User Authentication Protocol
User Authentication
fundamental security building block
- basis of access control & user accountability
Is
the process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system
entity by or for a system entity
has two steps:
- identification ‐ specify identifier
- verification ‐ bind entity (person) and identifier
distinct from message authentication
Means of User Authentication
four means of authenticating user's identity
based one something the individual
knows ‐e.g. password, PIN
possesses ‐ e.g. key, token, smartcard
is (static biometrics) ‐e.g. fingerprint, retina
does (dynamic biometrics) ‐e.g. voice, sign
can use alone or combined
all can provide user authentication
Mutual Authentication
•used to convince parties of each others identity and to exchange
session keys
• key issues are
– confidentiality –to protect session keys
– timeliness –to prevent replay attacks
Replay Attacks
• where a valid signed message is copied and later resent
– simple replay
– repetition that can be logged
– repetition that cannot be detected
– backward replay without modification
• counter measures include
– use of sequence numbers (generally impractical)
– timestamps (needs synchronized clocks)
– challenge/response (using unique nonce)
One-Way Authentication
•required when sender & receiver are not in communications
at same time (e.g. email)
• have header in clear so can be delivered by email system
• may want contents of body protected & sender authenticated
Using Symmetric Encryption:
Mutual
• can use a two‐level hierarchy of keys
• usually with a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC)
– each party shares own master key with KDC
– KDC generates session keys used for connections between
parties
– master keys used to distribute these to them
Needham‐Schroeder Protocol
• original third‐party key distribution protocol
• for session between A B mediated by KDC
• protocol overview is:
1. A‐>KDC: IDa || IDb || N1
2. KDC ‐>A: E(Ka,[Ks||IDb||N1|| E(Kb,[Ks||IDa])])
3. A ‐>B: E(Kb, [Ks||IDa])
4. B ‐>A: E(Ks, [N2])
5. A ‐>B: E(Ks, [f(N2)])
Continuation...
•used to securely distribute a new session key for communications
between A & B
•but is vulnerable to a replay attack if an old session key has been
compromised
– then message 3 can be resent convincing B that is
communicating with A
• modifications to address this require:
– timestamps in steps 2 & 3 (Denning 81)
– using an extra nonce (Neuman 93)
One‐Way Authentication
• use refinement of KDC to secure email
– since B no online, drop steps 4 & 5
• protocol becomes:
1. A‐>KDC: IDa || IDb || N1
2. KDC ‐>A: E(Ka, [Ks||IDb||N1 || E(Kb,[Ks||IDa])])
3. A ‐>B: E(Kb, [Ks||IDa])|| E(Ks, M)
• provides encryption & some authentication
• does not protect from replay attack
Kerberos
trusted key server system from MIT
provides centralized private‐key third‐party authentication in a
distributed network
allows users access to services distributed through network
without needing to trust all workstations
rather all trust a central authentication server
two versions in use: 4 & 5
Kerberos Requirements
• its first report identified requirements as:
– secure
– reliable
– transparent
– scalable
•implemented using an authentication protocol based on
Needham‐Schroeder
Kerberos v4 Overview
a basic third‐party authentication scheme
have an Authentication Server (AS)
users initially negotiate with AS to identify self
AS provides a non‐corruptible authentication
credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)
have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)
users subsequently request access to other services from TGS on the
basis of users TGT
using a complex protocol using DES
Kerberos v4 Message Exchange
Kerberos Realms
• a Kerberos environment consists of:
– a Kerberos server
– a number of clients, all registered with server
– application servers, sharing keys with server
• this is termed a realm
– typically a single administrative domain
•if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers
must share keys and trust
Kerberos v5
• developed in mid 1990’s
• specified as Internet standard RFC 1510
• provides improvements over v4
– addresses environmental shortcomings
•encryption alg, network protocol, byte order, ticket lifetime,
authentication forwarding, interrealm auth
– and technical deficiencies
•double encryption, non‐std mode of use, session keys,
password attacks
Kerberos v5 Message Exchange
Federated Identity Management
use of common identity management scheme
across multiple enterprises & numerous applications
supporting many thousands, even millions of users
principal elements are:
authentication, authorization, accounting, provisioning,
workflow automation, delegated administration, password
synchronization, self‐service password reset, federation
Kerberos contains many of these elements
Identity Management
Thank You
