Situation ethics
Situation ethics, in ethics and theology, the position that moral
decision making is contextual or dependent on a set of circumstances.
Situation ethics holds that moral judgments must be made within the
context of the entirety of a situation and that all normative features of
a situation must be viewed as a whole.
The guiding framework for moral decision making is stated variously
as that of acting in the most loving way, to maximize harmony and
reduce discord, or to enrich human existence.
Situation ethics was developed by American Anglican
theologian Joseph F. Fletcher, whose book Situation
Ethics: The New Morality (1966) arose from his
objections to both moral absolutism (the view that
there are fixed universal moral principles that have
binding authority in all circumstances) and
moral relativism (the view that there are no fixed
moral principles at all).
Fletcher based situation ethics on the general Christian
norm of brotherly love, which is expressed in different ways
in different situations. He applied this to issues of doctrine.
For example, if one holds to the absolute wrongness of
abortion, then one will never allow for abortion, no matter
what the circumstances within which the pregnancy occurs.
Fletcher held that such an absolute position pays no
attention to the complexity and uniqueness of each situation
and can result in a callous and inhumane way of dealing with
Fletcher held, within the context of the
complexities of the situation, one should
come to the most loving or right decision
as to what to do.
1: Only one ‘thing’ is intrinsically good; namely, love, nothing else at all
There is one thing which is intrinsically good, that is good irrespective of context,
namely love. If love is what is good, then an action is right or wrong in as far as it
brings about the most amount of love.
the greatest amount of neighbor welfare for the largest number of neighbors
possible
Notice that here he talks about “welfare” rather than “love”. Fletcher does this
because of how he understands love which, importantly, is not about having
feelings and desires.
2: The ruling norm of Christian decision is love, nothing else
As we have seen in the first proposition, the only way to decide what we ought to do (the ruling
norm) is to bring about love. We need to be careful though because for Fletcher “love” has a
technical meaning.
By love Fletcher means “agápē” — from ancient Greek. Agápē has a very particular meaning.
Initially it is easier to see what it is not. It is not the feeling we might have towards friends or family
member which is better described as brotherly love (philēo). Nor is it the erotic desire we might
feel towards others (érōs).
Rather agápē is an attitude and not a feeling at all, one which does not expect anything in return
and does not give any special considerations to anyone. Agápē regards the enemy in the same
way as the friend, brother, spouse, lover. Given our modern context and how people typically talk
of “love” it is probably unhelpful to even call it “love”.
Typically people write and think about love as experiencing an intense
feeling. In cartoons when a character is in love their hearts jump out of
their chest, or people “in love” are portrayed as not being able to
concentrate on things because they “cannot stop thinking” about
someone.
This is not what love means for Fletcher. In the Christian context
agápē is the type of love which is manifest in how God relates to us.
Consider Christ’s love in saying that he forgave those carrying out his
execution or consider a more modern example.
3: Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else
Fletcher thinks that most other moral problems can be thought of in this way.
Imagine we are trying to decide what is the best way to distribute food given to a
charity, or how a triage nurse might work in a war zone. In these cases we might
put the problem like this. We want to distribute fairly, but how should we do this?
Fletcher says the answer is simple. To act justly or fairly is precisely to act in love.
“Love is justice, justice is love”.
4: Love wills the neighbor’s good when we like him or not
This is self-explanatory. As we noted above, agápē is in the business of loving the
unlovable. So related to our enemies:
Christian love does not ask us to lose or abandon our sense of good and evil, or
even of superior and inferior; it simply insists that however we rate them, and
whether we like them nor not, they are our neighbors and are to be loved.
5: Only the ends justify the means, nothing else
In direct rejection of the deontological approaches Fletcher says that any action
we take, as considered as an action independent of its consequences is literally,
“meaningless and pointless”. An action, such as telling the truth, only acquires its
status as a means by virtue of an end beyond itself.
6: Love’s decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively
Ethical decisions are not cut and dried most of the time and they exist in a grey
area. No decision can be taken before considering the situation. Fletcher gives the
example of a women in Arizona who learned that she might “bear a defective baby
because she had taken thalidomide”. What should she do? The loving decision
was not one given by the law which stated that all abortions are wrong. However,
she travelled to Sweden where she had an abortion. Even if the embryo had not
been defective according to Fletcher her actions were “brave and responsible and
right” because she was acting in light of the particulars of the situation so as to
bring about the most love.
