Why Should You Believe It?

By John R. Searle Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism by Paul A. Boghossian Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 139 ., !19.9" # a er$ 1. %elativis& has a long history in our intelle'tual 'ulture, and ta(es several different for&s, su'h as relativis& about (no)ledge and truth, ethi'al values, aestheti' *uality, and 'ultural nor&s, to &ention a fe). Paul Boghossian+s boo( 'on'entrates on the first of these. ,he basi' idea he o oses is that 'lai&s to ob-e'tive truth and (no)ledge, for exa& le the 'lai& that hydrogen ato&s have one ele'tron, are in fa't only valid relative to a set of 'ultural attitudes, or to so&e other sub-e'tive )ay of er'eiving the )orld. .urther&ore, a''ording to relativis&, in'onsistent 'lai&s &ay have )hat he 'alls /e*ual validity./ ,here 'an be no universally valid (no)ledge 'lai&s. ,here is a traditional refutation of relativis&, as follo)s0 ,he 'lai& that all truth is relative is itself either relative or not. 1f it is relative then )e need not a''e t it be'ause it is only valid relative to so&ebody+s attitudes, )hi'h )e &ay not share. 1f it is not relative, but absolute, then it refutes the vie) that all truth is relative. 2ither )ay relativis& is refuted. Boghossian 'onsiders this traditional refutation and though he thin(s it is serious, he does not regard it as de'isive. .or one thing, &ost relativists regard it as a (ind of logi'al tri'(. ,hey thin( that they are ossessed of a dee insight, that all of our (no)ledge 'lai&s are &ade relative to a 'ertain set of attitudes, 'ultural nor&s, and re-udi'es. ,his insight is not refuted by logi'al argu&ents, or so they su ose. ,he 'urrently &ost influential for& of relativis& is so'ial 'onstru'tivis&, )hi'h Boghossian defines as follo)s0 /A fa't is so'ially 'onstru'ted if and only if it is necessarily true that it 'ould only have obtained through the 'ontingent a'tions of a so'ial grou ./ ,he so'ial 'onstru'tivist is anxious to ex ose 'onstru'tion )here none had been sus e'ted, )here so&ething that is in fa't essentially so'ial had 'o&e to &as*uerade as art of the natural )orld. 3any so'ial 'onstru'tivists find it liberating be'ause it frees us fro& the a arent o ression of su osing that )e are for'ed to a''e t 'lai&s about the )orld as &atters of &ind4inde endent fa't )hen in reality they are all so'ially 'onstru'ted. 1f )e do not li(e a fa't that others have 'onstru'ted, )e 'an 'onstru't another fa't that )e refer. 5hat do relativis& and so'ial 'onstru'tivis& loo( li(e in ra'ti'e6 Boghossian gives a nu&ber of stri(ing exa& les. A''ording to our best eviden'e, the 7ative A&eri'ans arrived on this 'ontinent fro& the 2urasian land&ass by 'rossing over the Bering 8trait9 but a''ording to so&e 7ative A&eri'an a''ounts they are the 1

des'endants of the Buffalo eo le, and they 'a&e fro& inside the earth after su ernatural s irits re ared this )orld for habitation by hu&ans. 8o here are t)o alternative and in'onsistent a''ounts. 8o&e anthro ologists say that one a''ount is as good as the other. As one ut it, /8'ien'e is -ust one of &any )ays of (no)ing the )orld. :,he ;unis+ )orldvie) is< -ust as valid as the ar'haeologi'al vie) oint of )hat rehistory is about./ Our s'ien'e 'onstru'ts one reality9 the 7ative A&eri'ans 'onstru't another. As Boghossian sees it, this is not a''e table. ,hese t)o theories are logi'ally in'onsistent )ith ea'h other9 they 'annot both be true. 1s there any )ay to eli&inate the in'onsisten'y6 ,he ans)er, say the relativists, is to see that ea'h 'lai& is relative. 5e should say not that the early A&eri'ans 'a&e by )ay of the Bering 8trait, but rather0 /a''ording to our theory,/ they 'a&e by the Bering 8trait. And /a''ording to so&e 7ative A&eri'an theories,/ they 'a&e out of the earth. On'e relativi=ed, the in'onsisten'y disa ears. 1ndeed all 'lai&s are relativi=ed in this )ay #in'luding resu&ably the 'lai& that the original 'lai&s )ere in'onsistent and the 'lai& that they have been relativi=ed$. 5ill relativis& res'ue so'ial 'onstru'tivis&6 Boghossian sees 'orre'tly that relativis& fails to solve the roble&, and &u'h of his boo( is about this failure. 1 do not agree )ith all of his argu&ents but 1 su ort his overall ro-e't. A roble& fa'ed by so'ial 'onstru'tivis& 'on'erns fa'ts about the ast. Are )e no) 'onstru'ting fa'ts about the ast )hen )e &a(e 'lai&s about history6 One extre&e so'ial 'onstru'tivist 'ited by Boghossian, Bruno >atour, a''e ts this 'on'lusion )ith so&e)hat 'o&i'al results. %e'ent resear'h sho)s that the an'ient 2gy tian haraoh %a&ses 11 robably died of tuber'ulosis. But a''ording to >atour, this is i& ossible be'ause the tuber'ulosis ba'illus )as only dis'overed by %obert ?o'h in 1@@A.:1< /Before ?o'h, the ba'illus had no real existen'e./ ,o say that %a&ses 11 died of tuber'ulosis is as absurd as saying that he died of &a'hine4gun fire. 5hat is one to &a(e of >atour+s 'lai&6 ,he &a'hine gun )as invented in the late nineteenth 'entury, and rior to that invention it did not exist in any for&. But the tuber'ulosis ba'illus )as not invented. 1t )as dis'overed. Part of the &eaning of /dis'overy/ is that to be dis'overed so&ething has to exist rior to the dis'overy, and indeed 'ould not have been dis'overed if it had not existed rior to the dis'overy. ,he 'lai& that (no)ledge is a so'ial 'onstru'tion is not &eant to state the 'o&&on la'e truth that &any fa'ts in the so'ial )orld are indeed so'ially 'onstru'ted. .or exa& le, so&ething is &oney, rivate ro erty, a govern&ent, or a &arriage only be'ause eo le believe that+s )hat it is, and in that sense su'h things are so'ially 'onstru'ted. 8o'ial 'onstru'tivis& &a(es the &u'h &ore radi'al 'lai& that hysi'al reality itself, the very fa'ts )e &ight thin( )e have dis'overed in hysi's, 'he&istry, and the other natural s'ien'es are so'ially 'onstru'ted.

,his vie) has been influential in a nu&ber of dis'i lines0 fe&inis&, so'iology, anthro ology, hiloso hy of s'ien'e, and literary theory a&ong others. ,he titles of so&e ty i'al )or(s ex ress various degrees of su ort for the do'trine0 Peter Berger and ,ho&as >u'(&ann+s The Social Construction of Reality9 Bruno >atour and 8teve 5oolgar+s Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts 9 Andre) Pi'(ering+s Constructing Quar s: A Sociological !istory of "article "hysics9 Bonald 3a'?en=ie+s Statistics in #ritain$ %&'()%*+,: The Social Construction of ScientificKnowledge.:A< Boghossian *uotes a fe&inist vie) as follo)s0 .e&inist e iste&ologists, in 'o&&on )ith &any other strands of 'onte& orary e iste&ology, no longer regard (no)ledge as a neutral trans arent refle'tion of an inde endently existing reality, )ith truth and falsity established by trans'endent ro'edures of rational assess&ent. %ather, &ost a''e t that all (no)ledge is situated (no)ledge, refle'ting the osition of the (no)ledge rodu'er at a 'ertain histori'al &o&ent in a given &aterial and 'ultural 'ontext.:3< ,his assage is )orth a 'lose reading. On the fa'e of it, the t)o vie)s being 'ontrasted, that (no)ledge is a /refle'tion of an inde endently existing reality/ and that /all (no)ledge is situated (no)ledge,/ are erfe'tly 'onsistent. Cistori'ally situated investigators 'an dis'over the truth about /an inde endently existing reality./ But the oint of the assage is to 'lai& that &ost fe&inists re-e't the idea that (no)ledge refle'ts an inde endently existing reality9 and the rhetori'al flourishes in the assage, su'h as /trans'endent ro'edures of rational assess&ent/ and /neutral trans arent refle'tion,/ are designed to reinfor'e that oint. 2. Boghossian distinguishes three features of 'onstru'tivis& and 'onsiders ea'h se arately0 'onstru'tivis& about the fa'ts #the fa'ts the&selves are so'ial 'onstru'tions$, 'onstru'tivis& about -ustifi'ation #)hat )e 'ount as a -ustifi'ation of a belief is a &atter of so'ial 'onstru'tion$, and 'onstru'tivis& about rational ex lanation #)e never believe )hat )e believe solely on the basis of eviden'e$. About the first and &ost i& ortant of these theses, Boghossian 'onsiders argu&ents fro& three hiloso hers0 Cilary Putna&, 7elson Dood&an, and %i'hard %orty. Putna& i&agines a hy otheti'al universe 'onsisting of three 'ir'les0 A, B, and C. ,hen he as(s0 Co) &any ob-e'ts are there in this universe6 ,hree6 7o, says Putna&, be'ause a''ording to 'ertain Polish logi'ians #he 'ites 8. >e=nie)s(i$, )e 'an 'onstrue one ob-e't as A, one as B, one as C, one as 'onsisting of AEB, another as BEC, yet another as AEC, and finally, one of AEBEC. 8o on this basis, there are really seven ob-e'ts in the universe. Be'ause )e 'an 'orre'tly say that there are three ob-e'ts or seven ob-e'ts, Putna& 'on'ludes that there is no ob-e'tive fa't of the &atter about ho) &any ob-e'ts there are.:F< As Boghossian sees, the 'on'lusion does not follo) fro& the re&ises. On'e you have sele'ted your 'onditions for so&ething being an ob-e't, there is a 3

straightfor)ard fa't of the &atter about ho) &any ob-e'ts there are. .or Putna& to say that there is no fa't of the &atter )ould be li(e saying that there is no ans)er to the *uestion /Co) &any guests 'a&e to the dinner arty6/ be'ause you 'ould say eight eo le or four 'ou les. Dood&an+s argu&ent is also )ea(. Dood&an says )e 'onstru't the 'onstellations of the night s(y by dra)ing 'ertain lines and not others. 5e dra) one set of lines that 'reates the Big Bi er, for exa& le. All other 'onstellations are si&ilarly 'reated, and )hat goes for 'onstellations goes for everything, a''ording to Dood&an. All of reality 'onsists of hu&an 'reations.On'e again, a bad argu&ent. Constellations are atterns )e have sele'ted in the s(y be'ause )e 'an dis'ern through our er'e tual a aratus 'ertain geo&etri'al for&s su'h as the Big Bi er. Constellations are, in this sense, observer4relative0 the a'tual stars exist inde endently of any observer, though the atterns )e use to na&e 'onstellations exist only relative to our oint of vie). But the stars, as )ell as &ountains, &ole'ules, and te'toni' lates, are not in that )ay relative to an observer. ,rue, )e have to sele't a vo'abulary of /stars,/ /&ountains,/ et'., but on'e the vo'abulary has been sele'ted, it is a 'o& letely ob-e'tive fa't that 3ount 2verest is a &ountain, for exa& le, and not a giraffe. ,he general attern of error is to 'onfuse, on the one hand, the so'ial relativity of the vo'abulary and the &a(ing of des'ri tions )ithin that vo'abulary )ith, on the other, the so'ial relativity of the fa'ts des'ribed using that vo'abulary. ,his 'o&es out stri(ingly in %orty+s argu&ent. %orty says that )e a''e t the des'ri tions )e do, not be'ause they 'orres ond to the )ay things are, but be'ause it serves our ra'ti'al interests to do so. Boghossian agrees that the fa't that )e give the des'ri tions )e do is a fa't that refle'ts so&ething about us and our so'iety. But, he oints out, the fa't that descri-tions are so'ially relative does not i& ly that the facts described by those des'ri tions are so'ially relative. Boghossian 'ites an argu&ent by %orty atta'(ing an arti'le of &ine:"< in )hi'h 1 said that &ountains, for exa& le, exist 'o& letely inde endently of us and our des'ri tions. %orty ans)ered as follo)s0 Diven that it ays to tal( about &ountains, as it 'ertainly does, one of the obvious truths about &ountains is that they )ere here before )e tal(ed about the&. 1f you do not believe that, you robably do not (no) ho) to lay the usual language4 ga&es )hi'h e& loy the )ord /&ountain./ But the utility of those language4ga&es has nothing to do )ith the *uestion of )hether %eality as 1t 1s 1n 1tself, a art fro& the )ay it is handy for hu&an beings to des'ribe it, has &ountains in it.:G< ,his is a strange assage. %orty is saying 'orre'tly that )e ado t the vo'abulary that )e do be'ause it serves various interests to have that vo'abulary. But )hat he negle'ts is that the fa'ts in this sort of 'ase exist *uite inde endently of the vo'abulary. Ce begins, /Diven that it ays to tal( about &ountains...,/ i& lying that so&eho) the existen'e of &ountains de ends on the usefulness of the

vo'abulary. But it does not. ,he fa'ts are the sa&e, )hether or not /it ays to tal( about &ountains./ >et us agree that )e have the )ord /&ountain/ be'ause it ays to have su'h a )ord. 5hy does it ay6 Be'ause there really are su'h things, and they existed before )e had the )ord and they )ill 'ontinue to exist long after )e have all died. ,o state the fa'ts you have to have a vo'abulary. But the fa'ts you state )ith that vo'abulary are not de endent on the existen'e or usefulness of the vo'abulary. ,he existen'e of &ountains has nothing )hatever to do )ith )hether or not it / ays to tal( about &ountains./ And it does not hel %orty+s 'ase to sneer at the existen'e of &ountains as /%eality as 1t 1s 1n 1tself,/ be'ause insofar as that ex ression is &eaningful at all, it is obvious that %eality as 1t 1s 1n 1tself 'ontains &ountains. 1 thin( Boghossian does a ubli' servi'e by ointing out the )ea(nesses of all of these argu&ents. But 1 fear that the real target of his boo( is not addressed by refuting bad argu&ents of the sort 1 have -ust 'ited. Peo le )ho are 'onvin'ed by so'ial 'onstru'tivis& ty i'ally have a dee &eta hysi'al vision and detailed refutations do not address that vision. 1n a sense Boghossian &a(es it easier for hi&self by ta(ing on &ore or less rational authors, s e'ifi'ally Putna&, Dood&an, and to a lesser extent %orty. ,heir vie)s are reasonably easy to refute be'ause they are, at least in the 'ase of Putna& and Dood&an, fairly 'learly stated. 1t is &u'h easier to refute a bad argu&ent than to refute a truly dreadful argu&ent. A bad argu&ent has enough stru'ture that you 'an oint out its badness. But )ith a truly dreadful argu&ent, you have to try to re'onstru't it so that it is 'lear enough that you 'an state a refutation. Boghossian ta(es bad argu&ents by Putna&, Dood&an, and %orty and refutes the&. But )hat about the truly dreadful argu&ents in su'h authors as Ha'*ues Berrida, Hean4.ranIois >yotard, and other ost&odernists that have been &ore influential during the last half4'entury6 5hat about, for exa& le, Berrida+s atte& ts to / rove/ that &eanings are inherently unstable and indeter&inate, and that it is i& ossible to have any 'lear, deter&inate re resentations of reality6 #Ce argues, for exa& le, that there is no tenable distin'tion bet)een )riting and s ee'h.$ ,he at&os here of Boghossian+s refutation is that of a Prin'eton se&inar. And in fa't Boghossian )as a student of %orty at Prin'eton. But he does not go into the s)a& and )restle )ith Berrida J Co.:K< Boghossian observes that )e 'ould say, )ith logi'al 'onsisten'y, /a''ording to our vie)/ the 7ative A&eri'ans 'a&e by the Bering 8trait, and /a''ording to their vie)/ they 'a&e fro& the 'enter of the earth, but that this nonetheless does not solve the roble& of relativis&. Co)ever, it see&s to &e that Boghossian gives the )rong a''ount of )hy it does not solve the roble&. Ce says that it does not solve the roble& for three reasons0

#A$ 1f )e relativi=e the 'lai&s by saying /a''ording to our vie),/ )e still have so&e nonrelative fa'ts left over9 there )ill still be nonrelative fa'ts about )hat different 'o&&unities a''e t or do not a''e t, for exa& le, hysi'al eviden'e of eo le 'rossing the Bering 8trait. #B$ 1t is often &u'h harder to figure out )hat eo le believe than it is to figure out )hat a'tually ha ened. ,he &ental is &ore u==ling than the hysi'al #this is one of his )ea(er argu&ents$. And #C$ if )e get out of ob-e'tion #A$ by saying that there are no nonrelative fa'ts, )e get an infinite regress. Cere is the regress. 5e start )ith0 #1$ A''ording to a theory )e a''e t, they 'a&e over the Bering 8trait. But if everything has to be relativi=ed then #1$ has to be relativi=ed, )hi'h rodu'es0 #A$ A''ording to a theory )e a''e t, there is a theory that )e a''e t and a''ording to that theory... And so on ad infinitu&. 1 agree )ith ob-e'tions #A$ and #C$ but 1 thin( they are sy& to&s of a dee er ob-e'tion, )hi'h Boghossian does not &a(e. ,he dee ob-e'tion to relativi=ing is that the original 'lai&s have been abandoned and the sub-e't has been 'hanged. ,he original 'lai&sLthat the an'estors of the 7ative A&eri'ans 'a&e via the Bering 8trait, and that they 'a&e out of the 'enter of the earthL)ere not about us and our theories but about )hat a'tually ha ened in hu&an history regardless of anybody+s theories. Our 'lai& is not that )e hold a 'ertain theory. Our 'lai& is that the a'tual an'estors of the early A&eri'ans 'a&e via the Bering 8trait, that there )ere a'tual hysi'al &ove&ents of hysi'al bodies through hysi'al s a'e. %elativi=ing of the sort that Boghossian 'onsiders does not solve the diffi'ulty9 it 'hanges the sub-e't to so&ething irrelevant. 1t 'hanges the sub-e't fro& histori'al fa'ts to our sy'hologi'al attitudes. ,his is the &ost i& ortant 'riti'is& of 'onstru'tivis&. 1t is of the very essen'e of the s ee'h a't of stating or asserting ro ositions of the sort )e have been 'onsidering that the s ee'h a't 'o&&its you to the truth of )hat you say and therefore to the existen'e of a fa't in the )orld 'orres onding to that truth. 8u'h s ee'h a'ts are &ade fro& a oint of vie) and ty i'ally )ithin 'ertain sorts of )ays of thin(ing, but the state&ents and assertions do not thereby be'o&e about the oints of vie) or the )ays of thin(ing. 1f you treat the& as being about the oint of vie) and )ay of thin(ing you get a different state&ent altogether, one that is not about the hysi'al &ove&ents of 7ative A&eri'ans but about the sy'hology of the s ea(ers. Boghossian is right to see that the relativi=ation still leaves you )ith nonrelative fa'ts about s ea(ers and their attitudes and that if you (ee going you get an infinite regress, but these are -ust sy& to&s of the dee er in'oheren'e. ,he 'onstru'tivists do not have a 'oherent 'on'e tion of the s ee'h a't of asserting or stating. 6

3. ,he se'ond version of relativis& Boghossian 'onsiders is about e iste&i' syste&s, that is, syste&s used to a'*uire (no)ledge and -ustify 'lai&s to (no)ledge. 5e -ustify our beliefs using one e iste&i' syste& but so&ebody &ight have a different e iste&i' syste& that )ould give different results fro& ours. 1t &ay loo( li(e any effort to -ustify ours )ould be 'ir'ular be'ause )e )ould have to resu ose the validity of our syste& in order to try to -ustify it. %i'hard %orty gives the exa& le of the dis ute bet)een Cardinal Bellar&ine and Dalileo.:@< Dalileo 'lai&ed to have dis'overed, by astrono&i'al observation through a teles'o e, that Co erni'us )as right that the earth revolved around the sun. Bellar&ine 'lai&ed that he 'ould not be right be'ause his vie) ran 'ounter to the Bible. %orty says, astoundingly, that Bellar&ine+s argu&ent )as -ust as good as Dalileo+s. 1t is -ust that the rhetori' of /s'ien'e/ had not at that ti&e been for&ed as art of the 'ulture of 2uro e. 5e have no) a''e ted the rhetori' of /s'ien'e,/ he )rites, but it is not &ore ob-e'tive or rational than Cardinal Bellar&ine+s ex li'itly dog&ati' Catholi' vie)s. A''ording to %orty, there is no fa't of the &atter about )ho )as right be'ause there are no absolute fa'ts about )hat -ustifies )hat. Bellar&ine and Dalileo, in his vie), -ust had different e iste&i' syste&s. ,he oint 1 believe Boghossian should have &ade i&&ediately, though in the end he does get around to saying so&ething li(e it, is that there are not and 'annot be alternative e iste&i' rationalities. Bellar&ine and Dalileo rea'hed different 'on'lusions but they )or(ed, li(e everybody else, )ithin exa'tly the sa&e syste& of rationality. Bellar&ine held the false vie) that the Bible )as a reliable astrono&i'al authority. But that is a 'ase of a false resu osition, not an alternative e iste&i' rationality. 5hy 'an+t there be alternative and in'onsistent e iste&i' rationalities6 Consider the exa& le of the state&ent that the 7ative A&eri'ans 'a&e by the Bering 8trait. 1 have ointed out that anyone )ho &a(es su'h a state&ent is thereby 'o&&itted to the existen'e of a fa't. But that 'o&&it&ent in turn 'arries a 'o&&it&ent to being able to ans)er su'h *uestions as, Co) do you (no)6 5hat is the eviden'e6 .urther&ore, only 'ertain sorts of things 'an 'ount as eviden'e for and against the 'lai&. ,hese re*uire&ents of rationality are not a''retions to the original state&ent, but they are built into it. ,he re*uire&ent that 'lai&s ad&it of eviden'e and 'ountereviden'e and that only 'ertain sorts of things 'ount as eviden'e is not so&ething added on to thought and language. 1t is built into the funda&ental stru'ture of thought and language. Consider another exa& le. 1 no) believe &y dog Dilbert is in this roo&. 5hat is the eviden'e6 1 'an see hi&. 1t is in the nature of the 'lai& in *uestion that )hat 1 see 'ounts as eviden'e. 7oti'e that, if in res onse to a de&and for eviden'e, 1 said /1 E 1 M A,/ that )ould not ans)er the de&and for eviden'e. Boghossian is )orried by the ossibility that )e &ight en'ounter an /alternative to our e iste&i' syste&...)hose tra'( re'ord )as im-ressive enough to &a(e us 7

doubt the 'orre'tness of our o)n syste&./ 1n su'h a 'ase, he fears, )e )ould not be able to -ustify our o)n. But )hat is &eant by /tra'( re'ord/6 ,he fa't that he uses this &eta hor )ithout ade*uate ex lanation ought to )orry hi& and us. ,he only /tra'( re'ord/ that )ould be relevant )ould be a body of established (no)ledge. But in order to as'ertain the resen'e of a /tra'( re'ord/ in this sense, to as'ertain the resen'e of a body of (no)ledge, )e )ould have to use the only e iste&i' rationality )e have, the one already built into thought and language. ,he hy othesis of alternative e iste&i' rationalities has no 'lear &eaning. 2ventually, after three diffi'ult 'ha ters #", G, and K$, Boghossian see&s to 'o&e to so&ething li(e this 'on'lusion. 1n the great debates of the 19GNs and after, 1 )as on'e as(ed by a student, /5hat is your argu&ent for rationality6/ ,hat is an absurd *uestion. ,here 'annot be an argu&ent for rationality be'ause the )hole notion of an argu&ent resu oses rationality. Constraints of rationality are 'onstitutive of argu&ent itself, as they are of thought and language generally. ,his is not to say that there 'annot be irrational thoughts and 'lai&s. ,here are lenty of irrationalities around. #.or exa& le, given the available eviden'e, it is irrational to deny that the resent lant and ani&al s e'ies evolved fro& earlier for&s of life. 5hy6 Be'ause, to ut it as an understate&ent, the eviden'e is over)hel&ing.$ 4. ,he last for& of relativis& that Boghossian 'onsiders is the ex lanation of belief. Cere the 'lai& is that the ex lanation of )hy )e believe )hat )e do is never a &atter of eviden'e or solely a &atter of eviden'e, but involves so&e irrational fa'tors, so&e so'ial 'ondition in )hi'h )e find ourselves. 1 a& u==led )hy Boghossian ta(es this 'lai& very seriously, not be'ause it is obviously false, but be'ause it does not really &atter to the issue of the truth or falsity or the -ustifi'ation of the 'lai&s under dis'ussion. 1f )e have -ustifi'ations for our beliefs, and if the -ustifi'ations &eet rational 'riteria, then the fa't that there are all sorts of ele&ents in our so'ial situation that in'line us to believe one thing rather than another &ay be of histori'al or sy'hologi'al interest but it is really *uite beside the oint of the -ustifi'ations and of the truth or falsity of the original 'lai&. 1t is a fa'tual *uestion to )hat extent eo le rea'h their beliefs by rational a raisal of the eviden'e, not a *uestion ade*uately settled by hiloso hi'al argu&ent. 1 thin( the reason that Boghossian is so 'on'erned about this is that so&e )ho have )ritten about the so'iology of s'ientifi' (no)ledge thin( that they 'an ex lain all of our beliefs, both the true and the false, the )ell4su orted and the unsu orted, by a 'o&&on attern of so'iologi'al ex lanation. Ce 'ites Bavid Bloor+s Knowledge and Social .magery:9< as an exa& le, along )ith the )or(s by >atour, 5oolgar, and Pi'(ering that 1 &entioned earlier. ,he )riters in *uestion ado t )hat Bloor 'alls /sy&&etri'al/ &odes of ex lanation0 they argue that true and false beliefs, as )ell as rational and irrational beliefs, &ust be ex lained by the sa&e 'auses. One exa& le, 'ited by Bloor, 'on'erns a study involving hysi'ists in 5ei&ar Der&any )ho atte& ted to /dis ense )ith 'ausality in hysi's./ A 8

/sy&&etri'al/ understanding of this s'ientifi' ro-e't )ould argue that, )hile 'onsidering ho) the hysi'ists thought about observed eviden'e, one should 'onsider as )ell ho) they atte& ted /to ada t the 'ontent of their s'ien'e to the values of their intelle'tual environ&ent./ Boghossian oints out 'orre'tly that sy&&etry about truth and falsehood is *uite different fro& sy&&etry about rationality and irrationality. 8y&&etry about truth is a ossible resear'h rogra& in the so'iology of (no)ledge be'ause eo le ty i'ally arrive at their s'ientifi' vie)s, both true and false, through the study of eviden'e9 thus, in &ost 'ases at least, both true and false beliefs 'an be seen as arising fro& the sa&e 'ause, eviden'e. 8o&e eviden'e &ay be &ore revealing of truth than other eviden'e9 nevertheless, if )e ut aside the use of fraud, both true and false theories have the sa&e underlying 'ause0 observed eviden'e. But that is not the sa&e as treating rationality and irrationality sy&&etri'ally. .irst, as )e+ve -ust seen, for both true vie)s and false vie)s to be sy&&etri'al, they &ust originate in the sa&e 'ause0 argu&ent based on eviden'e. But all argu&ent based on eviden'e assu&es a 'o&&on rationality. ,hus, as Boghossian argues, the 'ase for the sy&&etry of truth is )rong be'ause it rests on /the falsity / of the /sy&&etry about rationality/9 both 'annot si&ultaneously be 'orre't. ,rue vie)s and false vie)s &ay be arrived at by sy&&etri'al &ethods, but )hen those &ethods involve eviden'e, they are the&selves &anifestations of a 'o&&on rationality and thus &a(e i& ossible the sy&&etry, or e*uality, of rationality and irrationality. ,his is one of the best argu&ents in Boghossian+s boo(. 5. 5hat &otivates so'ial 'onstru'tionis&6 After all, )e ay an enor&ous intelle'tual ri'e if )e deny the ob-e'tive validity of the ast three and a half 'enturies of s'ientifi' investigation. Boghossian thin(s 'onstru'tionis& is &otivated artly by intelle'tual argu&ent and artly by oliti'al 'orre'tness. 1n the ost'olonial era, so&e have felt that )e should not i& ose our 'on'e tion of reality on other 'ultures. 5hy shouldn+t )e, in a &ulti'ultural de&o'ra'y, grant that ea'h 'ulture, or indeed ea'h erson, 'an have his or her o)n reality6 1 thin( in fa't the antirational, antis'ientifi' bias of 'urrent versions of relativis& and 'onstru'tivis& are &otivated by a &u'h dee er &eta hysi'al vision than one based on ost'olonial oliti'al 'orre'tness. 5hat exa'tly is that vision6 Cints of it o''ur in the assage on fe&inist e iste&ology that 1 *uoted fro& ?athleen >ennon. 1t is a vision a''ording to )hi'h all of our (no)ledge 'lai&s are radi'ally 'ontingent be'ause of their histori'al and so'ial 'ir'u&stan'es. A''ording to this vision, all of us thin( )ithin arti'ular sets of assu& tions, and )e al)ays re resent the )orld fro& a oint of vie), and this &a(es ob-e'tive truth i& ossible. .or so&eone )ho a''e ts this argu&ent, the idea that there are s'ientifi' 'lai&s that are ob-e'tive, universal, and established beyond a reasonable doubt see&s not only ina''urate but ositively o ressive.

And for su'h eo le the very idea of an ob-e'tively existing, inde endent reality &ust be dis'redited. On this vie), if )e are to be truly free, free to 'reate a &ulti'ultural de&o'ra'y, )e &ust above all liberate ourselves fro& /ob-e'tivity,/ /rationality,/ and /s'ien'e./ ,he &otivation, in short, is &ore rofound than Boghossian allo)s for, and it bears interesting affinities )ith earlier for&s of Counter42nlighten&ent %o&anti'is& of the sort des'ribed by 1saiah Berlin in his The Roots of Romanticism.:1N< Boghossian has )ritten an ex'ellent boo(. 1t is very 'o& ressed, and it is not al)ays easy reading, but it 'ontains relentless ex osures of 'onfusion, falsehood, and in'oheren'e. Notes Bruno >atour, /%a&ses 11 est4il &ort de la tuber'ulose6,/ La Recherche, 3ar'h 199@.
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Peter >. Berger and ,ho&as >u'(&ann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge #Boubleday, 19GG$9 Bruno >atour and 8teve 5oolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts #8age, 19K9$9 Andre) Pi'(ering, Constructing Quar s: A Sociological !istory of "article "hysics #University of Chi'ago Press, 19@F$9 Andre) Pi'(ering, /8'ien'e as a Cultural Constru't,/ letter to the editor, /ature, Hune ", 199K9 and Bonald A. 3a'?en=ie, Statistics in #ritain$ %&'()%*+,: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge #2dinburgh0 2dinburgh University Press, 19@1$.
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?athleen >ennon, /.e&inist 2 iste&ology as >o'al 2 iste&ology,/ "roceedings of the Aristotelian Society$ Su--lementary$ Oolu&e K1 #199K$, . 3K.
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Cilary Putna&, The 0any Faces of Realism: The "aul Carus Lectures #O en Court, 19@K$, . 1@.
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Hohn %. 8earle, /%ationality and %ealis&0 5hat 1s at 8ta(e6/ 1aedalus$ .all 1993.
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%i'hard %orty, /Boes A'ade&i' .reedo& Cave Philoso hi'al Presu Academe$ 2ol3 @N, 7o. G #7ove&berPBe'e&ber 199F$, . "G.
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8ee &y arti'le and ex'hange about Berrida in these ages0 /,he 5ord ,urned U side Bo)n,/ O'tober AK, 19@3, and /An 2x'hange on Be'onstru'tion,/ .ebruary A, 19@F. %i'hard %orty, "hiloso-hy and the 0irror of /ature #Prin'eton University Press, 19@1$, . 3A@P331. Quoted in Boghossian, . G1.
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University of Chi'ago Press, se'ond edition, 1991. Prin'eton University Press, ANN1.

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