Clemente vs.
Galvan 
Facts:  
  Plaintiff and defendant organized a civil 
partnership which they named "Galvan y 
Compaia" to engage in the manufacture 
and sale of paper and other stationery. 
  Plaintiff ask for dissolution which the 
defendant confirm but with a condition 
that having covered a deficit incurred by 
the partnership amounting to P4,000 with 
his own money, plaintiff reimburse him of 
one-half of said sum. 
  Juan D. Mencarini, assigned as receiver 
and liquidator. Upon acting on his duty, 
the court ordered him to deliver certain 
machines which were then at Nos. 705-
707 Ylaya Street. 
  But before he could take actual 
possession of said machines, upon the 
strong opposition of defendant, the court, 
on motion of the latter, suspended the 
effects of its order 
  In the meantime the judgments rendered 
in cases Nos. 42794 and 43070 ordering 
Clemente to pay a sum of money. 
  He mortgage the machines with his 
nephew, the intervenor (plaintiff in the 
herein case.) For having expired the 
terms in the mortgage the intervenor 
commenced case No. 49629 to collect his 
mortgage credit. 
Issue: W/N the mortgage between Clemente and 
his nephew (intervenor, plaintiff in the case) is 
valid? 
 
Rule: No. The machines in contention originally 
belonged to the defendant and from him were 
transferred to the partnership Galvan y Compania. 
This being the case, said machines belong to the 
partnership and not to him, and shall belong to it 
until partition is effected according to the result 
thereof after the liquidation. Also, Clemente did 
not have actual possession of the machines, he 
could not in any manner mortgage them. 
 
Leyte-Samar-Sales and K. Tomassi vs. Cea and 
O. Castrilla 
Facts: 
  Thisis a suit for damages by the Leyte-
Samar Sales Co. (hereinafter called 
LESSCO) and Raymond Tomassi against 
the Far Eastern Lumber & Commercial Co. 
(unregistered commercial partnership 
hereinafter called FELCO), Arnold Hall, 
Fred Brown and Jean Roxas, judgment 
against defendants jointly and severally 
for the amount of P31,589.14 plus costs. 
  The decision having become final, the 
sheriff sold at auction on June 9, 1951 to 
Robert Dorfe and Pepito Asturias "all the 
rights, interests, titles and participation" 
of the defendants in certain buildings and 
properties described in the certificate 
  on June 4, 1951 Olegario Lastrilla filed in 
the case a motion, wherein he claimed to 
be the owner by purchase on September 
29, 1949, of all the "shares and interests" 
of defendant Fred Brown 
  June 13, 1951, granted Lastrilla's motion. 
On August 14, 1951, modified its order of 
delivery and merely declared that 
Lastrilla was entitled to 17 per cent of the 
properties sold. 
  the petitioners seek relief by certiorari, 
their position being the such orders were 
null and void for lack of jurisdiction. 
Issue: W/N the court acted with excess of its 
jurisdiction? 
Rule: Yes. The parties were not notified, and 
obviously took no part in the proceedings on the 
motion. A valid judgment cannot be rendered 
where there is a want of necessary parties, and a 
court cannot properly adjudicate matters involved 
in a suit when necessary and indispensable parties 
to the proceedings are not before it. (49 C.J.S., 67.). 
All the defendants would have reasonable motives 
to object to the delivery of 17 per cent of the 
proceeds to Lustrial, because it is so much money 
deducted, and for which the plaintiffs might as 
another levy on their other holdings or resources. 
(NOTE: If Lastrilla was a partner, his remedy is 
to claim "the property", not the proceeds of the 
sale, which the sheriff is directed by section 14, 
Rule 39 to deliver unto the judgment creditors. 
In other words, the owner of property 
wrongfully sold may not voluntarily come to 
court, and insist, "I approve the sale, therefore 
give me the proceeds because I am the owner". 
The reason is that the sale was made for the 
judgment creditor (who paid for the fees and 
notices), and not for anybody else.) 
Us v. Clarin 
Facts: 
  Pedro Larin delivered to Pedro Tarug 
P172, in order that the latter, in company 
with Eusebio Clarin and Carlos de 
Guzman, might buy and sell mangoes. The 
profits were to be divided equally 
between him and them. 
  Pedro Tarug, Eusebio Clarin, and Carlos 
de Guzman did in fact trade in mangoes 
and obtained P203 from the business, but 
did not comply with the terms of the 
contract by delivering to Larin his half of 
the profits; neither did they render him 
any account of the capital. 
  Larin charged them with the crime 
of estafa, but the provincial fiscal filed an 
information only against Eusebio Clarin 
  First Instance of Pampanga, sentenced the 
defendant, Eusebio Clarin, to six 
months'arresto mayor. The defendant 
appealed. 
Issue: W/N the conviction is correct. 
 
Rule:  No.  The  P172.00  having  been  received  by 
the  partnership,  the  business  commenced  and 
profits  accrued,  the  action  that  lies  with  the 
partner who furnished the capital for the recovery 
of his money is not a criminal action for estafa, but 
a  civil  one  arising  from  the  partnership  contract 
for  a  liquidation  of  the  partnership  and  a  levy  on 
its assets if there should be any. 
 
(NOTE:  The  then  Penal  Code  provides  that 
those  who  are  guilty  of  estafa  are  those  who, 
to  the  prejudice  of  another,  shall  appropriate 
or  misapply  any  money,  goods,  or  any  kind  of 
personal  property  which  they  may  have 
received  as  a  deposit  on  commission  for 
administration  or  in  any  other  producing  the 
obligation  to  deliver  or  return  the  same,  (as, 
for  example,  in  commodatum,  precarium,  and 
other  unilateral  contracts  which  require  the 
return  of  the  same  thing  received)  does  not 
include  money  received  for  a  partnership; 
otherwise  the  result  would  be  that,  if  the 
partnership,  instead  of  obtaining  profits, 
suffered  losses,  as  it  could  not  be  held  liable 
civilly  for  the  share  of  the  capitalist  partner 
who  reserved  the  ownership  of  the  money 
brought  in  by  him,  it  would  have  to  answer  to 
the  charge  of  estafa,  for  which  it  would  be 
sufficient  to  argue  that  the  partnership  had 
received the money under obligation to return 
it.)