Combining Concepts: Operational Shock In Insurgencies

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – [email protected]

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 2013 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

COMBINING CONCEPTS: OPERATIONAL SHOCK IN INSURGENCIES

By

MAJ Ryan J Bulger

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6

INTRODUCTION 7

Research Questions and Scope 8

Methodology 8

LITERATURE REVIEW 10

Operational Shock 10

Systems Theory 12

Insurgency 14

Counterinsurgent Theory 18

Combining Concepts: Shock in Insurgencies 22

Summary 25

CASE STUDY 1: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 26

The Insurgency 26

The Operational Approach 28

Shocking the Insurgency 30

Loss of Operational Control 30

Fractionalization 31

Summary 32

CASE STUDY 2: DHOFAR 1965-1976 33

The Insurgency 33

The Operational Approach 35

Shocking the Insurgency 37

Loss of Operational Control 37

Fractionalization 38

Summary 39

CONCLUSION 40

Key Characteristics 40

Networked Approach 40

Adaptation 42

Selective Violence in Contested Spaces 42

Recommendations for Further Research 44

Closing 44

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 45

BIBLIOGRAPHY 46

Books and Articles 46

Dissertations 47

Online Sources 48

ABSTRACT

The focus of this work is to ascertain whether the concept of operational shock, which has served as the intellectual underpinning of the US Army’s doctrine over the past thirty years, can be used to guide an operational approach in a counterinsurgency campaign. The concept of operational shock sits at the foundation of much of United States Army’s operational doctrine. The American way of war now focuses not on the destruction of an enemy’s equipment and personnel, but on degrading and disrupting his ability to continue to fight.

Much of counterinsurgency doctrine and theory does not fit this operational logic. The previous decade of war has led to a renewed debate both in public and inside the national security apparatus of the United States. With the publication of Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, the United States produced its first doctrine dedicated to countering insurgency in over twenty years. The logic within FM 3-24 dictates that if the counterinsurgent can dissolve the conditions that enabled the existence of the insurgency, the governmental forces can change the logic of the population.

This paper does not refute the principle of addressing core grievances, which stands at the center of much of current counterinsurgency theory. It does, however, posit that to effectively set conditions to affect the logic of the population, the counterinsurgent must affect the logic of the insurgency it is opposing. The intent of this monograph is neither to prove nor disprove either the enemy centric or the population centric models of counterinsurgency, but instead to argue that there must be a balance of both approaches. There may be a time during a counterinsurgency campaign where the disruption of the insurgency’s logic and causing a fractionalization within the enemy system should be the focus of the counterinsurgent’s operations.

This monograph examines both the theoretical basis for current operational and counterinsurgent doctrine. It then combines these two concepts to provide a theoretical model of an insurgency in a state of shock. It then uses two historical case studies in which the counterinsurgent force, using different force structures and capabilities, were able to effectively shock the systems of the insurgencies they opposed. It identifies characteristics of each of the campaigns that facilitated the application of the appropriate force against the appropriate structures within the insurgency. These characteristics include a networked approach to operations, rapid adaptation of operational approach, and the application of violence in contested space.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the contributions of a number of people. First and foremost, to my wife Katie, who tolerated the late nights and my constant babbling about complex adaptive systems or how cool the new book about the Franco-Prussian War was. Second, to my monograph director, Dr Dan Cox, whose encouragement and expertise were crucial and who provided a sounding board for many of my lesser ideas. Third, to my editors MAJ Ryan Barnett, MAJ Andrew Lembke, and MAJ Kwadwo Agyei-Aye, for their constant help and their ability to turn my often incoherent thoughts into something somewhat meaningful. Finally, to the students and faculty of Seminar 2, many thanks for helping me learn and grow this past year as a planner and as an officer. You are the most talented group of people I have ever been associated with and I would fight to serve alongside any of you again.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the best efforts of both the defense industry and the myriad of subject matter experts who have written books on the subject in the past decade, there has been no magic operational approach or piece of equipment unearthed that is guaranteed to defeat an insurgency. As with other forms of conflict, there remain too many variables beyond the grasp of human control, too many instances of luck, and too much uncertainty to predetermine the outcome of any given conflict. In fact, victory against an insurgency can be even more difficult to predict because it relies so heavily on the will