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21, 1969

Dear Mr.

Billard:

Thank you for your very thoughtful letter of June 14, 1969, expressing your views on the problem of statistically evaluating allied progress in Vietnam. I fourid your comments very interesting. If you ever have a chance, I would be most pleased if you could stop by for a chat with Mr. Dean Moor, one of my Vietnam specialists, and give us a further reading on your views and experiences. B;st regardS

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Mr. Philip T. Biilard

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5703 Oromwell Drive Wash;i.ngton, D. C. 20016 June 14, 1969 Henry. A. Kissinger . Special Assistant to. President Natio.nal<Security Affairs 'Washington, D. C. .. Dear Dr. Kissinger: My o.nly personal contact with you came in the 1965-66 academic year when, as a student in the Co.lumbia Graduate School of Busines$ and a participant in the Internatio.nal Fello.ws Pro.gram~'taitght"by Pro.fessor John Stoessinger, I heard you give a vis'itlnglecture. I am hardly a militant radical. I spent three"y~ars in the Army, including OOSand a year in Vietnam, andI:wllls66n begin employzpent with a .large oil company, How":'" ever'~f\r,:t6o','share much of the concern about theYietnani war WhiC.1i~l;;heard;,expressed at the recent commencement afmy alma mat~r.:;;~Y;;XC:\l~;:gr!;lduatingenior William M. Thompson, 'Ji<, who s does~ !Jo~i:lhiIPI3~lr;3eem to. fit the image of a student r'ad i.ca.L..
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,':'Y~~:i~!')'~'nQ~ the un<?ertain stat,: of domestic toler~rice~~+()r the .'wa.rwhJ:clJ.<t. J.sh to d Lscuas , .nor .J.S it even the curreht. w sitlli,!i,t:j.,on,:;i,ti'Vietnam -- haying been away from that country. Since las~~',~~lY,~A~~" never having had .acceue to,the broad scope' inf:r:otiJ~t~on,which is available to people like yourself, I can harC{i;Y\presume,t9 off,er' advLce on a sub jecf of this nature. I do :1;'e$fr<th9~~h,:,i;h\i~,.1" Irno~'some~hing about ,tlle collec~i()n, and rep0I'~Iijg'oI J.nfoJ;'ma1;l.<;m, that'. ulhmately bebomes. a c.oI1:sJ.deration . i,n 'lP,gh' leV~ldecis,ions';<.andT'feelobligated'to cast some:' doubtiVolFrchE:!"vall.p.ltYof,the:raw:data;w:hiph originates at: the gra~f;ror~s:~t~ve~~' ""., . ',' ,. .'

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"tl',i'l-las a district intelligence adviser in Vietnam from Juiy, 1967}H,bJuly"1968. I saw the program in wha.ch I was inyolved charig~: ffomi'anextension of the original advisory effort to the ICEX:Pj'o.l:~rgm. 'then to the Phoenix Program. and I filled out' r-epor-ts on the elimination' of VC infrastructure, and I helped prepa:teHamlet Evaluation SurveylJ. Although I had inti.mate ,kno.wledge o:t:oply one dis;t'rict,. !talked to enough other military inteJ),igence,lieutenants during my:tourin',Yietnamal1d during, mys\l-bs~quent servicea,t'FortHolabird, Maryland; to conclude :~hat~l)1Ytfe~i;:ex'Periens~ '~aE? ,not~ '1solat~;d .=i,ildi Vi,d~al.'e:xa,mple.
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My experience indiciites'thatte-oorts from the field tend to err on the side of bpt'i1Mi,srrhllow - I, am speaking mainly of "the U. S. advisers, siIlce t'i~-W:lllost familia:: with their situation and _ feel that I they have the 'h,es.1;o ppor-bunLty to juCige the .r-eLa'tLve strength and,populari:tyqf the South Vietnamese government versus the local opposition,whatever its form may be. The ?ametendency probably ho'Ld.s true for _ U. S. combat .una ts , too, , s;i;p,ce'every commander wants to look good,and there 'are manyway s' '-td, count bodies and apply, other yardsticks of success in ba't t Le ," Ba,sical1i,' everyone warlts to be able t\' report a steadily improving situation, and tot~ke,some credit fOr the progress. It hardly matters that success 'in winning the support of the people is really a Vietnamese function. Advisers are there to help their;ddunterparts; and. if they are ,involved in their work, they " c~()~;; help,:butfee1,they have a stake in what happens Ln .their : area.t;::Evep'wJ:;wn they do, the.ir very best to report the ,truth, ' ' , howeY;~f,:haT~h,-~he:( ar~ l~mit~<i by the f~ct. that th~ir best ":':' I source:"of" l.nformatlon a s lnevl.tably their Vletnam~se counterpart, : W.ho.,')~@'~a:L~~s:P~~Sible government official, has, a' strong~nt~test i in por'tfaY:Lng a.~'rosy pict].lre.. ,. " ": ,,' ,Pl:,.!

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.ir~P.-~f.@;{~~;;r.e.;~asy escapeirom this, dileIDlllIi\... MY:Lser@;,l-t~'in C,' oUl1,Yry.::fRf .. B~~\:.Y~~:r ~ tours and und.erstand 'the V~etnam~s~ IG!-PS~age. and~t4:t.)l:r-~:,::>u.p~r:fJ:cially, H, at all. Vietnamese offl.cJ:a~~, .5'l1 the ;O~h~;r;)l}an4,. gre inti~ately acquainted with their local areas , and:~~~y.;}.4~~;~)),a~,;exper,i.encein dealing with sev:eral AIi1er:Lcan' cOUJ?:t,~rpar~s;,o:1:;heJ:' thah their current one. They 4,0, not have a ~onciFb~irp,h;X~d,~~;'~nformation, bu~. they have ob'v1o'~8.Cl~Y~IJ;~~ge~,:, ov:ef:Jf,tli!2~:,\~~:r::J:f~ friends.: Whll~ theY.. S~'advl$E!r:mEiY1J!l'?cl~fY:' cmd ::l-;1t~r:pr:eLwli,a~he hears f::om hlscounterpart, much,()~ wt;.at."" lie sees.i,anuhears-the raw Lnpuf upon which. he bases hlB Judg~' ~en~;,~~~#;~~~!;'~~~if~lY influenced by his Vietnamesec,oun;terpaf~::"
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': njfu6~h~ft:pfoblem in reporting is the necessity to des'c:tib~; inf6fln~'ti6h;\in,"t'erms of categories that may become arbitrary.' j)esp:t~f,t'~al:'progresstoward achieving precision through the of rigid"deffnitions and concrete examples,' it is still difficult to si;l.;i.:What, means to be "secure" ..lt or "pacified" or who .Lsva ;, !lVC'infrastructure cadre. Of course, establishing the definitions is ju~(a:begiiming. It is another big step to get everyont?,to int~fpret;:l'\-n~ ,aPl?ly them correctly.

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,;\Ni!i.'tiiIra.11y~'Iqo notpresume ...tha t all i;he above ideas are,new and :stiirfL~Ilg:;':'l:lu~' we'S'iin'E!t5.melil,~vpear ~p be a nl3;tion of :for~etful stat~~t;g*~tl~ :~9-::ctua~:;it1ers.'.::\w tt7ll;tl', ~9:'bEfCOIll,c;,;hY:pnotiz;~di';1:JY:',

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liu::b ~,HbUlci; lhb"\l1 '1,13 Tet Offensive do riot for. long turn, our attention away from': he logical answers we have produced and back to questions,about basic assumptions and the manner in which we applied them to derive the answers.
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"From my own experience I know of a district intelligence '.' adviser who, reported the. ~liminatiori. .of. a VC infrastructure membezwhen atrl,tck, backed Up arid accidentally killed an old peasant w,omaJl.Af:ter all, he reasoned, s newas dead anyway, and infrastructure'elimination had been rather slow ,recently. Similiirly, I have seen U. S. units add schoolchilp,ren and other slaughtered civilian bystanders to their enemy body co~t. I saw a province Leve L Phoenix adviser wage a beautiful pub:J..icrelationscaJ1lpaign . about the elimination of infrastructure j,l'l,' !liY own district when". actually the operations :in question ne't ted'ta number of low level personalities as the result of information obtained from one local VOleader who had been. captured fortuitously in aU. S .. sweep operation. The good r,esul1:;s.were.I+ot ba aed on, a ,well developed intelligence network at the grass. .r-co.t s Leve.L,. District officials had riot even been' involved in the, operations because province" : oifid.als' wanted, to preserve secrecy (and cred:it for them~f;l:J..ves). It \orasIlOturOng to be ple1:\.sed with this par-td.cul.ar- attackiontl1e. infrastru,cture,' but it.wa!3.misleading to imply, as was doneby the P~oenix, offi9;ial., that the results we re due .to this. "new".,." proe;f~~\,~ndthi:d;more eucce aae s could. be expect~d nO~,,:ih~tJ:a:~r,ass roots' ~nte;t:Ligenge network. ,,,as ope ra't Lng ,effect~vely~ ',:,~odfly'~he-\l I rE!a9:I;f~J;l!"Jle"f,advances ineliminatinlLthe enemy infr:~~~t.1;ic;;:;t:q,r~, is a1~5{~~"~ri~~~~aifo;hk~:pf~s been:;someprogr~~~;:~~';;tt:t~(.~~~e

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~~~~:~~~: ~~i~'i:dur~ng~y gtour ~here were five RD:~l~~~(~~~~~~a:j ~ opet~t~ng;:'1~tfu:q:my d~st.r1.ct. Th~s made it one of theg;r;~~es,~f~"'i focaI.,poil1ts of"the pac.tf'Lcat.Lon effort in all South,Vietn?m;',y~~ vThen',11eftr'iniliiy:months later, r coul,d not see any ~v;J.deiil:ie~~ot:1d', ;:, .' incrg~~i(!g;.~tl:'ength or popularity of the GVN. ,I know~ithi:dj"progr~~e" in sucrr-rna t t er-e takes a good deal of time and ,is difficultU;!;o measut?;:;p~t ;r" cannot help feeling frustrated at 'wha~t,:.~a~:i:~~tt expe;r:~1:1qGe(! ,. I' , .:",',:, .. ;:"L: "',"'"
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that the Nixon Administrati;'n i61pr~f~~ted:;) in a;:g:raduaLde-escalation of the .war, and I hope that,:our:'with~; drawaL;of:25~OOO troops w::ill bring some reciprocal action,by,,'" our ao.Versary., ~1aybethe psychology of the public negot:lfl.tions at Pal;'~s,~;md~"'e~pecially, of the tacit type of bargaining wh{CliJ is, 'hdpt:ifuiiy;,' also going on is what really counts now; :bu"t'~(

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to the ~xtent thatthelocal'politiqal and military circumstances' .influence th:i;s psychology, .a:athey must, and to the extent t o , which such factors~willin:fJ:uence tne scope and timing of our future move , I urge that :'r0V-uonot. siinply take for granted the s wealth>'Of information about60.nditions in Vietnam which you have. at<your, disposaL . '

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have one suggestion. As a check on information obtained Jroni.;wri,tteri.!:r~ports and YIP visits to the field , you might ": inter.;yie.w.~or circulate questionnaires among jUnior of'f'Lc er-s who . have spent, ,iii-rile' at"lower levels of commarid , Especially valuable would'.ber:,the observations of advisers who have recently' returned .from Vietnam -and are now out of the service. Nany of these people are ;1.ntelligentand well educat.ed, and they do not have a career at stake ".thatmight suffer if unkind words reached the wrong military' ears. Perhaps, in fact, my own writing of such a letter at this time, waiting until after my discharge, illustrates the ..tendency of many not to speak out as long as the system might be able to make them regret doing so,' A military organiza:tion denrands a certainloya~ty and authoritaria~ structure, but it may not be the bes1(suited t-o getting a true picture of an unpleasant si;tuation. ';i:i,
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Sincerely,

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,Philip

T. Billard

REPRODUCED AT THE NAnONAl ARCHIVES

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