Projection: New Terminology Based on a Dual System Derived from the Chinese Book of Changes and Applied to Psychological Considerations of Self, Action and Influence

Copyright © 2011 by James P. Devaney.

Library of Congress Control Number:       2011907839

ISBN:         Hardcover                               978-1-4628-7367-8

                   Softcover                                 978-1-4628-7366-1

                   Ebook                                      978-1-4628-7368-5

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For my Father (RIP)

And for my Mother, God Bless Her

For Monsignor Professor Michael Nolan (RIP)

For my Wife Jenny and our two sons Lenny and Tom

And for all those people, standing there, waiting.

Thank You.

Contents

Foreword

Introduction

Section I The Primary and Secondary Principles in Relation to Self; Opposition; Union and Separation

Section II The Four Primary Combinations

Section III Interindividual Relations and Thought

In Summary:

Appendix

Acknowledgments

Projection

New Terminology Based on a Dual System Derived from the Chinese

Book of Changes and Applied to Psychological Considerations of Self,

Action and Influence

FOREWORD

One of the main points of arguments in the debate on the origin of language is language is essential for thought.[1] However, now the viewpoint is being considered thought is essential for communication.

So, while the philologists of the nineteenth century and modem linguists may wonder about the origins of language and attempt a simultaneous better understanding of thought, here, in what hopefully is more the purely psychological approach, thought is approached directly.

This direct approach certainly leaves the researcher more exposed to abysmal mistake. Here, a system of interdependent structures is put forward, all hinging on a general correctness. When as here new terminology is employed in an attempt to further highlight what old terminology there is which perhaps is not fully appreciated or understood (e.g. projection, idea, field, action); whether consciousness is structural or not, or maybe both structural and non-structural at once; or whether a structural description of consciousness is permissible or not. One’s starting point is philosophical or metaphysical and one has already proceeded a long way on one’s own without much criticism, and perhaps this is not a good thing.

Here, what has developed is a regard for thought as practically equivalent to sensory awareness, while not denying thought to be much more than this too. This view certainly is in harmony with contemporary empirical research philosophy.

Two more specific points for discussion are mentioned. Here, the whole location for mental activity is equated with social interaction. Denying the importance of the biological, physiological activity occurring within the organism must be as bad a mistake as the more common one, which is here countered, of failing to recognize that to a limiting extent what takes place outside of the boundary of the organism is a part of the organism; deterministically and essentially linked to the doer.

The other point regards time and temporality, and the unlikeliness of anyone saying anything new about time. Yet, in a psychological sense it may not be too hard to accept that consciousness has some prerogative regarding time, in comparison to what is not conscious or inanimate. If that seems like such a reasonable statement, then what is the specific prerogative? Perhaps it underlies everything that we would define as intellectual or social in the human.

INTRODUCTION

Thought as determined by inter-individual relations—more, the possibility, by means of creative thought, of permitting, at least facilitating, action as an aspect of inter-individual relations, is considered.

As a demonstration