Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations 2022, 2:8 Last updated: 13 NOV 2024

CASE STUDY

The rise and fall of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: Implications for US-
China geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific
[version 1; peer review: 2 approved]
Raymond Kwun-Sun Lau
Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh

v1 First published: 09 Feb 2022, 2:8 Open Peer Review

[Link]
Latest published: 09 Feb 2022, 2:8
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1 2
Abstract
Strategic competition and rivalry between the United States and China version 1
has become a paradigm of international relations in the past decade. 09 Feb 2022 view view
Central to this growing strategic distrust between Washington and
Beijing is the tug of war between the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and
1. David Scott, NATO Defense College
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the role of China’s
‘peaceful rise/ peaceful development’ strategy and assertive Foundation, Cornwall, UK
nationalism characteristic of Chinese foreign policymaking in creating
2. Ito Ryuta , Hiroshima University,
an atmosphere of tension and misunderstanding between Beijing and
Washington have been largely overlooked. This paper, therefore, Higashihiroshima, Japan
seeks to understand the relationship between the rise and fall of
China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ concept, the emerging Any reports and responses or comments on the
prominence of assertive nationalism in China’s foreign policy making article can be found at the end of the article.
and a deteriorating US-China relations with deepening strategic
mistrust between the two major powers through a comparative-
historical analysis of China’s BRI and the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy.
Rather than demonstrating China’s commitment to its ‘peaceful rise/
peaceful development’ to the world, this paper argues that Beijing’s
offensive to defend China’s national interests in a confrontational
manner is an indication that an increasingly confident Chinese
leadership no longer feels the need for reassuring the world that
China's ‘rise’ is peaceful and non-threatening in nature. This could
embolden Beijing to defy (if not explicitly challenge) the ‘rules-based
international order’ upheld/ defended by Washington, thereby
spelling the end of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’
strategy.

Keywords
Indo-Pacific, Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), US-China relations,
Geopolitical competition, Strategic distrust, assertive nationalism,
Peaceful rise/Peaceful development, Chinese/China Model

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Corresponding author: Raymond Kwun-Sun Lau ([Link]@[Link])

Author roles: Lau RKS: Conceptualization, Formal Analysis, Investigation, Writing – Original Draft Preparation
Competing interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Grant information: The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting this work.
Copyright: © 2022 Lau RKS. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
How to cite this article: Lau RKS. The rise and fall of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’: Implications for US-China geopolitical competition in
the Indo-Pacific [version 1; peer review: 2 approved] Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations 2022, 2:8
[Link]
First published: 09 Feb 2022, 2:8 [Link]

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 Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations 2022, 2:8 Last updated: 13 NOV 2024

Introduction from Beijing’s perspective, has exacerbated the mutual suspi-

Speaking at a group study session of the Politburo of the rul- cions, or what is known as ‘strategic distrust’, between the two
ing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in June 2021, President major powers (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012; Zhao, 2019).
Xi Jinping told senior Communist Party officials that new con-
cepts, domains and expressions should be created to present Then, in the light of this climate of continuing US-China
an image of a ‘credible, loveable and respectable China’ (BBC strategic distrust, has the fundamental change in China’s for-
News, 2021). In the eyes of President Xi, ‘it is necessary to make eign policy endorsed by President Xi Jinping, contributed to
friends, unite and win over the majority, and constantly expand the tension and cumulative distrust between the United States
the circle of friends as regards international public opinion’ and China? What will the implications of the clash between
(Dyer, 2021). This, according to some observers (Dyer, 2021), an increasingly confident China and a vigilant America to
appears to be a rare acknowledgement of China’s current inter- the Indo-Pacific region? The aim of this paper, therefore, is
national isolation, and stands in stark contrast to the Chinese to address these questions. The paper seeks to understand the
President’s advocacy of the ‘Asia-Pacific Century’1 during his relationship between the rise and fall of China’s ‘peaceful
attendance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) rise/peaceful development’ concept,4 the emerging promi-
Summit in Peru in November 2016 (Global Times, 2016). nence of assertive nationalism in China’s foreign policy
(Whiting, 1983) and the deteriorating US-China relations. This
A year later, at the APEC leaders’ summit in Vietnam in mistrust between these two major powers will be explored
November 2017, the-then US President Donald Trump, dur- through a comparative historical analysis of China’s BRI and
ing his marathon tour in Asia, announced a new initiative- the the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy.
‘Indo-Pacific dream’ -as the centerpiece of his administra-
tion’s strategy towards the region (US Mission to ASEAN, Against the background of China’s growing ambitions and
2017). This vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, according to assertiveness, this paper argues that Beijing’s efforts to defend
President Trump, is ‘a place where sovereign and independ- China’s national interests in a confrontational manner, is indica-
ent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, tive of an increasingly confident Chinese leadership that
can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in no longer feels the need for reassuring the world that
peace’ (US Mission to ASEAN, 2017). China’s ‘rise’ is peaceful and non-threatening in nature. In this
sense, the resurgence of an increasingly confident China under
With both the American and the Chinese leaders outlin- President Xi and his efforts to make China an assertive player,
ing their visions for the region, it is worth noting that behind particularly via the launch of the BRI, was never meant to
the demonstration of their divergent ‘worldviews’ is a more demonstrate Beijing’s commitment to ‘peaceful rise/peaceful
serious message: The continuous effort made by the United development’ to the world. This has emboldened Beijing to
States to counterbalance China’s advocacy of the Belt and Road defy (if not explicitly challenge) the ‘rules-based international
Initiative (BRI)2 through the advancement of its ‘Free and order’ upheld by Washington (Majeed, 2021), thereby spell-
Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ (US Department of State, 2019),3 ing the end of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’
strategy.
1
The ‘Asia-Pacific Century’ is a policy idea advocated by the Chinese
President Xi Jinping during his attendance at the 2016 APEC CEO Sum- This paper begins by addressing the rise and fall of China’s
mit in Peru. Xi outlined a four-prong economic development plan includ- ‘peaceful rise/ peaceful development’ strategy and the growth
ing i) promotion of an open and integrated economy in the form of a Free of assertive nationalism in the Chinese foreign policymaking,
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP); ii) the enhancement of connec- with a particular focus on the emergence of wolf-warrior diplo-
tivity for achieving interconnected development in the context of the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) ; iii) strengthening of reform and innovation macy since 2017 (Zhu, 2020). I will then examine the launch
on the basis of the G20 Blueprint on Innovative Growth adapted by the of the BRI by President Xi Jinping in 2013. This is followed
2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit and iv) promotion of win-win cooperation by an analysis of the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the
for forging stronger Asia-Pacific partnership. establishment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad),
2
At its simplest, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is formerly known which composes of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan.
as One Belt One Road, is a massive infrastructure building and develop- The next section elaborates on the nature of the intensifying
ment project launched by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The
BRI has since become synonymous with Chinese foreign policy under Xi. US-China strategic competition and their growing mutual
3 strategic distrust (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012). The paper
A ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’, according to the US Department
of State, can be understood at three levels: the individual, state and regional. concludes with a discussion of the implications of the clash
The emphasis is being placed on freedom and openness in the Indo-Pacific,
the fastest growing region on the planet. Yet, many analysts, especially the
4
Chinese scholars, believe that this new US policy initiative towards Asia ‘Peaceful rise/ peaceful development’ is a new concept being introduced
is driven by the geopolitical changes to the existing Western-dominated in 2003 by Zheng Bijian, the former executive vice president of the Central
international order brought about by China’s rise and is, therefore, intended Party School of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and a foreign policy
to hedge against China’s foreign and security policy behaviour. See ‘Top U.S. advisor to President Hu Jintao. Zheng defined China’s ‘peaceful rise’ as a
diplomat rallies Asian allies in face of ‘aggressive’ China’, The Japan Times, 14 ‘new strategic path’ taken by the country ‘through independently build-
December 2021. Available at [Link] ing socialism with Chinese characteristics, while participating in rather
asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/antony-blinken-indonesia- than detaching from economic globalization’. The term, however, has been
speech/ (accessed 1 October 2021); US Department of State, ‘Free and Open replaced in official statements by the phrase ‘peaceful development’ in 2004.
Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision’, (Washington DC: the Depart- See Zheng, Bijian. ‘A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future
ment of State. 2019). Dingding Chen, ‘The Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Back- of Asia’, speech delivered during Boao Forum for Asia, Boao, China, 1-3
ground Analysis’, Instituo Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) November 2003; ‘White Paper on Peaceful Development Road Published’,
Commentary, 4 June 2018. China Internet Information Center, 22 December 2005.

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between an increasingly confident China and a vigilant the United States (Shambaugh, 2013). China, according to Zheng,
America for the Indo-Pacific region. could transcend the old development strategies of rising pow-
ers, as its rise ‘will not take the road of Germany in the first
A cautious China: the rise of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ world war, or Germany and Japan in the second world war -
strategy under Hu Jintao using violence to pillage resources and seek world hegemony’
China’s rapid and spectacular economic growth since the adop- (Okuda, 2016, p. 125). Zheng argues that the world, therefore,
tion of the reform and opening-up policy (gaige kaifang) by can rest assured that China would not challenge the status quo
its leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978 has transformed the coun- powers through war or other means. Instead, China’s ‘peaceful
try from a centrally planned to a ‘socialist-market’ economy rise’ would enable the country’s integration with the world.
(Cui, 2012; Global Times, 2021). As a result of an average 10%
annual GDP growth that China has experienced between 1978
and 2018 (Yao, 2020) and significant improvements in access In addition to Zheng’s ‘peaceful rise’, another important concept
to health, education, and other services over the same period, put forward by the Chinese government under the-then President
more than 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty Hu Jintao is the ‘harmonious world’ (Guo & Blanchard, 2008).
(World Bank, 2021). This spectacular growth and poverty In his speech ‘Build Towards a Harmonious World of Last-
reduction within the country has transformed China into an ing Peace and Common Prosperity’, delivered at the UN’s 60th
enormously powerful country, making China’s rise ‘the most anniversary summit in 2005, President Hu highlighted that
important geopolitical development of the twenty-first century’ multilateralism (an effective collective security mechanism
(Mearsheimer, 2014). within the UN), as well as mutually beneficial cooperation and
a more representative UN Security Council, could help establish
China’s forty years of reform and development have attracted a ‘harmonious world’ (Hu, 2005). Given the peaceful nature of
worldwide attention. Yet China’s seemingly inexorable rise the Chinese nation, ‘China’s development, instead of hurting or
has prompted some Internal Relations scholars such as John threating anyone, can only servce peace, stability and common
Mearsheimer, the leading proponent of offensive realism prosperity in the world’ (Hu, 2005). Issued by the State Council
(Myšička, 2021), to argue that ‘an intense security competi- of the People’s Republic of China in September 2011, the offi-
tion with considerable potential for war’ between US and China cial White Paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development, placed
is inevitable, because the United States ‘will go to enormous the emphasis on the ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-threatening’ nature
lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony’ Chinese foreign policy:
(Mearsheimer, 2014). As such, the rise of China, as Professor
Mearsheimer (2014) aptly pointed out, ‘is unlikely to be tran- The central goal of China’s diplomacy is to create
quil’ because most of China’s neighboring countries, including a peaceful and stable international environment for
India and Japan, will join the US to contain Chinese power. its development. China could become strong in the
future. Yet peace will remain critical for its devel-
It is against this backdrop that Zheng Bijian (2003), a former opment, and China has no reason to deviate from
vice-chair of the Central Party School, spearheaded a movement the path of peaceful development (China Internet
to introduce a new concept ‘peaceful rise’ (heping jueqi) during Information Center, 2005).
2002-2007. In his article written for Foreign Affairs, Zheng
(2005) suggested that the Chinese leadership, through its con- A confident China: The fall of ‘peaceful rise’
centration on economic development since the adoption of strategy under Xi Jinping
reform and opening-up policies in 1978, has laid out ‘the devel- China’s foreign policymaking, however, has witnessed a fun-
opment path to a peaceful rise’: a ‘new strategic path’ that damental transformation since President Xi Jinping came into
enables China’s emergence through peaceful means, without power in 2013. In his speech delivered at the 19th National
plundering other countries’ resources through invasion, colo- Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017, President
nization, expansion, or even large-scale wars of aggression. Xi (2017) highlighted that China ‘has achieved a tremen-
Beijing’s pursuit of the goal of a peaceful rising China, accord- dous transformation’, as the country ‘has stood up, grown rich
ing to Zheng (2005), would also enable the country to improve and is becoming strong’. This indicates that there is no reason
its relations with the rest of the world because ‘China does not why China has to shy away from world leadership, but instead,
seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs’. as the Chinese leader argued, ‘it is time for us to take cen-
tre stage in the world and to make a greater contribution to
In important respects, Zheng’s advocacy of China’s ‘peace- humankind’ (BBC News, 2017; Xi, 2017).
ful rise’ was aimed to counterbalance the influence of the ‘China
Threat Theory’ and the ‘China Collapse Theory’5 employed by
Underlying Xi’s intent to adopt a more proactive approach in
world affairs, is his strong belief in his country’s ‘national reju-
5
According to the proponents of the ‘China Threat Theory’, it is inconceivable venation’, which is known as the ‘Chinese Dream’ (China
for China to have a peaceful rise because a would-be superpower like China Daily, 2014). The essence of the ‘Chinese Dream’, in President
will inevitable be a threat to the United States. Proponents of the ‘China Col- Xi’s own words, is ‘a rich and powerful country, revitalizing
lapse Theory’, such as Gordon Chang, the author of The Coming Collapse of the nation and enhancing the well-being of the people’, and
China (2001), argue that the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises and the
that it constitutes ‘the inner meaning of upholding and develop-
inability of the Chinese Communist Party to build an open democratic society
would likely bring down China’s financial system and its communist regime, ing socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Ferdinand, 2016).
along with the entire country. This great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, accordingly, can
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materialize through realizing two centennial goals, that is, to (Zhu, 2020). Named after two domestic blockbuster movies
establish a ‘moderate well-off society by 2021 and a rich and Wolf Warrior (2015) and Wolf Warrior II (2017) (Zhang, 2017),6
strong country by 2049.’ (Xinhua, 2017a). This notion of the this new approach is a fundamental transformation of Chinese
‘Chinese Dream’, however, can only be implemented through diplomacy ‘from conservative, passive, and low-key, to assertive,
the path of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Xinhua, proactive, and high-profile’ (Zhu, 2020). This increasingly ‘muscu-
2017b), and, perhaps most importantly, the leadership of the lar’ foreign policy behaviour is characterized by Beijing’s increas-
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in materializing the national ing willingness to defend China’s self-proclaimed core (national)
revival of the Chinese nation, because ‘only the CCP can interests. The issues relating to China’s core interests, as men-
rejuvenate China’ (Sørensen, 2015). tioned in the State Council’s 2011 White Paper China’s Peace-
ful Development, involve state sovereignty, national security,
Along with his notion of the ‘Chinese Dream’, the other cor- territorial integrity and national reunification (The State Council
nerstone of Xi’s thinking is his advocacy of ‘four confidences’ of The People’s Republic of China, 2011).
(China Internet Information Center, 2016). Put forth most sys-
tematically by the President in his inaugural speech at the In the context of the Chinese Communist Party’s active promo-
closing meeting of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) tion of the ‘four matters of confidence’ as mentioned above,
in March 2018, Xi stated that China and its people should have China has seen a strident turn to assertive nationalism, as the
confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism government has become more willing to confront the West-
with Chinese characteristics (China Daily, 2018). These were ern powers and its neighbours. For instance, the Chinese diplo-
later officially referred to as the ‘four matters of confidence’, mats, especially the foreign ministry spokespersons such as Hua
and are added to the Party Constitution in 2017: Chunying and Zhao Lijian (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
"Confidence in the path" is confidence in the direc- People’s Republic of China, 2021), have pursued increasingly
tion of socialism with Chinese characteristics and assertive tactics to shape how China is perceived online, through
confidence in its future; "confidence in the theory" is hitting back at criticism by Western powers over China’s han-
confidence in the scientific, true and authentic nature dling of the Covid-19 outbreak via Twitter (Brandt & Schafer,
of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteris- 2020). Along with the use of abrasive language, Beijing has also
tics; "confidence in the system" is confidence in the increased its efforts to artificial island building and infrastruc-
advanced and superior nature of the system of Chinese ture construction, after making expansive sovereignty claims
socialism; and "confidence in culture" is a full affir- in the South China Sea (SCS) in recent years (Lee, 2015).
mation of the value of China's culture and a faith in The construction of ports, military installations, and airstrips
its vitality (China Internet Information Center, 2016). in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as the deployment
of fighter jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system in Woody
Perhaps most fundamentally, Beijing’s growing self-confidence Island, one of China’s largest possessions in the SCS, are two
has emboldened China to act more assertively in its foreign poli- cases in point (BBC News, 2014; Karambelkar, 2020).
cymaking (Johnston, 2013). One prominent example of this
growing sense of assertiveness is President Xi’s call for a ‘new From Beijing’s perspective, this assertive and often abrasive
model of major-country relationship’ during his talks with stance adopted by its diplomats does not only constitute a ‘jus-
the US President Barack Obama in Beijing, in November 2014. tified defence’ to protect China’s core interests against the
The Chinese President outlined ‘no conflict, no confrontation’, offensive and aggressive Western diplomacy, but also represents
‘mutual respect’ and ‘win-win cooperation’ as the three prin- a fundamental change of China’s international status. In this
cipal elements of the construction of this new model of major- sense, while Deng Xiaoping’s ‘keeping a low profile’ policy of
country relationship, between the two countries (Ministry of the early 1990s was well-suited for the early phases of China’s
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). Being economic modernization, the elevated status of China as a
driven by China’s self-perceived shrinking power gap with the leading economic power means ‘China should take charge
United States, President Xi’s effort to push the international com- as a great, responsible power because continuing low-profile
munity to build this new model, is an attempt to recast China- type policies will bring more harm than benefit to China’
US relations on more equal terms (Zeng & Breslin, 2016), (Shambaugh, 2013). Yet, perhaps the most crucial implication
because China under Xi, wants to be regarded as a great of this growing acceptance of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ among
power, and certainly to be equal with the US (Shepherd, 2018; China’s foreign policy officials and scholars is that it represents
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, the irreversible process of Beijing’s growing self-confidence
2013b).

A confident China: assertive nationalism 6

The term ‘Wolf Warrior’ is first derived from a 2015 Chinese-produced
characteristic of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ cross-genre action-military film called Wolf Warrior. It depicts a Chinese
The waning influence of ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ special force soldier with extraordinary marksmanship, pursuing a vicious
strategy has, therefore, become noticeable, since Beijing has drug lord who is defended by a group of deadly foreign mercenaries.
The release of its sequel, Wolf Warrior II in 2017 coincided with the 90th
increasingly signalled its resolve in China’s rising power
anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army in China.
aspirations. The country’s foreign policy has been reoriented into The film was highly acclaimed for its patriotic story, special effects, action
a more assertive direction, known as ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ sequences, and cast performances.

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on the world stage. The launch of the BRI, in this context, is In this sense, Beijing’s subtle promotion of its own brand
the most obvious manifestation of China’s self confidence in of state capitalism is not entirely unanticipated because, as
its system. suggested by Ian Taylor (2011), it has long been one of
China’s major foreign policy goals: ‘By portraying itself as an
A confident China: the launch of the BRI under Xi advocate for the developing world and emphasizing the rheto-
Jinping ric of South-South cooperation, China has arguably sought to
Along with his advocacy of the ‘Chinese Dream’ as discussed offer itself up as an alternative model to Western dominance’.
earlier, the BRI is arguably the most eye-catching initiative Kerry Brown (2018), one of the most influential Western think-
and visionary idea put forward by President Xi Jinping on the ers about Chinese politics, has described the Chinese leaders’
world stage. It was in September and October 2013, during his mentality on the BRI:
visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia respectively, that the new China … has usually been figured in ways which
Chinese leader proposed the building of the New Silk Road place it as a student, and the outside world—Europe,
Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road America and the developed world in particular—as its
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, teachers. Now this situation has changed. No other
2013a). Initially termed as One Belt One Road (OBOR), this country has lifted so many from poverty and built
vision of the Silk Road Economic Belt was aimed at connect- so much hard infrastructure in such a short period
ing China and Europe, through countries across central Eurasia, of time. It is now, therefore, the era of China the
while the 21st century Maritime Silk Road envisions China’s teacher, not China the student. The Belt and Road
connection with Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe through Initiative is one way that this is unfolding.
the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.
The rise of China as ‘the biggest player in the history of the
Beijing’s advocacy of the BRI, in the words of President Xi, world’, argued Graham Allison, in his 2017 book, Destined for
was meant to foster a ‘new type of international relations’ fea- War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, has
turing ‘win-win cooperation’ with Belt and Road countries. heralded a new balance of power known as geo-economics:
This foreign policy vision, according to the Chinese President, ‘the use of economic instruments (from trade and invest-
has nothing to do with ‘outdated geopolitical maneuvering’, ment policy to sanctions, cyberattacks, and foreign aid) to
since China has ‘no intention to interfere in other countries’ achieve geopolitical goals’ (Allison, 2017). The conduction of
internal affairs, export our own social system and model of Chinese foreign policy through economics, however, has raised
development, or impose our own will on others’ (Ministry of the eyebrows and concerns in the United States.
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2017b).
Instead, what China hopes to achieve is, as suggested by the An increasingly vigilant America: the gradual
country’s leadership, ‘a new model of win-win cooperation’ as emergence of the Indo-Pacific strategy under
the country is ‘ready to share practices of development with Donald Trump
other countries’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s China’s growing assertiveness in its foreign policymaking
Republic of China. 2017b). and its geo-economic offensive via the BRI, from Washing-
ton’s perspective, has shaken the very foundation of the United
Yet, it is important to note that this changing development States as a hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific in the past four
strategy of China, with its focus on connectivity and infra- decades (Walt, 2021). By paying increasing attention to the
structure construction across Eurasia and Oceania, is logically growing challenge of China’s ambition, the Barack Obama
connected with President Xi’s notion of the ‘Chinese Dream’ administration put in place the policy of strategic rebalanc-
and his emphasis on the great rejuvenation of the Chinese ing, by shifting the focus of US foreign policy from the Middle
nation, as mentioned above. In important respects, the BRI is an East, particularly its military counter-insurgency campaigns in
unparalleled geographical and financial-scale project. With Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Asia Pacific (White House, 2015a).
the BRI encompassing 4.4 billion people, at least 65 countries The goal of Obama’s initiative, known as the ‘US pivot to Asia’
(most of them developing economies) and a combined eco- policy, is to prevent China from becoming the dominant power
nomic output of $21 trillion (29% of global GDP), Beijing is in the Asia–Pacific region (Clinton, 2011; De Castro, 2018).
keen to promote development across the three continents - Asia, Yet, since President Obama stated that ‘the United States wel-
Europe and Africa - through the establishment of an infrastruc- comes the rise of a China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous,
ture network including highways, railways, telecommunica- and a responsible player in global affairs’ (Condon, 2011; White
tions, energy pipelines and ports (Aryal, 2021). As a result, House, 2015b), it seems fair to suggest that engagement with
this foreign policy vision can reasonably be understood as a China was still considered as the strategic foreign policy pur-
long-standing and deeply held belief by President Xi that a sued by the United States since President Richard Nixon (Zhao,
rejuvenated Chinese nation, as Xi himself put it, is able to offer 2019).
‘Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach as a new option
for other countries and nations who want to speed up their It was not until the election victory of Donald Trump in 2016
development’(China Daily, 2017; Foot & King, 2021). that the principle of a ‘qualified American welcome to the

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rise of China’, the strategic foreign policy being implemented maps, the narrative of the Indo-Pacific helps nations
through eight presidencies and four decades (Gracie, 2015), face one of the great international dilemmas of the
underwent a significant change. On 18th December 2017, 21st century: how can other countries respond to a
the Trump administration released its first National Security strong and often coercive China without resorting to
Strategy (NSS) (White House, 2017). Along with highlighting capitulation or conflict?’
the United States as being engaged in a global power struggle
for economic and military dominance, the NSS, in particular, In this sense, the fact that there is a growing recognition
identifies China as an a strategic ‘competitor’ and ‘revision- and acceptance of the idea of Indo-Pacific as what Professor
ist’ power trying to ‘shape a world antithetical to US values and Medcalf called ‘a changing approach’ instead of a mere wordplay
interests’ (Sevastopulo, 2017). is attributed to the multidimensional threat being posed by
China to the rule-based international order in the Indo-Pacific
Of particular importance is the Trump administration’s attempt region, which comprises of the Indian Ocean and the western
to highlight the geopolitical dimension of the Indo-Pacific and central Pacific Ocean, including the South China Sea. With
(White House, 2021). By highlighting the danger of ‘a geo- China being perceived as a significant challenge for its Asian
political competition between free and repressive visions of neighbours and the United States, a multinational collective
world order’ in the Indo-Pacific region, the NSS singled out response is deemed necessary and urgent. The most obvi-
‘Indo-Pacific’, which stretches from the west coast of India to ous manifestation of this multinational collective response is
the western shores of the United States, as a distinctive region the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (which is also known as
for the advancement of US national interests (Sevastopulo, ‘the Quad’).
2017). This is in line with President Trump’s advocacy of the
‘Indo-Pacific dream’ during the 2017 APEC leaders’ summit An increasingly vigilant America: the Quad’s
in Vietnam and his administration’s view that the US foreign revival under Donald Trump
and economic policy battleground with China lies in the ‘Indo- At its simplest, the Quad is a loose grouping of states compris-
Pacific region’ (Doyle & Rumley, 2019; Heiduk & Wacker, ing the United States, India, Japan and Australia, whose origin
2020). could be traced back to the Boxing Day tsunami in the Indian
Ocean in 2004 (CNN, 2004; Grossman, 2005). However, it was in
The release of the NSS was soon followed by the issuance of May 2007, after a three-year hiatus, that this group of four nations
the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Indo-Pacific Strategy held its inaugural meeting in Manila. The meeting was preceded by
Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked the first-ever trilateral exercises by the US, Japanese, and
Region by the US Department of Defense (DoD) in January Indian navies in April the same year. This, somewhat interest-
2018 and June 2019 respectively (US Department of Defense, ingly, coincided with the visit of the-then Chinese Premier Wen
2018; US Department of Defense, 2019). With the re-emergence Jiabao to Japan (Sharma, 2007).
of long-term, strategic competition with revisionist powers
like China being identified in the NDS as the central chal- It was against this backdrop that the-then Japanese Prime Min-
lenge to US (economic) prosperity and (military) security ister Shinzo Abe unveiled a new vision of regional connectiv-
(US Department of Defense, 2018), the DoD documents ity. In his address to the Parliament during his visit to India in
highlighted the importance of strengthening US alliances and August 2007, Abe suggested that a ‘new “broader Asia” takes
partners in the Indo-Pacific to a ‘networked security architec- shape at the confluence of the two seas of the Indian and Pacific
ture’, since the Indo-Pacific would potentially become ‘the Oceans’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan,
single most consequential region for America’s future’ (US 2007). By proposing the idea of linking the Pacific with the
Department of Defense, 2019). Indian Ocean, Prime Minister Abe’s advocacy of an ‘arc of pros-
perity and freedom’ helped provide an important foundation for
the emergence of ‘the Indo-Pacific region’ as a new geopoliti-
With the US Pacific Command being renamed as the US
cal concept to replace the ‘Asia-Pacific’ (Khurana, 2019). Since
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in May 2018 (Ali, 2018),
then, this new geopolitical concept has been employed and
a closer look at these fundamental documents issued by the
(somewhat) institutionalized across the official documents of
White House and the Department of Defense, suggests that the
the Quad countries (Department of Defence, Government of
US vision of ‘Indo-Pacific’ had become a ‘whole-of-government’
Australia, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of
approach (Garamone, 2017), after the continuous use of the
Japan, 2019; Ranjana, 2019).
term in official US strategy papers since 2017 (The Daily Star,
2019). The tactic used by the Trump administration, prima- Admittedly, Indo-Pacific is a term that denotes different things
rily as a response to China’s BRI (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020), to to different countries. Yet while there may be concern about
use the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in supporting a free and open Indo- ‘Whose “Indo Pacific”?’ does the concept refer to (Khurana,
Pacific, ‘is no mere wordplay’, as Professor Rory Medcalf (2020) 2019; Wilkins, 2020), these diverging national perspectives
points out: have not stopped the Quad’s evolution from a loose grouping of
‘It reflects something real: a changing approach by states focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
many nations to security, economics and diplomacy. operations, to one ‘with a strategic outlook centered on the ris-
Far from being an obscure account of words and ing concerns over free and open seas and a rules-based order’

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(Jash, 2021). This is largely attributed to the Trump adminis- When a confident China meets a vigilant America:
tration’s effort to revitalize the Quad through the resumption an irreversible confrontation
of a formal dialogue in late 2017 (Brunnstrom, 2017). It has become clear that the growing acceptance of the
Indo-Pacific concept, in particular the US-led ‘Free and Open
As such, the Quad has, since, met twice a year and perhaps Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and the revitalization of the Quad since
most importantly, the grouping has been upgraded to the level 2017, have been increasingly at odds with China’s BRI and Xi’s
of foreign ministers among Australia, India, Japan and the advocacy of ‘Asia-Pacific Century’. Beijing is not convinced
US since 2019 (Hindustan Times, 2019). The global COVID-19 by Washington’s claim that ‘the free and open Indo-Pacific
pandemic, which erupted in Wuhan, China in December 2019, Strategy is not just about China’ (US Department of State,
has driven the creation of Quad Plus, adding New Zealand, 2018), as this strategy is, in the eyes of many Chinese observ-
South Korea, and Vietnam as new Quad partners, for coordinat- ers, nothing more than ‘the most recent US response to China’s
ing actions on COVID-19, repatriating citizens, and opening up rise and to the consequential changes in the regional landscape’
trade and economic activity within the region (Bagchi, 2020). (Liu, 2020). In this context, Beijing’s outright rejection of
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is evidenced in the continuous use
The unifying elements among the Quad partnership are of the ‘Asia-Pacific region’ by the Chinese foreign ministry
twofold (Mehra, 2020): first, the democratic set-up of the four spokespersons (Xinhua, 2021b).
countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Tokyo’s active effort to
promote the democratic nature of the Quad, via Abe’s advo-
This growing sense of hostility between the United States and
cacy of Asia’s democratic security diamond (Abe, 2012), and
China, however, has to be situated in the specific context of
Canberra’s search for a values-based security and foreign policy,
the worsening strategic distrust between an increasingly con-
(Reilly, 2020), in particular, have helped transform the Quad
fident China and an increasingly vigilant America. In impor-
into ‘an inharmonious concert of democracies’ (Chellaney,
tant respects China’s strategic distrust of the United States is
2007).
induced by four fundamental structural changes in the inter-
national system since 2008: Firstly, China’s strong sense of
Another unifying element is the convergence of interests among
self-worth about its ascendance as the first-class global power;
these four countries in addressing China’s seemingly inexora-
secondly, China’s assessment of America’s relative decline
ble rise and Beijing’s assertiveness regionally and internationally
since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Thirdly, the emergence
(Sidhu & Rogers, 2015). Although the Quad is of course not
of an alliance between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
acknowledged (even among the four Indo-Pacific democra-
Africa, the five foremost emerging economies in the world
cies) as a formal anti-China alliance, it is hard to dispute the
known as the BRICS countries, and their willingness to chal-
impact of the China factor on the (re)shaping of the quadrilateral
lenge Western dominance and lastly, the growing acceptance of
grouping. The attendees at the second Quad Foreign Ministers’
China’s development model as an alternative to Western democ-
meeting held in October 2020 in Tokyo, for instance, vowed
racy and free market economy for developing countries to
to take stronger action to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific
learn from (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012).
(The Japan Times, 2020) and tackle what the US called China’s
‘exploitation, corruption, and coercion’ of smaller states in the
region (The Japan Times, 2021). In this sense, China, amidst America’s strategic distrust of China, on the other hand, is
the birth of a revitalized Quad, can be considered as what mainly driven by China’s growing confidence in asserting itself
Ramesh Thakur (2020) called ‘the godfather of Quad 2.0’. on the world stage politically, economically and militarily.
Politically speaking, this is evidenced in China’s one party
Perhaps not surprisingly, this revitalized Quad, or Quad 2.0, authoritarian political system and Beijing’s rebuttal of Western
from Beijing’s perspective, is nothing more than what the style liberal democracy; Economically speaking, China’s attempt
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called ‘an exclusive clique to export (albeit indirectly) its path of economic development
rallying countries to work against China’ (Hindustan Times, as an alternative development model for the developing
2021). This US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, in the words of the countries is a reflection of Beijing’s desire of implementing
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, is a ‘big underlying security its system of self-confidence; Then, military speaking, China’s
risk’, whose objective is ‘to trumpet the old-fashioned Cold military modernization and the aspirations for the People’s
War mentality [and] to stir up confrontation among different Liberation Army (PLA) dominance in the region constitutes
groups and blocs and to stoke geopolitical competition’ (Ministry a potential challenge for American freedom of access and
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2020). action in international waters (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012).
This, therefore, explains Beijing’s outright rejection of the
‘Indo-Pacific’ concept and refusal to use the term ‘Free and The inevitable consequence of the growing mutual distrust
Open Indo-Pacific’ (The Economic Times, 2021), since this between Washington and Beijing, is the intensification of
conceptual shift from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific, in US-China strategic competition. The BRI launched by an
Beijing’s eyes, represents an encirclement and containment increasingly confident China and the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific
strategy directed against China (Chen, 2018; Saeed, 2017). Strategy’ advocated by an increasingly vigilant America are

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on a collision course: China feels confident enough to rede- people across the world by achieving economic integration
fine itself distinctively in ways that a Chinese model of devel- and interconnected development. Instead, China’s BRI can
opment can be offered as an alternative to the rest of the world be seen as a reflection of Beijing’s growing sense of confi-
(Zhao, 2015), while the US is feeling increasingly uneasy about dence in projecting China’s path of economic development
China’s growing assertiveness on the world stage and the poten- as an alternative development model on the world stage.
tial challenge China poses to the ruled-based international order
(Al Jazeera, 2021; Zhao, 2017). In this context, the nature of the The second conclusion is that China’s desperate desire for
clash between an increasingly confident China under Xi and ‘striving for achievement’ under President Xi Jinping and cul-
an increasingly vigilant America since Trump is twofold. tivating a ‘New Model of Major Power Relations’ with the
First, as ‘China has gone through the stages of standing up United States (Cheng, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
and getting rich and is now advancing to the stage of becoming People’s Republic of China, 2017a), is primarily driven by the
strong’ (Yan, 2021), this suggests that China’s success in nar- growing influence of assertive nationalism characteristic of
rowing the gap in power with the United States has resulted in wolf-warrior diplomacy. Instead of aiming at making China a
what many Chinese scholars called ‘structural contradictions’ strong but humble (and peace-loving) country, China’s foreign
between a hegemon and a rising power (Yuan, 2011). These policy under Xi, is revealed in Beijing’s increasing willingness
‘structural contradictions’ have resulted in fundamental changes to defend China’s self-proclaimed core (national) interests in a
in the style and substance of Chinese foreign policy making. confrontational manner.
The emergence of the wolf-warrior diplomacy, as mentioned
earlier, is indicative of Beijing’s unwillingness to avoid con- The third conclusion to draw is that the divergent ‘worldviews’
frontation with Washington, and the launch of BRI is a reflec- expressed by the American and Chinese leaders, represent
tion of Beijing’s enthusiasm to lay out a distinctive path of a divergence (and eventually a clash) of fundamental strategic
economic development model (which is uniquely Chinese interests between Beijing and Washington. On the one hand,
and different from the Western model) on the world stage. China no longer wants to be integrated into the US-led
international order and the US, on the other, no long sees inte-
Additionally, the growing strength of assertive nationalism grating China as possible or desirable. In this context, Beijing’s
in China cultivated a stronger sense of self-confidence (Zhao, leaders tend to see wolf-warrior diplomacy as more useful,
2013). This has generated a deeper sense of hostility among its perhaps even necessary, to advance China’s self-proclaimed
leaders and people, leading to the view that the United States core national interests and counter foreign interference. Argu-
is an inevitable enemy of China, since the country has been ably, an increasingly confident Chinese leadership is convinced
elevated to the status as a stronger and more influential power that the advocacy of ‘peaceful rise/ peaceful development’ by
(Wong, 2021). Therefore, even though Beijing has vowed never promoting China’s rise as ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-threatening’ in
to seek hegemony (Xinhua, 2021a), the interplay between nature, would no longer be necessary for positioning China
China’s BRI and US-led ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strat- on the world stage. The US, on the other hand, appears to be
egy’ does reflect a strategic competition over international increasingly convinced that working with its partners and allies
leadership and prestige. China’s quest for greater international to advance a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific region through a
prestige, from Beijing’s perspective, is totally justifiable and revitalized Quad, is crucial for its success in counterbalancing
desirable because, in the words of Professor Yan Xuetong China’s quest for greater prestige and co-equality as a great
(2021), ‘China believes that its rise to great-power status entitles power.
it to a new role in world affairs—one that cannot be reconciled
with unquestioned U.S. dominance’. With this in consideration, the inevitable clash between
China’s BRI and the US-led ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Conclusion Strategy’ will remain a key characteristic of the long-term stra-
By carrying out a comparative-historical analysis of China’s tegic competition between Washington and Beijing: An increas-
BRI and the US-led ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy’, a ingly confident Chinese leadership no longer feels the need
principal issue and a recurring theme has become apparent: the for reassuring the world about the peaceful and non-threatening
fundamental shift of China’s foreign policy from ‘keeping nature of China’s ‘rise’. Therefore, the tension between the
a low profile’ under Deng Xiaoping to ‘striving for achieve- United States and China, as a result of the fundamental clash
ment’ under President Xi Jinping (Yan, 2014). This triggered of strategic interests between the two sides, is likely to per-
an inevitable decline of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful devel- sist in the coming decades. This indicates not only the dramatic
opment’ strategy under President Hu Jintao, and the emer- shift of the three-decade foreign policy of ‘keeping a low pro-
gence of the assertive nationalism characteristic of wolf-warrior file’ in Deng Xiaoping’s China, but also the demise and burial
diplomacy. of China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ strategy under
Hu Jintao.
There are three important conclusions to draw from this
comparative-historical analysis. The first is that the launch of Data availability
the BRI, along with President Xi’s advocacy of ‘Asia-Pacific All data underlying the results are available as part of the article
Century’ is not a reflection of China’s commitment to benefit and no additional source data are required.

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Open Peer Review

Current Peer Review Status:

Version 1

Reviewer Report 21 March 2022

[Link]

© 2022 Ryuta I. This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.

Ito Ryuta
Hiroshima University, Higashihiroshima, Japan

This paper is a very high level study with a high degree of empirical validity and logical
consistency. I consider it strongly deserving of passing peer review. The conclusion of the paper
suggests the possibility of a US-China conflict, but the comparative historical analysis conducted in
drawing this conclusion is also compelling. If the paper were to be developed further, one possible
direction would be to introduce a framework of international relations theory (such as offensive
and defensive realism) to strengthen the theoretical support for the claims. However, given the
objective set forth at the beginning of the paper--namely, to analyze the future of U.S.-China
relations using comparative historical analysis as a methodology--this paper has fully achieved
that objective. Therefore, I am deeply convinced that this paper is worthy of an Approved status.

Is the background of the case’s history and progression described in sufficient detail?
Yes

Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Partly

If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?

Yes

Is the case presented with sufficient detail to be useful for the teaching or other
practitioners?

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Yes

Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.

Reviewer Expertise: Indo-Pacific, International Relations, security studies, China, US, International
Relations theory, political psychology, philosophy, history, hybrid warfare

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of
expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.

Reviewer Report 18 February 2022

[Link]

© 2022 Scott D. This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.

David Scott
NATO Defense College Foundation, Cornwall, UK

With no particular weaknesses, the article is a good piece through being factually accurate, up to
date, widely sourced and referenced. Two useful comparisons are drawn, giving different but
mutually supportive analytical lenses: (1) chronologically between China's earlier peaceful rise
narrative and Xi Jinping's more assertive approach and (2) conceptually between China's BRI and
the US' FOIP. The article is fluently written and clearly expressed and has an evidenced argument.

Is the background of the case’s history and progression described in sufficient detail?
Yes

Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes

If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?

Yes

Is the case presented with sufficient detail to be useful for the teaching or other
practitioners?
Yes

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Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.

Reviewer Expertise: Indo-Pacific international relations

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of
expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.

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