

39. “WHO Adopts a ‘Pandemic Agreement’ after the Chaos of COVID.” AP News, 2025,
[Link] (AP News)

40. “Pandemic Fund by World Bank Draws over $700 mln from US, Germany.” Reuters, 24
July 2024, [Link]
700-mln-us-germany-2024-07-24. (Reuters)

41. “COVID-19 Shows Why the World Needs a Pandemic Agreement.” Time, 2024,
[Link] (TIME)

42. “COVID-19: Five Years On, the Time to Pay the Economic Bill Has Come.” Le Monde
(English edition), 17 Mar. 2025,
[Link]
 to-pay-the-economic-bill-has-come_6739254_19.html. (Le [Link])

43. Aavitsland, P., et al. “Functioning of the International Health Regulations during COVID-
19.” The Lancet, 2021. (Same as #8 but you may cite for different sections) (The Lancet)

44. Mohamed, A., et al. “The Synergies between International Health Regulations and One
Health.” ScienceDirect, 2024. (Same as #10, can be cited for other parts)
(ScienceDirect)

45. Doble, A., et al. “The Role of International Support Programmes in Global Health
Security.” PLOS Global Public Health, 2023. (Same as #18, for additional parts) (PLOS)