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Where's what and what's where: The language of objects in space
Lingua, Apr 1, 1994
ABSTRACT Many traditional views of language learning emphasize the importance of non-linguistic k... more ABSTRACT Many traditional views of language learning emphasize the importance of non-linguistic knowledge in constraining children's interpretations of the utterances they hear as they learn form-meaning correspondences. In the present paper, I propose that the structure of the human spatial-cognitive system may impose massive limitations on how the language of objects and places can be represented during first language learning. Specifically, the separation and respective structures of the ‘what’ and ‘where’ systems (as documented by neuropsychologists) show striking correlation with the properties of geometric representations underlying object names and place expressions (as proposed by Landau and Jackendoff 1993). Spatial representations underlying object names seem to be linked to detailed object shape (along with possible relevant shape transformations), while the representations underlying place-functions (spatial prepositions in English) seem to be linked to object descriptions preserving principal axes, but no detailed shape. Evidence is reviewed that these distinct representations are reflected in children's early comprehension, production, and learning of names for objects and places. Additional evidence from cross-linguistic studies of spatial terms appears to be consistent with the account given, although challenges remain. As a whole, the linguistic and psychological evidence support the notion that non-linguistic representational systems may play a part in shaping some of the character of languages.
The human language faculty is clearly adequate to the task of constructing a rich linguistic syst... more The human language faculty is clearly adequate to the task of constructing a rich linguistic system even under the unusual conditions of an impoverished stimulus delivered through an unlikely channel. A complete knowledge of the word includes both…semantic knowledge and all the syntactic knowledge relating to the word. Carol Chomsky's (henceforth, CC) studies of language acquisition are as fresh and as central to understanding language acquisition today as they were at their inception four decades ago. Here, we take a retrospective look at how some of her ideas, experimental studies, and perspectives have played out in the literature during the intervening years. As the quotes above hint, we will concentrate our attention on two specific issues that are implicit in CC's challenge: to understand how children come to know as much as they do about language and its interpretation onto the world, when the information they receive is paltry. The first concerns the robustness of language acquisition to variability in learners' access to input that would seem crucial to the function being acquired, as dramatized by CC in her studies of language in people who became both deaf and blind during infancy. The second concerns the abilities of children to reconstruct the meanings of sentences with covert structure, as in CC's landmark studies of whether blindfolded dolls might be hard to see. These two themes are
When people describe motion events, their path expressions are biased toward inclusion of goal pa... more When people describe motion events, their path expressions are biased toward inclusion of goal paths (e.g., into the house) and omission of source paths (e.g., out of the house). In this paper, we explored whether this asymmetry has its origins in people's non-linguistic representations of events. In three experiments, 4-year-old children and adults described or remembered manner of motion events that represented animate ⁄ intentional and physical events. The results suggest that the linguistic asymmetry between goals and sources is not fully rooted in non-linguistic event representations: linguistic descriptions showed the goal bias for both kinds of events, whereas non-linguistic memory for events showed the goal bias only for events involving animate, goal-directed motion. The findings are discussed in terms of the mapping between non-linguistic representations of goals and sources in language, focusing on the role that linguistic principles play in producing a more absolute goal bias from more gradient non-linguistic representations of paths.
Where learning begins: initial representations for language learning
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Apr 21, 1988
... Moreover, chronologically late learning of a first language as well as features of second lan... more ... Moreover, chronologically late learning of a first language as well as features of second languagelearning show effects of this same distinction, with the unstressed material being forever the last and hardest for older emigres to acquire (Johnson & Newport 1986; Morgan, Meier ...
Providing Support for ‘Support’: Parents’ Use of Verbs and Prepositions When Describing Support Configurations to Their Children
Journal of Cognition and Development, Apr 7, 2021
ABSTRACT Support (one object preventing another from falling) is linguistically encoded by adults... more ABSTRACT Support (one object preventing another from falling) is linguistically encoded by adults and children in a highly structured and differentiated way, with basic locative expressions or Light verbs (e.g., in English, the block is on/put on the box) encoding Support-from-Below, and lexical verbs (e.g., she stuck the block on the box) encoding Mechanical Support. We ask whether parents use such highly differentiated language when describing support configurations to their young children and whether the age of the child moderates this effect. We found that when parents of children 6-months to 3.5 years of age described events of Support-from-Below and Mechanical Support to their children, they did use distinct linguistic expressions, encoding Support-from-Below with Light verbs (e.g., put on) and Mechanical Support with other lexical verbs (e.g., stick on/to). This differentiation was especially prominent for parents of the oldest children, who used more lexical verbs (stick), and fewer Light verbs (put), to encode Mechanical Support. These findings are the first to demonstrate that parents’ spatial language to their young children distinguishes between two distinct types of support and suggest that parent input may play an important role in helping children learn to linguistically carve up the semantic domain of support. This sets the stage for future research to test the causal connection between the two.
How do children learn the meanings of simple spatial prepositions like in and on? In this paper, ... more How do children learn the meanings of simple spatial prepositions like in and on? In this paper, I argue that children come to spatial term learning with an a priori conceptual distinction between core versus non-core concepts of containment and support, and that they learn how language maps onto this distinction by considering both the simple prepositions and the company they keep-that is, the distributions of their co-occurrences with particular verbs. Core types of containment and support are largely expressed by in/on together with the light verb BE; non-core types are expressed by lexical verbs such as insert, hang, stick, and so on, which represent the specific mechanical means by which containment or support is achieved. These latter types arguably depend on extensive learning about the particular mechanisms of containment and support, many of which are invented by humans, as well as learning the specific lexical verbs that encode these mechanisms. The core versus non-core distinction is reflected in young children's and adults' linguistic descriptions of different spatial configurations, via different distributions of expression types across different configurations. Differences between children and adults are not likely to be rooted in either conceptual or semantic differences, but rather, in the probabilistic nature of available expressions, along with early limits on children's vocabulary of lexical verbs that express complex mechanical relationships between objects.
Learning a verb's meaning and its associated syntactic structures pose a number of difficult prob... more Learning a verb's meaning and its associated syntactic structures pose a number of difficult problems for a learner. However, it is widely assumed that there are consistent correspondences between verb meanings and verb syntax, and that knowledge of these correspondences may provide important help to the learner Gropen et al. 1991a,b). To take a simple example, English mental verbs like "think", "know", and "believe" take sentential complements, as do many other mental verbs in English and other languages. Accordingly, if this connection is universal, and if the learner knows this, then it could be very useful. If the learner already knows that a verb is a mental verb, then she can infer that it allows a sentential complement. If the learner hears an unfamiliar verb that takes a sentential complement, then this can be used as a clue that the verb might be a mental verb. In this paper we are primarily concerned with locative verbs, such as "pour", "fill", "load", and "stuff". Locative verbs encode the relationship between a moving object -the "Figure"-and a location -the "Ground". Although locative verbs all show this semantic similarity, they fall into at least four different syntactic subclasses based on their syntactic possibilities (Pinker 1989), as shown in (1-4). In addition to the Figure and Ground Non-alternating classes, Alternating verbs are divided into two subclasses, the Figure Alternating verbs in (3) and the Ground Alternating verbs in (4), based on which argument is obligatory in both syntactic frames (see Pinker 1989). Non-Alternating Figure verbs in English ("dribble", "spill", "slop", or "ladle") (1) a. John poured water Figure into the glass Ground . Figure-frame b. *John poured the glass Ground with water Figure . *Ground-frame manner-of-motion Non-Alternating Figure verbs Non-Alternating Ground verbs in English ("cover", "decorate", or "soak") (2) a. *John filled water Figure into the glass Ground . *Figure-frame b. John filled the glass Ground with water Figure . Ground-frame change-of-state Ground verbs
Two types of meaning representation are described, symptom and criterion, and it is argued that b... more Two types of meaning representation are described, symptom and criterion, and it is argued that both have psychological status in mental representations of kinship terms. Certain symptoms, such as old age and biofocals for grandmothers, are likely indicators of grandmotherhood, but they do not reliably pick out all positive instances, nor do they indicate negative ones. Criteria specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for grandmotherhood: having a grandchild. The psychological reality of these two representations was demonstrated by asking children and adults to select kin-term exemplars from pictures in which both age and reciprocal kin symptoms are displayed, and to justify their selections. In both tasks, there was change with age away from using typical age as the sole bas& for performance; older subjects selected pictures displaying reciprocal kin, and justified their choices by referring to the criterion. More important, at each age level, there was evidence for dual representation: Even subjects who selected pictures based on the age symptom often gave criterial justifications, and subjects who selected pictures based on the reciprocal kin symptom still preferred pictures displaying age symptoms in addition to the reciprocal kin.
Spencer et al. are intent on dismantling the nativist-empiricist debate, and they frame their arg... more Spencer et al. are intent on dismantling the nativist-empiricist debate, and they frame their arguments as follows. First, they argue that "development is often a non-obvious process that does not easily conform to our intuitions or rational expectations". Second, they argue that the fact of evolution "does not obviate the need to explain developmental process". Third, they argue that developmentalists must be held to the "highest of scientific standards" because the study of development is extraordinarily complex. They offer a wide range of empirical phenomena illustrating that development is complex and that human capacities change as a consequence of interaction between the organism and its environment. Their three points are surely correct, but they are simply orthogonal to the authors' main plea: That developmental scientists no longer engage in the nativist-empiricist debate. This debate is important precisely because it helps us frame answers to questions about development. Part of the problem is Spencer et al.'s apparent misunderstanding of the modern nativist position. First, this position does not embrace the idea that development is simple; it is the very fact of its complexity that drives the nativist to try to understand what kinds of rich structures might be capable of supporting the massive changes that occur over development. Examples abound: Modern studies of language have long sought to understand how hearing one's native language results in learning that language despite radical differences in experience . Modern studies of numerical cognition seek to understand how knowledge of number changes from a system common to many species to the one shown by humans alone . Modern studies of the development of spatial representation seek to understand how humans (and other species) represent location, how these representations are transformed over one's own movement, and how these transformed representations support inferences about one's current location . Each of these examples requires that we understand the basic building blocks of a system, and how these might change over development, as bodies grow, as minds and brains mature, as the world of interaction expands. Second, the nativist may consider the evolutionary contribution as part of the story of how these building blocks--rather than others--might have become available to the organism; but this position does not entail that development itself does not matter. Our capacity for mental rotation likely embodies abstract geometrical principles that have evolved to reflect principles of the world in which we have evolved . Still, the developmentalist wants to understand how this capacity sharpens over development. Third, surely every developmental scientist--whatever his or her theoretical persuasion--would agree that we should be held to the highest scientific standards: Our theories should be coherent and as well articulated as possible, our empirical tests should be designed to test key principles of the theories, and our interpretation of empirical results should extend and enhance those theories. Spencer et al. particularly worry about positing primitives for developmental systems. They seem to believe that because their position emphasizes change, they do not have to specify their own building blocks. But they do--every theory must start with primitives. If these are not specified, then we cannot specify the mechanisms of change, since those changes will operate on
Spatial representation of objects in the young blind child
Cognition, Feb 1, 1991
Four experiments investigated the young blind child's ability to discover, construct and ... more Four experiments investigated the young blind child's ability to discover, construct and transform representations of objects, in particular those that preserve the spatial relationships among object parts. Experiment 1 showed that three 18-36-month-old blind children systematically explored novel objects using distinctive haptic manipulations linked to novel shape versus texture. Experiments 2, 3 and 4 pursued a single blind child's ability to represent and transform the spatial configurations of objects. By 2 1/2 years, this child was able to rapidly recognize and identify familiar geometric figures following brief exploration (Experiment 2). By 3 years, she was able to recognize novel objects under 180 degree rotations when their configurations differed from distractors only in the spatial relationships holding among object parts (Experiment 3). At this age, she was also able to infer the locations corresponding to spatial parts of novel objects (the top, bottom, front, back and side) when the objects were upright or rotated, defined only by the location of a single "anchor" term that established their orientation (Experiment 4). In all cases, the blind child's performance was quite similar to that of sighted controls. The results indicate that visual experience is not necessary for the early natural emergence of the capacity to represent and transform spatial descriptions of objects.
Characterizing the Details of Spatial Construction: Cognitive Constraints and Variability
Cognitive Science, 2022
Spatial construction—the activity of creating novel spatial arrangements or copying existing ones... more Spatial construction—the activity of creating novel spatial arrangements or copying existing ones—is a hallmark of human spatial cognition. Spatial construction abilities predict math and other academic outcomes and are regularly used in IQ testing, but we know little about the cognitive processes that underlie them. In part, this lack of understanding is due to both the complex nature of construction tasks and the tendency to limit measurement to the overall accuracy of the end goal. Using an automated recording and coding system, we examined in detail adults’ performance on a block copying task, specifying their step‐by‐step actions, culminating in all steps in the full construction of the build‐path. The results revealed the consistent use of a structured plan that unfolded in an organized way, layer by layer (bottom to top). We also observed that complete layers served as convergence points, where the most agreement among participants occurred, whereas the specific steps taken to achieve each of those layers diverged, or varied, both across and even within individuals. This pattern of convergence and divergence suggests that the layers themselves were serving as the common subgoals across both inter and intraindividual builds of the same model, reflecting cognitive “chunking.” This structured use of layers as subgoals was functionally related to better performance among builders. Our findings offer a foundation for further exploration that may yield insights into the development and training of block‐construction as well as other complex cognitive‐motor skills. In addition, this work offers proof‐of‐concept for systematic investigation into a wide range of complex action‐based cognitive tasks.
Haptics as an aid to copying for people with Williams Syndrome
... The produced force was proportional to the distance between the HIP and the nearest point on ... more ... The produced force was proportional to the distance between the HIP and the nearest point on the constraint line to the Figure 3. Comparison of figure tracing and copying by a person with WS and a normal adult. The age is in years; months. ...
A set of eight experiments demonstrate spatial knowledge in a 2-year-old congenitally blind child... more A set of eight experiments demonstrate spatial knowledge in a 2-year-old congenitally blind child and sighted blindfolded controls. Once the blind child had traveled along specific paths between objects in a novel array, she was able to make spatial inferences, finding new routes between those objects (Experiment I). She could also do so when the routes were between places in space, not occupied by objects (Experiment II). Deviations from precisely straight routes in Experiments I and H were not due to faulty inferences, but probably came from imprecise motor control, since the same deviations occurred when inferences were not required--when the child moved to a place designated by a sound source (Experiment 111). This child's performances could not be accounted for by artifactual explanations: sound cues, experimenter bias, and echolocation were ruled out (Experiments IV, V, VI). Further. sighted blindfolded controls performed at roughly the same level (Experiment VII). Finally, Experiment VIII shows that the blind child could access her spatial knowledge for use in a simple map-reading task. We conclude that the young blind child has a system of spatial knowledge, including abstract, amodal rules *We wish to thank Lila R. Gieitman for extensive conceptual, editorial, and per,,;onal support in every phase of this project. 'We also thank C.R. Gallistel for suggesting several experimental ideas, and for pointing out the relevance of a geometrical approach to spatial knowledge. We thank the O'Brien family for their extensive commitment to this work. Finally, we thank Dr. G. Pereira and Ms. Anne Farren for locating our blind subject, and
We examined the relationship between spatial language and spatial memory by comparing native Engl... more We examined the relationship between spatial language and spatial memory by comparing native English, Japanese, and Korean speakers' naming of spatial locations and their spatial memory for the same set of locations. We focused on two kinds of spatial organization: axial structure of the reference object, and contact/support with respect to its surface. The results of two language (naming) tasks showed similar organization across the three language groups in terms of axial structure, but differences in organization in terms of contact/support. In contrast, the results of two memory tasks were the same across language groups for both axial structure and contact/support. Moreover, the relationship between spatial language and spatial memory in the two sets of tasks did not show a straightforward isomorphism between the two systems. We conclude that spatial language and spatial memory engage the same kinds of spatial properties, suggesting similarity in the foundations of the two systems. However, the two systems appear to be partially independent: the preservation of particular spatial properties was not mandatory across languages, nor across memory tasks, and crosslinguistic differences in spatial language did not lead to differences in the non-linguistic encoding of location. We speculate that the similarity in linguistic and non-linguistic representations of space may emerge as a functional consequence of negotiating the spatial world.
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