Class 2
Class 2
Protection
Class-2
Protective Relaying
Two recourses are open: (1) to incorporate features of design aimed at preventing
failures, and (2) to include provisions for mitigating the effects of failure when it occurs.
Modern power-system design employs varying degrees of both recourses, as dictated
by the economics of any particular situation.
Notable advances continue to be made toward greater reliability. But also, increasingly
greater reliance is being placed on electric power.
Consequently, even though the probability of failure is decreased, the tolerance of the
possible harm to the service is also decreased.
But it is futile-or at least not economically justifiable-to try to prevent failures
completely.
Sooner or later the law of diminishing returns makes itself felt.
Where this occurs will vary between systems and between parts of a system, but,
when this point is reached, further expenditure for failure prevention is discouraged.
It is much more profitable, then, to let some failures occur and to provide for mitigating
their effects.
Protective Relaying
The type of electrical failure that causes greatest concern is the short circuit,
or fault as it is usually called, but there are other abnormal operating
conditions peculiar to certain elements of the system that also require
attention.
Some of the features of design and operation aimed at preventing electrical
failure are:
A. Provision of adequate insulation.
B. Coordination of insulation strength with the capabilities of lightning arresters.
C. Use of overhead ground wires and low tower-footing resistance.
D. Design for mechanical strength to reduce exposure, and to minimize the
likelihood of failure causable by animals, birds, insects, dirt, sleet, etc.
E. Proper operation and maintenance practices.
Protective Relaying
Some of the features of design and operation for mitigating the effects of failure are:
A. Features that mitigate the immediate effects of an electrical failure.
1. Design to limit the magnitude of short-circuit current.1
a. By avoiding too large concentrations of generating capacity.
b. By using current-limiting impedance.
2. Design to withstand mechanical stresses and heating owing to short-circuit currents.
3. Time-delay under voltage devices on circuit breakers to prevent dropping loads
during momentary voltage dips.
4. Ground-fault neutralizers (Petersen coils).
B. Features for promptly disconnecting the faulty element.
1. Protective relaying.
2. Circuit breakers with sufficient interrupting capacity.
3. Fuses.
C. Features that mitigate the loss of the faulty element.
1. Alternate circuits.
2. Reserve generator and transformer capacity.
3. Automatic reclosing.
Protective Relaying
D. Features that operate throughout the period from the inception of the
fault until after its removal, to maintain voltage and stability.
1. Automatic voltage regulation.
2. Stability characteristics of generators.
E. Means for observing the electiveness of the foregoing features.
1. Automatic oscillographs.
2. Efficient human observation and record keeping.
F. Frequent surveys as system changes or additions are made, to be sure
that the foregoing features are still adequate.
Protective Relaying
Thus, protective relaying is one of several features of system design concerned with
minimizing damage to equipment and interruptions to service when electrical failures
occur.
When we say that relays protect we mean that, together with other equipment, the
relays help to minimize damage and improve service.
It will be evident that all the mitigation features are dependent on one another for
successfully minimizing the effects of failure.
Therefore, the capabilities and the application requirements of protective-relaying
equipments should be considered concurrently with the other features.
This statement is emphasized because there is sometimes a tendency to think of the
protective-relaying equipment after all other design considerations are irrevocably
settled.
Within economic limits, an electric power system should be designed so that it can
be adequately protected.
THE FUNCTION OF PROTECTIVE
RELAYING
The function of protective relaying is to cause the prompt removal from service
of any element of a power system when it suffers a short circuit, or when it
starts to operate in any abnormal manner that might cause damage or
otherwise interfere with the effective operation of the rest of the system.
The relaying equipment is aided in this task by circuit breakers that are capable
of disconnecting the faulty element when they are called upon to do so by the
relaying equipment.
Circuit breakers are generally located so that each generator, transformer, bus,
transmission line, etc., can be completely disconnected from the rest of the
system.
These circuit breakers must have sufficient capacity so that they can carry
momentarily the maximum short-circuit current that can flow through them, and
then interrupt this current; they must also withstand closing in on such a short
circuit and then interrupting it according to certain prescribed standards.
Fusing is employed where protective relays and circuit breakers are not
economically justifiable.
THE FUNCTION OF PROTECTIVE
RELAYING
Although the principal function of protective relaying is to mitigate the effects of
short circuits, other abnormal operating conditions arise that also require the
services of protective relaying.
This is particularly true of generators and motors.
A secondary function of protective relaying is to provide indication of the location
and type of failure.
Such data not only assist in expediting repair but also, by comparison with
human observation and automatic oscillograph records, they provide means for
analyzing the effectiveness of the fault-prevention and mitigation features
including the protective relaying itself.
Let us consider for the moment only the relaying equipment for the protection
against short circuits. There are two groups of such equipment.
One which we shall call primary relaying, and the other back-up relaying.
Primary relaying is the first line of defense, whereas back-up relaying functions
only when primary relaying fails.
PRIMARY RELAYING
One-line diagram of a
portion of an electric
power system
illustrating primary
relaying
PRIMARY RELAYING
Figure illustrates primary relaying.
The first observation is that circuit breakers are located in the
connections to each power element.
This provision makes it possible to disconnect only a faulty element.
Occasionally, a breaker between two adjacent elements may be
omitted, in which event both elements must be disconnected for a
failure in either one.
The second observation is that, without at this time knowing how it is
accomplished, a separate zone of protection is established around each
system element.
The significance of this is that any failure occurring within a given zone
will cause the tripping (i.e., opening) of all circuit breakers within that
zone, and only those breakers.
PRIMARY RELAYING
It will become evident that, for failures within the region where two adjacent
protective zones overlap, more breakers will be tripped than the minimum necessary
to disconnect the faulty element.
But, if there were no overlap, a failure in a region between zones would not lie in
either zone, and therefore no breakers would be tripped.
The overlap is the lesser of the two evils.
The extent of the overlap is relatively small, and the probability of failure in this region
is low; consequently, the tripping of too many breakers will be quite infrequent.
Finally, it will be observed that adjacent protective zones of Figure overlap around a
circuit breaker.
This is the preferred practice because, for failures anywhere except in the overlap
region, the minimum number of circuit breakers need to be tripped.
When it becomes desirable for economic or space-saving reasons to overlap on one
side of a breaker, as is frequently true in metal-clad switchgear the relaying
equipment of the zone that overlaps the breaker must be arranged to trip not only the
breakers within its zone but also one or more breakers of the adjacent zone, in order
to completely disconnect certain faults.
PRIMARY RELAYING
This is illustrated in Fig below, where it can be seen that, for a short circuit
at X, the circuit breakers of zone B, including breaker C, will be tripped;
but, since the short circuit is outside zone A, the relaying equipment of
zone B must also trip certain breakers in zone A if that is necessary to
interrupt the flow of short circuit current from zone A to the fault.
This is not a disadvantage for a fault at X, but the same breakers in zone
A will be tripped unnecessarily for other faults in zone B to the right of
breaker C.
Whether this unnecessary tripping is objectionable will depend on the
particular application.
Protective practices are based on the probability of failure to the extent that
present-day practices are the result of years of experience in which the
frequency of failure undoubtedly has played a part.
However, the probability of failure seldom if ever enters directly into the choice
of a particular type of relaying equipment except when, for one reason or
another, one finds it most difficult to apply the type that otherwise would be
used.
In any event, the probability of failure should be considered only together with
the consequences of failure should it occur.
It has been said that the justification for a given practice equals the likelihood of
trouble times the cost of the trouble.
Regardless of the probability of failure, no portion of a system should be entirely
without protection, even if it is only back-up relaying.
PROTECTIVE RELAYING VERSUS A
STATION OPERATOR
Protective relaying sometimes finds itself in competition with station operators or
attendants.
This is the case for protection against abnormal conditions that develop slowly
enough for an operator to have time to correct the situation before any harmful
consequences develop.
Sometimes, an alert and skillful operator can thereby avoid having to remove from
service an important piece of equipment when its removal might be embarrassing; if
protective relaying is used in such a situation, it is merely to sound an alarm.
To some extent, the preference of relying on an operator has a background of some
unfortunate experience with protective relaying whereby improper relay operation
caused embarrassment; such an attitude is understandable, but it cannot be
supported logically.
Where quick and accurate action is required for the protection of important
equipment, it is unwise to rely on an operator.
Moreover, when trouble occurs, the operator usually has other things to do for which
he is better fitted.
UNDESIRED TRIPPING VERSUS
FAILURE TO TRIP WHEN DESIRED
Regardless of the rules of good relaying practice, one will occasionally
have to choose which rule may be broken with the least embarrassment.
When one must choose between the chance of undesired or
unnecessary tripping and failure to trip when tripping is desired, the
best practice is generally to choose the former.
Experience has shown that, where major system shutdowns have
resulted from one or the other, the failure to trip or excessive delay in
tripping-has been by far the worse offender.
THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE
RELAYING
Although a modern power system could not operate without protective relaying, this does not make it
priceless.
As in all good engineering, economics plays a large part.
Although the protection engineer can usually justify expenditures for protective relaying on the basis of
standard practice, circumstances may alter such concepts, and it often becomes necessary to evaluate the
benefits to be gained.
It is generally not a question of whether protective relaying can be justified, but of how far one should go
toward investing in the best relaying available.
Like all other parts of a power system, protective relaying should be evaluated on the basis of its
contribution to the best economically possible service to the customers.
The contribution of protective relaying is to help the rest of the power system to function as efficiently and
as effectively as possible in the face of trouble.
How protective relaying does this is as foIlows. By minimizing damage when failures occur, protective
relaying minimizes:
A. The cost of repairing the damage.
B. The likelihood that the trouble may spread and involve other equipment.
C. The time that the equipment is out of service.
D. The loss in revenue and the strained public relations while the equipment is out of service.
THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE
RELAYING
By expediting the equipments return to service, protective relaying helps to minimize
the amount of equipment reserve required, since there is less likelihood of another
failure before the first failure can be repaired.
The ability of protective relaying to permit fuller use of the system capacity is
forcefully illustrated by system stability.
Figure next slide shows how the speed of protective relaying influences the amount of
power that can be transmitted without loss of synchronism when short circuits occur.
More load can be carried over an existing system by speeding up the protective
relaying.
This has been shown to be a relatively inexpensive way to increase the transient
stability limit.
Where stability is a problem, protective relaying can often be evaluated against the
cost of constructing additional transmission lines or switching stations.
Other circumstances will be shown later in which certain types of protective-relaying
equipment can permit savings in circuit breakers and transmission lines.
Curves illustrating the relation between relay-plus-breaker time and the maximum
amount of power that can be transmitted over one particular system without loss
of synchronism when various faults occur.
THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE
RELAYING
The quality of the protective-relaying equipment can affect engineering expense in
applying the relaying equipment itself.
Equipment that can still operate properly when future changes are made in a system
or its operation will save much future engineering and other related expense.
One should not conclude that the justifiable expense for a given protective-relaying
equipment is necessarily proportional to the value or importance of the system
element to be directly protected.
A failure in that system element may affect the ability of the entire system to render
service, and therefore that relaying equipment is actually protecting the service of the
entire system.
Some of the most serious shutdowns have been caused by consequential effects
growing out of an original failure in relatively unimportant equipment that was not
properly protected.
HOW DO PROTECTIVE RELAYS
OPERATE?
All relays used for short-circuit protection, and many other types also, operate by virtue of the current and/or
voltage supplied to them by current and voltage transformers connected in various combinations to the
system element that is to be protected.
Through individual or relative changes in these two quantities, failures signal their presence, type, and
location to the protective relays.
For every type and location of failure, there is some distinctive difference in these quantities, and there are
various types of protective-relaying equipments available, each of which is designed to recognize a particular
difference and to operate in response to it.6
More possible differences exist in these quantities than one might suspect.
Differences in each quantity are possible in one or more of the following:
A. Magnitude.
B. Frequency.
C. Phase angle.
D. Duration.
E. Rate of change.
F. Direction or order of change.
G. Harmonics or wave shape.
HOW DO PROTECTIVE RELAYS
OPERATE?
Then, when both voltage and current are considered in combination, or
relative to similar quantities at different locations, one can begin to
realize the resources available for discriminatory purposes.
It is a fortunate circumstance that, although Nature in her contrary way
has imposed the burden of electric-power-system failure, she has at the
same time provided us with a means for combat.
Problem
The portion of a power system shown by the one-line diagram of Figure
next slide with generating sources back of all three ends, has conventional
primary and back-up relaying.
In each of the listed cases, a short circuit has occurred and certain circuit
breakers have tripped as stated.
Assume that the tripping of these breakers was correct under the
circumstances.
Where was the short circuit? Was there any failure of the protective
relaying, including breakers, and if so, what failed? Assume only one failure
at a time.
Draw a sketch showing the overlapping of primary protective zones and the
exact locations of the various faults.
FUNDAMENTAL RELAY-OPERATING
PRINCIPLES AND CHARACTERISTICS
OPERATING PRINCIPLES: There are really only two fundamentally different
operating principles: (1) electromagnetic attraction, and (2)
electromagnetic induction.
Electromagnetic attraction relays operate by virtue of a plunger being
drawn into a solenoid, or an armature being attracted to the poles of an
electromagnet.
Such relays may be actuated by d-c or by a-c quantities.
Electromagnetic-induction relays use the principle of the induction motor
whereby torque is developed by induction in a rotor; this operating
principle applies only to relays actuated by alternating current, and in
dealing with those relays we shall call them simply "induction-type" relays.
DEFINITIONS OF OPERATION
Mechanical movement of the operating mechanism is imparted to a contact
structure to close or to open contacts.
When we say that a relay "operates," we mean that it either closes or opens its
contacts-whichever is the required action under the circumstances.
Most relays have a "control spring," or are restrained by gravity, so that they
assume a given position when completely de-energized; a contact that is closed
under this condition is called a "closed" contact, and one that is open is called and
"open" contact.
This is standardized nomenclature, but it can be quite confusing and awkward to use.
A much better nomenclature in rather extensive use is the designation “a” for an
"open" contact, and “b” for a "closed" contact.
The present standard method for showing "a" and “b” contacts on connection
diagrams is illustrated in Figure next slide
Even though an “a” contact may be closed under normal operating conditions, it
should be shown open as in Figure next slide and similarly, even though a “b”
contact may normally be open, it should be shown closed.
DEFINITIONS OF OPERATION