CS8792 - CRYPTOGRAPHY AND

NETWORK SECURITY

UNIT IV
DEPARTMENT: CSE
SEMESTER : 07

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UNIT IV - MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION AND
INTEGRITY
4-1 Authentication requirement – Authentication
function
4-2 MAC – Hash function
4-3 Security of hash function and MAC
4-4 SHA
4-5 Digital signature and authentication protocols
4-6 DSS
4-7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics
4-8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols
4-9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509

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Security of hash function and MAC
MAC – Message Authentication Code
 Symmetric and public-key encryption, we can
group attacks on hash functions and MACs into
two categories:
 brute-force attacks
 cryptanalysis
 A brute-force attack on a MAC is a more difficult
undertaking than a brute-force attack on a hash
function because it requires known message-tag
pairs.

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Security of hash function and MAC

 The way to measure the resistance of a hash or

MAC algorithm to cryptanalysis is to compare its
strength to the effort required for a brute-force
attack.
 That is, an ideal hash or MAC algorithm will
require a cryptanalytic effort greater than or equal
to the brute-force effort.

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Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
 SHA originally designed by NIST & NSA in 1993

 It was revised in 1995 as SHA-1

 US standard for use with DSA signature scheme

 standard is FIPS 180-1 1995, also Internet RFC3174

 Based on design of MD4 with key differences

 Produces 160-bit hash values

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Secure Hash Algorithm
 Most important modern hash functions follow the
basic structure.

 Within this basic structure, two approaches have

been followed in the design of the compression
function, as mentioned previously, which is the
basic building block of the hash function.

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Secure Hash Algorithm

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Secure Hash Algorithm
 NIST issued revision FIPS 180-2 in 2002

 Adds 3 additional versions of SHA

 SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512

 Designed for compatibility with increased security

provided by the AES cipher

 Structure & detail is similar to SHA-1

 Hence analysis should be similar

 But security levels are rather higher

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Secure Hash Algorithm

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Secure Hash Algorithm

C V 0  I V I n i t i a l n - b i t v a lu e
C V i  f (C V i  1 , Yi  1 )
H ( M ) C V L

Y i  i t h i n p u t b lo c k ,
L = # o f i n p u t b lo c k s ,
C V i = C h a in in g v a r ia b le

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Digital signature Standard (DSS)

 US Govt approved signature scheme

 Designed by NIST & NSA in early 90's
 Published as FIPS-186 in 1991
 Revised in 1993, 1996 & then 2000
 Uses the SHA hash algorithm
 DSS is the standard, DSA is the algorithm
 FIPS 186-2 (2000) includes alternative RSA & elliptic
curve signature variants
 DSA is digital signature only unlike RSA
 It is a public-key technique

DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm

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Digital signature Standard

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Digital signature Standard

 Creates a 320 bit signature

 With 512-1024 bit security

 Smaller and faster than RSA

 A digital signature scheme only

 Security depends on difficulty of computing discrete

logarithms

 Variant of ElGamal schemes

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Digital signature Standard

 have shared global public key values (p,q,g):

 choose 160-bit prime number q

 choose a large prime p with 2L-1 < p < 2L
 where L= 512 to 1024 bits and is a multiple of 64
 such that q is a 160 bit prime divisor of (p-1)
 choose g = h(p-1)/q

 users choose private & compute public key:

 choose random private key: x<q
 compute public key: y = gx mod p
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Digital signature Standard

To sign a message M the sender:

generates a random signature key k, k<q
nb. k must be random, be destroyed after use, and
never be reused

Then computes signature pair:

r = (gk mod p)mod q
s = [k-1(H(M)+ xr)] mod q

Sends signature (r,s) with message M

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Digital signature Standard

 Having received M & signature (r,s)

 To verify a signature, recipient computes:

 w = s-1 mod q
 u1= [H(M)w ]mod q
 u2= (rw)mod q
 v = [(gu1 yu2)mod p ]mod q

 If v=r then signature is verified

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Digital signature Standard

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Digital signature Standard
ElGamal Digital Signatures
Signature variant of ElGamal, related to D-H
so uses exponentiation in a finite
with security based difficulty of computing discrete
logarithms, as in D-H
Use private key for encryption (signing)
Uses public key for decryption (verification)
Each user (eg. A) generates their key
chooses a secret key (number): 1 < xA < q-1
compute their public key: yA = axA mod q

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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics

 We distinguish between (data) origin authentication

(verifying the origin of received data) and entity
authentication (verification of a claimant
identity(identity need to be proved).
 An origin authentication service can be built from a
data integrity mechanism, e.g. a MAC.
 Typically achieved by exchange of messages called an
authentication protocol (called an authentication
exchange in ISO 7498-2).

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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics

Why Entity Authentication?

 Entity authentication provides a fundamental service:
 It allows one host or user on the network to check with which other
host or user it is communicating.

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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics

 Suppose we want to design a protocol which

authenticates A to B. Is the following secure?

A B: ‘Hi B, I’m A’
 So we need something stronger.
 Authentication protocols can be built from a
number of different assumptions:
 A and B share a secret (e.g. a password, a
PIN, biometric information, a symmetric key).
 A and B have authentic copies of each other’s
public keys
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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics

 In strong authentication, one entity ‘proves’ its

identity to another by demonstrating knowledge of a
secret known to be associated with that entity,
without revealing that secret itself during the
protocol.
 Also called ‘challenge-response’ authentication.
 Typically use cryptographic mechanisms to protect the
messages in the protocol:
 Encryption.
 Integrity mechanism (e.g. MAC).
 Digital signature.

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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics
Example: Passwords Over a Network
 Alice has a user ID and password allowing her to
remotely access a computer B over a network.
 Alice sends the user ID and password over the
network
 B uses Alice’s ID to find an entry in a password file,
and compares the password received with the
password stored.
 B authenticates Alice if the passwords match.
 An example of user authentication based on
something known.
 a special case of entity authentication.

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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics
 Here the secret associated with Alice is her password.

 This secret itself is revealed during the protocol,

hence we have what might be termed weak
authentication.

 The password might be captured in transit over the

network.
 Depending on the network type and attacker
capabilities,

 So this approach not really suitable for use over

insecure networks.
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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics
 Biometrics is the measurement of physiological or
behavioral features that identify a person
(authentication by something inherent). Biometrics
measures features that cannot be guessed or shared.

 Several components are needed for biometrics,

including capturing devices, processors, and storage
devices.

 Before using any biometric techniques for

authentication, the corresponding feature of each
person in the community should be available in the
database. This is referred to as enrollment.

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4.7 Entity Authentication: Biometrics

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Passwords

The simplest and oldest method of entity authentication

is the password-based authentication, where the
password is something that the claimant knows.

 Fixed Password
 One-Time Password

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Passwords First Approach - User ID and password file

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Passwords Second Approach - Hashing the password

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Passwords Third Approach - Salting the password

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols
Challenge Response protocols

 In password authentication, the claimant proves her

identity by demonstrating that knows a secret, the
password.

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Using a Symmetric-Key Cipher

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Using Keyed-Hash Functions

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Using an Asymmetric-Key Cipher

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4.8 Passwords, Challenge Response protocols

Using Digital Signature

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
Authentication applications
 Developed to support application-level authentication
and digital signatures

 Most widely used services:

 Kerberos
 X.509

 Kerberos – a private-key authentication service

 X.509 – a public-key directory authentication service

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
Kerberos

 Symmetric encryption
 using no public keys

 Provides centralised private-key third-party

authentication in a distributed network

 Version 4 and 5

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
Kerberos
 Provide security in a distributed architecture
consisting of dedicated user workstations (clients),
and distributed or centralized servers

 Require the user to prove his identity for each service

invoked

 Require that servers prove their identity to clients

 Secure, Reliable, Transparent, and Scalable

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
Kerberos

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
Kerberos
 A Kerberos environment consists of:
 a Kerberos server
 a number of clients, all registered with server
 application servers, sharing keys with server

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
Kerberos

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
X.509
 Uses public-key cryptology & digital signatures
algorithms not standardised, but RSA
recommended

 Public key certificate associated with each user

Generated by some trusted CA

 Certification Authority (CA) issues certificates

 The notation CA<<A>> represents a certificate for a

client A signed by CA

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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
X.509
 issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing:
 version 1, 2, or 3
 serial number (unique within CA) identifying
certificate
 signature algorithm identifier
 issuer X.500 name (CA)
 period of validity (from - to dates)
 subject X.500 name (name of owner)
 subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
 issuer unique identifier (v2+)
 subject unique identifier (v2+)
 extension fields (v3)
 signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)
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4.9 Authentication applications -Kerberos, X.509
X.509

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