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180 views34 pagesThe Search Jor Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and The Tractatus
by James Conant
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180 views34 pagesThe Search Jor Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and The Tractatus
by James Conant
Uploaded by
mateustgCopyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
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PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS
Wo 20 nL BME LOPE
The Search for Logically Alien Thought:
Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the
Tractatus!
James Conant
University of Pittsburgh
U}n order to draw a limit to thought we should have to
beable to think both sides ofthis limit (ve should there
{ore have 1 be able to think what cannot be thought)
The limit ea, therefore. only be dram in language
‘and what lies on the other side of the limit willbe sin
ply nonsense.
Ludvig Wingenstene™
The only proper way to break an egg is from the inside.
—Parva Gallina Rubra
‘This essay is about three things: Wittgenstein’ eas concerning the question
‘ofthe possibility of illogical thought, the sources of those ideas (especially
in Kant and Frege), and Puinam’s recent interest in both of these matters,
‘Along the way, this paper briefly sketches the broad outlines of two
almost parallel traditions oF thought about the laws of logic: one rather long
and complicated tradition called the History of Moder Philosophy, and
‘one rather short and complicated one called Hilary Putnam. Here isa thumb-
nail version of how these to traditions align: Descartes thought the laws of
logic were only contingenily necessary; not so recent Putnam agreed. St.
‘Thomas Aquinas believed that they were necessarily necessary: relatively
recent Putnam agreed (ths is only confusing if you think Aquinas should not
15 be a step alead of Descartes). Kant thought they were simply necessary
Frege wanted (o agree—but his manner of doing so raised the worry that
there was no way in which to express his agreement that made sense
Wittgenstein agreed with the worry. He concluded that sense had not (yet)
been made of the question to which our two traditions sought an answer: very
recent Putnam agreed,
HISTORICAL PREAMBLE:
A DIFFERENT KIND OF CARTESIANISM
What is the status of the laws of logic, the most basic laws of thought?
Wherrin does their necessity lie? In what sense does the negation of a basic
Jaw of logic represent an impossibility?
‘The Scholastics were forced to think hard about these questions since
they believed in the existence of an omnipotent God for whom all things
are possible. If God is omnipotent does that mean that He has the power to
abrogate the laws of logic? The Scholastics, on the whole, were quite relue:
{ant to draw this conclusion. But does that then mean that Godl is not all-
powerful, that there is a limit to his power, that there is something he can
‘not do? That is a conclusion that the Scholastics were, on the whole, at least
‘equally as reluctant to draw. Posed here ina theological guise isa version of
‘a question that has continued to haunt philosophy up until the present: do the
laws of logic impose a limit which we run up against in our thinking? If so,
what kind ofa limit is this? Do their negations represent something that we
‘cannot do ot that cannot be’ If so, what sort of “cannot” is this?
Here is Aquinas's attempt to reconcile the omnipotence of the Divine
Being with the inexorability of the basie principles of Reason:
All confess that God is omnipotent: but it seems difficult to
explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists. For there
‘may be adoubt as to the precise meaning of the word “all” when
‘we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the
‘matter aight, since power is said in reference o possible things.
this phrase. God ean do all shings is rightly understood to mean
that God can do all things that re possible: and for this reason
eis said to be omnipotent. Now .. 2 thing is said to be pos-
sible in two ways. First, in relation to some power I, ho=
ever, we were fo say that God is omnipotent because He ean do
ll things that are possible to His power, there would bea vicious
Circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be
saying nothing else but thet God is omnipotent because He can
«do all that He is abe to do,
Ieremains, therefore, that Go is called omnipotent becasse
He can do all things that are possible absolutely: which is the
116
sevond way of saying thing is possible. Fora thing i said to be
possible or impossible absolutely, according 10 the relation in
‘which the very terms stand to one anther: possible, if the pred
icate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sis
And absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether
incompatible with he subject, as, for instance, that a man isan
‘Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradic
tion in terms is numsered among those possibles in respect of
‘which God is called ermnipatent; whereas whatever implies con
tradietion does not come within the scope of divine emnipo-
rence, hecause it canvot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it
is more appropriate 1 say tha such things cannot be done, than
that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary tothe word ofthe
angel. saying: No word shall he impossible with God (Luke
1.37), For whatever implies 4 contradiction cannot he a word,
because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.*
Aquinas is caught here between the Charybdis of asserting a mere tau-
tology (God ean do everything within His power) and the Scylla of implic-
itly aseribing a substantive limit to God's power (by declaring God can do
all those sorts of things which fall under a certain general description X. and
hence apparently implicitly declaring: He cannot do those things which do
not fall under X). One way out—a way out which, as we shall see, is prad-
ually refined in the course ef these (wo traditions of thought about logic:
‘would be for this description (of those things which God cannot do) to turn
fut not to be a genuine description at all. Aquinas, indeed, tries to argue that
those things whieh fall under the (apparent) description things which God
cannot do ate not, properly speaking, things which car be done at all. These
128 which “cannot have the aspect of possibility.” OF these, Aquinas
says, “itis more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that
God cannot do them.” But the worry arises: hasn’t Aquinas just offered us
aa redescription of what kind of a thing a logically impossible sort ofa thing
is? It would seem that we stil have here to deal with a certain (albeit remark=
able) kind ofa thing, Ifso, the question remains: what sort of a thing is this
and is it something not even God can do? Even if we concede to Aquinas that
perhaps, strictly speaking, we should not speak of it as if it were-a doable
kind of a thing, nevertheless, there certainly still appears to be an “it” here
that our words ate straining after and which has formed the subject of our
‘thought throughout the preceding paragraph.
Aquinas appears to be on his strongest ground when he tries to make out
that the “it” which falls uncer these descriptions—"that which is logically
impossible,” “that which even God cannot do”—is not a kind of a thing at
all, What we have here instead is an attempt to conceive of a kind of a thing
which “no intellect [i¢., not just a human intellect] can possibly conceive:
17 itisam attempt to speak a word “which eannot be a word.” In order to set up,
this way of dissolving the appearance of an “it” (sshich not even God can do),
Aquinas invokes Aristotle's distinction between those things which are
impossible in relation to some power and those things which are impossible
absolutely. Itis not clear, however, that this distinction really helps. It threat-
ens fo recreate the appearance that we have to do here with two different
kinds of things, belonging to two distinet orders of impossibility: the merely
impossible and the absolutely impossible. Just as itis natural to picture that
which is possible for a finite being (such as man) as contained within the
space of that which is possible for God, i can seen natural to take Aristo
Aistinetion as marking an analogous boundary, only a higher level. One
pictures the distinction in terms of two degrees of impossibility: things
belonging to the second degree (the absolutely impossible) ate situated on
the far side ofthe outer iit which encompasses things belonging tothe frst
degree (the metely impossible). So now it seems that although God never
chafes against anything which lies within the citeumnference of this exterior
circle, nonetheless, Great as He is, that is as far as He can go—even He must
remain within this circle. This picture ofa circle (circumscribing the limits
‘of that which is absolutely possible) Iying within a wider space (the space of
the absolutely impossible) inevitably leaves us with the feeling that we have
after all, sueceeded in describing a genuine limit to His powcr. The existence
of this outer space of absolute impossibility seems o settle the question in
precisely the contrary direction from the one in which Aquinas had hoped to
Jead us. The apparently innocent step of picturing the space of absolute pos
sibility as bounded by a limit seems to have led us to the opposite conclu
ion about God's omnipotence.
‘What sort ofa thing ies beyond the limit of God's power? Answer: the
sort which is absolutely impossible. And now it becomes iresistible to add
even for Him
Descartes concluded that Aquinas, along with most of the rest of
‘medieval theology, had wandered into blasphemy.*"If men really understood
the sense oftheir words,” they would never speak as they do. For their made
‘of speech clearly implies a limit to God's power. The only way o avoid such
blasphemy is to refrain from ascribing any limits to what the Divinity is able
to bring about
tum to the difficulty of conceiving how God would have
‘been acing ely and indifferent if he had made it fase. in
general that conzadictories could not be te together, is ey
{0 dispel his dtficlty by considering that the power of Ge can
rot have any limits and that our mind is nite and so created as
to be able to conceive as possible the things which Gov has
‘wished to bein fet possiie. but not be able to conceive as
pesible things which God could have made possible, but which
ug
hie has nevertheless wished 19 make impossible. The Fist
‘eomsidration shows us that God cannot have been determined to
make it true that comraictories cannot be tue together, and
therefore that he could have done the oppenite. The second con
siuation assures us that even if this be true, we should not try
te comprehend i, since our nature is incapable of doing s0.*
Descartes positively asserts here that God could have made contradi
tories true together.” He further asserts that this means that God ean bring
bout things which our minds are incapable of comprehending. If only that
which is comprehensible to minds such as ours were possible for God—it
undamental truths (such as that contradictories cannot be true together)
were extemal and prior to God's will—then He would not be omnipotent.
For His will would not be free with respect to such truths, but rather subject
to their determination, But this would be (o deny the infinitude and incom
prchensibility of God's power." The only way to avoid such an unworthy
blasphemy is to acknowledge that such truths do depend upon the will of
God and that it lies within His power to bring about the negations of such
truths." The sense in which they are nonetheless necessary or eternal lies in
the fact that God has decreed them to be true: hence they are necessary for
1s, But, from a Divine point of view, they are only contingently necessary.
For we nust allow that there is some sense in which God could have done
otherwise:
[Even if God has willed that some truths should be neces.
sary. this does not meen that He has willed them necessarily: for
itis one thing to will that they be necessary. and quite another to
will this necessarily, cr tobe necessitated to will i
If God had not been free 10 choose such laws as he did, if He were by
necessity constrained to wil the truth of the laws of logic, then there would
bbe a necessity that binds even Him, God would be inexorably subject to those
laws, ust as we are subject to His decrees, There would be a farum that bindls
even the Divinity, making a mockery of his alleged omnipotence. So we
‘ust say that God freely willed the laws of logic to be true, Descartes is very
careful, however, to insist that, although these laws do not bind God, this
does not make them any less binding for us, The hubris lies in our thinking
that because we cannot comprehend how the negations of such laws could
be true—for example, how it could be true that "He could have made con:
tradictories true together"—we are therefore in a position to conclude that it
‘cannot be done, even by Him It is hubris to think that the limits of our pow.
crs of comprehension enable us to specify something He cannot do:
In general we can asert that God can do everything that is
within our grasp but rot that He eannot do what is beyond our
grasp. It would be rash to think that cur imagination reaches as
far as his power."
9 [Slince Go is a case whise power surpasses the owls
ff human understanding, and since the necessity ofthese truths
‘does not exceed our knowlege, these truths are something less
than, and subject to, the incomprehensible power of Gad.
Descartes, nonetheless, wants to be able to say: we think rightly when
we think in accordance with these laws, We perceive correctly when we
clearly and distinctly perceive the truths of fogic to be in some sense “nec
essary": they are necessary in our world, But Descartes will not follow
Aquinas and say that their negations are absolutely impossible. They are not
as it were, necessarily necessary: God could have created a very different sort
ofa world, Of course, since our powers of conception are constrained by the
principles of logie, Descartes must say that we eannot make any sense of the
possibility of such a world—nonetheless, we should admit the mere possi
bility ofits existence:
{There is no need to ask how God! could! have brought it
tout eon eteity that i was mo tue that sic Foor make
tht, and soon; fr Fadmit this is uninteligible to us. Yet onthe
tther hand ¥ do understand... that it would have been easy for
God o ordain certain things such that we men cannot understand
{he possibilty of thee being otherwise than they are.'*
Descartes concedes that any attempt on our part to comprehend such a
‘world must meet with failure, This raises the worry: doesn’t Descartes’s
position ultimately collapse into Aquinas's? What are we to make of his
assertion that we should believe in the possibility of such a world even
though he himself freely admits that we cannot hope to comprehend it?
How does one undertake to believe in something one cannot understand?
Deseartes himself feels at least some of the force of this problem. In an
attempt to get around it, he helps himself to a fine distinction—a distinction
between our being able to conceive of such a world and our being able to
conceive that such an inconceivable world coutd be. The possibility of such
a world is not something we can comprehend, but itis something we can
apprehend. Descartes's own way of expressing this slippery distinction is
to say that the ultimate contingency of these truths (which we take to be nec
essary) is not something we can embrace in our thought, but we can touch
iin our thought:
1 know that God isthe author of everything ad that these
{eternal truths are something and consequently that He is thet
author. say that [know this, not that I conceive itor grasp is
because it is possible to know that God is infinite and all
powerful although our mind, being finite, cannot grasp or con
bined into the following teaching: breaking the (syntactical) rues of logic in
the right way allows us to show the unsayable—by running up against the
Jimits of language, we are able to “convey” what lies beyond these limits.
“Running up against the limits of language? Language is, after all, not
‘acage.”"”" The standard reading of the Tractatus has the teaching of the work
inside out. Throwing avsay the ladder means throwing away the idea that lan-
cage and that the rules of logic form its bars,
‘guage is a
THE METHOD OF THE 7RACTATUS
In the Preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes: “ Dieses Buch . .. ist
also kein Lehrbuch.” This book is not a catechism, a doctrinal text. It is not
a work which propounds a doctrine. Later he says: “Philosophy is not a body
155 ‘of doctrine [Lehre] but an activity” ($4.112). He then immediately goes on
to say what kind of an activity philosophy is: one of elucidation. Both carly
and late, Wittgenstein will insist that the dificulty of his work is tied to the
Fact that he is not putting forward theses." But if the work does not culm
nate in a conclusion about the nature of logic, how then does it effect ill
‘mination? What are we supposed to do with the nonsense the Tractatus
presents us with?
Towards the end of “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity.” Putnam
writes:
Tt makes mo sense to say oF tink that we have discovered that
Logic| i wrong, them it also makes no sense to Fler a rea
son fr thinking tis not wrong. reason for thinking logic]
isnot wrong is 2 reason which excludes nothing. Trying to ius
tify... Tog} is like trying to say that whereof one caanot
speak thereof one must be silent; in both eases, it only looks as
HM something is being ruled out or avoided."
Putnam here connects the topic of this paper with the question of how
‘one should interpret the closing line of the Tractatus. Putnam suggests that
Tine shoutd not be read as debarring us from being able to say something, The
contrapositive of that line is ‘whereof one may speak, thereof one can
speak.” Putnam's reading of that line suggests that if we are faced with a
silence at the end of the book, tis is simply because (although there has been
4 great deal of noise) nothing has been said.!® But proponents of the star
dard reading of the Tractatus take this silence to be one that guards the inef-
fable. They heat in this line (which speaks of silence) the declaration of a
substantive thesis: there are certain things which cannot be said and con-
‘coming them we must remain silent. At one point in the Investigations —
in the middle of another discussion about things which cannot be stated in
anguage—Wittgenstein formulates the task of philosophy as follows: "The
great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something
‘one couldn't do” ($374).
Wittgenstein says in our epigraph that what we wind up with when we
try to draw a limit to thought is not deep nonsense, but rather einfach
Unsinn—simply nonsense. Frege’s word for a mock thought is a
Scheingedanke. Both Frege's and Wittgenstein's word for a pseudo-
Proposition is a Scheinsatz—a mock proposition. A mock proposition is not
Just not “strictly speaking” a proposition; it is not a kind of a proposition, any
‘more than stage thunder is a kind of thunder."” A philosophical elucidation
aims to show us that the “propositions” we come out with in philosophy are
‘not propositions: the nonsense we are attracted to is plain unvamished no
sense—words that do not express thoughts.
The significance for Wittgenstein of Frege's exercise in elucidation can
156
the put as Follows: it enables us to come to see, once we peel off all the lay
crs ofthe onion, that there 's no “it” which has been proposed asthe content
of the thought experiment. In a sense, we come to see that there is no thought
experiment, All that we are left with i the realization that we were subject
(o an illusion of thought. becomes the mark of a successful philosophical
chicidation for Wittgenstein—as for Kant—that it bring is interlocutor to the
point where he can recognize the illusion to which be is subject as an illu-
sion. For Wittgenstein, however—unlike for Kant—this means that a philo-
sophical work which is self-conscious about its method will have to abandon
the form of the treatise."
To say that a philosophical work consists of elucidations is to say that
it must assume the structure of an onion. Frege’s thought experiment isan
example of a philosophical meditation which exhibits this structure, What
happens is not that we sueceed in conceiving of an extraordinary possibility
(logically alien thought) and then judge “it” to be impossible. Rather, what
happens is—if the elucidation succeeds in its aim—we are drawn into an lu
sion of occupying a certain sort of a perspective: call it the Cartesian per
spective. From this perspective, we take ourselves to be able to survey the
possibilities which undergird how things are with us, holding our necessities
in place." From this perspective, we contemplate the laws of logic as they
ae, as well as the possibility of their being otherwise. We take out
‘be occupying a perspective from which we can view the laws of logic from
sideways on." The only “insight” the work imparts therefore is one about
the reader himself: that heis prone to such illusions.
This illusion of perspective is engendered through an illusion of sen
We imagine ourselves to be making sense of the words in which the thought
experiment is couched, when no sense (as yet) has been made.
Tractatus's way of putting this (in §5.4733) isto say that if a sentence “has
no sense, that ean only be because we have failed to give ameaning to some
ofits constituent parts. (Even if we believe that we have done so.)" The prob:
lem is that we do believe that we have given a meaning to all of the sen
tence’s constituent parts" We think nonsense is produced not by a failure
‘on our part, but by a failureon the sentence’s part, We think the problem lies
(when we contemplate “the possibilty of logically alien thought") not with
the absence of meaning (inour failing to mean anything with these words at
all), but rather with the senses the words already have—senses which the
words bring with them ino this flawed thought, We think the thought is
flawed because the senses of its parts are incompatible (“llogicat” and
thought,” “private” and “language”): they clash with one another, They fail
to add up to a thought. So we feel our words are attempting to think a logi-
cally impossible thought—and that this involves a kind of impossibility of
a higher order than ordinary impossibility." But Wittgenstein’ teaching is
Ist that the problem lies not in the words (we could find a use for hem) but in
‘our confused relation to the words: in our experiencing ourselves &s mean
ing something definite by them, yet also feeling that what we take ourselves
to be meaning with the words makes no sense. We are confused about what
itis we want fo say and we project our confusion onto the Linguistic sting
‘Then we look atthe linguistic string and imagine we discover what iis try-
ing to say, We want to say to the string: “We know what you mean, but ‘it"
cannot be said.” The incoherence of our desires with respect to the sen
tence—wishing to both mean and not mean something with it—is seen by
us as an incoherence in what the words want to be saying (i only it were
something sayable). We displace our desire onto the words and see thet as
aspiring to say something they never quite sueceed in saying (because, we
tell ourselves, “it” cannot be said). We account forthe confusion these words
‘engender in us by discovering in the words a hopelessly flawed sense.
The heart of the Tractarian conception of logic is to be found in the
remark that “Wwe cannot make mistakes in logie™ (§5.473), The burden of the
J much of Wittgenstein’s later writing—is to try to show us,
that the idea that we can violate the logical syntax of language rests upon a
confused conception of “the logical structure of thought™**—that there is no
distinction to be drawn between deep nonsense and mere nonsense.!™
Everything which is possible in logic is also permitted” (§5.473). Ita sen-
tence is nonsense, ths is not because itis trying but failing to make sense (by
breaking a rule of logic), but because we have failed to make sense with it"
‘The Tractatus puts it ike this: “The sentence is nonsensical because we have
failed to make an arbitrary determination of sense, not because the symbol
isinitself unpermissible” (85.473). The idea that there are illegitimately con-
structed propositions" rests upon a misunderstanding of the logic of our lat-
Buage.!" Indeed, one of the most important continuities between early and
Tate Wittgenstein lies in his attack on the idea of a hopelessly flawed
sense!®*—the idea which gives rise to the illusion that we can occupy the
Cartesian perspective. In the Tractarus, Wittgenstein writes: “We cannot
give a sign the wrong sense” (5.4732). In the Investigations: “When a sen-
tence is called senseless, itis not as it were its sense that is senseless
(#500). This does not mean that we cannot give these words a sense, but
only that we have (as yet) failed to do so."
Inthe end, however, the snake bites its own tail, Our guiding idea—the
idea that “we cannot make mistakes in logie"—turns out itself to be a piece
‘of nonsense. For if the sentence “we can make mistakes in logic” turns out
{o be nonsense, then so does its denial. But in order to make sense of either
of these sentences we have to make sense of “the possibihty of illogical
thought.” Each rung of the ladder depends on its predecessors for support.
‘The collapse of one nung triggers the collapse of the next. We are initiated
into a structure of thought which is designed to undermine itself. The
Tractatus—a
158
Practatus takes the (illusory) structure of the problematic of the lugical
aliens to be paradigmatic of the "structure of philosophical confusion gen:
erally, and takes its elueidatory burden to be illustrative of the burden of
philosophical work generally. The aim is not to take us from a piece of deep
nonsense to a deep insight into the nature of things, but rather from a piece
of apparently deep nonserse to the dissolution of the appearance of depth
This brings us to a second important continuity in Wittgenstein’s work—his,
conception of the aim of philosophy. In the Javestigarions, he writes: “My
aim is: to teach you to past from a piece of disguised nonsense to something
My propositions serve ax elucidations in the following way
anyene who undersiands me eventually recognies then as non
ensicol when be has climbed oat theogh them, on them. vee
them, (He must, soto speak, throw avsay the ladder afer he has
clisbed up it. {My emphases] ($6.54)
Witigenstein does not ask his reader here to “grasp” his “thoughts.” He does
not call upon the reader to understand his sentences, but rather to understand
hin, namely the autor and the kind of activity in which he is engaged—one
of elucidation! He also tells us how these sentences serve as clucidations
by enabling us to recognize them as nonsense. One does not reach the end
by arriving at the last page, but by arriving at a certain point in an activity—
the point when the elucidation has served its purpose: when the illusion of
sense is exploded from within and one has arived at the center ofthe onion
The Preface and the concluding sections of the Trrctatus form the frame
ofthe text. Itis there that Wittgenstein provides us with instructions for how
to read what we ind inthe body of the text. Inthe Preface, Wittgenstein tells
us that the idea that we can form thoughts about the limits of thought is
simply nonsense. The book starts with a warning to the effect that a certain
kind of enterprise-one o” attempting to draw a limit to thought—leads to
plain nonsense. Inthe body of the text, we are offered (what appears to be)
2 doctrine about “the limits of thought.” With the aid of this doctrine, we
imagine ourselves to be able to both draw these limits and see beyond them,
‘At the conclusion of the book, we are told thatthe author's elucidations have
succeeded only if we reccgnize what we find in the body of the text to be
(simply) nonsense. The sign that we have understood the author (as opposed
tothe body) of the work isthat we ean throw the ladder we have climbed up
away. That isto say, we have finished the work, andthe work is finished with
us, when we are able (0 simply throw the sentences in the body of the
swotk—sentences about “the limits of language” and the unsayable things
which lie beyond them—avay.!
To read the work correctly we need to hold on to something and
throw something away. What we hold on to is the frame of the text—the
text's instructions for how to read it and when to throw it away. What we
159 eventually” throw away isthe body ofthe text—its mock doctrine, The pro-
ponents of the standard interpretation opt for the opposite procedure: they
cling firmly to what they find in the body of the text and throw away the
warnings and instructions offered in the frame. They peel far enough down
into the onion to see thatthe sentences they are attracted to are nonsense, but
they still want fo hold onto what (hey imagine) the nonsense is trying to say.
‘They conclude that the Tractarian onion must have a pit in the middle:
insight” into the rrurh of certain deep matters-—even though, strictly speak
ing, this truth cannot be put into language. Witigenstein’s aim is to enable
simply left with what one is left with after one has peeled away all the
ers of an onion,
A PARABLE
Certain general features of the Tractatus’s mode of elucidation are reflected
in the following Jewish tale which dates from the beginning of this cen-
tury." The parable, like the Tracratus, has an ethical point,
APole and a Jew are sitting ina train, facing each other. The Pole shifts
nervously, watching the Jew all the time; something is irritating him, Finally
‘unable to restrain himself any longer, he addresses the Jew: “Tell me if you
‘would please si: how do you Jews carry it off? It’s not that I'm anti-Semitic;
but, I must confess, I find you Jews teribly perplexing. mean, I simply can-
not understand how you do it.I simply want to know: how do you succeed
in extracting from people everything they have down to their last coin and
thereby accumulating your vast wealth? What is your secret?” The Jew
pauses for a moment and then responds: "Very well. I will tll you.” A see:
ond pause. “But it would not be right for me to divulge such a secret for noth-
ing. First, you must give me five zloty.” After receiving the required amount,
the Jew begins: “First, you take a dead fish; you cut off its head and put its
entrails in a glass of water. Then, around midnight, when the moon is full,
you must bury the glass in a che interrupts the Pole, “if
do all this will I become rich?” “Not so quickly.” replies the Jew, “this is,
not all you must do; but, if you wish me to continue, you must first pay me
another five zloty.” After receiving more money, the Jew continues in a sim-
ilar vein, Soon afterwards, the Pole again interrupts, and before continuing,
the Jew again demands more money. And so on, and so on; until all of a sud-
den the Pole explodes in fury: “You rascal, I see what it is you are aiming
a; there is no secret at the bottom of this at all.” “That,” replies the Jew. as
hhe returns the Pole his money, “is the secret.”
160
A TRACTARIAN MIDRASH
The Pole has a problem, He is perplexed about Jews. He desires to possess
the Jew's secret. His perplexity will be relieved, he imagines, only ifthe Jew
‘will disclose his secret. The Pole has a clear picture of the form which the
solution to his problem must assume: the Jew must provide him with know!
ceaige. The Pole pictures thisknowledge as both precious and hidden. Beyond
this, the Pole has no clear conception of what such knowledge is like, other
than that it is something he does not understand. All he knows for sure
about this knowledge is that he wants it. The Jew engages the Poie’s desire
by entering into his picture of the form which he imagines his satisfaction
‘must assume. The Jew therefore begins by charging the Pole money and urg-
{ing him to Jook in the direction he already wishes 10 attend. But the Jew's
delivery on his promise to relieve the Pole of his craving for knowledge lies
notin any of the hits of sectet doctrine which the Jew imparts to his listener.
but rather shrongh the activity by which he succeeds in capturing the lis
tcner's desire for such doctrine, The Pole is relieved of his craving (For the
Jew's secret doctrine) when he recognizes that this doctrine (to which he is
so powerfully attracted) cannot satisfy him, It cannot satisfy him because
there is no such doctrine: the secret is that there is no secret.
‘The parable ends by recording the Jew’s final gesture and final words.
Ye are told nothing conce-ning the Pole’s response to them. His perple?
ties about Jews may persist and continue to kindle his craving for knowledge.
The Pole will find relief from this craving only when he is lieved of the ill
sion that he will be satisfied by (Jewish) knowledge. He will be relieved of
his perplexity about Jews—and the lesson will be complete—when he rec~
‘ognizes that the source of his attraction to Jewish doctrine has nothing to do
with Jews and everything to do with himself.
NoTes
|. ‘This puperis indebted to the writings of Cora Dimond and Thomas Rickelis, to conver
sations with Stanley Cavell Stephen Engsirom, John MeDowel, Hilary Putnam. and
Jamie Tappenden to comments onan caer daft hy Cora Diamond, David Finkelstein
‘Richard Gale, Matin Sone, Michael Thompson, and Lisa Van Alstyne to lectres and
seminars om Frege by Burton Dreben and Warren Golfar, and to John MeDowell and
‘VD. Woorly for teling me about Lite Red Hen
2. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Preface
Lowe this quotation to Archibald R. Maclniyee, Curave ls Hisors, Nowe, and Clinical
Use (Chicago: Universit of Chicago Pest, 947), 209, Macliye als employs itasan
epigraph, though to make «rather different point (the only proper way’ 10 stimulate 2
161 sel sf the inside hy HS nerve) There no inition oe way othe her
Tater Macinyt aware of the lossng sigsinicant clue a he ators
parva Galina Bra” Latin for "Late Red Hen
Suma Theologica, Q.28, 3
'. One could. oie july. charge hat the complain developed inthe preceding paragraph
Saat Aquinas lt dtngush between Go's omniptence His absolute power an
fs ssity ihe absolute independence of His existence) [have not distinguished these
Inecane ny pes ere prepare the eader fora discussion of Descartes sti
ftom with scholastic views. Descartes moves seamlessly between the question of
Sshether theres something God cannot of His ose re wil vig about andthe question
shat the modal sats ofthe propstinns of gi teed independent of Ged
{henna Phage fe commited othe lan thatthe maces teh ofthe laws of opie
JP independent of G's will Descartes wo View him as commited toa doctine
‘which acres Fini to God's power
6. esc key thn he ist instance, Descartes as esprnng to Suare7 not Agnes
8 viddcrses the quetion of wheter the eee ate pice 1 Goa
aiwer Desires mst encerne 10
eject Suarer’s view is that the ete vers do mot derive thet th frm Gis hay
Fnuchowen ho then- rather, they are Krewe by Hi Recase they re tie. hes th
jt ito His knowledge of them andthe object ofthe feat
‘tate dependent on Go's wll then contrary to thei natre. they would be na more nee
hary than ny ther created truth they would ot proceed necessarily hut voluntarily
{See Diipuotenes Metaphysiea, Disp, XXXI, sec. 12, No, 40.) Inthe evar of si
Ing tte eteral rath ae independent of G's wil Suate7 allows htnsel tay that
the clerna ths would he ire even f Geel did not exist, This formation of the pro
fem ferns the pint of departare fr many of Descartes discussions of the tats ofthe
feral tthe, fo example inthe Sih Se of Rees:
IW anyone atten othe inmnearabe greatness of Gs he wil find it
manifestly clea that thete ean be nothing whatsoever thi does not
depend ct him This apples no jt everything tha subsists, but al
frde. every law, and etry reason for anything’ being tue or goed
Ifsome reason fr something's being good had existed prior to his peor
ination. this Would have determined God to prefer those things which i
{eas bes ta do [ny emphasis, (The Philosophical Wrrings of Descartes,
tans, Cottingham, Stoothf, nd Murdoch in 3 volumes (Cambridge:
‘Cambridge University Prese, 1984-1991}, vol 2, 293-94. Al subsequent
references to Deseares will be to oe of these volumes)
Descartes avoids Sue's concn tha thee ae tats which ont depend
gon Gus eee ysjecing hs tochles conversa lam that here ae ahs
echoed om lw Bsc sn nthe
Thos tra” depens upon the wil ef God and ws reordane by Min. Descartes, fate
Tats same ae gov noel the question of whee the eterna ths depend
ton God wih he question of whtir He eri ave true hit negations about 60
“Ror ws no te hat wie four mite igh") Ths the question othe stats of be
ttt Tune ths (ete ty wo etree Gd id ot ex esos
nongled for Descaes (ot ever wuld for Aus), ith he question ofthe extent
ST Gal's ommpcenc ether ies within his power bing abou the negation of
fennel
1. ncotet th passage uns “As forthe eral hse are rex posible nly
‘cure God rows them as reo posi. Tey are ot known a ue by Godin ay
sey th nally that they ae te independent Hin tf men aly undertone
The tem ofthe worse oul eer say wiht phen that htt of ang
‘Snr the iwwtee nich Ge a The peg pes on make ite
thtDecore'scocen hereto eps Susteren not sta
Af God aid not extn neveneless hese rae woul be efor the existence of God is
162
hint aa st eterna fal posible tts adhe oe fom whic aon
end" (v0h 2h
(Op cit vo. 3.236,
A peat many ingenious exegetial efforts to rescue Descartes’ doctrine of the eration
‘the tera tris seem tome fo depend upon a neglect, on the par of comments
‘Descartes’ unabashed wilingness to indulge in such positive assertions
Descartes carefully distinguishes between the “infinite and the ‘indefinite’ reserving the
former ter for God
‘Our reason for wing the ter inefiitecathec han ‘iit in hese
esses [the dvisiii f boady the numer of stars) in the frst place
“ato reserve the er "infnte’ for Ge lone, Fei he ease of Gad
lone, motel owe ait recognize any Tits im any respect, but out
lunderstading positively tells os tht there are none, Second in the ease
‘futher things, cur understanding does mot nthe same way pesitivel tell
‘otha hey lack ini in some respect, we merely acknowledge ina nes-
‘ive wa that any nas which hes may hae cannot be discovered by us
(Goi 1.202)
‘Our idea of Got ist sinly ofa Being whose its exceed cur grasp, ut rather
‘of a boing wih positively wthont ints, UI isin he mature af scl being no Tobe
{ally grasped by ws" vo. 1,19), So, for Deseaves, the Fact that Ged is intinite entails
thar He i incomprehensible
‘We shuld never ene iat arguments about the infinite... Por since we
are ft, it woutd be absird for so detemin anything concerning the
Infinite for this would Be an attempt to vt it and grasp it. (xc. 1
201-02)
“This insistence upon he infinite of God intoduces a peofound tense int the
heart of Descartes pilesophy-a tension Between the foundational role played by an
‘nbegat idea of God and the iconprebensbiity of Godt oa rite minds. Om the ome
han, the project of Fuenshig a secure foundation for u system of scientific knowledge
‘depends upon our knowledge of Gok “The certainty and th fal krowledge depends
‘uniquely on my narenese othe tre God to sich an extent that Iwas incapable ope
fect knowledge about anything else unl became swe of Hin (vol 249)-On he oer
hand the idea of Goi the lea of being seas true natures heyond the reach of ou
Fie minds: "We cannot comprehend the greatness of Ged, eventhough we can know
{vol 3023) This latter cai also gives ise to a free poate (which we wll Begin to
‘explore in mement: bow can we know what we cannot comprehend?
‘Such view of God's omiputence (hich takes even the most fundamental principles of
Topical consistency tobe sitject tothe Divine wil leads to theological havoc I'm not
{ing to explore bere any ofthe many absurdities sucha view may sem to imetly
‘tangle self in. Fora bie ot penetrating general scunsen ofthe pecs see
Richard MGile, On the Narre and Eristence of Gnd Cambridge: Cambri University
Press 1991), 18-29, Fora erp discussion of he problem with Deseares's view, in par
fica, sce Peter T. Geach, Providence ond Fst! (Cambridge: Cambeidge University
Press, 1972). Chapter 1 Among the moe helpful atemps to sot out Deseares's views
‘on the creatine the eiemal tus are A. Boyce Gibson, "The Eternal Vertis and the
‘Willof Goa inthe Philosophy of Descartes” Proceedings nf the Aviotelian Soe. 8
30, 1929-1950; F. Heche, The Creation ofthe eral Truth in Descartes’ System
in Descartes: Collection of rica Essays ed: Dovey (South Bend: University of Notre
Dane Press 1968): F- ML Cure, "Descartes andthe Creation of the Eternal Truths” The
Philosophical Review XCHI(4) (Oct 1984): H, Frankfurt "Descartes and the Creation
of the Etemal Truths” Phibsophical Review LXXVI Uan. 1977), A. Furkenstin
“Theology and the Scientific imapnation (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 1986),
179-92: HL. Ishiguro, "The Svs of Necessity and Impossibility in Descartes" in Essays
‘Descartes Mediations 2d. Rony (Berkeley. Univesity of California Pres, 1986)
‘Se also the discussions in Guérolt and Wilson cited below.
thers ps
163 2
8
15,
16
0.
20,
opie
Op cit
Op.cit
Op cit
owe this orm 0.
Op cit sul 3,25 Bren where Descartes does ot expily invoke sch a dition
(Gareecn what we can tach in hough and what we can gasp he acest have
someting ofthe sr ind Fo expt, wen he as ur elsing wha we cn
teas asin Preps 4281201)
‘Wein elev everything which God hs reves, even shah it ay
tebeyondout pap
Hence. Ge Rapens oes w ws something about Hs oes
sighs beyond te natural each of ur ind we al not exe to
ete dsp heft hte dont leary understand t And we wl
not be al spied tat there mich inte unease tare
SFGate we gs ee Mi
enact
Moe gency. one could formule the Cartesian Pricrent the fangeof pik
sophia pole one alls into when on ans caneve of rss as nel fe
cers having lit
anil Gucci hs uauaied way of ting de pin and ara ha se
ineligitiy ef he hypothe hee gs depend pn sn bare Kno ee
Gat So thoughe hphese spe ecient heen ea edi os
Stare she ose clay tha ih ecpton woul tb pes or Go. "Tha Gd
tsi and ots deter inf nalts, on need uh Wea
have rpc hive anche and conte ele of Gol moter op
{Sie th The Sol andthe Bods (Anoeap:Unerstyof Mesa Press 1S)
23) The second paragraph ofthe Fourth Monon tenons ove: might ape
beacctscharening Batik gueson wher wats eprted here tear
Chao tha he medi lonng he alg of en) one on pa
et conaictn) to "eogne™ 2 7)-or wheter sl repens (ws Goo
foi abot const on C's power
“This ined aes intertetve ses which ead well eyond the oe ofthis
Pare wih ate ened ae tama em
Be, Gacoltin the pacding eave fave thowgt hat allo at God cold are
Shen to dece wos be poi fr Ge er alent do ang hie
Seay os te ni pe he at et bees nt et
et snare dcsives. A ring that couldcev us ud be ine one
Sint nd Hence would not be Gr The teh of Go dessving us theories
1 aie conrad, Now Desc defiey ares hat such ato elves
ceneaton Dt oe aks seo Deseares> iw enna we ca
tot iy oo concep then ca ot what Ged mat dea
‘oallinete acon ort todo ert testes ocala in te
Sowing dim: we perceive aconation when we ate ocnceivet ding sch
ng. The pres fal in teen ne qcaon of he dec few ie on
init od. Asin inthis endnte, ne vay att a ie appear
eof ifleaty hr derves am ous cue ef Gd es sea rece
Sede vantherwe come tose ley an stint tht Ged could never eso
Iihieve Bat ner restos on he atte, we thine by ou a pow
{of enon? The quent: doe sah conaton hoe oncepton of Gd
(enna ma cn afr on ets et
for aelng tat He ack orto sch ating ers aly par of ot
Se alt esheets Fp icy. cw ne on
‘hu abotely iconic even oot ed concept of Got
lately impostor Gd given tiie power)? Whe one comes ct on
.
inuepetive ise wll depends great deal upon how much weight one pats on a hes 0
“hpstenty unequivocal passages in Descartes (hich 3s tempting to fnne) aoa
INE should pot are atin to Gas power tespecialy the bass of ee hme
Jpovers of comcepiont—passapes uch ax Princes, 8825-27 (vo. 120-02). the phy
ithe cilih ebjection inthe Sith Set of Replies. and sunnerous remarks 1m the
CComesponence, such a the following
For my prt, ko that my itellectis frite and Go's powers infinite
fant sls listo.» - Ando oly assert that God can do evers=
thing whieh {perceive tobe possible, bu Tam nots bold to assent the
Converse namely hat He anot do what conics with my conception of
Ahings -t mecly sry that i invalves centration, (vol 3.369)
"This suggests that with respect the ide that God isa deceive, we shoul
snetely sty hat nimvoive teen ¢Ad nother held ato asset that
He anno do what conics with ovr ewoxeption of ke up
hove she eae of a sacha passage might hear on the problem of the Cartesian Cirle
tnd the related question of what sor of valiaton it shat eur clear ad distinct eas
feceive withthe sane wf the editors)
“Tis formulinn (and hat of he previous sentence) sestepsacenral problem: ou cleat
{Rand mest tine idea, ievonding to Descartes, cour dea of Ga —itis"The one sew
tcc lands out rom all he ethers” (eo, 1 197). But ifthe necessity of or lear and
{istnee ideas merely dies fom he principles which have heen implanted i ou ite
mand this opens up the possibilty of pap etween God's actual nature ad even the
ost lear ad distinct dev which we ae able o form of His nate. Tis. rn, aes
the following exceedingly corrosive wort (suppressed the previews note: ou clear and
Ustinet perception of God's omniptence is merely a reflection of the fact thal acetin
foncept of Ge as been implied incur minds. But now its mo Tonger cleat wht the
bn for Descats's lam that we should never say that Ge cannot do something.
Sort to lock sf al tha this means i that omnipotence ia necessary Feature of ou con
Sopra Gidthas insofar x we wishto think of Go we cannot think of him in anyother
Seay than as omnipotent. But why shouldnt we conclude that tenevolence isan equally
“erential feature of our cancep of God and hence conclude that the idea that Gnd could
‘hee deceiver sone whichis szplyvnthikable fr us? In order to block this, 1ooks as
It Deseantes hast say that ont the idea that Go could bea deceive) the tea that Ged
Jacks emmipetence one that e cannot even appreher, Although ti sill God we touch
tupon nour thought when we apprehend the incomprehensible) possibility of His deceiv-
{pun it so longer in ary sense an idea of God that we form when we imagine a being
{eho is ot supremely powerful, But his won't do. For the atemp io privilege omnipo-
{ence and eal itasan gsc Featre of God'snatre or of ur concep of Gr) not ly
sre afoul of the doctrine of Gods simpli atin the end, it deprives the ieathat Ged
asa nature of sense, Descartes sys we should never say that God cannot do X even
TE involves something whic we take tobe contary © God's rate, But one’s xp on
the lea ofabeing’s having 9 naue—and hence one's concept of such a being ted
‘one's understanding ofthe modalities, To say that X is part of God's mature is to say
thar He wouldn't be God without XT hold that God can do anything, even something
Iwhich is contrary to His ature, to hold that He ean make anything compatible with His
‘ature which sto old tat God has no rare. Thus, t2sign omnipotence an absolute
[prorty overall of Goal’ other athutes is to completely dain the concept of Goof al
Fscontent by depriving us of any handle onthe nein tat God asa ature
‘One way to render what ce can perceive clearly and disney open to doubt is 0 have
itoceu Toone that God could have piven one a awed nature (such that one i deceived
{ven about that whieh seme most evident), When ones working within one's nature. as
‘tee, and one turns to fhe hing themselves, one i imply unable o wihold sent
{othat whichis cear and distinct oto affirm a manifest contradiction, Se, for example,
the Third Meditaion
‘Bot what aboat when Iwas considering something very simple and
straightforward for example that two and thre added together make
sa hat so
165 2
2s,
16
Hive. nd sy? Did Lt eat as these things ely enough aftr
‘het rth? Inded, the ly tease Hr my ler juste that they ete
‘pen to db wathat tected tht perp sone Ga cok have
siven me a natmne such hat Iwas deceive even ienates which seme
‘most evden, And whenever my recenceived elie in the supreme ower
‘6f Goa comes to mind. cannot hat ant that it woul Be ofr
he so desired to ig it shout hat I rong even in those mater whieh
Uihink I see tery clerly with my mind's eye. Yet when I turmto the
things hemteves which hink I perceive very cleaty am so convinced
hy them tht I spontaneously dectare et whoever ean do se deceive
hewillnever being itaborthattwosand three adled together are move
‘ress than five ran hing of hiskind in hich Use a manifest conta
Aten. (0h 3.28)
‘The idea that God could have given one a fase nar remlers even car mest
secure eles (those based om cleat and distinct perception! dubtelby vedi the
‘tpposiion that reason (one's faculty clear ae distin! percepein) Hell dlctve
hie hdea hs the power 0 dslodge our confidence in even the mot base tit
son—aconinence whichis oerwiseunshakable: Under ordinary eccumstances Wea
unable to dt what we cestly and disney perceive. A clear and distinct perception
sane which siestble. The conception of reason at work hee (as eompasing tse pt
‘pls in acordanee with which we cannot help ba think) i thoroughly pry
asa a contradiction involves something which we are incapable of arming. acest
and distinct perception, if we attend oi svolves something from which we are unable
‘o ithe assent—sometbing which itis psychology impossible to doubt Descartes
‘consi ofthe goal of rational argument i equally psychologist: ito attain a ate
‘of urshakable elit Foon of "conviction based cn arguient so tong that tean never
bre shaken by any stronger argument” (vo. 3. 147). Descartes psychelopisn is eident
ina pasage sucha the following
‘As soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are
Spontaneously convinced that iis tue. Now i this conviction is fi
that ts impossible for us ever to ave any reason for doing what we
ate convinced of then here are further questions forest ask- we have
everything that we could reasonably want = convcton so finn that its
‘quite incapable of being destroyed an such w conviction is clearly the
sae asthe most perfect certainty, (vl. 2 103)
‘TheextentofDescats'spsychologisn and its implications forthe interpretation
of his philosophy as « whole ate helpfully discussed by C. Larmore. ‘Descartes
Paychologsie Theory of Assent” Histon of Philosophy Quarterly. 184: L Loeb. "The
Cartesian Citle” in The Cambrilge Companion to Descartes, ed by J. Coingham
(Cambridge: Cambridge University res, 1992); and R. Rubin, *Descaress Validation
‘of Clear and Distinct Apprehension” Phlosophical Review. 1977,
Op.cit, vol 3,359.
‘This sept, for example, nthe passage fromm Descartes with which we began (vo. 3
235), Ths might appea to contradic bis remark nthe opening ofthe Sith Meditation
‘hat tha never julged hat something couldnt be made by Him except onthe rounds
that there would bea contradition in my perceiving Ht distinctly” (vol 2. 0). But
‘Descartes no only says i the former passage that God could have made contradiction
tee bot also that "we should not try to comprehend it, since ovr nature incapable of
doings.” This suggest that whet i at sen the Sie Meditation isa judgment which
flows from the naturally repugnant character ofa contradiction (our fine faculty of
jcdement) and not a judgment whichis grounded ina clear ad dstint perception af the
positive ints of Goa's power,
‘The crucial tenet of Cartesianism—hat reason imposes limits on the structure of our
thoughe—therefore cts across any facile classification of philosophies in terms of the
‘sul pigeonhols, such as empiricism versus rationalism (or naturalism versus pine
isin Viewed fom this perspective, Descartes an Mi ate staunch Caress: Labi
an! Locke staunch ant Caestans
{nis insrctvew conta! Lack one ofthe fouding Fathers of empiricism. ith
Descartes in thisrepind Veke lke Descartes, wilarpue that an ali to eenceive bose
Gea cull do someting does no. in general afeed a basis for conchng tha He end
rtd To conclade tus would be to deny Goss omniptence ke nite eka
Pe inthis connection is es ability to uperadd the power of though to mater: Teo
fess as much as you please that we canpot conceive how a soli. sutstance thinks but
this weakness of oar apprehensions reaches nal the power of God” Tle Works of Ja
Locke [London 1823) 468,
“To deny that Gel eo endow ete mater withthe power 1 think (9 the
‘round that we cannot cence of how thought could be produced hy mate) ist Wan
‘er into Blasphemy. But wha is tse here for Lace, oor inability to conceive bow
i certain sot af ease cel pve rise toa certain st of effet We can eoncive bis
Sch am efect cold he rice by sch a ease, but his Joes not mean that God eld
rot ondsin to be so. Ye Locke—for al is homily about the fms of usa ka
‘eg and all his piety about God's omnipotence wil net hesitate to declare “that,
‘Onynipotency cane make a substance tobe solid and no solid atthe same tne 65).
‘Our peers of comprehension are weefally fnite and hence incencevabity ism gen
fra. mot a measare of rpossihiity. But oe nab to grasp a conaiction fot om a
Pur with our maby to conceive certain kinds of causal enanecton; the fone st 90
‘ey a symptom ofthe Hite of our minds Locke steep the Catsian formula “that
‘ee canno! conceive something is nota reason to deay that Ged can do i only insofar as
‘hs comadiction involved in ou desenpion of what Gnd an do. That there no co
{radiction involved in oar conception of something) is, fr Locke (as for Aqoints). the
{est of whether something is possible and hence of whether (we can coherently 49) Gd
can doit Hence, Locke writes:
think it cans he denied that God, having 2 power to posace ideas
nus cam give that power toanother: to express itetherse, make any
‘dea the elfect of any opceatinn om our besies. This has no contradiction
Anal thereon spose [my emphasis) (253)
26, She writes:
{tis clear enough in any case, that Descartes i ep the “neces
‘we perceive in athematicl propositions asim some sense an degree @
function ofthe constitution of our minds themselves finite “sreattes
‘And even this eave limited cain fs been found extreme by sone
Dhilsaphere ath a Labi). would appear, Iwvever, thatthe hstry
Of epistemology and philosophy of mathematics since Descartes has
tended very clea to demonstrate that his poston was fr fom wil ot
excessively ios cate. From Hunve an Kant enward it ss heen widely
held tat alleped perceptions of necessity” cannot he ken fer ere)
sin that we mstin some senee or her have recourse tthe suctre
‘workings of our oem minds to give an account of these “perepions Ia
tion, there have been increasingly extensive doubts about the alleged
inelctable neces or eternity ofthe tratonal necessary (oe eternal)
truths, There is een 2 vey controversy among some Teading pilose
pers ofthe preent century whether logical necessity might ot go the
Same way a the waditional "necessity" of Eolidean geometry. Fro this
Poin of view whats eally extraordinary isnot Descates's cretion dee
{rine isl, ur the fact that he has not been given mee credit fr atving
‘i (Descartes London: Routledge Kepan Pal 1978), 125-26.)
27. Mind, Language and Realty (Cambeidge: Cambdge University Pres, 1975) 0
2k tid x
29. Op. cit, 235, Wilson immediacy goes onto observe, however:
167 w.
2
m
38
31
».
0,
168
Aim deren cen Desa sn Pt hat Dost
Act tk poston way thsi Came eel
Sd. escent seat dctine sly ete th
Nrown lance on cnc ten pido cena uk
Tisiwcemeced a dicen wil octon na manent fy Deas he
cont nec haan te De ti) Patna, ps
sad es of amon Ewe
Pann Te Aycan he ae in anne md ei ie. “To
sa a Pon oa oof ew aN Hard
University Press, 1983),
Coleen Rat and Reason Cantg: Cambridge Universiy Pres 1980.
98-14, Puna spperie floc amt in which am wnt te pope wich
‘Putnam goes on to complicate nd to conte extent rect the view pul forward in the boy
Pears nicely enigma aad
mes ecu eons ce
Eresoyinm enya oat
eas
Etat
Pee ee
ae Sane Tce ae Pi eee oo
athe coe Ces i ee
eee
a
ame ree er
ima eacvanenperteseees eee
See eect cpr
ee ee cea ae eee
Reece eee
etme
Uftedepyingron utr wns font
oa re re ote
eee cr aetna
Sree anager ea
Ti it opener aca nic ein
ce ere nee
sei artnet emt
Tete earensen yeaa cretineees
wirtararsoue
Cae eee eee aad
inl in The Principles Philoophs. Ato icantly. Deserts’ dotrin the
eternal us wax well known to Leitz and tis nconee ah tat Ka Ws
swith hs etcis of it
41. naneatir draft here is a this juncture an ext reference to Descartes
42. Philosophical Essay, trans. Roget Aview and Daniel Gather ¢ndianapols: Hacket,
1989) 3.
41, Kant's own full Bowded account of feeedom obsionsly requires great deal more fa fee
gent thon that he merely sift capaci fr rational houpht. AI hat mates for ca
present purpeses. never. that peactical reason, for Kam is species of reason
Descartes confusion (aboot id's wil being constained bythe las of log) sted,
for Kant not only toa confusion about the ceitons of etional agency. bl also fo an
invotiien appreciation ofthe spontaneity of teason. Descartes’ account of rational
‘Tongan infeence tn tems ofthe clea an stint percetions the natural Tigh of
‘enon ford) findamentlly misconceses the chaaetr of our faculty of spontaneity
Cinsitakng fora were a alleratve Torn ofreeptvit)—one tats affected By
{easene rather ha intuions} fa deterinae sort. The Kanan break with Cartesian
tries exonesing the ennory model of the mind as an organ which perceives reasons
444, The Leibizin outline of Kans conception of Feeder, and its eiance ona distinction
‘retcen the Real of Freed and the Real of Nature. evident ina passage such as
he flog
‘Willisa kind of cavity Belonging to ving Beings fara hey are
rational. Freedom would then Be the property this causality has of Being
Ne to work independently of determination y alien cases... The con
eptof enusality cares with that offs, Hence freedom ofthe wil
“ifongh it sm the propery of conforming to laws of mare, sno Tor
this eason lawless lust rather be 3 causality conforming fo nmable
‘thovgh ola seca kind: for otherwise fee will would be sell
contradictory. (Groundwork ofthe Mevaphysie of Morals, tans. H. I
Paton, Harper and Row, New York: 1964], 114.)
45. Theodice (Open Coun. LaSalle: 1985), 246-47.
46 The pont i summarized ir section 46 of the Monadefog
However. we must not imagine, as some do, thatthe eternal ths,
ting dependent on God, ace arbitrary and depend upon is will. 25
Descartes seems tofave hed...» That is te only of Contingent tas
Teas the aseseary tats depen solely om Go's understating
“and are is inermal object, (GW. Leite’s Manadology ed. Nicholas
Rescher [Pitsburg University of Ptsburgh Press: 1991], 156.)
447. “Only rational being ha he power to actin accordance wth his ide of awstats
inactordance with principles and oly so has he a wll” (Groundwork, RO.
8. “Asal acts of he understanding canbe reduced to jdpments, the understanding may be
eine a the facul of judgment” (AGS/B94).
49, Thisis how eatvey ecem Putnam summarizes the same point
“Tsay tha ur eith in the mest fundamental principles of deductive
logic. our fait ne principle of conradiction iets imply an innate
iepemsity i te obliterate totally the distinction between geason and
Blind faith. (-Theels At Least One A Pie Truth" op. ct, 108)
50. Stephen Engstom argues compellingly (in “The Transcendental Dedcton and Skep-
tits” forthcoming hat his passage (27 of the Transcendental Dedction) i nt—3x
has ofien been assured be red as directed apanst the Cartesian skeptic (but rather
boinst« Humean one) Bathe Cartesian skeet Engtrom is concered to rule out inthis
Content i the mare familer Cartesian outer‘worid skeptic (who doubts the existence of
“onporeal things outside the mind), Whereas the form of Cartesianism that preoccupies us
hereand with which Letni contend nthe passages quoted above is ofa very dil
ferent variety itis one which todches specifically om the question of the character ofthe
169 st
32
3s
4
5
necessity ofthe wns andaneta mksf ugh o Kan an acon rations
strain ernsotpselilgical access icons the tao uth he so he
andthe aeons ofthe understanding. this eget that Engst oul he night th
{the unmanitied reference 0 "he shepic” notwithstanding fn of ease Cats
{extemal wl) skepticism isin view i this page as ifr exapl, clea isin The
Refutation of Melis without nor having to deny tht certain Cartesian dts ate
nonetheless ming under re in §27 of he Transcendental Deitin, ned heals
ot “skepicio’ Kans faved term of desripton for skepticism concerning water
objects. What Kant calls skepicism” largely coieides with hat T have Been ealing
“Cotesia
My point snot that Kant necessarily has Descattes a mind in the Transcendental
Deduction. but rater tha he concerned to respond tna Cartesian problematic which he
ecmes to by way of Leib and Cratus (and which closely pales as Engin
mle eas out—a problematic which Kant akesto have been ave hy Hume sel,
Kan clare his point in the Lai
‘We cannot think oc use our understanding cthersie than acundin 0
conain lee
Alles acording to which the understantingprceets ane ether ne
suns or contingent. The Teter ne those without which mo ue of the
‘ndersing would be possible at al: theft ae hose without which
8 certain use of the understanding would not take place. The eninge
rules which depend upon a certain objet of eupition ae as variegated
these objets themselves.
Emo, we se aside all cogaition tht we ust hoerow fe
an teflec solely upon the use ofthe uadertanding in tet, we discover
those of is niles which are recescary throughout, in every respect and
regatdess of any special ebects. because without them we weld not
‘hink at all sigh in these miles can therefore he gained 9 prion and
Independent of ane experience. eae they contain, without scrim
ration benveen object, msetely the contions ofthe use of the unl
standing itself be it pre or empirical. (Kant Logic, ans. R, Haran
and W, Schwarz [Mineoa: Dover, 1978), 18)
Ibid 5
Bid, 14-15. See leo the Fits Critique:
“There are therefore two rules which logicians must always bear in
‘min in dealing with pure general ogc:
1. Asa general lope. it abstracts fom all content ofthe knowledge of |
derstanding and rom ll diferences i its objects and deals with noth
ing bt the mere form of thought
2. As pute fogic it has thing todo with empirical prin
ohjets
doesnot. as sometimes Been supose, bow anything ew
chology. which therefore has ma ifluence whatever onthe canon ofthe
Understanding (ASW7B7R)
Weave odo ere witha wages sof the into thoughts. at were
imposed the pipes of pre pene hg). tthe of he ins fhe gmat
Erplyment the steps —the lt ht of thought pe a swe aoa
hj, Pre ener loi deals th i conition of tong gener ascend
tle the odo oft soa Tce in rR
as 10 do with the possi of sessile Erol epne fo exp
thought). Transcendental dialectic, as a prophylactic against transcendental Mason 54
bach tanec
“Ths for Ka ie Witgenn he estons wich ies deta ion —
those gest which ae preserbel bythe ey mu fea el ihe ae
‘able and et se ely ble to omer (A ih ae helen ls
ie Tey are a thy re fy Wiese spy one, For Kan the pen
‘rei ies st ais fms tho arth las to es
eres thar ty fih us th opis ab ees
1 ‘Thetiit Kan wishes seer nol be etd withthe ane Wiens
crates etace The Kanan to lint bic ne wangress pip ec
Minn) wo preven endnes temp 0 make clarcamt he equated wh
the Cason mon at (which the lw gi pose eeu ho. AS we
{false ean’can be seens noting redone tt loi sich ol ht
the lowvot repeal ahi ae corsa fh peilty of ag sh
Make mpeseiad imposing itn thot Te rts i concerned wih the
Cres ino hw hae aac mh afte en
cu fileA ppear ee fo proitng Kata ring of he Toots
“pu pe ang onthe wo oto of it Metin the Kanan
Sef inte of thew kere he Tatra atin of the its kei
{helonnone) Ths nse the Kanan moment ofthe wr Tendon hd ad
Snmentes ty sb te Tron tes of Kann (wel as Schopenavei
Sean) eye he wk pecs ul undeine neo asin Hs 0
ik om fr comeing fates te onncenc of Cd te nga orc a:
‘phuttonthecter noel ing nant Roi eo he
Rinse nih sommes the pt ths paper ha es he fee
{helt lope apy nonsense”
50. The Baie Las of rahe tans. Monger Furth Bere Unversity of Cal
tri ese. 1967, 1. :
‘6 This isconeced a point rege makes when compari his syste with ht
Brot the Beefs nt ely caesar Bt lsat har
teste eel ututcalel bu ss universal lng. The angus
toss ean became ian exp cpesenaion f the (pie ame
stn wbch allan ces reese gifs fers wt merely 93°
Tete ue system f fp proves a erieoos reesettion 35
theaivereal media of tought This meen that he sitio between
tc nti ierrettoneniely alien othe Bsr or Frege logic net
Shout the mampetton of met sigs on pape: queens concerning ter dsmerpret
ime cineca do ane, and gel th sot deine y way schema
Forty thermo meget rom hich ner oases the syste,
‘The hauiaion ote poi of Sch standpit or Frege. depends pen 2
detain the eof he aw of tg the fundamenal ressppasitions of
{Fong shou anything satoeven, For Frege, or Ral. tee feno posi of
‘hernav loge nthe contemporary sense—tere ao nos competng meres 0
Chats pal pee he opal ocean hugh On this we.
feign jet} shoul, ase ght ino way abiay The
stole esence ot el ew i tha there Ison) one gies (Lecnes on the
Frnt of Marhemanes Cora Dona ihca: Corel 1976) 172) For futher
iscnsion of ts and eited mater, ee Jean San Hjenoo, “Logic as Cant and
opie a Langoge™ in Sete Essos Naples ising 1988), Waren Golan
apc nthe Teen’ Journal of Sombie Lege 448) (S197): and “Potent
‘Ai te Logit in tones Stuer nthe Piso of Science I, W.
‘Ngee and F Richer finnepots: Univer of innesaa Press THER, ad he
pave by Thoms Ricks, ited Delo
59, "When propositions cle» poster o antic in my seas tis smo judge
tout coon pscholopyssogcl pyc. which have made po
$i fo he coe the opt nr coneiouness nxn itajudement aboot
{he'way in whch Some eer tan hes come. perhaps eoncouy 1 eleve Is re
‘Mice ie judomen aout he imate qd my emp] pon which et the
Fisifeation fo Reding i to Be Ire” (The Foundations of Antimenc [Evanson
Nontiwesern Universi Pres, 180), 4),
(isan important difference between Kant and rege that rege sees logic tenon i
m 6
a,
6
nm
wna henge sce of kr edge
Towing passage!
ss exc, for example, he
‘What Lepr a a source of kno edge is what jot the reson
‘ion of teh the aren
1 isinish he following sources of knowledge
1, See perception
2. The logical soure of Knowledge
3, The geometrical and temporal sources of knowledge (Poshnonnus
Wetngs, ed. H. Hermes. F- Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach [Chicag:
University of Chicago Press. 1979). 128.267)
A numberof commentators hase though that the fllssng fomlation should he veal
snail nthe Kanton flat he cs
ow these distinctions bewcen api and paseo artic amd
analyte, concern a Tse it po the comfent ofthe jadent bat the
jsieaton for making the japment. [Foundations of Aifimen. 3)
“They have therefore wished wo asmis the fstowing foot, hich Frege appends ths
passage, a dsngennons:
By this Ido not, of course, mean to asign anew sere these terms,
ton to sate acoralely whut euler writers. Kant pric, have
meant by ther. Ib)
Frege rematks ina number of places that he thinks Kans “re view was ae
ifcalto discover (i. 37. jhecaute his ode of expression sometines obscures
his agreement ith Frege abou the importance of sharply desing he distinction between
the psychological andthe logical. Frege rakes it clear nhs discussions of Kans account
‘of arithmetic tha he understands Kan's view (hat the th of atelier symtic
pros to amount to the claim that pure infution rst be invoked “te ultimate
round of our knowledge of sch judgments” (bid. 18) rege takes Kat's concer here
tobe, lke his ow, withthe jthcarion ofthe tus of arithmetic Pepe's meive in
recasting the anaytictsyheti distnetion in terms of justification (ater than cane) 6
in part to make it lear tat the question a sve fs abt one that canbe lumina by 2
psychological investigation. (He views his conteperres is prone to confuse subective
_sychologieal content with objective ogieal content) Hei leo concemed to hea off
psychologist misconstrals of his (and Kans talk about racing ante ots imate
round. He is out to daw the distinction (asthe fll context ofthe passage om page 3
na manner which marks of as erisply as possible the question of how we
Proposition fom the question of where t dries is ution from,
‘So Frege’ intention i to rem thal to the spin. fmt the eter, of Kent's
pilosophy. Nonetheless, his reonsteal ofthe analticlsatheis distinction marks more
fash than Fege would have us believe, Kant defines an analytic judgment as one
whose predicates contained in its subjet Kans definition of analytic permits one to
inspect an individual adgment aken in oation and see wher it interal structure
isof the appropriate composition Frege's defnition departs rom this conception in three
significant respects. ist artention shifted fom the qetion ofthe nema legal tc
ure ofan ivi judgment tothe question of the logical relation between aiid
al jpment anda entire body of judgments om which it ay be derivable), Secondly,
im detenmining whether a proposition is analytic. the rlevant hey of propositions the
has avs of logic taken coletivey eather than, for Kant. simply the principle of po
