Elements of the Arena Active Protection System include ring of explosive panels at lower margin of turret ring and

radar on turret roof.

Active Protective Systems:

Impregnable Armor or Simply Enhanced Survivability?
by Captain Tom J. Meyer
Why Develop Active Protective
Systems (APS)?

Your task forces mission is to attack

along Axis Mustang to seize OBJ Patton
and destroy elements of the 152nd MRR
in order to gain depth for the defense
and prevent the enemy from attacking
into 2nd BCTs northern flank. Your
company team attacks with steady momentum and sets its support-by-fire positions. You observe the enemy in his BPs
that your S2 had accurately templated,
and order your Bradleys to target their
TOWs on the enemy T-80s at a range of
2.5 km. They engage, and impact with a
cloud of fire and smoke, but to your
amazement, they have no effect. The enemy BMP-3s and T-80s immediately engage your positions with their laserguided AT-10 and AT-11 missiles. Your
Bradleys and a few tanks are hit and
your team is being attritted at an alarming rate. How is this possible? Why were
the TOWs ineffective?
Is this total fiction, or a real possibility
in our not so distant future? Various
types of active protection systems (APS)

ARMOR May-June 1998

are employed by many armies worldwide. They currently do not pose a significant threat to our forces, but as these
systems proliferate and technology improves, this picture may change radically.
In the context of armored vehicles, active protection is a defensive system designed to intercept, destroy, or confuse
attacking enemy munitions. Active protection systems can be broken into two
categories, active or hard kill systems and countermeasure or soft kill
systems. An active or hard kill system
engages and destroys enemy missiles or
projectiles before they impact their intended target. It is a close-in system of
antimissile defense that creates an active
fire zone of protection at a safe distance
around the vehicle.1 Countermeasure, or
soft kill, systems confuse and divert the
inbound enemy missile with the use of
munitions (obscurants), jammers, decoys, and signature reduction measures.
Why develop APS when tank survivability, lethality and mobility have increased dramatically over the last decade? Consider the following reasons:
Current active protective systems
(APS) are designed to counter antitank
guided missiles (ATGM), not high velocity, high explosive (HE) or kinetic en-

ergy (KE) tank-fired munitions. A system that can defeat modern antitank
weapons increases survivability for tankon-tank duels.
ATGM production, lethality and proliferation has far outpaced armor protection. This, coupled with advances in topattack ATGMs and munitions launched
by aerial platforms at ranges that far exceed that of direct support (DS) air defense systems, have multiplied the threat
to the armor force.
Latest-generation main battle tanks
(MBT) stand at around 60-70 tons, and
this figure (mostly driven by armor protection) is perceived by many combat
developers as the maximum tolerable
limit.2 The addition of explosive reactive
armor (ERA) packages would possibly
exceed maximum tolerable suspension
limits, thus degrading performance.
Moreover, latest generation shapedcharged antiarmor weapons have been
purposely developed to overcome ERA,
through either tandem or triple warheads, ballistic caps, or a change in the
attack profile.3
Awaiting a qualitative breakthrough
in armor or ERA is not an option for armored forces that are already outclassed
by modern weaponry.

 It is simply less expensive to increase

survivability by adding an ERA and APS
package than by buying or developing
new tanks in sufficient quantity. This is
more cost-effective to Middle Eastern
and Eastern European countries because
these packages are fitted to T-55s, T-62s,
and T-72s during routine retrofits and are
light enough not to degrade automotive
performance.
Furthermore, the future antitank
threat will, by definition, be omnidirectional, forcing tank designers out of their
cozy frontal arc fixation and into trying
to provide virtually the same level of
protection all around their vehicles. 4
Although many countries have developed soft kill or countermeasure systems, only Russia has moved from the
concept to production stage to create a
truly hard kill, or active system. Current
Russian active protection and countermeasure systems include: Drozd, Shtora1, and Arena.
Drozd

The first operational APS, named

Drozd, was developed by the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1982. This system
was installed on some 250 naval infantry
T-55As (redesigned T-55ADs) in the
early 1980s, and was designed for protection from ATGMs and antitank grenades.5 It used primitive millimeter-wave
radar sensors on each side of the turret
to detect incoming rounds. A filter in the
radar processor was intended to ensure
that the system responded only to targets
flying at speeds typical of ATGMs.
These are engaged by one or more shortrange rockets carrying fragmentation
warheads (similar to mortar rounds),
fired from four-round launchers (one on
each side of the turret).6 Drozd provides
maximum overlap and protection only to
the forward 60 portion of the turret,
leaving the sides and rear vulnerable.
The tank crew can change the orientation of the system by rotating the turret.

Drozd defensive launchers are visible at the outer edges of the turret, below and outside the
smoke grenade launchers. Activated by a radar system that detects incoming rounds, the systems short-range self-defense rockets use fragmentation warheads. (All story photos taken at
Omsk, Russia demonstration by Ron Dritlein of TACOM)

Drozd suffered from several shortcomings. Its radar was unable to determine
threat elevation levels adequately, and
the self-defense rockets would almost
certainly have caused unacceptably high
levels of collateral damage particularly to accompanying dismounted infantry.7 The system costs around $30,000
and is reported to have been around 80
percent successful against rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) in Afghanistan.8
Shtora-1

Shtora-1 is an electro-optical jammer

that jams the enemys semiautomatic
command to line of sight (SACLOS) antitank guided missiles, laser rangefinders
and target designators.9 Shtora-1 is actually a soft kill, or countermeasures system. It is most effective when used in
tandem with a hard kill system such as
the Arena, which is discussed later.
During the International Defense Exposition (IDEX) held in Abu Dhabi in
1995, the system was shown fitted to a
Russian T-80U and a Ukrainian T-84

MBT. The first known application of the

system is the Russian T-90 MBT that entered service in the Russian Army in
1993.10
The Shtora-1 system comprises four
key components, the electro-optical interface station, which includes a jammer,
modulator, and control panel; a bank of
forward-firing
grenade
dischargers
mounted on either side of the turret that
are capable of firing grenades dispensing
an aerosol screen; a laser warning system with precision and coarse heads; and
a control system comprising control
panel, microprocessor, and manual
screen-laying panel. This processes the
information from the sensors and activates the aerosol screen-laying system. 11
Shtora-1 has a field of view of 360-degrees horizontally and -5 to +25-degrees
in elevation. It contains 12 aerosol
screen launchers and weighs 400kg. The
screening aerosol takes less than 3 seconds to form and lasts about 20 seconds.
The screen laying range is between 5070 meters. 12

ARMOR May-June 1998

The system is activated when

the laser warning system detects
the threat laser system. The tank
commander (TC) presses a button
that automatically orients the turret in the direction of the threat. It
then triggers the grenade launchers. The aerosol screen is effective
over a frequency band of 0.4-14 The Shtora system jammers are the two boxes at either side of the gun tube. Grenade dischargers are at
Em. The composition of this the rear of the turret.
cloud is claimed to screen the
tank against laser rangefinders
radar then operates in the target-tracking
vehicles during retrofit. It is available for
and designators and is also claimed to be
mode, locking onto the target at between
sale on the open market.
sufficiently hot to seduce IR homing
7.8 and 10.06 meters from the tank, and
weapons away from the MBT. The elecenters target data into the computer. Aftro-optical jammers, designated TShU1Arena
ter processing this data, the computer se7, introduce a spurious signal over the
lects the countermunition (CM), one of
0.7-2.5 Em band, into the guidance cirthe rounds of protective ammunition that
The Arena defense aid suite (DAS) was
cuitry of the incoming ATGM through
are housed in 20 silos around the turret,
developed by Russia around 1993 and
the use of a coded pulsed IR jamming
and fires a small projectile (similar to a
currently has no counterpart. The Russignal. The jammers provide coverage
Claymore mine) into the path of the apsians have demonstrated the system to
over 20 degrees in azimuth on each side
proaching ATGM. At the determined
the Germans and French, and it is reof the main armament and through 4 demoment, the computer generates comported to have performed as advertised.
grees of elevation, and is effective within
mand signals via a converter unit to the
The French were involved in further de2 seconds of target identification. It is
selected ammunition. The ammunition
velopment of the system, as of 1997. 15
claimed to be effective against Western
detonates 1.3 to 3.9 meters from the tarArena is intended to protect tanks from
ATGMs such as TOW, HOT, MILAN
get, generating a directed field of deantitank grenades and ATGMs and topand Dragon, as well as Eastern Bloc
structive elements, which destroy or disattack munitions, including ATGMs
ATGMs such as the AT-3. The TShU1-7
able the target to levels which are no
launched from aerial platforms. When
has a specified life of 1,000 hours, a
longer dangerous. After .2-.4 seconds,
these threaten the MBT, the computer
mean time between failures (MTBF) of
the system is ready to repel the next tarsystem automatically activates the active
250 hours, and a radiation source of 50
get.17
defense system with a reaction time of
hours.13
.05 seconds.16 Arena is fully automatic
Arena will not respond to false images
Shtora-1 has three methods of operaand provides a very high degree of proor targets such as: small caliber projection: fully automatic, semiautomatic/tartection through 300 with a dead area to
tiles, targets flying away from the tank,
get designation, and manual and emerthe rear of the turret.
targets outside of the 50 meter envelope,
gency mode. According to the manufacor slow-flying objects, such as pieces of
The system is switched on from the
turer, the system reduces the hit probearth. Additionally, the system does not
commanders control panel, then operability by the following factors: TOW
respond to shells or projectiles exploding
ates automatically. On completion of the
and Dragon, Maverick, Hellfire, and
around the tank, or targets whose trajecserviceability self-control check, the sysCopperhead laser seeker systems by a
tory does not cross a protected portion of
tem operates in combat mode. All inforfactor of 4-5:1; MILAN and HOT by
the tank.18 The concern for dismounted
mation on the modes of operation and
3:1; Artillery and tank projectiles fired
infantry is considered, with a danger
status of the system and its integrated
from systems with laser rangfinders by
zone identified 20-30 meters around the
units is displayed on the control panel.
3:1.14 There is no reference to success
tank. Arena is day- and night-capable
against the Russian AT-4 and AT-5 or
In combat mode of operation, the muland operates in any climate or terrain.
cannon-launched laser beam riders like
tidirectional radar mounted on the roof
Arena is reportedly effective against
the AT-10 and AT-11.
TOW, HOT, MILAN and Hellfire, as
of the MBT constantly scans for approaching ATGMs and locates any target
well as man-portable AT-4 and LAW 80.
Shtora-1 is currently installed on the Tapproaching within 50 meters of the tank
Again, there is no reference to its ef80UK, T-80U, T-84 and T-90 MBTs and
fectiveness against Russian-designed
within the designated speed band. The
offered for installation on other armored

ARMOR May-June 1998

ground-launched ATGMs or cannonlaunched ATGMs. By mid-1997, the

Arena system remained at the prototype
stage and is understood not to have completed its developmental phase.19
Arena is expensive, costing around
$300,000 per copy. 20
Drozd and Shtora-1 are designed to be
used with hull and turret ERA packages.
Tanks equipped with Arena have ERA
packages mounted on the hull. If the systems munitions are not effective in stopping the incoming projectile, the tank is
still protected by ERA. Arenas ammunition panels, located around the turret, act
as the turrets ERA, providing protection
if the selected ammunition fails to function.
IFVs versus Tanks

There are several possible reasons why

the Russians have not mounted APS on
BMPs or other IFVs. A hard kill system
may not destroy the entire incoming projectile. Tank base armor and ERA provide protection against any residual fragments that may survive a hard kill detonation. BMPs do not have this level of
protection, or the suspension systems capable of carrying additional armor plating and ERA. Additionally, the cost factor makes it more advantageous to protect tanks, rather than IFVs. The BMP-3
can be replaced for $800,000, while a T80U costs around $2 million.

cles. France and Israel currently employ

systems similar to Shtora-1 on their
tanks. Poland has developed and employs soft kill systems on AFVs. The
UK, Canada, Israel, and the U.S. are all
researching hard and soft kill systems.
The GALIX System

The French Galix countermeasure system mounted on the Leclerc MBT consists of an electrical control unit and
launching tubes set into the rear of the
turret. Galix is turret mounted and provides 360 protection. It can fire 80mm
smoke rounds, anti-personnel rounds, or
decoy rounds out to 30-50 meters, in single rounds or in salvoes. The Galix system reaction time is less than one second
and is reported to protect Leclerc against
any known weapon on the battlefield.21
The Galix 13 smoke round can produce a smoke screen that includes visual
and multi-band screening agents, over an
arc of 120 to the front of the vehicle,
that can last up to 30 seconds. This
screen can blind any optically or IR-controlled weapon system. The IR decoy deviates the trajectory of antitank missiles
controlled by an IR seeker. It is operated
from the top of the vehicle and is efficient for more than 10 seconds. 22 A major shortfall of the Galix system is the
lack of an LWR to alert the crew and
automatically cue the system.
Israeli Developments

Western Countermeasure Systems

It appears that the Russians developed

Drozd to counter RPG and ATGM
threats in Afghanistan. Shtora and Arena
followed, with the hope of sales to former Soviet arms customers. While many
nations have developed soft kill systems,
few have shown any interest in hard kill
systems until recently. Research and development costs, coupled with dwindling
defense budgets and a perceived lack of
an antiarmor threat to modern armor
seems to account for this lack of interest.
Next-generation soft kill systems will
include a laser warning receiver (LWR)
that automatically cues the system to the
incoming projectile. Currently, this is not
a characteristic of all soft kill systems.
The Japanese were actually the first to
introduce laser warning receivers combined with a countermeasure system on
first line AFVs. Their Type 90 tank includes a soft kill system. Sweden is currently developing a sensor-initiated hard
kill system for its armored fighting vehi-

10

The Merkava 3 MBT is fitted with the

Laser Warning System 2 (LWS-2) advanced threat warning system. The system provides an alert whenever optical
radiation is aimed at the vehicle from
any direction and warns against a possible enemy presence and attack intentions
in real time. The indication includes the
type of radiation, such as IR searchlight,
laser rangefinder, or laser designator. The
Merkava 3 is believed to be the first
MBT fitted with a threat warning system
as part of its standard production.23
The Israeli POMALS system operates
similarly to Shtora-1, and is designed as
an add-on or retrofit package. It features
the LWS-2 that identifies incoming radiation emitted by laser designators/rangefinders or IR sources. The
60mm launch tubes are mounted on the
turret to fire a wide variety of munitions
that produce countermeasure options, including visible or IR smoke grenades,
chaff/flare decoys, HE and antipersonnel
grenades, and special munitions. PO-

MALS can be upgraded to incorporate

an IFF system.24 POMALS is currently
in its prototype stage.
The Third Eye laser warning system
was designed for instantaneous detection
of laser rangefinders, designators, and IR
searchlights. It indicates the direction
and type of threat on a display screen
provided for the TC. An audio warning
is also provided through the vehicle intercom net. It can differentiate between
the various lasers and is insensitive to
explosions, flashes, or smoke. According
to the manufacturer, the Third Eye system has been in operational use with the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and has
proven its performance and reliability
under field conditions.25 The effectiveness of these systems is unclear. It is also
unclear whether the three Merkava Mk 3
MBTs recently destroyed by the Hezbollah with either AT-3s, AT-4s, or TOWs,
were equipped with any countermeasure
devices.26
United Kingdom Developments

The UK Defense Research Agency is

collaborating with British companies under the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and
Industry Defensive Aids Systems (MIDAS) program of applied research into
low-risk technology that could defeat
current precision-guided weapons such
as antitank missiles. An extensive trial of
available equipment aboard an armored
fighting vehicle in the autumn of 1995
successfully demonstrated all aspects,
from warning to countermeasures, operating under a central controller architecture.27
MIDAS involves system and integration studies, together with investigations
of sensor and countermeasure technologies. These include radar and laser warning receivers; electro-optical (IR and ultraviolet) and acoustic sensors for initial
detection; confirmation devices such as
pulse-Doppler radars; soft kill response
(defensive maneuvering, decoys, jammers, and rapid-blooming multispectral
obscurants); and hard kill weapons.28
Sanders Missile Countermeasures Device (MCD) AN/VLQ-8A jammers were
developed in the U.S. at the time of the
Gulf War, and 1,000 units were delivered
to the Army. However, they were only
fielded to the M2A2 ODS Bradley as of
1996. Last year, Lockheed Sanders took
the development of IR jammers/decoys a
step further by combining one with electro-optical detectors and successfully us-

ARMOR May-June 1998

Current generation APSs do not possess the capability to

engage and destroy kinetic energy projectiles. However, as
technological advances in fire control and detection increase, next generation APSs will most likely engage and
destroy both ATGMs and kinetic energy projectiles.
ing it on a moving vehicle to decoy an
attacking missile.29
Boeing, under contract with the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), is developing a
small, low-cost, fully self-contained active defense system for military vehicles
and high value assets. The system, designated the SLID, for small, low-cost
interceptor device, will provide protection from missile and artillery threats.
Threats are defeated at stand-off ranges
of up to 250 meters and include ATGMs,
HEAT rounds, mortar rounds, and artillery shells. Boeing is also evaluating advanced SLID applications, including
protection of assets from anti-radiation
missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned
aerial vehicle threats.30
Counter Active Protective Systems
(CAPS)

The U.S. military is not sitting idly

while APS technology improves and
proliferates world-wide. The CAPS program is designed to counter this threat to
our armor force. The purpose of the
CAPS program is to demonstrate a suite
of technologies that, when applied to
current and future Army antitank missiles, will neutralize the effectiveness of
threat tanks equipped with any one of a
variety of APSs. Technology components
of the CAPS suite are expected to include electronic countermeasures, advanced long-standoff warheads, decoys,
ballistic hardening countermeasures, and
RF electronic countermeasures. These
will be demonstrated in a modular component form by FY 98 and in prototype
by FY 99 and FY 00. A variety of longstandoff warhead technologies are to be
demonstrated by FY 98. This effort is
designed to neutralize the effectiveness
of threat tanks equipped with any one of
a variety of APSs. Funding for this program is around $9.7 million over the
next three years.31
The systems mentioned are not failure
proof, nor do they provide 100 percent
protection to all areas of the host tank
against an ATGM threat. Hard and soft
kill systems have not rendered ATGMs
obsolete. It is unlikely they have been
tested against the full range of ATGMs

ARMOR May-June 1998

available on the open market, especially

TOW II, Hellfire, Maverick, or Javelin.
Moreover, there is little reference to their
ability to engage and destroy simultaneous threat engagements. There is also no
reference to the employment, or effectiveness, of any of the Russian systems
in Chechnya. Arena is not yet in its production stage and Drozd and Shtora-1
are abundant, but have not proliferated
extensively. These are simply additional
protection systems that enhance survivability.
Current generation APSs do not possess the capability to engage and destroy
kinetic energy projectiles. However, as
technological advances in fire control
and detection increase, next generation
APSs will most likely engage and destroy both ATGMs and kinetic energy
projectiles. Technologically advanced
countries will continue R&D into advanced APSs called defensive aid suites
(DAS). DAS are a collection of hard and
soft kill subsystems that operate together,
providing an integrated defense against
antiarmor precision weapons. ERA and
base armor provide the last tier of a
DAS. These advances will pose a significant threat to our ability to acquire,
engage, and destroy threat armored vehicles.
Shtora-1 and Drozd performance video
tapes are available at the Threat Office,
Directorate of Force Development,
USAARMC.
Notes
1
Kashin, Valery, Arena: Active Protection
System For Tanks, Military Parade, May-June
1996, p. 2.
2
Bonsignore, Ezio and Ian Bustin, Towards
Electronic Armour, Military Technology, Dec.
1993, p. 10.
3

Ibid, p. 10.

Ibid, p. 11.

5, 6, 7

Hewish, Mark and Leland Ness, Shoot

First, Ask Questions Later: Smart Tanks Learn
To Fend For Themselves, Janes International
Defense Review, Mar. 1996, p. 34.
8
Danussi, Gerry, Captain, U. S. Army, National
Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) Analysts.
Personal Interview, 16 Jan 1998.

Russian Armored Vehicle sales brochure, from

the International Defense Exposition (IDEX) 97,
Provided to the Threat Branch, Directorate of
Force Development, USAARMC from the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), July
1997.
10
Janes Armour and Artillery Upgrades 19971998, p. 158.
11, 12, 13, 14

Ibid, p. 159.

15, 16

Ibid, p. 158.

17, 18

Kashin, p. 3.

19

Janes Armour and Artillery, p. 85.

20

Danussi interview.

21

Ferrard, Stphane and Grard Turb, The Leclerc System, Quercy S.A: 1Imprimerie Tardy,
1992, p. 37.
22

Ibid, p. 38.

24

Bonsignore and Bustin, p. 12.

25

Janes Armour and Artillery, p. 154.

26

Blanche, Ed. Hezbollah Turns Up the Heat

on Israel, Janes Pointer, Oct 1997, p. 6.
27

Janes Armour and Artillery, p. 154

28

Hewish and Ness, p. 35.

29

Ogorkiewicz, R.M., Transforming the Tank,

Janes International Defense Review, Oct 1997,
p. 40.
30
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/missiles/
slid/slid.htm
31

http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/
dtap_dto/we_dto.htm#WE.13.02.A.

Captain Tom J. Meyer, an Intelligence

officer, has served as a Chapparal and
Stinger platoon leader, battery XO, and
assistant S3 with 5th Battalion, 3rd Air
Defense Artillery, 8ID (M); as G2 operations officer with 7ID (L); as S2 with 1st
Battalion, 23rd Infantry (Mech) and company commander with the 502nd MI battalion at Fort Lewis. Currently, he is the
Fort Knox Threat Manager and Threat
Branch Chief, for the Directorate of Force
Development at the U.S. Army Armor
Center. He holds a BBS in Political Science from Hardin-Simmons University
and is a graduate of ADOBC, MIOAC,
CAS3 and CGSC.
E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: DSN 464-7563 or commercial 502624-7563.

11