lols 3t | & SEVEN WORKS RELIGIONS OF ASIA SERIES VASUB ‘ANDHU Number 4 The Buddhist Psychological Doctor Eattors Lewis R. Lancaster University of California, Berkeley aod STEFAN ANACKER JL. Shastri M. P. Education Service (Retired) ee | > 101538 SL 29A4+392, waa) \/ MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Delhi Varanasi Patna MadrasFirst Published 1984, Reprint 1986 MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 Branches ‘Chowk, Varanasi 221 001 ‘Ashok Rejpath, Patna 800004 6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras 600008 © MomiLat. BANARSIDAss Al rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced ‘or transmitted in any form or by aay means, without the prior permission of Motilal Banarsidass ISBN: 81-208-0203-9 [BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT HIRIJATNENDRA PRESS, A-45 NARAINA INDUSTRIAL AREA, PHASE I, NEW DLLME IIO028 AND PUBLISHED BY [NARENDRA PRAEASIT JAIN FOR MOTLAL BANARSIDASS, DELHI 110007 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Gensrat. IrRopucriOn TT, VASUBANDHU, mis Lire AND Ties Il, A MetHoo FoR ARGUMENTATION (VADAVIDHN) Introduction ‘Translation of Text Notes to the Translation IV, A Discussion OF Tar Five AGGREGATES (PARCASKANDHAKA-PRAKARANA) Introduction Translation of Text Notes to the Translation V._A Discussion FoR THE DEMONSTRATION OF ACTION (KARMA-SIDDHI-PRAKARANA) Introduction Translation of the Text Notes to the Translation VI. Tar Twenty Verses AND THER COMMENTARY (VoysariK8-KaRikA [Verri]) Introduction ‘Translation of the Text Notes to the Translation VII. Tae Trery Verses (TRIWSIKA-KARIKA) Introduction Translation of the Text ‘Notes to the Translation VII. Commentary ON THE SEPARATION OF THE MIDDLE FROM EXTREMES (MADHYANTA-VIBHAGA-BHASYA) Introduction Translation of the Text Notes to the Translation See8s. st 65 B 83 85 93 121 157 159 161 175 181 183 186 189 191 193 aut 23Cw) IX, THe TEACHING OF THE THREE Own-BEINGS (Trr-SvaBHAVA-NixDeSA) Introduction Translation of the Text Notes to the Translation XX. Guossary AND INDEX oF Key TERMS (ENGLIsH-SaNSKRIT-TIRETAN) XI, Appenpix : SANSKRIT TEXTS 1. Vimsikavrttib, 2. Trimsikavijfiaptikarikab 3. Madhyinta-Vibhiga-Bhasyam 4. TrisvabhavanirdeSah XII. BistiogRarHy XII Invex oF Proper NaMes XIV. Geverat INDEX 287 289 291 296 413, 413 42 424 483 491 ASR BARB . ‘BEFEO BSOAS EA HJAS TA IBK 1H ® ISCRL IsMeo JA JAOS JPTS JRAS MCB RO WZKM WZKSOA ABBREVIATIONS FOR JOURNALS, ETC. Archaeological Survey of India—Reports Bulletin de Académie Royale de Belgique Bulletin de UEicole Francaise d’ Extréme-Orient Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies Etudes Asiatiques Harvard Journal of Asian Studies Indian Antiquary Indogaku Bukkyo Kenko Indian Historical Quarterly Indian Studies in Honor of Charles R. Lanman Istituto per studie del medie e estremo oriente Journal Asiatique Journal of the American Oriental Society Journal of the Pali Text Society Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society ‘Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques Rocenik Orientalistezy Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde des Morgenlandes Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Siid-und OstasiensPREFACE ‘The purpose of this book is to present a Buddhist philosopher, who, though among the most famous, cannot really be said to be well-known. The thought of Vasubandhu has usually been pre- sented in an overly schematic and perhaps misleading way which does not do justice to this many-sided genius. The writings of Vasubandhu are also very relevant to the present time. In these translations, it has been the goal to avoid the practise usually followed with Indian philosophical studies, where trans- lated texts are encumbered with the original Sanskrit expressions in parentheses. This was done to make the texts as free-flowing as they are in the original, as has been done, for instance, in pre- vious translations of Greek philosophers. Where the original Sanskcit texts exist, these have also been given here, and for key terms and their translations the reader is referred to the trilingual glossary. Professional Indologists may in fact prefer reading the glossary first, so that they know from the outset the original Sanskrit of téchnical terms. Logicians, on the other hand, will bbe most attracted to the first treatise presented here, and spiritual seekers certainly most to the sixth. ‘The work on this book has taken place over a period of many years, and on three different continents. As there is always room for critical re-appraisal in such studies, itis true that some few things I would do differently at this moment, if I were beginning these translations now. On the “prides”, for instance, it is pro- bably better to follow the translation of La Vallée Poussin in Kosa V (cf. Discussion of the Five Aggregates, p. 68), though mine has the advantage of avoiding the concepts of “superior” and “inferior” which Vasubandau warns us against. It is also well to remember that the ethical categories “beneficial” (kuéala), “un- beneficial” (akusala), and “indeterminate” (avydkyta) refer not only to their effect of alleviation or infliction of suffering for others, but also to the “karmic” results for the “agent” “himself”. Unless this is kept in mind, the statement that beneficial and unbeneficial ‘cts cannot take place without conscious discrimination and voli- - tion (p. 62) may be misunderstood, as there may be totally unin- ‘entional actions harming to others for which the “agent” bearsCx) no karmic responsibility according to Vasubandu. As regards the list of “motivating dispositions” (samskara), which have always been a source of controversy (even in the third century B.C.), it is certain that some scholars would translate several of these items differently. But my translations are in conformity with ‘Vasubandhu’s own definitions, and on the whole I am quite happy with them. ‘Like the wandering youth Sudhana in the Gandavyiiha-stra, can honestly say that I have learned something from everyone I have ever met. To give complete acknowledgements is thus impossible. However, the following people who have been parti- ularly hefpful to me at various stages of this work ean be men~ ioned: the venerable Gyaltrul Rimpoche, for some direct insights {nto Samantabhadra; Geshe Sopa (bZod-pa), for the meanings of ‘certain technical turns of phrases in the Karma-siddhi-prakaraya; Jinamitra and all the other previous scholars who have worked ‘on these texts; the eminent Prof. Gadjin Nagao, of the University of Kyoto, for this edition and index of the Madhydnta-vibhdga- bidgya; Professor T.V. Venkatachala Shastri, of the University of Mysore, for insight, through Old Kannada literature, into the Jaina point of views P.K. Raja, of Piduwarahalli, Mysore City, for modern Hindu applications of Mahayana Buddhist ethical thought; Prof. Jacques May, of the University of Lausanne, for his readiness to lend out volumes of his Tibetan Canon; the late Prof, Richard Robinson, for founding the Buddhist studies depart- ment at the University of Wisconsin, without which I would never thave learned about these things at all; Prof. Alex Wayman, now of Columbia University, for introducing me to written Tibetans Prof, Douglas D. Daye, now of Bowling Green University (Ohio), for many ideas on Indian logic and for the translations of the names of the members of the Indian inference-schema; the editors and printers at Motilal Banarsidass, for bringing out this book; ‘and my father, the late Robert H. Anacker, who taught me so auch about European cultural history that I had to turn to India STEFAN ANACKER ort GENERAL INTRODUCTION VASUBANDHU is one of the most prominent figures in the development of Mahiyéna Buddhism in India. His name can be found in any history of Buddhism or of India in the Gupta period. However, though many of his numerous works have been translated from the original Sanskrit into Chinese and Tibetan, and much later at least a few into French, hardly any have up to now appeared in English. ‘The seven treatises pre~ sented here, though only @ minuscule portion of what he wrote, ate complete works with a most varied range of topics, and can serve at least as an introduction to his thought. Aside from the enormous influence he has had on almost the entire range of subsequent Buddhist writing, Vasubandhu makes parti- cularly interesting reading because of the great scope of his interests, the flexibility, originality, and openness of his thought, and his motivation to alleviate suffering, particularly that un- neoeay suring tat comes rom conetictd and constructed ‘mental activity. He has used a great variety of therapeuti ti iethods for this purpose, and, asa esl is name has pace in the lineages of teachers of practises as diverse as Pure Land? and Zen.* His works are in intensely diverse literary formats, including religious poetry*, ethical animal fablest, commentaries fon sitras* and treatises, and independent treatises in both prose and verse. His range of interests is also correspondingly vast and his mental consciousness is equally penetrating when ealing with logit, psychology’, the history of the Buddhist Canon?, medicine, the most practical instructions for medita- fon, and the signless meling of all mental borders. He emonstrates a fertility, flexibility, range, and it , range, and profundity of thought that quite overwhelms : by any standards, he is one of the greatest of philosophic and therapeutic writers. cto Vasubandhu, dogmatic reliance onany one method never xists, and there may be even within one work multiple and con Samy unfolding outlooks on « particular range of problems, This is why it is easy to misunderstand the purpose of his ritings if only some works are considered. There has been a2 ‘Seven Works of Vasubandhu ‘great deal of misrepresentation of what Vasubandhu’s Mahi- yyana methods are attempting to do, simply because certain few ‘works were given a pre-eminent position at the expense of others, and even these weren’t always understood. A young man much interested in Nagarjuna and the Prajié-paramita-sitras once termed Vasubandhu a “reifier", since it is not generally said, but obvious when one reads widely in his works that anything he “reifies” he also dissolves. And then there is the standard discussion of Vasubandhu as an “idealist” philosopher, which rests mainly on the interpretations of Hsian-tsang, who seems to have been most impressed by the preliminary portions of works, rather than thei conclusions. Even Vasubandhu’s most conscientious commentators, such as Sthiramati, seem often to become bogged down in what is least essential—some- times even making distinctions never made by the master him- self? Vasubandhu uses such a wide variety of means with such skill that it is easy to see how this might happen. The Tibetan historian Bu-ston makes a suggestive statement when he says, “The teacher Sthiramati was even more learned than his teacher Vasubandhu in Abhidharma; the venerable Dign’iga proved greater than his teacher Vasubandhu in the field of los and the saint Vimuktisena excelled his teacher Vasubandhu in the knowledge of Prajid-pdramitd.”* ‘Though these gentle- ‘men may have surpassed Vasubandhu in the mastery of one particular method, the open-endedness and multiplicity of therapeutic skills displayed by him is not fully continued by any one of them More recently, Vasubandhu has been split into two. Those who assert that there were two great Vasubandhus are put in the quandary of having to state which works are which Vasu- bandhu’s. Neither tradition nor internal evidence support their view. The effect of Vasubandhu’s conversion to Maha- yina among his former colleagues is well-documented." For Vasubandhu is not only a great Mahayana philosopher; he is also a great Abhidharmika, and it is as an Abbiharmika that hhe began his writing career. Abhidharma is the ancient Bud- hist phenomenology of moment-events, and the reduction of psychological processes to such moments. The combina- tion of Abhidharma and Mahayiina is one of the salient features of many of Vasubandhu’s treatises. Vasubandhu perhaps General Introduction 3 found the wholesale denial of causality in Nagarjuna’s stricter works contrary to the spirit of updya, “Skill in means” taken for the alleviation of suffering. But ultimately, that is, from the point of view of prajid, or non-dualistic insight, Vasubandhu ‘cannot really assert anything, either. The constructed “own being”, that range of events constructed by the mental con- sciousness, is recognized as exactly that, and is observed by Vasubandhu to have a constricting suffering-inducing effect if it is fixedly believed. It is true that present-day Tibetan classi fications of Buddhist philosophy regard Nagarjuna and Vasu- bandbu as disagreeing. But these are really the disagreements ‘of sixth-century followers of Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu. They belong to a time when Buddhism had become an academic subject at places such as the University of Nalanda. They may have disagreed because they were academics fighting for posts and recognition. Vasubandhu, on the other hand, seems interested in intro- ducing concepts only for the dissolving of previously-held ones, and these mew concepts remove themselves later. They are Provisional : once they have had their alleviating effect, they can be discarded, just as the Diamond Sitra recommends we do with all Buddhist formulations? Theyare makeshift rafts, and once they have taken us across ‘ turbulent stream, we do not need to carry them on our backs. It is a “revolution at the basis” (déraya-pardvrtti) which Vasubandhu’s works point towards—a state of consciousness where all previous modes of thought are abandoned. The seven treatises presented here are arranged in a “‘pro= sressive” fashion. The first work deals with the recognition of faulty logic in human statements; the second concerns types of momentevents and their delineations; the third, through the scholastic objection-and-reply method, fills up holes in the ‘ltssical Abhidharma psychological theory; the fourth and ith apply the new theory to startling conclusions; the sixth lincates a path to “revolution at the basis”, and the seventh points to the deepest insights of a therapeutic method ‘pated in meditation (yoga-dedra) and compassion. It is likely othe People will find certain works more interesting than caets + the logician will be most attracted to the first, the hical thinker or spiritual seeker most to the sixth, for instance. Qaieage Sea BABE ence (OOTY mek,4 ‘Seven Works of Vasubandiu ‘The motivating hope behind this work of translation is that alleviating clarity may be found by those who suffer, that old cruel and stupid boundaries may vanish, and that the living world may find more harmony and bliss. NOTES 1, The Pure Land schools of China and Japan strive for the attainment of the Western Paradise of the Buddha Amitabha by meditating on his name. ‘There («a treatise dealing with this method ascribed to Vasubandhu. Tt is the Sukhivattyythopadeia, and is extant in a Chinese translation by Bodhi- uci, (Taisho no. 1514). It has recently boon translated into English bby Minoru Kivota (in Mahdydna Buddhist Meditation : Theory and Prac tise, University Press of Hawai, Honolulu, 1978, pp 249-290). 2. There is a lot of “Zen” in Vasubandhu, Of the treatises presented here, the last two are replete with the same kind of insights Zen loves. But Vasubandhu is particularly known in Zen circles for his Commentary on the Diamond Sitra. (For the later Zen master Han Shan’s discussion of this work, see Charles Luk, Chan and Zen Teachings, series one, pp 159+ 200) dome 3. The Triramastotra |? *, 4. At least one survives,‘the Pafcakémopalambhanitaia, Peking/Tokyo ‘isin Tra, lane By on A 5S. In a Buddhist comteRt $satra are tid texts in which the Buddha is himself a speaker, or (on the cse of the Avotamsaa}, where hei re fent as the main inspiration See the Vadevidi, Method for Argumentaion, presented in this volume, 7. This term woud perhaps the bulk of Vasubandh’s output. Among the works presented here, see prtulatiy Discusion of the Five Aare: fate, and Discusion for the Demonstration of Acton. The Yydkhveutti, Peking/Toky0 Tibetan Trinisks, volume 13, p24, 9. Se tho description of obsttcs at Kofe Il, ad 19. 10, ‘See chapter four of The Commentary onthe Separation of the Midie ‘from Extremes, presented inthis wome "._Sce the ith caper ofthe same work, and The Teaching ofthe Tree vn Beis presented here. 12. For istaos, Sthramati attempis to make a distinction between “empty” and without own-being which inconsistent with iter Nagaee jana oe Vasubandhy, (Madhyanasibhigeita, Yamaguchi ed, 119, i117) 1B. Boston, Chos “oyun, p 147, 149 135 14 In Fraswaller's On the Date of the Buddhist Master of he Law Vasibonde, This theory of two. Vasubundhos has bon widely followed, General Introduction 5 {howsh ll evidence points to one thinker In fat, the evolving thought of a hlesopher rarely ssen more striking than in te ese of Vat andi, Some ofthe satents made by Frauvalner teva 9 Dslr risundestanting of histor, a when he Says tht peson Inne at the tine of Frederick the Great could easly be confused by someane withthe sane name living atthe time of Napoleon. Actoally, one peron ould have been living In both thot times For isaac, my putative seston General Quosdanovt, when a young man, was defeated by Federck the Great; when very owas deteatsd by Napoleon 15,” Soe Jin’ collection of an-Vasubandhupasagesin he Abhaharmo- tp, given i is artiste “On the Theory of he vo Vasubandhas™, BSOAS 21,1958, pp 48-53. Soe ako Satghabhada's denunciations of Vasant, in his abhidarma-nyayanasra, chap. 503, tanlated by La Vale Pus. sin in Melages Chios r ues vp? 16, We may count Bhivavveka, Cantril, Sthiramat and Dba mapilh among the most famous of such academié Buddhist They see to ove ating among tems 17 Varah prams, Maer ed p. 3, Valdya od. ps7VASUBANDRU, HIS LIFE AND TIMES So much controversy has surrounded the person and the time ‘of Vasubandhu that it may appear to the casual observer that arriving at any definiteconclusion regarding these matters must be an impossibility. . Actually, however, we are comparatively well informed as regards the great philosopher, and a determina- tion of his date, which will contradict neither what Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, or Arabic sources have to say about his times, is manifestly possible. A brief résumé of the problems is how- ever in order. ‘One of Frauwallner’s main reasons for assuming two Vast bandhus, other than his own distrust of flexibility of thought, is the apparent discrepancies of the Chinese datings of the master. ‘These had already been resolved by Périt, and have subsequently been thoroughly explained by Le Manh That*, as resting on different calculations for the date of the Buddha’s Nirvina accepted at various times by Chinese tradition. By following all that is contained in Chinese tradition regarding the matter, both Péri and Le Manh That arrive at the fourth century A.D. for Vasubandhu’s approximate time, Their con- clusion seems obvious when one considers that Kumérajiva (344-413) knew and translated works by Vasubandhu, which fact has in turn been the subject of vast and thoroughly sterile investigations as to the authenticity of these ascriptions, wheth- er the “K’ai-che Vasu” given by Kumarajiva as the author of the Satasdstrabhdsya can in fact be taken as “Vasubandhu”, and soon, Actually, as Péri has already shown, this work in fone portion has the complete name, and “K’ai-che Vasu’ is also the only name given to the great master Vasubandhu in the colophon of the Mahdyanasaigrahabhdsya, as well as else- Where in Chinese sources. From the Chinese side, we also find that Kumarajiva is said to have written a biography of Vasubandhu (unfortunately lost today) in the year 409, and that Hui-ydan (344-416) quotes a verse of Vasubandhu's Vim- Satikat. i should also be noted that the Bodkisattva-bhiimi of Vasubandhu’s older brother Asahga was already translated into Chinese in the years 414-42158 Seven Works of Vasubandhus thas been said that the Indian tradition regarding Vasubandhu, as found in his biographer Paramartha and several scattered literary notes in Sanskrit, contradicts the possibility of the fourth century as Vasubandhu’s approximate time. Para martha calls Vasubandhu the subject of Kings Vikramaditya and Baliditya, These have been assumed to be the Gupta emperors Skandagupta Vikramaditya (455-467) and Narasimba- gupta Baladitya 1 (467-473), respectively. However, there is evidence from Vamana that the Baliditya who became a pupil of Vasubandhu was in fact a son of Candragupta Il, the ‘most famous bearer of the biruda ‘Vikramaditya” (375-415).* No son of Candragupta II is specifically mentioned in inscrip- tions as having the cognomen “Baladitya”. Le Manh That ‘suggests that the curious title “Baladitya” (“Young Sun”) may have been used by Gupta princes in their minority:* Thus “Baladitya” may have been a title of Candragupta’s son Kumé ‘gupta I before ascending the throne. But it is more likely, in view of the fact that he is known to have functioned as “Young King” (yuvardja) during the life-time of his father, that this “Baliditya’” was Govindagupta, who seems to have been the oldest son of Candragupta II, However, it is argued, Govindagupta is not known to have ascended the throne, which both Vamana ‘and Paramittha claim for Vasubandhu’s pupil, and the death of Candragupta Il, in 415, would bring us to too late a date for Vasubandhui, who is known to have lived eighty years, and to have seen the aecession of Baladitya, but yet influenced Kuma- rajiva with Mahayana treatises as early as 360, and must have ‘been dead by 409, the date of his earliest biography. Le Manh ‘That has taken the rather radical course of doubting the very dates of the Gupta kings, which rest on the testimony of the The passage, in Vimana’s Kavyélankdrasdtravrit, reads = ““Soyam samprati-Candragupta-nayas candra-prakiso yw Jato. DhopatiraSrayah krta-dhiyaim digiy& krerthadramal [Kérayab keta-dhiym ity asya Vasubandhu-sicivyopaksepa-paratvat sitbic prayatvam.” Utnis wary son of Candragupta, young, shining like the moon, a patron cof eminent men of letters, has now become lord deserving congratulations fon the success of his effort. rhe sends tpatcon of eminent men of Fetes’ contains an allusion to the tutorship of Vasubandhu.” (Vanavilasam Press edition, p 86). Vasubandhu, His Life and Times 9 “Arabic writer al-Birdni, But there is another “way out” which js far more satisfying. Tt rests on what little we know about Govindagupta Govindagupta was the son of Candragupta 11, by his frst queen Dhruvadevi, According to several traditional Indian accounts’, Dhruvadevi was originally the wife of Candragupta IP's elder brother Ramagupta, who had ascended the throne at the death of his father, the great conqueror Samudragupta. ‘A Saka ruler, most likely the Satrap of Gujarat and Malwa, Rucrasena TV, took a threatening stance against Ramagupta, and was appeased only by Rimagupta’s offer to give Dhruva- devi to him, Thereupon, Candragupta and several companions disguised themselves as women, entered the Saka satrap's camp as Dhruvadevi and her attendants, and killed him. Acclaimed as a hero, Candragupta shortly after overthrew his brother, and Druvadevi in gratitude for his protecting heroism took him as her husband. If these events occurred at all (and some modern scholars have tended to doubt it, because there is no ‘pigraphical evidence’), they transpired "around 375, initial regnal date for Candragupta II. Now Govindagupta himself is known in contemporary sources only from a series of clay seals found and issued at VaiSali (Besarh).® Some of them he issued jointly with his mother; some of them with ministers under his charge. They all bear texts along this order: “Mahi rijédhirdja-Sri-Candragupta-patni- mahirdja- Sri-Govindagupta- miti-mahadevi-Sri-Dhruvasvamint, — Sriyuvarija-Dhatiraka- Padiya-kumaramatyadhikaranasya", “Mahéraja-Govindagupta ‘yuvardja-bhattaraka-padiya-baladhikaranasya", etc" (“The Breat Queen Sri Dhruva, wife of Sri Candragupta, Emperor, ‘and mother of the great king Govindagupta, (issues this) from the ofc of the princeminister to His Highness, the Young King”, “The great king Govindagupta (issues ths) from the iltary Office of his Highness the Young King",) These in- inscriptions were issued while Candragupta II was still alive, yet Govindagupta had “ascended the throne”, i. as Yave-rdja, "Young King". What we know about Govindagupta thus Aispels all controversy. Neither Paramértha or Vimana say ansthing about the death of Vikramiditya or Candragupta: they only say that his son ascended the throne during the life ime of Vasubandhu, As we know from ample other sources,10 Seven Works of Vasubandlue it was common in the Gupta age for Kings to consecrate their own sons as “Young Kings” long before their own death. This was a full-fledged anointing ceremony, in every way comparable to the total ascension to the throne, and usually involved subse- quent adiministration of given provinces by the newly-conse- crated “young king”, It was both a method of giving the prince training in ruling, as well as a more Kautilyan expedient of assuring the continuance of the dynasty. We find parallel in- stances in the European Middle Ages, such as when the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I appointed his son Henry King in Germany. In classical India, however, these appointments of “Young Kings” seem to have been the general rule. Thus the Pallava king defeated by Samudragupta was Visnugopa- varman, second son of the reigning King Skandavarman If, and “Young King” of Kafici. The practice seems to have been ancient in India, for in the Mahabharata, Duryodhana is called “king” during the life-time of his father Dhrtarastra. ‘The usual age at which the prince acceded as “Young King” was sixteen years. In the case of Govindagupta, this seems to have been c. 391, and the particular province given him was the contral Gangetic valley, including the towns of Ayodhya and vi As ¢, 390 is the beginning date of Candragupta II's campaign against the Saka Satrap Rudrasimpha III of Gujarat and Malwa, it seems probable that Govindagupta was made Governor of the ancestral realm in order to give the people a royal symbol during Candragupta’s extended absences. from home. It is in fact known that Candragupta II during his campaigns fora timehad Ujjainas his capital.* Attheend ofthese campaigns, he apparently re-established his capital at Patali as itis called the capital by Fa-hsien (in India 399-414), Thus there is no necessity for going against any tradition whatever. Taking into account the possibility that Vasubandhu ‘may have lived beyond his pupil Govindagupta’s consecration as “Young King", we may arrive at an arbitrary but plausible date, 316-396, for Vasubandhu. This should be taken as no more than a hypothesis, but it is at least one which will please all lovers of traditional history."? It also places Vasubandhu in one of the most brilliant ages in Indian history, and associates him with one of her most brilliant courts. Among countless other eminent men who may be mentioned’as his contemporaries, some Vasubandli, His Life and Times ss e@@tcnicn ( Gl ommsB) the great poet Kalidasa, the lxieotipher Amarasimha, and the Mimamsa philosopher Sabara were in all probability at the same court that invited Vasubandhu to his most famous debates, and to his most famous tutoring position. Whether his pupil Govindagupta ever fully ascended the throne is doubt- ful, though there are allusions in Subandhu'* to troublesome times after the death of Candragupta II, so perhaps a struggle between Govindagupta and his brother Kumaragupta I, in which the latter emerged victorious, is to be assumed. On the other hand, Govindagupta may have pre-deceased his father. At present we have no way of knowing, The details of Vasubandhu’s life are known from several biographies in Chinese and Tibetan, the earliest of which is the Chinese rendering of the life of Vasubandhu by Paramartha (499-569), who composed it while in China There was, as mentioned, apparently a previous account by Kumarajiva, which hhas not survived. The earliest Tibetan biography available to ime is a good deal later—it is that of Bu-ston (1290-1364). In addition, there are several references to Vasubandhu in the works of HsUan-tsang, Bana-bhatta, Vamana, and other writers. We shall attempt to reconstruct the main outlines of Vasubandhu's life, relying most heavily on Paramartha, and supplying dates for the main events, so that the dating of Vasubandhu presented here can be put to the test. Some of this material is no doubt legendary, but nonetheless interesting as a light on how Vasu- bandhu was viewed by later generations. Vasubandhu was born in Purusapura, present-day Peshawar, in what was then the Kingdom of Gandhara, around the year 316 A.D. According to Paramactha, of the Kausika gorra, and his mother was named Virifci, The couple already had a previous son, later called Asafga, and a third, nicknamed Virifcivatsa, was to follow."® Vasu- bandhu’s father was a court priest, and, according to the later Tibetan historian Taranatha, was very learned in the Vedas.!? Jn all probability, he officiated at the court of the Saka princes f the Silada clan, who at that time ruled from Purusepura.3® According to the Tibetan historians, Asafiga and Vasubandhu Were half-brothers, Asaiga’s father being a Ksatriya, and Vasu- bandhu's a Brihmana.%* According to them, the mother of Asaiiga and Vasubandhu was named Prasannasilé.®”2 Seven Works of Vasubandiu Gandhara was no longer at thattime the heart of agreat empire, as it had been under the last Kushan Emperors a century before; it had become a border land in the midst of small kingdoms, land perhaps the amazing decline in its population, which Hstian- ‘sang was to notice, was already taking place at that time. It ‘was, however, a very fertile area, and those who were willing to stay in a backwater country suffered no lack of prosperity. ‘Though its ancient artistic tradition was dead by this time, this birthplace of the Sarvistivada masters Dharmasri and the Bha- danta Dharmatrata, kept up its old tradition of scholastic Bud- dhist learning. It was known as the seat of the “Western mas- ‘ers"(Piscatiyas) of Abhidharma, ‘The Sarvastivadins, “the asserters that everything exists”, believed in the reality of external objects of consciousness, and further maintained that future ‘and past events have existence. The main Sarvistivada move ‘ment in force in Gandhira was that of the Vaibhisikas, those who took the Maka-Vibhasa (“Great Book of Options”) as their authoritative text. This Vibhdsa is a great scholastic edifice attempting to systematize everything importam n Buddhist theory and practise, and is the result of a great team effort of the noted North Indian Buddhist masters gathered in a con- ference called by the Emperor Kaniska two centuries before tthe time of Vasubandhu, Masters known to have taken part in the debates, and whose views are quoted in the book, are the Bhadanta Vasumitra, the Bhadanta Dharmatrita, Ghosaka, and Buddhadeva, This tremendous work often reads like @ ‘committee report, with widely varying opinions being offered, but very often it is the opinion of the Bhadanta Vasumitra which prevails. For instance, on explanations of how events “in the three times” differ, the Vibhdsd accepts the theory of the Bha- danta Vasumitra, which states that the difference between pre- sent, past, and future events lie in the state of their efficacy. In its full efficacy of engendering a consciousness proper to it, an event is obviously present and momentary. However, it can bbe remembered or anticipated : the only difference lies in the fact that as a past or future event, only a mental consciousness can apprehend it. Many of the views of the Vibhidrd are quite advanced. For instance, it maintains that “time”, a real cate- ‘gory to the Vaiéesikas (and to some people today who still speak of “time” as a “dimension”), is only a name for the flow of con- Vasubandhu, His Life and Times 13 ditioned events.# At the time of Vasubandhu’s youth, a cer- tain dogmatism, certainly not apparent among the masters of the Vibhasd itself, was becoming evident within the Vaibhasika schools. According to Taranatha,* Vasubandhu was born one year after his older brother Asaiga became a Buddhist monk. From the internal evidence of his works, Asaga seems to have studied mainly with scholars of the Mahisisaka school, which denied the Sarvastivida existence of the past and future, and which posited a great number of “uncompounded events”#* In his youth, Vasubandhu may have received from his father much of the Brahmanical lore so obviously at his command, and it may be from him also that he was introduced to the axi- ‘oms of classical Nydya and Vaisesika, both of which influenced his logical thought. ‘The name “Vasubandhu”, which he never changed even upon entering the Buddhist priesthood, may perhaps tell us some- thing about the character of its bearer. It means “the Kinsman of Abundance”, in particular the abundance of the Earth, and his retention of this name, in view of his genuine concern for the well-being of others, as well as his love of metaphors from teem- ing plant-life, rushing streams, and rippling lakes, is probably not entirely coincidental. While learning with the Mahigésakas, Asaiga came into contact with the Prajid-paramita-sitras of Mahayana Buddhism, which was completely overturning the older monastic Buddhist * ideal in favour of a life of active compassion to be crowned by complete enlightenment, Not being able to understand them, and not gaining any insight into them from his teachers, he undertook lonely forest-meditations. But after twelve years of meditation, he felt he had gained nothing. So he decided to give up secking enlightement. Just at that moment, a miser- able dog dragged itself across Asanga’s path. Its wounds were filled with squirming maggots. Asafga, filed with compassion, decided to remove the maggots from the dog with his tongue (@s he was afraid his fingers would hurt them), and to cut off 4 piece of his own flesh for them to live in. At that moment, the dog disappeared, and the Bodhisattva Maitreya stood be- fore him, Maitreya told Asaiiga to show him to the people, bbut none could see him in his total form, (One old woman is4 Seven Works of Vasubandhu said to have seen Asafga carrying a puppy, and to have become ‘very wealthy thereafter.) Maitreya dictated five works to Asafa, which are usually considered to be the Abhisamaydlaikara, the Mahdyanasitrdlai- Kara, the Madkyantovibhdga (of which an English translation is included in this volume), the Dharmadharmatavibhaga, and the Ratnagotravibhiga. He also introduced him to the Daia- bhimika-sitra, which details the path of a Mahiyénist. The interpretations of this Maitreya story are varied. Was ‘this Maitreya a private vision of Asafga’s? Was he a hermit- philosopher whose works Asaiga published? Is he pious fiction? Some modern scholars wish to dismiss the Maitreya ‘tory altogether as a later fabrication.” But it is interesting ‘that Vasubandhu himself distinguishes the author of the Madhya- ntavibhaga, Maitreya(natha), from its “expounder to us and others”, Asafga® Furthermore, the style of the works as- ctibed to Maitreyanatha and those all admit to be by Asanga, is very different. The first are compact often to a cryptic point; the latter are very wordy but also very clear. In this book, Maitre- yanatha and Asafga will be distinguished from one another on ‘the basis of the suggestion of these facts. At any rate, Asaiiga became the first main disseminator of the Youacara method of practising Mahayana, The name “Yogicira”, “practise of Yoga”, indicates the primary importance of meditation for this method. - In the meantime, Vasubandhu had entered the Sarvastivada order, and was studying primarily the scholastic system of the Vaibhisikas. Apparently he remained impressed with this all-encompassing structure for some time. He in turn amazed his teachers with the brilliance and quickness of his mind. His rain teacher seems to have been a certain Buddhamitra. In time, however, grave doubts about the validity and rele- vance of Vaibhasika metaphysics began to arise in Vasubandhu, AAt this time, perhaps through the brilliant teacher Manoratha, he came into contact with the theories of the Sautrantikas, that group of Buddhists who wished to reject everything that was not the express word of the Buddha, and who held the elabo- rate constructions of the Vibhdsd up to ridicule. That there ‘was a strong Sautrantika tradition in Purusapura is likely in view of the fact that it was the birthplace of that maverick e Vasubandh, His Life and Times 15 philosopher of the second century, the Bhadanta Dharmatrita, In fact, the most orthodox Vaibhasika seat of learning was, not in Gindhéra, but in Kashmir, whose masters looked down theit noses at the Gandharans as quasi-heretics. According to Hsitan- {sang’s pupil P'u-k'uang’ Vasubandhu finally decided to go to Kashmir to investigate the Vaibhasika teachings more exactly. Fearing that the Kashmirian scholars might distrust his inten= tions if they knew he was 2 Gandhatan, he entered Kashmir under a false name.** Pu-k'uang’s account does not explain, however, how he could cross the border. The later Tibetan ‘tradition does this by stating that Vasubandhu entered Kashmir under the guise of a “lunatic”.3! This story is told by Para. martha in reference to an earlier Abhidharmika, Vasubhadra,* but it is so suggestive for Vasubsndhu’s activities that it will be interesting to tell it here. For unlike nowadays, at least in the West, where the so-called “insane” are quickly incarcerated, in India they were and often still are free to roam about at will Posing as one would mean that Vasubandhu would have no doors barred to him.- It is very interesting that Vasubandhu, who is so adamant on the point that there is no difference be. {ween a so-called hallucination and what is conventionally termed “reality”, could have convincingly taken on a “schizophrenic” manner of relating to his environment. “He was always in the great assembly hearing the Dharma, but his manner was strange and incongruous, and his speech and laughter were ill. assorted. Now he would discuss in the assembly the princic ples of the Vibha, then he would inquire about the story of the Ramayana. The people thought lightly of him, and though hearing him talk, disregarded hira.”™* Bu-ston says that Vasubandhu in Kashmir entered the school of Safghabhadra. But it is unlikely that this intellectually acute and cantankerous individual assumed the professorship at that time, for, from what both Paramartha and Hsian-tsang, tell us*, Vasubandhu and Saighabhadra seem to have been about the same age. It is, however, more than likely that it Was the school Sarighabhadra was himself attending as a stu. dent, and this isin fact attested by P'u-k'uang* He says that the main master there was the teacher of Safighabhadra, whose ame is given in Chinese transcription as Sai-chien-tilo or Saiz hien-to-lo, This name has been variously interpreted asavec. wesc Seven Works of Vasubande “Skandhila” or “Sugandhara”, though P'u-k'uang’s translation, BOX ti-lo, whatever his Sanskrit name may have been, is known as the author of the brief but incisive Abhidharmavatdra, an orthodox Vaibhasika treatise preserved both in Chinese and Tibetan’® translations. ‘Vasubandhu studied in Kashmir for four years, probably from about 342 to 346, He was however no docile student, but rather in his increasing frustration with the over-intellectual and cate- gory-ridden dogmatics of the Kashmirian masters, frequently voiced his own refutations of many of their points. The mas- ter Sai-chien-tilo, disturbed by the obstreperous student, went into deep meditation, by the powers of which he discovered Vasubandhu’s trie origin. He then told Vasubandhu privately that he should return to Gandhara before his “uncultured stu- dents”, among whom one can well imagine the sharp-tongued Sanghabhadra, found out and attempted to harm him. Vasu ‘bandhu, doubly convinced that the Vaibhasika system did not reflect true Buddhism, decided to go home. But when he reached the border of Kashmir, the guards (who supposedly had supernormal insights and hence are called “yakyas” inthe story) said that a great scholar of the Abhidharma was about to leave the country. The people remembered Vasubandhu as a “lunatic”, but decided to have him questioned by some scholars, anyway. But Vasubandhu’s speech became free- associative, jumping from topic to topic, and the scholars did not understand him. They let him go. Theguards a second time sent him back. He was re-examined, with the same result. Finally, on his fourth attempt, he was allowed to cross the border, the scholars being convinded that he was a “lunatic”, and hence should not be disturbed. Vasubandhu returned to Purusapura. He began to prepare for an enormous project that had been in his mind for some time, He was at this time unattached to any particular order, and lived in a small private house in the middle of Purusapura, (Hstian-tsang three centuries later saw this house, which was marked with a commemorative tablett) According to Para- martha, Vasubandhu supported himself by lecturing on Bud- Ghism before the general public, which presumably remunerated fits neither ofthese reconstructions, Sai-chien- send Rca Be ee Cnn Vasiandh, His Life and Times ‘REGS BRC" (4 Os hhim with gifts. Such was the customary income for Buddhist public lecturers even in the days of the Asfasdhasrika-praj paramita'* At the close of cach day's lecture on the Vaibhi- sika system, Vasubandhu composed a verse which summed up his exposition for the day. Paramértha says, “Each verse was engraved on a copper plate. This he hung on the head of an intoxicated elephant, and, beating a drum made the following proclamation : ‘Is there anyone who can refute the principles set forth in this treatise? Let him who is competent to do so come forth !""# So in time he composed over six hun- dred verses, which gave an extensive outline of the entire Vai- bhasika system. These constitute the Abhidharma-kosa.* Vasu- bbandhu sent it, along with fifty pounds of gold, to his old teach- ers in Kashmir. Though Sei-chien-ti-lo himself cautioned them, all the others at the Kashmir school exulted that Vasubandhu hhad come over to their side, and had composed such a brilliant epitome of Vaibhasika doctrine besides. ‘They were disturbed only because Vasubandhu in his treatise s0 often used. terms such as “kila” (“itis claimed”) and “ity dus” ("so they say”). * As a matter of fact, during this entire time, Vasubandhu was Working on his real project, his autocommentary on the Kasa, which contains a thoroughgoing critique of Vaibhasika dogma tics from a Sautrintika viewpoint. He found a chance to pub- lish this Kosa-bhdsya when several of the Kashmirian scholars, puzzled by the abstruseness of many of the verses in the Kosa, sent his fifty pounds of gold back with an additional fifty, and asked him to write a commentary. Vasubandhu sent them his Kosa-bhdzya, by this time completed. For the subsequent furious indignation of the orthodox Vaibhisikas, we need not rely on traditional accounts only—it is amply attested by the relentless. invective employed by contemporary Vaibhisika writers such as Safighabhadra and the Dipakira. Vasubandhu Was to the latter “that apostate”, “that subscriber to theories that please only fools, and the sharp-tongued Sarighabhadra "The Pudgale-prarsedha:prakarapa, “A. Discussion for the Refutetion of Peronalty", may be the only extant work by Vasubandhu writen prior ‘othe Koa. This seems likely in view of the fact that its arguments and ‘lutions are less developed. It was originally an independent treatise, ‘at was finaly attached by Vasubandhs to the Kosa as ils last chapter. Ih ‘Lis book, it will be referred to a “Kosa IX".18 Seven Works of Vasubandhu could hardly find words harsh enough to vent his spleen : “that ‘man whose theories have the coherence of the cries of a mad deaf-mute in a fever-dream.”** Vasubandhu had thus at a fairly early age achieved a certain notoriety. His book was to become the standard Abhidharma work for the unorthodox in India‘, and, due no doubt in part to his subsequent fame as a Mahayéna master, in China, Japan, ‘Tibet, and Indonesia, as well. In the years directly following the composition of the Kosa, ‘Vasubandhu seems to have spent much time in travelling from place to place. It is certain that he stayed for a time at Sdkala, the modern Sialkot This town was at this time the capital of the Madraka Republic. Around 350, Samudragupta com- pleted his lightning-quick conquest of North India, and the fate of Bharatavarga was sealed. The elected executive council of the Madraka Republic, along with so many other frightened rulers of the frontiers, rendered its personal obeisance to the Emperor. It was, in all probability, subsequent to that event that Vasu- bbandhu, as well as his teachers Buddhamitra and Manoratha, decided to move to Ayodhya. Ayodhya, the ancient city of Rama, had become one of the main metropolises of the new Gupta Empire. Vasubandhu took residence in the old Sai- ghirama of the city*, and Hslan-tsang later saw the hall in ‘Ayodhya where Vasubandhu preached to “kings and many eminent men”. ‘ ‘Vasubandhu had, up to this time, but little regard for the Youa- ‘cdra treatises of his elder brother. He had perhaps seen the voluminous Yogdcdrabhimi compiled by Asaiga, which may have simply repelled him by its bulk. At any rate, he is reported to have said : “Alas, Asaiiga, residing in the forest, has prac- tised meditation for twelve years. Without having attained anything by this meditation, he has founded a system, so difficult land burdensome, that it can be, carried only by an elephant."*> Asaiiga heard about this attitude of his brother, and decided to attempt to open him up to the Mahayana. He sent two of his students with Mahayina texts to Vasubandhu. The evening ‘they arrived, they recited the Aksayamati-nirdesa-satra. Tn this sitra, a figure from outer space teaches the terrestrial denizens about the absence of own-being, the absence of existing and ceas- ar Vasubandiu, His Life and Times 9 ing, and the absence of any detriment or excellence, in all events ‘and “personalities”. This sitra seems to have greatly appeal- ed to the critical mind of Vasubandhu. He told Asaiga’s students that he thought the logical principles of Mahiydna ‘were well-founded, but that it seemed to have no practice. The next morning, Asafiga’s students recited the Davabliimika-sitra, which relates to the path of the Bodhisattva, who remains active in the world for the removal of suffering. Hearing this text, ‘Vasubandhu saw that the Mahayana had a well-founded prac- tice, too. He so regretted his former distegard for it that he wanted to cut off his own tongue. Asaiiga’s students quickly intervened, urging him instead to visit his brother. So Vasue bandhu went to visit Asaiga in Purusapura. In the discussions on Mahayana, which the two brothers held, Vasubandhu grasped the meanings immediately, whereas Asafiga always took some time to make his replies. Asanga urged Vasubandhu to use hhis superior mental consciousness to study, spread, and inter- pret the Mahayana. ‘Vasubandhu seems to have been quite overwhelmed by Maha- yana literature. His desire to read the enormous Satasahas- riképrajté-paramité-sitra led him to read it all the way through without stopping, which took him fifteen days and nights, which he spent in a tub of sesame-oil.!? The study of that huge work he regarded as of utmost importance. In that immense medi- tation, entities of a most diverse kind are brought up and made devoid of own-nature and * In view of the fact that they were the texts that converted him to Mahayana, Vasubandhu's commentaries on the Aksaya- matinirdesa-stira’* and the Dasa-bhimika may be his earliest Mahayana works. These were followed by a series of commen- taries on other Mahayana siitras and treatises. According to the Tibetans, his favorite sitra was either the Satasdnasrika- Prajid-paramita, ot the Astasdhasrika.® That these texts should have pleased a man who so loved argument, and who in addi- tion had such a great sense of humour, is hardly surprising, as {ey reveal the most profound insights through mind-boggling ialogues that are never far from laught Since the output of Vasubandhu’s Mahayana works is prodi« Flows, he was probably writing new treatises every year. So Could have been a very famous Mahiyéna master by the20 Seven Works of Vasubandiu year 360, the approximate date in which Kumirajiva took in- struction from Bandhudatta in Kucha. By this time, Vasubandhu could easily. have written those works which Bandhudatta trans- mitted to his brilliant pupil. Actually only one is specifically Known to have been studied by Kumarajiva in his youth : this was a commentary on the Saddharmapundartka-sttra, whick by its very nature is likely to have been an early Mahiydina work of Vasubandhu.s The year 376 brings Candragupta II, Vikramaditya, to the throne of the Gupta Empire. As famous for his liberal patronage of learning and the arts, as for his successful mainte- nance of the Empire, his reign marks one of the high points in the classical Indian period. And Ayodhyé, where Vasubandhu again took up his abode, became for a while the Emperor's capital-in-residence. It may have been shortly after this date that @ great debate occurred, which was to stick in the minds of the Buddhist biographers. Philosophical debating was in classical India often a spec~ tator-sport, much as contests of poctry-improvisation were in Germany in its High Middle Ages, and as they still are in the Telugu country today. The King himself was often the judge at these debates, and loss to an opponent could have serious consequences. To take an atrociously extreme example, when the Tamil Saivite Nanasambandar Nayandr defeated the Jain cdryas in Madurai before the Pandya King Maravarman Ava- ‘niSafamani (620-645) this debate is said to have resulted in the impalement of 8000 Jains, an event still celebrated in the Mina- ksi Temple of Madurai today. Usually, the results were not so drastic : they could mean formal recognition by the defeated side of the superiority of the winning party, forced conversions, or, as in the case of the Council of Lhasa, which was conducted. by Indians, banishment of the losers. One of the most stirring descriptions of such a debate is found in the account of Para- martha, where he describes how the Sakhya philosopher Vindhyavisin challenged the Buddhist masters of Ayo- dhya, in the presence of Emperor Candragupta Il himself. At that time both Vasubandhu and Manoratha were absent from Ayodhya, “travelling to other countries”(Vasubandhu seems really to have enjoyed a peripatetic existence), and only the old Buddhamitra was left to defend the Dharma. Buddhamitra Vesuband, His Life and Times 2 ‘was defeated, and had to undergo the humiliating and painful punishment of being beaten on the back by the Sankhya mas- fer in front of the entire assembly. When Vasubandhu later returned, he was enraged when he heard of the incident. He subsequently succeeded in trouncing the Safkhyas, both in debate and in a treatise, Paramarthasaprati. Candragupta IL rewarded him with 300,000 pieces of gold for his victory over the Saikbyas? These Vasubandhu employed for building three monasteries, one for the Mahdyinists, another for his cold colleagues the Sarvastivadins, and a third for the nuns. Refutations of Vaisesika and Sifikhya theories had been pre- sented by Vasubandhu already in the Kosa, but it was perhaps from this point onward that Vasubandhu was regarded asa philosopher whose views could not be lightly challenged. ‘The meditative career of Vasubandhu is of course less easy to trace than his writing activity. In the Zen lineages®, Vasu- bandhu is called the pupil of a certain Jayata, Whoever this Jayata was, he seems to have introduced Vasubandhu to the method of “meditating without props”. Many of Vasubandhu's works, including The Commentary on the Separation of the Midile from Extremes presented here, show his great interest in the techniques of meditation. Hslan-tsang says: ““Vasu- bandhu Bodhisattva was attempting to explain that which is beyond the power of words to convey, and which came to him by the mysterious way of profound meditation.”* Around the year 383, at his eighth birthday‘, the crown prince Govindagupta Baladitya was placed by the Emperor under the tutelage of Vasubandhu. The Empress Dibruvad also went to Vasubandhu to receive instruction.** This indi cates that Candragupta TI must have been secure in his image 8 a just ruler, for the Yogicarin is potentially a political ist, if compassion demands it. In Asaiga’s Bodhisattva-bhirmi it is stated that though non-harming is usually to be strictly observed, a Bodhisattva may be compelled to kill a king if this is the only way one can stop him from committing atrocities.” It is tempting to speculate on the effect of Vasubandhu’s tutor- Ship on his royal students. He may have done much to alle- viate the conditions of the thousands subject to the Guptas. He is known to have founded many hospitals, rest-houses, and Schools. That his compassion was not theoretical but practical2, we CEN Seven Works of Vasubandi can also be seen by the accounts which tell us of his helping quench the great fire that broke out in Rajagrha, and his. doing the utmost to help stop an epidemic in Jandntapura.** In some Tibetan accounts, Vasubandhu is associated with the University of Nalandi.!*This may ormay not bean anachronism, He is known to have passed his technique of no-prop medita: tion on to his old associate Manoratha. His most famous pupil, according to tradition, was Digndga.” In his old age, Vasubandhu seems to have taken up the wan- dering life again. Some of his last works are known to have been written in Sakala and in Kausimbi."” Kausimbi, for instance, is the place where he wrote his Twenty and Thirty Verses, and Hsan-tsang saw the old brick tower there, neat the ancient Saighirima of Ghosira, where these famous expo- sitions of Yogicira thought were written. ‘Around the year 391, the consecration of Govindagupta as “Young King” took place. He and his mother begged Vasu- bandh to settle down in Ayodhya and accept life-long royal support. Vasubandhu accepted the offer. The master was creative even at his advanced age, and more than a match for Vasurita, the Young King’s grammarian brother-in-law, in his favorite sport of debate. With the sums of money he re- ceived as remuneration for his debating victories, he built several rest-houses, monasteries, and hospitals in Ayodhya, Gindhara, and Kashmir, But primarily, as Hstan-tsang tells us, Vasu- ‘bandhu was going farther and farther with his contemplative exercises.” Debate was to him mainly updya : if it could lead to no one's interest in Mahayana, he would not engage in it. ‘Thus, when Saiighabhadra, who had written his two great trea~ tises, one of which is a furious denunciation of the Kosa Bhasya, challenged Vasubandhu to defend the Kosa's statements, and was invited to come to court and debate by the jealous Vasurita, Vasubandhu told his pupils that he could see no good reason for such a debate, but diplomatically sent the official answer that Sanghabhadra would indeed be hard to defeat. He prob- ably knew from his student days that Saighabhadra would not be convinced by anything, and, besides, the Kosa itself was probably no longer very important to him at the time. Thus, the debate never took place, but we can almost see the forms it might have taken, by comparing the Kosa, the Abhidharma- | woece Vasubandhu, His Life and Times 5 sane Bate = 8 Chewy nydydnustra of Saighabhadra,"*sAEMte Discussion for the ‘Demonstration of Action included here. Saighabhadra in fact died shortly after. At first, Vasubandhu had only this to say ‘about his refusal to take on the Kashmirian : “Though the lion retires far off before the pig, nonetheless the wise will know Which of the two is best in strength.’” A little later, be seems to have made a more generous appraisal of his greatest rival in the field of Vaibhisika scholastics. “Sahghabhadra was a clever and ingenious scholar,” he is reported to have suid; “His intellective powers were not deep, but his dialectics were always to the point." No utterance attributed to Vasubandhu could more clearly demonstrate the difference he felt between mere intellectual acumen and true profundity. Vasubandhu did not long survive Saighabhadra, In the cightieth year of his life, c. 396, he died. Tradition is unani- mous in saying that he died at eighty, but there are various ver- sions as to the place of his death. Paramartha says that he died in Ayodhya", but Bu-ston may be correct when he says that he died in thenorthern frontier countries, which he calls “Nepal”.™* For Hsilan-tsang corroborates the information that Vasubandhu was in the northern frontier at the time of Saiighabhadra’s chal- lenge to debate, which according to all traditions was one of ‘the last events in Vasubandhu’s life. He says that Vasubandhu was at that time in Sakala, where the Teaching of the Three Own- Beings, possibly Vasubandhu’s last work, was written.” Buc ston gives an interesting detail about this last journey of the master. He says that while Vasubandhu was in the north, he went to visit a monk named Handy. Handu was inebriated, and carrying an immense pot of wine on his shoulder, Vasu- bandhu upon seeing this cried, “Alas! The Doctrine will go to ruin”, recited the Usuisa-vijaya-dhdrant in reverse ordet, ad died.* According to Tarandtha, however, Vasubandhu was Prompted to recite the diidrant in reverse order when he saw & monk ploughing in his monastic robes.” Such is the account of his life, filled with prodigious activity, which can be recon- structed from the copious data of his biographers. The “personality” of Vasubandhu which emerges from his Works and his biographies shows him as a man filled with great Compassion for the mental affictions of others, and with a concern for their physical well-being, as well. The monetary4 Seven Works of Vasubandiu rewards which he received for his teaching and his debating Victories he did not keep (in contrast to Manoratha, who according to Hsiian-tsang amassed quite a fortune™), but utilized to build monasteries, hospitals, rest-houses, and schools. ‘His familiarity with the classical Indian medical art of Caraka indicates a similar concern. One of his most passionate passages describes the delivery of a baby. It is filled with compassion. verging on horror, for the suffering mother and the new-born child.‘ That passion, when tempered by compassion and insight, was for him no danger can be scen in the Commentary ‘on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes. His ironic and subtle sense of humor will be much in evidence in the works presented here. Both Indians and Chinese recognized him as a Bodhisattva, and perhaps this tells us as much about him as we need to know. + NOTES 1. Peri,“ propos deta date de Vasubandhu", BEFEO XI, pp 385 2. Le Manh That, "Dua vio vie khio e's tniét Vasubandhi", type- stp . Hsiian-tsang, Records 1 p 168, n. Le Mash That Op. Cit Tatvodetion to Wogihar’s edition of Bodhisattva bhimi, p 13. le Manh That, Op. Ci. ‘The drama Devicondraraptam by VidRhadetia; the Suman plates of Rasjakoja Emperor Amoghavarsa 1. (671 AD.) 4. haratiye Vidya Bhavan’s History and Cale ofthe Indian People, volume TH, The Clasical Age, pp 17-8. 9 He is also mentioned in 2 Tater insription at Mandasor of 467/68 [AD.sas'a son of Candrapupta Tl, See Majumdar and Alka, The Vake- ‘ake Gupta Age, p 180. 10. ASR 1903-4, p 107. 11, Collected by Saletore, Life m the Gupta Age, pp ITI-I7. 12. hid, p 13, Two additonal problems which have sometines been raised to give eredence tothe existence of two. Vapubandhs rest_on textual misinterpre- tation, Te hasbeen said that Yatomir, the famous commentator of Vas Tundh's Koto, himself belives in (wo Vasubendhus, as there ar refer fences 10 a "Veddhicirya Vasibandh” whose views ar combated by the futhor of the Kola, An investigation ofthe teat does not bear this out + Neddbtearya. Vasubendh, of "Sthavira Vasubandhu", named only three tines In YaSomis, at Voaklyd ad T 13-14 e; ad Mt 27: and ad TV, saves Vasubandhus, His Life and Times s 2b. The fist of these passages says that it isthe Vrddhtedrya Vasu- ‘bendhu’s opinion regarding unmanifest action, that it be called “material” because it depends on the material elements of the body. (ef. A Discuss son for the Demonstration of Action, note 3). This is, as a matter of fact, the opinion adopted by the Kosa itself. The second has been mistransated by La Vallée Poussin (Kofa II, p 70, n) who makes it say that Sthavira ‘Vasubandhy, the master of Manoratha, upheld the theory that ignorance ‘comes from improper mental attention. This is agnin a view strongly up: held by the Kova against the orthodox Vaibbasikas. But what Yasomitra actually says is “Apara it! Sthavira-Vasubandhor dedryo Manorathipadhyiya ‘eraméha". “The phrase an additional (theorist says that ignorance comes from improper mental attention)’ refers to Manoratha, the teacher of the Sthavira Vasubandh, who spoke of this matter in this way.” Thus the theory of two Vasubandhs, one the teacher, the other @ pupil of Manoras tha, seems ruled out. Manoratha is always called the teacher of Vasubendh, “The third passage states that the Sthavira Vasubandhu and others believe that a lame is destroyed by an absence of a cause of stability. This is gain clearly the position of the great Vasubandhu,asis amply demonstrated in Kola TV and the Discussion for the Demonsiraion of Action. ‘The ‘objection “An absence cannot be a cause" belongs 0 the Vaiseika. In ‘ach of these cases, the opinion attributed to “Veddhdctrya Vasubandhu® ‘or “Sthavira Vasubandhu’ is in fact the one adopted by the author of the ‘Kofa, and one of them does not refer primarily o the opinion of Vasubandha tall, but to that of Manocatha. It may seem strange that Yaéomitra only ‘on these occasions names Vasubandhu, whom be usually calls simply “the Master". “But in each of these passages, there are several alternative opine {ons listed, so some ambiguity might have resulted fromsaying simply "the Master". “"Veddha” in “Vrddhicarya” does not necessarily mean “old”; it may simply mean “eminent” (Apte, p 1491), Similarly, much has been ‘made of the fact that Yagomitra calls Asatiga a parvicdrva, “ancient mas- tee". ‘Since YaSomitra lived several centuries after Asniga, this should ot be surprising. But, besides, the expression may mean simply “pre- vious master’, i¢. a master prior to Vasubandhu, La Vallée Poussin has lo used a passage from the Chinese translation of the Samyuktabhidhar- ‘masira of Dharmatrata, which speaks of a Vasu who wrote an Abhidhatma commentary in 6000 slokas, to support the idea of an older Vasubandhu, €'Vasubandhu YAncien”, BARB 16, 1930, pp 15-39.) But this passage as inserted as a kind of footnote by the translator Sadghavarman in the Year 434, and it may in fact refer to our Vasubandh, whose Koda has 600 Tones, casiy exaggerated to 6000. esides, this “Vasu” could be “Vasu ‘ite or “Vasubhadra”, names of known Abbidharmikas proveding Vasu- wer ibhadra”, f known Abhidharmikas preceding Vs The second problem rests on the manner in which Paramirtha organizes ra git im his life of Vasubandhu. It has been assumed that events are A4 8 chronotogial order. This has given rise to problems, because Bantbondha's conversion by Asaige is mentioned only late in the text fa matter of fact, Paramartha does not necessarily mention prior events "+ Attention must be paid to the temporal particles in Paramartha— hi6 Seven Works of Vasubandhe when he says “frst” (as on page 287), this usually refers to a happening Which occurred prior to the event being discussed directly before. Param rtha’s digressons on the founding of Purusapura and the compilation of the Vibkied also clearly show that he is not writing in the historical order of the occurrences, 14, Vasavadana, v. 7. 15, translated by Takakusu in Tioung Pao 1908, pp 269-296, 16. According to Paramartha, all three brothers originally had the name ~Vasubandhi 17 Tarandtha, Mistry of Buddhism in India (te. Anton Scheuer), p 118. 18. The Classieal Age, p 33 19. Bu-ston, hos byune Il, p 137; TAranatha, p 118, 20, Bu-ston, M1, p 137; Taranatha, p 107 21. Vibhiza (selections) translated by La Vallée Poussin, Mélanges Chi- ois et Boudahiques 1, pp 34 1, pp 229 fT. 22. Ibid, & 23. Tarandtha, p 107. 24. ef. Introduction to A Discussion of the Five Ageregates, p 81 25. Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vohicule, » 183, thesis no. I 26. Tid, thesis no. 19, p 18. 27. Paul Demi, “Le Yogicdrabhami de Sangharakya”, BEFEO XLIV, p 381, m4 28.” Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes 1, itm vocatory verse. 29. Purk'uang, Keéa Commentary, quoted by Sakurabe in “Abjidhar~ ‘mavatira by an unidentified author", Nava Nalanda Mohavihara Research Institute, volume TL, 1960, p 363, 30. Thi, 31, See Tarthang Tulku, Crystal Mirror V., p 72. 32, Paramartha, p 279 33, Ibid. “He is of course relating this in relation to Vasubhadra, 34. Buston Th, p 142. 35. Paramétha, p 289; Hslantsang Records 1, pp 194195, 436. Sakurabe, Op. Cit, p 363. 37. Taisho 0. 1554 38. Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tripitaka volume 119, pp 43 ff 39. Pluk'uang, Sakurabe, 363 40. Paramictha, pp 279-80, tells this story again in reference to Vasu bhadra 41, Hsianasang, Records I, p. 105 42. frst cenlury B.C, See the story of Sadiprarudita and Dharmod- pata in the Arfasahosrikd-praja-paramitd, chapter XXX (Rajendralal Mitra fed. p 438, Vaidya ed. p 241). 43. Paramartha, p 287 46 Ibid. 45. See Jain’ collection of ant-Vasubandhu Passages inthe Abhidharma~ ipa, sven in his article "On the Theory of the Two Vasubandhus", BSO4S" 46, 1958, pp 48-53. Vasubandhu, His Life and Times ca 46, from Satghabnadra's Abhidharma-nyéydnusira, a translated. by La Vallée Poussin, Mélanges Chinois Bouddhigues 2, pp 25-180, ‘47. cf, Bioa’s’ Harsacarita, VIM, p 317 (Bombay Sanskrit Series ection), where even the parrots of the Buddhist community can recite portions of the Koi “8, Hslan-tsang, Records 1 p 172. 49, Allobabad pratasti of Semudragupta, cf. Classical Age, p 9. 50, Nonetheless, Vasubandhu soems to have had fond memories of Sakata, a5 he returned there towards theend of his life (Hsan-tsang, Re- cords I, p 196). Si, Hslan-tsang, Records I, p 325, 32. Tid, 55. Busston I, p 13. S&_Aljayamat?-nrdeia-stra, Tibetan translation in Peking/Tokye Tibe- tan Triptaka, volume 35, pp 2-74. 55. For the account of Asangn's students bringing the Aksayamati- rindelesitra and the Daia-bhumika, sae Bu-sion TI, 9 143. ‘36, Paramitha, p 292; Bu-ston Il, p 143; HsUan-tsang Records I, p 228. ST. Taranitha, - 122. oh Ateavamattardeterea, TokyojPeking Tibtan Trptaka, volume 59. Dalabhami-yyakhydna, Tokyo(Peking Trintaka, v, 108, pp $4136, 60. Boston, I, p 145, says Seta, but Taranitha, p 122, says Arta 61. This is either the Saddharmapurdarikopadesa, Taisho 1519-1520, ‘or, as Wayman, supposes, Taisho 1524," Anabiis,p 22. 62. HsGan-tsang’s account of the debate (T, pp 97-109) differs somewhat, though it agrees in the important detail that the Emperor Vikramaditya \as present, and that Vasubandbu was not at hand to defend the Dharma. Histan-tsang says that the debate was in part due to a personal vendetta of the Emperor against Manoratha, That master, not Buddhamitra; i& ‘designated by Hsan-sang as the viet of the Sankhya’s attack. He also. ives the site of the debate as Sravasti 63, Zen lineages in D-T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism, 60. 66, Hstan-tsang I, - 192, 68. The traditional age for the beginning of a prince's instruction, 66. Paramartha, p 288. 61. Bodhisattrabhiimi (Nalinaksa, Dutt edition), p 114, 68. Taranatha, p 124. ©, bid p. 122, 70. Some scholars have tended to doubt that Dignga was a direct pu pil of Vasubandhu. Its true that Digndga in his Praminasamuceaya, Is in doubt whether Method for argumentation is a work by Vasubandh, ‘at this may be, as Stcherbatsky has said, a polite way for Digniga to ex- Dress is fundamental disagreement with his teacher. At any rate, Dig- ‘éza wrote a small work on Abhidharma called the Marmapradina, which § Rothing more than notes onthe Kota, IF Kalidisa in Meghadita verse 14's in fact making an allusion to the heaviness of Digndaa's philosophy, ‘his would tend to support the latter's tutelage under Vasubandh,28 nh n a ms, B. % Tm 1% B. 80. 31. Seven Works of Vasubandhu Histan-tsang, Records 1, p 172, p 236, Tbid, 1, p 192, p 195. - Ibid, Tp 196. Ibid, 1p 195. Poramirths, p 293. Busston Tt, p 148. Hsdan-sang, Records 1, p 196, p 172. Buston TL, p 15 ‘Tarandtha, p 125 ? Histantsang, Records 1, p 108 Kota Tit, ad 19, fran lie. A METHOD FOR ARGUMENTATION (VADAVIDHDINTRODUCTION A Method for Argumentation (Vada-vidhi) is the only work ‘on logic by Vasubandhu which has to any extent survived. It is the earliest of the treatises known to have been written by him on the subject. This is all the more interesting because the Vada-vidhi marks the dawn of Indian formal logic. The title, “Method for Argumentation”, indicates that Vasubandhu’s ‘concern with logic was primarily motivated by the wish to mould formally flawless arguments, and is thus a result of his interest in philosophic debate. Topics previously discussed in works such as the Nyaya-siira of Gautama (c.3rd century B.C. ), the Npaya-bhasya of Vatsyayana (3rd-4th century A.D.), Asaiga’s “Rules of Debate”,* and the Buddhistic Tarka-sasra** are also discussed here. But what distinguishes the Vada-vidhi from these works is that its discussions of inference contain ‘complete criteria for determining the logical validity of an argue ment. In all of these earlier texts, inferences were formulated in a five-membered schema, which is indicated by the following exam- (topic) 1, This mountain is fire-possessing (Demonstrandum) 2. because it is. smoke-possessing (Justification) 3. asa kitchen (Parallel Positive Example) and unlike a lake (Parallel Negative Example) 4, and this is so (that the mountain is smoke-possessing) 5. therefore that is so (that the mountain is fite-possessing). ‘The redundancy of members 4 and 5 was seen by Vasubandhu, ‘who drops them from his schema.*** But there is also some: thing missing fom this formulation, says Vasubandhu.**** For, +, *¥ Sce Tucci, “Buddhist Logie Before Digndga”, JRAS 1929, 151.88, corrections 870-1 ***Vécda-vidhi 8, That this is an innovation of Vasubandhu’s is almost tertain, since Asabga’s work and the Tarka-tstra, which can antedate him only by a little, stil retain the fivemembered schema. se Yadav 5.32 Seven Works of Vasubandiue in an argument, any event could be interconnected with any other event, as Vasubandhu’s examples of spurious arguments show.? In other words, it is not clear what the necessary relationship between members 1 and 2 is. The Nydya-sitra assumes a “logical pervasion” (xydpti): in-this case, the logical pervasion of “smoke-possessing-ness” by “fire-possessing-ness.” But this “logical pervasion” is not precisely defined in the Nyaya- ‘sutra, not isa statement regarding it introduced into the schema itself, Vasubandhu says that the only way in which something ‘can be validly demonstrated in an argument is if there is a spe- cific indication of the “logical pervasion”,** and it is. also he who gives the first more exact definition of what this term might mean.*** Earlier definitions had focused on “regular co-existence” (sdhacarya), i."“Whenever Y is absent, X must bbe absent”, but this definition is not strong enough to handle the principle of implication, Vasubandhu, however, defines it as an “invariable concomitance”(avinabhava) between two events, meaning that the known event (e.g. “smoke-possessing- ness”) can occur only if the deduced event (“fire-possessing- ness”) occurs. He also insists that a statement of the invari- able concomitance between the perceived and deduced events is necessary to a valid inference-schema. Using Vasubandhu’s methods for formalizing an inference, the “fire-smoke” argument can be re-phrased as follows : in is fire-possessing (Demonstrandum) 2. Justification : because of its state-of-possessing-smoke and wherever there is a _state-of-possessing-smoke, a state-of-possessing-fire must occur 3. Exemplification : as in a kitchen (Parallel Positive Exam- ple) and unlike in a lake (Parallel Negative Example). From what has been said above, it is clear that Vasubandhu's logic operates from a different premise than Aristotle's. The focus of Indian logic in general is always on individuals, rather ‘Vadenidil 14 8 Vadacvidh 5, sesvada-vidh 4, ‘A Method For Argumentation 3 than their “classes”.* Even where “classes” are referred to, they must always be made up of existing known particulars. ‘Vasubandhu describes the process of inference as a particular event's being directly observed, and another invariably con- ‘comitant event's being remembered.** Vasubandhu’s logic, as i Indian logic after him, is thus rather “intensional” than “exten- sional", with an emphasis on the properties of individuals. ‘This focus explains the insistence on the exemplification, with- ‘out which no inference-schema is held to be valid. It ensures that the property discussed in the thesis is non-empty and re- lates to actual particulars. ‘The positive parallel example guaran- tees that there are yet other particulars which follow the same invariable concomitance pattern as does the event referred to by the “topic”, and the negative parallel example makes sure that these are contrasted with others not following the same invariable concomitance pattern. The paksa, or topic of dis- ‘cussion, must be either an existing particular, or a property of an. existing particular. “Fire-possessing-ness” refers to a property of a particular. Vasubandhu adopts these abstract nouns from the Nydya-sitra, but for him they do not imply: the existence of real universals, as they might to a Naiyayika.* For Vasubandhu especially (even if not for all Indian logicians following him), logic must be based on particulars, and even, to follow his tentative theory***, particulars which are always~ changing moment-events. But there will still be certain moment- events that exist only if others do, thus invariable concomitance is still a possibility. Another original contribution of Vasubandhu's is the reduc tion of spurious argument-types, of which no less than twenty- four are mentioned in the Nydya-sitra****, to three basic flaws in arguments, ‘These spurious arguments are all either “re- versed”, “incorrect”, or “contradictory”. ‘The schemas called by Vasubandhu “reversed are those which rest on confusions of the proper functions of the members of the schema, and always ‘Aristotle's logic, and Western logic after him, is primarily class-rient- ed; sce the method in Prior Analytics 1, IU ff ’ada-idhi 10. sc0 A Discussion for the Demonstration of Action 8, & *Npdyesaira V, 1, 1 and 101538Baw Veen som y, Seven Works of Vasubandin involve the absence of a trile” thvariable concomitance.* The “incorrect” or “unreal” are those where the event indicated in the thesis itself is not observed, or is in confict with what is directly observed. The “contradictory” is where events express- ed in the justification cannot co-exist with those adduced in the thesis.**, “Thus, several innovations in Indian logic previously ascribed to Dignaga are found in this treatise of his teacher Vasubandhu, “These include the definition of “logical pervasion’” as “invariable concomitance”, the insistence on the necessary inclusion ‘of @ statement of invariable concomitance in the inference- schema, the reduction of the earlier five-membered schema to cone of three members, and the reduction of pseudo-justifi tion-types. Vasubandhu’s criteria for a valid inference-schema are concise and precise, and there is nothing essential omitted. Dignaga’s “wheel of justifications’ (hetu-cakra), sometimes held to be the first complete Indian formulation of what con- stitutes the validity and invalidity of an argument®, is in fact nothing of the kind : it is a pedagogic device mapping out in detail what Vasubandhu’s criteria already presuppose. On first sight, the subject matter of A Method for Argumenta- tion might seem remote to those not specifcaly interested in logical forms. But Vasubandhu is possibly even in his logical work interested in the alleviation of suffering. Vasubandhu takes his examples of arguments to be rejected because of the Jack ofa true invariable concomitance primarily from the Mima rmsakas.*** This group of philosophers maintained that libera- tion can be reached only by strict observance of the Vedic ri uals, and they asserted “the cternality of sounds of speech" because of their insistence that the Vedic mantras have eternal power* But the beauty of Vasubandhu's criteria is that they can see through all spurious reasoning, and of suffering-promot- ing spurious reasoning, the human life-streams of the twentieth century have certainly had their fill, To give only some exam- ples of current sufferin-inducing spurious arguments which ‘could be deftly destroyed by Vasubandhu's method, there are the following : Vedat M1, 118. Vad Th In ths, be follows Gautama; see Nydestira Vs ty 1 gieece efi EdeBe nom (8 Og) migte. “Nation So-and-So is prosperous because of its state-of-having-prosperous-rich-people (ameaning : they have more diferent kinds of stu)". A Method For Argumentation “Nation So-and-So is happy because of its state-of-having-many-types-of-industry-made- goods.” Or, we may hear the potentate of a great empire say : “The poor in this country cannot be helped by the Govern ment because to do so would be monetarily inflationary” and . “There must be more weapons of destruction produced at all costs, because if the Government cannot teach the poten- tial for destroying all vertebrate lifesorms on this planet fifteen times over rather than fourteen, we are in danger.” Following the criteria of A Method for Argumentation, th first argument is flawed on several grounds. For one, its topic, “Nation So-and-So”, is not a real entity, as can be shown by the part example inthe inten Bain Doce J the Demonstration of Action, 3 - topic demonstrandum ‘Thesis : « ‘Configuration’ is not a single entity Justification : because of its state-of-consisting-of-totally- divided-parts Statement of Invariable Concomitance : for whatever consists of totally divided parts is not unity possessing Exemplification : justas an “army Parallel Example) a “forest”, etc, (Positive and unlike a moment-event. (Negative Parallel Example) Secondly, even admitting the somewhat tenuous definition of ‘Prosperity”, the justification is clearly “reversed”. Since the Frrcsived events should oosur ONLY if the deduced events do, is “inference”, the demonstrandum-event is not y lum-event is not properly mated to the event referred to in the thesis : the state of having Prosperous rich people is not invariably concomitant with the Prosperity of all iabitants of a “nation”. The second “ Snes" would be rejected by Vasubandhu as “incorret”, ine36 Seven Works of Vasubandlu the thesis itself is a mere unobserved supposition. The third and fourth, if enunciated together, are grossly contradictory. So logic is not icrelevant to the alleviation of suffering. In order to understand A Method for Argumentation propetly, the equivalence of various terms used in regard to members of the inference-schema, and the reasons for there being such various expressions, must be Kept in mind. The pair “demonstrandum/demonstrator” is essentially the same as the pair “demonstrandum/justfication”. The term “‘demonstrator” ‘emphasizes the purpose of the justification. The terms “event” (@harma) and “event-associate”(dharmin) refer to the justifica- tion and demonstrandum, too, or rather to the events which they discuss. The “event” is always the observed or known, “event”, the “event-associate” is that which can be related to the “‘event” through invariable concomitance. In the inference- schema “This mountain is fire-possessing, because it is smoke- possessing”, etc., the “event” is the directly perceived state-of possessing-smoke, and the “event-associate” is the inferred state-of-possessing-fie. Where the terms “event” and “event- associate” are contrasted in this treatise, the “event” always refers to the event expressed in the justification; the “event- associate” always to the inferred object expressed in the demon- strandum. Concerning the Text : A Method for Argumentation has not survived as an integral text in any language, and the subsequent fame of Dignaga's logical treatises has made it relatively unknown, But it has been frequently quoted in Dignaga’s Pramanasamuccayavrtti and Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramdnasamuceayatikd, both of which are extant in Tibetan translations. (Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tri- pitaka, Gtan-tshigs rig-pa section Ce, 9b ff.) All available fragments of A Mettod for Argumentation quoted in those texts have been collected and arranged through the painstaking efforts of Professor Frauwaliner (“Vasubandhu’s Vadavidhih”, Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Siid-und Ost-Asiens 1, 1957, 104 ft). A Method For Argumentation 37 ‘This translation follows that edition, but not the int rret of the text that accompany it there, serpetaions Noes 1, ii Yt buably later than our text, but ery ile of thas survived. Dienage ig Maras for the Study of Narya-Nyaya Logic, pp 90 t) classes made up of pr A “jae, and abhidheyatva" Frauwallner Festschrift). Sak CAstsa, esata, and Repestra. This school does recogni the eutene of teal ces aot Srey ese abstract terms corzesponds to one of them. The translation secre Seat fierce fe Sanaa would be “arising-immediately-upon-an-effort-ness” & One a Srinath toA METHOD FOR ARGUMENTATION 1. The topic (paksa) is the object of sense or understanding? ‘one wishes to investigate. 2, 3. The characteristic ofa thesis is the statement of a demon- strandum, i.e. something which one attempts to demonstrate. It cannot exist without the statement of a demonstrandum, ie. fone or another among the various events which could be demonstrated. That is, an event with inferability is accepted only because there is a statement of an example with inferability, such as fire, a seed, or the non-eternality (of sounds of speech) (in various stock examples of events with inferability : a fire is inferable where there is smoke, a previously-existing seed is inferable where there is a fruit, and the non-ternality of sounds of speech is inferable from their state-of-arising-imme- diately-upon-an-effort). There is no assertion which demon- strates in an argument if another (event) which can be demon- strated, among the many which could be demonstrated, is argued for, because a specified event-associate has not been asserted as having demonstrability through an event which can be demon- strated (ie. the event-associate “fire” is related to the event “smoke” which can be demonstrated, since smoke is always concomitant with fire, but water is| not, as water is not an event-associate of the event “smoke”) 4. A justification is an indication of the invariable concomi- tance of an event with something of such-and-such-a-kind, i. an event's not arising if something of such-and-such-a-kind does not exist. Something of such-and-such-a-kind in a demon- strandum is, for example, non-eternalty, etc, in reference to an object like sounds of speech, There must thus be an indication fof some event which does not exist unless concomitant with another, i. if there isa cessation of one, the other cannot exis. A justification exists only when there is an indication of an invariable concomitance of an event-associate with something of such-and-such-a-kind, for example, the invariable concomitance of a state-of-arising-dueto-an-effort with non-eternality, ot of smoke with fire. If it is a statement of such a kind, “be- cause of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effor”, it is A Method For Argumentation 39 a justification (Le, in the argument “Sounds of speech are non- eternal, because of theit state-of-arising-immediately-upon-ans effort", “because of their state-of-rising-immediately-upon-an. effort” is a justification, because of the invariable concomitancs of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-elfort’ with non-cter, nality). There is no justification where there is no such indic cation of an invariable concomitance, for instance, when one says, “Sound is non-eternal, because of its perceptibility sas “8 of its perceptibility by 5. The exemplification is the specific indication of the connec- tion of the two (event and event-associate) when one is attempt. ing to demonstrate something. The “connection” is the ins variable concomitance of the demonstrandum and the demon. strator, that is, the non-arising of the demonstrator when the demonstrandum does not exist. That through which the con, nection, ie. invariable concomitance, of the two is specifically mentioned, is called “the exemplification”. It must take the form of a specific parallel example, plus the statement of an invariable concomitance. Thus, in the inference regarding sounds of speech, a specific parallel example would be “like & Pot” (“Sounds of speech are non-eternal, because of their siate-of-arising-due-to-an-effort, like a pot”), and the statement of the invariable concomitance would be “Whatever has come about through an effort is not eternal, & 7. Among pseudo-justfications, there are (1) those which Se shot Memonstrated, (2) those which are not sufficiently these int @) those which incur a self-contradiction. Among che tase which are not demonstrated are those where the cram tis stated in the exemplification do not exist. For ed bo tits said, “Sound is non-eternl, Because itis perceive ities og this 8 an argument which is not demonstrated; an arpa It is eternal, because it is without a body”, this is one tnaiett Which is not sufficiently certain. “An example of not tena neurs selEcontradiction for a Vaigesika is “Tt is al. because it is perceived through the senses”; for a Saakhya : “Th "a : “The effect is contained in the cau: {0 be (trough re ea antaied inthe cause, Because it comes There is a , Undemoncer H&M in the exemplification if it exists with an rated object, for instance, if itis st “ one ce, if itis stated that “Sound al because ofits non-tangibilty, like a cognition, not40 ‘Seven Works of Vasubandiu like a pot.” ‘The object which is to be demonstrated, and the demonstrator, is not demonstrated by stating the negative parallel example “like a pot” 9. A direct perception is a consciousness through the- object itself only. When a consciousness arises only on account of the object-of-sense after which itis designated, and not through anything else, then this cognition is direct perception, for ‘example, cognitions of visibles, ete., or cognitions of pleasure, etc, With this definition, false cognitions are ejected, for example the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver. For this cogni- tion is designated by “silver” as a “silver-cognition”, but does not arise on account of silver, but rather is' evoked through mother-of-pearl. A conventional cognition is also rejected by this definition. For such a cognition is designated as “a cogni- tion of pots” etc., but does not arise on account of pots which are really existing, but rather only through juxtapositions of visi- bles, ete., which are interpreted as “pots”, Pots themselves can in no way give rise to this cognition, because of their con- ventionalty, and theic thus not being in a state-of-being-a-cause, Finally, cognition through inference is also rejected by this de- finition, because such a cognition occurs, for instance, through the cognition of smoke and the memory of its invariable con- comitance with fie, but not through the fire itself. That through which exclusively the cognition arises, and does not exist unless it arises, is regarded as an “object”in this passage-* 10. Knowledge which arises when an invariably concomitant ‘object is observed, is inference, “Invariable concomitance” means that one object cannot arise unless the other one exists, as for example, fire and smoke. The non-observation of & possibility of one's arising without the other is inference, and it is through this invariable concomitance that something may be inferred. Accordingly, the cognition of an object which may be inferred is the result of an inference. By this definition, false cognitions are rejected. Knowledge through inference ccan be specified as an observation coming when the means-of- evidence is directly observed, and the invasiable concomitance ‘between it and what can be inferred is remembered. One (the event-in the demonstrandum) does not occur unless something clse (the means-of-evidence) is directly known. Otherwise, there is no inference ‘A Method For Argumentation a 11. Flaws exist in a rejoinder when it is reversed, incorrect, or contradictory. A rejoinder is reversed when in the anterior thesis’, the formulation of the argument is separate from the characteristic of a true justification. An incorrect rejoinder js any that is false, ie. when the object does not exist in the ‘manner in which the thesis states that it does. A contradictory rejoinder in one that caiinot co-exist with its own thesis, 12. Among these, the reversed etc., include spurious replies based om identity of the objects, complete unrelatedness of the objects, various alternatives, non-differentiation, lack of a justification, excess, reduction, direct apprehension (irrelevant to the inference), doubts, non-utterance, difference of effect, ctc., (types of spurious replies as categorized by the Nyaya. sittra)*. 13, Among these, fourt* are reversed, because there is an uncertain similarity adduced in what is to be inferred through 4 justification which is certain. Just as the reversed is uncertain as regards that which should. be certain, so the contradictory is impossible because the objects in the argument cannot co- exist. It is possible to show that a rejoinder based on various alternatives is really one which is incorrect, because something is sated to be uncertain through something thats relly certain and true. 14. (When one argues through unrelatedness where related- ness occurs, this is a case where, to follow the older categori- zation* **, one is arguing from unrelatednessof objects.) Assum- ing that the thesis is as follows : “Sound of speech is not eternal, because of its. state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort, like @ pot”, the maker of such a spurious reply may say the follow- i : “Though in this case, the relatedness alleged by you exists, yet of these two, only a pot is fireable and perceptible by the eye, whereas sound is not. Therefore the pot is non-eternal because of its pereeptibility by the eye, and its fireability, ‘Whereas the same is not the case with sounds of speech. On the {Nemesia V, 1 1 ‘Spurious replies ‘based on complete untelatedness of objects, direct {Pprchension jrrelevent to the inference, non-utterance, and non-dilleren “**Nyavebhdye, ad V, 1, 2a Seven Works of Vasubandhu other hand, of these two only sound is eternal on account of non-perceptibility by the eye, etc., whereas the pot is not.” Such a rejoinder is reversed. For fireability is of insufficient strength to demonstrate non-eternality. One does not observe a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort without non-eter- nality; thus the inference is demonstrated, in the same way as that relating to fire and smoke. Where fireability does not exist, as in the case of wind produced by a fan, otc., there still does not exist an object without observable non-eternality. ‘Therefore, this reply is reversed. Even with audibility, sounds of speech are observed where a state-of-arising-immediately- upon-an-effort is also observed to occur. Thus this inference based on non-audibility is absurd, as it is refuted by the power of observation. It can be observed that a state-of-arising-im- ‘mediately-upon-an-effort invariably exists with non-cternality, $0 through what power is the inference .for sound’s non- eternality refuted? It simply isn’t, Therefore, this reply is reversed, The opponent is arguing with two-fold uncertainty. This follows from our explanation of the occurrence of his justification together with an unrelated topic, though he is arguing from a relatedness of the objects, or, secondly, from our indication that if a demonstrandum is refuted because of unrelatedness of objects, the justification adduced by us is without a refuta- tion. If one argues ftom a relatedness with fireability, which is certain, towards an uncertainty, though it is true that the relatedness alleged occurs, yet there is no connection in the anterior thesis’ rejoinder when it is stated that as without fire- ability, etc., non-etermality is not observed, it does not exist in the case of sounds of speech. The statement proceeds from a felatedness of objects which does not exist. Because it has been indicated that the statement of the opponent for the eter nality of sound because of its non-fireability, etc., is without a Justification, amd thus without a true demonstrandum, this reply is uncertain, as non-fireability is not concurrent with the demonstrandum eternality, since even where fireability does not occur, eternality still does not necessarily exist. Thus this reply is insufficiently cartain. When one is attempting to infer eternality from a total unrelatedness of objects to a relatedness, as when eternality is argued solely through audibility, one may ‘A Method For Argumentation “a that itis certainly not observed that non-audibility oveurs sm ntl. Thos ths opy revere (Discussion of spurious replies based on non-differentiaion, fle. where a differentiation which should be taken note of i ie apiguord in oder to adduge a the” The fost portion probably had as its aim the inclusion of this spurious type within the “reversed” category.)...- : 15. A reply proceeding from excess and reduetion** is reversed. For example, when a justification is brought up with its exempli- fication, and one says, for example, “Sounds of speech are not eternal, because they have arisen due toan effort", and the reply is given, for example, in this manner: “If the justi- fication demonstrates that the demonstrandum is associated with a certain event, then it follows that it is not different from the demonstrandum, like the water of a stream which has en- tered the ocean. An association ‘with an event is not possible ifthe object associated with itis not obtained. But if the demon- strandum is obtained, what purpose can the justification possibly have? On the other hand, if itis not associated with the event of the demonstrandum, then it is not different from those ob- jects which are not justifications, and thus is not a justification itself.” To this anterior thesis, it may be replied as follows : The ‘opponent is speaking of a cause-xs-condition-for-a-cognition. But instead of recognizing this, he speaks of it as if it were a material cause, and attempts to refute the inference in this way: He is thus making a vain assertion, because he is attempting to argue against something other than a cause-as-condition-for-a- cognition. Thus this reply is reversed. 16. A justification through a direct apprehension (irrelevant to the inference)*** in the opponent's demonstrandum, is a spu- rious reply based on direct apprehension. For instance, in the sNyavanstira V, 1, 23; Npdyabhiyva ad V, 1, 23; Nvdyarkola, 9 95. Example “It sounds of speech are noneternal because of their state-of arsing-due-to-an-effort, and this noneteroality of sounds of speech is ved through their similarity with non-ternal pots, ete, then, because of ‘thst inferabilty, all objects would be non-eteral.” (Nydya-koie's example fom the Nilakanthi, 9, 44) “*Nyayabhdyya, ad Vs 1 4 s+ *Npapastira V, 1, 27.4 Seven Works of Vasubandlu case already given, where the non-eternality of sounds of speech is inferred through their state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an- effort, the adversary may reply : “This is no justification for non-eternality, because in the case of a flash of lightning, ete. non-eternality is demonstrated through other means-of-cognition, such as direct perception, etc., (and there is no. state-of arising-immediately-upon-an-effort involved). There is no justi- fication where one object exists even where the other (sup- osedly invariably concomitant one) doesn't.” Others formulate this in a different manner : “There is no justification for non- eternality here, because there is no logical pervasion, just as in the case of the necessity of conscious activity for trees because of their sleeping at night, which occurs only for sirisa-trees.”” To this it may be replied as follows : In reply to the statement that non-eternality is demonstrated through a state-of-arising- immediately-upon-an-effort itself only, the opponent is saying = “There is no justification for non-eternality, and there is nc logical pervasion, either, so we are made happy.” But this reply is reversed. Because it is a vain assertion resting on the ‘assumption that we are claiming that something is non-ternal only because of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort, whereas what we are claiming is that something is non-eternal because of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-anceffort itself only. Thus this reply is reversed. «(discussion of reversal through doubt, where the means- ‘of-evidence is itself doubtful)... 17. When one assumes that since a justification does not exist before its utterance, the demonstrandum also must not exist, this is a case of a reply based on non-utterance.** For example, the maker of such a spurious reply may say to this same argu- ‘ment that sounds of speech are non-eternal because they arise due to an effort : “Since the justification does not exist prior to its apprehension and utterance, it follows that the demon- strandum also does not exist. Thus, since sounds of speech are said to be non-eternal because they have arisen due to an Set. Nyiyositra Vy 1, 14. ** ‘This is similar t0 the spurious argument based on not-having-arisen Ganuipat-sama) in the Nydyesitra and Nydpa-bhdjya, (See Npdpasatra and dhdpya V, 1, 12, and Vadevidhi 23.) ‘A Method For Argumentation 45 cffort, it follows that, because the justification does not exist prior to its utterance, the sound is not yet non-eternal. Thus it must be eternal prior to the utterance of the justifi But once it is eternal, how can it become non-eternal”” To this it may be replied as follows : This reply is reversed. We adduce the justification as something which brings about a cognition, but not as something which brings about a cessa~ tion. This maker of a spurious reply is however attempting to refute us on the grounds that the justification itself is supposed to bring about a cessation. Thus this reply is reversed. 18, When one attempts to show that the demonstrandum is not demonstrated on account of a minimal difference in effect’ this is a reply based on differeace of effect. When for example the thesis has been set up as follows : “Sounds of speech are rnon-eternal, because they are an effect, ike a pot”, the adver- sary may reply as follows : “The pot is non-eternal because of being an effect of a different sort, so how does this apply to sounds of speech?” To this it may be replied as follows : We are claiming that every effect in general is non-eternal, so the difference from the state-of-effect of a pot is irrelevant. Thus this reply is re- versed. 19. The incorrect includes spurious replies based on unwar- ranted overextension of principles** and on mere conjecture.*** 20. When it is said that sounds of speech are non-eternal be= cause of their state-of-possessing-a-cause-by-obvious-means-of- evidence, just like a pot, a maker of a spurious reply might say, “What is your justification for stating that the pot itself is non ‘eternal To this it may be replied as follows : Why is there no just fication simply because it has not been related to the demon- strandum, when the object in the parallel example can be directly observed to be concomitant with the event in the demon- strandum? For it can be directly observed by you yourselves, too, that the arising of a pot occurs with the means-of-evidence of a cause, Thus this reply is unreal, SNoayarsatra, Nydvardhigya, V, 1, 37. seid Vy 1, 9410. bid V, "1,21.46 Seven Works of Vasubandiu 21. (Spurious replies based on conjecture may be reduced ‘to unreal replies, also.) For instance, when it is argued that the self does not exist, because it cannot be apprehended, just like the son of a barren woman, the maker of such a spurious reply may respond as follows : “Then the self-evident supposition js incurred, that everything which is directly perceived must exist. But there are objects which though they are directly per- ceived do not exist, such as the citcle which is seen when a torch is hurled in an are.” To this it may be replied : It is being assumed that there is existence for everything that is directly perceived, which is a vain assertion. (What is being argued here is that that which is not directly perceived, and which cannot be inferred, does not exist.) Thus this reply is unreal. 22. The contradictory includes spurious replies based on not- hhaving-atisen, on’ eternality, etc 23. A reply madeon the grounds of not-having-arisen** occurs when one assumes that before’its coming into existence, the justifation cannot have existed, and aonsequently the demons- frandum also cannot exist. For example, when it is being argued that sounds of speech are non-eternal because they have frisen through an effort, the maker of such spurious reply might say : “I it is non-eternal, because it has arisen due to an effort, then prior to its arising it has not arisen due to an effort, ‘and consequently it is eternal.” “To this it may be replied : Before its arising, the sound does not exist. And to maintain that it does not exist and is eternal, is a contradiction, because non-existence and eternality cannot co-exist. Thus this reply is contradictory. ‘The same reply is also reversed on grounds of resting on a conjecture. For the adversary is saying : “Since before the arising of the sound its state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an- effort does not exist, it follows that it has not arisen due to an effort, and thus is eternal, because of its state-of-not-arising- ‘immediately-upon-an-effort.” To this it may be replied as follows : There is no certainty that something is eternal because of its state-of-not-arising- sNpdyosiira, Nytpabhisya Vs ty 21 ibid. V, 1, 12. A Method For Argumentation a immediately-upon-an-effort. For there are three possibilities here : Some things are eternal, like space, etc. And some things are non-eternal, such as flashes of lightning, ete. And some other things do not exist, like a sky‘flower, etc. Thus this reply is reversed. 24, When one argues’ from an object’s invariable association ‘with non-eternality to eternality, then we have a spurious reply ‘based on eternality.* In this case the adversary replies to the assertion that sounds of speech are non-eternal as follows : “In that case, sounds of speech are eternal, because they are eternally connected with non-eternality, and its unchanging nature is thus eternal.” To this it may be replied as follows : This is a contradiction, ‘And why is this? Because something non-eternal is being called “eternal”. Thus this reply is contradictory. *Nnasttra and Nydynbhdyya, Vy 1, 32. qtomga redte Pascnce |G oe) meas. Notes |. Throushout this translation, “object” means “an object of sense or undertaning”, 2 Ascording to the Vaiss, simple ents are eral, though they ray be persved by the sensn.” According to Satya, effets pre-cxit in their cue and hey are not anew vation ut only an explicit mani festation of that which is implicitly contained inthe mater cause. So the Sidkhya may assert theft Bll ofthe statement gen, But not the Second, sae the elt arity speaking dow tot come about Beaute of the cause, Toconitency with one's ov nsated hess i ota exlogal sound for rejecting an argument in Vasbandbu's method. "According to the provional theory mos! beloved 10 Vasubondh, what ie noma pereie as eats ae in no way realy ents; 0, for instance “pot” -a mere convetionalexpresion for an interdependent complex with no bifyngeny ese in. 4. The object that without which 4 cognition cannot ars, This Aefion doesnot xy anyhing about the otologkal wat ofthe "oie it ony ays that without that wbieh is doignated as an "abet tee ie 10 cognition. 5 "Anterir thes” i the ual Todi slate tem for an 0 ‘Rent’s thesis, since this is always presented first. ve8 ‘Seven Works of Vasubandhue 66. Vasubandhu makes a clear contrast between those events which serve as conditions for & consciousness-moment inasmuch as they are its objects- ‘of-consciousness, and those which are is truly generative conditions. (ef. Kota V, ad 2), 7, The sirya tree, Acacia speciosa Willd. or Acacia sirssa Buch., bas leaves which close at night. Thus itis said to “sleep”, The objector is saying that just as one cannot infer the necestity of conscious activity for trees from the sole example of the sirsa's sleeping, one cannot infer the snon-eternality of sounds of speech from their state-f-arsing-immediately ‘upon-an-efort, bocause a flash of lightning is non-eteral and there is no effort involved. A DISCUSSION OF THE FIVE AGGREGATES (PANCASKANDHAKA-PRAKARANA)INTRODUCTION ‘This work is an analysis of those aggregations of events that constitute a living organism. The method for describing “‘per- sonality” as aggregates of events of five different basic types: ‘goes back to the Buddha himself* According to this analysis, what is called an “individual” or “personality” is a complex array of always-changing interdependent events. The analysis {and the meditation in which it is rooted) focuses on complex successions of aggregates of particular momentary phenomena, and, while treating them genetically, refuses to comprise them into hypothetical wholes. That is, an “individual” is really all of the changing states “which make him up”, and there is zo central entity underlying the organism. It is only the close interdependence of aggregations of moment-events which makes for their relationship. ‘The basic types of aggregates are: materialities, feelings, cognitions, motivating dispositions, and consciousnesses. Un- like the earlier Upanisadic view**, and the at feast somewhat anterior Saiikhya and Jain theories***, the Buddha recognizes the body as a basic part of “individuality”, and physiological differences as “personality” differences. But unlike Western physiological psychology, which attempts to reduce all per- sonality factors to physiological causes, the Buddha sees other factors in “personality” which are not identical with physiological functions, Feelings are the mood-tones of the moment : these may have purely “psychological” causes apart from physiological cones. ““Cognitions” are the mental seizings of characteristics “ef. Mayhina 1, 140-141, 145, 185, ete Sef. Byhad-drapvaka-Upanisad Ml, 1, where the sublle “sellbody" is —EEe “A Discusion of the Five Aggresates o ‘and what is contact 7 Tei the distinguishing which coe annr'ine three Gense-organ, obec sensey and ‘corresponding remect together. And what is mental atten, fering into done by a citta. What is volition ? ch impels a citta towards good quali- zest? It ceonsciousness) hat tion 7 It is the en qt is mental action, whi yee flaws, and that which is neither. And what vis a range of events of which there is conscious towatnat is confidence? Teis holding to certainty it Tepurd to a range of events of which there is ‘certainty. What eermory? Itis the non-forgetting of a range of vs towards is memthere is acquaintance, and is a certain kind of discourse whastta, What is meditational concentration ? Wis ‘one-pointed tee ata towards an examined range of events VINE wernt? It is discernment.as regntds the same, and is either i esgrading, that which has arisen from not having under arch or that which is diflrent from these wo. What i. faith? sn convietion, desire, and serenity of cit towards action, sees: the Beneficial, and the Gems® What is immer shame? i eae mne coming about through a committed offense, in which the self, or rather the (psychological) event responsible, is Pre” pe cnant, And what is dread of blame Mt is that shame jor others that comes about through a committed offense, towards Othe outer world is predominant, What is lack, of greed ? Te is the antidote to greed, a non-attachmen’ (0 that ah i arising in manos What is'lack of hostility?” Wt Mun uote to hostility, and is loving Kindness. What is lack of confusion 7 It is the antidote to confusion, and is right Sraniton. And. what is vigor? It is the antidote to sith, cogniion dhusiaam of citta towards the beneficial. And ait ie tranquility ? Ths the antidote toa situation of suscep, Titty to harm, and i a skill in bodily and mental action. And satis earefubness? Its the antidote to carelessness, a cut) wat nose beneficial events which are antidotes, and abandon. a Gnbenefical events through continuing in whose bene slack of greed, up to vigor. What is equanimity? 1 saeeretever evenness of eitta remaining in a tranquil state of destcal tranquility in cita continuing. in those factorelsek Of pred up to vigor, through whic there is continuity is @ Sie since affictions through the clearing away of afflicted events ‘And what is an atticude of non-harming ? Mts the antidote tc* Seven Works of Vasubandhu ‘an attitude of harming, and is compassion. And what is atvach- ment? It is adberence to any fixed intent in appropriating aggregates.” And what is aversion? It is a tormented volition towards sentient beings. And what is pride? There are seven kkinds of pride :basic pride, greater pride, the pride that is more than pride, the pride of thinking “I am", conceit, the pride of ‘thinking deficiency, and false pride. Basic pride is any inflation of citta which considers, through a smallness, either “I am greater”, or “T am equal”, What is greater pride ? Greater pride is any inflation of citta which considers, through an equality, that “I am greater” or “I am endowed with greatness.” And what is pride that is more than pride? It is any inflation of citta which considers, through a greatness, that “I am great ‘And what is the pride of thinking “I am”? It is any inflation of citta which is connected with the view of either “Tam” or “mine” in regard to appropriating aggergates. And what is conceit ? It is any inflation of citta which considers, in regard to an excellence which was previously obtained in another ‘moment, but is no longer, “I've attained it.” And what is the pride of thinking deficiency? It is any inflation of citta which considers, “I am only a little bit inferior to those of greatly excellent qualities.” And what is false pride? It is any is flation of citta which considers “I am endowed with good qu: ties” when good qualities have not been acquired. And what is ignorance? It is lack of knowledge regarding action, results of action, the Truths, and the Gems, and also the mentally constructed that rises together with it. In the realm of desires, there are three roots-of-the-unbeneficial : attachment, aversion, and ignorance, and these are the same as the roots-of-the- uunbeneficial greed, hostility, and confusion. And what are views? These views are generally of five kinds : the view of a fixed self in the body, views regarding the permanence or impermanence of the elements constituting personality, false views, adherence to particular views, and adherence to mere rule and ritual. And ‘what is the view of a fixed self in the body? it is an afflicted tudgment viewing either an “I” or “mine” in the appropriating ‘aggregates. And what are views regarding the permanence or the impermanence of the elements constituting personality ? They relate to these same elements (the appropriating agere- gates), and are aflcted judgments viewing them as either lasting ——EEaEeEeer 0 “A Diseussion of the Five Aggresates ‘And what are false views? They are any oF ogra 4 involve fear towards the elements discontgments. which inv om aioe ede ich est aoersons onthe easy of Be pd most eated. And what is atahment © eta tans? say ated judement seeing in rue ae and in the aggregates conning in them, purity two-mindedness as regards the Truths, etc, The 3a ated vicws mentioned above, and dou, a is selfishness? It isa holding fast toa citta which isnotin accord forth to another an unreal object through an action. of oy a Sern peranee? tis hokding fst #0 a dled ita of harming? It is an intention unbeneficial towards seni beings. And what is lack of shame? It is a lack of im ie of skill in mentdl action, and is thickheadedness-) What is 6 Tt is a lack of trust ina citta, which is not in accord with fit * towards action and its results, the Truths and the Gems. vat fareiesiness? Tt is any non-guarding of cita from affictions0 ‘Seven Works of Vasubande being linked with greed, hostility, confusion, or sloth. What is loss of mindfulness? It is an afflicted mindfulness, an un- clarity as to the beneficial. What is distractedness? It is any diffusion of citta, which partakes of greed, hostility, or confusion fon the five sense-qualities of the realm of desires. What is lack of recognition? It is a judgment connected with afilic- tions, by which there is entry into not knowing what has been done by body, voice, or manas. What is regret? It is remorse, a piercing sensation in manas. What is torpor? It is a con- traction of citta which is without capacity for entering down into anything. What is initial mental application? A discourse of inquiry by manas, a certain kind of volition and discernment, which can be characterized as an indistinct state of citta. What is (subsequent) discursive thought? A discourse of examination ‘by manas, which in the same way can be characterized as a more precise state of citta.!® And what are the motivating dispositions disassociated from cittas? These are pure designations for situations in mate alities, cittas, and events associated with cittas, and are desi nations only for these, and not for anything else."¥ And what arethey? Prapti, the attainment without cognitions, the attain- ment of the cessation of cognitions and feelings, any non-medi- tative state without cognitions, life-foree, taking part in an of- anism, birth, decrepitude, continuity, lack of duration, the collection of words, the collection of phrases, the collection of syllables, the state of being separate from Dharma, and other factors like these. ‘Among these, what is prdpti? It is becoming connected with something attained. Actually, itis a “seed’"”, a capacity, an approachment, and an adjustment to circumstances.* And what is an attainment free from cognitions? It is any cessation of non-stable events: cittas and events associated with cittas, which is totally clear and separate from attainments, and which comes about through a mental attention dispensing with cogni- tions about to arise, where former cognitions do not exist. And ‘what is the attainment of the cessation of cognitions and feelings? It is any cessation of non-stable and more stable events, cittas and events associated with cittas, which comes about through a mental attention dispensing with cognitions, continuing in which comes after the summits of existence have been practised, ‘A Discussion of the Five Aggregates n and which is separate even from those attainments present in the stage-of-nothing-whatever.” And what is a non-meditative state without cognitions? Tk s the cessation of non-stable events: cittas and events associated with cittas, which takes place, for instance, within those groups of gods which are sentient, but do not have cognitions. What is lfeforce? It is, as regards any events taking part in an organism, any continuity, for a certain time, of motivating dispositions which have been pro- jected by past action, And what is taking part in an organism? It is any close interrelationship of bodily parts as regards sen tient beings. What is birh? It is any arising of a stream of motivating dispositions which has not already arisen, as regards any collection of events taking part in an orgnism. And what is deerepitude? It is an alteration in the stream of those like that (ie. events taking part in an organism). What is continuity? It is the serial propagation in the stream of those like that. What is lack of duration? It is the discontinuity in the stream of those like that. What is the collection of words? It is deno- tations for the own-beings of events. What is the collection of plrases ? It is denotations for the particularities of events.2! What is the collection of syllables ? They are the syllables of actual sound through which the other two are disclosed. Though these all refer to speech, meanings are communicated depen- dent on words and phrases. For the same syllable does not arise with another synonym. And what is the state of being separate from Dharma? It is the non-attainment of noble Psychological events aight? al ate called “the aggregate of motivational disposi- 5. And what is consciousness? It is awareness of an object= oFconsciousness, visibles, etc. “Citta” and “manas” are the same as consciousness. ‘They are so designated because of their variety, and because of their providing a mental basis, Tespectively. Actually, the store consciousness is also citta, 4s it accumulates the seeds for all motivating dispositions.** Is objects-of-consciousness and aspects are undiseerned.** It {2a an assemblage pertaining to an organism into a felt tear tionship, and continues as a series of momentevents. Thus, Roush there is awareness of a sense-object immediately upon Merging from the attainment of cessation of cognitions andn Seven Works of Vasubandhu feelings, the attainment free from cognitions, or a non-medi- tative state without cognitions, it arises as the consciousness of the attainments themselves; it is the state of evolvement into another aspect once there has'been perception dependent upon any object-of-consciousness; itis the state of citta’s arising again ‘even after the consciousness-stream has been severed: itis entry into Samsira* and transmigration in it This same store-con- sciousness is the support of all the seeds, the basis and causality for the body, and the state of continuance in a body. It is also called “the appropriating consciousness”, because it appro- priates a body. Used in the sense of a specific entity, manas is an object-of-consciousness, within the store-consciousness, 4 consciousness always connected with confusion of self, the view of a self, pride of self, love of self, etc. It also joins an assemblage pertaining to an organism into a felt relationship, and continues as a series of moment-events, but does not exist saint, the Noble Path, or at the time of the attainment of ‘cessation. Why are the aggregates thus designated 2 It is through their collectivity, ic. various kinds of materialites, ete., being heaped ‘up together that “times”, “series”, “aspects”, “development and “sense-objects” seem to oceur.** The twelve sense-felds are the sense-field of the eye and the sense-field of visibles, the sense-field of the car and the sense- field of sounds, the sense-field of the nose and the sense-field of smells, the sense-ficld of the tongue and the sense-feld of tastes, the sense-field of the body and the sense-field of tactile sensations, the sense-ield of manas and the sense-field of men- tally cognizables. The eye, visibles, the ear, sounds, the nose, smells, the tongue, tastes have all been discussed previously. ‘The sense-feld of the tactile is the four great elements and every- thing (all the incredibly numerous various sensations) which can be subsumed under tactile sensations. The sense-field of ‘manas is any aggregate of consciousness. The sense-field of ‘mentally cognizables is feclings, cognitions, motivating disposi- tions, unmanifest action, and the uncompounded. And what is the uncompoundgd ? Space, the cessation not through contemplation, the cessation through contemplation, and Such- ‘The world of change. “A Discussion of the Five Aggregates B ness. Among these, what is space ? It is any interval separat- ing materialites.* What is a cessation not through contemplax tion? It is any non-separation from cessation without anti dotes to afflictions figuring in. And what is cessation through ‘conternlation? It is any non-separation from cessation, any constant non-arising of aggregates through antidotes to afflic- tions. What is Suchness ? It is the “inherent nature (dhar- ‘mata of any event”, and is the selflessness of events.% Why are these called “sense-ields” Because they are the doors to the rising of consciousness. The eighteen sensory domains are the domain of the eye, the domain of the visible, the domain of the visual consciousness; the domain of the ear, the domain of sounds, the domain of audial consciousness; the domain of the nose, the domain of smells, the domain of olfac- tory consciousness; the domain of the tongue, the domain of tastes, the domain of gustatory consciousness; the domain of the body, the domain of the tactile, the domain of tactile con- sciousness, the domain of the manas, the domain of mentally cognizables, and the domain of the mental consciousness. The domains of the eye, etc, and the domains of visibles, ete, are the same as the sense-felds. The domains of the six conscious- nesses are awarenesses with objects-of-consciousness in visibles, etc., and which are dependent on the eye, etc. The domain of ‘manas is any of these consciousness-moments which are past immediately afterwards, because of the continuity of the sixth consciousness.®" In this way, the sensory domains have been determined as eighteen Ten of those sense-fieds and domains (the sensory organs and their objects) and that part of the sense-ficld of mentally ‘cognizables which may be subsumed under it (unmanifest ac- tion) constitute whatever is the aggregate of materiality. The sense-ield of manas and the seven domains of citta (the visual, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental consciousnesses, and the domain of mentally cognizables) constitute whatever is the aggregate of consciousness. The sense-fields and domains of mentally cognizables also constitute whatever are the other three aggregates (Feelings, cognitions, and motivating disposi- tions), one part of the aggregate of materiality which may be subsumed under it (unmaaifest action), and the uncompounded. Why are these called “domains” ? Because they grasp an “own-”% Seven Works of Vasubandine characteristic”, though without a “doer”** As to why they are called “aggregates”, etc., this serves as an antidote to the three kinds of grasping after self, in order. The three kinds of grasping after self are grasping for one central entity, grasp- ing for an “enjoyer”, and grasping for a “doer”. ‘Among these eighteen sensory domains, which contain materiality ? Whatever has the own-being of the aggregate of materiality. Which do not contain materiality? The rest of them. Which can be seen? Only the sensory domain of visibles is an object-of-sense which can be seen. Which are invisible? The rest of them. Which exercise resistance ? The ten which contain materiality, which exercise resistance on each other. Which do not exercise resistance ? ‘The rest of them. Which are liable to be connected with afflictions ?¢ Fifteen (i.e. the sensory domains of the eye to tactile conscious ness), and part of the last three (manas, mentally cognizables, ‘and mental consciousness). Which are unliable to be connected with afflictions ? Part of the last three. Those because of having a scope allowing for the direct perception of the arising of afflictions. Which are without affcitions ? Part of the last three. Which occur in the realm of desires ? All of them, Which occur in the realm of simple images? Fourteen : all of them except smells, tastes, olfactory-consciousness, and gus- tatory-consciousness. Which occur in the imageless sphere? Part of the last three. Which are included within the aggre- gates ? All of them except the uncompounded. Which are included within the appropriating aggregates? Those con- stituting a “personality”. Which are beneficial, which unben ficial, and which indeterminate? Ten may belong to any of the three categories : the seven sensory domains of citta, and the sensory domains of visibles, sounds and mentally cogni- zables. The rest of them are all indeterminate, Which are internal”? Twelve of them : all of them except visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations and mentally cogni- zables. Which are “external” ? Six of them: those not in- cluded in the preceding. Which have an object-of-conscious- ness? The seven sensory domains of citta, and one part of the sensory domain of mentally cognizables, namely, whatever events are associated with cittas. Which are without an object- of-consciousness 2 ‘The ten others and most of the sensory atames meds LdBicuce [6 Ome) ‘A Discussion of the Five Aggregates mgd. 15 domains of mentally cognizables. Which contain discrimi- nation? The sensory domains of manas, mental conscious- ness, and mentally cognizables. Which do not contain dis- crimination ? The rest of them* Which are appropriated ? Five of the “internal” (organs I-V) and part of the “external (ie. part of visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensa~ tions), Which are unappropriated ? Part of the four (all visibles, smells, tastes and tactile sensations not integral parts of the sensory organism)" Which are similar in what they show ? The five internal material ones (organs FV), theit respective consciousnesses and sensory domains, inasmuch as they have something in common. What is their similarity ? These are all, by means of their respective consciousnesses, empty, because of a conformity of each to understanding” NoTes * This seemsin contradiction with note 14, but Yasomitra explains: Though mination, they Tack the ikalpa), ie. “This is this, that is ind hence are called non-diseriminatory. (Abhidharmakofavvakhya, ad133), 1. On the Bodhisaitaa Maajusti “who has become a price", see Tateo= duction to this text, p58. 2. The great elements ‘The great material elements accepted by the Vibhdsd are earth, water, fire and wind, Tt has been held (€. Jaini, Abhidharmadipa, Introduction, 1 90) thatthe theory of these elements may have been inspired by the Vai esas, who enumerate earth, water, fire, wind, space, time, place, soul land manas as dravyas (Kandda, Vaiseska-siira 1, 1, §). But theit adop> tion in Buddhism may actualy antedate Kanda, a it i in evidence in the Dhammasaigani (648). It is possible that both Buddhist. Abhidharma land Vaisesika may derive their elements via the Upanzads (cf. Praina-Upa- nisad IV, 8) from the cosmogenic categories of the Bramanas. The Sata- atha-Brakana, XI, I, 6, 1624, states that water, breath (wind), speech, land fire were created at the fest Fullmoon and new-moon rites performed bby Prajgpati and Paramesthin; at the second rte, the sky (space), earth and water were created. Already in the Prakaranapdda of Vasumitra (Chinese translations Taisho {S41 and 1562), a text held in canonical esteem by the Vibhdjd, these ele ‘ents are not the common things usualy designated by the names “earth”, ic, but rather represent more abstract principles to be found in materiality Earth is the solid principle that holds things in place, water the wet prin- ciple which has cohesion as its special quality, fire the hot principle that 0oks and transforms, and wind the mobile principle that expands and dis laces (Prakaranapada 13 a, quoted La Vallée Poussin, Kofa I, p22). Vasu- \6 Seven Works of Vasubandhu ‘mitra says further that these elements are directly ferceptible only by the fifth, or tactile, consciousness. 3..‘A detailed discussion of the Vaibhisika concept of “unmanifest ac tion” occursin 4 Discussion forthe Demonstration of Action, 14 and in note3. 4. A discussion of these divisions ofthe visible (all of which except color are rejected by Vasubandhu) is given in A Discusion for the Demonstration of Action, 1-5.-On “configuration”, see note $ 10 that text. 5. Though an “unmanifest action” is a residual force which has as its Jocus the material elements ofthe body, it does not share the usual charac- teristics of materiality, sine itis not directly perceptible, and exercises no resistance. This latter phrase means that the locus of one materiality can not be occupied by anther, s0 that if two instances of materiality collide, ‘one will displace the other. 6. A cognition is a particularization of perception, and may accompany ‘any type of consciousnese-moment. Certain “signs” or salient features fare taken hold of : thus there may be “the cognition of the smell of a jase mine flower”, “the cognition of the taste of rice", or “the cognition that ‘everything i impermanent™ accompanying instances of smellconscious- ness, tasteconsciousness, and mental consciousness, respectively. 7. On eittas, see introduction to this text, p 5940 8. “One-pointedness” is a metaphor for complete concentration. Any range of events may serve as a fecus for meditational concentration. See introduction, p 63. A totally formless meditation is still “one-pointedness of citta towards an examined range of events, since formless experiences ‘are sill included in a definite range of events 9. This is a Buddhistic definition of “faith, which focuses on those few “articles of faith" accepted by Buddhism : that actions all have reti- Dbutory effects for their “performers”, that there is a beneficial course of action which is not conducive to the arising of suffering, and that the “Gems” (the Buddha, the Dharma and the Buddhist community) are worthy of respost because the’ indicate beneficial courses of action. 10. On manas, see introduction, pp 6061. This definition of “greed” suggests that greed (or attachment, which i seen to be the same) can arise ‘only in regard to mentally constructed events. 1, “The appropriating aggregates” are those collections of aggregates ‘that constitute a definite lifestream : they “appropriate” their interela- tionship. 12, The thee realms of experience are “the realm of desires “the realm of simple images” and “the imageless realm". Any state where all the sense-consciousneses are operative, and where all passions and aversions hhavetheie full opportunity to develop, is subsumed under “the realm of de- sires", Thus, all non-meditationaly concentrated states are included there. “The realm of simple images” comprises the four frst meditational stages, where certain senses, such a8 smell and taste, are not operative “The image- [ess realm” comprises any state where all senses except the mental conscious- ness are suspended, It is “imageless", then, in the sense that the frst five Consciousnesses no longer perceive their objects. "These states are the ex- yO ‘A Discussion of the Five Aggregates n treme meditaional concentrations, the four “imagelss attainments”, which Culminate in the attainment of the cessation of all cognitions and fecings “The conception of these “realms” in Buddhism shows an amalgamation fof cosmological needs with the result of meditational experimentation In the earliest Buddhist conception, there were apparentiy only two “realms”: fa “realm of images” and an “imageless realm”. (¢f. Suttenipra 75S- 1756, Irinttaka 51, 73.)" Przyluski noted that the contrast between the sreaim of desires" and the “realm of images” was added later (*Bouddhisme et Upanishad”, Bulletin de 'Ezole Francaise de I'Extrome Orient, 1932)- Falk supplies an explanation for this when she says that the assumption fof a throe-"realm” division was made necessary by increasing expecimenta- tion swith the imageless attainments (Namaripa, p 98). Originally, these ‘meditations were not very important in Buddhism, though they were prac- ‘ised and held central by several religious orders, including that of Udeaks, ‘the socond religious teacher of the Buddha, In Digha Ul, 131 ff, itis stated thatthe four simpler meditations are all that are needed to attain the fruits ‘of sainthood, and it is also significant that directly before his death, the ‘Buddtia went into those meditational concertrations only (Diaha Il, 156). Increasing experimentation with the sensesuspending attainments’ made it necessary 10 distinguish “realm-wise” between them andthe simpler mei= tational stage. 13. I is primarily doubt as regards the clearly perceived, false views, adherence to any particular view, and adherence to mere rule and ritual, that gives rise to mental constructions—those focuses of mental conscious ness that have no reality ouside of the constructions of that consciousness Other particular views which have an unbenefcial eect rest on those four lypes of confusion. 4. “Initial mental application” and “subsequent discursive thought™ are two kinds of fows of discrimination—in fact the fist of them isto Vasu bandhu svabhava-vikalpa, “basic diserimination”, the kind that makes all ‘other kinds possible, Both ofthese are regarded as existing together within the sensory consciousnesses by the Vibhird, and by orthodox Vaibhisikes such as Safghabhadra and the Dipakirs. But in the face of Vasubandhu’s attacks, which state that these two are not gonetcaly different, but only diferent stages in the same “series”, and thus can’t be situated toscther Within one moment of consciousness, both Safghabhadra and the Dipskira fare forced to admit thatthe second of these can be present in the first five 'ypes of consciousness only “in an unmanifest state", ef. Abhidharmadipa ad TH, 123, p 83; Yasomitra’s citation of Sanghabhadra's Abhidharmanya= Ydnusira, ad 33, Law ed MH, p 57. (See also Jain’s discussion, Abhi- harman, itcoduction, pp 83-88,) To Vasubandhu, “inital mental appli cation” is not realy a separate event, but represents & certain kind of vol tion and constructing discernment existing, ashe says, even in sensory con Seiousnesses, as long as these are not meditationally concentrated, (cf. Yac Somitra’s discussion, Vpakhya, ad 1 33, Law I, p 74) whereas according to ‘Older definitions, such as the Vibhdsd's and’ Asana’, it and discursive thought ret on volition and discerament, rather than being stectly identifiable8B Seven Works of Vasubandiuu with them (Abhidharmasamuceaya, p 10; Yasomitra Vydkhyd, ad TT 33, Law U, p 57, Following Vasubandhu inital mental application is volition ‘of discernment inasmuch as it does or does not involve deduction (ef. Ya Somitea, ad 1 33, Law I, p 74: “Anabhyohvasthlyam cetana abhyoha- vasthayim prajeti vyavasthapyate)". The discussion of Schmidthausen in his article "Sautrantika-Voraussetzungen in Vindatika und Trinsika™ Which attempts to uphold some kind of afundamental distinction between Sensory and non-sensory consciousnesses in Vasubandhu's psychology, is Confused t0 some extent by a misquotation from YaSomitra in Jainis edl= tion of the Abkidharmadipa. Initial mental application is certainly not for Vasubandh “only an impulse”, a5 Schmidthausen claims. Jains quota- tion from Yasomitea is “Cetanavisesa eva vitarka it” (p 19, n 4), “He says that initial mental application is only a certain kind of volition”, but the toxt clearly reads “Cetandprafidviesa”, a certain kind of volition or dis- ‘cemment” (Yagomitra, ad 133, Lav I, p 74). Vasubandhu does not place too much emphasis on the distinctness aspects of these mental streams, a8 he considers such descriptions quite relative (ef. Kosa Il, ad 330-b, La Vallée Poussin, pp 173-174). Sthiramati explains that the “indistinctness" ‘of intial mental application when compared to subsequent discursive ‘thought consists in the fact that intial mental application considers only the object of sense or understanding, without further connections being made. ‘These are made by subsequent discursive thought, (Trimlikavlfaptibhaeya, 1p 32). (See also Dhammasargan’ 7-8, and Carolyn Rhys-Davids’ com- ments on Buddhaphosa’s Atvhasalin! 114, 115, where “initial mental appli cation” is described as “a distinctively mental procedure at the inception of a train of thought, a deliberate movement of voluntary attention” and subsequent discursive thought” as “the movement and maintenance of a voluntary thought-continuum, a6 distinguished ffom the initial grappling With the subject of relection.", Dhammasagan! translation, p 10, note 13, pL, nove 2) Ic is interesting that Vasubandhu will characterize these mental flows which make for discriminations as being potentially affictions, These flows tend to result in holding fast to views, ele. and thus give rise vo alex tioas. They are both eliminated fairy early ia meditational concentration 15, Vasubandhu is here eliminating the entire category of “motivating dispositions disassociated from citta", and proceeds to explain how each fof these “moment-events™ thus categorized really represents a particular condition in materalities, cits, and events associated with cits 16, “Attained” is here being used in its most bland scientific sense, to ‘mean “becoming intimately associated for time" 17. See Introduction, pp 61-62. Here, what the Vaibhayika and Mabie sisaka accept a8 special entity prapt is equated to residues in conscious ness effected by latent impressions. 18. When one says, conventionally, that “X has Y", the Mabitisaka land Vaibhasika explain this as moment-event A subsumed in “series X”" ‘connected by a prdpti to moment-event B subsumed in “series Y". A pra —_— rq % A Discussion of the Five Aggregates p ‘pits recognized by them o¢ a special kind of entity that links diverse but felated elements. AS such it plays a role not unlike the inerence-cate- ipory (samandya-padrtha) of the Vaisesikas, except that the latter, at least In the earlier theor, is single, whereas there is a priptt for each connect- ing relationship. between two events. Vasubandhu regards the concept (of pripti 3s bogus. What is thus designated may be a “seed, as when fone says X has such and such a view”. This means that, within the aggre~ sateseries designated as "X”, there are consciousnesssmoments accompa- riod by latent impressions from past moments (“seeds”), making for a view. emay bea capacity, as when one says, "X has great bodily strength.” This means that, within the aggregate-series designated as “X", there isthe capa ity for doing heavy bodily actions. It may be an "approachment”, a grow- ing physical proximity of two events, as when one says "X is eating Food” ‘It may be simply an “adjustment according to circumstances, as when one says, "X has a feeling of pain’ (explained by the MahiSisakas and Vaibha- sikas a5 a consciousness-sries designated “X” linked to an ageregate of sulfering‘ecling by a prapt). According to Vasubandhu, this is simply fan alteration from one citta to the next because of a circumstance of pain in the feeling-agaregate interrelated to the consciousnese-agereeatc 19, The attainment of the cessation of felings and cognitions, last of the “imagsless meditations", is reached only after the consciousnest-sertes has passed through the other four imageless attalnments, which are also ‘designated as “the summits of existence". These latter are the meditational attainments focused on infinite space, on infinite consciousness, on nothing ‘whatever, and the state which is neither cognitional nor non-cognitional, For the attainment of cessation of feelings and cognitions to be reached, ‘even those events present in the stage whichis nether cogntional nor none cosnitional must no longer be present, Vasubandha says that the attain- ‘meat of cessation of feelings and cognitions must be separate from the subtle attachments present even in the stage of nothing whatever, but acta- ally he “should” say ia addition that this attainment is separate even from ‘the dio cognitions of the stage which is neither cognitional nor non-cogni tional, as well 20. ‘The factor here translated as “taking part in an organism” has ssually been rendered “generic similarity". This however is clearly not what is involved, as can be seen from Vasubandéu’s definition, 21. A word may indicate the “own-being” or “nature” of & moment= ‘event, eg “blue”, but 2 complete meaning dealing with particulars of events cean only be expressed by a phrase 22, Syllables themselves are not the conveyors of meaning, otherwise ‘ach’ synonym would consist of the same syllables, 23. "Citas” are so ealed because of theit variety (erat), and all in stances of “manas” are so called becasue of providing a mental basis (mand- raya). The first of these etymological explanations is used by Vasubanchu again in A Discusion for the Demonstration of Action, 31, and in The Teach- ing of the Three Own-Beings, 7. 24, This is the second etymological explanation of tt", by the root80 Seven Works of Vasubandiu fy clnoth, “to accumulate”. This again occurs in KSP 31 and TSN 7. The six consciousness are variegated, thus fit with the frst etymology; the store- ‘consciousness accumulates “seeds, thus fits with the second. 25. According to Mahiasaka and Vaibhasika theory, each conscious- oss must have an object-of-consciousness and also an aspect, that is, some special characteristic by which it ean be recognized, Since the store-con- sciousness underlies the six discerning consciousnesses which have definite objects-of-conseiousness and aspects, it cannot be discerned by any of them. ‘Thus its objectofconsciousness and aspect must be undiscerned. It is known only by inference, as Sumatsla says in Karmasiddhitka, ad 36, Though this may be an embarrassing admission to make in the face of Vaibhi- sika charges that a consciousness should be directly experienced, it at least hhas the value of consistency. Vasubandhu’s admission that the object- ‘of-consciousness and aspect of the store-consciousness are undiscerned is better than the approach of Occidental “depth-psychologists”, who posit 1 “subconscious” and then try to fix its contents, which is tantamount 10 saying that the “subconscious” ean be consciously discerned 26, Here, Vasubandiu his compactly given the inferential justiations for assuming a store-consciousness within his definition of it. The medi- tational attainment of the cessation of cognitions and feelings must itsolf ‘be accompanied by consciousness-moments, otherwise the consciousness series could never resume once the attainment ceases. This is one of the main arguments for the existence of the store-conseiousness in Discur- sion for the Demonsiration of Aetion. A. consciousoess-series changes per rmanently after it has been impressed by an objectof-consciousness : again this is impossible without some substratum. Entry into Samsara, he. con- sciousness’ becoming inked with an organism, is again impossible without ‘some consciousness preceding temporally the si disceraing consciousnesies, as these do not yet exist at the inception of an embrye"s existence, Trans. migration in Sansira, or, more properly, the residue of the agaregate-com- plex from one life to the next, is again impossible unless there isa substra- tum where the residue exists.” Some of these arguments were already used by Asana. (The argument ofa consciousness” being necessary in the attain _ment ofthe cesation of feelings and cognitions is raised by Asaniga in Mahi- “janasoigraha, 1, 31, the change in aspects in consciousness implying @ substratum in I, 32, no possiblity of the carry-over of impressions from ‘one momeat to the next without an underlying consciousness, in 1, 3334, And the impossibility of there being a residue of one consciousness-complex from one moment to the next without a store-consciousness in 1,38.) 27. The aggregates are first of all so designated because they are not simple momentevents, but are moment-events “heaped together”. For instance, “materiality”, though one kind of aggresate,coasists in one mo- ‘ment "ia one organise” of a huge number of moment-events, in fact all the events which twentieth century physiological chemistry is attempting 10 Gefine. Furthermore, they are not only “aggregated” in one moment, but the events in one aggregation-moment help give rise to the next. Time, real category to ancient and modern Vaiseykas, is recognized already in the Pibhagd as being only a name for the flow of compounded events (see A Discussion of the Five Aggregates 8 ‘Vibhipd selections translated by La Vallée Poussin, Mélanges 1936-37, p. 8) ‘Thus “time” exists only because moment-evens are followed by subsequent Ioment-events, A “series, similarly, i aly a metaphor for the phenomenon ffone aggrceate-moment’s arising when the other has ceased, and being causally Tinked tothe previous one. An “aspect”, defined asa distinguishing charactris- ticfor a momen-event, is really not anything of thesor, either, since “it” abstracted from the many events arising in one moment. “development”, ‘agin, does not realy occur, since there is not anything which can undergo ‘change : rather each momeat is distinct from the previous one. It is con ‘entionally said that “A visible is a sense-object of an eye", but this state- ‘ment comes only from the visual consciousnese-aggregate arising in & con pounded and_cogritional form. 28, "Space", recognized as a definite kind of entity in Vaigeyika philo- soph, is also accepted by many Abhidharmika systems, including that of the Mahigasakas (Bareau, Mahldisaka thesis no. 19, Les setes, p. 185). I itis accepted, it must clearly be uncompounded, ie, not consisting of conditioned moment-events. Vasubandhu however denies that space is fan entity at all. He says that it i simply an interval between materiales, tnd is thus an absence of impinging materiality. 29. “Cessation not through contemplation” is the Abbidharmika term for a cessation of the psychophysical complex which has not come about through the specifically Buddhist contemplations of the truth of suffering, the truth of the arising of sufering, the truth of the cessation of suffering, And the truth of a path leading tothe cessation of sufering. Passages which jn detail discuss “cessation not through contemplation” indicate that any cessation of “an aggregate-series” can be designated in this way, 2s long 23s the cessation has not come from a contemplation of the Four Noble Trux ths, nor by the inherent destruction of each momentevent, (This later lype of cessation, which refers to moment-events rather than to “series”, is called by the Vibhiea “cessation due to noneternality” (Vibhisa, 31, translated by La Vallée Poussin, BEFEO XXX, p.1 ff). Thus, a non-Buddhist yori who through: meditations is able to annihilate factors of suffering, has achieved this through “a eessation not through contemplation”, because the knowledge of the Noble Truths was not involved. A seris of blue vis- ual consciousnesses ceases when the stimulus giving rise to blue visual com svigusnestes ceases: this would aso be, and far more obviously so, “a exs- sation not through contemplation”. The nature of this cessation was hhowever the subject of much dispute among Abhidharmikas (cf. Vibhied 31,32, teanslated by La Vallée Poussin, BEFEO XXX, pp. 1-28; Vasubandhu, Kota I, ad $6; Sanghabhadra, Nydydmusira, I, 32, tanslated by La Vallée Poussin, BEFEO XXX, pp 259-60, cf. pp 263-298). “Cessation through contemplation” i essentially an Abhidharmika synonym for “Nirvina” (Wikia 31, synonym no. 1, La Vallée Poussin, p. 10) It is interesting that Vasubandhu here reduces’ the cause of “cessation through contemplation" from a realization of the Four Noble Truths to antidotes to affietions. Presumably, for him, a noa-Buddhist not recos- nizing the Four Noble Truths could still give rise to cessation through coa- templation, if antidotes to aiitions were applied.2 Seven Works of Vasubandiu 30, In other words, the only inherent nature in all events i that they hhave none! Suchaess ib the equivalent of Emptiness, by which all events hhave no eraspable nature. Vasubandhu has thus eliminated the entice Mahilisaka fist of uncompounded events, for all of them, by his defini tions, are mere absences. 31. The sixth consciousness, or mental consciousness, includes in its “domain” residues of consciousnesses of all six varieties. For example, ‘an audial consciousness may arise in one moment, the mental conscious ness “That note was flat, referring to the previous audial consciousness, ‘may arise in the next moment. T6e domain of manas, i.e. any of the cone sciousnesees preceding a sinth-consciousness-moment, i itself “past immedia- tely afterwards”, Le. itis momentary. But a reflection on this manas by 12 succeeding sixth-consfousness-moment, is possible. Thus, a kind of ‘continuity ia suoceeding sixth-conseiousness-moments i possible, because previous consclousness-moments of all six varieties affect succeeding sixth- ‘consciousness-moments. In the example above, the sound itself Js an au. ial consciousness, and lasts for a moment. “The mental-consciousness- ‘moment “That note was fat", which depended on the previous second- ‘consciousness-moment can itself give rise to a “series” of new sixth-con- ‘sciousness-moments, such as "The singer might have been under some strain At that moment”, “This composition requires great skill in executing musi- cal ornaments,” ttc, et, all of which are continuous upon one another and derive in part from the audial consciousness-moment which has long passed, 32. “There are only the efficacies of these particular domains, without there being any central “doet". This is of course a necessary recognition in realizing “the selflessness of personalities” 33. This should seem obvious, but the implications of this statement may not be. Thus, wherever visual “models” are made in regard to that Which isn't visible, what is being made is a distortion, It is as futile as at- tempting 10 explain the visible in terms of smell 34. See A Discussion for the Demonsiration of Action, note 43. The tecm “connected with distress” (sderava) has been rendered by “Tiable to bbe connected with actions”, which is what the prior term really means. 35. ‘The menta-consciousnessagaregates have the possibilty of recos- nizing the arising of aMictions; for instance, when they are meditationally concentrated in certain ways. “Thus they may be either liable to be con nectod with afflictions, oF not. 36. “Unappropriated” from the point of view of a particular agere- ate “series”, see note 11 37, A consciousnessmoment of any type may recognize its imperma- rence, sigmessness (in the sense that any signs seized by cognitions are diss tortions) and emptiness (by which itis not amenable to any kind of eate- ‘gorization), Thus, any of them may conform to understanding when they are experienced non-dually. But by the same token, all of these types of Consciousness-moments and sensory-domain-moments are empty, since the istnctions between them are actually void. A DISCUSSION FOR THE DEMONSTRATION OF ACTION (Karma-siddhi-prakarana)INTRODUCTION ‘The Buddhist academic Sumatiila, who in the late eighth century wrote a meticulous commentary on this text, perhaps not fully realized its revolutionary content when he allowed an objector the statement that this is one of those treatises that try to count the teeth of erows.* It ira highly scholastic work, in the style of the Kafa, and uses the technique of expressing the author's views as objections to opponents’ theses. It is in fact fa frontal assault on Vaibhasika theories, and answers many of the objections that Vaibhdsika masters had raised towards earlier formulations by Vasubandhu. It is not a “Hinayina”** treatise. It uses the store-con- sciousness to account for psychic continuity, quotes the Mabi- yina Sandhinirmocana-sitra as authoritative scripture, and ends very Mahayanistically with the transference of all merit gained to all sentient beings. But itis directed at “Hinayanists”, ‘and, by filing up holes in earlier theories, is attempting to lure Vaibhisikas to become involved with the further implications of Yogicara theory, which are not alluded to here deliberately “to ease the shock”. “Action” is “karma”, that kind of activity which has an ethi- cal charge, and which must give rise to a retributionary “rever- beration” at a later time, IF suffering is inflicted, the inflicting aggregate-complex “series” will feel future suffering as a retri- bution for it. But the “time interval” between the two events is a problem for a theory maintaining momentariness. This tteatise thus becomes absorbed in the problem of psychophysi- al continuity. In what is probably Vasubandhu's earliest theory, in Kosa 1X, memory is explained by a sensory or mental impression Temaining latent in the consciousness-“series” and subsequently, When the proper conditions are present, emerging toa conscious {Sumatisila, Karmaslddhiikd, Peking/Tokyo ed. Tibetan Canon no, $572, volume 114, p 204, 1, 2. “*EHinayina” (Lesser Vehicle) is the somewhat pejorative term given by Mahiyanists to Buddhists not following the Great Vehicle.86 Seven Works of Vasubandhut level, As we have seen, these latent impressions are often given the metaphoric designation “seed”. Thus, volitions of bene- ficial and unbeneficial actions leave such “seeds” within “the series”, which ripen as retribution, In the case of the experience of the attainment of the cessation of feelings and cognitions, this explanation runs into difficulties. For in this state all the normal functions of consciousness are suspended, and yet, afier some time, “the practitioner” emerges from the medita- tional concentration with memories and re that con- ‘tinue exactly where the last moment of full consciousness left off, During the time of attainment, where can these “seeds” exist? The theory as stated is inadequate to account for this. The Vaibhisikas had evolved @ solution to this problem. Following the time-theory of the Bhadanta Vasumitra* they could say that the experience of the attainment of cessation of feelings and cognitions and re-emergence from it could be explained by the last moment of the consciousness-“series” losing its full efficacy, that is, becoming past, and the next future ‘moment of the “series” becoming fully activated, that is, pre= sent, after a lapse has removed the obstacles to such a develop- ‘ment. ‘Vasubandhu, in Kosa II, ad 44 ff, admits that the Vaibhasikas can solve the problem of psychic continuity in this way. But the entire edifice of purely hypothetical entities which is being ‘used by the Vaibhasikas goes completely against his grain. To speak of the existence of the past and future is nonsense to him, since the past is that which no longer exists and the future is that which does not exist yet. At Koéa V, ad 27, and again in this treatise, 16-17, Vasubandhu. subjects the Vaibhasika theory to a series of sharp attacks, It cannot account for dis tortion in memories or for disappointments in ant fan existent past entity accounted for every instance of memory, it is difficult to see why memory should become distorted, oF why “one” shouldn't “have” all memories of all past events at any given moment. The disappointment in anticipations makes for an even more potent argument, since events may be anticipated which never become existent as present entities. ‘See page 12 ‘A Discussion For the Demonstration of Action 87 ‘Orthodox Vaibhasika masters were not lacking in replies to these objections. The Dipakara, for instance, defends the existence of the past and future by stating that it is mentioned in the sitras, that there could be no production of a retribu- tional effect without an abiding past deed, and that each con- sciousness-moment must have an existent object. A causal relation is possible, he says in reply to Vasubandhu’s distinction between conditions-as-objects-of-consciousness (which need not exist outside of consciousness) and truly generative conditions (which must have real existence outside of the particular con sciousness-moment), only between two existing entities.** So no event of purely designatory reality can exist without some reference to an ultimately real event. The Dipakira rounds off his arguments with the statement that the author of the Kosa, “that apostate from the Sarvastivada”, has fallen straight into the precipice of the emptiness theory of the Mahaydnists, and that he is now affirming all kinds of utter nonsense, such as thee different kinds of “own-beings” in reality. 4** Saghabhadra in tum has only one criterion for regarding something as existent : it must give rise to at least one conscious nness-moment as its object-of-consciousness.f He reduces all error to wrong connective combinations occurring after the impression of the existent has been perceived. There is really no such thing as an object-of-consciousness which has reference to a non-existent object. Even in the case of dreams, all ob- eets-of consciousness refer to things that have been experienced, or will be experienced, combined with present experience in a confused manner. The distortion of memory and the dis- appointment of anticipations can be explained in the same way. If the manner of seeing a present object is infinitely variable”, Saghabhadra says, “why cannot the same be true in regard to @ future object tt} Abhidharmodipa V, 28. 302, pp. 259-60. {rlbid, V, ad 319,p. 279, **Ibi, ad 324, 282, tAbhidharmanyayamusira, 30, Mélanges 8:28. Hid, p. «0 Tttbid, p. 73,88 "Seven Works of Vasubandiuu Saighabhadra not only defends the existence of the past and future : he also takes the offensive against the transforma- tion-of-the-series theory raised by Vasubandhu in Kosa IX. An action can't be considered as the beginning point for a gra- dual transformation of a consciousness-series, because the act and the citta may be totally different in nature and in their manner of conditioning what follows. According to Vasu- bandhu, in a karmic “series”, a beneficial action is followed by a series of cittas of which the last (Which can itself be unbene- ficial) is supposed to have the force projected by the long past, ‘act to produce an agreeable sensation. The seed metaphor used by Vasubandhu for this process is inadequate, says Sai- ghabhadra, since in the case of the series flower-fruit, there is always a constant relationship between the seed and the final fruit, that is, a certain seed alwayseventually gives rise to a fruit of the same nature. On the other hand, cach action must hhave an effect distinct from cittas following as a result of cittas, ‘otherwise, the sudden arising of an unbeneficial citta after beneficial one could never exist. ‘Vasubandhu in this treatise addresses himself to the ins tence of Saighabhadra and the Dipakira, that an objectively real event must be posited for each object-of-conscionsness. He says that it is really present causes and anticipations that allow us to think of something in the future, and present effects and memories which allow us to think of the past. In addition, hhe makes much of the point that certain moments never pro- ject a complete efficacy, and can thus according to the Vaibhai kkas never be “present”, though they are perceived as such.** Furthermore, what kind of force is an event exercising when it is past, and how or why should there be a sudden occurrence of a new type of event once it gives its effect of memory, arising from the attainment of cessation, or karmic retribution 2 On the other hand, Vasubandhu in this treatise is aware of the potency of Saighabhadra’s arguments, and realizes that the scheme given in Kosa IX is seriously flawed. It does no good ‘Abhidharmanyayimusira, 51, Mélanges $:80 ff 44 Discusion for the Demonstration of Action, 16-17. ibid, 1617, end. ‘A Discussion For the Demonstration of Action 89 to speak of the citta which attains the cessation of feelings and cognitions as a directly antecedent cause for the emerging citta, since the continuity of the “series” has obviously been inter- rupted within the meditational attainment, Several alter- native theories are considered : The first of these says that the citta emerging from the attainment of cessation need not rest on the citta preceding that attainment, but can arise from the reawakened body supplied with sense-organs, This is a coherent and parsimonious theory, and it does not appear that it has been full justice by either Vasubandhu or Sumatisila, Then there is the theory of the Bhadanta Vasumitra, that the attainment of the cessation of feelings and cognitions must itself be citta. But Ghosaka would object that citta without ‘concomitant feelings and cognitions simply does not exist, Ghosaka himself proposes that the attainment of cessation it- self constitutes an efficacious entity, which can be seen by the fact that it keeps the consciousness-series from renewing itself for some time. But Vasubandhu can attack Ghosaka's thesis by demonstrating that it is obviously not the attainment of cessation which has this function, but the consciousness-moment directly antecedent to attaining the meditation, ‘The attain ment of cessation is to Vasubandhu no more than the absence f full functioning consciousnesses. ‘The solution of this treatise is to introduce the concept of store-consciousness. In the attainment of cessation, the six consciousnesses are arrested by a powerful volition associated with the last conscious moment previous to this state, and all Psychic processes remain latently “within the store-conscious- ness”, which continues to function in a steady stream during ‘the entire time of immersement in the meditation. Continuity is maintained because each moment-seed influences the next. Sabghabhadra’s objections are met because the citta-series is no longer one-tiered, but rather involves now a separate series underlying the six consciousnesses. The retribution of a past ‘act may be explained by the volition of that act influencing the store-consciousness, and after the maturation of the seed there, its penetrating to a fully conscious level in the form of a pleasur- able or unpleasurable result. The fact that the citta antecedent ©F concomitant to this result may be beneficial whereas the re- Sul itself is painful, no longer disturbs, for the pain can be traced90 Seven Works of Vasubandiu back to the unbenefcility of the seed previously deposited Within the store-consciousness. With the reciprocality of the relationship of the store-consciousness and the six conscious- nesses, memory can also be explained. A perception leaves an impression in the store-consciousness, which colors future cognitions, but, in addition, under special circumstances and in connection with special stimuli, the seed of that perception may suddenly evolve, penetrating the sixth consciousness in the form of a memory. Tn this treatise, there are also arguments against theories of the Arya-Sammitiyas, Buddhists not completely dedicated to the theory of momentariness, who admit a more-or-less unchang- ing personalty-entity.* Vasubandhu argues against any en- tity “self”. He also argues against the Simmitiya thesis that manifest action represents a “‘motion”, “a progression of the same thing to another locus”. Vasubandhu subjects all of the Simmitiya arguments for the existence of “motion” to sharp criticism, Just because a thing is perceived to be the same from one moment to the next does not mean that the thing at ‘moment | and the thing at moment 2, may not be really diferent, because of subtle differences not directly pereeived, The im- plication of Vasubandhu’s arguments is that if things are not changing in every moment, they could never change at all. Vasubandhu in this treatise reduces actions having karmic retribution to volitions. This is a point of ethics in which Vasubandhu is at great odds with the Jains. The Jains would say that any action which causes suffering, whether intentional ‘of not, must have a retribution of suffering, since to the suffer- ing being, it is irrelevant whether the action was intentionally committed or not. The unintentional suffering caused to others by eating is still the eater’s responsibility : thus the Jain way out is sallekhand, final self-starvation, But Vasubandhu ‘must, to be consistent, focus on the intentions of the “agent”. The Jain path of absolute non-action, so as to avoid unintended infliction of suffering, cannot appeal to Vasubandhu, since asa Mahiyanist he is committed to the active alleviation of suffering. Many other problems are incidentally treated in this work, and many Abhidharmika categories subjected to criticism. See Simmliyarikaya-Sisra, of. Bareau, pp 123 ff A Discussion For the Demonstration of Action 1 Concerning the Text ‘A Discussion for the Demonstration of Action does not survive in ts original Sanskrit form. This translation is based mainly con the Tibetan rendering of ViSuddhisimha, Devendraraksita, and dPal-brtsegs (Peking/Tokyo ed. Tibetan Canon, Vol. 113, pp. 295 ff), with some references to the Chinese translation by Hslian-tsang (Taisho 1608-1609). Identifications of opponents have been supplied from the commentary of Sumatsila (Karma- siddhitik@, Peking/Tokyo ed. Tibetan Canon, vol. 114, pp. 203-223). Because of the difficulty of the subject matter, phrases omitted in the somewhat conversational treatment ‘of Vasubandhu have been supplied from this commentary also. It will be seen that this translation differs greatly from the only previous translation into an Occidental language, which is that of Lamotte (“Le Traité de PActe de Vasubandhu", Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 4 : 151 {1 There are even differences in the two translations as to which statements are Vasubandhu's, and which the opponent’s ! The translation presented here can safely claim to be the more accurate, inasmuch as it is based mainly on the Tibetan rather than the inflated Chinese, and follows the break-up of dialogue as itis presented in Sumati- ila. It should also be noted that though not all the arguments in the treatise proceed with the full criteria of inference-schema as demanded by A Method for Argumentation, Sumatisila, who is a master logician, provides us in each case with a full-blown inference complete with the necessary statements of invariable concomitance.Z gre cag A DISCUSSION FOR THE DEMONSTRATION OF ACTION (KARMASIDDHI-PRAKARANA) Homage to Arya Mafijusri-kumara-bhiitat 1, It is said in the sitras : “There are three kinds of acts : bodily acts, verbal acts, and mental acts.”* On this point 2. certain people (the Vaibhasikas) say : “The acts which are committed by the body are ‘bodily acts’; speech itself is ‘ver- bal action’, and both of these singly constitute “manifest and unmanifest’ action’ Acts which are associated with manast are ‘mental actions’, and they are equivalent to volitions.” But this matter has to be investigated at this point. What is this event which is called “manifest action” ? ‘Vaibhasika : To begin with, a “manifest action of the body” is a configuration which has arisen from a citta® which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it, V:. OF what is it a configuration ? Vaibhasika : It is a configuration of the body. V.. If it is a configuration of the body, how can one call it ‘an act which has been committed by the body? It is, after all, said to be an act committed by it. Vaibhasika : Since such an act (ic. a bodily act) has refer- fence to one part of the body in general, it is called “a confi- guration of the body”, (ie. a configuration of one part of the body, e.g. “a gesture of the hand”), and since it arises dependent upon the great elements” of the body in general, itis called “an ‘act committed by the body”. Verbal expressions which refer to things in general often also refer to their particular parts, as for instance when it is said “He lives in the village” or “He lives in the forest” (when what is meant is : “He lives in a house in the village” and “He lives under a tree in the forest”). V: What is the purpose of saying that it “has arisen from 4 citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it” ? Vaibhasike : Even though in speaking, there may arise a configuration of the lips, etc,, this description is not appropriate for such a configuration, because it has not arisen from a citta4 Seven Works of Vasubandiu which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it, but rather hhas arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to words. And though there may be a configuration which has arisen from the citta of a former aspiration, this de- scription is not appropriate for such a configuration, either, because it has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of- consciousness referring to it, but rather has also arisen from another citta, which is a retributory cause.® Vi Why is it called “manifest action” ? Vaibhisika : Because it informs one of (or: manifests to ‘one) a citta which is instigating action in another. “By the transformations of external motions, one is shown the intentions in living beings’ hearts, ‘As one is shown a fish living hidden in a lake, through the transformations of the waves.” Well then, what is this which you call “configuration” ? Vaibhasika : It is this: “length”, ete. Vz But what is “length”, ete. ? Vaibhisika : It is that by virtue of which cognitions such as “This is long! This is short !” arise. V: To which sense-field does it belong ? Vaibhisika : To the sense-field of visibles. 3. V: Now is configuration to be regarded as a special kind of atom, like color’, as some special aggregation of atoms, for as some single entity pervading the aggregations of color- atoms, ete. ? If it were a special kind of atom, “long”, “short”, ‘etc., would have to be comprised separately in each part of the aggregate to which it belongs, just as color is. If, on the other hhand, it were some special aggregation of atoms, what would be the difference between it and a special aggregation of color- atoms ? It could be due to a special aggrégation of these colors that “long”, “short”, etc., ariseas cognitions. Moreover, if it were a single entity pervading the aggregation of color-atoms, then, because it would be single, and because it would pervade, it would have to be perceived separately in each part of the aggregation, because it would have to be in all of the parts at fone time. Or else it would not be a single entity, because it would be constituted with various parts.” Furthermore, your ww ‘A Discussion For the Demonstration of Action 95 basic doctrine which states that the first ten sense-fields are aggregations of atoms, would be invalidated by this view. And it would strengthen the doctrine of the school of Kanada, which states that composites exist as entities which penetrate their components.!? 4. "When an aggregation of color appears in one direction in great quantity, it evokes the idea of “long”. If it appea thus in only a small quantity, it evokes the idea of “short When it appears equal in each of four sides, it evokes the idea of “square”. If there is an equal distance everywhere from its circumference to its center, it evokes the idea of “circular”, When a greater quantity of color appears amassed at its cen- tral portion, it evokes the idea of “convex”, and when a smaller uantity appears there, it evokes the idea of “concave”. When it appears to go along in one direction, it evokes the idea of “even”, and when it appears to go along in various directions, it evokes the idea of “uneven”. *Though ideas of various configurations may arise when a variegated quilt appears in such a manner, yet following your theory these various kinds of configuration cannot logically be situated within one locus, just as, for example, various colors cannot. But if they could, the idea of every configuration could arise in reference to every locus, and this is also not the case. (On the other hand, one configuration for each locus is ruled out because one can construe various configurations in one section of an embroidered quilt) This being so, there is no separate entity “configuration”. We form ideas of “long”, ‘tc., when color, and nothing else, is situated in special loci. AAs for example we form ideas of new “entities” with regard to arrays of trees, birds, ants, ete. There seems to be no flaw in this reasoning, 5. Vaibhasika : If this is so, how is it that something is rnible at a long distance through an object-of-conscious- ness of its configuration, while it is not discernible through an ‘object-of-consciousness of its color-aggregations? ** 'V: Well, how is it that some things are discernible through an object-of-consciousness of the configurations of the arrays ef. Koia IV ad 3 ¢ (LVP p. 10, 2nd ats). id, though the Kosa argument i not quite identical gene Biedic 1M vicd (6 Omes96 ‘Seven Works of Vasubandive of groups to which they belong, while they are not discernible through an object-of-consciousness of their main own confi- guration? There is no further entity involved here. As a matter of fact, whea we are confronted with something at a long distance, or in @ dark cave, the object is undiscernible through objects-of-consciousness referring to either color oF configuration, and we say, “What is this? I can only perceive it dimly. What are we seeing here 7” Since this is so, it should bbe recognized that at this time, its color is not being clearly perceived, nothing more.* (ie. when its color is not clearly Perceived, its “configuration” isn't, either.) For this reason, ‘manifest action consisting of “configuration” cannot be demons- trated 6. Certain other people (the Arya-Simmitiyas) say fest action is a movement which has arisen from a hhas an object-of-consciousness referring to 'V: What is the purpose of saying that it arises from a citta Which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it? Arya-Simmitiya : To exclude the movement of the lips, etc., which takes place in speaking. V: What is this which you call “movement” ? Arya-Simmitiya : Iti the progression (of a thing) to another locus. - V: To which senso-field does it belong ? Arya-Simmitiya : To the sense-feld of visibles. 7. V: How do you know that there exists such a progres- sion of the same thing to another locus ? Acya-Sammitiya : Because there is no special differentiating characteristic which can be ascertained for the thing (ie. any special characteristic which would distinguish the thing at locus from the thing subsequently at locus 2). V : But even though there is no special characteristic which can be ascertained for a product arising in a dycing-process when it is removed immediately after conjoining with the con- ditions allowing it to arise in the process, i.e. fire, the sun, ice, plants, ete, yet this does not mean thatthe product is not some- thing else than what has existed before. And though there *Koia IV ad 3 €(LVP p. 11) develops the counter argument in a slightly

You might also like

• Seven - Works - of - Vasubandhu Anacker 2005 PDF

  

  100% (4)

  Seven - Works - of - Vasubandhu Anacker 2005 PDF

  504 pages
• 8686-Article Text-8494-1-10-20110301

  

  No ratings yet

  8686-Article Text-8494-1-10-20110301

  6 pages
• Chatterjee-Vasubandhu's Vijnapti-Matrata-Siddhi (With Sthiramati's Commentary)

  

  No ratings yet

  Chatterjee-Vasubandhu's Vijnapti-Matrata-Siddhi (With Sthiramati's Commentary)

  208 pages
• 《The Book of Analysis (Vibhaṅga) 》 (The Second Book of the Abhidhammapiṭaka, Translated from the Pāḷi of the Burmese Chaṭṭasaṅgīti Edition) by P.A. Thiṭṭila (London Pali Text Society, 1969) (scan) PDF

  

  0% (1)

  《The Book of Analysis (Vibhaṅga) 》 (The Second Book of the Abhidhammapiṭaka, Translated from the Pāḷi of the Burmese Chaṭṭasaṅgīti Edition) by P.A. Thiṭṭila (London Pali Text Society, 1969) (scan) PDF

  648 pages
• Complete Seven Works of Vasubandhu The Buddhist Psychological Doctor 2nd Edition Stefan Anacker PDF For All Chapters

  

  100% (16)

  Complete Seven Works of Vasubandhu The Buddhist Psychological Doctor 2nd Edition Stefan Anacker PDF For All Chapters

  78 pages
• Asanga Abhidharmasamuccaya

  

  100% (3)

  Asanga Abhidharmasamuccaya

  180 pages
• Nagarjuna's Malamadhyamakakarika - JAY L. GARFIELD PDF

  

  No ratings yet

  Nagarjuna's Malamadhyamakakarika - JAY L. GARFIELD PDF

  394 pages
• Karma Yoga Sutra Satka Swami Vivekananda Ed Swami Harshananda R.K. Mutt

  

  100% (2)

  Karma Yoga Sutra Satka Swami Vivekananda Ed Swami Harshananda R.K. Mutt

  136 pages
• Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asanga, Rahula, 1971, Boin Webb, 2001

  

  No ratings yet

  Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asanga, Rahula, 1971, Boin Webb, 2001

  359 pages
• Karl Potter Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy Volume IX Buddhist Philosophy From 350 To 600 A.D.

  

  100% (1)

  Karl Potter Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy Volume IX Buddhist Philosophy From 350 To 600 A.D.

  285 pages
• Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asanga, Rahula, 1971, Boin Webb, 2001

  

  100% (3)

  Abhidharmasamuccaya, Asanga, Rahula, 1971, Boin Webb, 2001

  384 pages
• A.K. Warder - Indian Buddhism (2004, Motilal Banarsidass)

  

  100% (1)

  A.K. Warder - Indian Buddhism (2004, Motilal Banarsidass)

  313 pages
• The Philosophical Concept of Sa Skāra by Lakshmi Kapani PDF

  

  No ratings yet

  The Philosophical Concept of Sa Skāra by Lakshmi Kapani PDF

  234 pages
• 2015 528854 Neelakesi-1936

  

  No ratings yet

  2015 528854 Neelakesi-1936

  842 pages
• Systems of Buddhist Thought

  

  100% (2)

  Systems of Buddhist Thought

  386 pages
• Book Reviews

  

  No ratings yet

  Book Reviews

  3 pages
• Yoga Vasistha

  

  No ratings yet

  Yoga Vasistha

  770 pages
• The Philosophy of The Yoga-Vasistha PDF

  

  No ratings yet

  The Philosophy of The Yoga-Vasistha PDF

  770 pages
• Madhyanta Vibhanga

  

  No ratings yet

  Madhyanta Vibhanga

  174 pages
• Mahayana Texts Ad

  

  100% (2)

  Mahayana Texts Ad

  567 pages
• Anacker 1972

  

  No ratings yet

  Anacker 1972

  13 pages
• A Study of The Madhyantavibhaga-Bhasya-Tika

  

  100% (1)

  A Study of The Madhyantavibhaga-Bhasya-Tika

  405 pages
• Dharma Samgraha

  

  100% (1)

  Dharma Samgraha

  104 pages
• The Philosophy of The Yoga Vasistha

  

  100% (1)

  The Philosophy of The Yoga Vasistha

  762 pages
• Select Works of Sankaracharya

  

  100% (3)

  Select Works of Sankaracharya

  278 pages
• Madhyantavibhanga Distinguishing The Middle From The Extremes by Bodhisattva Maitreya Future Buddha

  

  No ratings yet

  Madhyantavibhanga Distinguishing The Middle From The Extremes by Bodhisattva Maitreya Future Buddha

  170 pages
• Indian Buddhism Warder 1970-2004

  

  No ratings yet

  Indian Buddhism Warder 1970-2004

  622 pages
• Bimala Churn Law TR Debates Commentary Atthakatha

  

  No ratings yet

  Bimala Churn Law TR Debates Commentary Atthakatha

  263 pages
• A Study of Mahayanasamghara III: The Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories

  

  No ratings yet

  A Study of Mahayanasamghara III: The Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories

  214 pages
• Buddha Teachings

  

  No ratings yet

  Buddha Teachings

  3 pages
• Systems of Buddhist Thought

  

  No ratings yet

  Systems of Buddhist Thought

  383 pages
• Nagarjuniana Studies in The Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna (Buddhist Tradition Series) (CHR Lindtner)

  

  100% (2)

  Nagarjuniana Studies in The Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna (Buddhist Tradition Series) (CHR Lindtner)

  325 pages
• Vasisthas Yogaswami Venkatesananda

  

  100% (1)

  Vasisthas Yogaswami Venkatesananda

  774 pages
• Nagarjuniana Studies in The Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna PDF

  

  100% (5)

  Nagarjuniana Studies in The Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna PDF

  325 pages
• (Buddhist Tradition Series) CHR Lindtner - Nagarjuniana - Studies in The Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna (Buddhist Tradition Series) - Motilal Banarsidass Pub (1987)

  

  No ratings yet

  (Buddhist Tradition Series) CHR Lindtner - Nagarjuniana - Studies in The Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna (Buddhist Tradition Series) - Motilal Banarsidass Pub (1987)

  325 pages
• A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics (Dhammasangani) 1975

  

  100% (1)

  A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics (Dhammasangani) 1975

  485 pages
• Seven Works of Vasubandhu The Buddhist Psychological Doctor 2nd Edition Stefan Anacker 2025 Full Version

  

  No ratings yet

  Seven Works of Vasubandhu The Buddhist Psychological Doctor 2nd Edition Stefan Anacker 2025 Full Version

  99 pages
• Rhys Davids - A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethic, Dhammasangani PDF

  

  100% (1)

  Rhys Davids - A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethic, Dhammasangani PDF

  485 pages
• The Concept of Mind in Early Buddhism

  

  100% (6)

  The Concept of Mind in Early Buddhism

  215 pages
• Death Process Sceen

  

  No ratings yet

  Death Process Sceen

  12 pages
• How To Generate Bodhicitta

  

  100% (1)

  How To Generate Bodhicitta

  3 pages
• Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra

  

  No ratings yet

  Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra

  111 pages
• The Mystic Cosmos

  

  100% (1)

  The Mystic Cosmos

  276 pages