How to SLSA Part 1 - The Basics

April 12, 2022

Posted by Tom Hennen, Software Engineer, BCID & GOSST
Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

How and when do you verify a package with SLSA?

How to handle artifacts without provenance?

Where is the provenance stored?

Where is the appropriate policy stored and who should verify it?

What should the policies check?

How do you establish trust & distribute keys?

What does a secure, heterogeneous supply chain look like?

The Situation

The Squirrel package ‘foo’

The Oppy package ‘baz’

A custom executable, ‘bar’, written by Acme employees

Basics

In order to SLSA, Squirrel, Oppy, and Acme will all need SLSA capable build services. Squirrel wants to give their maintainers wide latitude to pick a builder service of their own. To support this, Squirrel will qualify some build services at specific SLSA levels (meaning they can produce artifacts up to that level). To start, Squirrel plans to qualify GitHub Actions using an approach like this, and hopes it can achieve SLSA 4 (pending the result of an independent audit). They’re also willing to qualify other build services as needed. Oppy on the other hand, doesn’t need to support arbitrary build services. They plan to have everyone use their Autobuilder network which they hope to qualify at SLSA 4 (they’ll conduct the audit/certification themselves). Finally, Acme plans to use Google Cloud Build which they’ll self-certify at SLSA 4 (pending the result of a Google-conducted audit).

Squirrel, Oppy, and Acme will follow a similar qualification process for the source control systems they plan to support.

Verification options

Full verification

At some point, one or more of the organizations will need to do full verification of each artifact to determine if it is acceptable for a given use case. This is accomplished by checking if the artifact meets the appropriate policy.

Typically, full verification would take place with SLSA provenance, source attestations, and perhaps other specialized attestations (like vulnerability scan results). While having to coordinate this data for all of its dependencies seems like a lot of work to Acme, they’re prepared to do full verification if Squirrel and Oppy are unable to.
Delegated verification

When Acme isn’t using full verification, they can instead use delegated verification where they check if an artifact is acceptable for a use case by checking if some other trusted party who performed a full verification (such as Squirrel or Oppy) believes the artifact is acceptable.

Delegated verification is easier to perform quickly with limited data and network connectivity. It may also be easier for some users who value if someone they trust verified the artifact is good.

Squirrel likes how easy delegated verification would make things for their users and plans to support it by creating a Verification Summary Attestation (VSA) when they perform full verification.

When to verify

Verification (full or delegated) could happen at a number of different times.

On import to repo

Squirrel plans to perform full verification when an artifact is published to their repo. This will ensure that packages in the repo have met their corresponding policy. It’s also helpful because all the required data can be gathered when latency isn’t critical.

If this were the only time verification is performed, it would put the repository's storage in the trusted computing base (TCB) of its users. Squirrel’s plans to use delegated verification (and issue VSAs) can prevent this. The signature on the VSA will prevent the artifacts from being tampered with while sitting in storage, even if they’re just SLSA 0. Downstream users will just need to verify the VSA.

Acme also wants to do some sort of verification on the import to their internal repo since it simplifies their security story. They’re not quite sure what this will look like yet.

On install

Acme also wants to do verification when an artifact is actually installed since it can remove a number of intermediaries from their TCB (their repo, the network, upstream storage systems).

If they perform full verification at install then they must gather all the required information. That could be a lot of data, but it might be simplified by gathering the data from external sources and caching it in their internal repo. A larger problem is that it requires Acme to have established trust in all parties that produced that information (e.g. every builder of every package). For a complex supply chain that may be difficult.

If Acme performs delegated verification, they only need the VSA for the packages being installed and to explicitly trust a handful of parties. This allows the complex full verification to be performed once while allowing all users of that package to perform a much simpler operation.

Given these tradeoffs Acme prefers delegated verification at install time. Squirrel also really likes the idea and plans to build install time verification directly into the Squirrel tool.
On use
Verification could also take place each time an artifact is actually used. In this model, latency and reliability are very important (a sudden increase in site traffic may necessitate a scaling operation launching many new jobs).

Time of use verification allows the most context with which decisions can be made (“is this job allowed to run this code and is it free from vulns right now?”). It also allows policy changes to affect already built & installed software (which may or may not be desirable).

Acme wants their users to be able to verify on use without too many dependencies so they plan to provide VSAs users can use to perform delegated verification when they start the container (perhaps using something like Kyverno).

How to handle artifacts without provenance?

Inevitably a build or system may require that an artifact without ‘original’ provenance is used. In these cases it may be desirable for the importer to generate provenance that details where it got this artifact. For example, this generated provenance shows that http://example.com/foo.tgz with sha256:abc was imported by ‘auto-importer’:

Such an artifact would likely not be accepted at higher SLSA levels, but the provenance can be used to: 1) prevent tampering with the artifact after it’s been imported and 2) be a data point for future analysis (e.g. should we prioritize asking for foo.tgz to be distributed with native SLSA provenance?).

Acme might be interested in taking this approach at some point, but they don’t need it at the moment.

Next time

In our next post we’ll cover specific approaches that can be used to answer questions like “where should attestations and policies be stored?” and “how do I trust the attestations that I receive?”

Improving software supply chain security with tamper-proof builds

April 7, 2022

Posted by Asra Ali and Laurent Simon, Google Open Source Security Team (GOSST)
use malicious source filesinject malicious artifactsupload malicious artifactsTekton ChainsGitHub Actions workflowsSigstore’sSLSA 3

Provenance

SLSA ("Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts”) is a framework to help improve the integrity of your project throughout its development cycle, allowing consumers to trace the final piece of software you release all the way back to the source. Achieving a high SLSA level helps to improve the trust that your artifacts are what you say they are.

This blog post focuses on build provenance, which gives users important information about the build: who performed the release process? Was the build artifact protected against malicious tampering? Source provenance describes how the source code was protected, which we’ll cover in future blog posts, so stay tuned.

Go prototype to generate non-forgeable build provenance

To create tamperless evidence of the build and allow consumer verification, you need to:

Isolate the provenance generation from the build process;
Isolate against maintainers interfering in the workflow;
Provide a mechanism to identify the builder during provenance verification.

The full isolation described in the first two points allows consumers to trust that the provenance was faithfully recorded; entities that provide this guarantee are called trusted builders.

Our Go prototype solves all three challenges. It also includes running the build inside the trusted builder, which provides a strong guarantee that the build achieves SLSA 3’s ephemeral and isolated requirement.

How does it work?

The following steps create the trusted builder that is necessary to generate provenance in isolation from the build and maintainer’s interference.

Step One: Create a reusable workflow on GitHub runners

Leveraging GitHub’s reusable workflows provides the isolation mechanism from both maintainers’ caller workflows and from the build process. Within the workflow, Github Actions creates fresh instances of virtual machines (VMs), called runners, for each job. These separate VMs give the necessary isolation for a trusted builder, so that different VMs compile the project and generate and sign the SLSA provenance (see diagram below).

Running the workflow on GitHub-hosted runners gives the guarantee that the code run is in fact the intended workflow, which self-hosted runners do not. This prototype relies on GitHub to run the exact code defined in the workflow.

The reusable workflow also protects against possible interference from maintainers, who could otherwise try to define the workflow in a way that interferes with the builder. The only way to interact with a reusable workflow is through the input parameters it exposes to the calling workflow, which stops maintainers from altering information via environment variables, steps, services and defaults.

To protect against the possibility of one job (e.g. the build step) tampering with the other artifacts used by another job (the provenance step), this approach uses a trusted channel to protect the integrity of the data. We use job outputs to send hashes (due to size limitations) and then use the hashes to verify the binary received via the untrusted artifact registry.

Step 2: Use OpenID Connect (OIDC) to prove the identity of the workflow to an external service (Sigstore)

OpenID Connect (OIDC) is a standard used across the web for identity providers (e.g., Google) to attest to the identity of a user for a third party. GitHub now supports OIDC in their workflows. Each time a workflow is run, a runner can mint a unique JWT token from GitHub’s OIDC provider. The token contains verifiable information of the workflow identity, including the caller repository, commit hash, trigger, and the current (reuseable) workflow path and reference.

Using OIDC, the workflow proves its identity to Sigstore's Fulcio root Certificate Authority, which acts as an external verification service. Fulcio signs a short-lived certificate attesting to an ephemeral signing key generated in the runner and tying it to the workload identity. A record of signing the provenance is kept in Sigstore’s transparency log Rekor. Users can use the signing certificate as a trust anchor to verify that the provenance was authenticated and non-forgeable; it must have been created inside the trusted builder.

Verification

The consumer can verify the artifact and its signed provenance with these steps:

Look up the corresponding Rekor log entry and verify the signature;
Verify the trusted builder identity by extracting it from the signing certificate;
Check that the provenance information matches the expected source and build.

See an example in action in the official repository.

Performing these steps guarantees to the consumer that the binary was produced in the trusted builder at a given commit hash attested to in the provenance. They can trust that the information in the provenance was non-forgeable, allowing them to trust the build “recipe” and trace their artifact verifiably back to the source.

Extra Bonus: Keyless signing

One extra benefit of this method is that maintainers don’t need to manage or distribute cryptographic keys for signing, avoiding the notoriously difficult problem of key management. The OIDC protocol requires no hardcoded, long-term secrets be stored in GitHub's secrets, which sidesteps the potential problem of key mismanagement invalidating the SLSA provenance. Consumers simply use OIDC to verify that the binary artifact was built from a trusted builder that produced the expected provenance.

Next Steps

Utilizing the SLSA framework is a proven way for ensuring software supply-chain integrity at scale. This prototype shows that achieving high SLSA levels is easier than ever thanks to the newest features of popular CI/CD systems and open-source tooling. Increased adoption of tamper-safe (SLSA 3+) build services will contribute to a stronger open-source ecosystem and help close one easily exploited gap in the current supply chain.

We encourage testing and adoption and welcome any improvements to the project. Please share feedback, comments and suggestions at slsa-github-generator-go and slsa-verifier project repositories. We will officially release v1 in a few weeks!

In follow-up posts, we will demonstrate adding non-forgeable source provenance attesting to secure repository settings, and showcase the same techniques for other build toolchains and package managers, etc. Stay tuned!

Find and $eek! Increased rewards for Google Nest & Fitbit devices

April 5, 2022

Posted by Medha Jain, Program Manager, Devices & Services Security
Google Nest security commitmentssmart homewearablesBug HuntersBonus!
We are paying higher rewards retroactively for eligible Google Nest and Fitbit devices reports submitted in 2021. And, starting today, for the next six months, will double the reward amount for all new eligible reports applicable to Google Nest & Fitbit devices in scope.

We will continue to take reports on our web applications, services, and mobile apps at their existing reward levels. Please keep those coming!

An enhanced rewards program
Building on our previous programs to improve devices' embedded security posture, we’re bringing all our first-party devices under a single program, starting with Google Nest, Fitbit, and Pixel.
This program extends the Android Security Reward Program, making it easier for researchers to submit a vulnerability in first-party devices and improving consistency across our severity assignments. Refer to the Android and Google Devices Security Reward Program for more details.

What interests us?
We encourage researchers to report firmware, system software, and hardware vulnerabilities. Our wide diversity of platforms provides researchers with a smorgasbord of environments to explore.

What's next?
We will be at the Hardwear.io conference this year! The VRP team is looking forward to meeting our security peers in person. We’ll be talking about the architecture of a couple of our devices, hoping to give security researchers a head start in finding vulnerabilities. We’ll have plenty of swag, too!

We will continue to enhance the researchers' experience and participation. We intend to add training documentations and target areas that interest us as we grow the program.

A huge thanks to Sarah Jacobus, Adam Bacchus, Ankur Chakraborty, Eduardo' Vela" <Nava>, Jay Cox, and Nic Watson.

What's up with in-the-wild exploits? Plus, what we're doing about it.

March 10, 2022

Posted by Adrian Taylor, Chrome Security Team If you are a regular reader of our Chrome release blog, you may have noticed that phrases like 'exploit for CVE-1234-567 exists in the wild' have been appearing more often recently. In this post we'll explore why there seems to be such an increase in exploits, and clarify some misconceptions in the process. We'll then share how Chrome is continuing to make it harder for attackers to achieve their goals. How things work today While the increase may initially seem concerning, it’s important to understand the reason behind this trend. If it's because there are many more exploits in the wild, it could point to a worrying trend. On the other hand, if we’re simply gaining more visibility into exploitation by attackers, it's actually a good thing! It’s good because it means we can respond by providing bug fixes to our users faster, and we can learn more about how real attackers operate. So, which is it? It’s likely a little of both. Our colleagues at Project Zero publicly track all known in-the-wild “zero day” bugs. Here’s what they’ve reported for browsers:

First, we don’t believe there was no exploitation of Chromium based browsers between 2015 and 2018. We recognize that we don’t have full view into active exploitation, and just because we didn’t detect any zero-days during those years, doesn’t mean exploitation didn’t happen. Available exploitation data suffers from sampling bias. Teams like Google’s Threat Analysis Group are also becoming increasingly sophisticated in their efforts to protect users by discovering zero-days and in-the-wild attacks. A good example is a bug in our Portals feature that we fixed last fall. This bug was discovered by a team member in Switzerland and reported to Chrome through our bug tracker. While Chrome normally keeps each web page locked away in a box called the “renderer sandbox,” this bug allowed the code to break out, potentially allowing attackers to steal information. Working across multiple time zones and teams, it took the team three days to come up with a fix and roll it out, as detailed in our video on the process:
Why so many exploits? There are a number of factors at play, from changes in vendor and attacker behavior, to changes in the software itself. Here are four in particular that we've been discussing and exploring as a team. First, we believe we’re seeing more bugs thanks to vendor transparency. Historically, many browser makers didn’t announce that a bug was being exploited in the wild, even if they knew it was happening. Today, most major browser makers have increased transparency via publishing details in release communications, and that may account for more publicly tracked “in the wild” exploitation. These efforts have been spearheaded by both browser security teams and dedicated research groups, such as Project Zero. Second, we believe we’re seeing more exploits due to evolved attacker focus. There are two reasons to suspect attackers might be choosing to attack Chrome more than they did in the past.

Flash deprecation: In 2015 and 2016, Flash was a primary exploitation target. Chrome gradually made Flash a less attractive target for attackers (for instance requiring user clicks to activate Flash content) before finally removing it in Chrome 88 in January last year. As Flash is no longer available, attackers have had to switch to a harder target: the browser itself.

Chromium popularity: Attackers go for the most popular target. In early 2020, Edge switched to using the Chromium rendering engine. If attackers can find a bug in Chromium, they can now attack a greater percentage of users.

Third, some attacks that could previously be accomplished with a single bug now require multiple bugs. Before 2015, only a single in-the-wild bug was required to steal a user’s secrets from other websites, because multiple web pages lived together in a single renderer process. If an attacker could compromise the renderer process belonging to a malicious website that a user visited, they might have been able to access the credentials for some other more sensitive website. With Chrome’s multiyear Site Isolation project largely complete, a single bug is almost never sufficient to do anything really bad. Attackers often need to chain at least two bugs: first, to compromise the renderer process, and second, to jump into the privileged Chrome browser process or directly into the device operating system. Sometimes multiple bugs are needed to achieve one or both of these steps. So, to achieve the same result, an attacker generally now has to use more bugs than they previously did. For exactly the same level of attacker success, we’d see more in-the-wild bugs reported over time, as we add more layers of defense that the attacker needs to bypass. Fourth, there’s simply the fact that software has bugs. Some fraction of those bugs are exploitable. Browsers increasingly mirror the complexity of operating systems — providing access to your peripherals, filesystem, 3D rendering, GPUs — and more complexity means more bugs. Ultimately, we believe data is an important part of the story, but the absolute number of exploited bugs isn't a sufficient measure of security risk. Since some security bugs are inevitable, how a software vendor architects their software (so that the impact of any single bug is limited) and responds to critical security bugs is often much more important than the specifics of any single bug. How Chrome is raising the bar The Chrome team works hard to both detect and fix bugs before releases and get bug fixes out to users as quickly as possible. We’re proud of our record at fixing serious bugs quickly, and we are continually working to do better. For example, one area of concern for us is the risk of n-day attacks: that is, exploitation of bugs we’ve already fixed, where the fixes are visible in our open-source code repositories. We have greatly reduced our “patch gap” from 35 days in Chrome 76 to an average of 18 days in subsequent milestones, and we expect this to reduce slightly further with Chrome’s faster release cycle. Irrespective of how quickly bugs are fixed, any in-the-wild exploitation is bad. Chrome is working hard to make it expensive and difficult for attackers to achieve their goals. Some examples of the projects ongoing:

We continue to strengthen Site Isolation, especially on Android.

The V8 heap sandbox will prevent attackers using JavaScript just-in-time (JIT) compilation bugs to compromise the renderer process. This will require attackers to add a third bug to these exploit chains, which means increased security, but could increase the amount of in-the-wild exploits reported.

The MiraclePtr and *Scan projects aim to prevent exploitability of many of our largest class of browser process bugs, called “use-after-free”. We will be applying similar systematic solutions to other classes of bugs over time.

Since “memory safety” bugs account for 70% of the exploitable security bugs, we aim to write new parts of Chrome in memory-safe languages.

We continue to work on post-exploitation mitigations such as CET and CFG.

We are well past the stage of having “easy wins” when it comes to raising the bar for security. All of these are long term projects with significant engineering challenges. But as we've shown with Site Isolation, Chrome isn't afraid of making long term investments in major security engineering projects. One of the major challenges is performance: all of these technologies (except memory safe languages) could risk slowing the browser. Expect a series of blog posts over the coming months as we explore performance vs. security trade-offs. These decisions are really hard: we do not want to make Chrome slower for billions of people, especially as this disproportionately hits users with slower devices – we strive to make Chrome secure for all our users, not just those with the high end systems. How you can help Above all: if Chrome is reminding you to update, please do! If you’re an enterprise IT professional, keep your users up-to-date by keeping auto-update on, and familiarize yourself with the added enterprise policies and controls that you can apply to Chrome within your organization. We strongly advise not focusing on zero-days when making decisions about updates, but instead to assume any Chrome security bug is under exploitation as an n-day. If you're a security researcher, you can report bugs you find to the Chrome Vulnerability Rewards Program — and thanks for helping us make Chrome safer for everyone!

Mitigating kernel risks on 32-bit ARM

February 23, 2022

Posted by Ard Biesheuvel, Google Open Source Security Team

'odd fixesBOMRunning 32-bit Linux on 64-bit ARM systems

Ironically, at these low price points, the DRAM is actually the dominant component in terms of BOM cost, and many of these 32-bit ARM systems incorporate a cheap ARMv8 SoC that happens to be capable of running in 64-bit mode as well. The reason for running 32-bit applications nonetheless is that these generally use less of the expensive DRAM, and can be deployed directly without the need to recompile the binaries. As 32-bit applications don't need a 64-bit kernel (which itself uses more memory due to its internal use of 64-bit pointers), the product ships with a 32-bit kernel instead.

If you're choosing to use a 32-bit kernel for its smaller memory footprint, it's not without risks. You'll likely experience performance issues, unpatched vulnerabilities, and unexpected misbehaviors such as:

32-bit kernels generally cannot manage more than 1 GiB of physical memory without resorting to HIGHMEM bouncing, and cannot provide a full virtual address space of 4 GiB to user space, as 64-bit kernels can.
Side channels or other flaws caused by silicon errata may exist that haven't been mitigated in 32-bit kernels. For example, the hardening against Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities were only done for ARMv7 32-bit only CPUs, and many ARMv8 cores running in 32-bit mode may still be vulnerable (only Cortex-A73 and A75 are handled specifically). And in general, silicon flaws in 64-bit parts that affect the 32-bit kernel are less likely to be found or documented, simply because the silicon validation teams don’t prioritize them.
The 32-bit ARM kernel does not implement the elaborate alternatives patching framework that is used by other architectures to implement handling of silicon errata, which are particular to certain revisions of certain CPUs. Instead, on 32-bit multiplatform kernels, we simply enable all errata workarounds that may be needed by any of the cores that may ever run the image in question, potentially affecting performance unnecessarily on cores that have no need for them.
Silicon vendors are phasing out 32-bit support in the longer term. Given an ecosystem containing a handful of operating systems and thousands of applications, support for 32-bit operating systems (which is more complex technically) is highly likely to be dropped first. For products with longer life cycles, long-term procurement contracts for components available today are usually much more costly than adjusting the BOM over time and using newer, cheaper parts.
The 32-bit kernel does not implement kernel address space randomization, and even if it did, its comparatively tiny address space simply leaves very little space for randomization. Other hardening features, such as rodata=full or hierarchical eXecute Never attributes, are missing as well on 32-bit, and are not likely to be implemented, either due to lack of support in the architecture, or because of the complexity of the 32-bit memory management code, which still supports all of the different architecture revisions dating back to the initial Linux port running on the Risc PC.

Keeping the 32-bit ARM kernel secure

There are cases, though, where using the 32-bit kernel is the only option, e.g., if the CPUs are in fact 32-bit only (which is the case even for some ARMv8 cores such as Cortex-A32), or when relying on an existing 32-bit only codebase running in the kernel (drivers for legacy peripherals). Note that in such cases, it still makes sense to use the most recent kernel version compatible with the hardware, since we are in fact making an effort to enable some of the existing hardening features on 32-bit ARM as well.

THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK for v7 SMP cores

The v5.16 release of the Linux kernel implements support for THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK when running on ARMv7 SMP systems. This protects the kernel's per-task bookkeeping (called thread_info), which lives on the far (and normally unused) end of the stack, against stack overflows which may occur in rare -yet sometimes exploitable- cases where the control flow of the program simply ends up accumulating more state than the stack can hold. (Note that a stack overflow is not the same as a stack buffer overflow, where the overflow happens in the opposite direction.)

By moving thread_info off the stack and into the kernel heap, and by using a special SMP CPU register to keep track of its location, we can mitigate the risk of stack overflows resulting in thread_info corruption. However, it does not prevent stack overflows themselves: these may still occur, and result in corruption of other data structures that happen to be adjacent to the task stack in memory.

THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK for other cores

For CPUs that lack this special SMP CPU register, we also proposed an implementation of THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK that is expected to land in v5.18. Instead of a special register, it uses a global variable to keep track of the location of thread_info.

VMAP_STACK support

Preventing stack overflows from corrupting unrelated memory contents is the goal of VMAP_STACK, which we are enabling for 32-bit ARM as well. When VMAP_STACK is enabled, kernel mode stacks are allocated from the kernel heap as before, but mapped into a different part of the kernel's address space, and surrounded by guard regions, which are guaranteed to be kept unpopulated. Given that accesses to such unpopulated regions will trigger an exception, the kernel's memory management layer can step in and terminate the program as soon as a stack overflow occurs, and prevent it from causing memory corruption.

Support for IRQ stacks

Coming up with a bounded worst case on which to base the size of the kernel stack is rather hard, especially given the fact that it is shared between the program itself and any exception handling routines that may be called on its behalf, including interrupt handlers. To mitigate the risk of a pathological worst case occurring, where an interrupt fires that needs a lot of stack space right at a time when most of the stack is already being used by the program, we are also enabling IRQ_STACKS for 32-bit ARM, which will run handlers of both hard and soft interrupts from a dedicated stack, one for each CPU. By decoupling the task and interrupt contexts like this, the likelihood that a well-behaved program needs to be terminated due to stack overflow should be all but eliminated.

Conclusion

With these changes in place, kernel stack overflow protection will be available for all ARM systems supported by Linux, including ancient ones like the Risc PC or Netwinder, provided that it runs a Linux distribution that is keeping up with the times.

However, relying on legacy hardware and software comes with a risk, and even though we try to help keep users of the 32-bit kernel as safe as we reasonably can, it is not the right choice for new designs that incorporate 64-bit capable hardware.

🌹 Roses are red, Violets are blue 💙 Giving leets 🧑‍💻 more sweets 🍭 All of 2022!

February 14, 2022

Posted by Eduardo Vela, Vulnerability Matchmaker
Until December 31 2022 we will pay 20,000 to 91,337 USD for exploits of vulnerabilities in the Linux Kernel, Kubernetes, GKE or kCTF that are exploitable on our test lab.expansionCVE-2021-4154CVE-2021-22600patchCVE-2022-0185writeupSyzkaller

Reporting a 0day will not require including a flag at first. We heard some concerns from participants that exploiting a 0day in the shared cluster could leak it to other participants. As such, we will only ask for the exploit checksum (but you still have to exploit the bug and submit the flag within a week after the patch is merged on mainline). Please make sure that your exploit works on COS with minimal modifications (test it on your own kCTF cluster), as some common exploit primitives (like eBPF and userfaultfd) might not be available.

Reporting a 1day will require including a link to the patch. We will automatically publish the patches of all submissions if the flag is valid. We also encourage you all to include a link to a Syzkaller dashboard report if applicable in order to help reduce duplicate submissions and so you can see which bugs were exploited already.

You will be able to submit the exploit in the same form you submit the flag. If you had submitted an exploit checksum for a 0day, please make sure that you include the original exploit as well as the final exploit and make sure to submit it within a week after the patch is merged on mainline. The original exploit shouldn't require major modifications to work. Note that we need to be able to understand your exploit, so please add comments to explain what it is doing.

We are now running two clusters, one on the REGULAR release channel and another one on the RAPID release channel. This should provide more flexibility whenever a vulnerability is only exploitable on modern versions of the Linux Kernel or Kubernetes.

31,337 USD to the first valid exploit submission for a given vulnerability. This will only be paid once per vulnerability and only once per cluster version/build (available at /etc/node-os-release).

0 USD for exploits for duplicate exploits for the same vulnerability. The bonuses below might still apply.

Bonuses

20,000 USD for exploits for 0day vulnerabilities. This will only be paid once per vulnerability to the first valid exploit submission.

To submit 0days, please test your exploit (we recommend to test it on your own kCTF cluster to avoid leaking it to other participants), make a checksum and send the checksum to us. Within a week after the vulnerability is fixed on the mainline, submit the form as a 1day and include the exploit of which you sent a checksum to us.

20,000 USD for exploits for vulnerabilities that do not require unprivileged user namespaces (CLONE_NEWUSER). This will only be paid once per vulnerability to the first valid exploit submission.

Our test lab allows unprivileged user namespaces, so we will manually check the exploits to check if they work without unprivileged user namespaces when deciding whether to issue the bonus. We decided to issue additional rewards for exploits that do not require unprivileged user namespaces because containers default seccomp policy does not allow the use of unprivileged user namespaces on containers that are run without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. This feature is now available on Kubernetes and all nodes running on GKE Autopilot have it enabled by default.

20,000 USD for exploits using novel exploit techniques. This is a bonus in addition to the base rewards (applies for duplicate exploits). To qualify for this additional reward please send us a write-up explaining it.

An example of something considered as a novel technique could be the exploitation of previously unknown objects to transform a limited primitive into a more powerful one, such as an arbitrary/out-of-bounds read/write or arbitrary free. For example, in all our submissions, researchers leveraged message queues to achieve kernel information leaks. We are looking for similarly powerful techniques that allow heap exploits to be “plugged in” and immediately allow kernel access. Another example is bypassing a common security mitigation or a technique for exploiting a class of vulnerabilities more reliably.

GKE releasesherehttps://dojo.pwn.college/challenges/kernelhttps://github.com/xairy/linux-kernel-exploitationthe rulesbughunters.google.comhereon Discord

Vulnerability Reward Program: 2021 Year in Review

February 10, 2022

Posted by Sarah Jacobus, Vulnerability Rewards Team

Last year was another record setter for our Vulnerability Reward Programs (VRPs). Throughout 2021, we partnered with the security researcher community to identify and fix thousands of vulnerabilities – helping keep our users and the internet safe.

Thanks to these incredible researchers, Vulnerability Reward Programs across Google continued to grow, and we are excited to report that in 2021 we awarded a record breaking $8,700,000 in vulnerability rewards – with researchers donating over $300,000 of their rewards to a charity of their choice.

We also launched bughunters.google.com in 2021, a public researcher portal dedicated to keeping Google products and the internet safe and secure. This new platform brings all of our VRPs (Google, Android, Abuse, Chrome, and Google Play) closer together and provides a single intake form, making security bug submission easier than ever. We’re excited about everything the new Bug Hunters portal has to offer, including:

More opportunities for interaction and a bit of healthy competition through gamification, per-country leaderboards, awards/badges for certain bugs, and more!
A more functional and aesthetically pleasing leaderboard. We know a lot of you are using your achievements in our VRPs to find jobs (we’re hiring!) and we hope this acts as a useful resource.
A stronger emphasis on learning: bug hunters can improve their skills through the content available in our new Bug Hunter University
Streamlined publication process: we know the value that knowledge sharing brings to our community. That’s why we want to make it easier for you to publish your bug reports.
We now offer swag! The first 20 folks who share this blog post on Twitter and tag @GoogleVRP will receive a gift voucher for swag in their DMs.

As in past years, we are sharing our 2021 Year in Review statistics across all of our programs. We would like to give a special thank you to all of our dedicated researchers - we look forward to more collaboration in the future!

Android

The Android VRP doubled its 2020 total payouts in 2021 with nearly $3 million dollars in rewards, and awarded the highest payout in Android VRP history: an exploit chain discovered in Android receiving a reward of $157,000!

Our industry leading prize of $1,500,000 for a compromise of our Titan-M Security chip used in our Pixel device remains unclaimed - for more information on this reward and Android exploit chain rewards, please visit our public rules page.

The program also launched the Android Chipset Security Reward Program (ACSRP), a vulnerability reward program offered by Google in collaboration with manufacturers of certain popular Android chipsets. This private, invite-only program, provides reward and recognition for contributions of security researchers who invest their time and effort into helping make Android devices more secure. In 2021 the ACSRP paid out $296,000 for over 220 valid and unique security reports.

We would like to give a special shoutout to some of our top researchers whose continued hard work keeps Android safe and secure:

Chrome

This year the Chrome VRP also set some new records – 115 Chrome VRP researchers were rewarded for 333 unique Chrome security bug reports submitted in 2021, totaling $3.3 million in VRP rewards. The contributions not only help us to improve Chrome, but also the web at large by bolstering the security of all browsers based on Chromium.

Of the $3.3 million, $3.1 million was awarded for Chrome Browser security bugs and $250,500 for Chrome OS bugs, including a $45,000 top reward amount for an individual Chrome OS security bug report and $27,000 for an individual Chrome Browser security bug report.

Of these totals, $58,000 was awarded for security issues discovered by fuzzers contributed by VRP researchers to the Chrome Fuzzing program. Each valid report from an externally provided fuzzer received a $1,000 patch bonus, with one fuzzer report receiving a $16,000 reward.

The Chrome VRP would not be able to smash these records over the last year without the efforts of so many exceptional VRP researchers. We’d like to highlight a few researcher achievements made in 2021:

Rory McNamara, a Chrome OS VRP researcher who has been participating in the Chrome VRP for five years, became the highest awarded Chrome VRP researcher of all time. This year he was rewarded for six reports achieving root privilege escalation in Chrome OS, one of which received the highest reward amount achieved for a single Chrome bug report in 2021 at $45,000.

Chrome Browser VRP researcher Leecraso (@leecraso) of 360 Vulnerability Research Institute was the most awarded researcher of 2021, with 18 valid bug reports; a majority of which were for memory corruption vulnerabilities affecting the browser process.

We love when researchers write about their findings (only after we have publicly disclosed the bug, of course)! Chrome Browser VRP researcher Brendon Tiszka wrote an excellent two-part blog series on his discovery and exploitation of a V8 vulnerability, CVE-2021-21225, the analysis and reporting of which earned him a $22,000 VRP reward.

Huge thanks and congratulations to all Chrome VRP researchers that helped us make Chrome and Chrome OS more safe for all users in 2021!.

Google Play

Google Play paid out $550,000 in rewards to over 60 unique security researchers.

The Google Play Security Reward Program also released their Android App Hacking Workshop content and published a blog on their work to empower the next generation of Android Application Security Researchers.

kCTF VRP

In November we expanded our reward amounts for exploits against our kCTF cluster from 5,000-10,000 up to 31,337-50,337 USD. In the last 3 months we were happy to have several participants receive $175,685 USD in rewards. We also extended the timeline of the increased rewards until February 14 (from January 31) which should give everyone a couple more weeks to finalize any almost-working exploits.

GCP VRP Prize

To encourage security researchers to focus on Google Cloud Platform, we initiated the annual GCP VRP Prize in 2019. In March this year, we announced the winners of the 2020 edition of the prize and paid out $313,337 in prizes. Ezequiel Pereira won the top prize of $133,337 for finding an RCE in Google Cloud Deployment Manager. We saw some amazing research on Google Cloud Platform this year too. Stay tuned for the 2021 winners!

Research Grants

Six years ago, the Google VRP launched an experimental Vulnerability Research Grant program to encourage seasoned security researchers to take a detailed and extensive look into the security of Google products and services. And reward them even if there are no vulnerabilities found. Six years later, we are happy to announce that in 2021 we awarded over $200,000 in grants to more than 120 security researchers around the world.

If you are a Google VRP researcher and want to be considered for a Vulnerability Research Grant make sure you opted in on your bughunters profile.

Looking forward

With the launch of the new Bug Hunters portal, we plan to continue improving our platform and listening to you - our researchers - on ways we can improve our platform and Bug Hunter University.

Thank you again for making Google, the Internet, and our users safe and secure! Follow us on @GoogleVRP

Thank you to Adam Bacchus, Dirk Göhmann, Sarah Jacobus, Amy Ressler, Martin Straka, Jan Keller, Jon Bottarini, and Rishika Hooda

Reducing Security Risks in Open Source Software at Scale: Scorecards Launches V4

January 19, 2022

Posted by Laurent Simon and Azeem Shaikh, Google Open Source Security Team (GOSST)

Since our July announcement of Scorecards V2, the Scorecards project—an automated security tool to flag risky supply chain practices in open source projects—has grown steadily to over 40 unique contributors and 18 implemented security checks. Today we are proud to announce the V4 release of Scorecards, with larger scaling, a new security check, and a new Scorecards GitHub Action for easier security automation.

The Scorecards Action is released in partnership with GitHub and is available from GitHub's Marketplace. The Action makes using Scorecards easier than ever: it runs automatically on repository changes to alert developers about risky supply-chain practices. Maintainers can view the alerts on GitHub's code scanning dashboard, which is available for free to public repositories on GitHub.com and via GitHub Advanced Security for private repositories.

Additionally, we have scaled our weekly Scorecards scans to over one million GitHub repositories, and have partnered with the Open Source Insights website for easy user access to the data.

For more details about the release, including the new Dangerous-Workflow security check, visit the OpenSSF's official blog post here.