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Exerpt from Edouard Hugon, Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae, IIIae-IIa, Metaphysica Ontologica I (Paris: Lethielleux, 1935), pp. 434-6. Translated by Dr. Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo. Draft version, Copyright © Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo, Ite ad Thomam, 2017.
On
Simple and Composite Ens [...] [1]
I. – The
Notion of Simple Ens. Etymologically, the ‘simple’ means that
which is ‘without fold’ (sine plica), or without parts. Hence,
‘simple ens’ altogether excludes plurality and distinction
of parts within itself. For this reason,
‘simple ens’ is defined as “that which does not in itself consist of
many beings” (id quod in se ex pluribus entibus non constat).
But because
there are many different kinds of parts, so there are many different kinds of
simple things: the physically simple, the mathematically simple,
the metaphysically simple, and the logically simple.
The physically
simple is that which does not consist of physical parts, or essential parts, such
as matter and form, or of integral parts, or of accidental parts. The mathematically simple is what
which is indivisible in the genus of quantity because it is the last terminus
of quantity, though it be otherwise physically composite: thus, the point is
mathematically simple, but physically it is something composed of matter and
form. The metaphysically simple
is that which excludes real composition of essence and existence, namely,
God. Finally, the logically
simple is that which excludes composition of genus and difference. There is also a distinction between the negatively
simple, the abstractly simple, and the positively simple. The negatively simple is that which
lacks parts due to the paucity and imperfection of its own entity, as the
mathematical point, or a substance that is conceived as stripped of its
accidents. The abstractly simple
(praecisive simplex) is that which is abstracted from its parts on
account of its indeterminateness, in the way in which ens in general is
most simple, since it cannot be resolved into other concepts. The positively simple is that which
excludes parts on account of the perfection of its own entity.
The
simplicity that belongs to the ens a se, which is necessary and
infinite, is not negative, mathematical, or abstract, for these kinds of
simplicity involve imperfection. Rather,
the simplicity that belongs to it is essentially positive simplicity. Moreover,
it is physical, metaphysical, and logical: that is, it excludes the composition
of physical parts, integral parts, accidental parts, the composition of essence
and existence, and the composition of genus and difference.
Now, logical
simplicity does not belong to creatures, even spiritual creatures; for by their
genus and difference beings are restricted to a certain species. Nor does metaphysical simplicity belong to
them, for their esse differs from their quiddity. Now, they may possess physical simplicity,
which excludes essential or integral parts, but not that simplicity which
removes all composition of accidents: for in no created ens is the
essence an operative faculty, nor is the faculty identical to the operation
itself.
II.
– Notion of Composite Ens. By
opposition to the simple, the composite is that which admits in itself
plurality and distinction of parts, or which in itself consists of many
beings. The composite, therefore, taken
together in all its parts, is the whole itself, and is divided as a whole. Hence, we must make a distinction between (1)
real composites, which are subdivided into (a) essential composites,
whether metaphysical or physical and (b) integral and accidental
composites; (2) logical composites, which are subdivided into definable
and potential; and (3) potestative composites.[2]
Now,
all species of composites can be appropriately reduced to five: (1) essential
composites, composed of matter and form; (2) entitative composites,
composed of essence and esse; (3) integral composites, composed
of integral parts; (4) accidental wholes, composed of many accidents, or
of substance and accidents; (5) numerical composites, composed of many
complete substances which join into a unity of order or of collection.[3]
III.
– Positive simplicity of itself implies perfection; hence, an absolutely simple
ens is a pure act, or ens per essentiam.
Proof
of the 1st Part. Positive
simplicity of its own concept excludes whatever is opposed to unity and
undividedness, and has the function of containing the thing in unity. But to conserve something in unity is to
contain it in esse and in perfection, for one and ens are interchangeable. Therefore, positive simplicity of its own
concept imply esse and perfection.
Therefore, that which excels in simplicity is greater in perfection;
thus plants are more perfect than minerals, animals more perfect than plants,
man more perfect than animals, and angels more perfect than man.
Proof
of the 2nd Part. The ens
per essentiam, or pure act, is an unreceived and unreceptive act. But an absolutely simple ens is an
unreceived and unreceptive act, for it does not consist of receptive potency
and received act. Therefore, an
absolutely simple ens is a pure act and an ens per essentiam.
Now,
negative or abstractive simplicity do not imply perfection, either because they
abstract from perfection or only deny imperfection.
Therefore, simplicity in the
abstract, insofar as it prescinds from positive simplicity, is not a simpliciter
simple perfection, as St. Thomas[4] and Cajetan[5] explain.
IV. –
Composition of its own concept implies imperfection; hence, every composite is
a secondary ens, a caused and contingent ens.
Proof of the 1st
Part. Whatever is potential
involves imperfection. But a composite,
under the ratio of composite, is potential: for either one of its parts
is in potency with respect to another, or at least all of its parts are in
potency with respect to the whole.
Proof
of the 2nd Part. Whatever is the result of
something else is a secondary ens, for it is posterior to those things
of which it is made up. But the
composite is the result of its parts. Therefore, it is a secondary ens.
Moreover,
every composite consists of diverse things which of themselves and of their own
power do not come together to form something that is one. But those things which of themselves do not
come together to form something that is one require a cause to unite them. Therefore, every composite requires a cause,
and therefore is a contingent ens and an ens ab alio.
[1] On this point one
may consult St. Thomas, ST I.3 and 9, and his commentators on those
questions: Cajetan, Báñez, Sylvius, Gonet, Billuart, Buonpensiere, Satolli,
Janssens, Pègues, etc.
[2] See Hugon, Logic.
[3] All of these
compositions are found in our world, Cf. Hugon, Cosmology.
[4] Cf. St. Thomas, In
IV Sent. dist. 11, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.
[5]
Cf. Cajetan, Comment. in De Ente et Essentia, c. 2, q. 3.
