An Introduction to Analogy in St. Thomas' Theology

An Introduction to Analogy in St. Thomas' Theology

One common problem among experienced by beginners in theology, especially those who have a more analytical mind but who have no previous theological training, is that they do not understand or know how to handle analogy.  Since they know from q. 1 of the Prima Pars that theology is a science, which uses logic and even the scholastic method, they expect terms to mean the same thing every time St. Thomas uses it.  In the Summa, however, St. Thomas expects his readers to have previously undertaken a comprehensive course of logica and of philosophy in general, where analogy is studied in depth and applied throughout.  So when a reader comes to the Summa expecting univocity, perhaps because they associate it with logical rigor, they are disappointed and it can become a serious obstacle to understanding the text.

So let me explain analogy briefly for those of you who are not familiar with it (for those of you who are well versed in St. Thomas' logic and metapysics, and are interested in reading more on my take on analogy in Aquinas, I refer you to this old post). 

St. Thomas teaches that we can use a term either univocally or equivocally. We use a term equivocally when we use it many times with different meanings. For example, when I say that the tree has bark I mean something quite different form when I say that my dog likes to bark. In these examples, "bark" is being used in a purely equivocal way. On the other hand, we use terms univocally when they have the same meaning: I am writing these words on a computer and you are reading them on a computer. Here "computer" has the same meaning in both instances, and thus it is being used univocally. Now there is a third way to use terms, which is called analogy, but which is really a subset of equivocal terms. For example, I can say that my dog is "healthy" but also that his food is "healthy" and that his urine seems "healthy." Of course the dog's being healthy means that his physiological funcitons are all in normal order; but the food's being healthy does not mean that at all: it means that the food is capable of producing or continuing the dog's being healthy. And the urine's being healthy is not at all healthy in the way his food is healthy: it is healthy in the sense that it is a sign of the dog's being healthy. So in these examples the term "healhty" is being used with different meanings (equivocally), but yet these meanings are so closely related that they constitute a special kind of equivocal term. 

St. Thomas uses analogous terms throughout his discussion of God, and so does all of theology, for that matter. When we say that this steak that I'm eating is "good," and when I say that God is "good," by the term "good" I mean different things. God is not tasty, and the steak is not goodness itself. Goodness is an analogous term. In fact, pretty much all divine attributes are analogous terms: they mean different things when attributed to God and when attributed to creatures. Thus, you as a student of theology and of St. Thomas in particular you need to be always aware of the fact that analogy is ubiquitous. 

In Summa theologiae Ia, q. 13, a. 5, we read:

Sed contra, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.	On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Praeterea, Deus plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.	Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.	I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.	Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.	Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (Article [1]). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

To stress the point further, the use of analogy is so ubiquitous that we find it throughout theology, and not just in St. Thomas' discussion of divine attributes (which is perhaps the context in which philosophers use analogy the most).  

Analogy extends much further and is found in the discussion on the Trinity as well.  One example is St. Thomas' discussion on the "Son" as an "image" of the "Father." Those three terms are analogous: "Father," "Son," and "image" are being attributed to God, and therefore they have different (though related) meanings in God from the way they are meant when attributed to creatures.

The first point is regarding God as cause/principle. In order to understand St. Thomas' remarks on this topic, we need first to make an important distinction. And this distinction is not that between philosophy and theology. Philosophy indeed identifies God as the first cause. And so does theology. In doing so, philosophy and theology are speaking of the relationship between God and what is outside of God (ad extra). But theology also delves into God's inner life, what is to be found within God (ad intra). And within God, we find processions, where one person, the Father, is the first principle of the others. This procession ad intra is distinctly different from the causality of God ad extra. We can properly describe God's action ad extra as 'causation' or 'causality', but for the reasons St. Thomas gives, God's inner processions are best described as proceeding from a principle, rather than from a cause.

So, the take home message for beginners in theology: get used to analogy in theology!  It's everywhere!

Quaeritur: Logical Vocabulary in St. Thomas' Christology

Quaeritur: Logical Vocabulary in St. Thomas' Christology

Quaeritur: In St. Thomas' Christology, I have found some logical terminology that I do not understand, especially the terms "to predicate" and "reduplication."  Would you please define the following terms for me?  Thank you.

Respondeo: 

Predication: To "predicate A of B" is literally to make term A be the predicate of term B in a sentence or proposition. So to predicate A of B equals to saying that "B is A." For example, to predicate God of Christ is to say that "Christ is God." 

Reduplication occurs when a proposition has a qualification that specifies in which regard the predicate belongs to the subject.  So for example, I am both a father and a professor, and you might want to say that I am "stern" but maybe you want to add that I am so only as a professor and not as a father. So it would be reduplication to say "Professor Romero is stern as a professor." You are 'reduplicating' the term professor. And that reduplication is not a mere redundancy: it is necessary in order to specify in what regard the predicate belongs to the subject: "Prof. Romero qua professor is stern." This is often necessary in Christology in order to specify in what regard we predicate things of Christ. So for example, we can say of Christ the following: "That man is mortal as man" or "God incarnate is immortal qua God." Even if you don't repeat the subject in the predicate, it is considered reduplication if the subject implies the term: "Christ qua man is mortal." 

Reduplication is also common in philosophy; for example, when we say that the object of metaphysics is "being qua being." 

I hope this helps.

St. Thomas: Logic is Not a Science

St. Thomas: Logic is Not a Science

It is a rather common position among Thomistic scholars to consider logic as a science.  And St. Thomas in fact often calls it scientia rationalis in several texts.  However, I would argue that this is only an analogical and less strict use of the term, and that St. Thomas does not consider logic to be strictly speaking a science.  

In his Commentary on Boethius on the Trinity, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2, he argues that there are three genera of speculative sciences---natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics---and in the process clearly argues that logic is not a science, but rather "an instrument of science" (instrumentum scientiae).

Articulus 1

ARTICLE ONE Is Speculative Science Appropriately Divided into these Three Parts: Natural, Mathematical, and Divine?

Pars 3 q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod speculativa inconvenienter in has partes dividatur...	We proceed as follows to the first article: It seems that speculative science is not appropriately divided into these three parts...

Pars 3 q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VIII de civitate Dei quod rationalis philosophia, quae est logica, sub contemplativa philosophia vel speculativa continetur. Cum ergo de ea mentionem non faciat, videtur quod divisio sit insufficiens.	2. Again, Augustine says that rational philosophy, or logic, is included under contemplative or speculative philosophy. Consequently, since no mention is made of it, it seems the division is inadequate.

Pars 3 q. 5 a. 1 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio metaphysicae, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter se ipsa. Res autem, de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter se ipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias. Et ideo logica non continetur sub speculativa philosophia quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quiddam reductum ad philosophiam speculativam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et diffinitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in scientiis speculativis indigemus. Unde secundum Boethium in commento super Porphyrium non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.

Reply to 2. As is evident in the beginning of the Metaphysics, the speculative sciences concern things the knowledge of which is sought for their own sake. However, we do not seek to know the things studied by logic for themselves, but as a help to the other sciences. So logic is not included under speculative philosophy as a principal part but as something brought under speculative philosophy as furnishing speculative thought with its instruments, namely, syllogisms, definitions, and the like, which we need in the speculative sciences. Thus, according to Boethius, logic is not so much a science as the instrument of science.

Text Source: The Logic Museum.

Quaeritur: Difference Between Formal and Total Abstraction

Quaeritur: Difference Between Formal and Total Abstraction

Quaeritur: What is the difference between so-called ‘total abstraction’ and ‘formal abstraction?  If total abstraction consists in abstracting the universal from the particular (e.g., abstracting from a concrete man the universal ‘man’), and formal abstraction consists in abstracting the form from the matter-form composite (e.g., I suppose that from a concrete man, we could abstract his formal ontological structure, that is, his substantial form ‘man’), which places a given being in its species, and which would be similar to the universal---or am I mistaken?  Aren’t they ultimately the same thing?

Respondeo: The difference between these lies in that total abstraction consists, as you say, in abstracting the complete nature of the individual in question (e.g., if we look at a particular tree and abstract the nature of ‘treeness’, or the tree’s proximate genus ‘plant’, or its ultimate genus ‘substance’), whereas formal abstraction consists in isolating, not the whole nature, but merely some partial aspect of the individual, prescinding from its sensible qualities that depend on matter for their definition (as for example, taking the same tree, we can abstractly conceive its geometric shape or figure).  These two types of abstraction, according to modern scholasticism, correspond to natural science and to mathematics, respectively.

Here is a nice explanation from Klubertanz’s Introduction to the Philosophy of Being (2^nd Ed.):

Quaeritur: Are Secondary Substances the Same as First Intentions?

Quaeritur: Are Secondary Substances the Same as First Intentions?

Quaeritur: Dr. Romero, are “second substance” and “first intention” in logic the same thing? 

Respondeo: They are not exactly identical; secondary substances are either first intentions or second intentions. Primary substances are real, extramental substances, whereas secondary substances are beings of reason (entia rationis), that is, the ideas or intentions that we form in the mind. For example, that horse over there eating grass on the field is a primary substance, whereas the idea of 'horseness' that I form in my mind is a secondary substance.  Now, these intentions or ideas come in two kinds: first intentions, which are ideas that directly represent reality, such as my idea of 'horseness', and second intentions, which are ideas about ideas, or ideas concerning the relationships between ideas, such as my idea of 'genus' and 'species'.  Logic is the science of second intentions.

Quaeritur: How do Deduction and Induction Relate to A posteriori and A priori Reasoning

Quaeritur: How do Deduction and Induction Relate to A posteriori and A priori Reasoning

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Quaeritur: Are deductive demonstration and inductive demonstration equivalent to saying “a fortiori” and “a posteriori” demonstration respectively?  God bless.

Respondeo: You probably mean "a priori" and "a posteriori."  The answer is: not necessarily.  A priori and a posteriori can be used in different senses.

One sense is: prior to experience and posterior to experience.  For example, prior to experience (or a priori), I know that all the bachellors that you are friends with are unmarried.  I don't need to meet them and interview them to know they are unmarried.  But I can only know a posteriori (after meeting them), that such and such a bachellor, who is your friend, is six feet tall or has a Canadian accent, or whatever.  This is the most common meaning assigned to this word pair among today's scholars because it is the sense in which Kant used the word pair.  In this sense, induction is always a posteriori (because it necessarily proceeds from particulars, which are known through experience), whereas deduction can be a priori, but is not always.

But there is a second sense of a priori and a posteriori which is applicable to deduction: deduction a priori or "from the prior" (i.e., from the cause), or deduction a posteriori "from the posterior" (i.e., from the effect)--more technical terms for this distinction are: propter quid demonstration vs. quia demonstration.  For example, suppose they say that the International Space Station will be visible tonight where you live.  They say it will look the size of your average star, and its angular distance will be much faster than that of a star (but much slower than a shooting star), such that it will take about a minute to cross the night sky.  But you wonder whether it will twinkle like the stars or not.  You reason in the following way: any heavenly body that is relatively near, compared to the stars, does not twinkle, because what causes a heavenly body to twinkle is its enormous distance from Earth (the light from objects that are far is more susceptible to being altered by the Earth's atmosphere, which  causes the twinkling).  So you conclude that the Space Station will not twinkle, because it is relatively near, compared to the stars.  In essence, your reasoning proceeds from a premise that has to do with the cause (being near), to a conclusion that relates to the effect (not twinkling).  This is deductive a priori reasoning, or a propter quid demonstration.  

But, alternately, suppose that you are looking at a heavenly object at night, and you notice it does not twinkle.  You reason that it must be relatively near to Earth (like a planet), because it does not twinkle.  Your reasoning proceeds from a premise that has to do with the effect (not twinkling) to a conclusion that relates to the cause (being near).  This is deductive a posteriori reasoning, or a quia demonstration.  This is the sense in which many Thomists and translators of St. Thomas use the terms a priori and a posteriori.  I prefer simply to use the Latin: quia and  propter quid demonstrations.  Aristotle (and Aquinas in his Commentary) go into detail concerning these two kinds of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics.

Enthymemes

Enthymemes

Quia vs. Propter Quid Demonstrations of God's Existence

Quia vs. Propter Quid Demonstrations of God's Existence

From Summa theologiae I.2.2 arg 2; ad 2:

(Scholastic format in red.) 

Objection 2. Further, the essence is the middle term of a demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orthodoxa I.4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Major: If we do not know the middle term of a demonstration, then we cannot make that demonstration.

Minor: We do not know the middle term of a demonstration of God's existence.

Conclusion: Therefore, we cannot demonstrate God's existence.

Proof of the Minor: The middle term of a demonstration is the essence of the minor term (the major term in turn is a necessary attribute of the essence).  "God" would be the minor term of a demonstration of God's existence.   Therefore, God's essence would be the middle term of a demonstration of God's existence--such that the demonstration would look like this: "God is an X; X's exist; therefore, God exists," where X = God's essence.  But we do not know what God's essence consists in (but only what it does not consist in).  Therefore.

Reply to Objection 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".

I deny the major of the subjunct [i.e., the major of the "proof of the major"]: In propter quid demonstrations (i.e., demonstrations that proceed from causes to effects), the essence is the middle term; but in quia demonstrations (i.e., those that proceed from effects to cause), the effect is the middle term.  The demonstration of God's existence is a quia demonstration.  Therefore, in the demonstration of God's existence, the middle term are his effects.  And I deny the minor.  And I deny the conclusion.

Why Cajetan's Interpretation of Aquinas's Doctrine of Analogy is Not Wrong

Why Cajetan's Interpretation of Aquinas's Doctrine of Analogy is Not Wrong

Quaeritur: I've run into several articles by modern Thomists attacking traditional Thomists (e.g. Garrigou-Lagrange) for being "essentialists." Frequently, these moderns have been heavily influenced by Wittgenstein, which I find suspect to start with. At any rate, it seems that a large part of their attack is based on an allegation that the "essentialists" inherited a mistaken idea regarding analogy from Cajetan (interestingly, Charles de Koninck holds that Cajetan was incorrect as well, at least in the article I read by him). I was able to find an abstract of a promising looking article (“The Semantics of Analogy according to Thomas de Vio Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia” by Joshua Hochschild), but I haven't been able to get access to the entire thing.

My questions are these:

1) What is your take on the attacks on traditional Thomism as "essentialist"? Was Cajetan wrong in his analysis of analogy? I saw your post from 2006 about Gilson, but I was wondering if you had more to add.

2) Is there anywhere one can find a brief history of this debate? I read a past post on Gilson and his dismissal of the commentators and have read a little by him on the matter (I don't aggree with him), but I was wondering if you had anything further to add.

3) Mcinerny's book on analogy is quite polemic, but I was told that he softened his views afterwards. Is his newer book worth one's time?

4) Why is the debate today so incredibly one-sided by and large (i.e. Cajetan was wrong, end of story)? It seems to be given as a fact that Cajetan was wrong (e.g. many articles simply have it as a footnote that Cajetan had a severely flawed yet influential notion of analogy). It is unclear to me as to what Santiago Ramirez's position is on account of my poor (but improving) Latin.

Also, what-if anything- is worth reading by Joseph Owens? I've had him recommended to me, but at first glance he seems to be against all the commentators. I haven't really looked at him much, but I was wondering if he's worth reading, in your opinion.

Finally, I found a site with literally hundreds of articles, papers, and lecture notes of Charles de Koninck. I thought it might be good to link.

Respondeo: I will first give you my general thought on the matter, and then proceed to give a more direct response to (what’s left of) your questions.

I. I have not yet tackled Ramirez; all I know is that his view is based on Cajetan and he rejects McInerny’s view.

II. I have found reading McInerny's newer book (not "The Logic of Analogy," from 1961, but rather "Aquinas and Analogy," published in 1996) a great learning experience, not because I agree, but because I disagree. Unfortunately, I'm still in the middle of it; I read about half of it last Summer and got too busy and never finished. So far it is indeed very polemical. He dedicates the first chapter to attacking Cajetan (the chapter is titled "Where Cajetan Went Wrong"). The rest of the book (so far) seems to be based on these criticisms of Cajetan.

The first chapter, which left me unconvinced, McInerny makes the following points:

A. Cajetan bases his view on analogy on text from Aquinas' (early) Commentary on the Sentences (I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1m).

B. There Cajetan finds a list of instances of analogous names, which Cajetan interprets as being a logical division of analogy into separate "kinds":

1) analogy of inequality (e.g., "body" is said of all corporeal substances),

2) analogy of attribution (e.g., the dog is "healthy," the dog's food is "healthy," and the dog's urine is "healthy"), and

3) analogy of proportionality (e.g., "being" is said of a substance and of an accident, and of God and creatures).

C. Cajetan admits that the first kind is only abusively called "analogy", because it is really closer to univocity, but the other two kinds do represent genuine, irreducible species of analogy.

D. McInerny, instead, takes passages from the Summa as his basis for interpreting Aquinas' doctrine on analogy. The passages of the Summa seem to present a simpler doctrine, based on Aristotle's distinction in the Categories between univocal and equivocal names. There are:

1) Univocal names (e.g., Plato is a "man" and Socrates is a "man.")

2) Equivocal names (e.g., I write with a "pen" and my children play with a "pen.")

3) Analogical names (e.g., again, the dog is "healthy," the dog's food is "healthy," and the dog's urine is "healthy").

Then Aquinas proceeds to apply this third kind of name (analogous names) to speak of the difference between God and creatures.

E. Thus, McInerny concludes, there is only one kind of analogy. The kind of analogy that obtains between "healthy" things is the same kind of analogy that he will apply to God and creatures. Hence, Aristotle is right, Aquinas is right, but Cajetan is wrong.

III. This is an oversimplification of McInerny’s argument in Ch. 1, and I have not yet thought through all the details of the problem in the rest of the book, but so far here are my thoughts:

A. Aristotle is right. Aquinas is right. Cajetan is right. McInerny is wrong at least insofar as he thinks these three are irreconcilable.

B. McInerny is arguing on the basis of Aquinas' examples. He sees Aquinas in the Summa giving one example of "analogous names" (the "healthy" example) and then saying that analogous names are used between God and creatures. Therefore, he concludes, the kind of analogy that obtains between healthy things is the same as the kind of analogy that obtains between God and creatures. In general, he concludes that there is no basis in Aquinas to make distinctions between kinds of analogous name.

But this is bad reasoning. This is like arguing that, because cats are an example of mammals, and we say that dogs are mammals, it follows that cats are the same kind of mammals as dogs. It's literally the same form of reasoning: because healthy things are an example of analogous names, and we say that God and creatures are given analogous names, it follows that the healthy things are applied the same kind of analogous name as God and creatures.

C. My own interpretation of Aquinas, so far, is this:

1. Cajetan is interpreting the passage of the Sentences correctly: there are three distinct species within the genus "analogous names."

2. The text of the Summa is contrasting the GENUS "analogous names" with two other genera, "univocal names" and "equivocal names."

3. Therefore, a division of "name" would be the following:

A. Univocal
B. Equiocal
C. Analogous
... 1. by inequality
... 2. by attribution
... 3. by proportionality

4. This outline still doesn't quite fit with some of the details, for instance:

a. Aristotle's texts, which list only two kinds of “names,” the univocal and the equivocal (giving the term “healthy” as an example of equivocal names),

b. a few of Aquinas’ texts, which contrast “purely equivocal names” with “analogous names” (implying analogous names are equivocal, but not purely equivocal),

c. Cajetan's classification of the analogy of inequality as being really equivocity that is called analogy only abusively.

So my hunch is that this division can be further revised to make better sense of these problems, and others raised by McInerny, to look like this:

A. Univocal
B. Equiocal
... 1. Purely Equivocal
... 2. Analogous
...... a. by inequality
...... b. by attribution
...... c. by proportionality

This would make Cajetan, Aquinas, and Aristotle all agree. Aristotle would be listing only A and B; Aquinas would be listing A, B1, and B2; and Cajetan would be listing B2a, B2b, and B2c.

IV. In response to your questions:

Q1. I’m no longer so sure that the criticism that Cajetan was an “essentialist” is not based on this issue of analogy, as much as on the fact that Cajetan was very fond of performing a logical analysis on anything that he talked about, thus almost “reifying” logical “essences.” And for ‘existentialist’ Thomists, this is intolerable.

Q2. I’m not sure where you can find an updated history of the debate, but I believe Ramirez goes into it ad nauseam, from ancient Greek philosophy up until his time (1960s).

Q3. I am aware of the two mentioned above. If there is a newer one I don’t know anything about it.

Q4. Cajetan has to be wrong because he is the most prominent of the scholastic Thomists, and scholastic Thomism is over.

Q5. Joseph Owens: read his dissertation on Aristotle, titled: The Doctrine on Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. It’s a masterpiece as a historical interpretation of Aristotle which no one has suprassed it in almost half a century. Anything he has written on Aquinas, however, I wouldn’t be so excited about; it's not awful, but it's just the same old historical Thomism.

366th Anniversary of the Death of John of St. Thomas

366th Anniversary of the Death of John of St. Thomas

John of St. Thomas, OP on the Division, Order, and Necessity of Logic
From John of St. Thomas, OP - Outlines of Formal Logic, pp. 26-7 (available through ITOPL):

(Click images to enlarge.)

Material Logic: Quia Demonstrations vs. Propter Quid Demonstrations

Material Logic: Quia Demonstrations vs. Propter Quid Demonstrations

From St. Thomas' Summa theologiae I.2.2c:

I answer that it must be said that demonstration is twofold: One which is through the cause, and is called demonstration "propter quid" [lit., 'on account of which'] and this is [to argue] from what is prior simply speaking (simpliciter). The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "quia" [lit., 'that']; this is [to argue] from what is prior relatively only to us (quoad nos). When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us (quoad nos); because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist.

From Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I.13:

"Knowledge of the fact (quia demonstration) differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact (propter quid demonstrations). [...] You might prove as follows that the planets are near because they do not twinkle: let C be the planets, B not twinkling, A proximity. Then B is predicable of C; for the planets do not twinkle. But A is also predicable of B, since that which does not twinkle is near--we must take this truth as having been reached by induction or sense-perception. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of C; so that we have demonstrated that the planets are near. This syllogism, then, proves not the reasoned fact (propter quid) but only the fact (quia); since they are not near because they do not twinkle, but, because they are near, do not twinkle...."

A (major term) = close heavenly body

B (middle term) = non-twinkling heavenly body

C (minor term) = planet

Major Premise: B is A

Minor Premise: C is B

Conclusion: C is A

=

Major Premise: Non-Twinkling heavenly bodies are close heavenly bodies.

Minor Premise: Planets are non-twinkling heavenly bodies (effect).

Conclusion: Planets are close heavenly bodies (cause).

From Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I.13 (cont'd):

"The major and middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the demonstration will be of the reasoned fact (propter quid). Thus: let C be the planets, B proximity, A not twinkling. Then B is an attribute of C, and A-not twinkling-of B. Consequently A is predicable of C, and the syllogism proves the reasoned fact (propter quid), since its middle term is the proximate cause...."

A (major term) = non-twinkling heavenly body

B (middle term) = close heavenly body

C (minor term) = planet

Major Premise: B is A

Minor Premise: C is B

Conclusion: C is A

=

Major Premise: Close heavenly bodies are non-twinkling heavenly bodies.

Minor Premise: Planets are close heavenly bodies (cause).

Conclusion: Planets are non-twinkling heavenly bodies (effect).