MOIS NAVON

The Hillazon . and the Principle of Muttar be-Fikha

ollowing the vast amount of evidence supporting the identification of the Murex trunculus snail as the hillazon shel tekhelet,1 the question . has been raised as to whether a mollusk could be considered the ancient source of tekhelet, given that it is not kosher to eat. This question is motivated by the principle that religious articles must be made from sources which are muttar be-fikha (literally: permissible in your mouth). In order to address this question, an in-depth analysis of the muttar be-fikha principle is necessary to determine the breadth of its application.

Introduction to Muttar be-Fikha

The source of this principle is introduced in the gemara by way of the following baraita:
R. Yosef stated [baraita]: For the sacred service (melekhet shamayim), none but the skin of a clean (tahor) animal is considered fit. (Shabbat 28b).

R. Yosef attempts to apply the baraita to the Mishkan; however the gemara rejects this application. The gemara then investigates the application of the baraita to tefillin. It is explained that the baraita cannot be teaching that tefillin parchments must be made from a kosher source, since this is learned explicitly from the Torah itself, from the verse, So
MOIS NAVON is a member of the Ptil Tekhelet Association and lectures extensively on the topic of tekhelet. He has published articles in Jewish Thought and Jewish Bible Quarterly and gives talks in parshanut. He is also a computer design engineer living in Efrat.

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that the law of the Lord be in your mouth (Ex. 13:9).2 The gemara then goes on to explain that the baraita cannot be teaching that the boxes, hairs and sinews used for tefillin must be made from a kosher source, since this is known from a halakhah le-Mosheh mi-Sinai. The gemara concludes that R. Yosef s statement comes to teach that the straps of the tefillin must come from a kosher animal. The upshot of the gemaras discussion is that the principle which requires the use of a kosher animal applies to all aspects of tefillinnothing more, nothing less.3 The Mishnah in Megillah 8b states that there are no differences among tefillin, mezuzah and sacred scrolls (except that sacred scrolls can be written in other languages).4 As such, the rule of muttar be-fikha is broadened to apply not only to tefillin but to mezuzah and sacred scrolls as well. This is stated explicitly in Masekhet Soferim (1:1): It is not permitted to write sacred scrolls, tefillin or mezuzot on skins of tame [nonkosher] animals nor on skins of tame beasts; nor may they be sewn with their sinews, nor wound with their hair.5 At this point, muttar be-fikha would seem to apply only to tefillin, mezuzah, and sacred scrolls. However, in two places (Kiddushin 35a, Makkot 11a), the gemara applies laws that pertain to tefillin to the rest of the Torahhukshah kol ha-Torah kulah li-tefillin. The gemara in Makkot 11a concludes that the analogy of tefillin to the Torah applies only to the requirement that the parchment of a Torah scroll be muttar be-fikha. The gemara in Kiddushin 35a also applies the principle, yet in a different capacity. There, the gemara applies the rule concerning tefillin, that women are exempt from time-bound positive miz vot (miz vot aseh she-ha-zeman gerama), to all . . miz vot. Based on this latter gemara, Magen Avraham 6 (Orah H ayyim . . . 586:3) writes that the law of tefillin which enjoins the use of a kosher animal is to be applied to all miz vot. 7 . At this point muttar be-fikha is understood to apply to all miz vot. . Hence, at the outset it appears that all ritual objects must come from kosher (tahor) sources. Since the Murex trunculus is not a kosher animal, it would seem to be disqualified as a candidate for the source of tekhelet.8

Definition of Muttar be-Fikha

The following general principle is found in Shulhan Arukh: .
The skins for scriptural texts are to be from tahor animals, beasts and birds, and even from their nevelot and terefot; however, they are not to be from tame [i.e., non-kosher] animals, beasts and birds; as it is written, In order that the law of the Lord be in your mouth (Ex. 13:9)from a

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species that is permissible in your mouth (muttar be-fikha). (Shulh an . Arukh, Orah Hayyim 32:12) . .

It is thus clear that the rule of muttar be-fikha requires the use of a kosher (tahor) species; nonetheless, some contend that the definition of muttar be-fikha should also permit substances derived from non-kosher (tame) sources if they are afra be-alma (i.e., mere dust): That is, since mere dust is inedible, it is not considered non-kosher to eat. There are two categories of such substances: things that are inedible from their inception and things that over time, or after processing, become inedible.

Pirsha be-Alma
The Mishnah makes the following generalization: That which goes forth (yoz e) from the tame is tame (Bekhorot 5b). But the gemara . (Bekhorot 7b) exempts a mere excretion (pirsha be-alma) from this principle. R. J. David Bleich summarizes as follows:
. . . a substance is not forbidden as yoz e unless it is edible at the time it . is secreted; a secreted substance that is inedible at the time of its secretion, or becomes inedible thereafter, remains permissible even if its nature is such that it will develop naturally into, or be used in conjunction with, a proper foodstuff.9

Based on the principle that an inedible secretion (pirsha be-alma) is kosher, it is argued that the rule of muttar be-fikha should permit substances which are pirsha be-alma. Ginnat Veradim10 finds the ruling of Rosh,11 that torn Torah scrolls may be sewn with silk threads, as paradigmatic of this permission. Since Torah scrolls are the primary application of the muttar be-fikha law, the permissibility of using silk, which comes from a non-kosher creature, must be explained. Ginnat Veradim argues that silk is actually kosher in that it is merely the inedible tasteless excretion of the wormpirsha be-alma. Furthermore, silk is not similar to sinews, which are explicitly required to be from a kosher species. Sinews are initially edible and, as such, forbidden if from a non-kosher species, whereas silk is a pirsha be-alma and never forbidden for consumption. This argument is rejected by Shivat Z iyyon (#3) who explains that . pirsha be-alma simply cannot be included in the definition of muttar befikha. He reasons that animal hairs are clearly pirsha be-alma, yet the gemara explicitly demands that they be from kosher species.12 As for the permissibility of silk threads to mend torn scrolls, Darkhei Noam (14:1) explains that silk is only permissible in places not fundamentally essential to the scroll and its writing.13

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At this point, then, the definition of muttar be-fikha is understood to require a kosher species; and pirsha be-alma is of no consequence.

Afra be-Alma Final Product

The gemara (Avodah Zarah 67b) discusses the concept of non-kosher substances that become permitted to eat if they become unfit for human consumption (nifsal me-akhilat adam). R. Shimon, whom the normative halakhah follows, rules that something which is nifsal me-akhilat adam is permissible since it is no longer considered food. The opposing view, held by R. Meir, maintains that only substances which had been inedible from their inception are permitted. R. Yeh ezkel Landau in his Noda bi. Yehudah elaborates, explaining that the gemara (Bekhorot 23b) distinguishes between substances that are no longer fit for human consumption and substances that are no longer fit for consumption by a dog (nifsal me-akhilat kelev), applying greater leniency to the latter.14 Based on this, Noda bi-Yehudah explains that even according to R. Meir, once a substance has reached the stage of nifsal me-akhilat kelev, it is simply afra be-alma and permitted. The rule is best summarized as follows:
A substance which has become inedible for a dog (nifsal me-akhilat kelev), according to all authorities, no longer retains any prohibition, even if it became inedible only following its being forbidden.15

Kesef Mishnah (Rambam, Hilkhot Kelei Mikdash 1:3) employs this principle to defend Rambams permitting use of an apparently nonkosher animal16 to produce the mor used for the anointing oil and incense in the Temple, since the mor is afra be-alma in its final form. R. S. Landau, writing on his fathers Noda bi-Yehudah, takes issue.17 He explains that if it were the final substance that is the object of the muttar be-fikha rule, then the hairs and skins used for tefillin, Sefer Torah, and mezuzah should not be required to be from a kosher animal; they too are afra be-alma in their final form. Since they are required to be from a kosher animal, the application of afra be-alma to the final product is an unwarranted exemption from the muttar be-fikha rule.18 Furthermore, the gemara itself states: Tefillin are to be written only on the skin of a behemah tehorah and the skin of hayyah tehorah, and . upon the skins of their nevelot and terefot, but not on the skins of a behemah temeah (Shabbat 108a). Given that the processed skins of non-kosher animals are considered permitted to eat in that they are afra be-alma,19 the gemaras ruling that parchment may not come from the skins of a behemah temeah includes a rejection of the exemption of afra

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be-alma. Stated in the positive, the law of muttar be-fikha enjoins that even though skins are processed, and as such are really allowed for eating, only skins from a kosher species are permitted.20 The definition of muttar be-fikha requires a kosher species; and neither pirsha be-alma nor afra be-alma in final form is of any consequence.

Two More Approaches

Kosher foodstuff from non-kosher fish R. Gershon Hanokh Leiner (the Radzyner Rebbe) also encountered the . issue of muttar be-fikha when he proposed his non-kosher cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis) as the possible source of tekhelet.21 He asserted that, while the condition of afra be-alma is not sufficient to permit use of a substance from a non-kosher animal, if the substance was kosher (not merely inedible) from its outset, it would be acceptable as muttar befikha.22 He then argues that the blood of non-kosher fish is biblically permissible to eat, and as such its dye is muttar be-fikha. The first postulate, that a kosher substance from any non-kosher creature is acceptable, is Shivat Ziyyons (#2) explanation that when actual . kosher substances are required there is a separate rule to applymashkeh Yisraelwhich is distinct from the rule of muttar be-fikha. The rule of muttar be-fikha demands a kosher species, period. Furthermore, the second contention, that the blood of non-kosher sea creatures is biblically permitted, isby R. Leiners own admissionfraught with opposition.23 As another line of defense, the Rebbe proposed that the dyestuff of the hillazon was kosher in that it is like a bees honey.24 Bees honey is . deemed kosher because it is an exudation of the creature having nothing to do with the actual organism itself (Rambam, Hilkhot Maakhalot Asurot, 3:3). This description is inapplicable to the Murex trunculus, whose dyestuff is found in its hypobranchial gland, which serves for several indispensable bodily functions.25 Human-made changes Hatam Sofer (1:39), in examining the permission to use silk, offers the . possibility that dyed silk is acceptable since a fundamental change is effected by dying (as demonstrated by the laws of ownershipwherein dying changes an objects status). However, such a change is not effective in all cases, since wool from sheep which have been worshipped as the object of idolatry is forbidden for ritual use, even after being spun and dyed.26 Hatam Sofer has a novel response to this case, but it is not . the normative understanding. Furthermore, Noda bi-Yehudah altogeth-

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er rejects the notion that any change can make a substance from a nonkosher species admissible as muttar be-fikha. He explains that a fundamental transformation is made by animal skins to become parchment, yet the gemara 27 explicitly requires that they come from a kosher species.28 Indeed, H atam Sofer himself leaves the issue as one which . requires further investigation. In a related responsum on the subject (2:276), written some ten years later, he permits silk only in places where its use is not essential to the miz vah object (eino meakev). . Consequently, the argument that the law of muttar be-fikha applies to the final product, without concern for the source species, is dismissed. The law of muttar be-fikha requires ritual objects to be made from a kosher species, without regard for the permissibility of the final substance. The definition of muttar be-fikha requires a kosher specieswithout exception.

Application of Muttar be-Fikha

Given the definition of muttar be-fikha, one is left in a quandary, upon learning that the gemara (Sukkah 23a) permits, without reservation, the use of a tied elephant as a sukkah wall. Because of this gemara, Noda biYehudah29 contests Magen Avrahams claim that muttar be-fikha applies to all the miz vot stating: Behold, an elephant is not muttar be-fikha, yet . it is permitted for the performance of a miz vah. . Tashmishei Miz vah . Noda bi-Yehudah30 brings the shofar as yet another example of a miz vah . object which is permissible from a non-kosher animal. He explains that the similarity between shofar and sukkah is that they are both tashmishei miz vah31objects used to perform miz vot, yet do not have inherent . . kedushah (holiness). At this point, muttar be-fikha is understood as not applying to tashmishei miz vah. . Though there is support for the idea that a shofar from a nonkosher animal is permissible,32 there are those who hold that this is simply not so.33 To maintain the latter opinion, the unique quality of the sukkah, which allows for the use of a non-kosher animal, must be distinguished from the shofar. Har Z evi (Orah Hayyim 1:39) explains that . . . the law of muttar be-fikha applies specifically to miz vot which by defini. tion require the use of materials from animals (baalei hayyim).34 If the . miz vah does not, by definition, stipulate such a requirement, such that .

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the ritual object could be produced from vegetable or inanimate substances, then one could even use non-kosher animals. The elephant, therefore, is acceptable despite the fact that it is not kosher, since the miz vah of sukkah does not inherently require an animal source for its . fulfillment; a sukkah wall can be made from anything (e.g., metal, wood, stone). In contrast, the shofar must come from an animal; as such, it is argued that it must come from a kosher animal. At this point, muttar be-fikha is understood to apply to all miz vot . that require an animal source. Tekhelet, by definition, must come from an animal source, as the Tosefta (Menahot 9:6) states: Tekhelet is valid only from the hillazon; if . tekhelet was produced from other than the h illazon, it is invalid.35 . According to this last definition of the application of the muttar be-fikha rule, the hillazon must be a kosher animal. . But this last definition is undermined by the example of silk zizit . . brought by Peri Megadim36 and H atam Sofer.37 Shulh an Arukh (Orah . . . Hayyim 9:3), as per the gemara (Menahot 39b), legislates that zizit of . . . . materials [other than wool or linen] fulfill the miz vah of garments made . of that same material, such as silk [zizit] for a silk garment. . . . Given . . that silk is the product of a non-kosher creature (i.e., a worm), this is a miz vah38 which by definition requires the use of an animal, yet its . species is non-kosher.39 As such, muttar be-fikha cannot apply to all miz vot that inherently require an animal source. Given that zizit are a . . . tashmish miz vah, the definition of muttar be-fikha reverts to being inap. plicable to tashmishei miz vah. . In response to the silk zizit example, one could argue that since the . . miz vah of zizit can be fulfilled using materials that are not of animal or . . . food sources (e.g., linen), zizit are not, in an absolute sense, required to . . be from a kosher animal source. Consequently, the example of silk zizit . . reduces the scope of Magen Avrahams statement, but it may not necessarily exempt all tashmishei miz vah from muttar be-fikha. . At this point, it is instructive to revisit the shofar example. Rama (Orah Hayyim 586:1), based on Ran,40 prohibits the use of a non-kosher . . animal for a shofar. Ran reasons that a shofar cannot be of a non-kosher animal because the shofar is considered to be akin to Gods inner chamber (ke-lifnim dami). Thus, the demand that the shofar be from a kosher animal does not ensue from the application of muttar be-fikha to all miz vot. Rather, it stems from the unique significance of the shofar.41 . With this understanding, the shofar proves that muttar be-fikha cannot apply to all miz vot that inherently require an animal source. Given that .

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a shofar is a tashmish miz vah, the definition of muttar be-fikha reverts to . being inapplicable to tashmishei miz vah. . There is, however, a miz vah which seems to limit the generalization . that muttar be-fikha is inapplicable to all tashmishei miz vah: haliz ah . . . which some claim requires the use of a leather shoe.42 Though the Baalei ha-Tosafot (Yevamot 102b, s. v. ve-anelekha) hold that the leather need not be of a kosher animal, Rabbenu Tam (ibid.) does require the shoe to be from the skin of a kosher animal.43 His reason, however, is because of the verse, And I placed on you a shoe of tahash . [a kosher animal]. . . . (Ezek. 16:10). Thus, even according to Rabbenu Tam, the requirement of kosher leather is not due to the application of muttar be-fikha, but because of a specific inference from Scripture.44 Thus, the definition, that muttar be-fikha is inapplicable to tashmishei miz vah, still holds. . At this point, muttar be-fikha is understood as not applying to tashmishei miz vah. . Applying this new definition of muttar be-fikha to the case under discussion, tekhelet as used in zizit is perfectly acceptable from a non-kosher . . animal, since zizit is a tashmish miz vah.45 However, tekhelet is also pre. . . scribed for use in the Mikdash,46 wherein everything is considered tashmish kedushah.47 Given that there is no reason to believe that the tekhelet for zizit is of a different origin than the tekhelet of the Mikdash,48 the ques. . tion of muttar be-fikha must be understood in relation to tashmishei kedushah49ritual objects which have kedushah (holiness). Tashmishei Kedushah R. Behayyei (Ex. 25:3) infers that since silk is not used in the . Mishkan, all the appurtenances of the Mishkan must be muttar be-fikha. Torah Temimah (Ex. 25:4, n.4) does not find R. Behayyeis inference . valid. Rather, he explains that one cannot infer anything from the fact that silk was not used in the Mishkan, since everything was a matter of ha-dibbur ve-horaat ha-shaah (immediate circumstances). It is worth noting that silk was not available outside of China at the time of the Exodus (circa 1300 B.C.E.). For though the Chinese are known to have used silk since the third millennium B.C.E., Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) is the first Westerner to mention silkworms.50 Indeed the Silk Road, carrying silk from China to India, did not come into existence until 300 B.C.E., and did not connect to the West until 200 B.C.E.51 Of course, a miracle could have been wrought to provide silk, but concluding that silk is forbidden based on the absence of a miracle seems excessive.

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Returning to the gemara (Shabbat 28a) wherein R. Yosef s original statement is made, the gemara attempts to deduce which objects are susceptible to ritual defilement of a tent (tumat ohel) through formal comparison (gezerah shavah) with the Mishkanthe paradigmatic tent (ohel).52 The gemara reasons that since all the coverings used in the Mishkan are in some way referred to as ohel, any of the materials used in those coverings are susceptible to tumat ohel. In trying to determine whether skins of non-kosher animals acquire tumat ohel, R. Elazar inquires as to the origin of the tahash skins used in the Mishkan (i.e., . were they from a non-kosher animal?).53 The gemara goes on to prove that the susceptibility of non-kosher skins to tumah is not determined by their inclusion in, or exclusion from, the Mishkan. Rather, the ruling is deduced by an a fortiori inference (kal va-h omer) from goatskins. . After dismissing the use of the tahash skins in the gezerah shavah, the . gemara teaches that the various components of tefillin must be of kosher animal material. The gemara then goes on to conclude that the tahash . was a kosher species. Rashba quotes R. Hai Gaon who derives from this gemara the scope of muttar be-fikha.54 He explains that just as the gemara derived, by formally comparing a Mishkan tent to a corpse tent (gezerah shavah ohel Mishkan ohel met), which materials are susceptible to tumat ohel from the materials used in the Mishkan (i.e., wool and linen), so too the reverse comparison can be applied. That is to say, those materials that are susceptible to tumat ohel are acceptable for use in the Mishkan. Given that non-kosher animal skins are susceptible to tumat ohel,55 non-kosher animal skins must also be acceptable for use in the Mishkan. Therefore, concludes R. Hai Gaon, the requirement to use a kosher animal applies not to the Mishkan, but only to tefillin.56 As explained above, there are no differences among tefillin, mezuzah and sacred scrolls, so muttar be-fikha applies equally to all of these objects. Another miz vah object similar to thesein that it is writing on . parchmentis megillat sotah (the scroll of curses written in the case of an unfaithful woman [Num. 5:23]). Sedei H emed,57 in analyzing the . miz vah of Sotah, concludes that megillat sotah requires kosher parch. ment specifically because it has writing.58 As such, the application of muttar be-fikha is broadened to include all miz vot which entail writing. . At this point, then, muttar be-fikha is understood to apply to miz vot . with writing. This definition is called into question by the miz vah of get. The get . is a miz vah object composed of writing; however, the mishnah itself .

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permits a get to be written on anything (Gittin 19a).59 Sedei H emed 60 . quotes Bikkurei Shelomoh, who explains that a get does not require muttar be-fikha because the miz vah does not inherently require an animal . source. Thus, he would refine our application of muttar be-fikha to miz vot with writing which also require animal sources. . At this point, muttar be-fikha is understood to apply to miz vot . involving writing that inherently require an animal source. This last definition is a refinement based on R. Hai Gaons conclusion that muttar be-fikha applies to tefillin and not the Mishkan. However, Noda bi-Yehudah rejects R. Hai Gaons application of the gezerah shavah (learning ohel Mishkan from ohel met).61 He reasons that the gemara questioned whether the susceptibility of a non-kosher animal to tumah could be learned from the example of the tahash in the Mishkan, since the . tahash is not necessarily considered the actual Mishkan (but rather a func. tional covering). As such, the gezerah shavah does not apply, since the tahash was not formally part of the Mishkan tent. Furthermore, since . the gemara concludes that the tah ash was indeed kosher, the gezerah . shavah, maintains Noda bi-Yehudah, is simply inapplicable. This rejection of R. Hai Gaons position by Noda bi-Yehudah is weak for two reasons: 1) though the gemara was initially in doubt whether the tahash was part of the Mishkan, it concludes that the tahash was indeed . . considered part of the Mishkan (mah tahton karui ohel, af elyon karui . ohel); 2) the fact that the gemara concludes that the tahash was kosher, . does not break the gezerah shavah between ohel met and ohel Mishkan.62 Indeed, following the gemaras discussion of whether a non-kosher animal skin contracts tumah, the question is raised: And what about the status of the tahash? This question clearly implies that non-kosher skins . were permitted in the Mishkan.63 Be that as it may, we will continue with Noda bi-Yehudahs discussion since it is the more stringent approach. After much deliberation, Noda bi-Yehudah 64 explains that though he had propounded that the reason muttar be-fikha applied to tefillin straps was their being connected to sacred writing, there is room to disagree with his reasoning. One may claim that muttar be-fikha applies to tefillin straps because they are tashmishei kedushah (as explained by Tosafot Menahot 35b, s. v. elu tefillin).65 As such, the definition of muttar . be-fikha again applies to tashmishei kedushah. At this point, muttar be-fikha is understood to apply to all tashmishei kedushah. Nevertheless, one who accepts this definition is confronted with the three dyes used in the Mishkan: tekhelet, argaman, and tolaat shani.

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Noda bi-Yehudah expresses uncertainty as to whether the sources of these dyes were kosher. He posits that, assuming the dyes were from non-kosher creatures, muttar be-fikha has a new condition: everything that is for appearances has no requirement of muttar be-fikha. At this point, an investigation of the sources of these dyes is essential.

Dyes in the Mikdash

Tolaat Shani Rambam (Hilkhot Parah Adumah 3:2) explains that the tolaat shani (crimson) dye comes from a gargir, a grain-like object, within which lives a tolaat (insect).66 R. Beh ayyei (Ex. 25:3) interprets Rambams . description to the effect that the dye is from a kosher source (i.e., the gargir) and not the actual insect. This explanation is difficult for the following reasons: First, it comes in stark contradiction to the statement of the Yerushalmi: Just as tolaat shani is something that has the spirit of life in it, so too everything [i.e., tekhelet, argaman] has the spirit of life in it (Kil ayim 9:1).67 This clearly implies that the tolaat shani dye comes from a living tolaat. The Tosefta (Menahot 9:6) corroborates: Sheni . tolaat is from the tolaah in the hills; if it is not made from the tolaah in the hills, it is invalid. Similarly states the Sifra: Sheni tolaat, the color that is in the tolaat.68 So too the Sifrei: The color is from the tolaat, and not from anything else.69 Accordingly, Torah Temimah quotes Rambam (i.e., that the dye is from the gargir) and says in amazement: I have not found any source for this idea, and behold it is stated explicitly that the tolaat is an actual living insect!70 Second, it is well known that the ancients used crimson dye from an insect known as the Coccus (kermes) ilicis which lives on the red oak tree (Quercus coccifera) and holly oak (Quercus ilex).71 Archaeological evidence indicates that it is the oldest red dye, used by the Egyptians and Phoenicians.72 The Septuagint (Ex. 25:4-7, 26:1) translates tolaat shani as kokkinonthe Greek word used to refer to Kermes dye, and Pliny refers to its widespread use. 73 R. Saadyah Gaon (Ex. 25:4) agrees, explaining the words tolaat shani as the color Kermes. As for the gargir in which the insect is found, this may refer to either the egg or cocoon, in which the insect growsboth of which also contain the dye.74 If so, Rambam is not implying that the dye must come from a kosher source; rather, he is merely explaining a specific instance of where the dyefrom its non-kosher sourceis found.

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The fact that the tolaat shani dye came from an insect has been recognized by posekim and applied halakhically. H atam Sofer (Responsa, . 2:#276) states that the crimson dye of tolaat shani is wool dyed from insect extract. Similarly, Minhat Yizhak (3:#96) writes, as I have seen in . .. one of the writings of the soferim ha-haredim, the dye was produced . from the tolaat. Argaman R. Isaac Herzog, as part of his doctoral thesis Hebrew Porphyrology, discusses the source of the argaman dyestuff. He explains that the Septuagint translates every instance of the word argaman as porphyra (or a derivative thereof).75 Porphyra is the Greek name used to refer to the snails used for Tyrian Purplethe purple dye made famous by the Phoenicians and later monopolized by the Romans.76 R. Herzog brings evidence from the writings of Philo and Josephus, both of whom expressly state that the Temples argaman dye was of sea-snail origin.77 This is most convincing testimony, given that both Philo and Josephus lived during the Second Temple period; moreover, Josephus himself officiated in the Temple. R. Herzog then goes on to explain the reason for the lack of a formal declaration in Judaic literature to specify the source of argaman:
There was no necessity for formulating a law in rejection of nonconchylian dyestuffs for argaman, simply because the word argaman itself denoted nothing but purple dye or purple stuff, being the equivalent of the Greek or Latin purpura: argaman also designated the species of sea-snail productive of the dye which, when applied to clothing gave to the latter the name argaman. To have said that the stuff dyed with the vegetable pigment is not argaman, however close its color to the latter might be, would have been like saying, for instance, that counterfeit gold might not do when the Law required gold.78

The point is that the very name argaman indicates the sea-snail source which produces purple dye, just as the name gold indicates that well-known precious metal. Tekhelet The intention of this paper has been to ascertain whether tekhelet dye could halakhically come from a non-kosher source. The most direct method to establish the validity of such a claim is to demonstrate that the very creature mandated is nothing other than a non-kosher animal. The gemara describes the nature of the hillazon stating: its creation . (beriato) is similar to that of a fish (Menahot 44b). This identification .

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is no more precise than saying that the hillazon lives in the sea.79 Indeed, . Shemuel ben Hofni Gaon, in chapter 9 of his Book of the Laws of zizit, . . . writes that tekhelet is dyed with the blood of a sea creature. Rambam (Hilkhot Z izit 2:2) states that the hillazon is simply a fish (i.e., not . . . similar to a fish). One may therefore conclude only that the hillazon is . a sea creature, and not necessarily a kosher fish. For as R. Herzog explains,80 Rambam distinguishes only between fish and sherazei ha. mayim, and as such he would include Gastropods (of which snails are a member) in his categorization of fish. The Midrash describes the hillazon as follows: Go and learn [about . the clothes of the Jews in the desert] from the hillazon: all the time that . it grows, its shell (nartiko) grows with it (Shir ha-Shirim Rabbah 4:11).81 The gemara states, One who traps and breaks open (pozea) a . h illazon . . . (Shabbat 75a). R. Herzog explains that the verb pozea . . means break openthat is, something hard, like a nut. 82 These sources indicate that the hillazon is a hard-shelled creature.83 Given that . the only kosher sea creatures are those with fins and scales, which excludes all hard-shelled crustaceans, the hillazon, as described by the . Midrash and gemara, cannot be a kosher fish.84 Finally, there is the statement of Ravya (Berakhot 9:25), who quotes the Yerushalmi identifying tekhelet with the Greek word porphyra.85 Again, porphyra is the Greek word used to refer to snails, more specifically the Murex snails, which have been shown to produce both purple (argaman) and blue (tekhelet), depending on processing.86 Given the overwhelming evidence in support of the fact that nonkosher species were used as the dye sources of the Mikdash, Noda biYehudahs uncertainty as to the dye origins is removed. Consequently, his hypothesis that appearances dont count, is affirmed. Indeed, H atam Sofer 87 maintains that the dyes are obtained from non-kosher . substances and thus concludes that coloring is of no consequence. R. Elyashiv is more conservative, explaining that though tekhelet is acceptable from a non-kosher animal, it is so by definition, and one cannot extrapolate from this to general halakhah.88 At this point, muttar be-fikha is understood to apply to all tashmishei kedushah with the exception of dyesat least for the Mikdash.

Conclusion
In conclusion, we have seen the spectrum of opinions regarding the definition and application of the principle muttar be-fikha. It has been demonstrated that this principle, by definition, requires that the raw

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material for ritual objects come from kosher species without exception. It has been shown decisively that muttar be-fikha cannot be applied to all the miz vot; for any one of the counter-examples (sukkah, using an . elephant; shofar, from tame; zizit, from silk) is alone adequate to dis. . lodge the broad application of muttar be-fikha as initially understood by Magen Avraham. Indeed, Peri Megadim explains that the hekesh (inference) of Magen Avraham is not a hekesh gamur (inference without exceptions).89 Through the examples, we learned that muttar be-fikha is simply not applicable to tashmishei miz vah. And following the analysis . which established the hillazon as a non-kosher animal, we can now add . zizit of tekhelet to the list of miz vot which inherently require a non. . . kosher animal foodstuff for its fulfillment. R. Hai Gaons analysis brought by Rashba indicated that muttar befikha is in fact very limited in scope, applying only to tefillinand by extension, to sacred writings. By distinguishing the requirements of gittin, we further refined the application of muttar be-fikha to objects with writing that require animal material as their substrate by definition. R. Hai Gaons understanding was called into question by Noda bi-Yehudah, so we returned to the notion that the principle of muttar be-fikha applies to all tashmishei kedushah.90 Nevertheless, even allowing for this broader approach to muttar be-fikha, it was demonstrated that muttar be-fikha simply cannot apply to the dyes used in the tashmishei kedushah of the Mikdasheither because appearances dont count or simply by way of specific dispensation. With this deeper understanding of the parameters pertaining to the principle of muttar be-fikha, another obstacle has been removed from the path to accepting the Murex trunculus snail as the h illazon shel . tekhelet. May yet more Jews find in this the power to fulfill the miz vah of . zizit bi-shelemutah (in its full definition), and thus merit Gods very . . presence, as it says: He who is careful in the miz vah of zizit merits to . . . receive the face of the Shekhinah (Menahot 43b). .

Notes
1. Chief Rabbi Dr. Isaac Herzog, Hebrew Porphyrology, The Royal Purple and The Biblical Blue ed. Ehud Spanier (Jerusalem, 1987), 17-145; Menahem Borstein, Ha-Tekhelet (Jerusalem, 1988); Yisrael Ziderman, Reinstitution of the Miz vah of Tekhelet in Z iz it (Hebrew), Tehumin 9 (1988): 423-46; . . . Yehuda Rock, Renewal of Tekhelet and Issues of Z iz it and Tekhelet . . (Hebrew), Teh umin 16 (website expanded version www.tekhelet. com); . Eliyahu Tavger, Maamar ha-Tekhelet, Kelil Tekhelet (Jerusalem, 1993):

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312-34; Baruch Sterman, The Science of Tekhelet, Tekhelet: Renaissance of a Mitzvah (New York, 1996): 63-78; Rabbi Chaim E. Twerski, Identifying the Chilazon, Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society XXXIV (Fall 1997): 77-102. The statement is part of a verse describing tefillin. The Talmud interprets the words in your mouth as permissible in your mouth (muttar be-fikha), meaning that the parchments must be muttar be-fikha. The principle is interchangeably referred to as muttar be-fikha or a variation of lo hukhshar li-melekhet Shamayim ela davar tahor. (For example, see: R. Beh ayyei, Ex. 25:3; R. S. Landau, Responsa Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura . Tanina, Orah Hayyim, 3; R. S. Landau, Haggahot to Doresh le-Z iyyon, ch. 11; . . . Responsa Torat Hesed, Orah Hayyim, 60:3). . . . The statement of the Mishnah is made with regard to parchments; the gemara (Megillah 8b) then infers the rule to apply to the stitching as well. See also Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah, 271:1. See note 8 below for an explanation of why the terms tame and tahor should be translated as kosher and nonkosher. Responsa Sedei H emed (Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet H anukkah, 14) explains . . that the opinion of Magen Avraham is also held by Eliyahu Rabbah, Semag, Mikraei Kodesh, Birkei Yosef, and Batei Kenesiyyot. See Peri Megadim: Eshel Avraham (Orah Hayyim, 586:3). (See also Mahazit . . . . ha-Shekel 586:3 for an alternate explanation of Magen Avraham). For the sake of clarification, it is instructive to prove the following argument fallacious: Given that (a) the hillazon is a sea creature and (b) the mishnah . (Kelim 17:13) states, everything in the sea is tahor, except for the seal, the hillazon satisfies the requirement of being tahor. This argument is untenable . for the simple reason that the gemaras requirement that a ritual object be of a tahor substance means kosher (i.e., halakhically permissible for consumption). The usage of the terms tahor and tame to refer to kosher and non-kosher animals is taken from the Torah, when it refers to behemot temeot, meaning animals non-kosher to eat (Lev. 7:21, 20:25, :25, 27:11, 27; Num. 18:15). Though the Torah itself does not employ the terms dag tahor and dag tame, the gemara (H ullin 66b, Niddah 51b; also Shabbat 108a, . Bava Mez ia 61b, Avodah Zarah 40a, Hullin 67b, Hullin 113a, Bekhorot 7b) . . . uses the terms extensively to distinguish between sea creatures that have the signs of fins-and-scales and those that do not. Since the hillazon does not . have fins and scales, it is non-kosher (i.e., not permitted for consumption) and in the words of Hazal: tame. The intent of the mishnah (Kelim 17:13) is . not that all sea creatures are kosher, but that vessels made of the skins or bones of sea creatures do not receive tumah (are not mekabbel tumah) (Kehati, ad loc.). J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. III (Hoboken, NJ, 1989), 80. Orah Hayyim, 2:16, s. v. akh mah. . . Silk is acceptable to sew tears in scrolls (Rosh, Teshuvot, Kelal 3). Shabbat 28b. So too Responsa Hatam Sofer (2:276, s. v. ve-haynu tama). . Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Kamma, Yoreh Deah, 26. Enz iklopedyah Talmudit, vol. II, 91 . Rambam explained that the mor spice was obtained from an Indian animal

2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

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17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

which is used the world over for perfume. The animal referred to is held to be the Musk Deer (Moschus Moschiferus), used ubiquitously for its powerful scent (see Encyclopaedia Britannica, s. v. Musk). According to Noda biYehudah, Ravad (Hassagot, Hilkhot Kelei Mikdash 1:3) was of the opinion that Rambam was referring to a non-kosher animal, and thus questioned the acceptability of using a non-kosher animal in the Temple service. (See note 18 for a discussion of the alternate interpretations of Ravad). As an aside, the Musk Deer is known to be kosher and would thus conform to the requirement of muttar be-fikha (See R. Kapah, Perush ha-Mishnah, Kereitot 1:1). . Mahadura Tanina (Orah Hayyim, 3), s. v. od reayah. . . Hatam Sofer (1:39, s. v. le-zeh) finds Ravads point about the mor not to be . concerned with muttar be-fikha at all. According to Hatam Sofer, it is obvi. ous that muttar be-fikha requires a kosher species, and as such, the blood of a kosher species (though not kosher to eat) would be acceptable. Rather, through an exacting analysis of Ravads words, H atam Sofer explains that . Ravads point pertains to mashkeh Yisrael. The rule of mashkeh Yisrael, which applies to korbanot (such as the incense), specifies that a substance actually be kosher to eat, though not necessarily from a kosher species. R. Elyashiv explains that: Ravad was not arguing against Rambam based on either muttar be-fikha or mashkeh Yisrael but simply on sevarah. . . . And to this, Kesef Mishneh responded that since the mor became afra be-alma there can be no reason to prohibit its use. Accordingly, the words of Kesef Mishneh do not disagree with the understanding of Noda bi-Yehudah that there is no difference in the law of muttar be-fikha whether the object changed (Ha-Yoz ei min ha-Tame bi-Tefillin u-bi-Tekhelet, Zohar, helek 3, . . 51, s. v. ve-omnam [ed. R. E. Devorkas, 5758]). In any case, whether the issue of Ravad is over muttar be-fikha (as per Noda bi-Yehudah) or over mashkeh Yisrael (as per H atam Sofer) or over . sevarah (as per R. Elyashiv), all agree that the demands of muttar be-fikha are not mitigated by a substance becoming afra be-alma in its final form. Mahadura Tanina (Orah Hayyim, 3), s. v. od reayah. . . Yerushalmi Megillah (1:9, 12a); Tosafot (Shabbat 108a, s. v. eizeh); Shivat Z iyyon (#2, s. v. ve-ein lomar); Hatam Sofer (1:39, s.v. le-zeh yesh). See also . . Ginnat Veradim (Orah Hayyim, 2:16). . . Maamar Petil Tekhelet, Sifrei ha-Tekhelet Radzin (Benei Berak, 1990), ot 5, 51. See note 45 for an explanation of why the Rebbi felt compelled to argue as such. Ein ha-Tekhelet, Sifrei ha-Tekhelet Radzin (Benei Berak, 1990), ot 16, 268. Ibid., ot 9, 348. E. Spanier and N. Karmon, Mucrid Snails and the Ancient Dye Industries, The Royal Purple and the Biblical Blue, 183. Rambam, Hilkhot Issurei Mizbeah 4:7; Kesef Mishneh ad loc.; Mishnah . Berurah, Orah Hayyim (11:8:35). Shaar ha-Ziyyun, Orah Hayyim (11:8:25). . . . . . Responsa Sheelat David, Orah Hayyim, 3. . . Shabbat 108a. Mahadura Tanina (Orah Hayyim, 3), s. v. amar Shemuel. . . Ibid, s. v. omnam yesh li-dehot. . Ibid. These are tashmishei miz vah: sukkah, lulav, shofar, z iz it (Megillah 26b). . . . Responsa Olat Shabbat (Orah Hayyim 586:1). See further, note 41. . .

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33. Rama (Orah Hayyim 586:1). Magen Avraham (Orah Hayyim 586:3). . . . . 34. So too Torah Temimah (Ex. 13:9, n.47; Ex. 25:4, n. 4). R. G. H. Leiner similarly explained that muttar be-fikha applies only to objects that inherently are required to be from a food source (Petil Tekhelet, Sifrei ha-Tekhelet Radzin, ot 5, 51, s. v. u-mah ar she-nityashev); Ein ha-Tekhelet, Sifrei ha-Tekhelet . Radzin, ot 11, 250, s. v. u-ke-fi mah.) Similarly, Torat Hesed (Orah Hayyim, . . . 60:3), though he disagrees with Magen Avraham in general, tries to explain how, according to Magen Avraham, a sukkah can be made from an elephant. 35. Though there are some few who hold that tekhelet may come from sources other than the hillazon, the overwhelming majority opinion is that it must . come from the hillazon. See R. Bezalel Naor Substituting Synthetic Dye for . Hilazon, Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, 24(1992), 97-107; Yehuda Rock, Renewal of Tekhelet . . . , website expanded version, 12-13; Borstein, Ha-Tekhelet, 25-27. 36. Mishbez ot Zahav 32:28. . 37. 1:39, s. v. ve-ha lo kashyah. 38. A miz vah de-oraita according to those who rule according to the opinion of . Rabbah in Menahot 39b (e.g., Rama, Orah Hayyim 9:1). Even according to . . . those who hold that the miz vah is de-rabbanan, its parameters must be seen . as being shaped by de-oraita principles, since de-rabbanan miz vot based on . de-oraita miz vot ke-ein de-oraita tikkunthe rabbis defined miz vot like de. . oraita miz vot (Gittin 65a). . 39. Though the garment can use wool or linen z iz it, this is a special dispensa. . tion. The specific ruling that silk z iz it fulfills the miz vah for a silk garment is . . . a unanimously held decision in the gemara, regardless of whether one holds that a silk garment is de-oraita or de-rabbanan (Mishnah Berurah, Orah . Hayyim 9:3:9). . 40. Rosh ha-Shanah, Resh Perek Rauhu Bet Din 212b. 41. The words of Olat Shabbat are correct to allow a shofar from a non-kosher animal, . . . and from the words of Ran in the case of the shofar, there is room to be strict since it is likened to Gods inner chamber (Shivat Z iyyon, . #2, s. v. gam yafeh). From the words of Ran, only divrei kedushah . . . but not other miz vot . [require muttar be-fikha] . . . for if the shofar were not likened to Gods inner chamber, he would have no doubts [that it could be of non-kosher material] (Hatam Sofer, 1:39, s. v. ve-ha lo kashyah). . Rama [who stated (Orah Hayyim 586:1) that a shofar from a tame animal . . is invalid], himself writes in his Darkhei Mosheh that it is good to be strict [and use a tahor animal]. Obviously this [ruling to use a kosher animal for a shofar] is not based on the law but is merely a stricture (humrah be-alma) . (Sedei Hemed, Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet Hanukkah, 14, 215, s. v. ve-im). . . See also Torat Hesed (Orah Hayyim, 60:4, s. v. ve-yesh litmoah), Shaar ha. . . Ziyyun (Orah Hayyim, 586:1:14), Responsa Avnei Nezer (Orah Hayyim, 15, ot 9). . . . . . 42. See Enz iklopedyah Talmudit (vol. 15, 722) for a discussion of the mahloket . . tannaim over whether leather is required. 43. See Enz iklopedyah Talmudit (vol. 15, 726). . 44. R. G. H. Leiner, Ein ha-Tekhelet, Sifrei ha-Tekhelet Radzin (Benei Berak: 1990), ot 11, 252, s. v. u-meyushav. 45. On a historical note, the Radziner Rebbe did not adopt the opinion that muttar be-fikha was inapplicable to z iz it. He held that just as the shofar is . .

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46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56 57. 58. 59.

accorded a special status, in that it is likened to Gods inner chamber, so too tekhelet should be accorded the same status, in that it is likened to Gods throne (Ein ha-Tekhelet, Sifrei ha-Tekhelet Radzin, ot 9, 248). Nevertheless, even by according special status to tekhelet, one must say that just as the shofar could be (me-ikkar ha-din) from a non-kosher animal, so too could tekhelet. The Rebbe was not of this opinion and so felt compelled to develop the unconventional interpretation that the blood of non-kosher fish satisfied the requirements of muttar be-fikha. He proposed primarily two possible means to accept the dye as kosher: either because the blood of non-kosher fish is biblically permitted (Ein ha-Tekhelet, Sifrei ha-Tekhelet Radzin, ot 16, 267) or because the dyestuff is like bees honey (Ibid., ot 9, 348). Both of these solutions are problematic, as was previously discussed. Tekhelet, as it is related to the Mishkan, appears in the Torah as: donations (Ex. 25:4; 35:6, 23, 25); yeriot (26:1); lulaot (26:4; 36:11); parokhet (26:31; 36:35); masakh petah ha-ohel (26:36; 36:37); masakh shaar he-hazer (27:16; . . 38:18); efod (28:6, 8; 39:3, 5); hoshen (28:15; 39:8); hoshen to efod petil (28:28; . . 39:21); meil (28:31, 33; 39:22, 24); avnet (39:29); z iz petil (28:37; 39:31); . . clothing (39:1); travel covers (Num. 4:6, 7, 9, 11, 12). Noda bi-Yehudah (Mahadura Tanina [Orah Hayyim, 3], s. v. omnam yesh li. . dehot): Mishkan, Mikdash, and bigdei kehunah (priestly clothing) are tash. mishei kedushah. (Similarly Hatam Sofer, 1:39, s. v. ve-ha lo kashyah). . Though some exempt tekhelet in the Mikdash from the requirement to be of hillazon origin (R. Tuckachinsky, Ir Ha-Kodesh ve-ha-Mikdash; Avnei Nezer, . Orah Hayyim 16: 8-9), Mishneh le-Melekh states explicitly that, according to . . Rambam (Hilkhot Kelei Mikdash 8:13), the requirement for tekhelet from the hillazon applies equally to both z iz it and the Temple. Similarly, R. Herzog . . . maintains that there is not the flimsiest ground for drawing a distinction between tekhelet in z iz it and tekhelet in the Temple. He explains that the . . Talmud, in various places, discusses the tekhelet of z iz it and that of the . . Mishkan together and without distinction (Hebrew Porphyrology, The Royal Purple and the Biblical Blue, 55). These are tashmishei kedushah: sacks for keeping scrolls of Scripture, tefillin, mezuzot, a mantle for a Sefer Torah, a tefillin bag and tefillin straps (Megillah 26b). See Aristotles History of Animals. Textiles in Biblical Times, CIBA Review (1968/2), 11. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s. v. Roads and Highways; see also s. v. Silk. Gezerah Shavah ohel [Mishkan] [to] ohel [met]. The reasoning being that if the tahash is a non-kosher animal, then given . that its skins were used in the Mishkan (the definitive ohel), non-kosher animal skins similarly acquire tumat ohel (determined via the gezerah shavah which indicates that what applies to the Mishkan applies to the corpse tent). Hiddushei ha-Rashba, Shabbat 28, s. v. ela ha de-tani. . From the kal va-homer of R. Huna mi-Barnish (Shabbat 28a-b). . Hatam Sofer agrees with R. Hai Gaons analysis (1:39, s. v. ve-ulai). . Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet Hanukkah, 14: 212, 215. . Sedei Hemed (Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet Hanukkah 14: 206-07) explains that . . Rashash, Ritva, and Besamim Rosh also hold that muttar be-fikha applies only to things with writingTorah az mah. . And so follows the halakhah (Enz iklopedyah Talmudit, vol. 5, 586). Sedei .

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Hemed (Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet Hanukkah, 14: 213, s. v. be-ot dalet) cites . . Beit Yiz h ak, who uses the miz vah of get to prove that muttar be-fikha does . .. not apply to all miz vot. . Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet Hanukkah, 14: 216, s. v. ve-al ha-reayah. . Mahadura Tanina (Orah Hayyim, 3), s. v. ve-gam yesh lomar. . . See Hatam Sofer (1:39, s. v. ve-ulai). . See Torat Hesed, Orah Hayyim 60:4. . . . Mahadura Tanina (Orah Hayyim, 3), s. v. u-bar min dein. . . He then quotes Maginei Shelomoh, who explains that the reason the status of the tahash was questioned by the gemara (mah havi alah de-tahash) is that it . . was unclear whether these skins are considered tashmish kedushah (part of the Mishkan and as such would have to be kosher) or tashmish miz vah (not . part of the Mishkan proper, but simply protect the Mishkan from the rain). Similarly Rashi on Is. 1:18. The first half of the statement is unequivocal that tolaat shani comes from a living creature. The second half of the statement af kol davar she-yesh bo ruah . hayyim is ambiguous; the translation provided is interpretive, based on the . commentary of Elijah of Fulda. For a discussion of the interpretation of the second half of the Yerushalmi see R. M. Margoliot (Penei Mosheh and Mareh Panim), loc. cit. Also Isaac Herzog, Ha-Tekhelet be-Yisrael, (printed in Borstein, Ha-Tekhelet), 382. Sedei Hemed (Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet . Hanukkah, 14: 203, s. v. hen emet). . Sifra Mez ora, parashah aleph, s. v. Torat ha-Mez ora. . . Sifrei Be-Midbar, piska 124, s. v. Ezov ve-lo. Torah Temimah (Ex. 25:4, n. 4) does try to justify Rambam, explaining that one could interpret tolaat to mean the grain in which the insect is found. Nevertheless this is clearly a forced interpretation, inconsistent with the Yerushalmi (as well as with scientific evidence). Indeed, Sedei Hemed quotes . the interpretation and states, and this is a forced (dohak) interpretation of . the language of the Yerushalmi (Aseifat Dinim, Maarekhet Hanukkah, 14: . 203, s. v. hen emet). R.D. Lillie, The Red Dyes Used by the Ancient Dyers: Their Probable Identity, JSDC ( Feb. 1979), 60. Kermes dye is obtained from the female Kermococcus vermilis which lives in the Quercus coccifera oaks found in the Mediterranean and Near East. Northern Israel harbours two of the speciesK. biblicus which lives on a Qu. Calliprinos subspecies and K. spatulatus which lives on Qu. Ithaburensis which were probably exploited in biblical times also (I. Ziderman, Biblical Dyes of Animal Origin, Chemistry in Britain 22, 5 [1986]: 419-22). Though there is some question as to which particular species was used for tolaat shanithere is no doubt that the source of the ancient crimson dye was from an insecti.e., non-kosher. R.D. Lillie, The Red Dyes Used by the Ancient Dyers: Their Probable Identity, JSDC (Feb. 1979), 58. Ibid. Encyclopedia Britannica (Edition 15, 1985), vol.16, 645. Textiles in Biblical Times, CIBA Review, (1968/2), 19. R. Aryeh Kaplan writes From the context and from what is known of the dye, however, it appears that the pods [gargir] are the mature insects, and the worms [tolaat] are the eggs found inside. Crimson is obtained by

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67.

68. 69. 70.

71.

72. 73. 74.

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75. 76.

77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82.

83.

84. 85. 86. 87.

crushing the eggs in mature female insects (Me-am Loez, Exodus VI, 358, n. 37). Also Eliyahu Tavger, Maamar ha-Tekhelet, Kelil Tekhelet (Jerusalem, 1993), 327. See also R. M. A. Kaz, Kiyyum Miz vat Tekhelet Z iz it be. . . Yameinu, Kovez Or Yisrael, Gillayon 10, n. 66. . Isaac Herzog, Hebrew Porphyrology, 54. Aristotle, History of Animals, ch.15; Herzog, Hebrew Porphyrology, 20. The snails have been shown to be of the Murex family (ibid., 20-34); J.T. Baker, Tyrian Purple: An Ancient Dye, a Modern Problem, Endeavour 32 (1974):11-17; R.J.H. Clark, Indigo, Woad, and Tyrian Purple: Important Vat Dyes from Antiquity to the Present, Endeavour, New Series, 1993, 19199. See also Encyclopedia Britannica, s. v. Indigo, Dress, Phoenicia. Hebrew Porphyrology, 55. Ibid. 56. Y. Rock (15, n.57) explains that the similarity between the hillazon and . fish is simply that they occupy the same habitatthe sea. He arrives at this conclusion by noting that this description (i.e., similar to fish) is one of several in the baraita which concludes consequently the dye is expensive. He reasons that all the preceding descriptions come to account for the expense. Living with fish (i.e., in the ocean) makes the hillazon difficult to . obtain. This characteristic thus serves, along with the others listed, to justify the conclusion that its dye is expensive. See also Isaac Herzog, Hebrew Porphyrology, 68, who explains that from the sporadic allusion to the nature and characteristics of fishes in the gemara no precise taxonomy can be inferred. Hebrew Porphyrology, 68. Pesikta de-Rav Kehana, ch.11; Midrash Tehillim, Mizmor 23. The hillazon of . the midrash is the hillazon shel tekhelet (Baal Musaf he-Arukh, hillazon d). . . Hebrew Porphyrology, 57. Also see R. Herzog, Ha-Tekhelet be-Yisrael, in Borstein, 371; R. Isaac Herzog, Ha-Hed (Av 5692), quoted in Dr. Yisrael Ziderman, Reinstitution of the Miz vah of Tekhelet in Zizit (Hebrew), . Tehumin 9 (1988), 430. Also R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam, Responsa Birkat . Avraham, 19. A variant midrash (Devarim Rabbah 7:11) states, . . . all the time it grows, its clothing (malbusho) grows with it. Though the gemara (Niddah 51b) refers to the scales (kaskeset) of a fish as its clothing (levush), the gemaras (Shabbat 75a) use of the verb poz ea (break open) does not easily apply to the . cutting opening of a scaly fish. Indeed the gemara (Hullin 21a) uses the term . tear to refer to the opening of a fish. (See Twerski [above, n. 1], 84). The verb poz ea is employed throughout the gemara with various meanings, pri. marily: 1) bruisingas in olives (Shabbat 50b); 2) breaking openas in nuts (Shabbat 115a). Since the object of the pez iah as related to the hillazon is . . not to bruise it, but rather to reach its innards and extract the dyestuff, the usage implies the breaking open of something hard. In fact, though it is impossible to prove a negative, there are no ancient dyes known to have been produced from kosher fish (personal conversation with Prof. Yehuda Felix). . . . between tekhelet and kartibetween porphyra and prifinin. . . . Otto Elsner, The Past, Present and Future of Tekhelet, The Royal Purple and The Biblical Blue, 175. 2:276, s. v. ve-hineh.

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88. R. Elyashiv, Ha-Yoz ei min ha-Tame bi-Tefillin u-bi-Tekhelet, Z ohar . . 3(5758): 51, s. v. u-be-ez em. . 89. Mishbez ot Zahav 32:28 . 90. As an aside, R. S. Landau in a later responsum in his own Shivat Z iyyon (#2, . s. v. u-mah she-amad) limits the application of muttar be-fikha only to things which have actual writingTorah az mah. (See also his Haggahot to . Doresh le-Z iyyon, ch. 11, s.v. ve-hinei al miz vot aseh). . .