BULLETIN FEATURE
Catastrophic Pressure Vessel
Failures:Learning from the Past
ADAM HENSON, CHEMICAL SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIALIST
U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD
“ Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.
”
George Santayana, philosopher
O
n April 8, 2021, at the 25-plus-year history, nearly 200 cata-
Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corpora- strophic incidents have been investigat-
tion OPC Polymers Resin plant ed and 1,000 recommendations have
in Columbus, Ohio, the seal of a closed been issued.
manway of a kettle failed, releasing a
mixture of flammable naphtha solvent Several of those investigations focused
vapors. The vapors spread throughout on pressure vessel safety. These investi-
the building and outside, igniting short- gations include:
ly thereafter.
• D.D. Williamson & Co. Catastrophic
Vessel Failure (DDW) (2003)
The explosion resulted in a fire that
took over 100 firefighters almost 11 • Marcus Oil and Chemical Tank
hours to extinguish. One employee Explosion (MO&C) (2004)
was fatally crushed due to the build- • NDK Crystals Inc. Explosion with Photos courtesy of the
U.S. Chemical Safety
ing collapse. Eight other employees Offsite Fatality (NDK) (2009) and Hazard Investigation
received injuries, including third-degree Board
burns, fractures, and one requiring a leg • Loy-Lange Box Company Pressure
amputation. Vessel Explosion (Loy-Lange) (2017) The explosion at the Loy-Lange Box Co.
on April 3, 2017, resulted in the death
• Yenkin-Majestic Resin Plant Vapor of one employee and three workers at a
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Cloud Explosion and Fire (YM) nearby facility.
Investigation Board (CSB) launched (2021)
an investigation into the incident. The Here’s an explanation of the similarities The incident occurred due to the ves-
causes included the improper alteration among these incidents and key lessons sel’s contents overheating, which led
of the kettle, ignoring a previous close for the industry. to overpressurization. The operators
call, and an overpressure event. This is responsible for the process were con-
not the first incident investigated by the Incident Descriptions ducting other duties leading up to the
CSB that is attributable to these causes. incident. The vessel had no overpres-
DDW: On April 11, 2003, a pressure sure protection, and previous damage
The CSB vessel exploded at the D.D. William- to the vessel caused by the improper
son Co., Inc. facility in Louisville. The application of vacuum conditions is also
The CSB is a federal agency responsible explosion killed one employee and believed to have contributed to the
for investigating accidental chemical caused a release of 26,000 pounds of incident.
releases. Following investigations, aqua ammonia, which resulted in a
reports detailing the facts, conditions, small evacuation in the community and MO&C: On December 3, 2004, an
and circumstances of these incidents a shelter-in-place order affecting 1,500 explosion occurred at the Marcus
are released to the public. In the CSB’s residents. Oil and Chemical facility in Houston,
8 N AT I O N A L BOA RD B U L L E T IN SPRING 2025 [Link]
Loy-Lange officials did not adjust its operating practices after corrosion was detected. More than half the records
examined revealed an inadequate concentration of oxygen scavenger.
injuring several residents and three The cause of the incident was likely
firefighters. Flying debris damaged stress corrosion cracking (SCC). Micro-
the facility, nearby buildings, and scopic examination of steel recovered
vehicles within a quarter mile, and a from the incident revealed strong
50,000-pound pressure vessel was dis- evidence of SCC. The vessels at NDK
placed by approximately 150 feet. contained an alkaline sodium hydroxide
and water solution generally known
The cause of the incident was the to damage some steels. An existing
improper alteration of Tank 7. Mar- SCC surface-breaking fracture near the
cus Oil cut an opening in Tanks 5-8 to base of the vessel initiated the vessel
install a steam pipe in each vessel. The rupture.
process used to close these openings
weakened the vessels. Also, on the day Loy-Lange: On April 3, 2017, a pressure
of the incident, compressed gas used vessel exploded at the Loy-Lange Box
to transfer product was supplied at a Co. facility in St. Louis. The explosion
higher pressure than normal. killed one employee and caused signif-
icant damage to the facility. The force
NDK: On December 7, 2009, a pressure of the explosion caused the vessel to fly
vessel operating at 29,000 psig violently off the property, killing three people at
ruptured at the NDK Crystal, Inc. facility a neighboring facility.
in Belvidere, Illinois. The vessel rupture
caused pieces of structural steel to fly The cause of the incident was the
off the property, killing a truck driver improper repair of the vessel. In 2012, a
at a gas station about 650 feet away. flush patch was installed to the bottom
In addition, an adjacent automotive head of the vessel to repair damage
The cause of the Loy-Lange incident was supply company was damaged, injuring caused by corrosion. During the repair,
the improper repair of the pressure vessel. one worker. unacceptably thin material was left
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BULLETIN FEATURE
in place. Also, Loy-Lange’s operating 3, welded on a nozzle, and attached a Yenkin-Majestic changed the gasket to a
practices were not sufficiently adjust- lid that closed onto a gasket to seal the thicker one and continued production.
ed post-repair to prevent further assembly. There is no evidence that The kettle processed over 100 batches
corrosion. design calculations were performed to of resin before finally failing.
ensure the assembly could withstand
NOTE: The Loy-Lange investigation was 16 psig. The safe operating condition of the
the BULLETIN cover story in the 2023 vessel involved at NDK was questioned
summer edition. During the incident, the manway leak years before the incident. In January
began at approximately 9 psig. Post-in- 2007, the closure head of another
Similarities cident analysis of the new manway vessel in the facility experienced an
indicated a rating of 5 psig at best. The uncontrolled leak.
In reviewing these incidents, themes manway lid installed was 0.375 of an
become apparent. Recognition of these inch thick and secured with four bolts. NDK hired a consultant who determined
themes is important to facilitate inci- To achieve the desired result of 16 psig, that SCC caused the leak and that
dent prevention. the manway would have needed a lid SCC was present in the facility’s other
more than twice as thick and with twice vessels. SCC was attributed to several
as many bolts. issues. As a result of the consultant’s
report, NDK’s insurer notified them that
Improper R/A Forewarning Overpressure they reserved the right to deny claims
DDW X related to these vessels.
MO&C X X
Despite these warnings, NDK continued
NDK X
to operate its processes. The results
Loy-Lange X X of the 2007 investigation should have
YM X X X prompted further inspection of the ves-
sels. SCC on the lid in 2007 was a clear
Improper R/A: A repair or alteration Similarly, the vessel involved in the indication that the vessels were not
was made not in accordance with the MO&C incident was improperly altered. properly protected from this damage
National Board Inspection Code (NBIC) The closure weld used to reinstall the mechanism.
Part 3, Repairs and Alterations. patch plate was fused less than 25%
through and contained numerous flaws. Finally, the defect in the vessel involved
Forewarning: Defects in the vessels The strength of the vessel in this area in the Loy-Lange incident was caused
were known to the owner or user was reduced by more than 75%. The by oxygen pitting corrosion. Oxygen
before the incident. weld also created conditions likely to pitting corrosion is a widely known
cause pressure-cycle-induced fatigue damage mechanism in steam gener-
Overpressure: The process had cracks. ation systems. Preventing it requires
insufficient controls to prevent removing dissolved oxygen from pro-
overpressurization. The vessel involved in the Loy-Lange cess water, which is generally accom-
incident was also improperly repaired. plished by heating the water and adding
Improper R/A Only a portion of the corroded pres- chemicals.
sure vessel bottom head was replaced.
As stated, the explosion at Yenkin-Ma- A thickness loss of as much as 95% In the days before the incident, water
jestic was caused by an improper alter- was observed in the original material was observed leaking from the bot-
ation to Kettle 3. During an automation post-incident. On average, the original tom of the vessel. Similar leaks were
project, Kettle 3’s existing manway was material left in place measured less observed in this equipment in April
permanently connected to a raw mate- than half the vessel’s design minimum 2004, August 2012, and November
rial feed hopper. Yenkin-Majestic hired thickness. 2012. Additionally, at least two vendors
a company to install a new manway so notified Loy-Lange as early as 2004, and
they could continue to access the inside Forewarning thereafter, that corrosion was perva-
of the vessel. sive throughout its steam generation
At Yenkin-Majestic, the altered vessel system.
The original manway was rated to 50 leaked from the gasket of the new
psig. The new manway was intended to manway the first time it was placed Despite recurring equipment failures
be rated for 16 psig. The fabricator cut back into service. Instead of shutting due to corrosion and warnings from
a 20-inch hole in the top head of Kettle down the equipment and investigating, qualified vendors, Loy-Lange did not
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take action to ensure the mechanical Kettle 3 Conditions CCPS "Zones of Operation" Terminology
integrity of its equipment. Loy-Lange
also did not adjust its operating 20
practices to prevent further corrosion. 18 Peak pressure recorder Unacceptable/Unknown Safe Operating Limit
For example, over half of the records Operating Zone
16 Actual Rupture Disk Setting
reviewed post-incident revealed an Document Max
inadequate concentration of oxygen 14 Rupture Disk Setting
Pressure (psig)
scavenger. 12
10 Buffer Zone
Overpressure Manway failure
8
The overpressure event that led to the 6
incident at Yenkin-Majestic resulted 4 Emergency Cooling active Never Exceed Limit
Troubleshooting Zone
from adding flammable liquid solvent 2 High Pressure Alarm Maximum Normal
to the kettle while the agitator was not Normal Operating Zone Operating Limit
0 Atmospheric Pressure
operating. The operator reset the agita-
tor when he noticed it wasn’t operating. This figure is adapted from CCPS's "zones of operation" diagram to describe Kettle 3's
The activation of the agitator caused operating parameters. Because of the improper alteration, the kettle failed prematurely
the solvent to mix with the hot resin in the "Buffer Zone" before the vessel's pressure safety device's set point.
and rapidly vaporize.
prevent the agitator from starting up To prevent future incidents:
following the addition of the solvent.
The rapid vaporization of the solvent • All repairs and alterations should
Yenkin-Majestic had not installed or
caused the pressure within the kettle to be made in accordance with the
configured interlocks to prevent these
rise more than nine times than normal. requirements of NBIC Part 3. This
occurrences. The administrative con-
The safeguards installed on the kettle is true regardless of whether a
trols Yenkin-Majestic relied upon were
were insufficient to respond to such a jurisdictional authority requires it
not effective in preventing the incident.
rapid increase in pressure. The gasket and whether the owner or users
on the manway failed before the set believe it is necessary.
Similarly, the process involved in the
pressure of the kettle’s rupture disk.
incident at DDW was also not equipped • Warning signs should be
with engineering controls to prevent investigated to ensure the safe
The design of this process allowed
the overpressurization of the vessel. operation of equipment. Although
operators to add solvent to the hot
This equipment was only equipped NBIC Part 3 does not require an
resin-filled kettle while the agitator was
with a temperature gage and a pressure investigation of the conditions
not operating. The process also did not
gage. The operators of this process giving rise to a defect or an
were unaware that the vessel’s contents attempt to prevent future defects,
were overheating until they observed these are necessary steps to
the product escaping. Moments later, ensure safety.
the vessel exploded. • Finally, processes relying heavily
on human interaction will always
The vessel involved at MO&C was be prone to failure. Owners
operating at a higher pressure than or users should ensure that
normal on the day of the incident. This administrative controls alone
was a conscious decision. The vessel are not relied upon to ensure
was usually supplied with nitrogen at 45 safety. This is especially true for
psig, but on the day of the incident, it processes handling hazardous
was supplied at 67 psig. This vessel had chemicals or operating at extreme
no automated process controls or engi- pressure.
neering controls to address pressure.
As the recurring themes in these
Lessons for Industry incidents demonstrate, those who
The explosion April 8, 2021, at the cannot remember the past are
Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corporation OPC The consequences of improperly repair- condemned to repeat it. For more
Polymers Resin plant in Columbus, Ohio, ing or altering vessels, ignoring warning information on these and other
killed one person and injured eight signs, and operating processes with CSB investigations, go to [Link]/
others. insufficient controls can be disastrous. investigations.
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