Ennead VI, 4 and 5 in the Works of Saint Augustine Introductory When the late Richard Harder, shortly before his death, called attention to the importance of Plotinus’ twin-treatise on omnipresence (Ennead VI, 4 & 5)4 for the understanding of St. Augustine’s thought, the suggestion might have seemed a bolt out of the blue, And yet, that appearance of novelty is deceptive. Grabowski’s more recent study has only served to underline once again the fascination that notion exercised on the Saint’, but it must be said that Willy ‘Theiler’s controversial Porphyrios und Augustin’ had long since proposed a generous series of texts to support his contention that Augustine showed unimistakable traces of what amounts to the Neo-Platonic (in Theiler’s view, Porphyrian) teaching on omnipresence, and of its multiple corollaries®, While admitting that Augustine never seems to have read any work of Porphyry’s which has survived to this day (including the Sententiae)®, 3. One continuous treatise which Porphyry'’s fondness for the number nine has split into two, it is 22-23 in the chronological listing of Plotinus'works, Harder’s Vorirag, unfortunately Jost with his untimely death, is partially reconstructed from notes and appears in the Hardt Foundation Entretiens sur PAntiquité Classique, Vol. V : Les Sources de Plotin (henceforth, ited as : Sources) Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1960, Dp. 325-332. While leaving open the question whether Augustine got his doctrine directly or through Porphyry, Harder speaks suggestively of « exact citation » (p. 332) of the Plotinian treatise itself. ‘The full text of his remarks might have banished the appearance of contradiction, 2, So far as we have discovered, only L, Grandgeorge, Saint Augustin ef le néo-platonisme, Paris, 1896, pp. 39 ff., had previously alluded to this treatise as influential in Augustine's works, 3. The All-Present God. A Study in St. Augustine, by 8. Grabowski, St. Louis, ros4. The author is not concerned with tracing the source of Augustine's teaching, however. 4- Halle, 1933. (Henceforth : Porphyrios). 5 Theiler does not speak explicitly of this relation to the omnipresence theme ; but he makes no effort to hide the fact that many of the clements he finds parallel in Augustine and * Porphyry # are corollaries of the Plotinian doctrine contained in this treatise : see especially his treatment of Sententia X1,, pp. 43 ff. and the references to Ennead VI, 4-5, pp. 25-28, p. 46. Only his arbitrary Arbcitsatz (p. 4) has previously ruled out Plotinus as a direct source ; for some perceptive remarks on Theiler’s method, see P, Coureelle, Lettres Grecques on Occident, 2d ed., Paris, 1948, pp. 159 Mt. 6. Porphyrios, p. 4 ff.2 R-J. O'CONNELL ‘Theiler refers to these latter, as indeed he must, in the hope of grounding his thesis that Porphyry, and not Plotinus, provided Augustine with his introduction to the world of Neo-Platonic thought’. ‘Whatever one may think of his conclusions, it is certain that his resort to the Sententiae manages indirectly to underline the key role of the omnipresence notion in Neo-Platonic thought. In this, of course, the disciples were only faithful to their master ; Plato himself had pointed out its indispensability for a right understanding of his cherished participation theory : at the very heart of that theory, and grounding its possibility, lies the truth that (to cite Plotinus’ title) “Being is integrally everywhere, one and the same "® — and here, as Harder points out, Augustine's fota simud corresponds to the master’s 6\y mavrayoo®. The significance of the omnipresence theme, therefore, was far from lost on the Neo-Platonic school. The fact that not only Sententia XI,, which ‘Theiler cites and analyses at length, but the entire series running from the thirty-third to the forty-fourth (over a third of Mommert’s text) is little more than an extended paraphrase of Plotinus’ twin-treatise on the subject, shows the regard in which Porphyry held this particular work of the master. Modern commentators, too, have paid homage to this same treatise", One may wonder, then, if its crucial significance would have escaped the translator who undoubtedly mediated between Plotinus and Augustine ; Ennead VI, 4—5 would certainly have impressed him as a “‘ must ” if his intention was to make Plotinus’ thought accessible to the Latin world. And even a cursory reading of that treatise would have left a deep and lasting impression on Augustine. For there is little doubt that the difficulty of conceiving God's omnipresence as at the core of all creaturely participation in Him, is what Augustine is ultimately alluding to in the Confessions, as the maxima et prope sola causa inevitabilis erroris meac™, 7. Ibid. pp. 43 ff. 8. Or, as Mackenna (in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, 5) translates : « That the Authentic: Existent is universally an integral, self-identical Unity. + We find Brénier’s version probably more accurate ; see Les Ennéades de Plotin, Paris, 1924-48, Vol. I, p. 6, and vol. VI, pp. x6x Ml (Henceforth : Ennéades). The title in Greek : 76 é savraxod Shov elvar é& xalerairév. Si especially Parmenides, 131 B, which Bréhier, Joc, cit. shows is the starting point for this meditation, 9. Sources, p. 332. This phrase is from En. VI, 4, 45 33- Harder gives several other equiva- ents of the ofa simut notion as well, all from this treatise, 10. See note 7, above. 31, Sce his edition of the Sententiae (‘Teubner : Leipzig, 1907) in which pages 25-46, excepting only portions of pp. 41-43, constitute a Porpiyrian paraphrase of this twin-treatise, 12, See especially E. Bréhier, « Images plotiniennes, images bergsoniennes », in Etudes de Philosophie Antique, Patis, 1955, pp. 292-307 ; and A. Il. Armstrong, ¢ Emanation in Plotinus », Mind, (46) 1937, pp. 61-66. Both authors prominently feature images drawn ffom this treatise. 23. Con, V, 19. (We cite book and paragraph. omitting the chapter-headings), Augustine is, referring to his inability to conceive of God except in corporeal terms, but the root defect is expressed in terms of omnipresence : see, for instance, the ubique pracsens (Conf. V, 16) and pracsentissiie... wbique totus es (VI, 4) which bracket the development in which V, 2g occurs, See the other sections of the Confessions dealing with this difficulty : I, 2-6 ; IX, 7-16 TV, 14-20 ; IV, 25 — V, 2; V, 19-25 ; VI, 4-85 VI, 1-7, 12. The solution of the difficulty is furnished by the Neo-Platonic readings, Book VIT, 13-26.ENNEAD VI, 45 IN AUGUSTINE 3 State of the question At first glance, Fr. Henry might seem opposed to Harder’s suggestion. His insistence on the paucissinni libri, paucissimae gutiae, phrases in which Augustine describes his first contact with the libri platonicorwm4, sometimes gives the impression that Augustine never greatly expanded the range of those readings and that responsible scholarship must limit itself to the modest circle of treatises explicitly cited in the De Civitate Dei, And yet he is prepared in principle to admit that Augustine may well have read Ennead IV, 2, (not mentioned in the De Civitate)'and, what is more to our purpose, he answers Theiler’s appeal to Sententia XI, with the reminder that the finale of Plotinus’ twin-treatise on omnipresence could easily have been the common source of the similarities between Augustine and Porphyry which ‘Theiler finds so striking". But Henry pursues the ques- 34. P. Henry, Plotin et L’Occident, Louvain, 1934 (henceforth : Plotin) may not always have kept this clear in mind; see pp. 2ro-rz, In C, Acad. II, 5, the result of the gutlas Paucissimas is an incredibite incendium ; in De b. wita, 4, Lectis... Plotini paucissimis libris... sic exarsi, the result is the same, It is obvious from the context that Atgustine means to emphasize this result, aud hence the power of those readings, only accessorily the fewness of the books in question. Note also that the term liber is left deliciously indefinite ; does it mean ¢ treatise », collection, complete Ennead, or what ? For the breadth of the term, see, H. Leclerog, art, » Livre + in Dictionnaire d’Avchéologie Chrétienne et Liturgie, 1X, 2, esp. col. 1755, 1759. Once again, Augustine is speaking of his first contact with the platonict : did he read more of them afterwards ? While awaiting evidence to the contraty, one can only surmise with J, Noerregaard, Augustins Bekchrung, Tubingen, z923, p. 106, that he probably did ; the author's further researches show persuasively that this probability seems to have been a fact. Henry's criticism of Noerregaatd’s « long list » (Plotin, pp. 66-7) leaves utterly out of account the fact that even between this first contact and the composition of the Dialogues of Cassiciacum, there is a time-gap considerable enough (end-June to end-August, 386) to give free play to Augustine's insatiable intellectual appetite. See 2, Courcelle, Recherches sur les Gonjessions (henceforth : Recherches) Paris, 1950, p. 280 for these dates. ‘fo conclude, only careful study of the Saint's works can tell us whether he read more of Plotinus or not, 15. Henry finds reference to Euneads I, 6 (0 Beauly), Plotin p. x07 ; 11,2 (Providence 1), ibid. p, 12a; IV, 3 (Problems of the Soul, I) ibid. p. 1233; V, 1 (The Three initial Hypostases) P. 1275 V, 6 (On the Principle beyond being) ibid. pp. 129-30 ; Ty 4 (Om Happiness) p. 138. Having followed the clues indicating influence of Enneads I, 6 and V, I he concludes that it is fort possible these were the only treatises (paucissimi Wvbré!) instrumental in Augustine's conversion ; they ¢ suffice », in any case, to provide concrete illustration of Augustine's account in the Confessions, (Plotin, p. 128). Note, however, that a (ranslator interested in propa- gating Plotinus’ philosophy might well have succumbed to the (quite justifiable) temptation of suppressing Porphyry's arbitrary divisions (that between Ennead IV, 3 and its + successor » occurs right in mid-sentence !), thus reuniting Ennead IV, 3 — 5 into a single treatise on the soul, Ennead TI, 2 — 3 into one on Providence, even, perhaps, combining Enneads I, 6 and V, 8 (on Intelligible Beauty) into a liber on Beauty, and so on. This very real possibility — only extensive research can verify it as either probability or fact — makes the assumption that Hider means treatise and nothing else, all the more questionable, With this in mind, therefore, ‘ considerable nurtiber of treatises could have been included even under Augustine’s paucissint ; and (given the time-gap alluded to in note 14, above) even more be uncovered at wot: in his earliest writings, provided one knew what treatises to look for. Now other researchers have found little dificulty in uncovering such traces of Enneads TV, 3 and III, 2— 3 in the Dialogues of Cassiciacum, and that despite their sympathy toward the hypothesis of (additional) Porphyrian readings; see, for example, J. J. O’Meara’s edition of Against the Academics (Ancient Christian Writers series, Henceforth ACW, number 12), Westminster, Md., 1950, PP. 260 ff. The limitation to Ennends I, 6 and V, 1, consequently, is open to serious question, 16, Henry, Plotin, pp. 72 ff.4 R-J. O'CONNELL tion no further and there the matter rested until Harder’s Vortrag, so unfortunately lost, brought it to the fore again. In this (and in subsequent studies) we hope to show that Harder’s suggestion was highly significant. But before any valid conclusions can be drawn in this matter, both a broadening of perspective and a modification of method are indispensable. And first, a broadening of perspective. If we consent to limit the ‘debate only to the De immortalitate animae which furnished the starting point for Harder’s argument, it seems impossible to decide between Ennead VI, 4—5 and the treatise IV, 2, which Fr. Henry once again adduces for comparisoni?, Nor do we mean to insist that a choice between these’ two is necessary : Augustine could conceivably have read them bothi® With no intentions, therefore, of excluding Ennead IV, 2, we hope to show that Augustine not only read, but meditated and profoundly assimilated Ennead IV, 4—5. In order to do this, we propose to expand the area of search to include the second book of the De libero arbitrio and the Conjessions, two prominent links in Augustine’s repeated study of this treatise. ‘The consequences of this affirmation on Augustinian exegesis are, we think, important enough that we may be excused for covering the ground with what at times may appear to be over-painful care. From parallels to patterns Profoundly assimilated : the very depth of Augustine’s assimilation of this treatise is what imposes a modification of method. For the somewhat fragmentary comparison of textual parallels, particularly if confined to linguistic relationships, is at a distinct disadvantage in the case before us. ‘The more thoroughly a “ source ” is assimilated, the more profound its effective influence, the more freely the “ influenced ” author can manipulate, recombine and re-express the materials which he has made his own.® When this has occurred, purely philological analysis, remaining on the level of language, is incapable of uncovering the " source ” which may still be exercising a subterranean but decisive influence. We must then (if an image be permissible) look “ below ” the surface layer of 17, We assume that note 1, p. 332 of Sourcas, was inserted with Fr. Henry's knowledge and approval ; it reminds the reader that he traces the parallels, to which Harder alludes, rather to Ennead IV, 2. 18, Ifhe had, he would have found Ennead VI, 4—5 contains every insight of Ennead 1V, 2, ‘with enough sutperabundance to make him almost forget the latter in favor of the former. ‘The two remarks which encourage comparison with IV, 2 (om the soul not being like the color ‘white, on its not being ¢ distant from itself 9) are both, to stay with thei for the moment, found in Ennead VI, 4—5 : see VI, 4, 1 1 ff; VI, 5, 6, 10; and ibid, 11, where Plotinus comes back to the color comparison ; also VI, 5, 3 for an analogue of the non sibi distat notion, (Compare Henry, Plotin, pp. 75-6). If, therefore, an either-or relationship between Enneads IV, 2 and VI, 4—5 is insisted upon, then the connections in which these fragmentary parallels occur in Augustine must be more clesely examined, ‘his is one of the things we shall ‘be led to do. 19, See Testard’s excellent observations in connection with Augustine's Ciceronianisms, ‘in the final summary of his Saint Augustin et Cicéron, Paris, 1958, Vol. 1.ENNEAD VI. 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 5 expression, not merely to fragmentary doctrinal “ parallels”, but alert to the possibility of a dertium guid, namely, parallel ‘ patterns ” of thought and image that still betray a profound correspondence between the two authors in question. Even where the language seems no longer to correspond, hence where verbal rapprochements are out of the question; there may still persist an inner linkage of thought-in-movement in virtue of which each idea calls for its natural successor, each image for its natural partner. ‘To detect a correspondence at this level one must perhaps be, in Mandouze’s ironic phrase, quelque pew philosophe®, but no less objective than the scientific philologist for all that. Thought and image have contours as firm and represent a type of evidence just as” hard ” as the black and white of words on paper, to which they give rise as to their organically related expression®, Ommnipresence in Augustine : from Cassiciacum to the Confessions ‘These remarks on method are all the more necessary for the case which concerns us, since Augustine’s meditations on this treatise will be shown to have gone hand in hand with his readings of the Bible and of other Plotinian treatises, (and that in view of his ranning refutation of Manichaeism)—in a word, with his continued effort to construct an iniellectus fidei in which a synthesis of the Bible and Plotinus would provide more satisfying answers to the Manichaean problem of evil than the Manichees themselves could. ‘This complex preoccupation conducts him to a profound assimilation of the treatise on omnipresence (in connection with others, of course) with the result that Biblical expressions often cloak a Plotinian meaning—one that can be ferreted out only by close examination of the pattern of thought and image. It does not take much insight to detect, for example, the identical paradoxical structure beneath the verbal differences that distinguish Monica's response in the De beata vita : mihi videtur Deum nemo non habere, sed cum qui bene vivit, habet propitium, gui male, infestum™, and 20. « L’extase d’Ostie » in Augustinus Magister, Paris, 954, Vol. I, pp. 83 ff, The danger to which Mandouze points is real : philological method can get lost in words, considering them only with the most tenuous regard for their organic connection with the entire movement of thought they embody. at, Discuss method and lose friends, it has been sald. But pages could be written on this question and its methodological applications, ‘The desire for utter scientific » objectivity » is entirely laudable but it seems to have urged the patrons of a purely philological method to attempt an abstraction from the philosophical content of the works they are comparing, (evidently under the impression that subjectivity » must inevitably haunt any discussion between philosophers, with the result that the argument never ends). But can a problem involving a philosophic dimension ever be solved by + scientific » method without the scientist either suppressing that dimension or becoming at some point, in spite of himself, a philosopher ? Can, for instance, a textual parallel be considered convincing evidence of dependetice of one philosopher on another, except in terms of some implied theory of memory and how it operated in the case of the « influenced » thinker ? 22. De b, vila, 20.6 ReJ. O'CONNELL Augustine’s question in the Confessions : Quo it aut quo fugit (iniquus) nisi a te placido ad te iratum®™ ? "The supposition in both instances is the same : everyone “' has ” God, ie. participates in Him ; hence God is present in all creatures, even to those who choose absence from Him through sin. Flee though man may, God remains present, with an angry presence now, but present : for omnipresence is the heart of all participation, From Cassiciacum onwards, Augustine is struck by these paradoxes of omnipresence,*4 but his fascination with the theme is never more evident than in the Confessions. From the very opening paragraphs, we find him Jaunched on a series of queries on God’s presence to man, even to the man who chooses absence from Him. In variants and harmonics the same leitmotif spans the work from beginning to end, its recurrence telieved of monotony only by Augustine’s masterful handling of a set of mighty images, many of them adaptations of those already set down by the genius of image who was Plotinus. But the obverse of that leitmotif is equally important. Augustine spares no pains to remind us throughout the first seven books of the Confessions that the key to his error was precisely his incapacity to conceive of God in the spiritual terms which alone would do justice to his omnipresent relation to creatures. Read with a view to finding in them the influence of Enneads I, 6 and V, 1, the Confessions may seem to lead up to the Neo-Platonic illumination of Book VII, under the guise of a quasi- ecstatic “ ascent to the spiritual "%, But this is to miss the fact that, in Mandouze’s term again, “ C’est cette présence perpetuelle de Dieu dans les Confessions qui change tout”; if we compare the work with the treatises usually invoked to explain Augustine's mysticism, “on ne peut manquer d’étre frappé d’une différence radicale de tonalité’"”. What Mandouze seems to have sensed®, and what Theiler has repeatedly 23. Confay IV, 14. 24. See De b, vila, 17-22; De ordine IE, 3-6. The relation of these considerations to Ennead VI, 4—5 must, however, await proof. 25. Conf, I, 2 H. See Theiler, Porphiyrios, p. 44 who has seen both the omnipresence con- nection and the relation to Ennead VI, 4—3 (though confident, of course, of Porphyry's media- tion in regard to the latter). 26, Thus Henry, Courcelle and others. This movement is not absent, certainly, but it represents one side of the reality which is more complex. Put another way, the Confessions do show signs of Enneads I, 6 and V, 1; but those treatises (and others, notably IIT, 2—3) have been rethought and transmuted by an Augustine fascinated by Ennead VI, 4—5. Tf read through the lens of the former treatises only, the Confessions yield only a truncated part of their message ; this is why we shall later attempt to « situate » Augustine's preoccupation exactly before settling the question of the sources which are active. Those sources may be invoked in the measure that they aid us to understand Augustine's work as it stands, not as we would prefer to make it. 27. Art. cil. note 20, above, 28. The text reads as though Mandouze were about to affirm, without qualification, a diffe- rence of tonality between Augustine and Plotinus : confining that comparison to the treatises usually cited tn this connection is wisdom indeed.ENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 7 underlined™ is the fact that Augustine's interiority descriptions root firmly in an omnipresence conception which shows distinctive Neo-Platonic traits, Ennead VI, 4-5 : its proper character ‘Throughout the first seven books of the Confessions, then, Augustine is describing a difficulty, This is the first important similarity between that work and the twin-treatise we are about to consider. Bréhier’s Notice characterizes the distinctive trait of this treatise as follows : Le traité de Plotin ne présente pas une argumentation réguliére et une série de preuves A marche progressive; s'il y a progrés, c’est dans lintuition de plus en plus profonde et précise que l'on acquiert de In thése; il a conscience de I'insuffisance, en ces matiéres, des démonstrations qui contraignent l’esprit... ; il se sert plutdt d'images, @analogies qui le persnadent et qui, moyennant correction, lui donneront une vue exacte des choses; il fait appel an sens commun... & la croyance teligieuse commune; mais surtout (et il y revient souvent), il montre dans un trait particulier & imagination humaine, la raison profonde de la répugnance A admettre la thise de Vomniprésence de V’tre : on croit ’omniprésence incompatible avec le réel parce qu’on imagine invinciblement le véel comme wn corps dtendu et divisible, IL revient souvent : Plotinus repeats, insists, and never tires of repeating those methodological pointers. If one were to search for the single treatise of all his works which answers to the difficulty which Augustine just as tirelessly describes as his own, a better would never come to hand®, ‘The reader will have noted also the paradox of method to which Bréhier alludes here : the use of the imagination to purify the imagination, of image to dispel imagery, ‘The bearing of that paradox on our question will become manifest shortly. 29. Again, without always realizing it, perhaps. 30, Enndades, VU, p. 162. (Italles ours). 3x, It must be kept in mind that while this or that fragment may recur in several Enneads, its connections will be different depending on the « point + of the treatise in question, hence its internal unity, drive, movement of thought, in short, the character which sets the treatise as such apart’ from’ the others. Fragmentary comparisons inevitably allow this character to escape, but no method can quite hope to reproduce it ; Mandouze’s term fonalité is a (aot entirely subjective) way of expressing it. An attentive reading of this treatise and relevant portions of the Confessions (cfr. note 13, above) is the best way of grasping it ; but, failing that, we must here take a more analytic approach to showing the kinship between the two works, one not without considerable drawbacks,8 R-J. O'CONNELL Plotinus and Augustine : a parallel pattern of doctrine Now it is exactly this emphasis on methodology, this painful diagnosis of the difficulties involved in forming a correct conception of omnipresence, describing its nature, root and consequences in minute detail, then applying the corrective, illustrating again and again the manner of thinking that must be applied, — in short, this extended effort of philosophical manuductio is characteristic of this treatise as of no other that Plotinus ever wrote. Others present this or that element of the finished doctrine, or suppose it in passing ; none of them presents its mode of genesis, And once we examine the treatise from this, its proper point of view, we cannot but be struck by how regularly Augustine’s own descriptions of his difficulty, its root and nature and consequences, the terms, images and linkage of ideas, the diagnosis applied and the expression of the final insight with all its paradoxes, all read like faithful echoes of Plotinus’ twin-treatise. ‘The root of the difficulty can be variously expressed, but in both authors, as Bréhier notes of Plotinus, it comes down invariably to the same thing: we conceive of the relation of the superior world (which includes the soul, the Ideas, and God) to the inferior world, in terms drawn from sense, in terms appropriate to concrete sensible reality and to the working of our imagination, rather than to intelligence in its genuine operation. Put another way, we do not draw our principles from the appropriate intelli- gible realm, but from the inferior, corporeal realm®. 32 See Ennead VI, 4, 1-2, where Plotinus begins by discussing the soul; VI, 5, x where hhis concer is God ; VI, 5, 8 where it has become the Ideas. He does not distinguish these hypostases in respect of this problem, but passes blithely from one to another without changing either the principles or the terms of his conclusion, (Compare Conf., IV, 25 and VII, 2 where Auugustine points to the fact that God and the soul pose an analogous problem in this respect). All three hypostases (if we grant that # God » may be Plotinus’ term for the One, but see note 35, infra) are grouped under the head of 73 évrus dv as (in Mackerna’s term) « Authentic-Existents », A Latin like Augustine would naturally translate this as Verum Esse, verum ens, ot, more densely, Veritas } and we know that Augustine, like Plotinus, distinguishes this higher realm against the inferior, sensible, corporeal + image-world » (and there is every reason for thinking that this latter is what he means by the term vanitas) ; see Confessions III, 12 ; IV, 26 ; V, 25 ; ‘VII, 16 and other loci below, notes 33-37. This distinction of the « two worlds » both Theiler (Porphyrios, pp. 5-7 and rx) and R. Beutler (474. « Porphyrios » in Pauly-Wissowa Real-Ency- clopaedie (henceforth PW) XXIL, x, col. 305) attribute to Porphyry in alleged distinction from his master. Yet if Augustine had read only this treatise, or other treatises in the light of this oue asa dominant, the distinction would then be perfectly « Plotinian », in derivation. 33: The themes in both authors are variously expressed, but the logic of their linkage is what permits them to recur and interweave in a continuous series of fresh combinations. In the notes ‘which follow (53-37) we have chosen to follow the order of both works, hoping thereby to pre- serve (and not falsity) the impression created by uninterrupted reading of,them, For the basic statement on the Two Worlds, Ennead VI, 5, 2, 9-16, and Conf. VII, 16 bear comparison, For the basic statement of method, see Ennead VI, 5, 2, 1-0, immediately preceding the above : it is question of intelligence versus sense and imagination. The same warning recurs in Ennead V1, treatise 4 : 2, 27 ff ; 3; 23-29 j 4, 26-34 5 13, 5-0 j and in treatise 5 : 2, 1-9 ; 3 entire; 4, 1-10; 8, 1-15 (purification of emanation image itself) ; 11, 1-10, followed by the coordinate time-etemity distinction, 11, 14-24. As for Augustine (limiting ourselves to texts of the Confessions where the notion of God’s omnipresence is explicitly evoked in the context ; and omitting for the moment all referenceENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 9 What, then, is the result ? Note that the problem is entirely analo- gous whether stated of the soul, the Ideas, or of God, so we may express it briefly in terms of Augustine’s dominating interest, God. ‘The result is that, having imagined God after the fashion of an extended body, we automatically consider Him as spatial, hence as distributed part-for-part over a vast area, hence received part-for-part (as a property or form) by corporeal beings. We use such images as these : that God is “ poured out ” into the containers of inferior reality ; or “ diffused ” throughout and “ filing ”, penetrating ” them much as an ocean would a sponge; as“ more” in a large body than in a small ; or, (in an effort to correct such images) we place God “ above ” corporeal beings in such a way that He would be more distant from some than from others, or, worse yet, supported by them ; we are tempted to imagine Him as a kind of light, streaming down on material things in such a way as eventually to dwindle off into darkness where His light would “ fail”. What, then, is the correct vision? It involves the realization that there are two distinct orders of reality, radically different one from the other; that the higher realm is non-bodily, non-spatial, utterly partless, hence, if present at all, then present entire to each unity of the inferior world, — and consequently common to them all and the property of none. God is not in the realm of flux and hence not in any sense poured out ”: is not contained “ in ” inferior realities, rather, He contains them. Nor is He more “ here” than “ there ", more in this being than in that in any sense where distance, space, or quantity would have any r6le to play : their possession of Him is measured by their capacity, competence, rank. He is “ above ” the inferiors, not as a material light is above the things it lights up, but with a distanceless superiority which is that of producer to produced ; He does not rest on them, they rest in Him and from Him receive all their stability. But they are in Him, not as ina place or an envelope, not as in some space formerly part of the Void, for this would only be a more subtle way of putting God Himself in place. He is, on the contrary, utterly to Augustine's report on his Neo-Platonic readings) : ITT, 11-12 (note the equivalence of such terms as octdlus, sensus carnis ; and the fact that corpus, phantasmata and things ¢ outside + (Joris) axe, despite their difference of grade, uniformly inferior to what is spiritus, interior, and attainable only by the éntellectus mentis which sees quod vere est and can therefore be ommni- Present, fola ubique). Similar equivalences in IV, 24, 26 (critique of De pulchro et apto) ; V, 25, (note distinction of Two Worlds, opposition of corpus hujus mundi, seen by the sensus carnis, and the spiritwalia) ; VI, 6 ; VII, 1-2 and 7 ; VIL, rx (where the intus-foris distinction correlates with lumen tuum as against imagines corporuns) and 12, acies mentis being sharpened for the vision to follow, on the occasion of the libri platonicorum. (We shall see shortly that the Jumen gratis amplectendae pulchritudinis of VI, 26, to be seen not by the oculus carnis but ex intinio, isan echo of the Bros-image from Ennead VI, 5, 10). 34, Since the statement of the defective conception is often accompanied by its corrective, we cite the elements together in note 36. 35. We prescind from the question whether Plotinus’ « God + means the Nofis or thé One ; what matters is that Augustine read + God » and assumed it meant what that term signified for him. See note, 32, above.10 R-J. O'CONNELL placeless, and this placelessness is the very condition for His being integrally present to things in place.%* Paradox ? Then here is another. Or, rather, the same paradox in its most acute formulation. In order to be really ‘common ” to all, hence integrally present to each, God must become the property of none, must remain self-infolded, in Himself, and not go forth from Himself. To be present, He must remain forever “ apart”, with a distanceless distance, at once self-inclosed and not so. Only by remaining fast in Himself will He truly be the “ unfailing ", will there be no place or being in the inferior 36. Plotinus, Ennead VI, Treatise 4 : 1, 17-29, omnipresence of the soul wersus extension of bodily masses (compare also the opening question, line 1); 2, 1 ff, the Authentic uncontained contains realities of inferior world, but not as in place, for it is itself placeless ; hence inferiors do not possess Portions of the All, since omnipresence, not vast extension, is what is being affirmed; the Authentic is integrally everywhere ; no question of far, near, distance, but presence entire of Being to beings ; 3, 23-29, Being’s placelessness a condition for its omnipresence ; entire to all in same compieteness to cach, else fragmented like e body ; 4, 26-34, same problem with soul, the body in the soul and not the reverse ; soul not present part-for-part but partlessly omnipresent throughout ; 8, 28-38, unity not co-extensive with the multiple, but utterly non- quantitative ; not extended (since extension is bodily) ; 11, 1-10, grades of being determined not by «locality » but by adequacy, competence of the inferiors to receive the Authentic which is entirely present to each ; 13, 5-10, again, no extension in Real, participation must be in the inextended, and (r4-r9) undivided, wholly unquantified omnipresent ; ‘Treatise 5 : r, God now in question ; 3, this being not in place, not + in » anything, nor distri- ‘buted part-for-part ; 4, 1-10 : else God partly at one point of universe, partly at anotiver, not omnipresent, a body ; 13-17, He is omnipresent, not failing at one or other point ; 8, 8-r5, puri- fication of emanation metaphor : relation is between orders of being, producer and produced (cfr, 1-7, no question of distance) ; a, 4o-end, Being is foundation, not founded on inferiors ; 11, 7-11: contrast with material reality, a stone ; 12-14, Being is measureless measure of things in place ; 15-28, etemal principle of things in time; r2, entire : the « One Life » image, see below. Augustine, Confessions T, 2 the capacity of things to receive God, suggesting God's « vastness +; non essem nisi esses in me corrected to nisi essam in fe ; nothing in heaven and earth can be ¢ exira » God; ibid. 3, (note the images suggested, implere and fundere, then corrected) God container and not contained ; the vasa which receive Him do not make Him stabilis, but the contrary ; He not effusus, for erigis, non tu iaces, non dissiparis ; also te toto imples omnia, but (implied) (non) partem tui capiunt ... but ubique totus es ef res nulla te totum capit, I, 28, Non ... spatiis lacorum itur abs te (sed affects). (Compare Henry, Plotin, pp. 7 f. on De Musica VI, 40 :longe ase facere Deum, non locorums spatio, sed mentis affectu ;he attributes, rightly, we suggest, to Ennead VI, 5, x2). TTT, r2, elimination from Deus spiritus of all extension, mass, since thus He would he 4n parte minor quam in toto, hence His presence not tota ubigw IV, 14, love ¢ in » God linked with His creative omnipresence, inplendo fecit (omnia), this in tura Tinked with Veritas omnipresent ; TV, 15, temporal-eternal correlation of omnes-simul notion, the eternal mansio in x6 then attributed « stability # (slans et manens) ; 18, God non Tonge ... non fecit et abiit ; 23, again, soliditas Veritatis. V, 19, the root of his error ; confer V, 16 (\bique praesens) and VI, 4 the paradoxes of God's presence ubigue folus ... musguam locorum ; ‘VII, t Fost-Manichaean (probably Stoic) image of God as corporeum ... per spatia locorum infusum sive etiam extra mundum per infinita diffusum (cpr. Ennead VI, 4, 1-2 especially) ; the non-spatial seems to him a nthil, ne inane quidem, tanguam ... locus omni corpore vacuatus wv» locus inanis Jamquam spatiosum nihil (opt. Ennead VI, 4, 2, same context as above, on the Void !) ; VIT, 2, continuation of same theme and allied images of fendere, diffundere, ete. (all spatial), with subsequent correction in terms of part-for-part argument (compare De quant, animae 24 on the elephant argument !) ; VIT, 7, sponge image ; rr, defect of all this, the Jumen he seeks is not in loco, foris, but intus. We stiall come presently to Augustine's use of the » One Life » theme, and to his own purification of the emanation-image.ENNEAD VI, 45 IN AUGUSTINE u world to which His power (identical with His Presence) fails to reach. Even this ultimate refinement, this final paradox, Augustine has firmly grasped and put to work.” The question of source : a question of formal structure If only considered from the viewpoint of their number, this cor- respondence of elements is almost bewildering. It stamps Augustine's doctrine of omnipresence as in any case distinctively related to the one held and taught by Plotinus, whatever be his direct source for that doctrine. ‘We shall shortly see that his account of the bri platonicorum and his presentation of the metaphysic he found there put that relation to Neo- Platonism beyond all question, But is it possible that Augustine gleaned this variety of elements: from hither and yon in any number of Neo-Platonic writings? Not impossible, perhaps : but the rule of choosing the simplest of available hypotheses counsels that we settle on one treatise that best accounts for all the elements concerned, rather than burrow into a number of others which will do the job much less well. ‘The appeal to a number of other treatises, furthermore, would utterly fail to explain the formal aspect of the correspondence, the tight unity of conception which links this number of elements into a pailern which is parallel to that found in Ennead VI, 4—5. The omnipresence doctrine, in Mandouze’s phrase, is not just one element alongside of a number of others in the Confessions, it is precisely ce gui change tout, what en-souls them all, transforms them and puts them into an entirely new register. And this it does precisely in virtue of its own internal laws, its own formal structure, a structure which suggests that Augustine must have found it in a source in which the same presiding conception was already powerfully at work. 37. Ennead VI, 4, 8, 28-38; but far more often and vigorously in treatise 5 + thus 1, x; 2, 16 5 3 entire 5 4, €8D. 23-17 5 9, 40-48 ; this is also the « point » of the Hvosimage in VI, 5, 10, For Augustine, the adjective « unfailing » is applied to God as Veritas (see note 32) with the attribute manens in se sometimes being explicitly connected with this unfailing insight ; see Confessions VI, 6, veritas semper manens et ex nullo deficiens ; 1V, x4 (transmuting the theme of Providence as presented in Ennead IIL, 2—3) Quo it... nisi ad le'?... Nam ubi rion invenit legem Juan ? Et lex tua veritas et veritas tu; V, 22, where God’s attribute of manens takes on the eternity nuance of Ennead VI, 5, 11, 15-28; IV, 7, An tt, quamois ubique adsis ... in te manes, nos autem in experimentis volvimur ? But see below, the treatment of his Platonic readings, where this theme becomes even more explicit than formerly. Note that for Augustine (as for Plotinus, Ennead VI, 4, 3 and VI, 5, 8) it is not legitimate to ift this last paradox by having God « far » and his + power » near : see Confessions VII, 6 for the general principle : Voluntas enim et potentia dei deus ipse est ; and the application, II, 35 Won enim longe a nobis omnipotentia tua, etiam cum Jonge sumus a te. Much of the power of the Confessions, in fact, comes from Augustine's thorough assimilation of this insight in a way that permits him to rethink Plotinus’ other treatises in function of it.2 RJ, O'CONNELL Plotinus or Porphyry ? Now among the Neo-Platonists our only realistic choice lies between Plotinus and Porphyry : and that choice must already be weighted in favor of Plotinus, For despite the presence in the Sententiae of most of these elements and of their guiding conception, we have not only Theiler’s doubts that Augustine read that work, but the admission of other tenants of the Porphyrian hypothesis that Augustine did read Plotinus®. Their additional claim that he read Porphyry as well is (before the composition of the De consensu evangelistarum) based entirely on indirect evidence®, much of it, ironically enough, accountable for by this very treatise of Plotinus. But, the question may be raised, did Porphyry explain the omnipresence doctrine in some lost work resembling, even more closely than the Sententiae, Ennead VI, 4—5? The answer is that we simply do not know, But a paraphrase of Plotinus more faithful than that contained in Senten- tiae XXXUI-XLIV, would be almost tantamount to outright translation, the task of discerning what Augustine « borrowed » from Porphyry’s and what he took from Victorinus’ translation would become impossible, and the entire question becomes, for that very reason, idle and without real significance. We may, then, consider the Sententiae as representative of Porphyty’s philosophic manner; indeed, as Theiler’s own practice shows, we have no other recourse. Now the lasting contribution of Theiler’s work seems to have been that of pointing up the residue of Augustine’s Neo-Platonism that must still 38. This holds for Courcelle, Solignae and O'Meara ; it does not hold for ‘Theiler, See (inter alia) Courcelle’s Lettres Greeques, pp. x6: # ; O’Meara’s Against the Academics pp. 22-3 and notes ; Solignac’s ¢ Réminiscences plotiniennes et porphyriennes », in Archives de Philoso- hie (20), 1957, Pp. 446-465. Theiler’s review of Courcelle's Recherches sur les Confessions, itt Gnomon (25) 19355 pp. 113-121, shows he is still impenitently and exclusively Porphyrian. 39. See O'Meara's Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine, Paris, 1959, especially pp. 85 ff.; G. Bardy (Les Révisions, Bibliotheque Augustinienne XI, Paris, 1950, P, 880) dates the De consensi as « vers 400 », quite possibly after the completion of the Gonfessions, (sce ibid. pp. 577-8). Before that date, O’Meara’s practice is to attribute to Porphyrian influence themes in Augustine's early works which the ageing bishop censures as « Forphyrian +; so, for example, the contempt of sense-knowledge and the fuga @ corpore, both of which Augustine could easily have learned from Plotinus, and from this very treatise. It is transparently possible that Augustine could have found it polemically useful to abstain from criticizing Plotinus, the better to use the master against the anti-Christian theses of his disciple. 40. For the arguments in favor of such writings, see Beutler, art, cil. PW XXII, 1, cols. 255-7. The reader will not overlook the measure of conjecture in all this. 4x. Theiler, Porphyrios, pp. 43 ff., presents an extended analysis of it; is he perhaps uncomfortably aware of the number of times his effort to ¢ reconstruct » the lost writings of Porphyry from the converging evidence of Augustine's De vera religione and fragments taken from later Neo-Platonists, (assumed to be following Porphyry since they echo the De vera réligione |) bas led him to conjecture what Porphyry « must » have said ? Thus, the emphasis on'ré\ua, so evident in Plotinus and in Augustine, kann ... sicht gefellt haben (p. 28) in the ‘writings of Porphyry : here the irony of his method, ainied at substantiating his arbitrary exclusion of Plotinus, is painfully clear,ENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 13 be accounted for. And in choosing Porphyry as the source of those elements which flow from the Neo-Platonic doctrine of omnipresence, his instinct is to be commended, for his eye was really on Augustine : he has, assuredly, entered what is very much the right church. But he chose the wrong pew. ‘This a careful analysis of the Confessions’ account of the Neo-Platonic readings at Milan will shortly make clear. But that analysis requires in its turn that we situate those readings in terms of the problematic that Augustine hes gone to some lengths to evoke. The “ difficulty ” of omnipresence, the “ problem ” of evil For “ difficulty” and “ problem” are not quite the same thing. A difficulty, as we use the term here, is what makes the problem irresoluble. And the main problem of the Confessions is still, at bottom, the Manichaean problem of evil : unde malum? ‘Yhat problem Augustine presents at length in Manichaean terms in the account he gives, in Book III, of his conversion to that sect ; the order of presentation there dovetails closely with the solution he claims to have found in Neo- Platonism*®, What put the problem beyond solution, he assures us in Book III, was his inability to transcend corporeal imagery, to form a spiritual conception of God, a conception which would permit him to understand that the Divine Presence is /ola simul, omnipresence“, Hence he conceived both of God and of Evil as material substances, mutually exclusive one of the other. In Book VII, accordingly, we must not be surprised to hear his claim that, having arrived at that conception of omnipresence, he found that he had resolved the problem of evil. Resolved it, that is, in its intellectual dimension. Meanwhile, however, he has repeatedly pointed out that the question, unde malwm ? cannot be answered until one sees clearly on the prior question, quid est malum > ‘This solution, in turn, becomes accessible only when the “ darkened heart ”, the acies mentis obscurata, have been cleansed and enlightened. For this very obtencbratio, with its resulting incapacity to break through the evil of corporeal imagery, is an aegritudo, an insania, a punishment for a primal 42. Conf., IIL, 10-18. 43. Let us stay for the moment with one significant detail : after showing that everything 4s in ordine locorum (Conf. VIL, 18-19], Augustine attains to the complementary insight that everything is in ordine temporum as welt (Ibid. VIL, 23). Compare the hierarchic universe (order of place) in Conf ILI, 10, and the affirmation (ébid. 13) that all justice comes from the fone eternal lex, qua formarentir mores regionum et dierum, (the order of temporal realities). 44, Conf. III, 12. 45. Ibid, ; also V, 20 ; VIL, 4-7. Compare the principle enunciated in De moribus ecclesiae Ul, 2 and that contained in the opening lines of Ennead I, 8, On the Origin of Evils. P, Courcelle (Recherches, p. 167) claims this as one of Augustine's early readings in Plotinus, and there is much evidence to support that view, The fact is not without its irony ; the privatio theory of the origin of evils is precisely what Plotinus is attacking throughout the major portion of this treatise.. O'CONNELL 4 iniguitas whose root-identity is pride, superbia'®, In Augustine's mind, then, there is an organic connection between the iniguitas of man and his incapacity to arise to a proper conception of God’s omnipresence. The difficulty which makes his problem irresoluble is itself an outgrowth of that problem in its existential and religious dimension. Only when God has succeeded in bringing low his proud head (caput)? has the opportune time come'® for Augustine to attain to a spiritual conception of Him and His relation to creatures. How had this been achieved ? Augustine sees two means, exactly those which the Manichees rejected : the humble submission of faith, and the purifying “ heat ” of sufferings” which God’s omnipresent Providence applies to cauterize the wound of the heart, bathe the film on his inner eye, reduce the swelling whereby his inflata facies prevents him from seeing. In another image, Augustine is turned foras, outwards (and downwards) to the ima of vanitas, away from the Summa which is God dwelling forever intus, in corde. “The cure which opens his inner, spiritual eye, will also “ turn ” his gaze from outer to inner, from lower to higher. Not before giving us a final summary of this entire complex of conversion-imagery, one which makes clear the relation between evil and the incapacity to conceive of omnipresence, and at the same time suggests that he is at last ready to accept the admonitio which he is about to receive, does Augustine open his account of his Neo-Platonic readings®. This effort to “ situate ” those readings in a context which Augustine has prepared with consummate care, will help us avoid seeking a message there which corresponds much more to our own preoccupations than to his. ‘The more unified Augustine’s account of his Platonic readings proves to be, the less chance there is of understanding any single portion of it except in terms of its contextual setting®, And a little scrutiny reveals that Augustine’s account in Confessions VIL, 13-26, is quite literally organic ; the sutures that bind it together are living tissue, and no one member can be understood except in functional relation to the others and to the whole. 46. Conf. VIL, 21; compare the final identification of iniquilas as the root of evil (unde malum) in VIL, 22. 47. In Con}, IV, 5, there is an obvious imaginative association of superbia with the capul ; but in VII, rx with the more biblical cervix, The images are not always consistent, but the former association is significant. 48. Conf. VI, x7, and 24, where Augustine is discreetly using his own story as typical of God's providential’ action according to the ordo lemporum. 49. Conf. V, x4 (suffering) and VI, 6 (faith). Hence, as his cure approaches, he refers again to these agents : VIZ, 4 (faith) and z2 (suffering), $0. Conf. VII, 1213. 51. See E, Hendriks, Augustins Verhdlinis sur Mystik, Wurzburg, 1936, pp. 132 for some methodological remarks which have not lost thelr value,ENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 15 Libri platonicorum : an organic and logical account Having begun with what Fr. Henry has aptly called a “ spiritual apology ” to justify his enthusiastic allegiance to Neo-Platonism®, Augustine presents us with the fruit (and this comes down practically speaking to the content) of those readings, in paragraphs VII, 16-23. A reflection on the Incarnation (VII, 24-5) leads into a final summary of the entire experience, VII, 26. Against all reductions which would see in the central section (VII, 16-23) a movement which is unilaterally “ ecstatic ”, it must be remarked that Augustine’s concern is not only with the lies which the Manichees had spread about God, but also with those they uttered respecting His opera, His creatures. "The movement of the entire account, accordingly, is not so much ' upward ” as “ oscillating” — from God to creatures and back again. Vidi tz, yes’ — but (and we shall stay with purely formal indices for the moment) that vision of God's true nature issues in every case into a corrected vision of creatures in their true relation to God : note in this connection the inspexi cetera infra te (VIL, 17), the manifestatum est mihi (VIL, x8) which modifies a vision both of creatures and of God, the respeai alia ef vidi (VIL, 21), the itaque gradatim a corporibus (VII, 23) of the final ascent, the cetera ex te of the final summary (VII, 26). Even on the basis of purely philological considerations, nothing could be plainer : both God and creatures are involved throughout, and the account oscillates from one to the other just as it does throughout the Confessions, with an oscillation commanded by the relational character of the omnipresence notion, Another piece of evidence for the organic unity of the account is the progress of the philosophical Wellanschauung it transmits. One could show some interesting relationships with the progression of content and problematic in Augustine’s early work* ; but we shall stay for the moment 52, See Henry, Plotin, pp. 96-203 and p. 313, note x. 53. There is, perhaps, third solution to the question of whether Conf, VII, 16-25 resumes the content of the libri platorsicé or Augustine's subsequent reflections on them, as Gilson (LEsprit de la philesophie mediéoale, Vol. 1, Paris, 1932, p. 259, note 7) would prefer, Comparison with Augustine's early works migitt well show that he is presenting the fruit of his gradual adeptation of the content of those writings, a process that may well have taken ‘him up to 39x, a.d, But in that case, itis probable that he came back again and again to reading and meditating Plotinus, in the effort to find an inellectus which would rime with his accumu lating knowledge of the fides eatholica. See note, 56, below. 54. Compare Conf, II, 10, and note 43, above. 55. But the vision was in speculo et aenigmate, Conf. VILL, x. He is using videre in the sense of an intellectual vision of the invisibilia intellecta, per ea quae facta sunt (Conf. VIL, 23). Comparison with his language in the texts cited above, notes 33-37, confirms this, and Solit. 1, 8 fl. (where Augustine affirms he has not yet attained to that scientia which he desires) pnts it beyond reasonable doubt. 56, The question deserves more extensive treatment ; we presen there only summary indica- tions, Conf. VII, 16-17 interweaves the same themes (doubt, certitude, cibus animae, beatitude) Prominent in the (chronologically interwoven) De 5, vila’ and Contra Academicas ; VIL, 18+ 19 presents a kind of De ordine, part I, in which refinements due to Iater works (De moribus ccclesiae among them, see note 45, above) answer to the question guid est malum ? VII, 20 moves toward the solution of the unde malum question (De ordine, part I1) and particularly mates16 RJ. O'CONNELL with the archiclassic movement which presents us first with a vision of God as Esse, the cetera (to use the classic terms) as ‘‘ beings by participation ” (VII, 16-17); God as Summum Bonum, creatures as “ good by partici- pation ” (VII, 18-19); God as Veritas Aeterna, inferior realities as * temporally true ”, their ordo lemporalis (VII, 20-22) complementing the “« order of place ” referred to earlier (VIL, 18-19). At this point, the vision of iniquitas represents the dénouement setting the stage for the only true * ascent ”” (VII, 23) of the entire account, one which starts from corporeal beauty and arises to the Divine Decus which ultimately explains their power of attraction. Ens, bonum, verum, pulchrum, nothing could be more classical. ‘The progress of the account, therefore, is not only organic, but logical as well : there is no indication whatever of a series of discrete “events ”, only a continuously developed view of reality under the sign of participation theory. s+ the problem of evil solved It may seem upsetting to claim that the '' high point ” of this entire section lies not in this or that vision of God, but in the insight into iniguitas. And yet nothing is more coherent with the close connection which Augustine has set up between his omnipresence difficulty and the problem of evil. This explains why the transcendent cibus grandium which Augustine is too “ infirm ” to eat (VII, 16) is counterpointed later by the Cibus miscens carni of the Word made flesh (VIL, 24-5). The insights prompted by his readings issue in certainties, (vidi, certus cram, manifestatum est mihi) but, just as importantly, in a sense of his own infirmity which, against the Manichaean denial of our responsibility for our fall, Augustine must trace ultimately to his own iniguitas. ‘Thus, his inability to form a cotrect conception of God and creatures, a conception in which God’s omni- presence plays the crucial réle, is due to his own « perversity ”, his own lack ‘of order; only when his insania has abated can he enjoy the insight which is the feripeteia of the entire account, namely, that the unde malum question is answered with the single term, iniguitas. The ascensio animi of VII, 23, is made possible only when his former Mani- chaean “‘ presumption” has been turned (inchoatively at least) into “confession”, when his own perversity is recognized and (implicitly) avowed for what it is. a. the difficulty of omnipresence banished ‘The main contribution of the readings therefore was to cut through Augustine's difficulty and thereby solve his problem, precisely by con- ducting him to a right notion of God’s nature and relation to the world, ‘use (VIL, 22) of the perversitas notion brought to maturity in the De Genest contra Manichacos, and then inserted as the climax-definition of sin in De libero arbitrio 11, 53, written later. Only then does Augustine take up the ascensio animi, starting with created beauty (Conf. VII, 23) which corresponds (roughly) with the effort of the De musica, especially Book VI.ENNEAD VI, 45 IN AUGUSTINE 7 a notion commanded by the Plotinian doctrine of participation, and hence of omnipresence. ‘The oscillation already noted suggests this strongly ; the concern is with God and the cetera, the alia, But closer examination will put that interpretation beyond doubt. We shall explain shortly our reasons for thinking that the Jux inconmu- tabilis vision of VII, 16, supposes Ennead VI, 4—5 ; suffice it to remark for the moment that the vertlas...neque per finita neque per infinita locorum spatia diffusa, when taken in connection with its analogies throughout the Confessions‘, manifestly refers not only to God’s spirituality, but ultimately to His omnipresence. ‘The inspexi celera which follows (VII, 17) brings us to the ille autem in se manens innovat omnia, a Biblicism which shows that Augustine found in the Wisdom books the same paradoxical doctrine (to be present, God must remain “ in Himself”) as he had discovered in Plotinus ; this is perhaps why he has already evoked it earlier (VII, 14) when showing the basic agreement between the platonici and Scripture. ‘The little“ de malo" (or De ordine, part 1) of paragraphs VII, 18-z9, betrays the same orientation; the declaration that there is nothing “outside ” (extra) the created universe which could “ break in and corrupt ” its order, invincibly recalls the terms in which, just before these readings (VII, 7), the problems of evil and ommipresence are posed : ubi ergo malum ef unde et gua huc inrepsit ? In paragraph VII, 20, Augustine is getting to the core of the problem and consequently to the heart of the matter. He alerts us to that fact by interrupting the positive side of his development, One final time, he resumes his former Manichaean views. He adds a sketch of his post- Manichaean Stoicism ; the terms in both instances perfectly parallel former statements (in III, xo ff.; VIL, 1-3; 7) where the omnipresence preoccupation is unquestionable. And that same context is echoed faithfully here by the deum per infinita spatia locorum, which is then corrected in a resperi alia which inverts that relation ; in le cuncla finita... non quasi in loco — God is not “ contained ”, He is, rather (as Plotinus had insisted) “ container ” — provided always that we understand that term correctly, for He is indeed infinitum, sed aliler... One need only compare the description of the Verbum in VIL, 24 with that in VIL, 14 and 17, to find its supereminens implying the super omnia tempora and the connected manens in se so crucial to Plotinus’ doctrine of omnipresence. The final summary in VII, 26, only adds to the presumption already formed : Augustine advises us that he was certus...te infinitum esse...cetera vero ex te esse omnia. ‘The relation of God and creature is uppermost in his mind ; the key to that relation is participation; and the heart of participation is omnipresence. 57. See the texts resumed in note 36, especially Conf. 1, 35 I, 12; VI, 43 VIL, r-2. When Augustine uses this imagery, the difficulties against omnipresence are never very far from his attention. 238 R-J. O'CONNELL Iniquitas : and the Neo-Platonic aversio Augustine is, therefore, presenting us with an organic and progressive vision which may best be described as a Christian-Platonist religious philosophy®*. Turning back now to the heart of the account, we find the vital problem, the unde malum of the Manichees, resolved in the final phrase of paragraph VIL, 22 : Et quaesivi, quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam, sed a summa substantia, te deo, defortae in infima voluntatis perversitatem Proicientis intima sua et tumescentis foras, Here we are confronted with a variant of the aversio-conversio couple which Theiler has attributed to Porphyry, partially on the strength of comparison with Sertentia XI**, Fr. Henry, on the contrary, points out that dependence on the finale of this double treatise on omnipresence is at least equally probable, Indeed, such is the contrast between Porphyry’s wearying prolixity and the admirable compression of his master, it is difficult not to present the entire Plotinian text. We shall try to pare it to what is directly relevant. ‘The finale to which Henry has drawn attention opens on a note which is absent from Porphyry : a lapidary question-answer that may well have provided the seed of Augustine's celebrated name for God, vila vitarum, vita animae meae™. ‘The changes we make in Mackenna’s translation are in the interests of a more literal fidelity to the new text of Henry- Schwyzer®, “To return, ” Plotinus asks, “ how is that Power present to the universe?” And he answers : As a One Life : ‘Qs to) pla, Consider life in any living thing : it ... is omnipresent ;... in it there is no Matter to make it grow less and less according to the measured mass, Conceive it as a power of an ever-fresh infinity, brimming over with its own vitality. If you look to some definite spot and seek to fasten on some definite thing, you will ‘mot find it, The contrary is your only way ; you cannot pass on to where it is not; you will never halt at a dwindling point where it fails at last and can no longer 58. ‘The religious impact of these readings, and the religious importance Augustine accords to intellectual insight as he understands it, are not to be underestimated : see, for example, E. von Ivanka, « Die Unmittelbare Gotteserkenntnis... » in Scholastif, (13) £938, PP. 521-43, ‘The roots of this valuation lie in Augustine's religious anthropology, as we have already suggested by our effort to situate the Platonic readings in connection with the problem of evil and sinfulness. Our modem reluctance (whatever its grounds) to accord the same value to intellectual knowledge, makes us prone to imagine « mysticism » in what was, for him, a kind of insight only inadequately described by the term « religious philosophy », 59 Porphyrios pp. 43 ff. 60, Plotin pp. 70-73. 61. Conf. ILI, 10: Tu vila es animarum, vita vitarurn ... vita animae meae, Also Conf. VIL, 2 vita vitae mene, (Note the omnipresence context in both itistances), 62, We must here express our gratitude to Fr. Paul Henry, who so generously put at our Gisposal the page-proofs for the forthcoming critical text of the Sixth Ennead,ENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 19 give; you will always be able to move with it—better, to be in its entirety (é 78 mavzl) and so seek no further; denying it, you have strayed to something of another order and you fall; looking elsewhere, you do not see what stands there before you : aapiv oi iSav 7 dls Adov Brérew. But supposing that you do thus “seek no further”, how do you experience it? In that you have entered into the All (nas) and have not remained in some part of it (é pdper airod). You do not say :‘'so much is me” (roooirés yu) but laying aside that ‘so much” you become the All (7 dv). No doubt you were the All from the first, but something other than the All has been added to you, and that addition dimi- nished you ; for the addition was not from the All (od ydp éx 700 -wavrés) —you can add nothing to the All—but from what is not the All (705 w} navrés). Tt is on account of this non-being that you are become some-one (ns), and you are not the All except by putting that non- being away. Yon increase, then, by letting go of the “ alien” (va Ma) ; cast aside the alien and there is the All, present. No need for it to come to you in order to be present ; when it is not present it is rather you who have departed ; to depart does not mean to put distance between you and the All, for it is still present ; but (more exactly) you did uot depart : still near to it, you turned about to the contraries : add napeiy ent ré evavrla dorpdgns*®, It is rare that the scholar can enjoy at least the illusion of agreeing with just about everybody, yet here is a text which lulls us into that utopian dream. One need only compare it with Porphyry’s interminable para- phrase (he is convinced his reader is not very bright) to be assured that all the elements of Plotinus’ masterful text are at least represented. And yet, it must be admitted that a reasonably intelligent reader (and Augustine could lay modest claim to that) might have spelled out those virtualities for himself, particularly with the aid of other Plotinian treatises. To this extent, then, we find ourselves in agreement with Henry against Theiler. And yet it must be acknowledged that the latter has amassed an impressive series of texts which show Augustine playing variations on a number of the themes we have just seen, among them the aversio to non- being, a diminishing addition, one which makes the soul “less” in its very being, reducing it to an egestas copiosa since it has lost the wniversum in pursuit of the pars®. And a number of other instances could be added to these : some of them presented in Theiler’s Porphyrian commentary on the Confessions*®, 63. Enn. VI, 5, 22. 64, It can be found in translation in Bouillet’s edition of the Enneads, as well as in the Creuzer-Moser edition of Ficinus’ translation, 65. See Theiler, Porphyrios, pp. 25-8 and p, 46 for a series of these parallels (with generous references to Ennead VI, 4—5 as well). Note the correlation of pars and propria in Plotinus our part-icularity is what makes us some-one « apart # from the All. 66. Ibid. pp. 60-59.20 R-J. O'CONNELL ‘Augustine never tires of that final paradox of God remaining present even to the man who has “ departed "*?, remaining with us even when we are not with Him, since He does not desert us, it is we who did the deserting, and so forth", Here, too, is quite a probable source for the Augustinian image of God as “ center ”, with the other things as “ opposites”, on an outer periphery®. Sinners, in Augustine’s phrase, ponunt ad te tergum et non jaciem™, and hence he says of himself, dorsum habebam ad lumen, et ad ea quae inluminabantur faciem™. "These are only some of the reasons which suggest that Theiler entered the right church ; the doctrine he underlines as Augustine's in a number of instances manifestly reflects the omnipresence doctrine of the Plo- tinian school, whether drawn from Ennead VI, 4—5, or Porphyry’s Sen- tentiae, or something very like the latter. Plotinus or Porphyry : a parallel pattern of imagery But the text just cited also hints at the means of showing that he did choose the wrong pew after all : for it presents us with an image — a meta- physical image, if you prefer, one that Plotinus offers to purify our habitual images — but the image of the center is there, nonetheless. And at this point the paradox pointed to in Brehier's remarks cited above” promises to hold a precious clue. For few works more teem with imagery than the Confessions; and the same must be said for Plotinus’ treatise on omnipresence. Why are the images we are about to study entirely absent from the Sententiae ? One could press on Theiler that their omission was syste- matic; that, great enemy of the imagination that he was, Porphyry would have dropped them intentionally”. But the irony of the situation is that Porphyry’s rejection of the imagi- nation is at least partially a construct of Theiler’s, starting from the 67. See the texts has Theiler has amassed /oc. eit. above, note 65, for example, Conf. X, 38, ‘Mecum eras et tecum non eram ; see also II, 3, cited above, note 37, where God's omnipotence is never far from us, even when we have chosen to be «far» from Him; cpr. also the Cassiciacum paradoxes, notes 22 and 24, above, 68. One instance among many : Con}. V, 2 : Solus praesens etiam his, qui longe funt a te . quia nom, sicut ipsi deseruerunt creatorem suum, ita tu deserwisti creaturam tuam, 69. This is quite likely a variant of the omphalos image common to primitive religions, as H, Fugier has claimed, + Image de Dieu-Centre dans les Confessions de saint Augustin », Rev. é. august. I, 1955, PP. 379-95. But closer identification and specification of the source than Miss Fugier was inclined to attempt, can clarify the meaning and the « psychological value # of the image as Augustine uses it. Does it imply, as it did for Plotinns,t he ¢ fall of the soul » 7 70. Conf. TI, 6. 71. Conf, TV, 30. 72. Above, p. 7. 73. Such an argument would be entirely too abstract, however, and not take into account that a theory of the imagination need not always rime with poetic practice. This is true of Augustine (and of Plotinus) ; it may have been true of Porphyry — though he seems to have been less endowed with imagination than either of the above,ENNEAD VI, 45 IN AUGUSTINE ar condemnation of imagery he finds in Augustine's De vera religione: “ Give me a man who can see without being influenced by imaginations ” says Augustine at one point ; and from such utterances Theiler has spelled out an entire Porphyrian polemic against the phantasia™. Despite that theoretical rejection of the imagination, however, Augustine remains a literary artist of the first order, an “ image-maker ” of undeniable brilliance, and a powerful image evokes in him a response that proves he is, after all, one of us, — a man; and that image remains ineradicably consubstantial to the furthest reaches of human thought. ‘That irony is perhaps only more intense when we consider Plotinus’ intention in this treatise : despite all his warnings against imaged think- ing (and we shall see how closely they accompany some of his most stunning efforts of metaphysical imagination) this twin treatise alone would certify him as one of the most potent wielders of image who ever wrote philosophy. So struck has Bréhier been by the method of “ dynamic image ” we are about to see in action, he has devoted a special study to the process’. Armstrong, too, has been led to make a comparable study”. And both of them have had to deal with images taken precisely from this treatise, There are four important images in Ennead VI, 4—5 which, for our purpose, we may reduce to three distinct types. First and most characteristic of Plotinus’ method are the two dynamic images of the Light and of the Hand. ‘he second type is represented by the image of the Head, and here the strictly dynamic character is gone, paradox having taken its place. ‘The third type is represented by the image of “* Eros waiting at the door "’ which we shall consider now. Neither dynamic nor paradoxical, it occurs in Ennead VI, 3, 10. But first, a world of explanation on its function in the argument. “ Eros waiting at the door” ‘The relation that Plotinus means to exclude is one whereby the superior reality will compose with the beings of the inferior world, becoming a “ form " ap-prop-riated by this being rather than by that. Such a relation would prevent its remaining integrally present to each and common to all of them”, The difficulty in conceiving this relation is the same as always : we insist on imagining it in terms of sensible reality, in terms of beings whose mass makes them subject to mutual exclusion in place so that part of them must be possessed by this, another part possessed by another being. Plotinus offers his reader several examples to illustrate the relation he wishes him to grasp : diverse subjects can see the whole of the same object, hear the same sound in iis entirety"®, ‘The result of our study, he will 74. Porphyrios, pp. 36 fi and 57. 75. Art, cit., note x2 above. 76. Art, cit., note 12 above, 77. Plotinus’ clearest statement 0 this principle occurs in Ennead VI, 4, 3, 12 ff.22 Re-J. O'CONNELL repeat in the text we are about to cite, wisdom itself, are both common to all of us without being parcelled out part for me and part for you. Having siezed on this relation of appropriation of the part against community in the whole, Augustine presents a long mannductio in the second book of the De libero arbitrio™, where he systematizes Plotinus’ different suggestions into an ascending consideration which shows that the lower senses (taste, smell) necessarily possess only this or that part of the shared object, — Augustine and Evodius cannot eat the same piece of honey in its entirety — since the operation of these senses involves an appropriation of the object, a transformation whereby it becomes part of the individual nature of the sentient, The higher senses (hearing and sight) on the contrary, furnish a more adequate analogy of the (spiritual) community of possession (of Wisdom) which leaves the object entire and ‘unchanged, still common to both subjects of intellectual knowledge. ‘This manuductio, some twenty paragraphs of the text, has been treated by commentators either as an anomaly to be ignored* or as a mere digression®?, Vet the importance of the commune-proprium distinction in Augustine's subsequent writings, and the fact that he puts it to work in the culminating definition of sin here®*, shows that it had functional import to him. That import, we suggest, involves a profound and decisive adaptation of the source from which he drew these diverse elements : from paragraph 20 to paragraph 38 of the second Book of the De libero arbitrio, the Saint has strewn generous traces of the Eros image from Ennead VI, § which clearly betray that source. We assemble them here, underlining on either side the corresponding elements which, despite the transforma- tion which Augustine has worked, still answer one to another : Enn, VI, 5, 10 : De Libero Arbitrio IL Méva_ofv ev dvr oodpovody wal odk & 34. ... Cum illa (veritas) in se manens adly yous teeiva 82 rd EMa dvfpryra nec proficiat ... nec deficiat ... sed Ge abr) Gorep 05 dort 780y Uevpivra. Kal integra et incorrupta ... convetsos obrés cor 6 Bypaudv “Epus napiv twley lastificet lumine.... del kal epiduevos 709 eahod eal dyandiv del . 35. Ecce ... ipsa veritas : amplectere abrus bx Blvasro peraaxety. Inel nal 6 vradda jp : te lpasria ra Seeiuacetsdiedvaey ana wage keioos ofrus eye. TS Be af faurod_péver al of évés dpaoral woNtal Blow dpavres Show fgouow abvans Fray yaad 0 ip oho 78 papery... 78. Ennead VI, 4, 12, 1, ff. 79. Paragraphs 15-33. 80. So Dom Mark Pontifex, in ACW 22, The Problem of Free Choice, Westminster, Md., 3955. 8x. So F. Thonnard, Bibliothéque Augustinienne, VI, 2d ed., Paris 1952, p. 240, note 2. 92. De libero arbitrio II, 53. Once one admits that the second book stands as a kind of véractatio of the first, where the unique object of their research was the definition of sin (I, 34), then this definition of sin assumes particular importance, becoming, in fact, the ¢ point » of the second book. See P. Séjourné, » Les conversions de saint Augustin d'aprés le De libero arbitrio Ly in Revue des Sciences Religieuses, (89-90) 195%, P. 359, note 2 and p. 360 : he likens the second book to an « édition revue et corrigée » of the first.ENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE kal yop xal_8_dpoveiv mow Bdov + Bd wal furdy 78_gpovety, ob 78 yey Bde, ré Be Bi by yeloton yap, wal ranou Bcopevor 75 Gpavety Yara... "AM elaep Gras _perdyonev 700 Poorer, 8 Bet elvau 7d aird may Caurd owdy, real obras excifer, 0d polpas airod AaBévres, oBBt_Shov dyes, Shor be_Kal_o¥, dnoonacdey Zedeepor Ceardpou alrot Kal rats yuyais ds éfanrdueBa 708 Ayabod expiv evBwetoBas, 0 yap aMov piv Fd, Dow 82 at od eiderry, GIG 700 abrOb “By 1 aiv@ dpa drres wal Spapev rayaldy kal dganrépeta advo SSS 71 88 Kal eumdBiov 706 els _& ; OD yap 18 Frepov dnutiet Oirepov rénov ob maphyov. Sonep ody épivres wiv udOqwa, wal Bedhpn- a nat Ghos movies adoas ent pox areoxwporpevas. 23 25, «.. Quid de ipsa sapientia . +» An Vero unam praesto esse com- muniter omnibus, cujus quanio magis quisque fit particeps, tanto est sapien- tior ? 37. Nemo enim locis separari ab ea quisquam potest ..., Habemus igitur qua fruamur omnes aequaliter aique communiter, nullae sunt angus- fiae, nullus in ea defectus. Omnes amatores suos nullo modo sibi invidos vecipit, et omnibus communis est, et singulis casia est, Nemo alicui, dicit, « Recede, ut etiam ego accedam, remove manus, ut etiam ego amplec- tar». Omnes inherent, id ipsum ones fangunt, ... Cibus eius nulla ex parte discerpitur, nihil de ipsa bibis quod ogo non possim ... quod tu de illa capis, et miki integrum manet.... Non enim aliqnid eins aliquando fit cuiusquam unius proprium, sed simul omnibus tola est communis. 36, In veritate cognoscituy et tenetur Summum bonuwm, eaque veritas sapientia est, cernamus in ea tenca- musque summum bonum.,.. (Cjr. IL, 26-7) 38. Nam et si posset esse cuiusquam suavis cantus sempiternus et studiosi eius certatim ad eum audiendum venivent, coartarent sese atque pugna- rent de locis, quanto plures essent, ut cantanti esset quisque propin- quior.... At illa veritatis et sapien- tiae pulchritudo ... nec multitudine audientiumconstipata secludit venien- tes ... nec migrat locis ... De toto mundo ad se conversis gui dili- gunt cam, omnibus proxima est... nullo loco est musquam deest... @ nullo in deterius commutatur 20, ... Ratio et veritas numeri omni- bus ratiocinantibus praesto est.... Cum ... ipsa aequaliley omnibus se pracbeat valentibus eam capere . nec ... quasi alimentum vertatuy atque mutetur ... ea vera et integra permanente...24 R-J. O'CONNELL 33. Ome antem quod communites omnibus ratiocinantibus ... praesto est, ad ullius eorum proprie naturam Pertinere quis dixerit ? ‘The first thing which strikes on examination of this parallel is the initial identity of basic image : it is question in both cases of Beauty and her many lovers. But while Plotinus soon drops this image, Augustine continues with it and simply assumes Plotinus’ other illustrations under it, fusing them with it. Here as throughout the manuductio which has led to it, he combines Plotinus’ other examples of udOqua, Oedipnua and the objects of émtornur} more generally, with the notion of dpovely; the resulting whole becomes that hypostatized veritatis et sapientiae pulchritudo which, from the context, is identical with the Eternal Christ, Both authors take care to eliminate all limitations of place, hence to avoid all species of “‘ crowding ” proper to the sensible sphere, so that despite their multitude the lovers need not elbow each other out of possession. Augustine’s singulis casta shows Plotinus’ od Seyduevos in moralistic dress ; yet despite the “ distanceless distance ” implied in both expressions, all the lovers possess the beloved by intimate contact, that contact, more- over, going out to the same “ whole ” and not to different wholes or one or other partial fragment. ‘The fundamental reason for this is that Wisdom “ remains in itself ” and does not “ go forth ” to become the " property ”” of this or that participant, remaining, on the contrary, “ common ” to all her lovers. The possession of the good Plotinus presents as an additional example, and it is interesting to find the allusions to both sight and touch so faithfully reproduced (Spdyev réyabev Kal edanrdpeba ; cognoscitur et tenetur ; cernamus...teneamusque) (cfr. II, 26-7 where this combination occurs four times), but this too, Augustine (with Trinitarian intentions, doubtless) has assumed into the basic image with which Plotinus had begun, reminding his reader that in that Truth (Christ) we hold and behold the highest good, ie. the Father. Despite all this fusion of elements, despite the occasional vivacity which Augustine brings to their develop- ment, the identity of fundamental image and of the metaphysical insight it transmits is manifest®, 83. (Qui) joris admonct, intus docet (II, 38). See II, 37, where this manifestly refers to Christ {as throughout the De magistro). 84. Tt would seem that Augustine read Ennead VI, 4—5 before composing the Soliloguiay as the following citation from that work suggests ; we underline te elements found also in the Eros-image of the De libero arbitrio : Ratio : Nunc illud quaerimus, qualis sis amator sapientiae quam castissimto conspecte aique amplexu, nullo interposito velamento quasi nudam videre ac tonere desideras, qualem se illis non sinit, nisi paucissimis et electissimis amatoribus suis. An vero s alicujus pulchrae feminae amore flagrares, jure se tibi non daret, si aliud abs te quidquam. raster se amari comperisset ; sapientiae se tibi castissima pulchritudo, nist solam arseris, demonstrabit ? Augustinus : (after protesting the singleness of his love) : .., Quem modum autem. Potest habere illius pulehritudinis amor, in qua non soluin jon invideo cacteris, sedENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 25 Light : a dynamic image and a metaphysical correction ‘The second image we must consider is the dynamic Light-image which Plotinus presents in Ennead VI, 4, 78, ‘To bring out the steps in the correction-process, we divide it into three paragraphs : Or imagine a small Iuminous mass serving as centre to a transparent sphere, so that the light from within shows upon the etitire outer surface, otherwise unlit : we surely agree that the inner core of Light, intact and immobile, reaches over the entire outer extension; the single light of that small centre illuminates the whole field, The diffused light is not due to any bodily magnitude of that central point, which illuminates not as body but as body lit, that is, by another hind of power than corporeal quality, Let us then abstract the corporeal mass, retaining the light as power : we can no longer speak of the light in any particwlat spot ; it is equally diffused throughout the entire sphere, We can no longer even name the spot it occupied ... we can but seek and wonder as. the search shows us the light simultaneously present at each and every point in the sphere, ‘The movement of thought, therefore, involves three steps : frst, the presentation of an initial image of the corporeal order, the luminous core. ‘Then comes a correction consisting in the reminder (the underlining is meant to bring it out) that light, in Plotinus’ view, is an incorporeal phenomenon. ‘Thirdly, the radical step, Plotinus asks us to “ abstract the corporeal mass ”, and the initial image is shattered and at the same time lifted out of the corporeal and into the intelligible realm, It is in this moment of “ shatter ” that Plotinus expects insight to occur. But what was Augustine to do with this dynamic correction if he did not hold Plotinus’ theory on the incorporeality of light? Paradoxically enough, Plotinus himself offered a way out, and in this very treatise. Later on he is compelled to return to his favorite image of ‘ emanation ” and submit it to a profound correction ; and it is a compliment to Augustine’s. alertness that he seems to have grasped the relation of that correction with the one we have just seen. ‘The changes we make in Mackenna’s translation here are in the interests of a more literal fidelity to the text : It is not reasonable, it is even impossible in our opinion, to conceive of the Ideas and Matter as lying apart (yupls) with Matter illumined from them as from somewhere above (népputer dvaféy nofer), a mean- etiam plurimos quaero qui mecum appelant, mecum inhient, mecum feneant, mecumaue berfruantur ; tanto mihi amicioves futuri, quanto exit nobis amata commaunior, (Sol. I, 22). It is doubtful that Augustine, so recently converted from seusual excess, would hazard an nage s0 close to the sphere of luis former difficulties, without stimulation from a source: Which he esteemed. Added to the evidence already seen (notes 22, 24, above) the importance of Ennead V1, 4—5 for the understanding of the Cassiciacum Dialogues, and of Augustine's conversion story, becomes even more manifest, 85. Lines 23-40, 86. See Bréitier, Enndades, VI, p. 186, note r; also Armstrong, art, cil, pp. 64 f,26 R-J. O'CONNELL ingless conception, for what could the words “ far” and " separate "’ mean here (vi yap &» ety 13 « néppw 9... xat 78 xupls » 3)? The theory of participation would not be the most obscure and difficult of all if it could be made understandable through such images (napabelyuaow). ‘When we ourselves speak of illumination, it is not to suggest the mode in which sensible light pours down on sensible objects (ds ént ‘ay alByrav... els aloByrdv) ; but since, on the one hand, the Ideas hold the rank (réé) of Archetypes with respect to material things, their images (ciSwha), and since, on the other hand, there is an analogous “ apartness (rowtrov oto xupls) between illumination (sic : r§s &Mdy- eas)? and illuminated, this is why we talk as we do*, But now we must speak more precisely, We do not mean that the Idea is locally separate from Matter (cs xupls évros rémw) showing itself in Matter like @ reflection in water; Matter is at all points in contact (¢arzopény) with the Idea, It is because the Idea, say, of Fire, is not in the Matter (2 7 Sty) that the Fire itself, not having become the form of Matter (odx eyyerduevor alrd 79 hy wopHiy) cam produce (wapéfera:) the form of Fire in the entire enfired mass ;... that single Fire ... produces an image (exéva) of itself ... yet it is not spatially separate (rérw xupis dv od mrapéfe)**, Now it would seem that what Augustine has done, with or without benefit of other Plotinian reminiscences", is combine both treatments of the light-image to the point where they coalesce, the incorporeality of light becomes an unnecessary postulate, and yet the dynamic movement of correction is retained toa remarkable. degree. Here is the first paragraph of his reflections on the Hbri platonmicorum : 87, One can understand why the translators uniformly render this by # source of ilhimi- nation », but Plotinus’ exact phrasing may have been intentional ; see Armstrong's explanation -of his effort to purify the difficulties of his emanation image, art. cit, supra. 88, Enn. VI, 5, 8. This passage is elliptical in the extreme, and cach translator docs what he can with it. ‘The most difficult portion occurs at VI, 5, 8, lines ro ff. which Bréhier renders « Comme les choses matériclles sont des images, dont les idées sont les modéles, et comme, Gans le rayonnement, l'étre éclairé est séparé de celui qui éclaire, (see note 87), nous employons vette métaphore ». Bréhier drops out entirely the notion of rags which Mackenna, for his part, stresses perhaps overmuch : « We use the phrase in the sense only that, material being image while the Ideas are archetypes, the two orders are distinguished somewhat in the manner of illuminant and illuminated +. The translation we present means to conserve, without undue emphasis, that distinction of orders which seems capital to the understanding of Plotinus’ ‘thought here, For evidence of Augustine's sensitivity to this notion, see Theiler, Porphyrios, Bp. 17 fi. 8. Note the distinction of cause and effect which correlates with the distinction of orders of being. 90 Such as Ennead I, 6 and V, x, 0n which Henry and Courcelle place almost exclusive stress here, We do not mean to exclude such reminiscences, only to show that they do not account adequately for the movement of the thought, ax integra! datum of the problem,ENNEAD VI, 45 IN AUGUSTINE a7 Et inde admonitus (by these books)" redire ad memetipsuin intravi in intima mea duce te et potui, quoniam factus es adiutor meus, Intravi et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra enndem oculum animae meae, supra mentem meam lucem incomutabilem, non hane vulgarem et conspicuam ommi carni, nec quasi ex eodem genere grandior erat, tamquam si ista multo multoque clarins claresceret totumque occuparet magnitudine, Non hoc illa erat, sed aliud, aliud valde ab istis omnibus. Nec ita erat supra mentem meam, sicnt oleum super aquam nec sicut caelum super terram, sed superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea. (Conf. VIL, 16.) Ii we compare them to similar expressions in connection with the omni- presence difficulty in the Confessions, the terms intima, oculus animae axe ‘Augustine's way of reminding us that his insight on this occasion was at last a truly intelligible one®", ‘The lux inconmutabilis could, at first glance, be attached to any number of Plotinian light-images ; again, it is not impossible that other reminiscences are at work here.’ But Augustine’s care to warn us that he is not speaking of ordinary light (vulgaris), sensible ight (conspicuam omni carni) rings a special note. It is a light, he continues, of a different order entirely (non ex eodem genere), — the distinction, as Plotinus had insisted, is one of rd&is. Supra it is, and Augustine repeats the term several times, but not supra as one sensible object is “ higher " than another : nec i/a...sicud olewm super aguam, nec sicut caelum super terram. ‘This would imply the spatial relation Plotinus insists must be eliminated, bring in images of ‘' far and separate ” which have nothing to do with the case, suppose that corporeal realities of the ot. Henry, Plotin, p., 112 (followed by Courcelle, Recherches, pp. 137-167) attaches this term admonitus to Plotinus’ « admonition » contained in Ennead I, 6, 9, 7: “Avaye éxi oavrév. It may well have been that originally this phrase struck Augustine forcibly, but it then started f subsequent process whereby he seems to have connected it with some analogous theme in Christian literature or liturgy (the prasceptis salwaribus admoniti of the Mass, perhaps ?) and then developed an extremely technical sense which he attaches to the term j at the end Of this process, the rapprochement to Ennead T, 6 appears almost pure verbalism, O'Meara Presents some suggestions both on the term’s meaning and its possible Scriptural correspou- ences in A gainst the Academics, p. 176, uote 14. For the sense of the term, compare De ord. I, 14, where Augustine is + admonished » by the sound of running waters ; Fbid. 25 (this time by a cock-fight) ; De b. vita, 35 and Sol. I, 2-3 both connect it with the work of the Holy Spirit ; aud the Confessions use the term repeatedly to express God’s inspirational action in conjunction with the semi-occasionalistic operation of any secondary cause whatever, usually fone who is ignorant (nesciens : we shall meet the term again) of the effect of his action ; sce Con}. 11, 7; TI, 8; IV, 5, 8, etc. Courcelle, Joc, cit., seems on much more solid ground in secing the work of Enncad 1, 6 in Con}. VIT, 23 : there, the context is onc of pulchva and decus, the movement of thought is vunmistalsably ¢ ascensional », and the criterion of judgement is brought Into play exactly as in Ennead 1, 6, 3, 1 ff, Henry on the other hand, must make the soul's effort at self- purification, culminating in a vision of itself (Ennead T, 6, 9}, equivalent to the mind’s dynamic effort to attain to the vision of that Light which is divine (Conf. VI, 16) : this transposition would have demauded some mental gymnastics indeed, aud seems psychologically most improbable. Add to this that it eliminates all omnipresential reference from the transcendence of spatial considerations : this reference is a constant in the Confessions, something which Henry's prior option for Ennead I, 6 as.a + source » does not permit him to # see », 92. See notes $5 and 58, above,28 RJ. O'CONNELL same order were in question. But this light is aliud, aliud valde : its superiority is exactly as Plotinus had described it, one of true being to its image, of producer to produced, superior quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior guia factus ab ea. So much for the second of Plotinus’ corrections : Augustine has encased the first dynamic correction inside the process we have just examined, And he has done it, we would suggest, not through some slavish comparison of one text with the other, but precisely because he has so firmly grasped the movement of the thought and the dynamism of the image-correction involved. Note for a moment the almost feverish pace of that movement : supra...supra...non...nec...amquam si! ‘The phrase hurtles forward with the same dynamism sensed in Plotinus’ correction. A light, assuredly : but inconmutabilis, supra mentem ; not this ux vulgaris, — and at this point Augustine sketches his own dynamic correction in two bold strokes : first in the order of quantity, nec quasi...grandior...totumgue oceuparet magnitudine ; then, interior to this first, a correction in the order of intensity : tanquam si ista mulio multogue clarius claresceret. And both corrections culminate in that aliud, aliud valde which represents both the lunge into the intelligible and the link with Plotinus’ second correction, Note too, how the grandior... totumgue occuparet magnitudine reproduces the same movement of expansion whereby Plotinus’ light spreads outward and finishes by “ occupying the entire mass of the sphere ” (éy navrl 7 mepiexovr. gatvew™). Brief, pointed, metaphysically condensed to a degree that demonstrates a philosophical talent of a high order, Augustine’s text leads us straight to the Veritas which alone truly exists, though not per finita neque per infinita locorum spatia diffusa : and the familiar terms of the omnipresence problem are once again with us%, The “ Hand” — from dynamic image to paradox The extremely sophisticated process of “ dynamic correction ” we have just examined® was developed by one of human history's greatest thinkers, on the basis of an immense philosophic culture and after years of teaching activity. It shows Plotinus, beyond any doubt, a true “professional ”. What is astonishing is that Augustine, much less seasoned, far less learned, immensely talented, doubtless, but with the brilliance that from time to time betrays the amateur, Augustine seems nonetheless to have grasped the secret of a process which may well have eluded the faithful Porphyry. But Augustine is not giving lessons in philosophic method ; nor is his 93- See the final portion of the text from Ennead VI, 4, 7, cited above, p. 25. 94. On the relation of verum esse and the Plotinian évras 8, see note 32, above. 93. See notes 57 and 91 above. This omnipresential reference is, once again, entirely absent from Ennead 1, 6, 96. We refer the reader once more to the studies Bréhier and Armstrong have devoted to it, cited in note r2, above.ENNEAD VI, 4.5 IN AUGUSTINE 29 native gift the dynamic image. It is in handling paradox that he is a master of another sort : the very opening paragraphs of the Confessions, to cite but that instance, show an intensity of treatment, — image paired off against counter-image, terms colliding with their contraries, the stab of paradox everywhere, — which provides an admirable lens for meta- physical vision. “This remark on the style of Augustine’s imagination may help us to understand the transformation he has worked on the second of Plotinus’ dynamic images, that of the “ Hand”, It occurs in the same paragraph of Plotinus’ treatise as the dynamic light-image, and is absent, just as its partner was, from the Sententiae. Its purpose is to show that a being can control another with its energy without splitting up into parts corresponding to the parts of the extended being controlled : A hand may very well hold’ an entire mass, a long plank, ot anything of the sort; its power is distributed throughout and yet, it is not distributed unit for unit over the objects being held : the power is felt to reach over the whole area, though the hand is only a hand-long, not taking on the extension of the mass it holds, Tengthen the object, and provided the total is within its strength the power extends to this new body-mass without the need of being divided into as many parts as the new mass possesses, Now let us eliminate the corpoteal mass of the hand, retaining the power it exerted : is not that power, the indivisible, present through- out that assemblage of bodies, and present in the same way to each part ? The “ Head” — and a tug at the hair Again, the three-stage process is evident : an initial image, an intermediate correction, then a correction so radical that the image shatters. Before passing on to see what happens to it in the Confessions we present the last image that concerns us : that of the Head, Almost useless to mention that it, too, is absent from Porphyry ; but it is important to remark the doctrine which it is meant to illustrate : as in the finale of Ennead VI, 5, cited above, Plotinus is here insisting that we are all one being, identical with the universal being, the All, The thesis in 97 Plotinus uses the term xparoiy, Exactly translated, this becomes Mackenna’s « control » ; but Ficinus uses denere, Bréhier « tenir tevé », and we have taken the liberty of inserting this more obvious term here. One may suppose that such a neutral term (tenere) was probably present in the translation Augustine used : see the omnitenens manu veritate, Conf, VII, 22. P. Courcelle kindly offers the information that the omnitenens with respect to God is repeated in Conf. XI, x5 —and, we would add, in explicit connection with repeated evocations of the ehand » image (XI, 13-15), and in the same time-eternity connection as here, Conf, VIX, 21. Courcelle observes also that in Tract. in Joannem CVT, 5, Augustine assures his hearers of the equivalence between the Latin omnilenens and the Greek mavréxparap, ‘thus returning to Plotinus’ term xparodv. This, however, may well be no more than a curious coincidence. 98. See pp. 18-19, above.30 R-J. O'CONNELL question is what Armstrong speaks of — precisely in reference to these same two texts — as “ outspoken pantheism ”, The consequences of that fact we shall bring to light shortly ; now to the text : We reduce to Real Being, all that we have and are; to that we return, as from that we came, We have knowledge (voojue) of what is there, not images ( in Scripture is never used formally and properly to symbolize God’s omnipresence!, As such it would serve no purpose in the context of omnipresence which Augustine has been careful explicitly to evoke, unless the Saint himself had rethought the Scriptural image in terms of Plotinus’ dynamic correction and thereby impregnated it with this new meaning, the one that is directly relevant and indispensable in this context}, ‘The other elements in the presentation only reinforce this view. Augustine has gone to some lengths to bring both images into starling collision at the heart of his account, but collide they do. Only when 103. See De moribus ecclesine II, 21 ff. ; Conf. IV, 27 V, 5 ; Testard, Cicéron, J, p. 60, note 1. xo4. In Scriptural terms, God's « arm is long » so to speak, the hand of His power « extends » to the ends of the earth : but the image of the hand never bespeaks omnipresence in the formal way required here by the context which Augustine himself has prepared. See, for example, Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de la Bible, (Brepols) Patis, 1960, s.v, + Main » x03. In general it must be said that when approaching Augustine's imagery, an either-or mentality is to be avoided : what has struck him at a number of points is the seeming coincidence of Biblical and Plotinian imagery and expression, one which permits him (rather too easily at times) to suppose a fundamental accord of meaning. The + flight » image of Conf. IV, 7, 12, etc. reflects both St. Luke's Prodigal and Plotinus’ Ennead V, I, 1, and the question then arises, which has been attracted into the meaning-world of the other ? ‘The same principle holds for strictly Plotinian imagery : Augustine combines themes and images from various treatises in a way that makes them interpenetrate. So, for instance, the universality of Providence, (Ennead IIT, 2—3), « rethought » in terms of omnipresence, brings forth the startling description of the sinner literally hurtling against God’s omnipresent Lex which is none other than’s God’s own asperitas ; see Conj. V, 2ENNEAD VI; 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 33 his insania had abated, when his eyes had been closed to the “ vanity ” of the corporeal world of sense and imagination‘ is he able to form a proper idea of the Veritas which is his lapidary expression for the Plotinian Svras dv; once this idea is formed, then he sees that God is not properly in things, but as Plotinus had insisted, that the very reverse is true : im te cuncta finita, sed aliter, not as in a place — and at this point the grammatical anomaly which has driven translators to every variety of desperate solution, is fully intended : not manu veritatis as one might expect, but manu veritate, the sheer juxtaposition of two ablatives, the one correcting the other almost to a point of cancellation, almost to the strain and rupture Plotinus produces when he calmly suggests that we “ now eliminate the corporeal mass of the hand ” and thereby shatters his image before our gaze. — The “ Head” — and the parvatus conversus But fovisti caput nescientis : have we really Plotinus’ “ head ” here ? Does not that fovisti refer uniquely to the curative action of the calor Dei? which Augustine sees at work to heal his wound and reduce the swelling of his tumid face? It must be said that Augustine does have this in mind ; but like any other Latin-speaker he might have another, even several other fovere images in mind as well. “ Vous avez attiré ma téte contre vous ” — Labriolle’s translation appears arbitrary until we notice how artfully Augustine has evoked another image that immediately leaps to mind in connection with this pregnant term : that of sinw, gremio fovere, the tender action of a mother, drawing her ailing, fretful child on her breast to comfort him, Can it be that in the thesaurus of Augustine’s imagination, the ambivalent term “ foveye” can sometimes mean " turn about ” ? ‘The fact is that Augustine has carefully prepared for this central section as early as Book I, where the maternal image is rarely absent, and the theological fruit of his meditations is compressed into St. Matthew's verse on the parvulus, (I, 30) : talium est regnum caelorum. Conversion consists quite literally, for Augustine, in becoming an infant once again : if there is any doubt on the fact he eliminates it by ringing the changes on his hidden key-term from Book IV, 1 to Book V, 2, and nails the matter firmly down with his meditation in Book IX on God’s work in his own conversion, Thus, in Book IV, he begins by describing himself as a 106, For the correlation of vanitas, phantasma, sensus carnis, corpus ete, see note $3, above, 107, See note 32, above, 108, Thus Pusey translates suggesting this nuance slightly : » soothed my head s. For the calor notion, note the (otherwise inexplicable) repetition of Ps. 8,7 : Et nemo se abscondet a calore tuo, Con. V, x; IX, 8, (both manifestly conversion contexts). Cpr. VII, 11-12, where the medicinal image of « bathing » the head and eyes (another sense of fovere) shows this process of conversion approaching its term, 109. Conf. IX, r-rr, but especially 7-11} more discreetly, I, 1-8.34 R-J. O'CONNELL parvulus on God’s own breast, sugens lac inum™, continues his meditation with the reminder that the hand of the proconsul was placed on his head, but not to cure him — for God alone could cure that illness, He was, he says, looking for beauties foras when God was all that time non longe, ever present within him, intimus cordi¥®, He returns to another familiar image commanded by his key term (pullos pennis fovere) by evoking the nidus fidei where the alimentum is none other than the Pauline lac spoken of at the beginning of the book, where the wings that protect are none other than God’s!8. God’s is the manus medicinalis forever and everywhere at work to heal Augustine’s swollen head", and from that healing warmth, (calor : the most general sense of fovere) no man can hide, But His is also the hand that carries us : ¢u portabis4® — whither? As if to answer, Augustine rings the changes on the terms veriere and lorquere once again”, reminding us that the terminus of that divine action is always a reditus ad cor which makes each of us once again the os conversum ad te, the infant quite literally returned to the breast of “ maternal omnipresence” : +. Ut exsurgat in te a lassitudine anima nostra ... transiens ad te s+ et ibi refectio et vera fortitudo, Quo ... fugerunt (iniqui) cum fugerent a facie tua ? ... Fugerunt ut ++ excacati in te offendunt — quia non deseris aliquid eorum quae fecisti — .., subtrahentes se lenitati tuae et offendentes in rectitudinem tuam et cadentes in asperitatem tuam, Videlicet nesciunt quod ubique sis, quem ‘nullus civcumsoribit locus, et solus es pracsens etiam his qui longe fiunt a ie, Convertantur ... et quaerant te ... et ecce ibi es in corde corum, in corde confitentium tibi et proicientium se in te et plorantium in sinu tuo ... et facilis terges lacrimas eornm ... tu domine, qui fecisti, reficis et consolaris eos (V, 1-2.). Here, then, we have the full orchestration of the /overe theme, and it is Augustine's imagination which has produced it, not our own. ‘To assure 110. Con. IV, x 5 cpr. I, 30 where this image is subtly prepared ; Augustine sees in infancy the symbol, not of innocence, but of humility, so that every word of Jt. 38, 3 seems taken with & terrible literality : Misi conversi jueritis (thus the 0s conversum ad te, Conf. V, 1-2) et eficiamini sicut parouli, non intrabitis ... The « point » of Book I seems then : God is right in treating us with the same corrective stermness as we use with our children, 111. Conf. IV, 4-55 Compare also 1, 3 where God is potens imponere lenem manum ; TI, 6 where nulla manus could be found in his entourage to uproot the briers which grew up over his ¢ unclean head ». Note, ibid., the image of perversilas and the similar scheme of imagery in V, 11-13. God's hand is imposed (a liturgical gesture seems influential here) on Augustine's proud head, and more often than not, to « turn » it, 112, Conf. IV, 25 113. Conf. TV, 32 ; cpr. IV, x; also VI, 8 (context : the authority of the Church) sinus, sremium Ecclesiae ; I, x0, 22, 30, the image of the parvulus in the arms of his nurse ; TZ, 19, the invocation of God as sinus cogilationis, ete. All these elements can already be seen forming in De moribus ecclesiae, 1, x7. 114. Cpr. Conj. V, x and the images evoked in note 121, above, 115. Bee note 108, above. 16. Conf. IV, 3t. _ 117. Ibida, Vivit apud te bonun nostrum et quia inde aversi sumus, perversi sumus, Reverlamur iain domine, ut non evertamur....ENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 35 us there is no mistake he repeats the performance again in Book IX"8, — all the themes and paradoxes of omnipresence are there, the contrast of inner and outer, vanity and truth, the coupling of blindness and nescientia - and blending with them, God’s omnipresent action, warming and healing and shadowing with his wings and caressing as a mother does to draw her infant to her in the turning movement of conversion. Fouisti caput : astonishing, that the word itself, so frequent in conversion contexts at Cassiciacum, seems to have been saved for this, the heart of the Conjessions®, And hardly less remarkable is the careful setting it has received. Averte oculos meos ne videant vanitatem, read the verse of Psalm 118 he is citing; Augustine has added the caput, modified it with a nescientis that. recalls Plotinus’ dyvoodev from the context of the head- image" ; polarized the ambiguity of that fovere by dropping out the averte to which his readers were accustomed and which they would dimly, half- consciously supply ; doubled that polarization by the unbroken movement of the entire section toward the vision which climaxes it, the vision of that iniquitas which is the primordial counterpart of conversion, that perversity of a will which twists itself (detortae) away from God, the Summa, spewing forth its zntima and swelling “ outward ”, foras, (VII, 22). To the violence of that deforsio, Augustine wishes us to note, God replies by a gesture of maternal lenitas : tu facilis terges lacrimas...et consolaris. And like a child, tired after the long day’s play at games that only leave him dretful and unfulfilled, he climbs back up at last onto his mother’s lap, tosses himself on her breast, wailing his childish complaints against the hard world ; gently the maternal hand dries his tears, strokes his feverish head, closes 118, Loe. city note 107, above. 119. Conf. X, 50 recounts how deeply affected he was by the hymnody of Ambrose, basilica ; thus Monica's evocation of Fove precantes Trinitas (evigilans in fide, Augustine notes {in loc., De b, vita 35; cpr. Conf. VIL, 22 : fovisti ... evigilani in te) comes as a fitting climax to a dialogue whose main theme is the cibus veritatis (De b. vita x7 ; cpr Conf. Vy 2 and VII, 16-17, 33-24). The counection of cibus and nufric themes is due in part to another coincidence of Plotinian and Biblical imagery : St. Paul, whose writings Augustine read infentissime after his Neo-Platonic illumination, says (I Tess. 2,7) Facti sumus parouli in medio vestrum tamguam si nulrix foueat filios suas. ‘Chis fovere action recalls the nutrix and lac (alimentum parvulorum) of the faith which the Church gives her children ; its counterpart is found in the Plotinian description of the intelligible paradise (Ennead V, 8, 4, 1-2) where truth is ¢mother and nurse, existence and sustenance » to them there : yeréreipa kal 'rpogds kat ovala xal spops{. This, however, is the cibus grandium, Truth itself (Conf. VII, x6-17) and the weakness of tlhe fallen state requires first the cibus miscens carni of the Word made Flesh, (Conf. VIL, 23-4). This same Veritas, Sapientia is the nuérix of Augustine's soul at Cassiciacum, the philosophia (Plotinus’ Athena was goddess of Wisdom) identical with the Christian religion quae pueris nobis insita .., me ad se nescientem rapiebat. (C. Acad. TI, 4) an image unmistakably recalling that of the « head » in Plotinus. In Philosophia’s sinus, gromium, Augustine now finds himself (C. Acad, TH, 7 ; 1, 3) since her ubera exclude no age-group (C. Acad. I, 4) ; she it is who now (me) wutrit et fovet (Ibid. I, 3), thus discharging the function which Romanianus, as minister of Providence (Ibid., IT, 4) exercised when Augustine was as yet unfledged : gui cunabula, et quasi nidum studiorum meoruns foveras, (Ibid. 11, 3). A perfectly analogous scheme of imagery is used for Licentius' + conversion to philosophy » De Ord. T, 22-24. 320. See Labriolle, Skutella in loc. 321, See text cited above, p. 30. Note the nescientens in C, Acad. IT, 4 (cited in note 119, above) and the constant recurrence of the nescientia theme (man's typical reaction to God’s omnipresence implied in the action of admonitic) in the texts listed in note 91, above,36 R.-J. O'CONNELL his eyes ; and like a child he is soothed, cessaui de me paululum, stops his fretting and drowses off, consopita est insania mea, and awakens to the spiritual vision that the rectifudo he hurtled against that day, the asperitas on which he fell, was God’s though he knew it not : nesciunt, quod ubique sis ; and that the hand that healed, carried, soothed and comforted, this too was God’s ommitenens, the only truly existent, omnipresent Veritas, The “ Head ”, second stage : fovere becomes retorquere Lenitas, facilis : this is the God of Isaias, who cannot forget a straying child. But, cruel to be kind, that God must sometimes be asperitas, rectitudo. To the violence of that primal detorsio He must sometimes reply with commensurate violence; and no reader of the Confessions will have forgotten the scene when : Narrabat haec Pontitianus. Tu autem, domine, inter verba ejus retorquebas me ad meipsum, auferens me a dorso meo ubi me posueram, dum nollem me adtendere, et constituebes me ante faciem meam, ut viderem quam turpis essem, quam disfortus et sordidus, maculosus et ulcerosus, Et videbam et horrebam, et quo a me jugerem non erat, Et si conabar a me avevlere aspectum, narrabat ille quod narrabat, et tu me rursus opponebas mihi, et inpingebas me in aculos meos, ut invenirem iniguitatem meam et odissem, (VIII, 16.) Here the underlining serves to make it unmistakably clear that the same basic image of retorquere is at work throughout, and linked with the primal de-torsio which is iniquitas. But the content reveals that Augustine has succeeded in inverting the valency of the Plotinian image entirely, What he has in fact done is this : he has given us the image of the Head in two distinct stages, the caput nescientis with the discrete allusion to the foras- intus couple issues into a vision of God as omnitenens manus, Veritas. The explicit mention of retorquere has been saved for here, where the divine action, far from recalling a mother's tenderness, is quite obviously patterned on the almost heartless gesture of a master engaged in house- breaking a young puppy. Why has Augustine split the image in two ? Pantheism, pride, presumption __ ‘The reason we have already seen : both the Plotinian images of conversion in Ennead VI, 4—3, — the Head, and the image of return to the All in the finale of VI, 5, — were expressly meant to illustrate the “ outspoken 122, P, Courcelle remarks that distortus et maculosus is rather an echo of Seneca. That may or may not be : it is not, we repeat, a question of either-or ; nor is it likely that the original hhas the overtones which the echo receives in the Plotinian setting here. See Conf. V, 11-13 where this image is discreetly prepared.ENNEAD VI, 45 IN AUGUSTINE 37 pantheism ” of their context. Plotinus, in effect, would assure Augustine (just as the Manichees had, and the Stoics) that his soul was of the divine substance. ‘Twice before had the idolatry of pantheism been offered him on similar fercula Aegyptiorum, but this time, he assures his reader, non manducani™®, Tf, Plotinus had declared, if one were to think finally without images (clausisti oculos...ne viderent vanitatem), if a man, either by his own power, or by a lucky pull from Athena, were to be twisted about, then he would see “ himself, God, the All”. Fovisti, rvetorquebas — tu autem domine I Augustine means to insist on this first point : only God’s hand can heal, can turn the head, convert the man who has turned his back to the light, promote the return from foras to the inferior intimo, to the cor ubi habitat veritas : but once turned, Augustine sees the manus omnitenens, that Veritas who is Filius, as well as dextera Dei, the omnipresent law and power of God from which no man can flee, — he is careful not to intimate that he sees himself ! This darkness, this non-being that wraps us round, Plotinus had assured him — and the Manichee message was essentially the same — is the “ alien ”’, a diminishing addition which is, in the last analysis, unconn- ected with our real identity. Here Augustine scents the absolutely fundamental difference between praesumptio and confessio : when God turns his head in that insistent movement of moral conversion we must admit we have been warned : totum ego eram, the saint has previously exclaimed (V, 18). This distortus thing is none other than himself. He can, it is true, no more escape from himself, his own cor obtenebratum, than he can from the aelernum internum Who is God : his “ interior ” is now one, now the other, with an ambiguity that can sometimes bewilder. But they remain eternally distinct, they are emphatically not one and the same thing! | Summary : the point of “ over-proving ” But pantheism was not the only barb contained in this treatise. If we have inflicted so lengthy an article on the Augustinian public, it is because comparison with the omnipresence doctrine of Ennead VI, 4—5 may have far-reaching consequences on the interpretation of other aspects ‘of St. Augustine’s thought as well. To justify the exegetical applications we intend to make of this treatise, it was not, assuredly, indispensable to furnish proof of direct dependence on Plotinus : we could have contented outselyes with considering Ennead VI, 4-5 as one of several possible representatives of the expression which 123. Conf. VII, 15 ; see note 100, above. 324. And yet, Augustine has not sufficiently + purified » the Plotinian position, so that the Jogic of this relationship still imbeds an ambiguity : see the part-whole relation in Conf. IV, 34-17. It is a question whether all pantheistic implications can be eliminated if this scheme is, preserved. But there is no doubt of Augustine’s intentions : he wants no part of pantheism,38 Re-J. O'CONNELL that doctrine received in the Plotinian school, assumed that analogous expression could have been found in Porphyry as well, and thereby abstracted from the problem of whether Augustine drew his insights and language from the one rather than from the other. ‘The fact that so per-h suasive a case can be made out for Plotinus rather than Porphyry does, however, have some importance. Aside from commending the solidity of the conclusion that Augustine’s omnipresence doctrine is at least Plotinian in a broad sense, the probability that it is Plotinian in the stricter sense, ie, drawn from Plotinus himself (read, doubtless, in a reasonably faithful translation) makes that doctrine immediately susceptible of much | more precise analysis against the backdrop of Plotinus’ text and its powerful images. ‘The interpretation of the “Head” image in Augustine was presented as an instance of the exactitude with which one may follow the workings of the saint's imaged thought, once the supposition of direct dependence is granted. To sum up that process of proof, then, we have attempted to show how’ important both the omnipresence doctrine and this particular treatise were in the Plotinian school : the probability is, therefore, that it existed in Latin translation. We then went on to show that Augustine's difficulty | in the Confessions was one which prevented him from attaining to a view of God, not only as spiritual but ultimately as omnipresent, and related to the world in terms of the participation theory. Both in the description and diagnosis of his difficulty and in the response he says he found in the libri platonicorum, we attempted to uncover not merely a set of fragmentary doctrinal parallels but a tightly structured pattern of connected elements, reproducing the same pattern as one finds in this precise treatise of Plotinus as in no other. A comparison of the great images only confirmed this dependence on Plotinus, excluding Porphyry in decisive fashion, Repercussions : Ennead VI, 4—3 and its three barbs Some scholars make little secret of their skepticism with regard to such efforts at Quellenforschung : the writer himself has not always concealed his unhappiness at some of its methods and findings, reductions and exaggerations. And yet, Augustine's text still holds out difficulties which only a firm grasp of his thought-world and of its language can help us resolve. Nor can such offorts be considered as merely “ preparatory ”, eventually freeing the scholar to get (at last !) to the business of unearthing what (a somewhat solipsistically conceived) “ Augustine himself ” is Purported to mean. ‘The Saint's dialogue with the thought of his times was entirely too continuous for that, and the same continuous dialogue is necessary if we are to understand him. Now the treatise we have been considering contained three barbs, at least, The first was pantheism, and we have seen that by the time of the Confessions Augustis ne haa finiy extracted it. The second was the refusal in principle to admit that God could “ come ” — not only is there no need for Him to come, it is in the logic of Plotinus’ metaphysic that He mayENNEAD VI, 4-5 IN AUGUSTINE 30 not. In this connection, Augustine himself admits that for a time after his Neo-Platonic fervor hit him, he did not even vaguely suspect what a mystery was contained in those words, Verbum caro factum!, ‘The so-called “ Photinianism ” of Augustine's early theology of the Incarnation might well be illumined by reference to this particular treatise of Plotinus. But there was a third barb here as well. It was not just a digressive tendency which brought Plotinus, in the course of a treatise on Omnipresence, to explain at length certain aspects of his view on the fall of the soul into the body¥%. Metaphysic and spiritual life are too tightly knit in his thought for him to have been able to side-step the topic : it was in the very intent of his system to make them rime. And for Augustine, no less than for Plotinus, philosophy always feeds the spiritual life, always includes a religious and anthropological reference. When, therefore, Augustine takes his image of conversion from this treatise ; when he tells us that all sin implies a turning from a common good to a good which is proper, private, “ ours " in an exclusive sense™” ; when he explains that it was this vainglorious desire to have something proprium which plunged us from the heights into the dma} ; when, even as late as the Confessions, he describes iniquitas as a turning-away from the Summa to the ima of corporeal creation™, and our punishment as a confinement to " particularity 1%, the question arises : to what extent are we entitled to read into his language the meaning that language must have if he has really accepted the anthropology that he found imbedded in Ennead VI, 4—5? In short, is the man who without exaggeration can be called the Father of Occidental Christianity, in the Confessions whose influence on western spirituality has been literally incalculable, cryptically advising us that we are all so many souls, fallen from a Plotinian pre-existence ? The question must be posed squarely, answered sesponsibly. But it is mot a question one man may hope to answer definitively. We hope shortly to offer at least a contribution toward that answer. And if the relation we have been led to uncover with Ennead VI, 4-5 is sound, if the pattern method we have applied here may legitimately be extended to other Plotinian treatises as well, the answer we propose must be in the affirmative. Robert J. O’Connert, S.J. Fordham University. 125, Conf. VIZ, 24-5. 226, Since the soul {s one of the hypostases belonging to the intelligible world, he must eliminate all notion of Its entertaining a relation of # form », « proper » to the body « in which » (atter its putative descent) it would seem to find itself. See Ennead VI, 4, 14-16. 127. De Libero Arbitrio 1, 53. 328. De Quant, Animae 78. 129. Conf. VIT, 22, ‘These last thtee texts are closely related. 130, Loc, cif, note 124, above.Datation du premier concile de Carthage contre les Pélagiens et du Libellus fidei de Rufin Le premier concile de Carthage contre les pélagiens, qui devait aboutir a la condamnation de Célestius, est le plus généralement daté de la fin de Yamnée 411 ou méme du début de l'année 4x2!, Dans un article paru il y a peu d’années, M. J. H. Koopmans a cherché a préciser davantage la date de ce concile et a cru pouvoir conclure que « the only possible period that is left for the council is July, August and maybe the first week of September 422 34, Cette conclusion doit-elle étre retenue ? Rappelons britvement tout d’abord les données du probléme : x0 Du De gestis Pelagii XXII, 46, il ressort que le procés engagé contre Célestius n’eut lien qu’aprés la conférence avec les donatistes, donc qu’aprés le 8 juin qr. 2° Augustin précise qu’il n’était pas présent au concile (Retractationes, II, 33), bien plus qu’il n’était pas présent a Carthage a cette date (De gestis Pelagii, XI, 23). 3° Or Augustin était certainement présent & Carthage au moins jusqu’au 2g juin 411 (Sermo 296). 4° Augustin préchait & Carthage, sur le Psaume 72, le 13 septembre 411 (Epist. 140, 8, 33). 5° La lettre 139, 3, écrite durant Vhiver 4r1-412 et, de toute facon, antérieure au 28 février 412%, atteste qu’ ce moment Augustin avait déja 1, Cl. O. Parte, Les voyages de saint Augustin, dans Recherches augustiniennes, vol. ty Paris, 1958, p. 15 ; G. BARDY, Saint Augustin, Patis, 1940, p. 355 le date de 4x1, sans préciser davantage, Les Mauristes le dataient de 412. 2. J. H. KOopMans, Augustine's first contact with Pelagius and the dating of the condemnation of Caelestins at Carthage, in Vigiliae Christianae, VIII (1954)y PP. 149-163. Texte cité, p. 152. 3 Ch A. Cufwenr Paty DE Lassent, Fastes des Provinces ajricaines, t. 1, Paris, 190%, PP. 124-126,42 F, REFOULE écrit les deux premiers livres du De peccatorum meritis et avait sur le chantier, entre autres, le troisiéme livre du méme ouvrage. 6° Dans ie De gestis Pelagii XI, 23, Augustin affirme qu'il consulta & Carthage les Actes du concile. 7° Enfin, il est certain que le De peccatorum meritis fut écrit aprés la con- damnation de Célestius (Retractationes, IL, 33; De gestis Pelagii, XXII, 46). Si T’on tient compte de ces différentes données, il apparait que le concile de Carthage n'a pu avoir lieu qu'entre le 1° juillet et le début de septembre 421, si Augustin était bien absent de Carthage durant cette période, ou qu’entre Ja fin de septembre et le mois de décembre 4rz, (ou I’extréme rigueur le début de janvier 412). J. H._Koopmans estime que la premiére période est plus vraisemblable que la seconde. En effet, assure-t-il : « Nous pouvons présumer qt’ Augustin (quand il écrivait le De peccatorum meritis) était bien informé de la procédure du concile et des arguments échangés. Sur ce point, Augustin ne fait pas mystere de sa source d'information, Bien qu’il ne fat pas présent au concile, it en a Iu plus tard les Actes quand il retourna 4 Carthage. Ainsi, avant décrize le De peccatorum meritis & Yautomne, il a da avoir fait un séjour & Carthage. Et en effet ce séjour nous est connu, car il ressort clairement de la lettre 140 qu'il précha en cette ville, le 13 septembre, sur le Ps. 72. D'autre part, entre la fin de juin et le début de septembre, il ne se trouvait pas & Carthage, mais visitait son propre diocése »4. Cette démonstration suppose donc : 1° qu’Augustin ne se trouvait pas & Carthage en juillet-aoit 4rr ; 2° qu'il avait pris connaissance des Actes du concile quand il rédigeait le De peccatorum meritis, T/auteur, dans sa thése de doctorat, a cherché & prouver le premier point en se fondant sur la chronologie des sermons de saint Augustin proposée par Kunzelmann et Zarb. Il n’a pas, par contre, cherché A démontrer Je second point, mais il présume (assume) qu’ Augustin était bien informé. Cette démonstration se heurte, croyons-nous, aux objections suivantes : x0 I/on sait la difficulté, souvent insurmontable, que présente la datation des sermons de saint Augustin. Dans le cas présent, il ne semble pas que l'on puisse entigrement se fier a Ia chronologie proposée par Kunzelmann et Zarb, ni que la présence d’Augustin dans son propre diocse au cours de 1'été 411 soit assurée. « Il est peu probable, écrit méme O. Perler, qu’ Augustin ait quitté Carthage aprés la conférence du 1° au 8 juin pour y revenir peu apris au mois de septembre’. » 4: JH. Koommans, of. city pe 152. 5. J. H. Koopmans, Augustinus'Briefwisseling met Dioscorus, Amsterdam, 1949, pp. 38-40. 6. 0, PERtER, art. city p. 41.DATE DU Ie CONCILE DE CARTHAGE 43 2° L/hypothése de M. Koopmans ne rend pas compte du texte suivant Augustin dans le troisiéme livre du De peccatorum meritis (écrit att cours de Vhiver 411-432), passage qui semble Iui avoir échappé : « Ante parvum tempus a quibusdam transitorie colloquentibus, cursim mihi aures perstrictae sunt, cum illic apud Carthaginem essemus ; « non ideo parvulos baptizari, ut remissionem accipiant peccatorum, sed ut sanctificentur in Christo », Qua novitate permotus, et quia opportunum non fuit ut contra aliquid dicerem, et uon tales homines erant de quorum essem auctoritate sollicitus, facile hos in transactis atque abolitis habui. Et ecce (contra Ecclesiam) iam studio flammante defenditur, ecce scribendo etiam memoriae commendatur, ecce res in hoc discriminis adducitur, ut hinc etiam a fratribus consulamur, ecce contra disputare atque scribere cogimur » (VI, 12). Augustin se référe ici A son séjour A Carthage « ante parvum tempus », antérieur a la fois & I’éclatement de Ia crise et aux consultations de frares. Des lors, ne doit-on pas dater le concile et Ja lettre de Marcellin consultant Augustin sur cette affaire? (,.. et me per litteras consulebat, De gestis Pelagit, XII, 25) apres te séjour d’Augustin a Carthage en septembre 4r1, puisque le passage ci-dessus retranscrit date de Vhiver 411-412 ? 3° Il faudrait enfin établir qu’Augustin avait une connaissance directe des Actes du concile. Or, ce dernier point n'est pas évident. Notons tout d’abord qu’Augustin, tant dans les Retractationes (II, 33) que dans le De gestis Pelagti (XII, 25), ne se réfare qu’aux « questions » que lui avait posées Marcellin. Une étude attentive des théses pélagiennes critiquées par Augustin dans le De peccatorwm meritis n’autorise pas non plus, semble- t-il, A conclure qu’Augustin avait consulté les Actes du concile avant décrire cet ouvrage. Les Actes comprenaient, ontre un procés-verbal des débats, dont Augustin a donné un bref extrait dans le De peccato originali, un (ou plus probable- ment) deux « mémoires » du diacre Paulin ott ce dernier avait, en six theses, cherché a résumer la doctrine de Celestius d’aprés un (ou plusieurs) de ses écrits. Ces théses nous sont connues a la fois par Marius Mercator (PL 48, col. 69-70, 114-115) et par Augustin qui s'y rapporte a diverses reprises dans le De gestis Pelagii (XI, 23 ; XXXV, 65) et le De peccato originali (XI, 12), en y attachant visiblement une extréme importance. Ces six théses sont les suivantes : 1° Adam mortalem factum, qui sive peccaret, sive non Peccaret, moriturus fuisset ; 2° Peccatum Adae ipstm solum laesit, et non genus humanum ; 3° Parvuli, qui nascuntur, in eo statu sunt in quo 7. Bien qu’Augustin patle de « fratres », il se pourrait que Marcellin soit le seul A avoir consulté, Augustin usant souvent du pluriel alors méme qu’il ne s'agit que d'une seule Personne, d’un seul auteur, cf, B. ALTANER, Auguslins Methode der Quellenbeniltzung. Sein Studium der Vaterliteratur, dans Sacris Erudiri, 1V"(z952), P. 7.44 F. REFOULE foit Adam ante praevaricationem ; 4° Neque per mortem, vel praevari- cationem Adae, omne genus hominum moritur, neque per resurrectionem Christi omne hominum genus resurgit; 5° Lex sic mittit ad regnum coelorum, quomodo et Evangelium ; 6° Et ante adventum Domini fuerunt homines impeccabiles, id est, sine peccato®. Augustin se référe-t-il explicitement ces théses dans le De peccatorum meritis, @une facon telle qu'elle implique la connaissance directe du [ibellus du diacre Paulin ? Dans le tableau suivant, nous avons cherché a relever dans une premiére colonne les théses pélagiennes critiquées par Augustin dans le premier livre du De peccatorum meritis, en indiquant, dans la mesure du possible, dans une seconde colonne, la source probable d’Augustin, pour y repérer les traces du Libellus de Paulin et des Actes du concile. / IL, 2 (p. 3, 16-18) Qui dicunt « Adam sic creatum, ut Cf. De Peccatorum meritis, IIT, 1, 1. etiam sine peccati merito moreretur non poena culpae, sed necessitate naturae » ... ‘VILL, 8 (p. 10 1-2) A propos de Rom. 5,12: «hhane ili Cf. & 1%, 9. mortem non corporis, sed animae intel- ligi volunt... » TX, 9 (p. 10, 818) Sur Rom. 5, 12: « ...conari eos quidem in aliam novam detorquere opinfonem tuis litteris intimasti, sed quidnam illud sit quod in his verbis opinentur tacuisti, Quantum autem ex aliis compari hoc fbi sentiunt... » « Quod et mors ista, quae illic commemorata est, non sit corporis, quam nolunt Adam peccando mernisse, sed animae, quae in ipso peccato fit, et ipsum peccatum non propagatione in alios homines ex primo homine, sed imi- tatione transisse. In parvulis nolunt Cf. RUFIN, Libellus, n° 4x (PL. 48, credere per baptismum solvi originale 478 C) : « pariter etiam dominus noster peccatum quod in nascentibus nullum J.C. de parvulis docet, quod ab omni esse omnino contendunt ». peceato sint alieni... ». ‘XU, 15 (p. 16, rx-15) Quod originaliter tractum est, non Cf, XXX, 58; XXXIV, 63. — Rurin, tantum a regno dei separat, quo parvulos Libellus, n° 40 (PL. 48, 477 B). sive accepta Christi gratia defunctos intrare non posse ipsi etiam confiientur, verum et a salute aeterna facit alfenos, qua nulla esse alia potest praeter regnum dei, quo sola Christi societas introducit ». 8, Nous avons suivi ici Pordre donné par Marius Mercator.DATE DU I* CONCILE DE CARTHAGE 45 XVI, 22 (p. 21, 24-26) « Quapropter qui dieunt parvulos ideo Paptizari, ut hoc eis remittatur quod in hac vita proprium contraxerunt, non quod ex Adam traduxerunt », XVUI, 23 (p. 22, 13-18) Sed illi movent et aliquid considera- tione ac discussione dignum videntur sfferre, qui dicunt parvulos recenti vita editos visceribus matrum non propter remittendum peccatum percipere baptis- mum, sed ut spiritalem procreationem habentes creentur in Christo ot ipsius regni coclorum participes fiant eodem modo filit et hasredes dei ». XIX, 24 (p. 23, 24-26) Quomodo ergo quidam meritum huius actatis a domino laudatum esse comme- morent, quando ait « sinite parvulos venive ad me, talium est enim regnum dei ». XX, 26 (p. 25, 14-25) ‘Tenentur autem isti sententia domini dicentis : « Nisi quis natus fuerit denuo, non videbit regnum dei... habent enim videlicet quo confugiant atque delitiscant, quia non ait dominus : si quis non renatus fuerit de aqua et spiritu non habebit vitam, sed ait « non intrabit. XXL, 30 (p. 28, 18-22) Nam ct hi, quibus videtur injustum, ut parvoli sine gratia Christi de corpore exeuntes non solum regno dei, quo et ipsi fatentur nisi per baptismum renatos intrare non posse, vernm etiam vita acterna et salute priventur, quaerentes quomodo iustum sit, et alios ab originali impietate solvatur, alius non solvatur... » KEXV, 36 (p. 35, 4-6) Quamvis eos nonnulli mox natos inlu- minari credant sic intelligentes quod scriptum est : erat Inmen verum, quod imluminat omnem hominem venientem im hune mundum », Ch XXXIV, 63 (p. 64, 16-20). Ruri, Libellus, n° 40 (col. 477 B) + « Baptisma igitur infantes non propler peccata percipiunt, sed ut spiritalem pro- creationem habentes, quasi per baptisma in Christo creentur, et ipsius regni coelestis participes fiant, sicut beatus Paulus docet hoc modo : Si qua in Christo nova creatura (I Cor. 3, 17) et iterum : ¢ Sin autem filii et hacredes, haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi » (Rom. 8, 17». Cf m. 48 (col. 482 8). Rurmy, Libellus, n° 41 (PL 48, col. 478) : Pariter etiam Dominus noster J.C. de parvelis docet, quod ab omni peccato sint alieni cum ... ad discipulos suos dicit : « Sinite parvulos venire ad me...» CE. Ruri, Libettus, n° 48 (col. 482 A) : « Similiter autem, quod etiam his qui credunt in ipsum spiritualem adoptionem filiorum largitur et dona, et efficit regni sui coelestis haeredes, sicut ipse Dominus noster J.C. docens Nicodemum dicit : « Amen, Amen dico tibi, si quis non denuo fuerit, non potest videre regnum Deis. Ch. Rurmy, Libellus, n° 39 (col. 476 A): .dinsaniunt qui per unum hominem Adam, omnem orbem terrarum iniqui- tatis flagitiorumque condemnant, Nam qui haec dicunt, aut injustum Deum pronuntiant, aut certe Deo diabolam aestimant fortiorem. CE RUFIN, Libellus, n° 40 (col. 477 A) « Similiter autem etiam beatus Joannes dicit de procreandis filiis, quia simul atque nescuntur, illuminationem sancti- ficationis ab unigenito Verbo percipiunt, cum dicit : « Erat lux vera, quae illu- minat omnem hominem venientem in hune mundum »46 XXVI, 39 (p. 38, 7-8) +++ porro quia parvulos baptizandos esse concedunt... XXXVI, 50 (p. 47, 20-23) Ad Hebraeos, quoque epistula... quo- niam legi quosdam huic nostrae de ‘baptismo parvulorum sententiae contra- sia sentientes etiam ipsam quibusdam opinionibus suis tester adhibere voluisse. EXIX, 57 (p. 56, 23-57, 2) . non itaque per nuptiarum bonum defendant concupiscentiae malum... nom erigantur in superbia erroris alieni, de quorum parvula aetate dedit dominus humilitatis exemplum, XEK, 58 (p. 57, 10-16) Sed quia non ait, inquiunt, « nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non habebit salutem vel vitam aeternam », tantummodo autem dixit ; « non intrabit in regnum dei », ad hoc parvuli bapti- zandi sunt, ut sint etiam cum Christo in regno dei, ubi non erunt, si baptizati non fuerint, quamvis et sine baptismo si parvuli moriantur salutem vitamque aeternam habituri sint, quoniam sulla peccati vineulo obstricti sunt. XXXIV, 63 (p. 64, 12-20) s proinde qnod adtinet ad baptismum parvulorum ut eis sit necessarius redemp- tionem etiam ipsis opus esse concedunt, sieut cuiusdam eorum libello brevissimo continetur, qui tamen ibi remissionem alicuins peccati apertius exprimere noluit. Sicut autem mihi ipse lidteris intimasti, fatentur iam, ut dicis, etiam in parvulis per baptismum remissionem fieri pecca- torum; nec mirum... non tamen origi- naliter, inquiunt, sed in vita iam propria posteaquam nati sunt, peccatum habere ‘coeperunt. XXXIV, 63 (p. 64, 21-23) Multum disserui, quorum etiam unius Jegi librum ea continentem, quae ut potui refutavi. Fy REFOULE Cf. RurW, Libellus, 2° 28 (col. 467 ©) : « Apertius autem etiam beatus Paulus ad Hebragos scribens... »; n° 30 (col. 469 C); n° 37 (col. 474 D). CE. De peccatorum meritis, IL, XXV, 39+ CE RUFIN, Libellus, n° 4x (col, 478.B) : citation de Mare, x, 4, et de I Cor., xtv, 20 (2). CE. Ruriy, Libellus, n° 48 (col. 482 A). CE De peccatorum meritis, I, xxxvz, 58 (p. 126, 20-23) ; De peccato oviginali, Xvun, 21 (C.S.E.L., 48, p. 181, 17-19) 3 Epist., 157, 22; Epist,, 175, 6; Contra Julianum, 1, 3 (9). CE. De peccatorum meritis, I, xvet, 22 (p. 21, 1318).DATE DU I* CONCILE DE CARTHAGE 47 Parmi les sources utilisées dans le premier livre du De peccatorum meritis, Augustin en mentionne donc Iui-méme trois : les lettres de Marcellin, un trés bref Jibellus, et un livre qu’il a cherché a réfuter au cours des trente-quatre premiers chapitres. Augustin révéle ailleurs que le JiBellus auquel il renvoie fut écrit par Célestius a Carthage (De peccato originali, XVIII, 21), et méme de fagon encore plus précise, dans I’église de Carthage, « ... quamquam per baptismum Christi etiam parvulorum fieri redemptionem libello suo Caelestius in Carthaginiensi ecclesia iam confessus est » (Epist., 175, 6). Quant au «liber » réfuté par Augustin tout au long des trente-quatre premiers chapitres, nous avons cru pouvoir I'identifier avec le libellus fidei de Rufin le Syrien. Le P. de Blic avait naguére relevé qu’Augustin avait cité cet ouvrage au chapitre xvmx du De peccatorum meritis® — découverte qui semble avoir passé inapergue, comme nous Je verrons plus loin — mais il n/avait pas cherché systématiquement a retrouver Ja trace de cet écrit dans les autres chapitres. Nous pensons avoir montré qu’Angustin s'y référaitconstamment, Lon ne peut exclure absolument qu’Augustin ait eu connaissance des , Actes du concile. Il est certain que le Jibellus de Célestius en faisait partie puisque Célestius le rédigea dans I'église de Carthage, autrement dit, au cours méme du concile, Mais ce libellus, en raison méme de sa bridveté, pouvait atre facilement recopié, et il est également possible que les évéques qui condamnérent Célestius aient cherché a le répandre, puisqu'il pouvait @tre considéré comme une rétractation, au moins partielle, de Célestius. Au second chapitre du premier livre, Augustin se référe expressément a la premiére thése du « mémoire » du diacre Paulin. Mais Augustin assure Tui-méme dans le troisiéme livre (c. I, 1), que Marcellin Ja lui avait commu- niquée et V'avait consulté a ce sujet. Nous ne trouvons ensnite aucune référence directe et explicite aux autres thases relevées et dénonoées par Paulin et une analyse du deuxiéme livre aboutit a la méme constatation. ‘Etant donné I'importance qu’Augustin devait attacher a ces théses dans ses ouvrages postérieurs, ce silence laisse présumer qu'il en ignorait la teneur exacte quand il rédigeait le De peccatorwm meritis et que Marcellin n'avait pas cru bon de Jes Ini communiquer. Dans ces conditions, et indépendamment méme des deux autres difficultés que nous avons mentionnées précédemment, il nous parait impossible que Je concile de Carthage ait pu avoir lieu avant le mois d’octobre 4rz, au plus tot. L’analyse précédente projette en outre des lumiéres intéressantes sur la fagon extrémement libre dont Augustin utilise les écrits de ses adversaires, Ii affirme expressément qu'il a cherché a réfuter au cours des trente-quatre 9. J. DE BUC, Le péché originel selon saint Augustin, dans Recherches de Science religieuse, 36 (2027), p. 518-529,48 F. REFOULE premiers chapitres un livre de tendance pélagienne, que nous avons cru pouvoir identifier avec le Jibellus de Rufin. Or, sauf au chapitre xvur, jamais il ne le cite littéralement, ce qui explique que les historiens n'ont, a l’excep- tion du P. de Blic, jamais retrouvé la trace de l’ouvrage de Rufin. S’atta- chant moins a la lettre qu’ esprit, Augustin cherche bien plutdt a inter- préter le Hibellus & la lumidre de ce qu'il connaissait par ailleurs des idées de Célestius et de Pélage, a en prolonger la doctrine et A en dégager {es présupposés implicites. Il reléve ainsi les textes scripturaires cités par Rufin et cherche A rendre compte de la raison de ce choix, méme quand Ruffin s'était contenté de les mentionner, sans y ajouter le moindre com- mentaire. Il n’hésite pas non plus & modifier la formulation des objections adressées par Rufin contre la doctrine du péché originel, peut-étre pour mieux pouvoir les réfuter. Le livre II du De peccatorum meritis en offre, croyons-nous, un exemple remarquable. Au chapitre xxxmm, 53, Augustin formule une objection de ses adversaires dans les termes suivants : « Si peccato mors ista corporis accidisset, non utique post remissionem pecca- torum, quam redemptor nobis tribuit, moreremur ». Il est vraisemblable qu’Augustin se référe & objection suivante de Rufin : « Sin vero, ut ipsi asserunt, propter peceatum Adam moritntur infantes, dicant nobis cur statim baptizati mortem gustare permittuntur, quippe cum omnes qui baptizati sunt et propter hoc filii Dei facti, peccatum habere non possint » (PL 48, col. 476 D). A premitre vue, il n’est pas évident qu’Augustin se référe au texte de Rufin, Celui-ci ne prend en considération que le cas des Petits enfants. Augustin généralise I'objection ; tout baptisé, qu’il soit adulte ou petit enfant ne devrait-il pas étre libéré de la peine de mourir ? Un passage de la Cité de Diew nous autorise cependant a croire qu’Augustin se référe bien A objection de Rufin. A livre KIIL, c. 4, de la Cité de Diew Augustin écrit, en effet, en envisageant en premier lieu le cas des petits enfants et en renvoyant au De peccatorum meritis : « Si quem vero movet, cur vel ipsam (mortem) patiantur (infantes), si et ipsa poena peccati est, quorum per gratiam reatus aboletur; iam ista quaestio in alio nostro opere, quod scripsimus de Baptismo parvulorum™, tracta ac soluta est... » (PL 41, 379). Cet exemple nous permet de saisir, sur le vif, si nous pouvons nous exprimer ainsi, les libertés qu’Augustin prend avec les textes de ses adversaires, Il serait également intéressant de relever le choix qu’ Augustin a fait parmi les objections présentées par Rufin et de se demander pour- quoi il n’a pas réfuté certains arguments, A premiére vue, impressionnants. Mais nous ne pouvons ici entreprendre ce travail délicat, dont les résultats ne peuvent étre qu’aléatoires. ‘Une conclusion, plus importante encore, se dégage de l’analyse du premier ro. Lon sait qu’Augustin mentionne & diverses reprises sous ce titre le De peccatorum meritis, cf. G. BARDY, Euures de saint Augustin, XII, Les Révisions, Paris, 1950, P. 584.DATE DU I CONCILE DE CARTHAGE 49 livre du De peccatorum meritis. A la fin d'une étude sur le libellus fidei de Ruffin de Syrie, parue ii y a quelques années, le professeur Altaner — 8 qui avaient échappé les citations du Hibellus dans le De peccatorum meritis — proposait de dater I'écrit de Rufin entre 413-428, de toute fagon aprés 472. Il le considérait en effet comme une réponse, soit au De peccatorum meritis, soit au sermon 294 prononeé par Augustin a Carthage en 413, « Da hier klar die Ansicht, die ungetauften Kinder wiirden der positiven Héllenqual fiberantwortet, bekimpft wird, handelt es sich fiir uns datum festzustellen, wer zuerst dieses harte Theologumenon vertreten hat. Soweit ich die Viterlehre tiberpritft habe, stellte ich fest, dass vor Augustinus kein lateinischer und erst recht kein griechischer Autor diese strenge Meinung ausgesprochen und aus der Lehre von der Allgemeinheit der Exbsiinde gefolgert hat... Wir diirfen deshalb wobl als sicher annehmen, dass sich Rufinus in Kap. 4 gegen die von Augustinus vertretene Lehre wendet, und dass seine Schrift deshalb friihestens 413 abgefasst wurdelt, » Le fait que le /bel/us de Rufin, loin d’étre une réponse & Augustin, est antérieur au De peceatorum meritis et constitue méme une des sources de cet ouvrage, nous oblige a penser que la conception dite augustinienne du péché originel et du sort des petits enfants morts sans baptéme constituait une « theologumenon », non seulement en Afrique, mais aussi en Italie (puisque Rufin dut écrire son traité & Rome, of il résida de 399 jusqu’a au moins 410) avant méme les débuts de la crise pélagienne en 4x1. En ce cas, ne devons-nous pas conclure qu’Augustin fut plus traditionnel et moins innovateur que le professeur Altaner le présumait ? En résumé, il ressort de Ianalyse du premier livre du De peccatorum| meritis : 19 que le concile de Carthage dut avoir lieu aprés le mois de sep- tembre 41x ; 2° que le Uibellus fidei de Rufin constitue l’ouvrage réfuté par, Augustin tout au long des trente-quatre premiers chapitres du premied livre du De peccatorum meritis ; 3° que la conception dite augustinienne du péché originel est antérieure & Augustin, ou tout au moins, si I'on veut encore 'attribuer 4 Augustin, antérieure & ses premiers écrits anti-pélagie! et quelle était déja répandue dans I'figlise a Ja fin du 1V° siécle. | F, Rerouut, O. P. 11. B, AvTaNeR, Der Liber de fide, ein Werk des Pelagianers Rujinus der Syrers, dans Theologische Quartalschrift, x30 (1950). PP. 447-448: 4Augustins Briefe zur entscheidenden Phase des Pelagianischen Stréités (von den verhandlungen in Jerusalem und Diospolis im Jahre 415 bis zur Verdammiing des Pelagius im Jahre 418) TEIL I ENTSTEHUNG UND VERLAUF DES LEHRSTREITES UNTER DEM PONTIFIKAT INNOCENTIUS’ I (411-417) Einleitung. Weder die Gnadenlehre, noch eine Pradestinationslehre oder die mit beiden im Zusammenhang stehende Exbstindenlehre hat Augustin erst in der Auseinandersetzung mit Pelagius und dessen Schiilern zu entwickeln begonnen. Vielmehr hatte er schon vorher fiir jene Lehrpunkte grundsitzliche Erkenntnisse gefunden und formuliert? und dadurch den pelagianischen Widerspruch veranlaSt®, Die vollige Ausrichtung des augustinischen Denkens auf die Gnade hin, die allem menschlichen Bemiihen und Verdienst zuvorkommt, muBte den Protest des Pelagius x, Vgl. H, Reuter, Augustinische Studien (Gotha 1887) 8. ro f.; 2. F.K, Milller, Art. : Pradestination IT (Kirchentehre), Realencyklopadie fr protestantische Theologie und ‘Kirche BA, 15, 3. Aufl. (Leipzig 1904) S. 590; F. Loofs, Art. : Augustinus, ebd. Bd. 2 (Leipzig 1897) 8. 279; F. Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium det Dogmengeschichte 4, Aufl. (Halle 1906) 8. 288; A. Hamack, Tehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte Bd. ITT, 4, Aufl. (Tibingen 1920) 8. 165 ; J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus 2. Aufl. (Freiburg i. Br. 1929) $. 17; ©, Scheel, Die Anschauung Augustins dber Christi Person und Werk (Tubingen und Leipzig 901) S. 443; R. Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte Bd. 2, 3. Aufl. (Erlangen und Leipzig 1923) 8. sor. K, Janssen, Die Bntstehung der Gnadentehre Augustins. Diss. (Rostock 1936) S, 130 ldsst die Schrift » De div. quaest. ad Simpl, « sogar schon » den Endpunkt der Entwicklung von Augustins Gnadenlelire « sein, 2, F. Loofs, Art.: Augustinus a. a, O, S. 278 (vgl. F. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte S, 289 und S. 339f); K. Bauer, Zur Verstindigung tber die Stelling Augustins in der Geschichte. Zeitschr. fir Kirchengesch, 42 (1923) 8. 234 ; H. Barth, Die Freiheit der Entscheidung im Denken Augustins (Basel 1935) 8. 126,52 H, ULBRICH herausfordern, der, ein Hiferer des Gesetzes, im Hintreten fiir die bedingungslose Verbindlichkeit der géttlichen Gebote und im Appell an die menschliche Verantwortlichkeit und Freiheit das Gebot der Stunde sah’, — Dabei stand Pelagius mit seiner Auffassung nicht allein ; vielmehr war er geradezu ein Exponent der unter den gebildeten Christen im Abendland vorherrschenden Geisteshaltung!. So kam es — nach einem ersten Zusammensto8 zwischen einem Bischof aus Augustins Umgebung und Pelagius’ — 2u der groflen Auseinandersetaung, dem Lehrstreit, der als der » pelagianische « in die Geschichte der Kirche einging und dessen weitreichende Konsequenzen bis in unsere Zeit fortwirken. Den eigentlichen Anstof zum offenen Streit gab jedoch weder Augustin noch Pelagius, sondern dessen Schiiler Caelestius, der zusammen mit seinem Meister im Jahre 410 vor Alarich aus Rom nach Karthago #loh?. Wahrend Pelagius selbst bald nach Palistina tibersiedelte, setzte sich Caelestius zunichst in Karthago fest und griff in die Diskussion ein, die dort Ende des Jahres 411 aus Anla@ der Wiederaufnahme und eventuellen Wiedertaufe der Donatisten iber die Taufe gefiihrt wurde. In diesem Zusammenhang wandte sich Caelestius gegen die Erbsiindenlehre und die » Taufe zur Vergebung der Sinden «, ine in Karthago tagende Synode? verurteilte die Thesen des Caelestius — unter denen sich auch die Behauptung befand, das Gesetz sei wie das Evangelium dazu bestimmt, die Menschen zum Himmelreich zu fiihren — als Irrlehren. Das Interesse der Synode scheint dabei hauptstichlich der Kindertaufe gegolten zu haben. Obwohl Caelestius infolge seiner Verurteilung aus Afrika flichen mute, ndtigten sein Auftreten und die sich immer weiter ausbreitende pelagianische Propaganda Augustin doch zur Stellungnahme. Indem er das nicht in Sifentlicher Streitschrift, sondern in einer Predigt tat®, offenbarte er gleich zu Anfang die Beweggriinde, die ihn zu seinem Auftreten gegen die 3+ 2u Pelagius vgl. G. de Plinval, Pélage, ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme (Lausanne 1943) ; zur kirchlichen Situation zu Beginn des 5. Jahirh. s.G, de Plinval, Pélage, 8, 115 ff. und J. Ferguson, Pelagius. A Historical and Theological Study (Cambridge 1936) 8. 18 ff. 4. A. Hamack, Dogmengeschichte S. 170; G. de Plinval, Pélage 8. 202. Abnlich, aber vorsichtiger, J. Ferguson, Pelagius S. 42. Vgl. auch G. de Plinval, Pélage 8. 205. 5 Vel. S. Kopp, (bei A, Kunzelmann/A. Zumkeller, Aurelius Augustinus, Schriften gegen die Semipelagianer (Warburg 1935]) S. rr f. und J. Ferguson, Pelagius 8. 47, der den Vorgang auf das Jahr 405 datiert. 6. Uber Caclestius vgl. G. de Plinval, Pélage S. 212 und r541.; J. (Ferguson, Pelagius S, 48f. und E, Jauncey, The Doctrine of Grace up to the End of the Pelagian Controversy (london 1925) S. 183, Vgl. die genannten Werke auch zur folgenden Darstellung der Auselnandersetzungen in Karthago, 7. Als Datum dieser Synode gibt E, Jauncey, The Doctrine of Grace 8. 184 das Jahr 4x2 an, wahrend Hefele (C. J. v. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte 2. Bd. 2. Aufl, Freiburg i. Br. 1873), §. 104) das Jahr 4rz fiir wahrscheinlich halt. G. de Plinval (Pélage, Zeittafel S, 13-15) bleibt mit seiner Angabe » qri-gr2 ¢ unentschleden. Augustin aahm an der Synode nicht teil (Retract. IL, 59, 2 CS.EL. 36, p. 171, 16). 8. Sermo 176 M.S.L. 38, col. 949-953. Vgl. E. Jauncey, The Doctrine of Grace 8, 187,AUGUSTINS BRIEFE I 53 Inlehre trieben : nicht etwa der beriichtigte furor theologicus, sondern die seelsorgerliche Verantwortung des Bischofs fiir seine Gemeinde und die gesamte Kirche’. In dieser Predigt verteidigte Augustin die Exbsiindenlehre, die Notwendigkeit der Kindertaufe und die Heilsgnade im Unterschied zur Schépfungsgnade!', Zur gleichen Zeit wurde dem Bischof von Hippo auch Anla® gegeben 2u einem Privatbrief, in dem er pelagianischem Gedankengut entgegentreten mulitel?, Bald jedoch scheint Augustin erkannt 2u haben, daB solch behutsames Vorgehen der Gefiihrlichkeit der Irrlebre nicht angemessen sei : wohl noch im Jahre 411 ging er mit seiner dem Tribun Marcellinus gewidmeten™ Schrift » De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum @® zum offenen Angriff tiber — wenn auch noch ohne den Namen des Gegners zunennen, Erst in dem dieser Schrift als drittes Buch angefiigten langen Brief erscheint der Name des Pelagius, der dort als ein heiliger Mann und emster, ja hervorragender Christ bezeichnet wird! : gegen die Sache, nicht gegen die Person des Pelagius richtete sich Augustins Angriff ! Noch im selben Jahre!’ folgte eine weitere Schrift » De gratia novi testamenti «, die der Verfasser seinem karthagischen Freund! Honoratus widmete. Unmittelbarer Anla dazu waren, wie atich schon fiir die dem Marcellinus gewidmete Schrift, vom Adressaten gestellte Fragen!, Hatte Augustin in » De peccatorum meritis.., « berausgearbeitet, da man weder die Gnade so verteidigen diirfe, daB dabei scheinbar das liberum arbitrium aufgehoben wird, noch umgekehrt das liberum arbitrium so, da8 man sich in tiberheblicher AnmaBung als der Gnade undankbar erweist®, so 9. Val unten S, 55 und ep. 177 CS.EL. 44, P. 672, 15 8, sowie ep. 157 ebd. p. 4715 24¢P. 4724 2. to, Sermo 176 M.S.L,. 38, col. 9508. 31, Ebd, col. 952 5. 12, Ep. 130 CS.BL. 44) p. 4088. 13. Diese Datierung wird dadurch nahegelegt, dass Augustin in den Retractationen diese Schrift vor jener dem Honoratus gewidmeten (+ De gratia novi testamenti *, iberlicfert als ep. 140) einordnete, Die Schrift an Honoratus aber ist nach A, Goldbacher (C.S.B.L.. 58, P. 375) im Winter 4r1/412 entstanden, 34, Marcellinus hatte Augustin gebeten, ihm etwas zu schreiben gegen jene, die behaupten, Adam hitte auch ohne Siiude sterben miissen und von dessen Siinde sei nichts auf seine Nachkommen tibergegangen. Besonders aber tiber die Kindertaufe und die Frage der Stindlosigkeit sollte Augustin den Freund belehren (C.S.E.L, 60, p. 128, 1583). Vgl. auch J. Ferguson, Pelagius S. 55. 15. CS.BL, 60, B. 358, 36, Sanctus vir, ut audio, et non parvo provectu Christianus (CS.E.L. 60, p. 129, 7); vir ille tam egregie christianus (C.S.E.L,. 60, P. 133. 10). 17. 8, oben Anm, 13. 18. Ep. 140 CSL. 44, Ps 15585. Zu dem freundschaftlichen Verhiltnis Augustins 21 Honoratus vgl. ep. 139 (an Marcellinus) C.S.E.L. 44, D. 153, 78. ¥ ad Honoratum nostrum 4. 39. Val. unten 8, 68; Tell 11,8, 2ox f,, 203, 211, 2201, In seinem Traktat » De dono perse- verantiae «sagt Augustin, die neue Fragestellung habe ihn dazu gendtigt, seine Anffassung noch einmal ausfuhrlich darzulegen (A. Kunzelmann/A, Zumkeller, Aurelius Augustious. Schriften gegen dle Semipelagianer [Wurzburg 1955] S. 324). 20, C.S.E.Ty. 60, Ps 100, 24 654 H, ULBRICH findet er in » De gratia novi testamenti « bereits die sowohl dem Wesen der Gnade als auch der Wiirde des Menschen angemessene Synthese von Gnade und freiem Willen in der Liebe als einem Wirken des géttlichen ‘Willens im Menschen. Der Wille Gottes aber wird — grundlegend fir die gesamte weitere Entwicklung des augustinischen Gedankengebaudes — als gnadenhafter Wille definiert. Als zweite, auch fiir die schirfsten Ausformungen des augustinischen Denkens bestimmende Voraussetaung macht diese Schrift deutlich, da8 Augustin das liberum arbitrium nicht Jeugnen, sondern in das rechte Verhiiltnis zur Gnade bringen will. So gipfelt der Traktat » De gratia novi testamenti « in der Lehre vom Gericht nach den Werken und von der Barmherzigkeit Gottes als der Quelle unseres rechten Wissens von Gott, unserer Gerechtigkeit, Heilung und Errettung. Die 6ffentliche Auseinandersetzung mit der pelagianischen Lehre setzte Augustin im Jahre 412 fort mit der Schrift » De spiritu et littera «, wohl der schénsten Frucht seines in dieser Zeit so regen Gedankenaustausches amit Marcellinus", Was er in dieser beriihmten Schrift breit ausgefiihrt hat, findet sich knapp, klar und in den tragenden Gedanken zusammengefaft in einem Brief*? an Anastasius, dessen Persinlichkeit fiir uns leider nichts als ein Name mehr ist. Hier legt Augustin seine an Paulus ausgerichtete Lehre vom Gesetz als dem zur Gnade fiihrenden Padagogen dar. Bemerkenswert ist die am SchluB dieses Briefes bei Augustin erstmalig erscheinende Wertung des Gebetes als ein Argument fiir die Notwendigkeit der Gnadenhilfe — ein Gedanke, der im Laufe seiner Auseinandersetzung mit dem Pelagianismus fiir Augustin zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnt. Die eigentliche Zielrichtung des Briefes aber laSt sich ausdriicken in dem Satz, daB das aus der Liebe zur Gerechtigkeit, d.h. zu Christus erwachsene ‘Tun frei vom Zwang der Furcht, freiwillig ist. Wahrend Augustins Eingreifen in Nordafrika offenbar Erfolg hatte®, zeigte sich in der iibrigen rémischen Welt eine unvorhergesehen starke Verbreitung der netten Lehren, die vor allem im Orient, in Italien und Sizilien Fu gefaGt hatten™, So muBte der Bischof von Hippo mit einem nach Sizilien gerichteten Brief in seinem Kampf gegen jene Lehren erstmalig iiber die Grenzen der heimischen Kirchenprovinz hinausgreifen. 21. CS.Biln 60, p. 155 8% 22, Ep, 145 CSEL, 44, Pr 26655, Zur Datierung val. A. Goldbacher C.S.E.L. 58, p. 39. Fur unmittelbare zeitliche Nahe des Briefes zu » De spiritu et littera « spricht sein enger inhal licher Zusammenhang mit diesem Buch. 23. G, de Plinval, Pélage S. 265. ES. Jauncey, The Doctrine of Grace S. r94 sagt wesentlich zurilckhaltender, Augustin scheine cinige Haretiker in Karthago iberzeugt 2u haben. Vel. ep. 157 CS.EL. 444 Be 47% 5-7 24, G. de Plinval, Pélage 8. 266. 25, EP. 157 CSET, 44, Pe 449 55.AUGUSTINS BRIEFE I 55 Doch tat der Kirchenlehrer auch diesen Schritt nicht aus eigenem Antrieb, sondern auf Veranlassung des Laienchristen Hilarius aus Syrakus, der ihm fiinf charakteristische Merkmale der in Sizilien auftretenden pelagianischen Lehre zur Beurteilung vorlegte*. In seiner im Jahre 414 oder Anfang 415 geschriebenen®” Antwort vermittelt Augustin dem Fragesteller eine ausfiihrliche und griindliche Belehrung, in der die bisher von ihm entwickelten Gedanken zusammengefaSt und teilweise auch weitergeftihrt werden. Besonders kraftig tritt in diesem héchst bedeutungsvollen Schreiben Augustins Beweggrund fiir seinen Kampf gegen Pelagius in Erscheinung : es ist die Verantwortung des Seelsorgers fiir die » schwachen und ununterrichteten Seelen «, die allzu leicht zum Inrtum und zur ‘Trennung von der Kirche verfithrt und damit dem Verderben preisgegeben werden kénnten ; denn Heil gibt es fiir den einzelnen — das ist die Uberzeugung des Bischofs von Hippo — nurals Glied der einen und wahren Gesamtkirche, Selbst den Irrlehrern gegeniiber gilt noch diese Verantwortlichkei Augustin will lieber, da8 sie innerhalb der Kirche gesunden, als da8 sie wie unheilbare Glieder von ihrem Kérper abgeschnitten werden miissen®. Mit solcher strengen Auffassung von seinem Amt gewinnt der Kirchenvater das Recht und die Freiheit, dem Irrtum mit Scharfe, an der er es gerade in diesem Brief nicht fehlen 1é6t, entgegenzutreten. Hatte Augustin schon in seinem Brief an Anastasius® durch die Betonung des Gerichtes nach den Werken und die Beurteilung von Liebe und Freiwilligkeit als einander entsprechende Begriffe seine Gnadenlehre gegen ein libertinistisches Mifverstindnis abgesichert, so macht er hier die Fehideutung, als leugne er den freien Willen des Menschen, unméglich. Daf ein solches Verstiindnis seiner Gnadenlehre, deren ganzer Intention zawiderlaufen wiirde, machen Aussagen wie diese deutlich, da® die Gnadenhilfe gegeben werde, weil es die Freiheit des Willens gebe. Wer zu Gott sage » Sei mein Helfer « (Ps. 26, 9 sec. vulg.), der bekenne, da 8 er Gottes Befehl erfiillen wolle, aber um ihn zu erfiillen, die Hilfe des Befehlenden erflehe®. Das widerspricht der Pravenienz der Gnade deshalb 26, Vgl oben Anm, 19, Der Brief des Hilarius ist ep. 156 CS.E1, 44,0. 4488, Die Anrede » filius ¢, die Augustin in seiner Antwort (ep. 157 C.S.E.L, 44, B. 449, 9) gebraucht, welst aut den Taienstand des Hilarius hin, 27. Zur Datierung vgl. A. Goldbacher C.S.EL. 58, p. 415. 28. Ep. 157 CS.BL, 44, P. 471, 24-D. 4722. Vel. cp. 177 ebdp. 671, 15 8. und oben. 52, 29. CSEL. 44y Be 472. 30, Vgl. oben 8. 54. 31. Der Vorwurt, et lengne den freien Willen, wurde Augustin wiederholt von seinen Gegnern gemacht; vgl. unten, TeilII, 8.216. die gegen derartige Vorwiirfe gerichtete Betonung der mensch. Jichen Verantwortlichkeit und der Moglichkeit sittlicher Entscheidung durch Augustin, sow!e C.S.E.L, 57, p. 178 und p, 210 (ep. 194) ; CS.ELL. 42, p. 163 (+ De gratia Christi et de peceato originali ¢1) ; CS.E.L. 60, p. 428 5. (» Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum ¢). Die Massilienser warfen ihm gar Fatalismus vor ; vgl. den Bericht Prospers, ep. 225 C.S.EL. $7, P. 458. 34 CSELe 44y Be 455856 H. ULBRICH nicht, weil Augustin die Willensfreiheit nicht im metaphysischen Sinne als absolut und wertneutral versteht, sondern als eine Befreiung des Willens durch dessen Unterwerfung unter die Gnade und den daraufhin geschenkten Geist der Liebe™. Aus dem zur Liebe befreiten Willen gehen dann die Werke als Friichte der Gnade und der Dankbarkeit fiir diese hervor™, Das Gebet, besonders die fiinfte Bitte des Vaterunsers, nimmt in dem Schreiben an Hilarius einen zentralen Platz ein als Argument fir die Notwendigkeit der Gnadenhilfe®*. In den Mittelpunkt der ganzen Beweisfiihrung riickt es dann vollends in » De perfectione iustitiae hominis «, einer Schrift, die Augustin im Jahre 475% als Antwort auf die anonym umlaufenden, dem Caelestius zugeschriebenen » Definitiones « verfaBte’?. Hier nun verwendet der Kirchenlehrer, wie es scheint zum ersten Mal", die Paulusstelle Rom. 8, 30 im Zusammenhang einer Aussage tber die Pridestination. Hs ist bemerkenswert, da die Pridestination zum Heil dabei auf die einzelnen Glieder der Kirche bezogen wird, Augustin die praedestinatio ad bonam partem also rein individuell fat, wihrend er die praedestinatio ad interitum gerade nicht auf Individuen, sondern auf ein genus bezieht®, In » De gratia novi testamenti « begegnet bereits eine entsprechende Aussage, in der die praedestinatio ad interitum auf den ordo der Siinde, dem der Mensch selber sich zuordnet, bezogen wird". Von dieser Unterscheidung der praedestinatio ad bonam partem als einer individuellen und der praedestinatio ad malam partem als einer generellen wird man auseugehen haben, wenn man entscheiden will, ob und in welchem Sinne man von einer doppelten Pridestination in der Lehre Augustins reden darfit, Auch in dem Buch » De natura et gratia «, mit dem der Kirchenvater im Jahre 415 dem ihm durch ‘Timasius und Jakobus bekannt gewordenen Werk des Pelagius » De natura « begegnete™, ist die in unmittelbarer 33. Vgl. unten S. 64 f. (ep. 177). Dort ist ausgesprochen, was hier der Gedankengang schon als Konsequenz fordert. 34 CSET. day De 457- 35. Z.B. CS Ein 44, De 4578. 36. Datierung nach Urba-Zycha CS.EX,. 42, p. I und J. Ferguson, Pelagius 8. 65. 37. Vel. CSEL. 42, p. 3 (+ De pert. iust. hom. «). 38. Ep. 149, wo diese Stelle im gleichen Sinne verwendet wird (C.S.E.L.. 44, P. 367, 10 ss), ist zwischen 414 und 416 entstanden (vgl. A. Goldbacher C.S.E.L. 58 p. 40). 39. CSEWL,. 42, p. 36.und p. 46 sowie p. 32, 6-9 +» hoc ergo bonum, quod est requirére deum, tion erat qui faceret, non erat usque ad wnuim, sed in 0 genere hominum, quod pracdestinatum est ad interitum 4, Das einschrinkende + sed « betont, dass der Mangel am Tun des Guten nur bel jenem genus von Menschen besten 40. CELL. 44, p. 158, 45.1 ¢ qui enim iniuste se ordinat in peccatis, iuste ordinatur in poenis ¥ eigentlich :# wer sich... in den Stinden einordnet, wird... in den Strafen elngeordnet 41. Vgl unten, Tell II, 8. 223. 42. Vgl unten S. 68. Die Auseinandersetaung dee Pelagius in seinem Buch » De natura + mit Gedanken und Argumenten, die thm Augustin entgegengestellt hatte, witd deutlich 2. B. in dem Hinweis, dass es um die Méglichkeit, nicht um die Wirklichkelt eines siindlosen Lebens gehe (+ De natura et gratia « C.S.E.L. 60, p. 237, 26) und in dem Aufgreifen des augustinischenAUGUSTINS BRIEFE I 37 Verkniipfung mit der Gnade geschene Pridestination auf den einzelnen bezogen — wieder im Anschlu8 an Rom. 8, 30%. Der Gnadenbegriff selbst wird in dieser Schrift prizisiert durch eine grandsitzliche Unterscheidung der Schépfungsgnade — iiber die der Gnadenbegriff des Pelagius nicht hinausfiihrt — von der an Christus gebundenen » helfenden « Gnade, die allem menschlichen Tun 2uvorkommt!, Diese Gnade Gottes durch Jesus Christus besteht in der Liebe, die durch den Heiligen Geist in unseren Herzen ausgegossen ist und die gleichbedeutend ist mit der Gerechtigkeit des Christen vor Gott", Die Schrift » De natura et gratia « bezeichnet den Entwicklungsstand der augustinischen Gnadenlehre fiir den Zeitpunkt, in dem der Streit mit Pelagius in seine entscheidende Phase eintrat. Wenn auch die Klarung. verschiedener Finzelfragen noch offen geblieben und manche Begriffe in ihrem vollen Inhalt und ihrem Verhiiltnis zueinander noch nicht bis zu Ende durchdacht waren, so hatte Augustin doch im Jahre 415 bereits eine feste Basis und bestimmte Form fiir die Auspriigung seines Denkens zum spezifischen » Augustinismus « erreicht. Die Verhandlungen in Jerusalem und Diospolis im Jahre 415. Wahrend Augustin an » De natura et gratia « arbeitete!*, kam ein junger spanischer"? Priester, Paulus Orosius, nach Hippo, um mit ihm wegen der in Spanien auftretenden Priscillianer Kontakt aufzunehmen. Angustin sandte ihn weiter zu Hieronymus nach Bethlehem, ausgeriistet, mit zwei Briefen iiber diese Sache (ep. 166 und 167), sowie auch mit antipelagianischen Beweismitteln, darunter Aktenstiicke ‘ber die Verurteilung des Caelestius in Karthago vom Jahre 4rr und eine Abschrift von ep. 157. Als Orosius im Mai/Juni 415 nach Palistina kam, fand er den streitbaren Finsiedler von Bethlehem in Kampfstimmung vor; dieser hatte das Gefecht mit Pelagius, der sich seit etwa awei bis drei Jahren in seiner unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft, bei dem Bischof von Jerusalem, aufhielt Gebetsarguments, besonders der fiinften und sechsten Bitte des Vaterunsers (ebd. p. 245, 25-P. 246, 5). * De natura et gratia +: ed. Urba et Zycha C.S.E.L, 60, D. 23388, Die Datlerung. ebd. Praefatio p. VIII. 43. CS.BL. 60, p. 235, 26-236, 13. 44. Ebd. p. 267 md 284, 21 68. sowie p. 238, 21-23 (Pelagius) ; ebd. p. 235, 23-25, P. 278, 24 85. D. 279, 41 §. und p. 285, 10 (Augustin). 45. Ebd. p. 299. 46. J. Ferguson, Pelagius 8, Saf. halt es fir moglich, dass Augustin bel der Ankunft des Orosiug nicht an # De nat. et grat. +, sondem an + De perf, just, hom. + arbeitete. 47. Val G, de Plinval, Pélage 8. 270. E, Jauncey, The Doctrine of Grace S. 197 gibt als Herkunftsort des Orosius Bracara bzw. Braga in Portugal an, F. Ferguson, Pelagius S. 8: Tarragona (nach Oxos. Hist, VII, 22).58 H. ULBRICH und dort immer gréferen Einflu® gewann, bereits erdfinet!®, Das jugendlich ungesttime Hingreifen des Orosius konnte nur dazu dienen, die Auseinandersetzung zu noch gréBerer Heftigkeit 2u entfachen. Vor allem brachte er die formelle Verdammung des Caelestius durch die mitgebrachten Aktenstiicke im Orient erst zur Kenntnis, Indem er sich um den Beweis bemiihte, da jenes Urteil gegen den Schiiler notwendigerweise den Pelagius mitbetraf, richtete er gegen diesen einen gefihrlichen Angriff. Vorerst jedoch war sein Gegner in der starkeren Position; der hatte angesehene und einflu@reiche Génner, Ctesiphon, Anianus und vor allem Bischof Johannes von Jerusalem, mit dem er sich in vollstem Finverstindnis befand. Den Bischéfen in Palistina war auf Grund des origenistischen Einilusses » eine Summe von Gedanken « geliufig, die das Hinverstandnis mit Pelagius erleichterten™. Zur Priifung der gegen Pelagius gerichteten Anschuldigungen berief Bischof Johannes im Juli 4z5 einen Konvent nach Jerusalem ein’, Dem Pelagius wurde dabei keinesfalls die Rolle eines Angeklagten zugeteilt, ebensowenig wie Orosius als Anklager auftrat, sondern lediglich zur Berichterstattung iiber die Vorginge in Karthago geladen waril. Hieronymus nahm an dem Konvent nicht teil. Orosius legte indessen nicht nur die karthagischen Akten vor, sondern verlas auch den mitgebrachten Augustinbrief, den er damit zum Mafstab der katholischen Tehre 2u machen versuchte™, Dieses Ansinnen, Augustin zur Autoritat fiir die Verhandlungen des Konvents zu machen, quittierte Pelagius mit der bekannten Gegenfrage, was ihn denn Augustin anginge. Die Verhandlungen in Jerusalem verliefen sehr giinstig fiir Pelagius. Johannes stellte fest, daB die vorgebrachten Anschuldigungen gegen Caelestius nicht gegen Pelagius gerichtet seien, und an der Lehre seines Schiitlings, da der Mensch die Gebote leicht®® erfiillen kinne, wenn er 48. Zur Mission des Orosius und zu den Vorgingen in Palastina im Jahre 415 vgl G. de Plinval, Pélage 8. 270 ff, E. Jauncey, The Doctrine of Grace 8, 197 ff. und J. Ferguson, Pelagius S. 8x ff. 49. H. Reuter, Augustinische Studien 8. 155. So. H, Reuter, Augustinische Studien S, 156 welst darauf hin, dass dieser Konvent (den G. de Plinval, Pélage S. 276 cine Synode nennt) keine Didzesansynode gewesen sel (60 dennoch E. Jauncey, ‘The Doctrine of Grace S. 198 und J. Ferguson, Pelagins 8. 82). Das Datum des Konvents (28, Juli) bei E, Jauncey und J, Ferguson ebd. 51. SoG. de Plinval, Pélage S, 276, wihrend H. Reuter, Augustinische Studien S. 156 betont, dass wir als Historiker nicht » wissen +, dass Johannes den Orosius zu dem Konvent berufen habe. 52, H, Reuter, Augustinische Studien 8. x60. 53. In der r2, der dem Caelestius zugeschriebenen » Definitions « heisst es ahnlich : wenn, die Stinde eine Sache des Willens sei, dam kénne der Wille durch sich selber doch leicht (> perfacile «) (zum Besseren) getindert werden (+ De perf. just, hom. ¢ CSE. 42, p. 11, 9-11)« Hier geht es nur wm den Ausdruck » perfacile «. Vgl. atch unten S. 77 und Anm, 96, Zu der Lehre des Pelagius, die Gnade helfe zu lelchterem Erfiillen der Gebote vgl. + De gratia Christi « CS.EL. 42, p. 131, 4-6 und p. 148, 765, (durch die Hilfe des Heiligen Geistes sei es leichter, das Bose zu melden).AUGUSTINS BRIEFE I 50 wolle, nahm der Bischof yon Jerusalem keinen Ansto8. Orosius mufte sich schlieBlich mit der Forderung begniigen, Pelagius solle 2u seiner Aussage nur noch hinzufiigen, die Erfiillung der Gebote sei allein mit der Hilfe Gottes méglich. Das ingehen anf dieses Verlangen hitte allerdings — wenigstens in den Augen der Gegner des Pelagius — praktisch einen Widerruf bedeutet. Als er auch damit nicht durchdrang, war der MiBerfolg des Orosius offenbar. Dieser Fehlschlag ging nicht zuletzt auf das Konto der Sprachschwierigkeiten, die in der Ungeschicklichkeit und Unredlichkeit des Dolmetschers bei der miindlichen Ubersetzung — ein Protokoll wurde nicht gefiihrt — bestanden®, Wahrend nimlich zumindest Orosius und Pelagius, aber wohl auch die iibrigen Teilnehmer auBer Johannes Lateiner waren®’, sprach der Bischof von Jerusalem griechisch. Alles, was Orosius zuletzt noch erreichen konnte, war das Ubereinkommen, die Sache dem Papst Innocentius I. zur Entscheidung vorzilegen. Der Angriff war zunichst abgeschlagen und die Position des Pelagius stirker als zuvor. Das mute Orosius am eigenen Leibe erfahren, als er durch den Vorwurf, er habe behauptet, der Mensch kénne noch nicht einmal mit Hilfe der Gnade die Siinde vermeiden, unversehens selber in die Situation des Angegriffenen geriet. Ein zweiter Anlauf war ndtig, wenn man dem Pelagius in seinem Jerusalemer Refugium zuleibe riicken wollte. Dies unternahmen zwei von ihren Amtssitzen in Arelate und Aquae Sextiae vertriebene gallische Bischéfe, Heros und Lazarus, die sich damals in Palistina aufhielten. Sie erhoben bei dem Metropoliten von Caesarea, Eulogius, eine formliche Anklage gegen Pelagius. Indem der Metropolit daraufhin am 20. Dezember 415 in Diospolis (Lydda) 14 palistinensische Bischéfe zur Priifung der Lehre des Pelagius versammelte, wurde dieser zum ersten Male in aller Form zur Rechenschaft gezogen. Obwohl auch Johannes von Jerusalem an der Synode teilnahm, war die Lage fiir Pelagius bedrohlicher als vordem in Jerusalem ; denn jetzt befand er sich in der Rolle des Angeklagten. Obwohl der Synode als Grundlage der Verhandlungen reicheres Material vorlag®, darunter auch AuSerungen des Caelestius, pritfte sie nur einzelne verdichtige Satze des Pelagius. Hauptpunkte der Diskussion waren die Fragen des villig freien Willens und der effektiven Verwirklichung der Siindlosigkeit. Pelagius sah sich, » um die heilige Synode zufrieden- zustellen ? gendtigt, den Caclestius zu verdammen. Und sich selber muBte er in allen Glaubensfragen ausdriicklich dem Urteil der Kirche unterstellen. Aber es gelang ihm durch doppeldeutige Formulierungen, 54. H. Reuter, Augustinische Studien , 157. 435. So (gegen Hefele) H, Reuter ebd, 8. 158 f. 36. Vel. im einzelnen G, de Plinval, Pélage 8. 286, Zu den Verhandlungen vgl.» De gestis Pelagii + § 2-44) CS.E-1) 42, Ps 52 53. 57. + De gestis Pelagii «'§ 24 CS.EL. 42, p. 77, 248.60 H. ULBRICH durch Ableugnung der Urheberschaft an besonders belastenden Aussagen . und nicht zuletzt durch Liige, sich vor der Synode zu rechtfertigen. So fithrten denn die Verhandlungen zu der Entscheidung, da Pelagius rechtglaubig sei und zur kirchlichen und katholischen Gemeinschatt gehdre®. Zu diesem Ausgang miégen wiederum, ahnlich wie in Jerusalem, Sprach- schwierigkeiten beigetragen haben; denn alle Teilnehmer der Synode waren Griechen und griechisch war die Verhandiungssprache, wihrend die Sitze des Pelagius ja lateinisch formuliert waren‘, Entscheidend aber war zweifellos, da® die orientalischen Bischéfe zu wenig mit der Materie vertraut waren tind wohl iiberhaupt nicht das rechte Verstiindnis fiir die verhandelten dogmatischen Fragen der Abendlinder aufbringen konnten bzw. weil — um mit H. Reuter zu reden — eine Differenz bestand zwischen » der dogmatischen Stimmung im Oriente « und » derjenigen, welche im Oceidente die herrschende geworden « war. Jedenfalls starkte das Urteil der Synode von Diospolis, das Pelagius durch scheinbare Opfer und durch Unebrlichkeit erreicht hatte, sein Ansehen nur noch mehr und er férderte eiftig den allgemeinen Hindruck, als sei er triumphierend aus allen Anfeindungen hervorgegangen, indem er das Urteil durch eine chartula in allen Provinzen bekannt machte und davon auch Augustin ein Exemplar zuschickte', Darin behauptete er, die Kirche habe seine Lehre von der Stindlosigkeit bestiitigt, verschwieg aber wohlweislich, was fiir ihn hitte ungiinstig erscheinen kinnen wie auch seine Verdammung des Caelestius. Die Reaktion der nordafrikanischen Kirche. Orosius kehrte im Frihling oder Anfang Sommer 416 nach Karthago zuriick. Ex brachte im Auftrage des Johannes von Jerusalem, der also keinen Groll hegte, Reliquien des heiligen Stephanus mit, die walrend der Synode yon Diospolis auf wunderbare Weise gefunden wurden® ; auferdem aber hatte er je einen Brief von Hieronymus und den Bischéfen Heros und Lazarus bei sich. Die von ihm iiberbrachten Nachrichten liber die Vorginge in Palistina wirkten alarmierend in Nordafrika, wo man sogleich den Ernst der Lage erkannte, Zwei Synoden, die eine in 58. CSET. 42, p. 99; 4 £5. 59. Vgl. H. Reuter, Augustinische Studien S, x62 nud E, Jauncey, The Doctrine of Grace 8. 218, 60, Augustinische Studien 8. 163. 61. » De gestis Pelagil « § 54 und 57 CSE.L, 42, p. 106 und p. 121; ep. 179 CSET). 44) Pp. 695. Vgl. G, de Plinval, Pélage 8. 292. 62. G. de Plinval, Pélage 8. 293. 63. Vel. ep. 175 CS.EL. 44, p. 653, 13 8. und J. Ferguson, Pelagius S, 93. Der Brief des Fieronymus ist dessen ep. 134.AUGUSTINS BRIEFE I on Karthago fiir die prokonsularische Provinz, die andere in Mileve fiir Numidien — von denen wenigstens die erste eine Routineversammlung, also nicht eigens wegen Pelagius cinberufen war, gaben die Méglichlceit einer sofortigen gemeinsamen Aktion. Beide Versammlungen richteten je ein Synodalschreiben an den Papst Innocentius I. Der Zweck des noch im Jahre 416 verfaSten Schreibens der in Karthago versammelten prokonsularischen Bischéfe'’ — es waren 68, an ihrer Spitze der greise Aurelius von Karthago — wird gleich in dessen Bingang ausgesprochen : Innocentius mége mit seiner apostolischen Autoritit eintreten, um das Heil vieler zu schiitzen und die Irrlehrer selbst zu berichtigen. Dazu miissen diese oder, falls sie sich reinwaschen kinnen, doch die Irrlehre offiziell durch den rémischen Stuhl verdammt werden. Als Urheber der Irrlehre ist den versammelten Bischéfen durch einen von dem Presbyter Orosius tiberbrachten Brief der gallischen Bischéfe Heros und Lazarus neben Caelestius auch Pelagius genannt worden. Augustins Name findet sich nicht unter denen der am Kopf des Schreibens genannten Bischéfe, Er hat also — da sein Amtssitz zur Provinz Numidien gehérte — an dieser Synode nicht teilgenommen, Doch es sind seine Gedanken und Argumente, mit denen die prokonsularischen Bischéfe den Papst zu dem erhofften Schritt 2u bewegen suchen: die Pelagianer verteidigen nicht den freien Willen, sondern riihmen ihn bis zur Liisterung, sodaB fiir die Gnade Gottes kein Raum mehr bleibt, die doch die Entscheidung unseres Willens durch den Glauben erst wahrhaft frei macht®*, Obwohl sie nicht wagen, die Gnade Gottes dffentlich zu bekimpfen, tun sie das praktisch doch mit ihrer Behauptung, die menschliche Natur allein teiche aus, um die Gebote Gottes zu erfiillen, Damit stellen sie sich in Widerspruch zur Heiligen Schrift’. Wenn der freie Wille die Méglichkeit in sich trigt, der Versuchung zu widerstehen, dann ist die Bitte des ‘Herrengebetes : » Fiihre uns nicht in Versuchung « iiberfliissig. Dann tat Christus unrecht, als er fiir Petrus betete (Luc. 22, 32). Auch diirite es 64, Vel. den ersten Satz von ep. 175 (CS.E.L. 44, P. 633, 1158): # Cum ex more ad Carthaginensem ecclesiam sollemniter venitemus atque ex diversis causis congregata ex nobis -synodus haberetur... +). 65. Ep. 175 CS.EL. 44, D. 652.88, Zur Datierung vel. A. Goldbacher C.S.EL,. 58, p. 45. 66, Val. oben S. 55 £ (ep. 157). 67. Vel. ep. 145 CSET. 44, D. 268, 6-12 $8.5 p. 270, 1-3 und ep. 157 ebd. p. 451, 19-23; Bs 454) 3-5: 198.} P. 455, 14-21. In der Auswahl der Schriftstellen, die den pelagianischen, Behauptungen widersprechen, ist die karthagische Synode weitgehend selbstandig gegentiber Augustin. Im einzeluen sind folgende Stellen herangezogen : Rom. 7, 22-253 8, 26 9, 26; 12, 5-6 ; 1. Cor. 15, 10. $7 3 2. Cor. 3,55 4s 7. Nur eine dieser Stellen findet sich in den Briefen Augustins bis au diesem Zeitpunkt; Rom, 7, 22-25 in ep. 157 zweimal (C.S.EL. 445 D. 463, 1588. und p, 465, 1181). Vielleicht ist das Heranzichen von 2. Cor. 3, § nahegelegt worden, durch die Benutzung der benachbarten Stelle 2. Cor. 3, 6 durch Augustin in ep. x45 (CS.EL.. 44, P. 268, 14) und ep. 157 (ebd. p. 455, 17). Auch der Zusammenhang, in dem 1. Cor. 15, 57 steht, ‘ist von Augustin durch Zitat von r. Cor. 15, 53-54 schon verwendet worden (ep. 145 CS.ELL,. 44, P. 256, 9831).