The Rise ofAnthropological Theory + A History of Theories of Culture Thomas Y. Crowell Company | arrears Marvin Harris COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SWS SOSCopyright © 1968 by Thomas ¥. Crowell Company, Inc All Rights Reserved. Except for use in a review, the reproduction of ttilization of this work in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, for other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying land recording, and in. any information storage’ and retrieval system is forbidden without the written permission of the publisher LG, Card 68-27392 ISBN 0690-70522'8 (Text) 04690703336 (Trade) Designed by Judith Woracek Barry. Manufactured in the United States of America, Furst Printing, May, 1968 Second Printing, May, 1969 ‘Third Printing, August, 2972 Fourth Printing, Aps, 1972 Acknowledgments are gratefully made to the following authors and publishers ‘who have granted permission to use selections from copyrighted pub Tications oss, ¥, Race, Language and Culture (New York: ‘The Macmillan Company, ‘940)- Capynght © ogo by Franz Boas. uno, ert, to Selected Baer in Antvoplogy (Bele: Univenty of alfa Pes, 296) aouuiens, £5 The Elementay Forms of Religious Life, tans, J.W. Swain {uendon: Ceorge Alen & Unwin Ltd, 1985). puneneis, &, The Rules of Sociological Method, tans. S. Solovay and J. Mueller (Glencoe, Il: The Free Press, 1938). Copyright © 1938 by Geosge Catlin, ronvs, €.9, Habitat, Economy and Society (London: Methuen & Company, Ltds New Yor: F.P. Dutton, Inc, 1934) ocun, A, The Nature of Culture (Chicago: ‘The University of Chicago Press, 1952). Copyright © 1952 by The University of Chicago Pres. évestaauss, C Totemism, trans, R. Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) Copyright @ 1962 by Presses Universitaires de France; translation copy right © 1963 by Beacon Press sowie, x, History of Ethnologieal Theory (New York: Faster and Rinchart, 1937) aaunbock, €, Social Structure (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949) Copytight © 1949 by The Macmillan Company, vise, x, With Heart and Mind (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Win. B. Eecdmans Pub- lishing Company, 1962) nanctirre-aRows, AR, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West Ltd; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952). sarin, &, “Resiew of W. H.R, Rivets ‘Instinct and the Unconscious: A Contrib tion to a Biological Theory of Psycho Neurosis" ed. D. Mandebaum, Selected Writings of Edward Sapir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949) stewan, J, "The Economic and Social Bass of Primitive Bands,” ed. R. Lowic, Bisays in Antinopology Presented to A.L. Kroeber (Berkeley: Univer sity of California Press, 1936) srewanp, J., and ¥. seivzeR, “Function and Configuration in Archaeology ‘American Antiquity, IV_(1938), 4-20. sonunes, WG, and Ac. KELLER, The Setence of Society (New Haven: Yale Uni versity Pres, 1927) ruton, #3, Primitive Culture (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1938)Acknowledgments ‘When an author has completed his book, it would seem a simple task to thank those who have helped him in its preparation. In actuality the task is not an easy one at all. Apart from all the advice and assis. ance received from colleagues, I am indebted in many ways to those men and women whose ideas and conclusions are the subject of this book. It was their writings and rescarch that helped shape and define the discipline of anthropology; and though I disagree with many of their formulations, this book is in a sense a result of these disagree ments, It is not possible to name all those who have helped in the prepara tion of this volume, but I would like to single out those who made specific suggestions for the improvement of the manuscript. I bene fited especially from the contributions of Elman Service, Robert Cameito, Morton Fried, Harvey Pitkin, Eric R. Wolf, Robert Cum- ming, Victor Bamouw, Abraham Rosman, Robert Murphy, Nan Pendrell, Alexander Alland, Michael Harmer, William Willis, Alexan- der Lesser, and Barbara Price. T should also like to thank my students and associates for their help and encouragement, especially Rolf Knight, Richard Davis, and Adrian DeWind for their invaluable assistance in all matters pertain ing to references and the bibliography, and to Amelia Hess and Esther Modell for their general patience and fortitude,Contents YS 3 Introduction 1 Enlightenment 8 Reaction and Recovery: The Early Nineteenth Century 53 Rise of Racial Determinism 80 Spencerism 108 Evolutionism: Methods 142 ‘The Evolutionists: Results 180 Dialectical Materialism 217Contents 9 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Historical Particularism: Boas 250 The Boasian Milieu 290 The Ethnographic Basis of Particularism 301 Kroeber 319 Lowie 343 Diffusionism 373 Culture and Personality: Pre-Freudian 393 Culture and Personality: Freudian 422 Culture and Personality: New Directions 449 French Structuralism 464 British Social Anthropology 514 Emics, Etics, and the New Ethnography 568 Statistical Survey and the Nomothetic Revival 605 Cultural Materialism: General Evolution 643 Cultural Materialism: Cultural Ecology 654 Bibliography 688 Index 765 SS 8S A cewrmien began as the science of history. Inspired by the tri- lumphs of the scientific method in the physical and organic domains, ninetcenth-century anthropologists believed that sociocultural phe- nomena were governed by discoverable lawful principles. This con- viction joined their interests with the aspiration of a still earlier period, extending back before the social sciences had been named, to the epochal stirrings of the cighteenth-century Enlightenment and the vision of a universal history of mankind. Whatever the weaknesses ‘of the theories propounded by the early anthropologists under the sway of ninetcenth-century scientism, we must concede that the issues addressed—origins and causes—gave their writings an enduring sig- nificance. Commencing with the twentieth century, however, and continuing through the carly forties, efforts were made to alter the strategic premise upon which the scientism of anthropological theory depended. Almost simultaneously, there arose in England, France, Germany, and the United States, schools of anthropology that in one way or another rejected the scientific mandate. It came to be widely believed that anthropology could never discover the origins of institu 1‘The Rise of Anthropological Theory tions or explain their causes, In the United States, the dominant school flatly asserted that there were no historical laws and that there could not be a science of history. It has been said in defense of this period that anthropological theory had become overspeculative and that an interval of intense dedi cation to the collection of empirical data was precisely what was most needed at the time. In retrospect, however, it is apparent that the data were not collected without theoretical bias, or theoretical consequence. While ostensibly operating within a restricted theoretical frame, conclusions of the widest possible significance bearing on the nature of history and culture were formulated. These spread to adja cent disciplines and were incorporated into the intellectual prospectus of the public at large. On the basis of partial, incorrect, or misinter preted ethnographic evidence, there emerged a view of culture that ‘exaggerated all the quixotic, irational, and inscrutable ingredients in hhurgan life, Delighting in diversity of pattern, anthropologists sought cout divergent and incomparable events. They stressed the inner, sub- jective meaning of experience to the exclusion of objective effects and relations. ‘They denied historical determinism in general, and above all, they denied the determinism of the material conditions of life. By emphasizing inscrutable values, vain prestige, itrational motives, they discredited the economic interpretation of history. Anthropology came increasingly to concem itself with idiographic phenomena, that is, with the study of the unique and the nonrepetitive aspects of history. This state of affairs did not for long go unchallenged. A strong countercurrent tending toward the reinstatement of nomothetic— that is, generalizing—interests was already making itself felt in the 1930's. Since then, the interest in regularities has spread, and the form, if not the substance, of scientism is once more in the ascen: dancy. Yet, it remains uncertain to what extent anthropology is about to resume its eminence as the science of history. The resistance to this formulation of the grand strategy of anthropological rescarch has acquired the strength of habit. Many anthropologists find it sufficient to apply themselves to limited problems cast in an ostensibly scientific idiom but deliberately detached from questions of causality and origins. Various strategems have been introduced that avoid state ‘ments of causality, while conveying the impression that an explanation is being offered. Rather.than explanations of sociocultural differences and similarities in terms of true nomothetic principles, we have so- called functional explanations; we have correlations in which it is not Known how the causal arrow points, and we have “accounting for” in 2 1, Introduction terms of paradigmatic cognitive frames, which are accepted as givens, although nothing is known about how long they have existed. “My main reason for writing this book is to reassert the methodologi- cal priority of the search for the laws of history in the science of man, There is an urgency associated with this rededication, which grows in direct proportion to the increase in the funding and plan. ning of anthropological research and especially to the role anthro- ppologists have been asked to assume in the planning and carrying out Of intetnational development programs. A general theory of history is requited if the expansion of disposable research funds is to result in something other than the rapid growth in the amount of trivia being published in the learned journals, The publishing of more and mote about less and less is an acceptable consequence of affluence only if specialization does not lead to an actual neglect or even obfuscation ‘of fandamental issues, Needless to say, if the anthropological contribution to. intesna- tional development programs continues without benefit of a general theory of sociocultural change, the consequences could be disastrous in a more literal sense. It may be possible to defend the so-called middlerange theories in relation to pute research, the idea being that work can proceed on an eclectic, piecemeal basis in the expecta- tion that the fragments will eventually fall into place when macro- theory is created. But the middle-range, piecemeal approach to directed cultural change exposes anthropologists to the charge of it- responsibility. Actually, there is little to commend the iden of middle ground theory, even without the possible onus of development ‘programs that result in underdevelopment. In theoretical as well as applied anthropology, eclecticism is frequently nothing more than a convenient excuse for not having to bother with the question of the scientific importance of a particular research option. ‘Were mete exhortation on behalf of macto-theory the subject of this volume, I should not have troubled myself with its writing. But the matter is considerably more advanced. The burden of my argu ment is that the basie principle of a macrotheory of sociocultural evolution is already known. This is not to say that it is known in the form that is familiar to us from physics—as the Newtonian laws of motion, or as the laws of quantum mechanics—but rather ina fashion that closely approximates the kind of principle that has governed research in evolutionary biology since the time of Darwin ‘The kind of principle to which I refer, in other words, has its precise analogue in the doctrine of natural selection. In this analogy, the ‘meaning of “principle” is not equivalent to the statement of the spe 3The Rise of Anthropological Theory cific “laws” of evolution, but rather to the statement of a basic research strategy, from the application of which there is an expectation that a nomothetic causal understanding of sociocultural phenomena may be achieved. Darwin's contribution, which we shall ave occasion to discuss Tater on, was to direct attention to the general conditions re sponsible for bio-evolution, namely, differential reproductive success. It remains for the biological researcher to discover the particular con- catenation of causes in any given instance of speciation responsible for the reproductive success of later over earlier forms. believe that the analogue of the Darwinian strategy in the realm of sociocultural phenomena is the principle of techno-envitonmental and techno-economic determinism. This principle holds that similar technologies applied to, similar environments tend to produce similar _atrangements.of labor it production and distribution, and that these in tum call forth similar kinds of soctal groupings, which justify and ‘coordinate their activities by means of similar systems of values and Deliefs. Translated into research strategy, the principle of techno: environmental, techno-economic determinism assigns priority to the study of the material conditions of sociocultural life, much as the principle of natural selection assigns priority to the study of diferential reproductive success. ‘The strategy in question will at once strike the sensitized reader as, ¢ form of materialism aud. indsd-Lbetbatr to it throughout this book as the strategy “fatal eal) Although I am tempted to avoid the term “materialism” in deference to the reflexive oppro- brium which it elicits among the public at large as well as among, ‘many social scientists, to do so would be pusillanimous, Tt may be said that one of the central purposes of the present volume is to decontaminate, so to speak, the materialist approach to history. This result can be achieved only if the strategy of cultural materialism is carefully separated from philosophical materialism on the one hand, and dialectical materialism on the other. In the former cease, we deal with metaphysical disputations concerning the essence of being—the question of the ontological priority of matter over mind, ‘This issue may well be left to the philosophers, since it has no direct bearing on the statement of the laws of sociocultural evolution. To take a position conceming the direction of the causal arrow in socio: cultural systems does not oblige us to enter into a discussion of the ultimate nature of reality. In the case of dialectical materialism, how- ever, there is much that requires our closest attention. Dialectical materialism is a sub-case of cultural materialism, which has been incorporated into the political creed of Marxist communism. The 4 3. Introduction dialectical and revolutionary components in this brand of materialism hhave not been confirmed by anthropological research. Indeed, the rystification of world historical processes under dialectical materialism is no less severe than under bourgeois cultural idealism. My aim has been resolutely to steer a course independent of the ideologues of the cold war. I shall recognize in the writings of Marx and Engels achieve- ‘ments of unparalleled importance for a science of man; but I shall also insist on the ertor of Marx and Engels’s attempt to shackle cultural materialism to the spooks of Hegel’s dialectic. I am con- vinced that the coming generation of social scientists is prepared to say to party hacks and bourgeois toadies, “a plague on both your houses,” and to get on with the business of secking the truth, wherever the search may lead. In order to achieve a fair hearing for the cultural-materialis strategy, wwe are compelled to embark upon an historical survey of the develop- ment of anthropological theories of” culture. The reason for thus passing in review the major anthropological theories of the past two hundred years is to prove that the principle of techno-economic and technoenvironmental determinism has never been consistently ap- plied across the range of phenomena with which anthropologists are familiar, despite the fact that anthropologists have played a crucial role in discrediting this option. I shall demonstrate that the failure to apply the cultural-materialist strategy resulted not from any reasonable program of oriented research, but from the covert pressures of the sociocultural milicu in which anthropology achieved its disciplinary identity. This failure is all the more remarkable in view of the ad: mitted and demonstrable inability of the science of man to develop a viable alternative to the prematurely discredited strategy, and in view of the passion with which anthropologists have argued that they have remained free of ideological bias. ‘The reader has now been forewamed that, while this book is a history of anthropological theories, it is intended to prove a point rather than to provide an encyclopedic inventory of all the figures who hhave in any degree ever made suggestions concerning the causes of sociocultural phenomena. While there are useful purposes to be ful filed by a compendium approach, it appears to me far more urgent for anthropologists and all those who feel the need for resuming and carrying forward the scarch for the principles governing the trajectory ‘f sociocultural evolution to devote themselves to a critique, rather than a summary, of where we have come from and where we ate Boing. ‘This larger enterprise obliges us to view anthropology in a fashion 5‘The Rise of Anthropologi to which its practitioners have all too readily grown unaccustomed. As a iscipline which above all others is competent to concem itself with the fundamental questions of sociocultural causality, anthropology rust cease to regard itself as being somehow outside of and detached from and above the main currents of Western thought. During the idiographic interlude at the beginning of this century, an image of anthropology as a new discipline contributed greatly to the élan of the pioneering fieldworkers. ‘The achievements of the present were stressed almost to the complete neglect of the historical conditions out of which the discipline had arisen. The result has been that many anthropologists have suffered a form of deculturation—they hhave been cut off from their own cultural roots. The penalty for this discontinuity is a form of naiveté similar to ethnocentrism. The ulture” of the latest research design and practice is taken as natural, while altematives are barely considered or remain unimagined The provincialism of this situation is intensified by the scientific community's disposition to regard research as the summum bonum of all scientific activity. A kind of pragmatism has resulted, in which it is held that a bit of rescarch is to be judged only on its own merits—that is, for what it has accomplished. But by returning to the historical sources of our discipline, we shall come to understand that research must be evaluated not only by what it has done, but also by what it has not done. One might argue that the choice of a particular research topic and research strategy does not prevent others from making a different set of choices. But the limitations on deployable time and manpower oblige us to consider carefully the relative contributions of alternative research options and strategies to the development of nomothetic theory. It is only by a study of how currently acceptable fashions in anthropological research developed within the wider in- tellectoal habitat that we shall eam to appreciate what has been achieved as well as what has not been achieved in anthropological theory. It follows from the importance of an ample vision of the history of fdeas that the selection of Key figures in the history of anthropological theory should be guided by criteria of intellectual relevance and in- fluence, as well as by disciplinary identity. For this reason, certain explicitly anthropological personalities have been omitted, while philos ophers, economists, historians, etc, are discussed at length. A certain amount of calculated indifference to disciplinary boundaries is abso- Tutely essential for an understanding of the viewpoint of the period which predated the formal crystallization of socialscience specialties It would undoubtedly be useful to sustain this coverage through to 6 the present moment, since many features of contemporary anthro- pological theory are shared by adjacent disciplines. Most regrettable in this regard is the omission of relevant twentieth-century sociological theory. But the prospect of further enlarging the present volume acted as a deterrent, giving rise to a result which the reader may wish to regard as a merciful inconsistency. I should like to take this opportunity to apologize for what may appear at times as unnecessarily severe criticism of venerated col Jeagues, in both present and past generations. Although I have sought to avoid ad hominem discussions, it has seemed to me at this par- ticular moment in the development of anthropological theory that critical judgments deserve priority over polite ones. It has certainly not been my intention to be disrespectful of the men and women who have devoted themselves, frequently with great personal courage and sacrifice, to the ideal of furthering the understanding of the ways ‘of mankind. My interest throughout the writing of this book has been to advance the theoretical standing of anthropology among the social sciences. Nothing said herein may properly be construed as demeaning anthropology’s universalistic and comparative mission, nor as de- tracting from the personal stature of the extraordinarily talented, enlightened, and humanly involved scholars with whom anthropology has always been so well endowed.Enlightenment 2 T. rise of anthropological theory began during that hallowed epoch in Westem culture known as the Enlightenment—the period roughly coincident with the one hundred years from the writing of John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) to the outbreak of the French Revolution, Yet the importance of this epoch in the formation of the science of culture has gone unrecog nized, principally because of the prolonged influence of anthropolo gists who were uninterested in such a science or who denied that it ‘was possible, For there have been many anthropologists who believed that the human actors free will, the uncertainties of national character, and the tangle of chance and circumstance in history thwart all scientific efforts in this domain. Those who believe that it is man’s unique destination to live outside the determinate order of nature will not concede the importance of the eighteenth century. Many contemporary anthropologists regard the scientific aspirations of the Enlightenment as the very quintessence of that vanity to which the prophet of Ecclesiastes referred all new ideas, Thus, Margaret Hodgen (1964:484) has written about the eighteenth century as if 8 2. Enlightenment it were a mere “aftermath” to the Middle Ages, asserting furthermore that “recent centuries have witnessed litle that warrants the title of theoretical innovation.” But for Hodgen and the anthropologists upon whom she relied for her misunderstanding of contemporary theories of culture, all scientism in sociocultural matters is a delusion. This bbook is predicated on a contrary belief; and hence, for us, all that is new in anthropological theory begins with the Enlightenment, We shall see in the present chapter how the social philosophers of the eighteenth century first brought the central issues of contemporary anthropology into focus, and how they sought resolutely, but without success, to formulate the laws governing the course of human history and the evolution of sociocultural differences and similarities ‘The issues of sociocultural inquiry brought forth during the En- lightenment embrace most of the themes that serve cither as the foundation of contemporary theory or as the basic frame of reference in terms of which modem sociocultural rescarch is still being carried out. In the present chapter, we shall review these contributions as they relate to vitally important aspects of modern theory. We shall inguite into the degree of success with which the Enlightenment philosophers were able to identify the sociocultural domain as a distinct field of inquiry characterized by a uniquely human elabora- tion of culturally determined behavior; to what extent and upon what philosophical and epistemological grounds the proto-anthropologists of the Enlightenment believed that sociocultural phenomena were a legit- imate domain for scientific study; the extent to which ideas concerning the nature and direction of sociocultural evolution were set forth in the Enlightenment, a hundred years before Darwin. Finally, we shall describe and evaluate the first halting approximations to a theory of sociocultural causation based on naturalistic premises. THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE CULTURE CONCEPT According to Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, the ‘concept of culture, in the sense of a “set of attributes and products of human societies, and therewith of mankind, which are extrasomatic and transmissible by mechanisms other than biological heredity did not exist anywhere in 1750” (2952:145). Although these authors recognize and cite the use of the term “culture” (only in the Ger- manic Kultur form) and “civilization” (in both French and English) during the eighteenth century, they postpone the emergence of the modern concept until well into the nineteenth century. They concede 9‘The Rise of Anthropological Theory only that “By 1850 it was de facto being held in some quarters in Germany, though never quite explicitly . ..” (ibid.) ‘There is actually no reason why a definition of culture must or should emphasize the extrasomatic and nonhereditary factors, even though most twentieth-century anthropologists regard these as essen tial to the concept. Since we have yet to discover how to separate hereditary from acquired influences in a given human or infrahuman population’s entite repertory of behavior, we can scarcely hope to Adclimit an operationally valid cultural field of inquiry in such theoreti- cal terms. The definition that Kroeber and Kluckhohn propose is one step beyond a mere concept of culture; it is rather a theory of culture, namely, an explanation of how the features of a particular popula tion’s behavioral repertory are established, i.e, by learning rather than by genetic processes. It is not particularly vital in the present context, however, to argue whether the prevailing formula is a concept of culture or a partial theory of culture; rather let us determine to what extent the ideas to which Kroeber and Kluckhohn refer are anticipated in the years preceding the French Revolution. ‘A more generous concer with de facto or implicit, as opposed to formal or explicit, definitions justifies a much earlier historical thresh- old for the culture concept than that set by these two authors. The principal defect in their history of the concept is that they fail to locate its development within the main currents of the scientific awakening, They neglect to point out that the implicit, or de facto, formulation was not a mete appendage of an occasional interest in customs and institutions, which has to be ferreted out of obscure passages in the collected works of forgotten authors. On the contrary, from our vantage point, it is apparent that a nascent version of the concept and theory of culture was the major theme in the intel lectual ferment that preceded the French Revolution. Indeed, these ideas have always had revolutionary political, as well as intellectual, auspices and consequences. Not only is the modem culture concept implicit in the ideological antecedents of the French Revolution (and of the American Revolution as well), but the very substance of the revolutionary program proclaimed the validity of the concept and testified to its importance. THE EMPTY CABINET Tt was actually the seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke who provided the metaphysical foundation upon which an- thropologists over two hundred years later were to rear the first formal 10 2. Enlightenment definitions of culture. In fact, Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding was the midwife of all those modern behavioral disei- pines, including psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology, which stress the relationship between conditioning environment and ‘human thought and actions. “He stood in relation to the eighteenth century much as Freud and Marx stand to ours, Even his enemies ‘were obliged to employ his terms” (arr 1964:6). What Locke attempted to prove was that the human mind at birth was an “empty cabinet” (Lock 1894 1:48; orig. 1690). The knowledge or the ideas with which the mind later comes to be filled are all acquired during the process of what we would call today enculturation. Although there are distinctly human, as opposed to animal, capacities, there are no innate ideas. This applies equally to such abstract logical principles as “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” as to what Locke calls practical principles, or moral rules of conduct: Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree, | appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Where is that practical truth that is uni- versally received without doubt or question, as it must be if in nate? Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most civilized people, amongst whom the expesing thei children, and leaving them in the elds to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice; as litle condemned or scrupled as the beget- ting them? Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the same graves with their mothers, if they die in childbirth; or des patch them, if pretended astrologer declares them to have un happy stars? And ate there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expose their parents, without any remorse at all? In a part of Asia, the sick, when their ease comes to be thought desperate, ate carted out and laid on the earth before they are dead; and Teft there, exposed to wind and weather, to perish without asss- tance or pty. It is familiar among the Mingrelians, a people pro fessing Christianity, to bury their children alive without scruple. ‘Thete are places where they eat their own children. The Carib: bes were wont to geld their children, on purpose to fat and eat them. And Garcilso de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on theie female captives, whom they kept as concubines for that purpose, and when they were past breeding, the mothers themselves were Killed too and eaten. The virtues whereby the Tououpinambas believed they merited paradise, were revenge, and eating abun- dance of their enemies [ibid.66). uThe Rise of Anthropological Theory Locke was more concemed with the epistemological issue of how Knowledge or ideas ate established than specifically with how indi- viduals and whole tribes and nations come to possess such (not al- ways accurately reported) customs. However, since the prevailing view of the times regarded behavior as the consequence of knowledge, the answer which he supplied on the origin of understanding served ‘equally as the answer for verbal and nonverbal behavior. All of man’s understandings Locke attributed to the perceptions conveyed through “sense impressions.” Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:—Ffow comes it to be farnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless faney of man has painted on it with an almost end- less variety? Whence has i all the materials of reason and knowl edge? To this I answer, in one word, from exPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself [bid :123}. ‘The inescapable consequence of this doctrine is that different ex- periences, or, in modem terms, differential environmental exposure, will produce both individual and national differences in behavior. The rewlutionary sociopolitical implications of Locke's arid discussion should be evident: No social order is based upon innate truths; a change in the environment results in a change in behavior. In the words of Claude Helvétius, whose On Man (1772) was one of th most systematic developments of the radical implications of Locke's theories: Locke and I say: The inequality of minds is the effect of a Known cause, and that cause is the difference in education foeetvérwus 1818:71; orig. 1772], . . . all then in us is acquisi tion... [mexvénis 1946:1019]. Our understanding, our tal ents, our vices and virtues, our prejudices and characters . . . are not therefore the effect of our several (hereditary) temperaments ‘Our passions themselves are not dependent on them [ibid.:1019] T have proved that compassion is not either a moral sense, or an innate sentiment, but the pure effect of self-love. What fol: lows? ‘That itis this same love, differently modified, according to the different education we receive, and the circumstances, and sit: uations in which chance has placed us, which renders us humane for obdurate: that man is not bom compassionate, but that all may or will become so when the laws, the form of government and their education lead them to it [ibid.:1022).. 2 Enlightenment TOLERATION VERSUS RELATIVISM Pethaps the reason why anthropologists have been reluctant to trace the culture concept to Locke's Essay is that Locke, in company with all of the eighteenth century’s formal and de facto students of culture, despite the power they attributed to experience to shape customs and beliefs, did not abandon the notion that there were ‘universally valid moral beliefs and right and wrong rules and modes of conduct. Tt was not the concept of culture that was absent in 1750, but rather the moral indifference of cultural relativism. Neither Locke not his followers cated to leap from the elusiveness of innate ideas to the abeyance of moral censure. And thus, during the next century and a half social science followed Locke in his conviction that despite differences in experience, reason, correctly applied, would eventually lead man, everywhere, to the same social institutions, moral beliefs, and scientific technical truths, Just as the information of the senses ‘worked over by reason leads to an understanding of the laws of mo tion, so too would empirical inquiry eventually lead one to a knowledge of religious and moral verities. In the meantime, however, before these truths are demonstrated, the watchword is tolerance. For where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the truth ofall that he holds, or of the falschood of all he condemns . ..? ‘The necessity of believing without knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this feeting state of action and blindness ‘we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform our- selves than constrain others [Locke 1894, 11:375; orig. 1690]. Toleration of alien ways is a characteristic attitude among Des cartes, Vico, Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, Turgot, Helvétius, and many other famous Enlightenment authors; but this toleration should not be confused with moral indifference or genuine cultural relaiv- ism, By the same token, moral commitment should not be equated with the lack of a culture concept TREASURE OF SIGNS ‘The very year for which Kroeber and Kluckhohn assert that there was no culture concept anywhere in existence is the year when the culture concept implicit in Locke's metaphysics was given its clear- est and most enduring expression. This achievement, too long ignored by anthropologists, was the work of a twenty-five-year-old genius who later became one of France's most famous statesmen—Anne Robert B¢ of Anthropological Theory Jacques Turgot. It was in 1750 that Tuxgot conceived his Plan for Two Discourses on Universal History, a project that his duties as finance minister under Louis XV prevented him from completing, but which, even as a sketch, formulates several theories that are still essential to cultural anthropology. The subject matter of the universal history which Targot planned corresponds precisely to what was in fact cultural anthropology’s subject matter during the second half of the nineteenth century and to what perhaps has once again become its principal concemn Universal history embraces the consideration of the successive progress of humanity, and the detailed causes which have contrib: uted to it: the earliest beginnings of man, the formation and mix ture of nations; the origins and revolutions of government; the development of language; of morality, custom, arts and sciences; the revolutions which have brought about ‘the succession of cempies, nations, and teligions [roxcor 1844:627; orig. 1750) ‘This is followed by a statement that corresponds to one of the accepted modern definitions of culture: Possessor of a treasure of signs which he has the faculty of multi plying to infinity, he [man] is able to assure the retention of his acquired ideas, to communicate them to other men, and to trans mit them to his successors as a constantly expanding heritage [ibid ‘At least two categories of definitions in Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s ‘compendium—"Emphasis on Social Heritage or Tradition” and “Em- phasis on Symbols"—are clearly in debt to Turgot. Bronislaw Malinow- ski defined culture as follows: “This social heritage is the key concept of cultural anthropology. It is usually called culture” (xrorsex and KLUCKHOHN 1952:47). According to Leslie White, ““The cultural cate- gory, or order, of phenomena is made up of certain events that are dependent upon a faculty peculiar to the human species, namely the ability to use symbols” (ibid.:69). Kroeber himself, in contrasting ‘human with biological evolution, streed the cumulative cflects of culture or what Turgot calls a “constantly exparkling heritage” (ef ROEDER 194825) As in the case of Helvétius, the relationship of all these ideas to Locke is explicit in Turgot’s explanation of how individuals come to display behavioral differences: A lucky arrangement of the fibers in the brain, a greater or lesser quickness of the blood, these are probably the only differences which nature establishes among men. Their spirits, or the power and capacity of their minds, display real inequality, the causes of 4 Enlightenment which we shall never know and never be able to reason about. All the rest is the effect of education, and that education is the result of all our sense experience, of all the ideas we have been able to acquire from the cradle onward. All the objects which sur- round us contribute to that education; the instructions of our parents and teachers are only a small part of it [runcor 1844:645) ENCULTURATION tis clear that when “education” is equated with an individual's entire history of sense experience, a concept very similar to that of ‘enculturation is being employed. ‘This radical belief in the power of enculturation is one of the great themes of the Enlightenment. From it there issues the whole liberal as well as socialist tradition of class and racial democracy. One of its most important technical expressions, is the doctrine of “psychic unity,” the belief that in the study of sociocultural differences, hereditary (genetic) differences cancel each other out, leaving “experience” as the most significant variable. The origin of this doctrine has been associated quite erroneously with the ‘writings of some of the mid- and late- ninetcenth-century cultural ‘evolutionists. Indeed, as I shall endeavor to show in subsequent chap- ters, the main nineteenthcentury trend was to deny what the eigh- teenth century had established in this regard. As we shall see, the pristine fervor with which the idea of psychic unity was advanced by ‘Targot and his immediate successors, especially Helvétius, was not recaptured until the Boasian period. But by then, the consciousness of continuity with the Enlightenment had been thoroughly shattered. When Franz Boas wrote his Mind of Primitive Man in 1911, the only two eighteenth-century writers he deemed it relevant to mention were Boulainvilliers and Linnaeus, neither of whose ideas were especially representative of the Enlightenment (noas 1938c:19ff.). Yet, the fol- lowing passage from Turgot would, except for style, serve as a summary of Boas’ position ‘The primitive dispositions are equally active among barbarians and civilized peoples. They ate probably the same in every place and time, Genius is spread throughout humankind somewhat like gold in a mine. The mote ore you mine, the more metal you extract. The more men you have, the mote great ones or ones fit ting to become great. ‘The chances of education and circu stances develop them or let them be buried in obscurity fruncor 18442645) ‘One of the most intriguing by-products of Locke’s environmentalism was the popular surmise that races of men might exist whose cultural exposure was so impoverished that they would be indistinguishable 15The Rise of Anthropological Theory from animals. Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men (1755), implied that it was not beyond the power of education to accomplish the transition from ape to man. This possiblity had its most ardent advocate in the Scotsman James Bumett, Lord Monboddo. In his Of the Origin and Progress of Language (1774), Monboddo argued that the great apes were really uncultured human beings. Monboddo's life-long belief that with proper conditioning apes could Team to talk, and his insistence that a race of men with tails would be found in Asia and Africa drew forth the scom of many of his contemporaries (TiNKER agaziiaff.). Monboddo's fights of fancy, however, were grounded in a very solid appreciation of the power of enculturation and the plastic ity and indefiniteness of human nature: the conviction that oranga tans were wild men is merely an extreme instance of the popular faith in human perfectiblity. It is... difficult to determine how far the natural capacities of the brutes may go with proper culture; but man, we know, may, by education and culture continued for many years, be trans. formed almost into an animal of another species. ‘Thus with respect to his body, though he is undoubtedly by nature a terres- trial animal, yet he may be so accustomed to the water, as to be come as perfectly amphibious as a seal or an otter—And, with respect to the mind, itis impossible to say how far science and philosophy may carry it. The Stoics pretended, in that way, to make a god of a man [Mona0000 1774:32-23). ETHNOGRAPHY As I have previously indicated, there is no compelling reason for insisting that the culture concept be made to include theories of psychic unity, dependence on learning, and extrasomatic heritage Stripped of these factors, the culture concept comes down to behavior patterns associated with particular groups of peoples, that is, to “cus toms,” or to a people's “way of life.” In this sense, a de facto concept of culture is probably universal. Certainly, the practice of ethnog- raphy, the description of culture, isnot dependent upon the theory that custom is a strictly extrasomatic heritage. It is doubtful that # great cighteenth-century Jesuit ethnographers, upon whom the philo sophes were so dependent for their comparative information about Primitive institutions, shared Locke's philosophy, despite their own educational mission and despite the papal dogma that the American Indian had 2 human soul and hence should be instructed in the sacra ments, Nonetheless, it would be rather difficult to establish the point that these industrious ethnographers lacked a de facto notion of 16 Enlightenment culture. For example, Martin Dobrizhoffer's Account of the Abipones is certainly not recommended for its sccular scientism. Noting the diversity of Paraguayan languages, Dobrizhoffer comments: ‘Truly admirable is their varied structure, of which no rational per son can suppose these stupid savages to have been the architects and inventors. Led by this consideration, I have often affirmed that the variety and artful construction of languages should be reckoned amongst the other arguments to prove the existence of an eternal and omniscient God [1822, 11:157] Such views, however, did not prevent Dobrizhoffer from rendering a fairly accurate account of Abipone economy, material culture, wedding ‘ceremonies, marriage, death and mourning ceremonies, warfare, and dozens of other standard ethnographic categories. The ethnographic coverage achieved by Joseph Lafitau in his influential account of the Customs of Anierican Savages Compared with Those of Earliest Times (1724) should be considered in the same light. The table of contents of this book provides an interesting precedent for the uni- versal pattern which Clark Wissler elaborated in 1923 (P. 74) Lafita’s categories Wiser’ eategories Religion Speech Political government Material traits Marriage and education Act Occupstions of men Knowledge Occupations of women Religion Warfare Society Commerce Property Games Government Death, burial, and mourning War Sicknéss and medieine Language ‘The problem with Lafitan was not so much that he lacked a concept of culture, but that his view of American Indian cultural processes was completely trammeled by belief in the fall and the Biblical version of the dispersal of the tribes of Israel. This did not prevent im, as Sol Tax (1955b:445) has noted, from being the first European to describe a classificatory kinship terminology Probably the greatest ethnographer of the eighteenth century was the French scholar J. N. Démeunier. Although a stay-at-home himself, Démeunier rendered an invaluable service to his contemporaries by translating numerous ethnographic and travel reports, Démeunier and his works were widely cited before the close of the eighteenth century, but fell into an oblivion from which they were not rescued until Van Gennep found and bought The Customs and Manners of 7The Rise of Anthropological Theory Different Peoples (1776) on a Paris quai for a “tidiculous price” (vaw cexner 1910:23). Obscurity descended once again when Lowie neglected to mention Démcunier’s name, much less accord him prece- dence as an ethnographer over C. Meiners. The latter's Outline of the History of Mankind (1785) is modeled after Turgot’s and. Voltaire's essays on “universal history” and contrasts. sharply with Demeu hier’ essentially: synchronic and ethnographic interests. Démeunier's working categories include: Food and Cookery, Women, Marriage, Birth and Education of Infants, Chiefs and Rulers, Distinction of Rank, Nobility, Warfare, Servitude and Slavery, Standards of Beauty, Modesty, Pody Adomment and Disfiguement, Astrology, Magic, Society, Domestic Manners, Penal Codes, Trials, Punishment, Sui cide, Homicide, Human Sacrifice, Sickness, Medicine, Death, Fu nerals, Scpulchres, and Burials. Dozens of non-European peoples are cited, including the Kalmucks, Mexicans, Ethiopians, Tartats, Hotten- tots, Tahitians, Ostyaks, Samoyeds, Auracanians, Yakuts, Tupinam. bis, Siamese, Chinese, Caribs, Dahomey, Jaggas, New’ Zealanders (Maori), Lapps, Maldive Islanders, Japanese, Kamchatkans, Gaunches (Canary Islanders), Omaguas, Moxes, Koryaks, Indian Fakie, Ikinois, Loango, Ambrym Islanders, Bukarians, Horons, Iroquois, Javanese, Senegalese, Congo, Mandingo, Nayars, Tibetans, Mariana Islanders, Benin, Ceylonese, Natchez, Peruvians and Surinam Bush Negroes. Can one do this kind of comparative ethnography and not have a concept of culture? What Démeunicr lacks, in company with other great ethnographers of his own and former times such as Herodotus, al Idris, Gabriel Soares de Souza, Cieza de Leon, Hans Staden, Bemal Dias, William Dampier, Frangois Raynal, Cadwallader Colden, and Prangois Xavier de Charlevois, is not a concept of culture, but rather the slightest clue as to how cultural differences might be scientifically explained. It was the philosopher Locke and his direct intellectual hits, and not the ancient or modem ethnographers, who cleared the way to the scientific study of culture HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND NATURAL LAW ‘The possibility of creating a branch of learning that would do for human affaits what physics had done for inanimate nature~"dis- cover” its Iaws—acted as a powerful stimulus upon the best minds of the Enlightenment. In its earliest stages, the search for this natural order was guided by Descartes’s emphasis upon mathematico Aeductive logic. In retrospect the results of Cartesian social science are 18 2, Enlightenment scarcely more commendable than the medieval reckoning of the num- ‘ber of angels on a pinhead, But at least issues were joined and problems defined. Thus, Baruch Spinoza’s attempt to apply Des- cartes’s geometric method to human behavior has had no lasting influence upon the social sciences, but Spinoza’s vision of nature, one and continuous, including man and his products, constituted a fanda ‘mental break with the past. Spinoza remarked in his Ethics (1632): ‘Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be ‘treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phe nomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive rman to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is de: termined solely by himself . .. [quoted in nace. 1948:273] Spinoza flatly rejected such views: Nothing comes to pass in mature, which on beset down to Saw thetein, for natu is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her eficacy and power of action; that, natr's avs and ordinances, whereby al things ome to pass and change from One form to another, are everywhere and alvays the same, so that there should be one and the same method of undewstanding the natore of all things ‘whatsoever, namely, throwgh nature’ uni versal ls and les iid). By “method of understanding,” however, Spinoza meant the kind of Cartesian exercise which he had previously employed to furnish a geometric proof of God's existence. His science of man was to enjoy the same prospectus, as though human behavior were a matter of “tines, planes and solids” (ibid.). More modem in its attitude toward sociocultural phenomena was the landmark magnum opus of Giambattista Vico: The New Science (1725). Vico specifically warned against ‘subjecting everything to the method of geometry” (caromen 1959:10). His new science was to be concemed with the empirical synchronic regularities of social life—"the perennial springs of the natural law of nations” (vrco 1948: (92; orig. 1725)—as well as with the regularities of history. This new ‘queen of the sciences” was in one of its two principal aspects “a history of human ideas, on which it seems the metaphysics of the human mind must proceed” (ibid.). The natural determinism, which Vico believed he had discovered, was so awe-inspiring that it required a divine providence to set it in motion; but once begun, history un- folded with unswerving regularity: 19‘The Rise of Anthropological Theory ‘The decisive sort of proof in our science is therefore this: that once these orders were established by divine providence, the course of the affairs of the nations had to be, must now be and will have to be such as our science demonstrates, even i ‘worlds were produced from time to time through etemity [ibid.:92-93), It is not for the mere notion of historical determinism that Vico and other cighteenth-century founders of social science command our attention. In Westem theology, doctrines of national predestination are as old as the belief in a “chosen people,” or a world running its downward course toward Armageddon and the second coming. The point is not merely that there is a direction or intelligibility to hhuman history, but rather, that this orderliness is a consequence of natural rather than divine conditions. In actual practice, as we shall see, none of the eighteenth-century heralds of the “new science” was capable of sustained adherence to the emergent conception of undeviating orderliness. Throughout the period there runs a counter current that threatens to efface the mechanistic posture. ‘This was the widely held belief that men in general at all times possessed the ability to change their social orders by exercising choice, rational ot irrational, as the case might be. The paradox of a determined order in which the actors respond to unidentifiable causes, or willful inspira tions, is beyond the capabilities of most of the philosophes to resolve. ‘This difficulty helps to explain more precisely what Vico meant by his new science. It was Vico's belief that since man was the author of human history, he had a better chance of understanding cultural ‘than physical events. “He believed that really to know the nature of something, it was necessary to have made it” (carbiver 1959:10). Yet, paradoxically, the autonomous sef-creativeness of man was to be recon: ciled with the fact that “law exists in nature” (vico 1948:1) A similar problem is evident in the work of Montesquieu, whose ‘The Spirit of Laws (1748) is one of the most famous’ monu: ments of the age, In the preface, Montesquieu announces the orderli ness he has discovered in the realm of sociocultural events: T have first of all considered mankind, and the result of my thoughts has been that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners, they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy. I have laid down the frst principles, and have found that the particular cases follow naturally from them; that the histories of all nations are only consequences of them; and that every pat: ticular law is connected with another law, ot depends on some other of more general extent . . . [1949:Ixvii orig. 1748] 20 2. Enlightenment ee ‘Montesquieu then proceeds to invoke material causative factors, mast of which, as we shall see (p. 42), relate to climatic conditions. ‘Nonetheless, neither his faith in universal law nor his essentially secular orientation prevents him from urging in effect that culture is, after all, inscrutable: “It is in the nature of human laws to be subject to all the accidents which can happen, and to vary in proportion as the will of man changes” (ibid.:58-9). The paradox of this position was expressed in Emile Durkheim's summary of Montesquieu’s contribu. tion to social science: He is convinced that this sphere of the universe is governed by laws, but his conception of them is confused. According to him, they do not tell us how the nature of a society gives rise to social institations, but rather indicate the institutions that the nature of a society requires, as if their efficient cause were to be sought only in the will of the laugiver [puxxurist 1960:65; orig. 1893) Durkheim also correctly. noted that since the time of Montesquien “all social science has endeavored to dissipate this ambiguity.” One can scarcely agree with Durkheim, however, that it was the ninetcenth- century sociologist Auguste Comte who first “established that the laws Of societies are no different from those governing the xest of nature” (ibid.). Moreover, Comte, whose faith in natural law was based on a dozen or more eighteenth-century predecessors, was no more su cessful in establishing the empirical vindication for such a belief, nor in resolving the paradox of cultural determinism and free will. Cer- tainly, as we shall see, there were among Comte’s contemporaries bolder approximations to the physicalist model. The hesitancy with which eighteenth-century writers applied the Newtonian model to history is well illustrated in the work of Vol taire and Rousseau, two of the brightest luminaries of the age. Voltaire's Essay on the Customs and Spirit of Nations (1829; orig. 2745) is an important contribution to the development of modern historiography, especially in its attack on the then prevailing theologi- cal views of history. But Voltaire’s fundamental orientation to the past is that time proclaims the omnipresence of stupidity. The author of the phantasmagoric travesty Candide (1759), despite his powerful influence in spreading the Newtonian gospel, did not take dly to a science of culture. Similarly, Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose Political doctrines were widely invoked by the Jacobins, contributed little, if anything, to the growth of this aspect of cultural theory. Rousseau’s concern in The Social Contract (3762) with establishing the general or popular will as the legitimatizing force in political aThe Rise of Anthropological Theory organization belongs, rather, with those romantic mystifcations of history which replace the notion of natural law with unpredictable and ungovernable national or tribal collective souls. We shall meet again with this form of mystification in Chapter 8 MATERIALIST MODELS A fundamental influence in the expansion of the eighteenth century's natural-determinist outlook was exerted by J. O. de La Met trie’s Man a Machine (1748). La Mettric was a practicing physician with medical experience. Thus, his concern with the man-machine idea had practical as well as philosophical motivation. Although Descartes's “animal machine” was an obvious forerunner, itis important to note that La Mettrie did not propose any comprehensive philosophical sys- ‘tem, but, rather, that he regarded the man-machine as the best possible hypothesis to account for such recently discovered facts a the irritabil ity of detached muscles and the peristalsis of the intestines (La MErTRI 1912:229; orig. 1748). Experience and observation arc the only guides he admits (ibid.:88). “The anthor of L’Homme Machine became the first to launch the medical sciences fatefully and creatively, as others had already done with mathematics, physics, and astronomy, onto the vast and brightly lit stage of Enlightenment thought” (vawraNtan 1960:94). But it is as an argument for the continuity of man’s behavioral capacities with those of infrahuman organisms and in- ert matter that the man-machine thesis made its mark upon the social sciences. The doctrine that “the transition from animal to man is not violent” (r4 MErTaIE 1912:103) is pregnant with consequences that are still unfolding in such fields as physiology, physical anthro- pology, and primatology. In the case of the social sciences, there is a wellcharted path of intellectual awakening running from La Mettrie to D'Holbach and Diderot (of. tance 1925, I:4glf.) Pethaps the most uninhibited and systematic discussion of man’s place in nature's determinate order came from the pen of Paul Henri Thity, Baron 'Holbach. Written under the name of the dead aca. demican M. Miraboud, and published under secret auspices, The System of Nature, or The Laws of the Physical and Moral World (2770) steadfastly embraced the full consequences of La Metre’ ‘materialism ‘Man is the work of nature; he exists within nature and is subject to nature's laws. . . [p'nornactt 1770, I:a]. There is neither ac- cident nor chance in nature; in nature there is no effect without 2 2. Enlightenment sufficient cause, and all causes act according to fixed laws . . [ibid.:75]. Man is therefore mot free for a single instant of his life... [ibid.:219), Unlike La Mettrie, who was a deist and who simply did not think it was profitable to discuss the unknowable, D'Holbach intended to destroy every vestige of traditional religion, including prime movers, as well as souls, ghosts, and demons. “The universe,” he declared, “consists of nothing but matter and motion” (ibid.:10). It is in this brusque abandonment of the skeptical mode that modem philo- sophical critiques of metaphysical materialism find most grist for their mill. For D'Holbach apparently accepted the forms in which the external world presents itself to human consciousness as ultimate reality, Matter was for him the literal universe of macro-objects; force the push-and-pull experience of human muscle, ‘As many twentieth-century philosophers of science have noted, modem physics itself is no longer committed to the kind of solidity which to philosophical materialists made matter seem more real than intangible thoughts. From the point of view of the social sciences, how- ever, the literature of philosophical disputation concerned with proving the inadequacy of D’Holbach’s metaphysical materialism is no more relevant than the somewhat lesser output concemed with preserving D'Holbach’s metaphysical honor. It would seem obvious that D'Holbach’s materialism was intended to tid the scientific community of the debilitating effect of super naturalism, That this is the only working assumption by which mod- cern physical science proceeds remains as unassailable today as in the cighteenth century. ‘That matter and energy ate interchangeable is not expressed by a formula in which devils and angels constitute variables. Nor has the discovery that the orbits of individual clectrons ate unpredictable (in conformity with the Heisenberg principle) couraged physicists from attempting to state the general determinate principles which govern all large samples of subatomic events. But 1 Shall have more to say on this in subsequent chapters. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND FR WILL ‘The lingering disrepute of D’Holbach’s uncompromising athe- ism still stands between him and a proper recognition of his influence upon behavioral science. In particular, the manner in which he avoided the paradox that Durkheim attributes to Montesquiew had an important effect on the theories of Marx. Since the behavior of the 2B‘The Rise of Anthropological ‘Theory ‘human organism is not exempted from the reign of universal law, it follows that the material influences impinging upon an individual, together with his innate physical character, are theoretically sufficient to account for his actions. What then accounts for the subjectively perceived impression of voluntary performance and choice? We do exercise choice, D'Holbach concedes; but it is a choice dictated by our wants and needs. Since we usually “want” what we choose, we ex perience the illusion of free choice. Actually, however, freedom is nothing more than the liberty to choose or act on behalf of wants that have been established by processes over which we have had no control (o'notsact 1770:2028f.). ‘The significance of this viewpoint for the development of the concept of culture has already been discussed. Here, let it suffice to say that most of the modern behavioral sciences hhave in large measure concerned themselves. with untangling the conditions and processes which make an individual's or group's choice predictable, despite the apparent absence of material constraint in so much of what we do. PREDICTABILITY With the possible exception of D’Holbach and Helvétius (see pp. 43.) the philosophes invariably equated the orderliness of human history with the progressive perfection of mankind’s rational decision: ‘making policies. The expansion of science to include human affairs was, therefore, in itself the most important source of sociocultural change in the process by which humanity would eventually come to be en. dowed with “rational” social systems. According to some students of the Enlightenment, the consummate equation of natural law with right reason was achieved in Marquis de Condorcet’s Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrés de Esprit Humain (Outline of the Intellectual Progress of Mankind) (1795). “No other volume pro: duced in eighteenth-century France presents so faithfully the views of man and of the world held by the philosopher. Its attitude toward hu- ‘man society was inspired by the physics of Newton, in which the con: ception of uniform, universal, natural laws that govemed the universe, ‘was made to apply to social organization” (suaPiko 1934:259) ‘After sketching the advances achieved during the ninth epoch of world history, ic, from the time of Descartes to the formation of the French Republic, Condorcet's faith in the uniformity of nature em: boldens him to predict the main events of the nest, or tenth, epoch, Why should it not be possible, he inquires, to foretell man’s future? Since the only grounds for belief in the truth of the natural sciences is m4 2. Enlightenment “hat universal laws . . . which regulate the phenomena of the uni verse are necessary and constant” (conpoxcer 1822:262; orig. 1795), knowledge of the future should be as certain as that of the present and past: “If man is able to predict with almost complete certainty the phenomenon whose laws are known ... why regard it as a chimerical enterprise to foretell the future destiny of the human species . . . 2” (Ibid.) There isa rather sad irony surtounding the circumstances under which Condorcet’s Outline, called by Croce the “last will and testa ment” of the eighteenth century (SHAPIRO 1934:260), was composed. In 1793, Condorcet, urging lawfulness and moderation, stumbled into the crossfire between the anything but lawful and moderate leaders of the second phase of the French Revolation. Hunted by the Jacobins during the nine months of writing the Outline, he was finally caught in 1794 and died in jail, despite his stubborn faith in the power of reason to guide human behavior, He failed to see that Robespierre, who char acterized Condorcet as a timid conspirator working “ceaselessly to darken the light of philosophy by means of the perfidious rubbish of his paid-for shapsodies” (ibid.z97) was no less rational than he. Nature, at least, had sponsored both of them. EARLY THEORIES OF SOCIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION Evolution, taken to mean the change of one form into an- other, is a concept which few, if any, ideological traditions have failed to apply to sociocultural phenomena, ‘That this understanding of evolution is the historically critical one in Western culture, despite its simplicity, is evidenced by the resistance with which the bare notion of biological transformation was greeted. ‘The mere proposal that one biological species might have had its origin in another was regarded as a grave threat to Europe's traditional ideological order. This, however, was an oddity of the Judeo-Christian’ tradition. Nothing comparable occurred when theories were proposed concern- ing the transformation of institutions and customs. Evolutionary doctrines were, after all, an essential part of the Biblical account of the origin of humanity. It will be recalled that according to the Old Testament, among the first men there was neither sex nor family nor economics, government, warfare, ete. Sub- sistence activities required practically’ no effort. This state of affairs was terminated by a foreign migration resulting in family life and onerous subsistence tasks. Economic specialization is announced 25‘The Rise of Anthropological Theory shortly thereafter, with Cain the hunter and tiller of fields, and Abel the Keeper of flocks. Then, the first crime occurred. This led, among Cain's descendants, to the development of urban life. Cities flour ished until they were destroyed by a catastrophic flood. They sprang up again, however, with a high tower as safeguard against future inundations, This provoked a supematural retribution, whereby the previous linguistic unity of the world was shattesed, and men found themselves speaking mutually unintelligible languages. Polytheistic religions developed among the linguistically distinct tribes and na: s. Later, monotheism was instituted among one of them by supernatural act. At the same time, new basic legal and moral princi- ples were established. Although the New Testament is not concemed with sociocultural evolution to the same extent, there is certainly no doctrinal negation of the possibility of fundamental changes in customs and institutions. In itself, the Christian Bible proclaims the orthodoxy of the notion that old religious patterns are subject to evolutionary change. ‘The novel contribution of the eighteenth century to historical per spective, therefore, cannot have been the mere notion of fundamental sociocultural change; much less was this the achievement of the nine teenth-century evolutionists. Rather, it was in the eighteenth century that a particular construal of the superorganic evolutionary process was achieved, which not only influenced all subsequent cultural evolu: tionary doctrines, but which also channeled the belated awakening in biology along special and quite inappropriate tines. The Enlightenment version of sociocultural evolution challenged the orthodox European outlook in two fundamental ways: The substance of the Biblical version of the origin of institutions, and the order in which they unfolded were systematically contradicted. Secondly, as I have already emphasized, the mechanisms responsible for sociocultural. transfor mation were now regarded as purely natural expressions of cause and effect relations. Tn effect, in the matter of sociocultural evolution, the Enlighten: ment merely restored an existing ancient doctrine to a position of intellectual respectability. Thus, all evolutionary thought during the Enlightenment betrays the influence of the great firs-century-s.c. Roman materialist poet-philosopher, Lucretius. In his On the Nature of Things, Lucretius, drawing upon still earlier evolutionary notions advanced by the Greek Epicurus, achieved a level of sociocultural and bioevolutionary understanding that set him ahead of his times by at least eighteen centuries. For Lucretius’ evolution was a cosmic process, 6 SE 2, Enlightenment responsible for the diversity of all levels of phenomena, A confi ence of atoms formed the world, In the warm, damp soil of the young earth, vegetable life appeared. Later came the animals, includ- ing man. Spontaneous generation ceased and the earth no longer bore new life. Monstrous variations on existing forms appeared, but they did not survive. Early man started as a brute, hardier than modem man, largerboned, strongersinewed, and less affected by climatic extremes. At fist, men lived like beasts, without the plow and without iron tools with which to work the fields, plant, or cut down trees These early men ate only what the sun and ‘rain provided: they lacked clothing and built no permanent houses, but lived, instead, in caves and in Brushwood shelters. Lacking the institution of marriage, they followed a carcer of sexual promiscuity. But their lot was not a happy one, for food was scarce and many died of hunger. Lucretius sought the beginnings of human speech in animal communication. Although he was unable to solve the problem (no one ever has), he surmised that language could not have been the invention of one man, but must, rather, have been the result of a long evolutionary process (LUCRETIUS 1910:197-215) UNIVERSAL HISTORY Enlightenment evolutionary reconstructions were concerned with a wide variety of evolutionary change. Voltaire’s Essay on the Customs and Spirit of Nations (1745), for example, emphasized the development of Christianity in Europe, including the growth of the clergy and the origin of the Sacraments, the development of European feudal systems, and the growth of the French and English parlia ments. Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-88) also represents a mature product of this mew approach to institutional history. Vico, on the other hand, was concerned more with recurring sociocultural transformations. Following precedents in Herodotus, he postulated that each nation evolves through three stages: the ages of the gods, heroes, and men—ages distinguished by the characteristic relationship between man and the supematural and somewhat resembling Comte’s theological, metaphysical, and posi tivist phases. ‘Thus, “the first men among the gentiles, simple and nude, and under the powerful spell of most vigorous imaginations encumbered with frightful superstitions, actually believed they saw the gods on earth.” As a result of the uniformity of ideas, “the Orientals, Egyptians, Greeks and Latins, each in ignorance of the others, after a‘The Rise of Anthropological Theory ‘wards raised the gods to the planets and the heroes to the fixed stars"; i.e, their religions made the supematural increasingly moze remote (vico 1948:4)- "Turgot’s Universal History is an example of Lucretian evolutionary thought which provides many striking precedents from nineteenth- and twentieth-century formulations. According to Tusgot, mankind hhad evolved through the stages of hunting, pastoralism, and farming, [The hunters] without provisions, and in the middle of the for- cst, are only able to occupy themselves with subsistence. The foods which the carth produces without agriculture are very meagre; it i necessary to resort to hunting animals; the latter within a given atea are very sparse and unable to supply nourish- ment for many men; as a result, the dispersal and diffusion of peoples is accelerated . . . families or nations are very far re moved from each other because each requires a vast space to nourish itself—that is the state of the hunters. They have no fixed point of abode and they move about with extreme facility from one place to another. The difficulty of living; a quarrel; fear ‘of an enemy is sufficient to separate the families of hunters from the rest of their nation [1844:629). It is interesting to note the resemblance between Turgot’s descrip tion of the hunting stage and Julian Steward’s (1955:122-23) ecologi cal interpretation of the patrilineal band, especially in view of the latter's insistence upon a rather sharp distinction between “universal” evolutionist and “multilinear” evolutionist approaches (see p. 642) It is clear that Turgot, with a universal stage in mind, nonetheless foreshadows Steward’s ecological orientation They follow where the hunt leads them, without fixed destina tion, If the hunt takes them in a given ditection they continue to get further apart. It is this which accounts for the fact that peo ples who speak the same languages are sometimes found sepa- rated by distances of over six hundred leagues, and are surrounded by people who don’t understand them. This is common among the American savages, where one finds, for the same reason, na- tions of 25 to 20 men [ruxcor 1844:629] Wherever there are domesticable species, men gradually find it more advantageous to gather animals into herds than to chase after them: ‘The life of the pastoralist is before long introduced everywhere these animals ate found; [but] the life of the hunting peoples is preserved in the parts of America where these species are absent. 28 er 2, Enlightenment ‘Only in Peru, where nature has provided a species of sheep called Tamas, is pastoralism found. This is probably the reason why that part of America was more readily civilized [ibid] Evidently, Turgot’s evolutionism also embraced a fairly modem no- tion of the relationship between economic surplus and social strati fication: “Pastoral people, with their subsistence more abundant and secure, are more populous. They become more familiar with the spinit cof property” (ibid.). ‘This tendency is increased in the agricultural stage: ““The earth was able to sustain many more men than were required to till it. Hence, to a greater extent than among pastoral peoples, men were free for other work: hence towns, commerce a greater ability in war; the division of labor, the inequality of men, domestic slavery and precise ideas of goverment” (ibid.:631). EVOLUTIONARY STAGES A generation of anthropologists in the United States has been brought up to believe that the division of cultural history into the stages of savagery, barbarism, and civilization was the ill-advised late- nineteenth-century accomplishment of Lewis Henry Morgan. But this trisection had already been performed by Montesquieu who noted: “There is this difference between savage and barbarous nations: the former are dispersed clans, which . . . cannot be joined in a body; and the latter are commonly small nations, capable of being united. The savages ate generally hunters; the barbarians are herdsmen and shepherds” (1949:176). In Turgot’s writing, the hunting, pastoral, and agricultural phases are still more prominent, and a culmination of this trend occurred with the publication in 1767 of Adam Fergu- son's An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Drawing upon Charle voix, Colden, Lafitan, Dampier, Wafer, and classical Greek and Roman, sources, Ferguson sought to improve upon the conjectural reconstruc tions of man’s primeval “state of nature.” Like Montesquieu, Ferguson was well aware of the dangers of ethnocentric distortions in accounts of primitive peoples Our method . . . too frequently, is to rest the whole on con- jecture; to impute every advantage of our nature to those arts which we ourselves possess; and to imagine, that a mere negation of all our virtues is a sufficient description of man in his original state. We are ourselves the supposed standards of politeness and civilization; and where our own features do not appear, we appre- hhend, that there is nothing which deserves to be known [1819:138; orig. 1767].‘The Rise of Anthropological ‘Theory Ferguson, unlike many of his contemporaries, refused to regard the savage cither as a simpleton or a superman. He possessed a true an- thropological vision in that he saw the primitive as a whole human being: ‘Who would, from mere conjecture, suppose, that the naked sav. age would be a coxcomb and a gamester? That he would be proud ‘or vain, without the distinction of title or fortune? And that his principal care would be to adorn his person, and to find an amuse ment . . . that he would thus share in our vices, and, in the midst of the forest, vie with the follies that are practised in the town . .. that he would likewise . . . excell us in talents and virtues; that he would have a penetration, a force of imagination and clocution, an ardour of mind, an affection and courage, which the arts, the discipline, and the policy of few nations would be able to improve. Yet these particulars are a part in the description which is delivered by those who have had opportunities of seeing ‘mankind in their rudest condition [ibid.:138-39) Ferguson, perhaps more clearly than any of his predecessors, correctly surmised the essential features of primitive economic and social organi zations. Moreover, with greater certainty than Morgan, he correlated the principal evolutionary stages with economic and social organi- zation and the “means of subsistence” (ibid.:175)—a phrase widely jn use Tong before Marx made it unfashionable. Among the people Of the world there are those who entrust their subsistence chiefly to hunting, &shing, oF the natural produce of the sol. They have litle attention to property, and scarcely any beginnings of subordination or goverament. Others, having possessed themselves of herbs, and depending for theit provision on pasture, know what it isto be poor and tich, They know the relations of patron and client, of servant and master, and by the measutes of fortune determine their station. This dis: tinction must create a material diference of character, and may fumish two separate heads, under which to consider the history of mankind in their nudest state; that ofthe savage, who is not yet acquainted with property; and that of the baxbaran, to whom it is, although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of eate and desire fibid.149] Ferguson, unlike many modern critics of the concept of primitive com- munism, did not confuse the communal ownership of strategic re sources among hunters and gatherers with complete absence of private property. Arms, utensils, and clothing are not shared communally. Erzoneously, however, he equated matsilincality and matrilocality with 30 2, Enlightenment this most primitive stage. But his phrasing of the political characteris- tics of low-energy hunters and incipient farmers is remarkably modern. “They have in fact no degece of subordination diferent from the distribution of function which follows the differences of age, talents, and dispositions. Personal qualities give an ascendant i the midst of occasions which requite their exertion; but in times of relaration, leave no. vestige of power ot prerogative (ii-153) Ferguson also saw, although only in barest outline, that the transition from primitive to state organized social systems involved fundamental changes in the role of the family and kinship, Thus, prior to the formation of the state, among savages and barbarians, “Families, like so many separate tribes, are subject to no inspection or government from abroad; whatever passes at home, even bloodshed and murder, are only supposed to concern themselves” (ibid.:1 56). EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION Ferguson’s analysis of the evolution of social organization was surpassed with the publication in 1771 of John Millar's Observa- tions Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society, Millar attempted to trace the evolution of the family, including sex relations and mar- riage forms, as well as the development of class differences and political systems. This great Scottish jurist philosopher was probably the first social scientist to stress the economic and educational (enculturative) functions of the family, over against sexual passions and romantic love: “The Savage is seldom or never determined to marry from the particular inclinations of sex; but commonly enters into that connec- tion when he arrives at an age, and finds himself in circumstances which render the acquisition of a family expedient or necessary, in order to his comfortable subsistence” (atuzak 171:7). He notes the prevalence of premarital sexual license among primitives and properly emphasizes the frequent harsh punishment for postmarital infidelity (ibid:10). He also identifies and discusses a surprisingly wide spec: trum of primitive kinship and marital institutions, including wife- Tending, polygyny, polyandry, brideprice, and matrilineality. In most of his interpretations and postulations of sequence, Millar is, in retro- spect, quite wrong, He advances the incorrect opinion that the more Primitive the group, the more degraded the women ate in relation to men. From this there follows the further error, that brideprice is an ‘expression of female servitude. Matsilincality is said to arise from the 31