The New Revolution in Political Science David Easton The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 4. (Dec., 1969), pp. 1051-1061. Stable URL hitp:/flinks.jstor-org/sicisici=0003-0594% 28 1969 12% 2963%3A 4% 3C1051%3A TNRIPS%3E2.0,CO%3B2-L. ‘The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hutp:/wwwjstor.org/joumals/apsa.himl. ch copy of any part of'a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @ jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ ‘Sun Apr 30 04:09:35 2006The American Political Science Review VOL. LXIIL DECEMBER, 1969 THE NEW REVOLUTION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE* Davin Easton University of Chicago ioralism—has scarcely been completed before it has been overtaken by the increasing social ‘and politieal crises of our time. The weight of these crises is being felt within our discipline in the form of a now conflict in the throes of which we now find ourselves. This new and latest challenge is directed against a develop- ing behavioral orthodoxy. This challenge shall eall the post-behavioral revolution, ‘The initial impulse of this revolution is just being felt. Its battle eries are relevance and ‘action. Its objects of eriticism are the disci- plines, the professions, and the universities. It is still too young to be described definitively. Yet we cannot treat it as a passing phenome- non, as a kind of accident of history that will somehow fade away and leave us very much 1s we were before. Rather it appears to be a specific and important episode in the history of our discipline, if not in all of the social soiences. It behooves us to examine this revolu- tion elosely for its possible place in the cot ing evolution of political seienee. Does it repro- sent a threat to the discipline, one that will divert us from our long history in the search for reliable understanding of polities? Or is it just one more change that will enhance our capacity to find such knowledge? ‘The essence of the post-behavioral revolu- tion is not hard to identify. It consists of a deep dissatisfaction with political research and ‘teaching, especially of the kind that is striving to convert the study of polities into a more * Presidential Address delivered to the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-6, 1969. New York City, rigorously scientific discipline modelled on the ‘methodology of the natural sciences. Although the post-behavioral revolution may have all the appearances of just another reaction to behavioralism, it is in fact notably different, Hitherto resistance to the incorporation of scientific method has come in the form of an appeal to the past—to classical political sei- ence, such as natural law, or to the more loosely conevived non-methodology of traditional re- search. Behavioralisin was viewed as a threat to the status quo; classicism and traditionalism ‘were responses caleulated to preserve some part of what had been, by denying the very possibility of a science of polities. ‘The post-behavioral revolution is, however, future oriented. It does not especially seok to return to some golden age of political research for to conserve or even to destroy a particular methodological approach. It does not require ‘an adherent to deny the possibility of discover- ing testable generalizations about human be- havior. It secks rather to propel political soi- fence in new directions. In much the same way, Ddehavioralism in the 50's, by adopting a new technology, sought to add to rather than to deny our heritage. This new development then a genuine revolution, not a reaction, a becoming, not a preservation, a reform, not a counter-reformation. Post-behavioralism is both a movement, that is, an aggregate of people, and an intellectual tendency. As a movement it has many of the diffuse, unstable, even prickly qualities that the behavioral revolution itself onee had in its own youth. It would be a serious mistake, in- deed, a grave injustice, to confuse this broad, inchoate movement with any organized group either inside or outside the profession, Nor ought we to attribute any special political color to post-behavioralists in the aggregate. They range widely, from conservatisia to the active left. Nor has this movement any particular 10511052 methodological commitments. It embraces rigorous scientists a3 woll as dedicated classi- cists, Neither does it appeal to any one age group alone, Ite adherents include all the gener~ ations, from young graduate students to older ‘members of the profession. This whole improb- able diversity—political, methodological, and generational—is bound together by one senti- ment alone, a deep discontent with the ditec~ tion of contemporary political research. ‘Even though today the organized cleavages within our profession are writing most of the dramatic scenarios, in the end these cleavages may prove to be the Jeast interesting part of what is happening. What will undoubtedly hhave far deeper meaning for us is the broader intellectual tendency that provides the envi- ronment within which current divisions have taken shape. Tt is on the purely intellectual components of post-behavioralism, therefore, that I shall focus. ‘New as post-behaviorslism is, the tenets of its faith have already emerged élearly enough to be identifiable. They form what could be called a Credo of Relevance! I would describe the tenets of this post-behavioral eredo as follows: 1, Substance must precede technique. Tf one ‘must be sacrificed for the other—and this need not always be so—it is more important to be relevant and meaningful for contemporary ur~ gent social problems than to be sophisticated in the tools of investigation. For the aphorism of science that it is better to be wrong than vague, post-behavioralism would substitute ‘anew dictum, that itis better to be vague than non-relovantly precise. 2. Behavioral seience conceals an ideology ‘of empirical conservatism. To confine oneself exclusively to the description and analysis of facts is to hampor the understanding of these same facts in their broadest context. As a result empirical political science must lend its sup- port to the maintenance of the very factual ‘conditions it explores. It unwittingly purveys ‘an ideology of social conservatism tempered by ‘modest incremental change. '3, Behavioral research must lose touch with reality, The heart of behavioral inquiry is sb- traction and analysis and this serves to conceal the brute realities of polities. The task of post Dehavioralism isto break the barriers of silence that behavioral language necessarily has ere- ated and to help politial seience reach out to the real needs of mankind in a time of erisis. * Compare with the Credo of Behavioralism as Aeseribed in D. Easton, A Framework for Poitieal “Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p.7. ‘THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW vor. 63 4, Research about and constructive develop- ment of values aro inextinguishable parts of the study of polities. Seience cannot be and never has been evalustively neutral despite protestations to the contrary. Hence to under stand the limits of our knowledge we need to be aware of the value premises on which it stands and the alternatives for which this knowledge ‘could be used, '5, Members of a learned discipline bear the responsibilities of all intellectuals. ‘The intel- Teetuals’ historical rolehas been and must be to protect the humane values of civilization. This is their unique task and obligation. Without this they become mere technicians, mechanics for tinkering with society. They thereby aban= don the special privileges they have come to claim for themselves in acadomia, such as free dom of inguiry and a quasi-extraterritorial protection from the onslaughts of society. 8, To know is to bear the responsibility for ‘acting and to act is to engage in reshaping society. The intellectual as scientist bears the special obligation to put his knowledge to work. Contemplative science was a product of the nineteenth century when s broader moral ‘agreement was shared. Action science of neces- sity reflects the contemporary conflict in so- ciety over ideals and this must permeate and color the whole research enterprise itself. 7. If the intellectual has the obligation to implement his knowledge, those organizations composed of intellectuals—the professional associations—and the universities themselves, cannot stand apart from the struggles of the day. Politicization of the professions is ines- ‘capable as well as desirable. No one post-behavioralist) would share all these views. I have presented only a distillation of the maximal image. Tt represents perhaps ‘a Weberian ideal type of the challenges to be havioralism. As euch the eredo brings out most of the salient features of the post-behavioral revolution as it appears to be taking shape today. 1, SIIPTENG DKAGES OF SCIENCE What has this developing new image of po- litical seienee to offer us? In the United States behavioralism has without doubt represented the dominant approach in the last decade. Will post-behavioralism destroy the undeniable fzains of the behavioral revolution or is post behavioralism only a valuable addition that ‘ean and should be ineorporated into our prac~ tives? One thing is clear. In a rapidly changing ‘world surely political seience alone cannot claim to have completed its development. Only1969 THE NEW REVOLUTION fon the assumption that behavioral political seience has said the last word about whs makes for adequate research and an appropri ate discipline ean we automatically read out ‘of court any proposals for change. ‘The history of the various theoretical sci ences, like physies and chemistry, reveals that every discipline rests on certain fundamental assumptions. Tt is a captive of what has been described as o research paradigm? Over the years political science has been no less prone to evelop models of what constitutes a good discipline or adequate research, and these models have undergone marked’ transforma tions ‘The behavioral model of this century has been but the last in a long chain, It has shifted the balance of concern from preseription, ethical inquiry, and action to description, ex planation, and verifiestion. Behavioralism has justified this shift on the grounds that without the accumulation of reliable knowledge, the ‘means for the achievement of goals would be so uncertain as to convert section into a futile game. The growing success of the scientific enterprise in political science cannot be denied. ‘New conditions of the modern world, how- ever, foree us to reconsider our image of what wwe want to be. Scientific progress is slow, and however more reliable our limited knowledge about polities has become in the last fifty years, social crises of unforeseen proportions are upon us. Fear of the nuclear bomb, mounting inter- nal cleavages in the United’ States in which civil war and authoritarian rule have besome frightening possibilities, an undeclared war in Vietnam that violates’ the moral conscience ‘of the world, these are continuing conditions entirely unpredicted by political seience, be- havioral or otherwise. The search for an answer {8s to how we as politcal scientists have proved 80 disappointingly ineffectual in anticipating the world of the 1960's has contributed signifi- cantly to the birth of the post-behavioral revolution. In this perspective the legitimacy of raising doubts about the adequacy or relevance of po- litieal seience in the contemporary world of crises cannot be questioned. We can join the post-behavioral movement at least in asking Must we be committed eternally to an un- ‘changing image of the discipline, behavioral or otherwise? Is it not incumbent on us to take ‘secount of changing conditions and to be ready and willing to reconsider old images and modify them to the extent deemed necessary? Must ©. S, Kuhn, The Siructure of Seientife Revtue tions (Chicago: University of Chieago Press, 1962), IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1053 political science continue to do what it has been doing over the last few decades, in the hope that some “normal” period will one day return in which time will be on the side of those who seek to develop # more reliable understanding of political processes? ‘The nogative answer that many individuals from all generations of political sefentists are ssiving is clear. One of the probable underlying reasons for this answer we ean readily under- stand. Mankind today is working under the pressure of time. Time is no longer on our side. ‘This in itself is a frightening new event in world affairs. An apocalyptic weapon, an equal ly devastating population explosion, danger- ous pollution of the environment, and, in the United States, severe internal dissension of racial and economic origin, all move in the same direction, They move toward increasing social conflict and deepening fears and anxieties about the future, not of a generation or of a nation, but of the human race itself. Confront- ing this cataclysmic possibility is a knowledge of the enormous wealth and technical resources currently available in a few favored regions of the world, the spectacular rate of inerease in man's material inventiveness and technology, ‘and the rich potential just on the horizon for understanding social and political processes, ‘The agony of the present social erisis is this contrast between our desperate condition and ‘our visible promise, if we but had the time. In the face of a human situation such as thi the post-behavioral movement in political science (and in the other social sciences simul- taneously) is presenting us with a new image of our discipline and the obligations of our pro- fession. It pleads for more relevant research. Tt pleads for an orientation to the world that ‘encourage political scientists, even in their professional capacity, to preseribe and to act 580 as to improve political life according to hu- ‘We ean respond by refusing to budge, much as the classicists-and traditionalists once did in the face of the onslaught of the behavioral ists. Or we ean recognize the need for change and explore the best ways of reconstructing our conception of our discipline and of the related professional institutions of which we are part. It is the second course that I propose we con sider. IL, THE IDEAL COMBHTAENTS OF POLITICAL A dovision to contemplate revising the image of our discipline and profession places the po- Titial scientist in a strange and difficult pre- dicament. Fierce pressures are building up for solutions to immediate problems. Yet the na-1054 ture of basie research is to shift the focus away from current concerns and to delay the appli- cation of knowledge until we are more secure about its reliability. This dilemma of contemporary political seience is perhaps hest revealed in the ideal commitments of behavioralism. For example, according to the behavioral image of science, those very epistemological characteristics of political research to which the post-behavior- Alists so strongly object would seem to be une avoidable, indeed, highly desirable. Post Dehavioralism deplores what it views as tech- nical excesses in research. Yet no one could possibly deny that technical adequacy is vital. Without it the whole evolution of empirical science in all fields of knowledge in the last tivo thousand years would have been in vain. De- spite some post-behavioral objections to sci- fentific abstractness and remoteness from the world of common sense, by its nature science ‘must deal with abstractions. No science could by itself cope with the whole reality as it is interpreted by the politician. Only by analysis, by chopping the world up into manageable units of inquiry, by precision achieved through measurement wherever possible, ean pol Seience meet the continuing need of a complex, post-industrial society for more reliable know! edge. Even to appeal to science to discard ab- stract theory and models as the test of rele- vanee for research and to put in their place the social urgeney of problems, is to ask it to sa ‘which have proved most sue- ing reliable understanding. ‘Furthermore, it appears that the use of the methods of behavioral seience favors the very kind of sociological position for the political scientist to which post-behavioralism so stren- uuously objects. These methods help to protect the professional seientist from the pressures of society for quick answers to urgent if compli- ‘ented problems, The history of the natural sei- fences shows us how slowly basic research moves. The overshadowing new ideas in the natural seiences—Newtonian mechanies, Dar- winian evolution, Einstein's relativity, or modern eyberneties—eome infrequently, on a time seale of conturies. But during the intervals between new ideas, great or small, science seeks to work out their implieations with » passion {or details, even if research seems to lead away from the ‘practical, obvious problems of the day. These seemingly remote, often minute de- tails, about seales, indices, specialized tech- niques for collecting and analyzing data and the like, these details are the building blocks of the edifice in which more reliable under- standing occurs ‘THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW vou. 63 What is true about the slow pace of basic re- search in the natural scionces and about its re- Imoteness we can expect to apply with equal force to the social sciences. Indeed in social re- search we even have difficulty in agreeing on the great discoveries, so undeveloped are our criteria of adequacy. In addition, even if the political scientist begins with an immediate Social problem, as he so often does, in the pro- cess of investigation he will be likely to restate the problem in more researchable terms. This reconceptualization usually leads him back to the very kind of fundamentals that appear relevant to initial practical concerns. ‘The ideology of pure or basfe research and its ‘success in the better developed sciences in pro- viding a reliable base of knowledge have seemed to justify this research strategy, slow and pains= taking as it is. In helping to protect scholar ship from the daily pressures of society for quick and ready answers, this ideology has freed science to pursue truth in the best way it knows how. ‘This same concern for generalized, verifiable understanding has foreed social scientists to discriminate with extreme care about what we ‘ean and eannot do with our premises and tools. We can deseribe, explain, and understand but wwe cannot prescribe ethical goals. ‘The value question is thus set aside, not beeause we eon sider it inconsequential, but only because we see it as unresponsive to the tools useful in analyzing and explaining the empirical world ‘These then are some of the normal ideal com- mitments of science: technical proficiency in knowledge, the pursuit, of basic understanding with its necessary di vvoree from practical concerns, and the exchi- sion of value specification as beyond the com= petenee of science. It is these ideals that be- ‘havioral research in political sence has sought to import into the diseipline. 1V, NEW STRATEGIES FoR SCIENCE ‘Today these traditional ideals of science are confronted with a set of social conditions which have no historical precedent. This extraordi~ nary circumstance has created the predicament in which behavioral research now finds itself Tt derives from the fact that we are confronted with @ new and shortened time seale in the course of human events, one in which the fu- ture may need to be discounted more heavily than ever before. For many, nuclear war or civil strife, with authoritarianism as a credible ‘outcome, are clear and present dangers, to be ‘counted in decades at the most. For many, ‘without immediate and concentrated attention to the urgent issues of the present day, we may1969 have no future worth contemplating, however tuncertain our findings or inadequate our tools. How then ean behavioral research, with its acknowledged glacial pace and apparent re- moleness, hope to meot the demands now being placed upon our discipline? For some among post-behavioralists, the fear of physical and political self-destruction has led to the abandonment of seience altogether. For them science is simply incapable of mea- suring up to contemporary neods. Others, who have always considered science to be inherently defective, now feel justified in their convictions. But for those post-behavioralists who continue to place their hopes in modem behavioral sei- ence, the current crisis poses the issue about the wisdom of continuing our commitment to 4 “normal” strategy of seientifie research. ‘Those kinds of post-behavioralists have been driven to eonelude that we have no alternative but to make our research more relevant. For them we ean do so only by devoting all our professional energies to research, prescription and action with regard to the immediate issues of the day. In short, we are asked to revise our self-image by postponing the demands of slow- moving basie research and by acting in our professional capacity so as to put whatever Knowledge we have to immediate use, For all of us this plea poses some eritical questions, Even in the face of the social erises of our time, do we really need to subordinate the long-run objectives of the scientific enter- prise to the undeniably urgent problems of the ay? Is there any other way in which we ean cope with this transparent need for practical relevance? And if so, ean we hope to retain for political seience those conditions of theoretical ‘autonomy, precision, and relative insulation 80 vital if we are to continue to be able to add to ‘our espital stock of basic understanding? T would argue that we do not need to aban- don the historical objectives of basie science ‘There is a strategy that will enable us to re spond to the abnormal urgeney of the present crises and yet preserve these traditions. By adopting this course, post-behavioralism need not be considered @ threst to behavioral re- search but only an extension of it necessary for coping with the unusual problems of the resent epoch. ‘To appreciate the strategy implied, we must remember one thing. Hvenif itis arguable that the time seale in terms of whieh we must think hhas been greatly shortened, mere projection ‘cannot fully persuade us that the future needs to be counted in decades, not centuries. What ‘THE NEW REVOLUTION IN POLITICAL ScrENCE. 105 little solace we may got from it, we know that our intuitions have been wrong in the past. We may still have centuries rather than only de- ‘eades ahead of us. ‘This realistic possibility suggests that we ought to pursue an optimizing strategy in which there is some apportionment of resources for the long run as against the short run, just in case we are not in fact all dead. The eost of devoting our efforts exclusively to short-run sis far too high. It might easly assure that, we do in fact survive the present crises, the ue to add to our eapital aecu- tragically unprepared for even greater erises in the more distant future. We will then have lost ‘every chance to prevent the self-annihilation of mankind or the collapse of those political insti- tutions we cherish, Is there any sensible way in which we ean provide for some satisfactory use of our re- Sources without distracting excessively from ‘the attention and altered research orientations that the major issues of the country and the world require? It is to this question that those of us who still have some hope that we may survive the certain and greater crises of the near future ought to be devoting some of our energies. Various courses of action are possible sand we need to consider them as they apply to the diseipline as well as to the profession. Basic v8. applied research For the discipline, the post-behavioral revo- lution suggests the appropriateness of revising our ideal image at least as it has been incorpo- rated into behavioralism. It is vital to continue to recognize the part that basic research ought to play. But in the allocation of finsneial and ‘human resources we must also consciously rec~ ‘ognize that a shift in emphasis must occur at ‘once to take into account the critical times in which we live. In terms of any ideal distribution of our efforts, basic research ought to command a dis- proportionate share. Although socially useful results from such research are usually a long time in coming, they are in the end more de- pendable, But under the ineseapable pressure of current crises the emphasis needs to be re- versed. A far larger part of our resources must, be devoted to immediate short-run concerns We need to accept the validity of addressing ‘ourselves direetly to the problems of the day to ‘obtain quick, short-run answers with the tools ‘and generalizations currently available, how- ever inadequate they may be. We can no1056 longer take the ideal scientific stance of behav- foralism that because of the limitations of our understanding, application is premature and rust await future basie researeh.* In truth this proposal represents less of a shift in our practices than a change in our ideological posture. ‘The behavioral revolution hhas never been fully understood or absorbed into the discipline; we are still grappling with its meaning. Any easual inspection of ongoing research would reveal that, regardless of any ideal apportionment, at no time has pure ro search really consumed more than a very small fraction of the diseipline’s resources. We have bbeen only too ready to advise federal, state tnd local agencies on immediate issues and po litieal parties and candidates about their paigns. It is just that with the behavioral revo- lution the ideals of the discipline as incorpo rated in research ideology were beginning to change. This new image legitimated that kind of basic research, the pay-off of which might not be immediately apparent, but the future ppromise of which was thought to be eonsider- able. Today we need to temper our behavioral image of the discipline so that in these eritieal times we no longer see it as commanding us to devote most of our efforts to the discovery of demonstrable basic truths about polities. We will need to obtain more of our satisfactions from seeking immediate answers to immediate problems. This kind of shift in disciplinary focus will call urgently for the systematic examination of the tasks involved in transforming our limited ‘knowledge today into a form far more eonsum- ‘able for purposes of political action. Certain dificulties stand in the way of appiying our knowledge. In the first place, contemporary social problems far outrun the capacity of po- litical science alone or in concert with the other social sciences to solve them. Our basic knowledge is itself limited. What little we have is not necessarily directly applicable to prac- tical issues. In the second place, like medieval medicine, ‘we msy still beat the stage in which we are lot~ ting blood in the hope of curing the patient, Because of our low eapacity for sorting out the ‘complex causal connections between our advice and its social consequences, we have little ‘assurance that we may not be doing more harm than good. Some efforts are currently under way to correct this situation, In the broaden- ing quest for social indieators we are inventing techniques for isolating the outeomes of policy +See D. Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953), pp. 78 #. ‘THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE. REVIEW vow. 63 outputs and for comparing these consequences with the presumed policy goals. Thereby we shall have & measure of the elfects of our inter vention in the social processes. But the success of these efforts lies some distance in the future. In the third place, politieal science alone is tunable to propose solutions to social problems; these normally involve matters that call upon the specialized knowledge and skills of other social scientists. Yet seldom do policy makers sook the collective adviee of comprehensive teams of social scientist, ‘These and many other difficulties have stood. in the way of the application of our knowledge to specific situations. They have contributed to the low academic esteem of applied science, in comparison at least with basie research, Past efforts at application have experienced too little success to attract the best minds of the day.* In temporarily modifying the immediate priorities of the discipline, we will need to de- vise ways for elevating the self-conscious de- velopment. of applied knowledge, inappropr ately called social engineering, to the respecta- bility that behavioralism has succeeded in ‘acquiring for basic research. To assign all of our research resources to the present, however, as some post-behavioralists seom to be suggesting, would be to diseaunt the future far too heavily. We need to keep alive ‘and active the legitimate long-range interests of all science. Sovial problem-solving is not totally inconsistent with this objective. The line between pure and applied research is often very fine. Those of us who choose to adopt the long-run point of view, optimistically expect ing the survival of mankind, will find much from which to profit in the research under- taken by those concerned with applied prob- Jems. Yet this cannot relieve us of the need to continue to devote specific attention to basic problems in the diseipline—to the reeoncep- twalization of our significant variables, to the continuing search for adequate units of politi- ‘For the diference between outcomes and outputs seo D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 351 ‘For the literature on social indieatore see TA. Bauer (ed), Social Indicators (Cambridge: M.LT. Press, 1966); “Social Gouls and Tndiestors for Ameriean Society,” Annale of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vols. 371 (fay, 1967) and 873 September, 1967). Seo H. W. Riecken, “Social Science and Con- temporary Social Problems,” 23 Iteme (1969), 16,1969 ‘THE NEW REVOLUTION cal analysis, to the exploration of alternative ‘theories and models about the operation of various types of systems, and to our basic methodological assumptions and technical re- quirements. Admittedly these persisting con- cerns often lead us far from the practioal issues of the day. Yet without attending to these Basie problems we eannot hope to add to our store of reliable knowledge, and thereby to pre pare ourselves for equally eritieal political crises in the more distant future. Value premises and research interests In addition to suggesting this temporary re- alleation of our resourees as between basic and ‘applied research, we noed to become inereas- ingly aware of the fact that basic research is not without its own substantive deficiencies. This is the message underlying the constant post-behavioral eomplaint that our research is hot relevant. Tt is argued that excessive pre- ceupation with techniques and vith factual description has distracted us from the signifi ant questions about the operation of the ‘American democratic system in particular. We have learned great deal about this eye- tem but all within a value framework that aceopts the ongoing practices as essentially satisactory and at most subject only to the need for incremental improvements. As a dis cipline we have proved incapable of escaping & ‘commitment to our own politieal system. his research myopia, the post-behavioralists ‘gue, has discouraged us from posing the right questions for discovering the basi forces that shops the making and exertion of authontar tive decisions. Here the post-behavioralists are alerting us, once aguin, to what has been repeatedly re- vealed over the years, by Marx, Weber, and Mannheim, among others, namely, that all re- search, whether pure or applied, of necessity rests on certain value assumptions. Yet the ryth that research ean be value-free or neutral dies hard. We have continued to develop our iseipline as though the subjects we select for research, the variables we choose to investi gate, the date we collect, and the interpreta- tions we generate, have all some extraordinary pristine purity, unsullied by the kinds of value premises to which we subscribe, consciously or otherwise. We do not consistently ask the ques- tion, central to the sociology of knowledge: ‘To what extent are our errors, omissions, and Interpretations better explained by reference toour normative presuppositions than to igno- ance, technical inadequacy, lack of insight, absence of appropriate data, and the like? Be- hhavioralists have indeed failed to insist, with IN POLITICAL ScrENCE 1057 the same fervor we have applied to our tech- nological innovations, that our operating values be brought forward for self-conscious examina tion and that their impact on research be assessed, ‘Today the hazards of neglecting our norma- tive presuppositions are all oo apparent. There ean be little doubt that political science as an enterprise has failed to anticipate the erises that are upon us. One index of this is perhaps that in the decade from 1958 to 1968, this Review published only 3 articles on the urban crises; 4 on racial confliots; 1 on poverty; 2 ‘n civil disobedience; and 2'on violence in the United States.” In some considerable measure we have also worn collective blinders that have prevented us from recognizing other major problems fac ing our discipline. For example, how can we account for the failure of the current pluralist interpretations of democracy to identify, un- derstand, and anticipate the kinds of domiestie needs and wants that began to express them= solves as political demands during the 1960's? How can we account for our negleet of the way in which the distribution of power within the system prevents measures from being taken in sufficient degree and time to escape the resort to violence in the expression of demands, 8 condition that threatens to bring about the doopest crisis of political authority that the United States has ever suffored? How can we the difficulty that political science ine has in avoiding a commitment to the basic assumptions of national policy, oth at home and abroad, so that in the end, collectively we have appeared more as apolo- gists of succeeding governmental interpreta tions of American interests than as objective analysts of national policy and its conse quences? Finally, in even so recent a major re- research ares as political socialization, how can wwe account for the natural, effortless way in which inquiry has sought to reveal the eontri- butions of preadult political learning to the stability of systems, virtually ignoring the ‘equally significant function of socialization in bringing about politieal change?* There is no single explanation for the narrow vision of our discipline. We can, however, at least go so far as to offer this hypothesis: What- ever the reasons, the failure to broaden the 1 This undoubtedly reflects only the few articles ‘on this subject submitted for publication rather ‘than any editorial predisposition. * See D. Easton and J. Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origine of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), chapter 2.1058 vision of our basie research may be due in good part to a continuing hesitation to question our ‘normative premises and to examine the extent to which these premises determine the selee- tion of problems and their ultimate interpre- tations. Creative speculation How are we to make those serious efforts necessary to break out of the bonds imposed on basic research itself by ongoing value frame- works? How are we to create those condi ‘that will help us to ask fundamental questions about the operation of political systems, that will lead us to pose those “outrageous hypoth~ eses” about which Robert Lynd once chided us? A new awakening to the part that our value commitments and other social influences play in limiting the range of our basic research may partly correct the errors of our ways. But this moral self-serutiny may not be enough. If we are to transcend our own cultural and methodological biases, such self-awareness can carry us only part of the way, We may need to take stronger measures and find additional help by returning to an older tradition in po- eal research but in a thoroughly modern way years ago, in The Political System, 1 ‘argued for the urgent need to reconsider our approach to value theory at the same time as ‘we began the equally critical task of construc ting empirical theory.!* The latter task is now under way in our discipline. The first one, crea- tive construction of politieal alternatives, has vyet to begin. To enrich their own understanding and to sive broader meaning to their own social real- ity, the great political theorists of the past found it useful to construct new and often radically different conceptions of future pos- sible kinds of political relationships. By formu- lating such broad, speculative alternatives to the here and now’ we too ean begin to under- stand better the deficiencies of our own politi- cal systems and to explore adequate avenues of change that are so desperately needed. This, I would argue, must now be considered part of the task and responsibility of science if it is to retain its relevance for the contemporary world. ‘Those philosophies that seek to revive classical natural law and that roject the possibility of science of man have thereby forfeited their ‘opportunity and put in question their fitness to undertake this creative task of theory. We #R. 8. Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930) WD, Easton, The Political Syatem, chapters 9 and 10, ‘THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW vou. 63 require boldly speculative theorising that is prepared to build upon rather than to reject the findings of contemporary behavioral science itself and that is prepared to contemplate the implications of these findings for politcal life, in tho light of alternative, articulate value frameworks. “The signiieance for political science of this kind of oreative speculation cannot be overesti- rated, For those who seek to understand how political systems operate, such speculation pro- Yides alternative perspectives from whic to determine the salience of the problems they choose for research and analysis. If we take feriously the conclusions of the sociologists of knowledge, then our scientific output is very ‘much shaped by the ethical perspectives we hold. Tn that event, by falling to encourage within the discipline ereative speculation about Political alternatives in the largest sense, we Eannot help but imprison ourselves within the ions ofthe ongoing value framework. As that framework bezins to lose its relevance for the problems of society, its. system-mainte- nance commitments must blind us tothe urgent questions emerging even for the immediste future ‘And this is precisely what has happened to political ssienee. Both our philosophers and ‘ur scientists have failed to reconstruct our value frameworks in any relevant sense and to test them by creatively contemplating new kinds of political systems that might better reat the needs of a post-industrial, eybernetie society. A new set of ethical perspectives woven ‘round this theme might sensitize us toa whole range of new kinds of basic political problems worth investigating. It might also point up the Significance of inquiry into these problems with new oF radically modified types of relevant, empitical theories, Thereby we could perhaps he" freed from that occupational myopia brought about by excessive attention to the facts as they are. We would perhaps be less prone to stumble into the pitfall of “empirical conservatism,” oF commitment to system- ‘maintenance’ perspectives, of ‘which politial Science has with justice been accused by post-behavioralists and others. In these several ways, then, does our disci pline need reordering. Basic research needs to "8 H, Mareuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beaoon Press, 1964). chapter 4 S00 C. A. MeCoy and J. Playford (ods.) Apoltical Politics (New York: Crowell, 1967) ‘and D. Easton, The Politial System, chapters 2 find 111969 ‘THE NEW REVOLUTION be maintained as an investment for the future. But even its priorities need to be rearranged in the light of a better understanding of its own value assumptions. Applied, action-oriented re- search requires more systematic attention than ever before. We need greater awareness of the limits that our value premises have im- posed on our research; and on the solid founda~ tion of knowledge constructed by behavioral research, alternative possible rearrangements of our political relationships need to be seri- ously contemplated. ‘VI. THE PROFESSION AND THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE Not only our discipline, however, but our profession needs restructuring to bring it into harmony with the changing conceptions of so- cial science. Our discipline refers to our intel- leetual enterprise; our profession, to the trained ‘and expert scholars who participate in the dis cipline, Post-behavioralism suggests that be havioral commitments ereate not only a disci pine but a profession that shows @ declining relevance to the political world around it ‘The behavioral image of the profession ‘Two basic reasons account for this decline, it isin effect argued. First, professionslization of the discipline in behavioral terms has nour- ished an image of political science in which knowledge and action have been carefully sep- arated and compartmentalized.!* As scientists possessed of special skills, we see ourselves as purveyors of something called professional ex- pertise, Our task as experts is to offer adviee ‘bout means only, not about the purposes to which our knowledge might be put. As the well- worn adage puts it, we are on tap, not on top. In fact, as post-behavioralism correctly as- serts, the expert has never lived by this rule. In the discipline, as we have slready noted, behavioral inquiry has not been able to attain fany real measure of ethical neutrality hhas had serious consequences for search. In the profession too, the erities point ‘out, ethical neutrality is no’less spurious. In the’ application of his knowledge the political tist explicitly or unwittingly accepts the value premises of those he serves. His posture of neutrality has the added consequence of undermining his will or capacity to challenge the broader purposes to which his knowledge isput. ‘A second reason accounts for the decline of 1 S00 especially T. Rossak (ed.), The Dissenting Academy (New York: Random’ House, 1968), Introduction. IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1059 professional relevance. Here post-behavioralism breaks sharply with the prevailing professional paradigm about the moral relationship between research and action. In the behavioral inter- pretation, the possession of knowledge imposes no special obligation on the politieal scientist to put his knowledge to use in the service of society. He remains free to choose whether or not he ought to step outside his scientific role for this purpose. This Inissez faire attitude towards political engagement has been an s0- cepted moral premise of the profession. It has permitted if not encouraged withdrawal from | strife, Knowledge is divorced from For post-behavioralism, however, tho line between pure research and service ‘begins to fade. Knowledge brings an awareness of alter- natives and their consequences. This opportu nity for rational choice imposes special obliga tions on the knower. The political scientist as a professional is the knower par excellence. I ‘therefore immoral for him not to act on his knowledge. In holding that to know is to bear ‘8 responsibility for acting, post-behavioralism joins a venerable tradition inherited from such diverse sources as Greek classical philosophy, Karl Marx, John Dewey, and modern existen- tialis, Criteria forthe use of knowledge ‘The implications of this post-behavioral shift in the image of the professional's role in society ‘are considerable. If the political scientist is to evaluate the uses to which his knowledge is being put and if he is himself to bring his Knowledge to bear on social issues, what cri teria are to guide his choices? Here post-be- jsm returns to the humanist conception intellectual as the guardian of those civilized, humane values known to most men. tis incumbent on the professional to see to it ‘that all society, not just a privileged part, benefits from his expertise. His obligations are met only if he takes into account the broadest spectrum of interests in society. ‘Many post-behavioralists scrutinize the ac- tivities of scholars in recent years and conclude ‘that the talents of political scientists have been put in the service largely of the elites in society “in government, business, the military and voluntary organisations. The professional is seen as having little communication and con- taet with those who characteristically benefit Teast from the fruits of modern industrial so- ciety—the racial and economic minorities, the ‘unrepresented publies at home, and the colonis ‘masses abroad, These are the groups least able to command the resources of expertise for which political science stands. The social re-1060 sponsibility of the political seionce expert is to rectify the imbalance. Tn this post-behavioral view, the application of expert knowledge in the service of social reform becomes competitive with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Reform becomes inseparable from knowledge. Clearly there is in birth a new image of the professional, one in which science is not necos- sarily denied its place but in which the scientist is no longer free to divorce the life of the mind from the life of social action. Weber's differen- tiation between the yoration of the scientist ‘and that of the politician no longer wholly suffices. ‘This new image leads to the politicization of the profession. If the individual professional is called upon to utilize his knowledge on behalf of society, those collectivities of experts that we eall the professional associations are them- selves equally culpable if in their corporate cegpacity they fail to challenge the purposes to which their expertise may be put or if they to act when their knowledge warns them of danger. Herein lie the moral and intellectual roots of the constant pressure of the profes sional associations to take positions on public issues about which their competence may give ‘them special knowledge. The politicization of the profession ‘This post-behavioral tendency to politicize the professional ascocintions has met with ‘great resistance. Objection arises less from principled argument than from the practical fear that our professional associations will no longer be able to fulfill their normal seientific purposes. Let us grant the plausibility of this practical consideration. Even so, do we need to reject entirely the new moral image being de- veloped by post-behavioralism? One fact is clear. The crisis of our times spares no group, not even the social seiences. ‘The pressures to utilize all of our resources in critically evaluating goals as well asin providing effective means are too great to be denied. For ‘nereasing numbers of us tis no longer practical or morally tolerable to stand on the political sidelines when our expertise alerts us to disaster. In accepting this new (but ancient) obi tion of the intellectual, however, we need to recognize that the professional political scien tist may engage in three distinguishable kinds of activity. These are teaching and research on the one hand and practical politics on the other. Somewhere between these the political scientist acts as a consultant and an adviser. Each of these kinds of activity—as a scholar, politician, and consultent—shapes and influ: ‘THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW vou. 63 fences the other. Is it feasible to construct a single organization that will serve the collective purposes of the profession for facilitating all three of these kinds of activities? It seems highly unlikely. Can we provide some sensible division of labor among different organizations that will permit the fullest expression for all those aétivities into which these critical times are pressing the professional political scientist? ‘This seems possible. ‘We can conceive of some professional organi- zations being devoted largely to that kind of action that helps to add to our store of basic knowledgeand thateasescommunicationamong. ourselves and among sueceeding generations of political scientists. These we already have in ‘our professional associations. They are designed to aid both teaching and research. We can, however, also conceive of other types of pro fessional organizations that would be concerned with structuring the application of our exper- tise to ongoing critical sovial problems. kind of organization we do not yet have in political science, or, for that matter, in the social sciences as a whole. But here if we consider the matter only as political scientists we create insurmountable difficulties for ourselves. Social problems do not ‘come neatly packaged as economie, psycho- logical, political and the like. Our erises arise out of troubles that involve all aspects of ‘human behavior. Our professional associations ‘re oriented toward the disciplines, and these are anulytic fields. Of necessity they piece up reality into specialties that have meaning largely for the pursuit of fundamental under- standing. For purposes of setting gosls and determining means for solving social problems, however, we need to draw the disciplines to- gether again into a single organization, one that ean mobilize the resources of all the Social sciences and bring them to a focus on specific ‘To this end it is time that we accept our special responsibility as students of polities. ‘We must take the initiative by calling for the establishment of a Federation of Social Seien- tists, a proposal that has already been ad- ‘vanced by one of our colleagues. The tasks of such a Federation would be to identify the major issues of the day, clarify objective evaluate action taken by others, study and propose alternative solutions, and press these corously in the politieal sphere. ‘Without eolleetively politicizing ourselves in ™ David Singer of the Montal Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, “Michigan, in personal correspondence.1969 this way, by the very act of standing by while the probiems of the world continue to inerease in numbers and intensity, we thereby uneriti- cally acquiesce in prevailing policies. We infact adopt a politieal position. By scting collee- tively in our professional eapacities through a Federation of Social Seientists, we will have ‘an opportunity to justify our policies intellec- tually and morally. Thereby we may begin to satisfy our growing sense of political responsi- Dility in an age of crisis. At the same time we shall be able to preserve our historie institu tions, the professional associations, for the continuing pursuit of fundamental knowledge. Such a Federation would fail in its responsi- bilities, however, if it became merely an echo ‘of national goals, an instrument of official poliey, or a bland critic of things as they are. If Mannheim is correct in describing the intel- lectual as the least rooted of all social groups, the professional sovial scientist ought to view himself as committed to the broadest of hu- mane values. These need to be the touchstone that he brings to bear on social isuses. Yet ‘many barriers block the way. Of these identifi- cation with the goals and interests of one’s nation is prominent. Political scientists have to escape the crippling effects for seholar- ship of unwitting commitment to national foals and perspectives. Just as science as a sot of disciplines has pretensions to being inter- national in scope, so the social scientist himself reeds to be denationalized. Some day, like the ideal international civil servant, the profes- sional social scientist too may be permitted to sieve maximum freedom from national com- ‘mitments by being obliged to carry an interna THE NEW REVOLUTION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1061 tional passport and to conduct himself accord ingly. For the profession, therefore, the emerging post-behavioral phase is encouraging the de- velopment of a new norm of behavior. It sees policy engagement as a social responsibility of ‘the intellectual whatever the institutional form through which this may be expressed. Some day it may also require the release of the social scientist from bondage to the unique needs and objectives of his own national politi- cal system, Itis clear that changing times require radical re-thinking of what we are and what we want to be both as a discipline and as a profession Post-behavioralism is & pervasive intellectual ‘tendency today that reveals a major effort to do just this. Its very pervasiveness prevents it from becoming the possession of any one group. or of any one political ideology. Tt supports and extends behavioral methods and techniques by seeking to make their substantive implications more cogent for the problems of our times. Post-behavioralism stands, therefore, as the ‘most recent contribution to our collective heritage. For that very reason, as an intelleo- ‘tual tendeney it is not the threat and danger that come seem to fear. Rather, in the broad historical perspectives of our diseipline, the post-behavioral revolution represents an op- portunity for necessary change. We may choose to take advantage of it, reject it, or modify it. But to ignore it is impossible. It is a challenge to re-examine fearlessly the premises of our re- search and the purposes of our calling.