Certain properties fall into none of Aristotle's categories; rather they

are properties of all of the things to which the categories are

applicable. For this reason, these properties are said to "transcend" the
categories. Although there is some variation in what is counted as a
transcendental, the list generally included being, unity, truth, and
goodness. Thus, everything that falls into any of Aristotle's categories
is a being, has a certain sort of unity, and is true and good to a certain
etent.

Albert's view is that good adds something to being in one way, but not
in another. Adding a negation !"# to being does not add reality; rather
it adds a mode of signi$cation% unum && that is undivided being or
unity. Absolute a'rmation !(a# does add reality to being && the
eample is that "white" adds not only a mode of signifying but also a
certain reality to "man," i.e., being white. The other )ind of a'rmation
that adds reality to being is real relative a'rmation !(b'# insofar as it
involves an intrinsic change in the thing. The eamples, fatherhood or
sonship, are relations which involve real change in the man himself,
not merely etrinsic change !(b''# such as "being to the left of." *ood
+bonum, && relation to an end, and true +verum, && relation to an idea,
both involve this latter sort of change. -ence truth . goodness don't
add reality to being; rather, they add only a mode of signi$cation.


Note: The following text is a summary of one of Aquinas texts on Transcendentals,
that can be found on the Jpeg files accompanying this e-mail
A/uinas on the Transcendentals
0eing is the $rst concept grasped by the mind, and all concepts
contain the idea of being; therefore, all concepts are formed by
addition to the concept of being.
-owever, no new concepts can be formed by adding something
etrinsic +in the manner of a di1erence, to being, since every content
is already contained within being.
Thus, things only 2add to being3 to the etent that they epress a
mode of being not epressed by the term being itself.
This can occur in two ways%
A. 4o that the mode epressed is some particular mode of
being +5 presume A/uinas is tal)ing about modes of being
that can be reduced to one of Aristotle6s ten categories,.
0. 7hen the mode epressed is conse/uent upon every
being.
a. Conse/uent upon every being considered in itself.
4uch a mode epresses something about being in
either an a'rmative manner or in a negative
manner.
i. A'rmative% 8nly a thing6s essence is said to
be predicated absolutely of every being.
-ence 2thing3 is said of all beings. 2Thing3 is
a mode of being that di1ers from 2being3 in
that it epresses the essence of being, whereas
being epresses the act of being.
ii. 9egative% 2The negation which follows upon all
being in an absolute manner is the absence of
division. This is epressed by the name one,
for one is nothing else than undivided being.3
b. Conse/uent upon every being considered as ordered
to another.
i. According to the division of one from the other.
-ence a thing is called 2something3 inasmuch
as it is divided from others.
ii. According to the agreement of one being with
another. This is not possible nless there is
something which by its nature agrees with all
being. According to Aristotle, that thing is the
soul.
". 2good3 is a mode that re:ects the
agreement of being with the soul6s
faculty of striving.
(. 2True3 is a mode of being that re:ects
being6s agreement with the soul6s
intellect.

Theory of Transcendentals:
Aquinas view on good/being:
I. Transcendentals are modes/properties of being generally consequent on being, as
opposed to specific modes of being !i.e. the ten categories"#.
A. They are: thing, something, one, good, and true
$. These % can be categori&ed into ' groups:
(. That which follows every being in itself
a. These can either affirm the essence of the substance or))))
'. That which follows every being in virtue of its relation to something else
a. This relation can either be (# division of being from another, or '# beings
suitedness to another..
the latter includes goodness and truth.
goodness refers to a beings suitedness to the appetitive part of the soul, and truth
refers to a beings suitedness to the cognitive part of the soul.