Bandra-worli sea link

Bridging The Gap

What’s it all about
Western Freeway Sea Project
Two Phases
An alternative to the Mahim Causeway
route
The project has been commissioned to
divert traffic that presently is 1,25,000
cars a day in each direction and is
expected to grow at the rate of 250 cars
per day
The prime consultants
1.Consortium of Sverdrup Civil Inc., AGRA,
2.Shrikhande Consultants,
3.TPG
4.KPMG with HNTB and Ratan Batliboi.
Proof consultants
Consortium of Construma Consultants, Mott
Mc Donald and Schlaich Bergermann.
The Bandra Worli Sea Link is an eight-
lane, cable-stayed bridge with pre-stressed
concrete viaduct approaches, and is the
first phase of the proposed West Island
Freeway system
4.7 Km
Reduction in travel time from 45 min to
less than 10 min
MSRDC awarded the contract in 2000 to
HCC, work on the project started full
swing only in January 2005 after the go-
ahead from the Supreme Court came
towards the end of 2004
The cost of the project quadrupled to Rs
1,600 crore from Rs 400 crore, which was
the original value of the contract
History
1983:
Central Road Research Institute commissioned by the state of
Maharashtra to carry out a study of the road transportation
network of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. Four major
roads proposed as an integrated solution including the West
Island Freeway linking the Bandra-Nariman Point road of
which the Bandra-Worli Sea Link forms an integral part.

February 1991:
The Central Government through its Ministry of Environment
and Forests issues a notification regarding the Coastal
Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification which prohibits
reclamation between the high tide line and the low tide line
and which would create any obstruction in the flow of tidal
waves of the sea.
16 March 1991:
Mangroves and nature park areas of around 184.14 ha. In Mahim
creek declared as “protected forest” by a Maharashtra Gazette
Notification under the Indian Forest Act

October 1992:
BMRDA prepares a new plan and prepares a feasibility report for
the sea route link between Bandra and Worli. At this point no
notice was issued inviting public objections and suggestions
and no plan was published.

June 1993:
Maharashtra Government, through its public works department,
approached the Centre for Environmental clearance of the
project. The Union Government declines to sanction the
project.
September 1993:
BMRDA invites 30 select persons for a seminar on the
Bandra Worli project most of whom are either government
or municipal officials and only five representing NGOs.

27 January 1994:
Ministry of Environment and Forest Notification under the
Environment Protection Act prescribing that no
modernization of any activity which would increase the
pollution level nor any new project which would fall under
Schedule 1 to the Notification would be undertaken in any
part of India without being given environmental clearance
by the Central Government in accordance with the
procedure prescribed.
4 May 1994:
Further notification of the MoEF modifying the
notification dated 27 January, 1994, giving the Central
Government discretion to dispense with the
requirements of public notice if satisfied that the same
was in the public interest.

1995:
The Maharashtra government forwards its Coastal Zone
Management Plan to the Central Government for its
approval as required by the CRZ notification. This plan
include the possible construction of the Bandra-Worli
Sea Link project but the alignment as quoted in the
report may be accepted as part of the CZMP.
27 September 1996:
The Central Ministry of Environment and Forests,
approves the Coastal Zone Management Plan subject to
terms and conditions, as a result of which the sanction to
the said Bandra Worli Sea Link is refused and all
mangroves with an area of 1000 sq. metres or more are
to be classified as CRZ-I with a buffer of at least 50
metres and areas in the Mithi river estuary also
classified as CRZ-I

10 April 1997:
MoEF notification prescribing that every application for
Environmental Clearance was required to be
accompanied by details of public hearing.
9 July 1997:
CRZ notification amended so as to permit reclamation and bunding
for the construction of bridges, sea links and other facilities
essential for activities permissible under the notification or for
coastal erosion, cleaning of water waves, storm water drains etc.

8 May 1998:
Letter from the National Fish Workers’ Forum to the Secretary
Urban Development Department asking for the Project Report
and Plans – No response was received from the Government.

1998:
Hearing given to the Mumbai Environmental Action Group with
regard to the Bandra Worli Project without providing them with
any particulars, plans, maps or information.
7 January 1999:
The Central government grants Environmental Clearance of the said
project without holding a public hearing, subject to strict
compliance of its terms and conditions.

11 January 1999:
Mr. Suresh Prabhu announced the sanctioning of the project in
Mumbai

12 January 1999:
Maharashtra Machimar Kriti Samiti’s letter to the Chief Minister
objecting to the clearance of the project

June 1999:
Work on the Bandra-Worli Sea link commences.
9 July 1999:
Hundreds of fishermen hold demonstrations on the site
of the project and demand its cancellation.

2 October 1999:
Peaceful demonstration of hundreds of fisherfolk held on
General Arun Kumar Vaidya Road near Mahim
Causeway.

23 November 1999:
Morcha held by fisherfolk, and other social and
environmental groups, Labour Unions etc. Around 400
persons arrested and put in Bandra police custody.
2 December 1999:
Meeting with Mr. Vilasrao Deshmukh, then Chief
Minister of Maharashtra in Sahayadri Guest House and
visit of Mr. Vikramsih Patankar, Minister of Public
works Department at the site. He accepts that there were
problems with the project.

December 1999:
Minister of State for Urban Development, Mr. Sunil
Tatkare visits the Mahim Causeway and orders the
MCGB to remove the coffer dams along with the
reclamation on both sites, north and south of the dams
before the monsoons and he confirmed that the claims
of 30 metre depth between dams was false.
ILLEGALITY OF THE
PROJECT
Environment Impact Assessment
In January 1994, the Government of India notified the Environment
Impact Notification under rule 5 of Environment (Protection) Rule,
1986 and 29 designated project. The notification made it obligatory
for the 29 designated project to prepare and submit an EIA
(Environment Impact Assessment), and Environment Management
Plan (EMP) and a Project Report to an Impact Assessment Agency for
clearance. The Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of
Indian was designated the Impact Assessment Agency.
Under this Notification, any member of the public
could have access to a summary of the Project
Report and detailed environment management
plans.
Public Hearing
The law requires that the public must be informed and
consulted on a proposed developed after the completion of
EIA report, via the media of a public hearing of the same.
Anyone likely to be affected by the proposed project is
entitled to have access to the Executive Summary of the EIA.
All the members of the local community, scientists
and other concerned citizens who deposed before the
IPT (Indian People’s Tribunal) stated that they were
not consulted about the project nor were they aware
about any public hearing being held for this project.
When BEAG (Bombay Environmental Action Group)
asked for an opportunity for a Public Hearing, the
MoEF ( Ministry of Environment & Forest) agreed to
the opportunity but the relevant documents, reports,
etc. were not made available to BEAG, due to which a
proper presentation could not be made
Incomplete Environmental Impact
Assessment
For obtaining Environmental Clearance of projects,
the applicant has to obtain a No Objection Certificate
from the concerned State Pollution Control Board
(SPCB). The MPCB should issue this No Objection
Certificate only after completing a Public Hearing.
As is clearly shown earlier, the Public Hearing
was not held in regard to (BWSLP), nor were
the relevant documents etc. made available for
inspection to the IPT panel or other NGOs and
concerned citizens. Therefore the panel
concluded that the EIA is incomplete.
Project Report not Available
Whoever applies for Environmental Clearance of projects has to
submit 20 sets of a summary of the salient features of the
project and other relevant documents as prescribed, to the
concerned State Pollution Control Board so that the same can be
made accessible to the concerned persons in case of a public
hearing.
The Mumbai Environmental Action Group (BEAG)
approached the MoEF for an opportunity to raise
objections with regard to the project. MoEF agreed
to give them the opportunity but no particulars,
maps or other information was furnished to the
BEAG. The BEAG in its letter dated 8th September
1998 addressed to the Chairman of Expert
Committee for Infrastructure, Development and
Miscellaneous Projects, MoEF, notified that they
were not given access to the EIA report and other
relevant documents
CRZ Violations Due to Reclamation

The State of Maharashtra and the MMRDA gave an

undertaking that no reclamation would be carried out in
the Bandra-Kurla Complex area under Environmental
Clearance under condition “land reclamation should be
kept to the minimum, at any cost to less than 4.7
hectares and the same should be monitored closely so
that it does not violate the provisions of the CRZ
notification, 1991 or as amended subsequently.”
However the land reclaimed is now alleged to be 27
heactares. The MSRDC has subsequently claimed that
the extra 22 hectares reclaimed were an “inadvertent
error in correspondence with the MoEF’.
Quarrying

Condition (iv) of the notification says, “the

construction material should be obtained only from
approved quarries. In case new quarries are to be
opened, specific approvals from the competent
authority should be obtained in this regard.”
This has been violated by the Mumbai Suburban
Collector who has issued the quarrying Permit
No.C/Desk- IV/MNL/SR/61-99-2000 dated 22nd
March 2000, permitting Messrs. Prakash
Construction and Engineering Company to
undertake quarrying at CTS No. 13/2; 14 of village
Powai,Taluka Kurla, Mumbai Dist. The quarry falls
within a ‘no development zone’, prescribed in reg.
60 of the development control regulation for
Greater Mumbai, 1991.
Local Community not consulted
Condition (x) of the Environmental Clearance,
reads as follows, “wherever fishing activities are
getting affected, the concerned association or union
of people should be consulted and their
concurrence obtained for this project.”
The fishermen affected by this project were
neither consulted nor was their consent
obtained. The fishing area has been reclaimed
causing great hardship to the fishermen who
have fished in these areas for centuries. No
attempts have been made to adequately
rehabilitate and compensate these fishermen
for the resultant loss of their livelihood.
IMPACT OF THE PROJECT
ON ENVIRONMENT,
LIVELIHOOD AND TRAFFIC
Mumbai is geographically positioned in a way that
requires creeks and shallow waters opposite
headlands, to arrest the forward progress of waves.
In most areas, these creeks have been reclaimed or
blocked. Mahim Cree is one of the few places left
where the waves can partially enter. This vital
opening should not be further narrowed.
One of the possible impacts of the project,
an increase in wave height in the Shivaji
Park Region of the coastline.
The project directly affects the livelihood
of several fishermen families.
Approximately 20,000 people are
dependent on fishing as an occupation.
InMahim 500 are dependent and in Bandra
another 2,000 are affected.

All of these families can trace their ancestry to

over 600 years of living in this area and
fishing in these waters.
These fishermen and their families are the
original residents of Mumbai.

In spite of protesting consistently and

vigorously against the project, their pleas
were ignored and reclamation was initiated.
Due to the siting of the project and the
extent of reclamation, the fishermen have
been denied access to the sea.
The road network in Mumbai is based on
three north-south corridor routes and there
are very few continuous east-west routes.
Therefore, traffic is concentrated on a few
routes that have become congested.
Mumbai road traffic has worsened by
around four hundred percent in the last
twenty years. It poses considerable health
problems.
The effect of major new roads in the Island
city such as the West Island Expressway
(Bandra Worli Sea Link) and the East
Island Expressway (Vashi Sewri Sealink)
would be to attract considerable additional
traffic to South Island destinations.
Thesolution to the traffic problem in
Mumbai can only be to reduce the
amount of vehicles plying on the road.
THE ALTERNATIVE…..
THE ALTERNATIVE….
(PARANJPE COMMITTEE REPORT49. )
Alternatives (TCS)
In addition to these a number of
immediate short-term strategies were
suggested by the Paranjpe Committee
Report49.

These include:
Declaring some North South roads as one
way roads during peak traffic hours.
Staggering office timings.
The Police Department on all congested
roads should strictly enforce parking
restrictions. Special parking areas should
be provided wherever possible in South
Mumbai. On-street parking should be
priced.
Upgrading, extension and
synchronization of traffic signals.
Provision of separate bus lines on some
arterial roads.
Imposing heavy penalties for violating
traffic regulations.
REASONS FOR DELAY
Project has been embroiled in various
issues such as logistical, environmental
clearance and public interest litigation
leading to its delay and subsequent cost
escalation. (Indian Express 13.01.09)
The project was initially delayed when
the BMC failed to hand over land for
construction of a jetty on time. The area
where the jetty stands today was earlier
used for the outflow of sewage into the
sea. The BMC had to extend the
sewage outflow tunnel further into the
sea and leave the area clear for
constructing the jetty. (
www.projectstoday.com 18.06.02)
 Work on the project has reportedly been delayed
following the exit of engineers from abroad, on
account of the ongoing tension between India
and Pakistan. These engineers were technical
experts, who were closely involved in the
implementation of an important section of the
sea link. (www.projectstoday.com 18.06.02)
The fourth and crucial section of the sea
link, which involves the construction of a
cable-stayed bridge together with
viaduct approaches extending from
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Road in Worli
to the Bandra toll plaza, is likely to be
delayed because of the departure of the
engineers from abroad. (
www.projectstoday.com 18.06.02)
 The structure from Pier No. 34 onwards was
shifted 200 m in the sea on Worli end, changing
the alignment to join at the connecting point
Change in alignment resulted increase in Worli end
Link bridge from 230m to 811 m foundation base
was altered with proposed specifications 
Change in design of Bandra Cable stay
bridge 
Instead of single cable stay tower, a new
design of separate cable stay towers for
each carriage way was introduced.
 Major changes in the foundation; the number of
pile foundation increased from 40 to 52. Increased
the width and weight of the Segments. Segment
erection methodology got redefined.
The major variations were ordered in October
2004 as a result HCC could not do much work
in the initial four years and the actual work
began only in January 2005.
ACCIDENTS AT BWSL
VIDEOS
Architecture
videos\1.Bandra Worli
Sea Link - Bridge Architecture Animation
.mp4

Discovery
videos\2.Bandra Worli
Sea Link Feature On Discovery Channel.
mp4
videos\3.Bandra Worli Sea Link.mp4

videos\4.Asian Hercules at Bandra Worli

Sea Link.mp4
videos\5.Asian Hercules at Bandra Worli
Sealink.mp4

Accident
videos\6.YouTube- MIDDAY BREAKING
NEWS.flv
THANK YOU