Case Title: IN RE: Petition for the Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines and

Administration of Estate under Rule 77 of the Rules of Court — Allison Lynn Akana, Petitioner
Ponente: Justice Lopez, J.
Date: (Decision excerpt provided; assumed 2024)

Facts:
 Lynetta Jatico Sekiya, an American citizen residing in Hawaii, died in 2017.
 Her will was probated in Hawaii, naming her daughter Allison Lynn Akana as the
personal representative.
 Lynetta owned a parcel of land in Pardo, Cebu City, Philippines, valued at ₱896,000.
 Allison filed a petition for allowance (reprobate) of the will before the MTCC of Cebu
City, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, citing Rule 77’s requirement that
reprobate be filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
 Allison refiled with the RTC, but the RTC again dismissed the case, holding that
jurisdiction over probate depends on the estate value (below ₱2,000,000, thus within
MTC jurisdiction) under RA 11576 and BP 129.
 Allison appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that Rule 77 jurisdiction
remains with the RTC regardless of estate value.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for reprobate of a foreign will for lack of
jurisdiction.

Held:
✅ Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction.

Ruling / Ratio Decidendi:

1. Reprobate vs. Probate:
o Probate is the original allowance of a domestic will, establishing its extrinsic
validity (due execution, testamentary capacity, formalities).
 o Reprobate is the recognition in the Philippines of a will already probated
abroad, focusing on authenticity and jurisdiction of the foreign court, not on
the estate’s value.
2. Rule 77, Section 1 explicitly provides that wills proved abroad “may be allowed, filed,
and recorded by the Court of First Instance (now RTC).”
o This rule has not been amended or repealed by RA 11576 or BP 129.
3. RA 11576 and BP 129 apply to domestic probate where valuation determines
jurisdiction.
o These statutes did not modify Rule 77, which specifically governs foreign wills.
o Reprobate is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it deals with the
recognition of a foreign judgment, not with estate value.
4. The RTC conflated reprobate with testate proceedings. The Supreme Court clarified
that they are distinct legal processes.

Doctrine:
“Reprobate or re-authentication of a foreign will already probated abroad is distinct from the
probate of a domestic will. Jurisdiction over reprobate proceedings remains with the Regional
Trial Court under Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.”

Disposition:
 Petition GRANTED.
 RTC’s Orders (July 12, 2023 and August 24, 2023) SET ASIDE.
 Case REMANDED to RTC Branch 17, Cebu City for further proceedings.

Key Takeaway:
Reprobate proceedings, being special actions for recognition of a foreign probate judgment,
remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, regardless of the estate’s value in the
Philippines.
Case Digest: People of the Philippines v. Angelo O. Montilla, G.R. No. 242375
Ponente: Justice Singh
Date: (Decision not explicitly stated in text; Supreme Court resolution after August 31, 2018,
following Montilla’s death in June 2021)

Facts:
 Several individuals were charged with double murder for the killing of Richard Escobia
and Aileen Palmes-Lustre in Maguindanao (October 25, 2003).
 After multiple reinvestigations, Angelo O. Montilla and Doris P. Lapuz were included
as additional accused.
 The case went through complex procedural history—motions to admit/recall amended
Informations, motions to quash, and a transfer of venue from Cotabato City to Davao
City due to alleged bias.
 The RTC Davao City, Branch 16, in an Order dated October 10, 2014, dismissed the
case for lack of probable cause.
 The RTC Branch 15 later reinstated the case invoking the doctrine of judicial stability.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the dismissal, ruling that judicial stability did not
apply since the case merely changed venue, not jurisdiction.
 Both the People (through OSG) and the Spouses Palmes (victims’ heirs) elevated the
case to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in reinstating the RTC Branch 16’s dismissal for lack of probable
cause.
2. Whether the doctrine of judicial stability applies.
3. Whether there was probable cause to indict Lapuz.
4. (Procedurally) What is the effect of Montilla’s death pending appeal.

Ruling:
1. Death of Montilla:
 o Criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto are extinguished under Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
o Hence, the case against Montilla was dismissed due to his death before final
judgment.
2. Doctrine of Judicial Stability:
o Does not apply here because all the RTC branches involved were acting on the
same case, not separate and co-equal cases.
o The transfer from Cotabato City to Davao City was a change of venue, not of
jurisdiction.
o Thus, RTC Davao City, Branch 16, could dismiss the case within its authority.
3. Probable Cause as to Lapuz:
o The RTC Branch 16 validly found no probable cause.
o The prosecutor’s inclusion of Lapuz was based solely on allegations of ill motive
from another accused (Reyes) without corroboration.
o No evidence linked Lapuz to the murders; she was even one of the original
witnesses.
o Hence, the dismissal for lack of probable cause was upheld.
4. Procedural Note on Rule 65:
o Generally, certiorari is not the proper remedy for denial of a motion to quash, but
the Supreme Court allowed review because the lack of probable cause justified
dismissal.

Doctrine:
 Judicial Stability: A court of concurrent jurisdiction cannot interfere with another’s
judgment in a separate case.
→ Inapplicable when venue—not jurisdiction—changes under Supreme Court authority.
 Probable Cause: Judges must personally determine probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest; lack of it warrants dismissal.
 Death of the Accused: Extinguishes both criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto before
final judgment.
Disposition:
 Petitions DENIED.
 CA Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
 Criminal case dismissed as to Montilla (due to death) and Lapuz (for lack of probable
cause).

Key Takeaways:
 The change of venue does not divest the new court of power to decide; judicial stability
does not prevent it from acting.
 Probable cause must be grounded on credible, corroborated evidence—not mere
suspicion or accusation.
 The death of the accused before final judgment terminates all criminal proceedings
and related civil liability arising from the crime.

Case Title:
Spouses Rodolfo Palmes & Esmaelita Palmes v. Court of Appeals, Angelo O. Montilla, and
Doris P. Lapuz
G.R. No. 242375
Ponente: Justice Singh
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Date: (Decision promulgated after August 31, 2018; SC Resolution following Montilla’s death
on June 6, 2021)

I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

This case arose from the double murder of Richard Escobia and Aileen Palmes-Lustre on
October 25, 2003 in Buluan, Maguindanao. The victims were ambushed and killed by armed
men while on board a vehicle. The Spouses Rodolfo and Esmaelita Palmes are the parents of
one of the victims (Aileen Palmes-Lustre).
Originally, several individuals—including Imelda Reyes and Jerry Mamaki—were charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cotabato City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No.
034-SA for double murder.
During the course of reinvestigations, two other individuals were implicated: Angelo O.
Montilla (then Mayor of Tacurong City) and Doris P. Lapuz (then Officer-in-Charge, City
Treasurer’s Office, Tacurong).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Initial Proceedings
 The Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Maguindanao conducted several
reinvestigations upon court orders.
 Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Yanson later filed a Second Amended Information
including Montilla and Lapuz, but it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor,
Ringear Pinote.
 Prosecutor Pinote opposed the filing and issued a separate resolution dismissing the
charges against Montilla and Lapuz for lack of evidence.
2. Conflict of Prosecution Authority
 Despite Pinote’s objection, Asst. Pros. Yanson filed the Information again—this time
approved by OIC Prosecutor Kasan Abdulrakman—which the RTC admitted, issuing
warrants of arrest.
 Montilla questioned the filing and sought relief before the Court of Appeals (CA) via
Rule 65, but the CA dismissed his petition as premature.
 The Supreme Court later affirmed this dismissal.
3. Change of Venue
 Montilla requested a transfer of venue alleging local bias, and the Supreme Court
granted it.
 The case was transferred from RTC Cotabato City, Branch 15 to RTC Davao City,
Branch 11, and later re-raffled to Branch 16.
4. RTC Davao Orders
 RTC Branch 11 (2012): Ordered a new reinvestigation and suspended the warrant of
arrest.
 CA (2014): Reversed Branch 11’s order, ruling that the RTC cannot delegate its function
to determine probable cause to the prosecutor.
  RTC Branch 16 (Oct. 10, 2014): Motu proprio dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause based on a review of the evidence.
 RTC Branch 15 (Dec. 10, 2015): Reinstated the case, invoking judicial stability—
arguing Branch 16 could not nullify prior orders from RTC Cotabato City Branch 15 that
had found probable cause.
 RTC Branch 17 (2016): Denied Montilla’s motion for reconsideration.
5. Court of Appeals Decision
 CA (Jan. 22, 2018): Reversed the RTC Branch 15 order and reinstated Branch 16’s
dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.
 It held that judicial stability was misapplied, because all orders came from the same
case transferred from one venue to another—not from different co-equal courts.
 The CA concluded that Branch 16 had the power to assess and dismiss the case since it
had jurisdiction when it was raffled to it.
6. Supreme Court Petitions
 Two petitions were filed:
1. G.R. No. 242375 – by the Spouses Palmes (private complainants)
2. G.R. No. 243925 – by the People of the Philippines (through the OSG)
 The petitions were consolidated.

III. ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in reinstating the RTC Branch 16’s order dismissing the case.
2. Whether the doctrine of judicial stability (non-interference) applies.
3. Whether there was probable cause to indict respondent Doris Lapuz.
4. What is the effect of Montilla’s death during pendency of the case.

IV. RULING
1. As to Montilla – Case Dismissed (Death of Accused)
 Montilla died on June 6, 2021 due to COVID-19 complications.
  Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability and civil liability ex
delicto are totally extinguished upon the death of the accused before final judgment.
 Thus, proceedings against Montilla were dismissed.
2. On the Doctrine of Judicial Stability
 The doctrine prevents one court of concurrent jurisdiction from interfering with
another’s judgment in a different case.
 It does not apply when the case is transferred to another branch by order of the
Supreme Court because of a change in venue, not jurisdiction.
 Hence, the RTC-Davao Branch 16 was not interfering with the earlier Cotabato RTC;
it was properly exercising jurisdiction over the same case.
3. On the Lack of Probable Cause (as to Lapuz)
 The RTC Branch 16’s finding of no probable cause was supported by the record:
o The main evidence against Lapuz came from the counter-affidavit of co-accused
Imelda Reyes, who had personal motives to implicate her.
o Lapuz herself was one of the original complainants, having executed an affidavit
leading to Reyes’s earlier indictment.
o The alleged “ill motive” (fear of exposure of financial anomalies) was
unsupported by any independent evidence.
o The theory that Lapuz would participate in an abduction while being in the same
car as the victims was implausible and contrary to ordinary human behavior.
 Therefore, there was no factual basis to believe that Lapuz was probably guilty, and
dismissal was proper.
4. On Rule 65 and Proper Remedy
 Normally, denial of a motion to quash cannot be assailed by certiorari since the remedy is
to proceed to trial.
 However, the lack of probable cause justified judicial intervention because continuing
trial without it would be a grave abuse of discretion.

V. SUPREME COURT HOLDING

 Petitions DENIED.
  CA Decision (Jan. 22, 2018) and Resolution (Aug. 31, 2018) AFFIRMED.
 Case dismissed as to:
o Montilla – due to death.
o Lapuz – for lack of probable cause.

VI. KEY DOCTRINES ESTABLISHED

1. Judicial Stability Doctrine:
Applies only to different cases handled by co-equal courts, not to the same case that has
been transferred between branches due to venue change.
2. Distinction Between Venue and Jurisdiction:
o Jurisdiction: Court’s power to hear and decide a case (substantive).
o Venue: The geographical location where a case is tried (procedural).
o A change in venue does not affect jurisdiction.
3. Probable Cause in Judicial Context:
o The trial judge must personally determine whether evidence is sufficient to
warrant trial.
o Dismissal is proper where evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause.
4. Death of the Accused Pending Appeal:
o Extinguishes criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto under Article 89 of
the RPC.

VII. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

 Reinforces that probable cause must rest on competent, corroborated evidence, not
unverified accusations.
 Clarifies that courts receiving a case on venue transfer have full authority to reassess
probable cause and dismiss the case if warranted.
 Upholds the principle that criminal prosecution should not continue absent clear factual
basis, protecting individuals from unjust prosecution.
Case: Pastor Corpus, Jr. y Belmoro v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No.: Not specified in text
Ponente: Justice Lopez, J.
Date: Decision summarized from Supreme Court ruling

Facts
 On November 25, 2017, complainant Roberto Amado Hatamosa was allegedly
punched by Pastor Corpus, Jr., causing a bloody nose and a fractured finger.
 The Complaint-Affidavit was filed on January 8, 2018, and the Information for
serious physical injuries was filed on May 21, 2018.
 The trial court (MeTC) found Pastor guilty not of serious but of slight physical injuries,
sentencing him to 30 days arresto menor and ordering him to pay ₱10,000 in moral
damages.
 The RTC and CA affirmed the conviction.

Issues
1. Whether the conviction of Pastor for slight physical injuries was proper despite the
original charge being serious physical injuries.
2. Whether the crime of slight physical injuries had already prescribed when the
Information was filed.

Ruling
✅ Petition Granted. Pastor Corpus, Jr. is Acquitted.
 The Supreme Court reversed the CA and RTC decisions, holding that the crime of
slight physical injuries had already prescribed when the Information was filed.
 Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses like slight physical injuries
prescribe in two months.
 The variance doctrine allows conviction for a lesser included offense, but not if the
lesser offense has already prescribed.

Key Points of Law

 1. Variance Doctrine (Rule 120, Secs. 4 & 5, Rules of Court):
Allows conviction for a lesser offense necessarily included in the crime charged.
2. Prescription of Crimes (Article 91, RPC):
o The prescriptive period begins from the date of discovery.
o It is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court, not
merely before the prosecutor, for cases under the Rules on Summary Procedure
(such as slight physical injuries).
3. Application:
o Incident occurred on November 25, 2017.
o Information filed on May 21, 2018 → 177 days later.
o Since slight physical injuries prescribes in 60 days, the offense was already time-
barred.

Doctrine
“An accused cannot be convicted of an offense lesser than that charged if the lesser offense had
already prescribed at the time the information was filed. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the law on prescription.” — Francisco v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108747,
1995)

Disposition
 Petition GRANTED.
 CA Decision and Resolution REVERSED.
 Pastor Corpus, Jr. y Belmoro ACQUITTED of slight physical injuries on the ground
of prescription.

Significance
This case reiterates that prescription is a substantive right that completely extinguishes
criminal liability. Prosecutors must file Informations within the prescriptive period, particularly
for light offenses, or risk dismissal regardless of the merits.
📚 Case Digest: Jay V. Sabado v. Tina Marie L. Sabado (G.R. No. —, Supreme Court
Decision, J. Hernando)
Facts:
Tina Marie L. Sabado filed a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order
(TPO/PPO), Support and Support Pendente Lite against her husband, Jay Villanueva Sabado,
alleging psychological and emotional abuse, humiliation, and deprivation of financial support
under Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act). The RTC
of Makati issued a TPO and later a PPO, ordering Jay to stay 200 meters away and provide
₱100,000 monthly support. Jay contested the ruling, claiming improper service of summons and
lack of due process since he was abroad at the time.
RTC Ruling:
The RTC denied Jay’s opposition for being filed beyond the five-day non-extendible period
under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. The court found that Tina had sufficiently proved emotional and
psychological abuse and deprivation of support, issuing a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO).
CA Ruling:
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that notice received by Jay’s counsel in a related case
was equivalent to notice to him. It found no deprivation of due process, and that Jay’s
opposition was filed late.
Issues:
1. Was there valid service of summons upon Jay?
2. Did the RTC validly acquire jurisdiction over Jay’s person despite alleged defective
service?
3. Was the issuance of the PPO proper?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision.
Held:
 On Service of Summons: While summons was not personally served since Jay was
abroad, he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by filing an Entry of
Appearance with Opposition to the PPO without contesting jurisdiction.
 On Jurisdiction: Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, which cures any defect in the service of summons.
  On the PPO: Tina sufficiently proved psychological and emotional abuse as defined
under R.A. 9262, justifying the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order and support
order.
Doctrine:
 Voluntary appearance cures defective service of summons and is equivalent to valid
service.
 Summons under the Anti-VAWC Law is not a procedural tool but a substantive relief;
however, jurisdiction over the person of the respondent still requires valid service or
voluntary appearance.
Disposition:
Petition DENIED; Court of Appeals Decision AFFIRMED. Jay V. Sabado is ordered to stay
200 meters away from Tina Marie L. Sabado and to continue paying ₱100,000 monthly support.

Key Takeaway:
In petitions under the Anti-VAWC Law, while urgency may justify ex parte protection orders,
courts must still acquire jurisdiction over the respondent. However, any defect in service of
summons is cured once the respondent voluntarily submits to the court’s jurisdiction by filing
pleadings or seeking relief.

Case Digest: Kristine Calubaquib-Diaz v. Dino Lopez Diaz and Republic of the
Philippines
G.R. No.: (not specified in text)
Ponente: LEONEN, SAJ
Date: (decision not specified, likely 2023 or 2024)

Facts:
Kristine Calubaquib-Diaz filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against her
husband, Dino Lopez Diaz, under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).
Despite issuance of summons, Dino was not personally served. The process server attempted
service twice at Dino’s address but was informed by the security guard that Dino only visited
occasionally and resided in Antipolo. Kristine moved for summons by publication, which the
RTC granted.
After trial, the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over Dino because the summons by publication was defective, given that personal service and
substituted service were not diligently attempted.
Kristine elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that:
1. Service by publication was valid as personal service was impossible.
2. The case was in rem, so jurisdiction over the person was not necessary.
3. The OSG was estopped from questioning jurisdiction because it did not object earlier.

Issues:
1. Was summons by publication validly effected upon Dino Lopez Diaz?
2. Is the OSG estopped from questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over Dino?

Ruling:
1. NO. The service of summons by publication was invalid.
The Court emphasized that personal service of summons is the preferred mode in all types of
actions—in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. Other modes (substituted or publication) are
only allowed if personal service is impossible despite diligent efforts.
In this case:
 The process server only attempted service twice, not the required three attempts on at
least two different dates.
 The report showed no diligent efforts were made to locate Dino or to attempt
substituted service, despite leads that Dino resided in Antipolo.
 Therefore, due process was violated, and the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
Dino’s person.
Because jurisdiction over the party is a constitutional due process requirement, the RTC’s
decision declaring the marriage void was null and void.
2. NO. The OSG is not estopped from questioning jurisdiction.
 Jurisdictional defects cannot be waived or cured by estoppel.
 Dino was never served valid summons and had no opportunity to object, so the “earliest
possible opportunity” to object had not yet occurred.

Doctrine / Legal Principle:

 Personal service of summons is mandatory regardless of the type of action.
 Summons by publication may only be resorted to after exhausting personal and
substituted service with proper documentation of efforts.
 Due process requires valid service of summons even in actions in rem such as
annulment of marriage.
 Jurisdictional defects cannot be cured by estoppel or waiver.

Disposition:
✅ Petition DENIED.
✅ The Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
✅ The RTC’s judgment declaring the marriage null and void was REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction over Dino Lopez Diaz.

Key Takeaway:
Courts must strictly comply with the rules on service of summons, especially before
depriving a person of constitutional rights in family law cases. Summons by publication is a
last resort, not a shortcut.

Spouses Ladica vs. Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 211639 (May 3, 2021):

Facts
  The dispute involves Lot No. 2373-A, contested between spouses Benedicto and Virginia
Ladica (petitioners) and spouses Rolando D. Uy and Annaliza Uy (respondents).
 The respondents (Uy side) filed a complaint for forcible entry (detentación) / unlawful
detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
 The respondents claimed they had prior physical possession in 2005. The Ladica side
allegedly entered via force, destroyed a fence, cut banana plants, etc., in 2006, thereby
dispossessing the respondents. The action was filed within one year from the deprivation.
 The Ladicas claimed that as heirs of the registered owner, they had a superior right to the
title and to recover possession on that basis.

Issue
Whether the Ladicas, as heirs of the registered owner, can recover possession based on their
claimed ownership even though respondents allegedly had prior actual physical possession and
were dispossessed by the Ladicas.

Ruling (Supreme Court)

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Key holdings:
1. Nature of forcible entry / unlawful detainer
o These remedies are summary proceedings under Rule 70, intended to recover
“possession de facto” (physical/material possession), not to decide ownership.
o The judgment in such actions is conclusive only as to possession, and does not
bind the parties or the court with respect to title or ownership.
o The issue of ownership should not be decided, except when it is “intimately
intertwined” with possession—i.e., when the question of who had prior possession
cannot be resolved without resolving ownership.
2. Requisites for a successful forcible entry action
The Court reaffirmed that in a forcible entry/detainer (Rule 70) case, the plaintiff must
prove:
(a) prior physical possession;
(b) unlawful deprivation by force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth;
(c) that the complaint was filed within one year after the deprivation.
In this case, respondents were held to have sufficiently established these elements:
o prior possession in 2005;
o entry by Ladicas in 2006 via force/strategy/stealth;
o proper timely filing.
3. Even the owner (or heir) may not oust prior possessor by force
o The Court emphasized that even if the Ladicas have a superior title or claim, that
does not entitle them to oust a person in prior possession summarily. The courts
protect the security of possession.
o Hence, the prior possessor (respondents) may recover possession even against the
owner, provided they can satisfy the elements of forcible entry.
o The Court quoted doctrine: “in a forcible entry case, … a party who can prove
prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.”
4. Ownership claim not resolved, except if needed for possession
o The ownership question (Ladicas’ claim) was not resolved in this case because it
was unnecessary to determine it to adjudicate who had better right to possess.
o The Court adhered to the doctrine that the issue of ownership may only be
provisionally resolved when it is “intimately intertwined” with possession.
5. Binding nature of factual findings
o The factual determinations of the lower courts (Court of Appeals) on who had prior
possession, how the dispossession took place, etc., were binding on the Supreme
Court (i.e., will not be disturbed) unless there was a clear showing of error.
Hence, because the respondents met the requisites for forcible entry, the Supreme Court ruled
that the Ladicas cannot displace the respondents by invoking their ownership claim in that
summary remedy. The Ladicas’ proper recourse to assert their ownership rights (title) would be
via an appropriate plenary action, but they cannot employ self-help or bypass the summary
remedy’s limits to dispossess a prior possessor.

Legal Significance & Principles Illustrated

 Possession is protected apart from title: The doctrine underscores the legal protection
afforded to a party in prior physical possession, even if that party is not the “owner.”
Courts do not allow self-help; the owner must seek the proper remedy.
 Summary proceeding is narrow in scope: Forcible entry / unlawful detainer is strictly
about possession; it does not decide title.
 Ownership not to be adjudged unless necessary: The caution against resolving
ownership in summary proceedings absent necessity helps preserve efficiency and avoid
overstepping the bounds of summary procedure.
 Owner cannot evict by force: Even the registered/registered-interest holder must resort
to the courts, not self-help, to evict someone in prior possession.
 Factual findings of lower courts are respected: The Supreme Court will generally
accept the findings of fact (especially in possession disputes) unless proven clearly
erroneous.