COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW Books | & 1 Revised Penal Code and Special Laws Atty. Leonor D. Boado sana JA BATHE gy 7 vaA ey . eFUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Le acts cf the Legislature prohibiting certain acts 1B penalties for their violations. Those that ac treat of their nature and provide for their pun- ishment. (Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298, Janta- ary 1999) 2. Criminal law is a branch of public law because it treats of acts or omissions which are primarily wrongs against the State. 3, Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to en act penal laws among the Bill of Rights: a, ‘The law must be general in application (equal protec- tion), b. _ Itmust observe substantive and procedural due proc- 8, ._Itshould not impose cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines. yuld not cperate as a bill of attainder. a such 113213, August 15,1994) ‘5. Provisions in the Code complementing ex post facto law: no felony shall be punishable by any penalty ctibed by law prior to its commission. 9: penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in- sofar as they favor the offender who is not a habitual b. 1COMPREHENSIVE REVIWEK IN CHIMINAL.LAW delinquent. Therefore, a law which increases the pen- alty for an act or omission cannot be given retroactive effect. 6. Examples of ex a. Makes an mitted was not crit b. Aggravates the ser ‘was committed. ©. Imposes a pens ens of the crime than when it an when the crime d. Makesit e prosecution to establish the guilt committed. ce Requires a ace than when the Basis — Art. stitution FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 3 Basis — Art. 2, Revised Penal Code Prospectivity — (when the law shall be applicable) — the law should have only prospective application ex- is favorable to the offender, (iretrospectivity the retroactive application of penal laws.) Basis — Arts, 21 and 22, Revised Penal Code ‘Art. 11(22), Constitution (ex post facto) Art. 4, Civil Code 8, Doctrinal application of the prospectivity rule: a. The prospectivity rule applies to administrative rulings and circulars, and to judicial decisions which though not laws, are evidence of what the laws mean, Thus Under Art. 8 of the New Civil Code, judicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system. Legis interpretato legis wim obtinet, This is, especially true in the construction and application of crimi where it is necessary that the punishat an act be reasonably foreseen for the ‘guidance of sodety. (Co vs. CA, G.R. No. 10076, Octo- ber 28, 1993) '. Lex prospicit, nor respicit. The law looks forward not back- ward, The rationale against retroactivity is that a law usually deridesrights which may have already become vested or impairs the obligations ofcontract, hence, un- constitutional, Prior to the statute's nullification it must have been in force and had to be complied with (doc- trine ve fact) It would be to deprive the law it fairness and justiceif there be no recog- had transpired prior to such adjudica- c. Incase of conflict between the mala prohibita doctrine and the prospectivity rule, the latter should prevail be- ‘cause all doubts must be resolved in favor of the ac- cused. (id.) Moreover, ex post facto law isa constitutional ‘edict hence is superior to any doctrine or rule,“ ‘COMPREHENSIVE REV 9, Philosophies IN CRIMINAL LAW FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 5 is applied to heinous crimes, whereas, the is made to work on economic and social ‘Aheinous crime is a grievous,odious and hateful offense which by reason ofits inherent or manifest wick- edness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity, is regarded fs seriously outrageous to the common standards or norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and orderly society. (RA 7659) ‘4. Usilitarian or protective theory under which the primary function of punishment in criminal law is to protect society from potential and actual wrongdoers. The re- tributive aspect of penal laws should be directed against them. The law should not be applied to further materi- alism and opportunism. (Magno vs.CA, GR.No. 96132, June 26, 1992) 10. Penal laws are construed strictly against the State and liber~ ally in favor of the accused. Whenever two interpretations of law or appreciation of evidence are possible, the exculpa- tory interpretation shall prevail, consistent with the rule on presumption of innocence. This principle, for instance, is manifested in the three-fold rule, the rules on mitigation of crimes and the recuirement that qualifying circumstance should be proved by the same quantum of evidence neces- sary to establish guilt, among others. Under the equipoise rule, when the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are equally balanced, the scale Should be tilted in favor of the accused in obedience to the constitutional presumption of innocence. (Ursua vs.CA, 256 ‘SCRA 147, 70SCAD, April 1996; Corpuzvs. People, 94SCRA 73, February 1991) Where the State fails to meet the quan- tum of proof required to overcome the constitutional pre- ion of innocence, the accused is entitled to acquittal, right regardless of the weakness or even the absence defense. For any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's case and not on the weakness of the defense, (Cosep vs. People, 290 SCRA 378, May 1998)(COMPREHENSIVE KUVIGWINEIN CRIMINAL LAW cd with deliberate intent by means of fault As to stage ‘consummating the offense. those which have various G.R.No. 110353, May 21, 1998) Likewise arson can only be attempted or consummated, because the slightest burning of the property consummates the crime of arson especially since the amount of dam- age in the property has been delcted in the amend- ments to the law on arson. 2. Less grave felonies; and 3. Light felonies. oo « FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 7 ‘As to count — composite, compound, complex, continued, continuing As to nature — mala in se and mala prohibita 12. Crimes mala int se and mala prohibita fs ’ssion may either be inherently evil (mala suse there is a law prohibiting the same may only intend to make the Code apply suppletorily thereto. For instance, Presidential Decree No. 533 is an amendment of Arts. 338, 309, and 310 of the RPC. Thus, cattle rustling is still malurm in se, (Taer vs. CA, 186 SCRA 598, June 1990) involve moral turpitude whereas mala pro- not. The doing of the act itself and not its pro- hibition by statutes fixes moral turpitude. It does include such acis as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in its positively being prohibited. (Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483, July 1996) Distinctions: In me 1, Basis — moral state of the offender hence, good faith or lack of criminal intents a defense. 2° Modifying circumstances — taken into account in imposing the penalty on the offender because his ‘moral trait is the basis ofthis crime. 3. Degree of participation — penalty is computed on the basis of whether he is a principal offender, or merely an accomplice or accessory. Mala in se:8 ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL CAW. n — the penalty on the of- ay they are all deemed princi- 4, Stage of accomplishment — viclation of law is punished only when accomplished or consum- mated. 13. Effect of repeal of penal law on the accused: express repeal — the act or whether the accused is 14, TheSpanish e English version for the Code 1 enacted in Eng- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ° 15, Revised Administrative Code). For instance, if the Code uses the term “lockup” (encerrar) rather than “kidnap’ (secuestar or raptari, thus, the Spanish version should prevail in the interpretation of that Asticle. {People vs. Astorga, 283 SCRA 420, December 1997) 15, Finality of acquittal rule: the fundamental philosophy high lighting this rule cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in wequal contest with the State. The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an al- leged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, ex- pense and ordeal and compelling him tolive in a continuing, state of anxiety and insecurity, as well asenhancing the pos- sibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. (People vs. Velasco, C.R. No. 127444, 340SCRA 207, Septem- ber 13, 2000) ARTICLE 2— Scope of application of the Code 1. Two applications of the Code: a, Intra-territorial application — within the Philippine ar- chipelago, including its atmosphere, interior waters and maritime zone. « when the question asks for the exceptions to the ap- ‘of the Code, do not include in the answer the intra- (orial application in paragraph one for that is the gen- eral rule.) 2, Treaties and Jaws ofpreferential application prevail over the provisions of the Code such as R.A. No. 75 on immunity of diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. Under inter- national laws, sovereigns, heads of states and their official representatives enjcy immunity from suits.(COMPREHENSIVE RIVIEWUR IN CRIMINAL LAW from criminal jurisdicti case of an action relati vurisdiction. strictly to the territoriality the crime. The country of regis- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES n try will have jurisdiction only where the crime re~ lates te 1] management of the vessel. nother cases (such as drug-trafficking! the host country will have jurisdiction, 5. Second and third exceptions: a. Forgery is committed by giving to a treasury or bank note of any instrument payable to bearer or to order the appearance of a true genuine document or by eras- ing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any ues, letters, words ar signs contained b. Ifforgery was committed abroad, it must refer only to Philippine coin, currency note or obligations and secu- tities. 6. Fourth exception: a pablic officer /employee who commits a crime related to the exercise of his office. Without this rela~ tion, they are acting in their private capacity and hence bound ty the law of the host country. 7. Under the fifth exception: crimes against national security and the law of nations include Treason, Espionage, Provok- ing War and Disloyalty in Case of War, Piracy and Mutiny but not rebellion. When rebellion is committed abroad, the ine courts will not have jurisdiction because rebel- lion is a crime against public order. ARTICLE 3 der the Code,. Intent is a mental state Asa general rule, crimi Two instances wh Motive is the mov (COMPREHENSIVE REVEWEK IN CRIMINAL LAW the need to determine it by the trated by the overt acts of means used. This intent a person. such as intent must beestab- ally liable even if there is no crimi a, Felonies cor b. Offenses mala proh 1985) A felony requires absentas the mind is is doctrine applies only to dolo. which impels a is immaterial When the act the crime is purely dispute, motive ported with sulffi- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 2 dent evidence for a conclusion of guilt, a conviction is sus- tainable, (People vs. Macoy, G.R. Nos. 96649-50, July 1997) 8. Art. 3 compared with Art. 365: in Art. 3, culpa is a mode of committing a crime hence killing, for instance, is denomi- mated homicide through reckless imprudence. In Art. 365, culpa itself is the crime punished, thus the killing is denomi- nated reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality ofa willful crime, AVS. the Peace of Bacolor, GR. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995) but a distinct crime in the Penal Code, designated as a quasi-ofiense however, a ‘conviction for the former can be had under an information ‘exclusively charging tre commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. (Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, 197 SCRA 94, May 14, 1991) Intelligence is the capacity to understand what is rightand ‘wrong. Discernment is relevant to intelligence, NOT mean though, that when a person acted discernment, he intends the crime or the wrong done. {People vs, Cordova, 224 SCRA 319, July 1993) Intelligence ‘both dolo and culpa, thus, whether the result- ing felony is intentional or culpable, discernment is an ele- ment, Absent discernment, there is no offense whether dolo nor culpa. en insanity is interposed as a defense or a ground of a ion to quash the burden rests upon the accused to estab- that fact, for the law presumes every man to be sane. in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove insan- legal presumption of one’s sanity stands. (Zosa vs. GR. No. 105641, March 10, 1994) 10. ARTICLE 4 L who commit an impassible crime.a COMPREHENSIVE RIViIWI INE CHUMINAL.LAWT FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 5 another, There are three persons involved: the offender, the intended victim and the actual victim. Consequently, the act result in a complex crime (Art. 48) or in two felonies, h there is just one intent. Thus, aberratio ictus may result lo a greater criminal liability to the offender. 6. Ervor in personae or mistake in identity involves only one of- fonded party but the offender committed a mistake in ascer- ining the identity ofthe victim. Unlike inaberratio ictus there ‘persons involved: the actual but unintended the offender. in personae depends upon the intended ‘committed: 2. Thereare twa cl rent gravity, Article 49 shall apply — ty between the intended and the actual felony committed shall be imposed, In effect error in personae is extenuating circumstance. b. Iftheactual and intended crimes are the same, then there the victim of the blow); i is no mitigation of penalty for the mistake in the iden- ondingly the criminal li- in identity); tity of the viet carries the same srevity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim, The main rea- wea wrong caused than that ; son behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused | had acted with such a disregard for the life of the vic- tims without checking carefully the latter's identity as imselfon the same legal plain as one who kills ly. (People ly, unlawfully and feloni No, 39519, November 21, It does not apply to culpa; “intentionem” denotes in- tent. ictien ‘The mitigating circumstance of lackof intent to commit 3. In aberratio ictus or none person but the harm fell on so grave a wrong as that committed should be appreciated fender intends the injuich, in its natural and con- an efficient intervening cause, jhich the result would not to be considered gener- inflicted by the of responsible. (People body. (People vs. Impossible Crime: 1. Elements: a. The acts performed would have been a crime against persons or propert the offense is inherent} FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES wv Impossible crime is punished to suppress lawlessness or to teach a lesson to the offender. Subjective, the offender is a criminal although objectively no crime has been committed. There is no attempted or frustrated stage. 4, There is now the impossible crime of rape because of the amendment brought about by the Anti-Repe Law which re- chasified Rape under Crimes Against Persons as anew chap- ter and renumbered Art. 266 A to D. 5, There is legal impossibility where the intended acts, even if completed would notamount to a crime. Example; sealing property that tured out tobe owned by the stealer. It would apply to those circumstances where: a. Themotive, desire, and expectation is to perform an act in violation of law; b.Thereis an intention to perform the physical act; c. There's a performance of the intended physical act; d. The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount crime. 6. Physical impossibility is present when extraneous circum- slances unknown to the actar or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. Example: stealing, from a vault that is empty. 7. The offender must not know the circumstance which made the crime an impossible crime. For instance killing a person who is already dead, Homicide / murder requires intent to kill. Had the offender known that the victim is already dead, intent to kill will be absent. At most, it will amount to des- ccration of the dead. ARTICLE 5 ‘Nulum crimen mula porna sine lege — there is no crime when there is no law that defines and punishes it. As a civil law coun-6 CCOMPREHIUNSSIVE HHVLEWER IN CRIMINAL, LAW On the other hand a common law crime is one that is mani- festly contrary to good customs and public policy even though not expresdy punished by law. As distinguished from statutory legislature, common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action relating to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial decrees of the courts recogniz- not rest for authority upon of the will of the legislat ‘prens and pi lack's Law Dictlonary) ARTICLE 1. In the consummated st may or may not phrases here are: ‘The important FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES » Preparatory act refers toa prior act. Example: buy- {ing poison to kill the intended victim. Preparatory acts are as a rule notcriminal unless these acts are in them- selves penalized as independent crimes, Example: Pro- posal and conspiracy to commit a crime are not pun- ished except in those cases provided for by law, e.g. pro- posal and conspiracy to commit rebellion. E, ("Directly” — Tae offender shall be liable for the at- ‘mal: ‘empted stage of the felony that is directly inked to the spective of his intention. Example: a per- ig to rob a store forced open the window of the building but before he could enter he was appre- hended. He cannot be charged with attempted robbery even if that was his intention because the overt act of forcing open the window is not directly linked with rob- bery. He may be charged with attempted trespass be- cause that act is directly related to entering the store. “Desistance” —is an absolutory circumstance true only in the attempted stage. The attempted stage exists up to that time when the offender stil! has control of his acts. The moment he has lost contral of the outcome of his acts the subjective phase is passed; the stage is now either frustrated or consummated (objective phase) where desistance is merely factual and produces no le- , will not exempt the offender from acts necessary for the commission ofthe offense is other than the offender's spontaneous desistance, the felony is attempted. (People vs. Pareja, G.R No, 88043, Decem- ber 9, 1996) |. Criteria to determine whether the crime is material or for-(COMPREHENSIVE KEV KWH IN CRIMINAL LAW FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 2 other blow on the victim, which he was not able to do because he was apprehended. In frustrated homicide, the wound is mortal, sufficient to bring about death hhence, there is no need of another blow but death nev- ertheless did no: supervene because of timely medical attendance. the acts of ex- ing the offense b. When the Code de it cannot be frust ARTICLE 7 1. When light felonies are punishable: a. Only when consummated except for crimes against persons or property. b. _ Inall stages if the crime is against persons or property. 2. Who are punishable — principals and accomplices. Acces- sories are not criminally liable for light felonies, (Article 16) ARTICLE 8 1. When the proposal is accepted, it becomes conspiracy. The essence of conspiracy is community of criminal intent. (Peo- ple vs. Tilos, 349 SCRA 281, January 16, 2001) : 2. Itisessential for one to be liable for the acts of the others that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherarce of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, itis necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a di- tect or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of: ! 4. Active participation in the actual commission of the b. Moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present of the crime; oF . _ Bxerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspira- tors. (Pecho vs. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, er should still noed to deal an- 1996) 4. Bxampl ‘mortal, hence3, Two concepts of cons RIVIEWEICIN CRIMINAL. LAN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES B sign and purpose. (People vs. Bragaes, GR. No.62359, November 14, 1991) Necessi ‘onspiracy as a crime cannot be implied conspiracy. It can only be by pre-agreement or planned. 5. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not rrecessary for conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, orinferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to 2 joint purpose and design, concerted action and comunu- nity of interest. 6. Implied conspiracy is one that is deduced from the mode ‘and manner in which the offense was committed. The con- certed acts of the parties to achieve the same objective sig nify conspiracy. People vs. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 325, Novern- ber 13, 1989 held that “The act of the appellant in holding the victim from behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and overt act to- wards the realizationofa common criminal intent which may be classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the moment. It sprang from the tum of events, thereby uniting the criminal design of the slayer immedi- ately before the commission of the offense.” (Subayco vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 117267-117310, August 22, 1996) 7. Conspiracy is not presumed, Like the physical acts consti- tuting, the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proved beyond reascnable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the com- (Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101545, January 8; Fecha vs. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996) 8. One who joins a criminal conspiracy edopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators, and he can no longer repudiate the conspiracy after it has materialized. Convic~ tion is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert.2% (COMPRERINSIVI REVIEWER IN CKIMINAL.CAW ‘of all, and each of the \ilty a8 co-princi- The act of one then b accused will thereby be gun, he would still be ofthe vie- 0 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Fo scone of the crime, or in exerting moral as- Jo, GR. Nos. 120394-97, January there must be a conscious design to wnspiracy is not the product of negli- jonality on the part of cohorts (“decides fagsuci vs. Sandiganbayen, January 3, 1995, 15. When may the head of a government office be held liable as ‘-principal for the acts of his subordinates? If he by an act ‘of reckless imprudence brought about the commission of fa thru falsificatioa, or malversation through falsification, ime could not have been accomplished. fraction consists in the reliance in good by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to pre- 4, Under the Arias doctrine all heads of offices have to rely toa reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why he ‘should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The umber in bigger offices or departments is even more ap- palling, (Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, 180SCRA 309, December 19, 1989) ARTICLE 9 — Grave, less grave, light felonies 1. Grave felonies are penalized by capital punishment or afflic- tive penalties in any ofits period, i, theminimum, medium or maximum period of the penalty is an afflictive penalty. Afflict cover prision mayor, disqualification, re- clus ral and reclusion perpetua.% (COMPREHENSIVE RLVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ‘Art. 26, a P200 fine is correc- tional) 4. The classification of felonies ax to severity is significant to determine: a. Ifthe felony is punishable; (Art, 7 o1 light felonies) b. Whether the accessory (Art. Whether a complex crime was comm d. The duration of the subsidiary penalty; (Art. 39, no. 2) ¢. The duration of the det in case of failure to post the bond to keep the y {Whether the crime hax pr (Art. 35) ; (Art, 90), and The proper penalty for quasi-offenses, (Art. 365) ARTICLE 10 — Special Laws CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY u (Art,11 1015) are not applicable to violaticns of special laws. However, the Code shall have supplementary application to the special laws (seccnd sentence) whenever the latter uses the nomenclature of penalties in the Coce, thus indicating the intent of Congress to make the Code epply suppletorily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under its system of penalties. (People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 930280, July 29, 1994) 4, ‘The suppletory effect of the Code to special laws under this article cannot be invoked where there is legal or physical impossibility of or a prohibition in specisl law against such supplementary application. Where the special law expressly grants the court discretion in applying thepenalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the Code. (id.) 5. Dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 because it is the act alone, i the motives which constitute the offense. Ver- ‘as proved that petitioner committed the un- jeged in the information, it was properly pre- ‘were committed with fall knowledge and ‘with criminal intent, and it was incumbent upon him to re- but such a presumption. (Lim vs. CA, G.R. No. 100311, May 18, 1993) CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 1. Inthe Philippines, penal laws subscribe to the classical theory hence there is a predetermined penalty for each crime. It is the office of modifying circumstances to increase or decrease the penalty depending upon their presence or absence. 2. The circumstances which affect or modify criminal liability are: a. Justifying — Art. 1 b. Exempting — Art. 12% ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVI CRIMINAL LAW Mitigating — Arts, 13nd 15 Aggravating — Arts. 14 Absolutory —exemp! Extenuating — mi re an 3. Absolutory circumstances a, Instigation due to public policy; b. Art. 63) — spontaneous d in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed constitutes another crime; Art. 7 — attempted! frustrate ple vs. Ramos, J 5. Abuy-bust been accepter Dangerous Drugs Lan ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 2» officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. Inentrapmer necessary that a buy-bust operation ‘occurred, otherwise, it will be considered in case of doubt as instigation, Instigation is an absolutory cause akin to an ex- cempting circumstance. (People vs. dela Paz, G.R,No, 104277, 43 SCAD 284) Instigation and frame-up cannot be both present in a case for they are incompatible, In instigation, the crime is actu- ally performed by the accused except that the intent origi nates from the mind of the inducers. In frame-up, however, the offense is not committed by the accused. Precisely, the accused is only framed or set up in a situation leading to a false accusation against him. ‘An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police of- ‘cers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous ‘drug cases, Itis viewed by the court with disfavor, for it can 5e easily concocted, To substantiate suck defense, including. ENTRAPMENT INSTIGATION a. ‘The mens rea originated evil deaoriginated| fromthe from the accused who peace officer who induced the accused to commit the act3 4 vincing evidence a Unlawful aggrest ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LABILITY 2 b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. ‘The effect of invoking self-defense is to place the burden in the accused to prove to the satisfaction of the court the fact oflegitimate defense because thereby he admits the act com- plained. ‘Unlawful aggression is the primordial requisite which must {tall times be present. When unlawful aggression is absent, there is no self-defense whether complete (Article 11) or in- complete (Articles 69 and 13{1)). {¢ must be actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent, danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidat- ing attitude. The accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression, Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in reel peril the life or personal, safety of the person defending others being defended and. . Bausing, G.R. No. 64965, Unlawful aggressic 2 real or at least imminent. Real ‘aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon such as to cause injury or danger to life or personal safely. Aggression is imminent if an attack is impending or at the point of happening. Itmustbe offensive and positively strong, |, That petitioner sustained injuries does not signify that he ‘was a victim of unlawful aggression. (Roca vs. CA, GR. No. 114917, 350 SCRA 414, January 29, 2001) When the aggression no longer exists, such as when the ag ‘gressor ran away after the attack or when the defender was, able to wrest the weapon from the aggressor, thereisnoneed for self-defense. SEI |. The presence and severity of the number of wounds on the part of the victim disprove self-defense, so do they belie thethe accused to the means adopt aggressor. (People 1999) “Stand ground when 18. ai. x 24, ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY = ately procede the act. It is not enough that the-provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. In defense of one’s chastity, there must be imminent and immediate danger of rape to justify killing. If it were only ‘acts of lasciviousness, killing is an unreasonable means. |. Slander may be a necessary means to repel slander. But it ‘must not be more than needed to defend himself from the sefamatory remarks. In defense of property, killing is not justified. There must in mn be the necessity to save another life. Ifthe aggres- nis on property even if there was no attack on the de~ fender or owner or possessor defense is proper but not to the extent of killing the aggressor otherwise the means used to repel or prevent the aggression will be not reasonable, (People vs. Narvaez. GR. Nos, 1-33466-67, 21 SCRA 389, April 20, 1983)" For defense of relatives the third requisite becomes: “in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the per- son defending had no part therein.” For defense of strangers, the third requisite is that the per- son defending is not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motives. Beyond 4 degrees of consanguinity is defense of strangers and the third element in defense of relatives will be replaced. The presence or lack of all or some of the requisites for the defense have the following effects: a. All requisites are present — justilying circumstance; (Art. 11) b. Tworequisites re present, unlawful aggression plus an- other — privileged mitigating circumstance; (Article 69) One requisite present which must be unlawful aggres- sion — ordinary mitigating circumstance. (Article 13, no. 1)Py 25. 26. 27. (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWHIIN CRIMINAL LAW The elements of state of r ty are: fed actually exists; than that dene to avoid it; ¢. There is no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it, The state of necessity must not be caused by the negli- gence or violation of the law of the actor otherwise this ben- fit cannot be invoked. Under Art. 101, bility shall be borne not by the actor but the ones: y the avoidance of the evil. The elements of fulfillment of duty or exerese of right or office are: essary consequence of or office. Under the doc Code, the law justifies the act of the owner or lawful posses- sor ofa thing in using force necessary to protect his propri- etary or ory Ti ust however exercise this right at the very mo deprived of his Property. If sufficient ypsed from the deprivation, he must seek the help of the proper auth his property, otherwise he could be ‘Appellant was not c girls he was at- ig any act of prostitu- person he was authos- y. Even then, the /etim were not a mance of his duty ale suspects did ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LABILITY 3 i i im to death. (People Co ee ee SCRA 8 Janay 24200) 28, ‘The elements of obedience to superior order are: a. Anorder has been issued by a superior; b, ‘The order is fora legal purpose; ¢ Themeans used to carry: Even if the order is illegal 1 ate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate . (Tabuera vs, Sandiganbayar, G.R. Nos. 103501- ‘SCRA 332, February 17, 1997) ARTICLE 12 — Exempting circumstances 1. The exempting circumstances are: a. Imbecility/insenity ». Minority Accident 4. Compulsion ofirresistible force e, Impulse of uncontrollable fear £_Insuperable orlawful cause 2. Distinctions between justifying and exempting circumstances JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING a, Theactis legal “The actis criminal. b. There is no crime, hence There is a crime, hence a no criminal criminal. ‘There is a crime and civil li- ability but the law exempts the actor from criminal li- abilities. 4. ‘Theemphasis of the law The emphasis of the law is is on the act on the actor.|. Article 79 refers to (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWEK IN CRIMINAL LAW exclude imputability. (Pe . When insanity is interposed as a defense or a ground of a motion to quash the burden resis upon the accused to estab- lish that fact, for the law presumes every man to be sane. Hence, in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove insan- ity, thelegal presumption of one’s Civil Code) (Zosa vs. CA, 1994) acquitted. He is pre (id) . Insanity is a defensi ance, and as such mi sion othe crime, wi at the very momer the convict shall be tence has been pronou shall be suspended only wilh regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance "ing observed in the corresponding cases, fat any time the convict shall recover his reason, his taining the permission of the same court. (People vs. Rafanan, Je. GR. No. 54135, 204SCRA 65, November 21,1991)” ity for crimes committed under its influence, ‘Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted asan exempting cit~ ‘camstance, there must be a complete deprivation of intelli- gence — not only of the will — in committing the criminal Sct In the case of Rafaan, the fact that the appellant threal- fencd the victim with death in case she reported her ravish- 6, 1998) “The two tests are: a) Cognition test or complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act, and (b) Voli- tion test or a total deprivation of the freedom of the will. The(CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINALLABILITY » tased on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused of the death penalty must be given fair opportuni ffer all defenses possible that Could save them from capital punishment. (People vs. Genosa, G.R. No, 135981, 341 SCRA 493, September 29, 2000) ‘The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist equipped with the specialized knowledgeof determining the state of a person's mental health. 16. The youthful offenders are: a. Nine (9) or under where the law itself presumes lack of intelligence hence no proof will be admitted to prove the contrary even if the minor has superior intelligence. b, Over 9 but under 15 who is not criminally liable unless he acted with discernment. But even if he did so, he is itled to AT LEAST two degrees’ lowering of penalty. (Article 68) However, discernment is not rel- evant to intent but to intelligence. While there may be discernment, itdoes not necessarily mean that the mi- nor intended the crime, (People vs. Cordova, july 1993) If intent is not likewise proved, the accused will be ac- from the offense charged. 15 but under 18, Under PD 603 as amended by PD.1179, aminor 15 years old but less than 18 may apply for sus- pension of sentence provided that: 1. The penalty prescribed for the crime is not death of life imprisonment; GR. No. 93752, 2. He must not have been given a suspended sen- 15, Thereis legal and ee tence bef since the prvlge avaiable once fying circumstan ae penalty ofthe a 3. Atthe time sentence is promulgated, hei stil be- sideration, especi low 18 and qualified for commitment to reforma- very life, Itcould tory. and life or even: 17, The allegation that the minor committed the imputed acts ‘rwith intent to kill” has been held as sufficient compliance for any criminal vonvietion must be to the requirement of allegation in the information that the cal or procedural to offer this defen:21. COMPREHENSIVE REVINWIK IN CRIMINAL LAW child had acted with di al, July 1993) vopile vs Cordova, et wing must concur: ‘exempting circumstan« firing a shotgun at another is not a lawtul A shotgun would not have fired ‘cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant cocked the shotgun before discharging it, showing a clear intent to fire it at someone. (People vs Aplin, G.R.No. 140794, 367 SCRA273, October 22. 24, ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY a Negligence is the omission to do something which a reason- able man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, wauld do, or the do- ing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would ot do, (Raynera vs. Hiceta, G.R. No. 120824, April 21, 1999) Drivers of vehicle who bump the rear of another vehi- ‘presumed to be the cause ofthe accident, unless con- (ed by other evidence. The rationale behind this pre driver of the rear vehicle has full control in a position to observe the vehicle in responsibility to avoid the ies with the driver of the rear ” His is the last chance of avoiding the accident, Id.) In case of accident, the actor must not abandon the vic- tim or else he will be liable for abandonment in Art. 275. . ‘The elements of impulse of uncontrollable fear are: used the fear of an evil greater than or quai tothat which the accused was required to such gravity and imminence that yuld have succumbed to it. 4. The force must be physical, must come from an outside source, and the accused must act not only without a will but also against his will. b. The actor mustbe reduced to a mere instrument, such that the element of freedom is wanting. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded fear of death or serious bodily injury ifthe act is not done. , Insuperable cause is an exempting, circumstance which ap- plies to felonies by omission. The law imposes a duty on the offender to performan act but his failure to do sos due toa lawful or insuperable cause. For instarce, Article 125 pro-oy (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW vides for the number o! be delivered to the judicial ARTICLE 13 — Mitigating Circumstances period of the penalty prescribed f defense which do not have to 3. Unlike in aggravating circumstance, there are analogous mitigating circumstances, tosuffer in full for acts ness and intent for th Santos, supra,) 5. Kinds of mitigating circum a. Ordinary ~lower b. Privileged — lows Cider coeur ible or indivisible pen- ly. © Specific— applies to likeconcealment of dishonor in the ca by the pregnant woman, 6. Distinctions between ordinary and privileged mitigating ci cumstances: (CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY * a. Ordinary can be offset by generic aggravating circum- stance; Privileged cannot be offset by any kind of ag- gravating circumstance. Lb Ordinary mitigating lowers the penalty prescribed to Gada re vcptin ceca Where thereat? ordinary mitigating and no aggravating circumstance in which case the penalty is lowered by one degree only. Privileged mitigating lowers the penalty by degree. ‘Thus, if a provision of the Revised Penal Code states that the penalty for a particular felony is lowered by one or two degrees in view of the presence of a particu- lar circumstance, that is a privileged mitigating circum- ‘stance which cannot be offset by any genericaggravat- ing. Example Article 69 on incomplete | /justification/ex- emption. Ordinary mitigeting is not considered in the determi- nation of the proper penalty when the penalty pre- scribed is a single indivisible penalty. Privileged is con- sidered whatever penalty is imposadle. 7. One and the same fact should not give credit to more than ‘one mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused. For in- stance, passion, tion cannot co-exi only one circus of the offender, 8. The mitigating circumstances are: Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances; Passion or obfuscation; Voluntarily surrender; h. Voluntarily plea of guilt;“ (COMPREHENSIVE REViEWUN IN CRIMINAL LAW sion bat the incompleteness of the req is mitigating. 10. Minority is always a privileged mitigating circumstance be- TL. Inoneinstance, apy committed the offe 15. cv CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LABILITY s Code, she is entitled to a reduction of penalty by one degree (Art. 68, RPC). But the benign provisions of the Code are not applicable to offenders prosecuted underspecial laws. (Peo- ple vs. Ondo, 227 SCRA 562) PD. 603 is not applicable to: One who has once enjoyed its benefits; b. One whois convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment; 2 Ayouth who has been convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. . Suspension of senterce shall not apply toa youthful offender who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. A youth convicted of illegal recruitment and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment Clearly falls under te exception provided for by the Child and Youth Welfare Code. (i.) It can be inferred from Article 191 of P.D. 603 ‘that the provi- 's operative only during the trial or pending appeal. theless the law uses the word “may,” which denotes directory in nature and implies discretion on the pal trial court to place the minor under the custody of his or her parents or any suitable person. (d.) What Article 189 of PD 603 modified is Article 80 of the Re- vised Penal Code on suspension of sentence; and not para graph 2, Article 13 of the same Code which treats of minor- ity asa mitigating circumstance. Thus, for minority tobe con- sidered as @ mitigating circumstance, the offender must be lunder 18 years of age atthe time the crime was committed. “The age of the minor is reckoned at the time of the commis- sion of the crime to determine if he is qualified for suspen- ‘ion of sentence, bat the age at the time of rendition of ser- tence is considered ifthe application will be granted. ‘The judge committed error in suspending the sentence since the crime of the minor, robbery with homicide, is punish- able by reclusion perpetua to death. However, since the deci21. ). Penal laws should be lib (COMPREHENSIVEREVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW sion has become final, even the Supreme Court can no longer alter that judgment no matter how erroneous it may have been. (People vs. Galit. G.R. No. 97432, March It is not for the Supreme Court to order the release minor from the training school without the benefit of a re- vview of the recommendation of the DSWDby the trial court. Under Art. 196 of PD 603, it is the trial court who should review the report and recommendation which per se is not sufficient to warrant the release of youthful offender. The court should seek out concrete, material and relevant facts toconfirm that he hadi reenter society as a produ /e and law abiding citizen. But, hes not to be tried anew for the same act he was charged with, The inquiry is not a criminal prosecution but the deter- mination of his proper education and rehabilitation during his commitment in the Center and his moral and social fit- ness to rejoin the communi . ly construed in favor of the of- fender, Thus, considering the gravity of the offense and in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court allowed the pres- entation of and admitted the birth certificate of the accused toprove minority although said birth certificate was not pre- sented or offered in the trial court. An official document pre- pared by the DSWD inthe exercise of its functions and which document is incorporated in the records of this case can be taken judicial notice ex mero motu. (People vs. Regalario, 220 t only at the time of the commission of the crime ‘When the accused is no longer a yeuthful offender at th ‘anymore avail of the benefit of suspension of sentence. Nei- ther can his “minority” [19 years old] at the time of commis- sion of the crime be apreciated as a mitigating factor. (Peo- ple vs. delos Reyes, GR. No. 44112, October 22, 1992) Aminor found criminally responsible ma; escape pen ally for Article 196 of PD 603 provides that i is shown to that the youthful offender whose thas behaved properly and has eful member of the commu- majority, upon recom- as the case and order the satisfaction of sentence has! shown his capal 22. in which case, it rrpetua pursuant Article 83, thus iged mitigating circumstance. 24. \t provocntion are: inate from the offended party. 25, Provocation is im: ff no interval of time elapsed be- tween the provocation and ‘the commission of the crime. (Feo- ple vs. Pagal, 79SCRA 570) 26. Accused cannot claim that he was provoked when the of- fended ran away from him because the hapless victim feared faving been beaten up twice by his assailants that ng. To flee when danger lurks is human and can jed asa gource of provocation sufficient within ‘when an offended party flees has no reason to pursue and ‘G.R.No, 75508, June 10, 1994) requisite of incomplete icient provocation as a tL ent of self-defense, it requires he person defending himself; a pertains fo its presence on thepart31. 32, (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWIICIN CRIMINALLAW of the offended party. (People vs. CA, G.K, No, 103613, Feb- ‘ruary 2001) Inimmediate vindicat be a crime. It may be cate himself of such man (US. vs. Ampar, 3 fendes's daughter. (Peo hich the offende mighthave recovered hi a ‘The court will not app obfuscation inas- non the part of iber 1994) The acts of ness, for which no ‘obfuscation can arit Voluntary surrender ar each other and can be se offender. plea are independent of insidered in favor of the ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY * 34, The elements of voluntary surrender are: a, The offender su:rendered to a person in authority or his agent; b. The offender surrendered before arrest is effected; his guilt or ppenge incidental to his search and capture; 4. There is no pending warrant of arwest or information filed. (People vs. Taraya, GR. No. 135551, October 27, 2000) For instance, when Ampie leamed that the police were looking for him for the death of Salvador, he im- mediately wentto the police station wherehe confessed to killing Salvador in self-defense. However, the said surrender does not constitute as a mitigating circum- stance for at the time of his surrender, he had a pending, warrant of arrest issued five days before his: surrender. His arrest by that time was imminent. (id) 35, Voluntary surrender can be appreciated even if the accused turned themselves ane week after the crime. The fact is they voluntarily surrendered to the police before arrest could be ed, (People vs. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45, January 36. Since it was the police officer who wen: looking for the ac- ‘cused immediately after obtaining information fromeyewit- nesses as to who had perpetrated the crime even if he did rnot resist arrest or deny his criminal act, this cannot be equated with voluntary surrender. (People vs. Rebamontan, 305 SCRA 609, April 1999) 37. On the day following the killing, accused surrendered to the Provincial Commander. That the Provincial Commander announced over the radio thathe would issue a shoot-to-kill order unless accused voluntarily surrenders, and that he was persuaded to surrender by his employer do not militate50 ‘COMPREHENSIVE RVINWUN IN CRIMINAL.LAW by law. (People vs. iat of reprisal does not detract from the sponlaneity of his surrender and the fact that he had saved the State the time and trouble of search- ing for him. (People vs. Amazan, G.R. No. 136251, Jan. 16, 2001) The fact that accused yielded his weapon at the time of the inddent albeit with some persuasion should be consid i favor. (People vs, Amion, G.R. No. 140511, March 40. The elements of volunta a. The plea was mad b. twas spontan efore presentation of the: 41. 2. Voluntary plea of g1 repentance and respect positicn in the accused 45. 46. 47. “CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIASILITY a ‘Accused did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty tothe sape charges and only bargained fora lesser penalty. Inshort, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by plead- ing guilty to the offense charged, he should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. Its the ewence of a plea of, sully that the accused admits absolutely and uncondition- ally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to ‘Hence, he may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on rt by admitting his guilt provided that a certain pen- ‘be meted unto him. (People vs. Magat, GR. No. 382SCRA 517) ‘The offender's being deaf and dumb or blind or otherwise suffering from some physical defect must be related to the offense committed be:ause the law requires that the defect tas the effect of restricting his means of action, defense, or communication to his fellow beings. Ines must only diminish and not deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts. Otherwise he will be exempt from criminal liability, Analogous circumstances must be similar to those enumer- ated in Article 13. Exemples of these are: Restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner may be considered mitigating circumstanz in malversation of public funds (Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan, 239 SCRA 33, December 1994) as analogous to voluntary plea of guilty. b. That: coluntarily took the cow to the munici- pal hall to placeit unconditionally inthe custody of the Authorities and thus save them the trouble of recover- ing the cow, car be analogous to voluntary surrender, (Canta vs. Peop'e, G.R. No. 140937, ‘February 28, 2001) Extreme poverty is not among the mitigating circum- ‘stances enumerated in Article 13 of the Code and it is doubtful whether it may be considered as a circum- stance of a similar nature or analogous to those men-COMPREHENSIVE EVEN IN CRIMINAL LAW fact that defendants belong to the non-Christian cultural minorities cannot reduce from the subjective point of view their awareness of the gravity of the offense for robbery and killing ave by thelr very naturejust as wrong to the ignorant as to the enlightened. ARTICLE 14 — Aggravating Circumstances: 1 2 Aggravating circumstances are those which show greater perversity of the offender, hence, they have the effect of in- creasing the penalty. Aggravating and mi guished in the follo ircumstances may be distin- analogous circumstances Jaw in favor cf the accused; sive to curtail discretion of her circumstances may yy lower the penalty by de~ Je 64, no. 5; aggravating cir- ‘cumstances, no mater how many can only increase the period within that penalty prescribed by I sage can never be by degree. Mitigating circums does not have vating circumst tion before the} Examples of 2b: ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 3 mitted on the occasion of robbery would not increase the penalty; while in other cases, the ruling was, the multiplicity of rapes/homicides committed would be law provides that the additional rape or ho should be considered as aggravating circumstance. (Peo- ple vs. Gano, GR. No. 134373, February 28, 2001) b. Immoral motive, while it may find support in evidence may not be considered as it does nct fall under any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Villaver, G.R. No. 1-32104, March 25, 1983) 4. The four kinds of aggravating circumstances are: 2. Generic aggravating circumstances which: 1. Have the effect of the penalty being imposed in the maximum period. Note that the penalty pre- seribed in Book II of the Code is the maximum imposable, thus the increase in the penalty cannot bbe to the next higher degree but only to the maxi- mum period; 2. Apply toall felonies; and 3. Can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circum- stance. Prior to the amendment of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a qualifying circumstance not alleged in the Information but proved may be appreciated as.a generic ‘aggravating circumstance because this is not an element of the crime, hence, its appreciation does not violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him, Howeves, with the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. (ection 8, Rule 110) ‘A cursory examination of the Information filed against accused-appellant would show that the aggra-COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW vating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling are not ple vs, Deberto, 205 3CRA SCRA 240) i with reclusion perzetua the penalty is doubled, fhe time I court ren- 291; People vs. Legaspi, 357 (40 years maximum), thus ‘CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 35 c. Special or specific aggravating circumstances which apply to a particular felony. They do not change the cheracter of the offense charged but guide the court in imposing the proper penalty. (People vs. Agguihao, ‘March 10, 1994) The same rule as in generic aggravat- ing applies to special aggravating circumstances as both denot change the character of the offense charged. RA 7659 added the circumstance of “organized / syndicated group” in Article 62(1a). This is aspecial ag gravating circumstance because Article 14 was not cor Fespondingly amended to include the same. The maxi- mum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was com- mitted by any person belonging to an organized /syn- dicated crime group which is defined as a group of 2 or ‘more persons collaborating, confederating, Or ‘mutually helping one another for purposes of gun in the commis- sion of any crime, ‘é. Inherent aggravating circumstance whichis an element of the felony thus no longer considered against the of- fender in the de:ermination of the penalty. (Art. 62, no. 5, ‘The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective Decem- ‘ber 1,2000) requires that every complaint or information must expressly and specifically allege not only the qualifying but tiso the generic aggravating circumstances; otherwise, the Jame will not be considered by the courteven it proved dur- ing the trial. The Revised Rules is applicable in all criminal aces, not only in cases where the aggravating circumstances would increase the ponalty to death. (People vs. Legaspi, GR. Nos. 1336164-65, April 20, 2001) Prior to the Revised Rules the non-allegation of generic aggravating circumstances duly proven in the course ofthe trial could be taken into account by the trial court in cetermining the imposable| penalty. (Peo- ple vs. Legaspi, G.R. Nos, 136164-65, April 20,2001) 6. ‘The rationale for the requirement to be informed of the ex: istence of the qualifying circumstance is for accused to pre- pare properly for his defense to meet head-on the qualifying Prrourastance and because such circumstance changes the‘COMPREHENSIVE RIVIEWIR IN CRIMINAL LAW (CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY a7 2. ‘That accused appellant used his service firearm in shooting the victim should not be considered as taking advantage of piblic position. For such to be considered aggravating, the public official must use the influence, prestige and ascend- Eney which hs offce gives him in ealizinghis purpose, (Peo- ple vs. Amion, G.R. No. 140511, March 1, 2001) nature of the charge against him. (People vs. Abuyen, tember 1992) i et ea In contempt of or with Insult to public authorities 1. Requisites: ‘a__The public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties; 'b. Offender knows the identity of the public authority; . When the convict is over 70 years old. In death penalty, old age is in effecta privileged mitigating circumstance becatsse the penalty islowered by one degree. Inallother cases, senility is merely a generic aggravating circum- stance. 7. Pursuant to Article 83 the death penalty is suspended (auto- matic reprieve) a. Uponawoman while sheis pregnantor within one year after delivery. b. Uponany person over 70 (this is inappropriate because sentence isnot suspended but commited, above). 8. The Code has its own legal designation of the penalty for offenses therein, thus life imprisonmentshould not be inter- changed with reclusion perpetua, 9. Distinctions between reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment: Life Imprisonment a. Under special laws b, Hasno fixed duration . Without accessory penal ¢. ties Redusion Perpetua a. Under the RPC b. With fixed duration With accessory penal- ties 10. As early as 1948, it was made clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as lifeimprisonment. Thus, S.C. Adm. Circulat 6-A-92 (June 21, 1993) amending Circular 6-92 (October 12, 1992) enjoins trial judges to strictly observe the distinction between lifeimprisonment and reclusion perpetua to curb the erroneous practice of using them interchangeably in the im- ‘position of penalty for serious offenses like murder. (People «vs. Narca, July 1997) LL. Reclusion perpetua now has a definite term, however, it re- mains an indivisible penalty because there is no clear legis-88 ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLLAW lative intent to alterits original classification as such for Con- gress did not accordingly amend Arts, 63 and 76, the law on what are considered divisible penaltics and what should be ‘ing reclusion perpetua such as Art. 41 on accessory penalties and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art. 61 were not also amended. (People vs. Lucas, January 9, 1995 in relation to People vs. Reyes) 12. Sincein all the graduated scales of penalties recusion perpetua ple vs. Reyes, 212 SCRA; People vs. dela Petia, July 1997) 13. Article 70 of the Coce provides that in applying the three- fold rule, the duration of pena perpetua shall be computed at alties. (People vs. Tena, October 1992) Ve Rectan pepe ein todeath eae review of death penalty is mandatory, escape > of the convict will not foreclose review of the convic- ony the Supreme Court, whereasin recluson perpelua, PENALTIES » escape of the convict ipso facto makes the decision of the tzial court final and executory. . The death penalty can be imposed only for heinous crimes and cannot be imposed by operation of law; re- clusion perpetua can be imposed by operation of law such as in qualified felonies. 16 Bordo kap th pence na pincpa eal yet thre 90 crime in Book Il of the RPC for which it can be imposed be- penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. 17. Compared with bond for good behavior a. Bond for good behavior (BGB) is a principal penalty which cannet be imposed; Bond to keep the peace (BKP) is a penalty specifically applicable to grave and light threat only.7 (COMPREHENSIVE XEVIEWERINCRIMINALLAW | b. Failure to post BGB will make the accused suffer destierro; failure to post BKP will makehim liable tosuf- fer detention. 18. Disqualification is both a principal and an accessory pen- ally. It is a principal penalty when imposed in Book TI as a penalty for a particular crime; an accessory penalty when the principal penalty to which it is attached is imposed. 19. In the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the following are examples where the lesser offense absorbs the graver offense: a. The lesser offense of rebellion punished with prision mayor, absorbs the graver offense of murder punished ‘with reclusion perpetua to death, if committed in further- ance of rebellion; b. The lesser offense of forcible abduction, which is pun- ished by reclusion temporal, absorbs the graver offense of illegal detention of a woman, which is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. ©. The lower offense of slavery involving kidnapping of a ppetson, whichis punished by prision mayor, absorbs the higher offense of kidnapping which is punished by re- clusion perpetua todeath. (People vs. Quijada, July 1996, dissent of Justice Regalado) 20, AI prisoner whether under preventive detention or serv leaged on bail or on recognizance. An attomey cannot prac- the ding that peiod except wherele world appear val PENALTIES a in court o defend himself. (People vs. Maceda, Minute Reso- tution, January 24, 2000) 21, Publiccensure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 as a penalty lower than arresto menor. ‘The offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physi- cal injuries penalized with public censure is therefore a light felony. (Reodica vs. Memoracion, July 1998) 22. The medium period of prision mayor is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. (Bemabe vs. Memoracion, August 1997) ARTICLE 34— Civil Interdiction 1. Article 38 of the New Civil Code defines civil interdiction as 2 not appoint an ay a mr the actof the agents the act ofthe principal. Otherwise he would be doing indirectly what the law prohibits to be done di- rectly. Moreover, one of the causes for theextinction of agency is civil interdiction. 3, What the law prohibits is the disposition of property by an act inter vivos. The will ofthe testator does not dispose of the property at the timeofits making but at he time of his death. ARTICLE 38 — Pecuniary Liabilities vil [2+ The pecuniary liabilities ofthe offender are those owing to the offended party for reparation of the damage caused and thot owing tothe goverentin te frmf re and ents : of proceedings. 2. ‘Thay are to be sti in the onder pve reparation, then indemnification, next fine and lastly costs, raed2 (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ings fthemeas thecovicarenot enough to sete them 3 Fees rin Fst py In he the act of issuing a worthless check. This isthe only logical conclusion since the law does not require that there be dam- ageor prejudice to the individual complainant by reason of the issuance of the worthless check. (Lazaro vs .CA, Decem- ber 1993; Esler vs. Ledesma, 52 Phil. 114) 4, In Article 9, a P200 fine isa light penalty but in Article 26, it is already a correctional penalty. Article 9 should prevail ‘when the issue is prescription of crime because it is within the Title of the Code pertaining to felonies and how they are committed, Article 26 should prevail when the issue is pre- scription of penalty because within the Title of the Code on. peralties. S. Fine whether imposed singly or altematively et a. Afflictive/ grave ifmore than P6,000.00 b. Correctional/less grave if P200.00 — P6,000.00 c. Light if less than P200.00 ARTICLE 39 — Subsidiary Imprisonment 1. Subsidiary penalty takes the place of the fine for insolvent 1 convicts. Itis neither a principal nor accessory penalty, but a substitute penalty for fine only. The subsidiary penalty may be in the form of imprisonment ar deprivation of right de- perding upon the prindpal penalty imposed on the convict. 2. Subsidiary penalty is computed at one day for each P8.00 of fine but in no case to exceed one year at the most. If the pen- allty is: a. Purely a fine and the felony committed is grave or less grave, the subsidiary imprisonment chall not exceed 6 months; if light felony, not more than 15 days. Fine and Destierro which must be of a fixed duration: destiero also in accordance with the above rules. The b. ‘The principal penalty consists in other than prison sen- tence which is not of fixed duration; ©. Subsidiary penalty is not expressly stated in the sen- tence to take the place of fine in case of insolvency; and 4d. Thesentence imposed does not incude fine. 4. The court must expressly state that subsidiary penalty shall be served in case of insolvency because this is not an acces- sory penalty that follows the principal penalty as a matter of course. 5. Subsidiary penalty is also imposable in violations of special penal laws such as BP. 22. ARTICLE 45 Confiscation forfeiture of the proceeds cr instruments of the crime is automatically imposed unless: 1, They were the property of 3rd person who has no complic- ity in the crime, or 2. If the property is not within the jurisdiction of the court be- cause it was not submitted thereto. Notwithstanding the foregoing confiscation shall pro- ceed ifthe said articles are by themselves contraband or not subject of lawful commerce.cr COMPREHENSIVEREVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW PENALTIES ARTICLE 48 — Complex Crimes 5. Only 1 information should be filed for3 murders and an at- 1. Asticle 48 speaks of two kinds of plurality of offenses bet | murder produced by a Gone a. “When a single act constitutes two or more grave or ‘The death penalty should be imposed as the penalty for the less grave felonies” otherwise called compound crime ‘more serious crime, which in this caseis reclusion perpetua to (or delito compuesto). death, should be applied in the maximum period. (People b, “When an offense is a necessary means for committing vs, Carpo, et aly, April 4, 2001) the other” also known as complex crime proper (or delifo 6 Complex crime proper is a felony committed when one complejo). offense is necessary to commit another. This means thatthe 2. Compound crimes are those committed when a single act first offense is committed to insure itate the com- results to two or more grave or less grave felonies. The felo- mission of the next crime, It does not include: nies committed may be: (a) two or more grave felonies or (b) a. A.ctime to conceal another because such is not neces- two or more less grave felonies or (c) one grave and on¢ less. sary to commit but to conceal the other crime. ‘grave felonies. The recultant light felony shall be treated asa te cases uiaiisce diesen tastes poietic separate offense. the former shall be absorbed by the latter such as tres- 3. The basis of compound crimes is the singularity of the act. passing which is an element of robbery. For instance, the single act of throwing hand grenade, Kill- ingsome and seriously wounding anumber of persons. (Peo- Acrime which has the same element as the other crime pie vs. Guillen, 47 0.G, No. 7, 3433) However, in recent deci- i ite documents have the same element of damage. One sions of the Supreme Court, a single act of pulling the trig yaa the same damage cannot bing about two eximes. ger of a machine gun and several bullets come out, killing ‘Thus, there is NO complex crime of estafa thru falsifi- several persons is not complex crime because of the special cation of private documents. But falsification of publi property of the automatic gun. (But does not the offender official or commercial documents does not have the el- know also of the special property of grenade which will nec- ‘ement of damage, hence, there is a complex crime of essarily result to multiple deaths injuries?) estafa through falsification of public, or official, or com- 4, Ifthe act or acts complained of resulted from a single crimi- mercial documents, nal impulbe, such as throwing hand grenede, t constitutes a 7. "The penalty for complex crimes under article 48 isthe pen- single offense. Since the three 3 murders and attempted. alty for the most cerious crime in the maximum period. Such murders were produced by a single act (the explosion caused is beneficial to the accused because of the fact that ‘by the hurling of a grenade into the bedroom of the victim), is given a single penalty whereas if the crime is consid- the case comes unde: Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code on. ered separate, the offender shall be given as many penalties Soacle eOeree aeeee e aee as there are crimes committed. 2001) the act of two roosters two 4 rt Speen luk tiapompiy nica apo 8. As anexception ‘o the “single act” rule the Supreme Court Goapabelageany : held as constituting a complex crime, the case of People vs. sion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent a coms existence of their own, because there are not two distinct to, February 1992 “appropriations nor tvo intentions that cheracterize two sepa- In Lawas, the accused and other members of the Home ite crimes. Guard commenced firing at a large group of Maranaos ata96 ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW PENALTIES ” "signal from Lawas, and continued firing until Lawas gave a i 10, There is no complex crime of arson with homicide. If death ceasefire signal. About 5) Maranaos died in the slaughter. results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is ‘The accused were held guilty of the complex crime of multi- : ee ‘cumstances. 11. Example: The accused killed 4 persons and the house was ‘bumed to conceal the killing. In the course of the arson, a baby in the house was burned to death. Hiow many crimes were committed? 9, In determining the proper penalty to be imposed for com sion perpetua to be served successively in accordance with plex erime in relation to the indeterminate sentence on the “Axticle 70 of the Cede. (People ve. Cedonio, January 1994) convict: 12. ‘Theother kinds of plurality of crimes where: ‘a. First, determine the penalty for themostserlous offense, intmaposed are: as single penalty b. Second, for purposes of determining the next lower - i : Seeoee Ae dang of the penalty prescribed by law 8. Composite crimes or special complex crimes: for the offense, not merely the imposable penalty be- b. Continued crime or delito continuato; and cause of its complex nature, should, «prior, be consid- Sposed to that of People os. Fulgncio, 92 Phil. 1069, is 1. Composite crimes'are those which are treated as single indi- the correct rule), c. This one-degree lower penalty should be imposed in its maximum period following Art. 48 on the penalty | complex crimes, such as those found under Article 294 on fered. (The ruling in People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549, as | Continuing crimes or transitory crimes, robbery with homicide, etc and deemed a product of one eeeee tea ee . resence ng ciecumstance would re : : in imposing a redo the sort nay deem applicable. 14. Between composite crimes (special complex crime) and com- ‘Considering, however, that the penalty has to be im- plex crimes: posed in the maximum period, the only effect ofthis a. In composite crime, the offenses comprised are fixed additional mitigating crcumstanceis to impose only the bylaw, eg. rcbbery with rape, robbery with mutilation. - minimum portion of that maximum period. (Nizurtado Incomplex crime, the combination ofthe offenses is net vs. Sandiganbayan, December 1994) specified but generalized, that s, grave and/or lesseer 15. ‘COMPREHENSIVE R2VIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ‘grave; orone offence being the necessary means to com- mit the other. be Jn composite rime the penalty forthe specified come im period ¢ Incomplex crimes the light felony resulting from the ‘same actis treated separately. In special complex crimes, the other felonies are absorbed. Thus, in robbery with homicide, the homicide is deemed generic and includes the slight physical injuries. ‘When one of the crimesin an information charging complex crimesis not proved the effect is that the accused can be con- vicred of the other. For instance, in the crime of rape with homicide, if the rape was not proved, the accused may be corvicted of homicide. e. If there is an allegation of qualifying in that which is charged. ‘While the information sufficiently alleges the forcible taking ‘of complainant, the same fails to allege “lewd designs.” When a complex crime is charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of forcible scbdctin, ns well as all tha ele- PENALTIES * ments of rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant or the purpose of se«ually assaulting her as in fact he did raze her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction, Hence, the crime committed by appellant is sim- rape only (People vs, Sabredo, GR. No. 126114, 331 SCRA ra Intact “delits continuada” or"con- about the same place and all the overt acts violate one and the same provision of law. Only one erme shall be charged, 18. Forinstance, in thecase of Santiago vs. Gerchitorena, 228SCRA, April 3, 1988, (i) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, on or about October 17, 1988. g li hi Be f is ‘mentary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, (Id, 20, The trend in theft cases is to follow theso-called “single lar and place constitutes but one larceny, Abandoned is “separate larceny doctrine,” under which there was a die- tinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abar- doned was the doctrine that the goverxment has the discre-+ 100 (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWERIN CRIMINAL LAW tion to prosecute the accused for one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims. (Annotation, 37 ALR ‘rd 1407, 1410-14) (Id.) 21. Some examples of delito continuado: a, Thetheft of 13 cows belonging to different owners com- b. mitted by the accused at the same placeand at thesame period of time, (People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320) ‘The theft of 6 roosters belonging to 2 different owners from the same coop and at the same period of ime. (Peo- ple vs. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563) . The theft of 2 roosters in the same place and on the same occasion, (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437) ‘The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a Iawyer everytime he collects veteran’s benefits on be- hhalfof a client, who agreed thatthe attcrney’s fees shall sameciminal impulse. (People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975) (id) 22, Cases when the concept of delito continuado was not applied: ‘a. Two estafa cases one of which was committed during. b the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956. (People vs. Dichupa, 113 Phil 306) The said acts were committed on different occasions. ‘Several malversations comuritted in May, June, and July 1936 and falsifications to conceal the said offenses com- mitted in Auguskand October 1936. The malversations and falsification were not the result of only one pur- ‘pose or of only one resolution to einbezzle and falsify. (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil. 354) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 in- « volving failure of the collector to turn over the Seat a aN a oN a a. PENALTIES 101 installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 in- volving pocketing of installments for a sewing machine. (People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77) ‘Bestafa caies committed by theconversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on different dates. (Gamboa vs. CA, 68 SCRA 308) 23, Acontinning crime is: a b. In the Rules of Court, one where any of the elements of the offense were committed in different localities, such that, the accused may be indicted in any of those locali- ties. Any offence which is continuing in time, eg, rebellion which may have been started years ago by the offend- ers and continuing up to the present. 24. Examples of continuing crime: a. Rebellion, insurrection, conspiracy and proposal to com- mit such crimes, setting them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a mas- sive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. (Garcia- Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA) Squatting, hence even if the illegal occupancy of the gust 1990, Minute Resolution; People vs. City Court, General Santos City, April 1992) c Violation of B.P, Blg. 22. Venue is determined by the place where the elements of making, issuing, or draw- ing of the check and delivery thereof are committed. ‘Thus, a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or de- ‘termine the place where they were executed. Whatis of10 a ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALTAW decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The deliv ery of the instrument is the final act essential to its con- ‘summation as an obligation. (Ibasco vs, CA, September 1996) Abduction, kidnapping and illegal detention. 25, When an act or acts constitute more than one offense, the accused may be liable either for: a b c a A single crime, with one crime absorbing the other offenses ‘Acomplex crime when the offenses constitute grave or less grave felonies or when one crimes the necessary tocommit the other “A pecial complex crime, with each offenses constitut- ing elements of the composite offense ‘Two separate crimes Forinstance, the taking of woman forcibly and thereaf- ter, rape was committed on her. How should the offenders be charged? a If the original intent is to rape, the taking is merely a means to commit the intended offense in which case, the crime is simple rape, the abduction being a neces- sary means to bring about the desired result, If the intention is to take the woman against her will "with lewd designs, there is the complex crime of forci- a ble abduction with rape, Ifthe original intention is to kidnap the woman for ran- som and thereaiter, rape is committed as an after- thought, the offerse committed is special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; |. Ifin (b) above, there were several counts of rape, the first rape shall bz complexed with the forcible abduc- .. Hon and the subsequent rapes treatedas separate crimes of rape. PENALTIES 10 ARTICLE 49 e 3 i F : e a £ e rE : homicide. Article 49 provices for the imposition of the lower penalty, in the maximum period, whereas article 48 prescribes the penalty for the most serious offense in the maximum pe- riod. 3. Compare the penalty for the intended crime and for the ac- tual crime committed. Impose the lower penalty in the maxi- ‘mum period. Exception: if the crime committed constitutes an attempt or frustration of another with a higher penalty and the law provides a higher penalty for the frustrated or attempted, the penalty for the latter shall be imposed in the maximum period. w ARTICLES 50-57 —Ponalty for attempted and frustrated felonies on the accomplices and eccessories ARTICLE 61 — Rules for graduating penalties ARTICLE 71 — Graduated scales 1, Art71 providesthe scale from which the penalty prescribed SEE ley Rant ol shal be taken, Ar 61 presenbes the rules for applying the pally net ower in degree in Arts 2 ee 61, it is to be under- teach penalty prescribed by law for every felony is 4 degree Thus, generally when the penalty imposed com ‘prises of two periods, the two-period penalty is one degree and the penalty next lower in degree should be composed of two periods also.104 ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW 3, The penalties in Book II of the Code are understood to be: (a) the principal penalties imposed (b) upon the principal of- fonder (c) for the consummated felony. (Article 46) Hence, there is a need to provide the rules when the crime is not consummated, and when the offenders include accomplices and/or accessories. 4, Mlustrating Articles 50-57, the penalty for the three stages against the offenders: Consummated Frustrated Principal less Odegree less 1 degree less 2 degrees Accomplice less 1degree less 2degress less 3 degrees Attempted ‘Accessory less 2degrees less 3 degress less4degrees Additional deductions from the penalties are provided in Articles 250 of one degree for frustrated and attempted patricide, murder or homicide because of the gravity of the penalty prescribed. 5. Accarding to Act. 71, the penalty next lower in degree than arresto mayor is destierro and notarresto metor, whereas under ‘Art. 70, destierro follows arresto menor in the degree of sever ity. 6. The rules for graduating penalties under Article 61 are as follows: a, When the penalty prescribed is single atld indivisible thenext lower in degree isthe penally immediately fol- lowing under Art. 71. Thus, Reclusion Perpetua is one degree lower than Death. >. For two indivisible penalties, the next lowers that im- mediately following the minimum so for Reclusion Perpetua to Death, the penalty next lower is Reclusion Temporal. ¢. Whenthe penalty prescribed is composed of one or more * divisible penalties to be imposed to ‘heir full extent, the ‘PENALTIES 08; penalty next lower in degree shell be that immediately following the lesser, eg., prision mayor to reclusion ten- poral, the penalty next lower is prision correccioncl. Incase of one or more indivisible penalties and the maxi- mum of a divisible penalty, the next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum peri- ‘ods of that divisible penalty anc the maximum period of that immediately following, Thus, one degree lower than Reclusion Teraporal maximum to Death is Prisim ‘Mayor maximum to Reclusion Temporal medium. (Peo- ple vs. Paredes, November 1996) alty next lower shall likewise be composed of three pe- tiods thus: Maximum — prision mayor, minimum Medium — prision correccional, maximum Minimum — prision correceional, medium ARTICLE 62 1, The different kinds of modifying circumstances referred to ‘here are: a. Those which in themselves corstitute a crime (para- b © graphl) such as “by means of fie" or arson. ‘Those included by law in defining a crime and, ing the penalty (paragraph 1), ¢g,, inyinghando upon ¢ person in authority in Direct Assault. ‘Those inherent in the crime (paragraph 2) e.g., evident premeditation in robbery. ‘These circumstances shall no longer be considered in imposing the penalty because in (a) and (b) they were already considered by the law in prescribing the pen-Se 106 ‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW alty for the offense arid in (c) the circumstance is ab- sorbed by the crime committed. 4. Those pertaining to the moral attributes of the offender orhis relations with the offended or any other personal causes (paragraph 3) — only the offender having such attribute shall be a‘fected, as for instance, only the one blinded by passion or obfuscation shall have his liabil- ity mitigated. In rape, the relationship of one of the of- fender will be considered against him only and not against the other offenders. Habitual delinquency will will not aggravate the crime of the other offenders. 2. The inserted provision of Art. 62(1)(a) of the Code of syndi- cated or organized crime group is the deed of a group of persons, at least two in number, which is o:ganized for the People vs. Alberca, Jure 1996) 3. Another new provision referring to the aggravating circum- stance of abuse of official position where the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period regardless of the mitigat- ing circumstances. This complement the constitutional pre- ‘cept of public office is apublic trust. Itis sutmitted however tha: when the penalty imposable is reclusion nerpetua to death under Art, 63 and there are mitigating circumstances con- curing , or when the aggravating circumstance of abuse of official position concurs with a privilege mitigating circam- stance, this provision under Art. 62(1.a) should give way. 4, The phrase “same rule” in no. 2 of Art. 62 should refer to paragraph 1 of no. 1 without regard to no. 1(a) because the latier was a mere insertion. Thus, the same rule, i, aggra- vating circumstances which are inherent in the crime to such degree that it shall of necessity accompany the offense shall nolonger increase the 2enalty therefor. ‘PENALTIES 7 ARTICLE 63 — Rules for application of indivisible penalties 1. There are two classes of penalties in this article each withits own rules: a. Single indicisible penalty under par. 1 — (reclusion perpetua OR death) (Memory Aid — SIP) — modity- ing circumstances are never considered, b. Two indivisible penalties under per.2— _(reclusion perpelua TO death) (Memory Aid—TIP). Here, therules are: ‘Modifying Circumstance Penalty to be imposed 1 mitigating — reclusion perpetua aggravating — death ‘No aggravating /no mitigating — reclusion perpetua Some ome miigating/some — offset, then apply the foregoing rules 2. Thepenalty cannot be lowered by one degree no matter how circumstances present does not apply in Article 63. 3. The mitigating circumstances referred to in Articles 63 and penalty imposed is divisible or indivisible. 4. While Art. 248 of the Code punishes murder with “rech perpetua to death.” it does not follow that courts should pose these two insviible penalties, What shouldbe imposed is one or the other depending on the presence of modifying circumstances. (People vs. Rabanillo, May 26, 1999) 5. Under the amendatory sections of R.A. No. 7659, the pen- alty of reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on treason108 (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW Filipino (Sec. 2), qualified piracy (Sec. 3), parricide (See. byal '5), murder (Sec. 6), kidnepping and serious illegal detention (Gec.8) robbery with homicide (Sec. 9), destructive arson (Sec. 10), rape committed under certain circumstances (Sec. 11) and plunder (Sec. 12). (id.) Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty it has no minimum, medium or maximum period. People vs. riltigating or aggravating circumstances that may have at tended the commission of the exime. (People ve Dones, 234 SCRA) ARTICLE 64 — Rules for application of Divisible penalty 1. Therules when the penzlty imposable isa divisible penalty are: : Modifying Circumstances Proper Period a. No aggravating and’no — Medium mitigating b. Mitigating only — Minimum © Aggravating only — Maximum 4. Some of both circum- offset then apply the stances present above rules Two or more mitigating _ one degree lower in and no Aggravating the proper period 2. Art. 64 is important in the application of Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW) because the modifying circumstances are first considered in the determination of the maximum penalty. On the basis of the maximum penalty imposed, the minimum penalty shall be computed. 3. The court shall impose the penalty next lower to that pre- scribed by the Code in the period that it may deem applica~ ble depending upon the number and nature of the mitigat- Sea of this Article, PENALTIES 108 For instance, in the crime of homicide which is punishable with reclusion temporal, where there are two mitigating with maximum thereof within the range of prision mayor. (People vs, Germina, May 1398) 4. Courts cannot: a. Lower the penalty by degree when thereis an aggravat- ing circumstance even if the net effect of the offsetting is two or moremitigating circumstances left (par. 5); b, Impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law no matter how many aggravating circumstances are ‘present. 5, Article 64 does not apply to quasi-offenses because Article 365, paragraph 5 provides that in the imposition of the pen- alties for imprudence, the courts shall exercise their sound circumstances are not applicable, the judge is given leeway to exercise his sound discretion. 6, The significance of one day in the beginning of the period of penalty is that it separates one degree from the other. For ‘separated from prsion mayor (6yearsand 1 day to 12 years) by one day. The one-day difference determines whether a ‘convict shall be eligible for probation oc not; whether sub- sidiary penalty can >e imposed or not; etc. The 1-day difference separates reclusion temporal from. eclusion perpetua which determines whether the rules in ar- ticle 63 o article 64 will be applied in determining the proper period of penalty in view of the presence or absence of the modifying circumstances.ne (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW ARTICLE 65 — Rules when penalty not compesed of 3 perlods ARTICLE 76 — Legal duration of penalty 1. Art. 76is the law on duration of divisible penalties which is that divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into periods: the minimum, medium and maximum. The dura- tion of the period of a divisible penalty is camputed as fol- lows: Using as an example prision mayor with a period of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years: Step 1 —Deduct the beginning of the period from the end of the period. 12 years minus 6 years = 6 years Step 2 — Divide the difference by 3 corresponding to the 3 periods of minimum, medium and maximelm. 6 years divided by3 =2 years Step 3— Add the quotient in step 2 to the beginning of ‘each period starting wich the minimum. 6 years and 1.day plus 2 years = 8 years. Hence: Minimum — 6 years and 1 day to 8 years ‘Medium— 8 years and 1 day to 10 years Maximum — 10 years and 1 day to 12 years 2. Art.65 applies when the penalty is divisible but is not com- ‘posed of 3 periods. For instance, robbery in an uninhabited lace is penalized by prision correccional in ts medium and ‘maximum periods (Art. 302). The duration of this penalty is, 2years, 4 mos. and 1 day to 6 years. 3, Harmonizing these two provisions, the penalty shall be con- ‘verted into one with three periods to comply with the legal duration of the penalty, The steps are: a. , Get the duration of the penalty 6yrs. less 2yrs.4months =3 yrs. and § mos. or 44:mos. PENALTIES m * b, Divide the duration of the penalty by 3 to get the dura- tion of each period. 44 mos. / 3=14 mos. and 10 days each period & Ad the quotient to the minimus ofeach period, The owestis the minimum period, thesecond the medium, and the highest the maximum. Thus, Minimum =2 yrs. 4 mos. 1 day to 3 yrs. 6 mos. 10 days Medium =3 7xs.6 mos. 1 days to4 yrs. 8 mos. 20 days ‘Maximum =4 yrs, 8 mos, 21 days to 6 yrs. ARTICLE 66 — Imposition of fines 1, The factors to consider in the imposition of fines to the cul- prit are: a. Presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, 3h one case, the Supreme court reduced the fine of 10,000.00 to only P2,000.00 in view of the presence of three mitigating circumstances. (Nizurtado v3. Sandiganbayan, supra.) b. Moreparticularly, the wealth or neans of culprit. This, the fine to beimposed may be reduced if, notwithstand- ing the presence of aggravating circumstance, the cul- prit cannot afford the correct fine. ARTICLE 68 — Penalty on minors 1. For over 9 but less than 15 who acted with discernment — take note that the 2-degree reduction is AT LEAST and AL- WAYS; thus it could be 2 degrees, 3 degrees or more but never less than 2. Itis mandatory in the sense that the penalty un- der paragraph 1 of this article should always be lowered in all cases, and discretionary in that the judge has the disere- tion to loweriit by two or more degrees. 2. For over 15 but under 18 — one degree lower but alwaysin the proper period. a The age is reckoned at i fine of the commission of the offer to be ented ip aoa ene FESSIONAL SUHUO} ATENEO LIBRARY“an (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW PENALTIES 1 4, Under this Article, when the accused is less than 15 years of | its maximum period. The imposable penalty prescribed by age, the penalty shall always be lowered by atleast two de- i Jaw therefore is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. I is submitted that it is Article 68 that shall be applica- 4 ble for offenders less than 15 because in case of ambiguity, | the law isto be construed in favor of the accused, especially 1 eas for a child of tender age. Moreover, Article 68 emphasized a, Jelly 1998) that penalty shall be AT LEAST two degrees ALWAYS. Penalty a ARTICLE 69 — Penalty for Incomplete justification and exemption tificate of the accused to prove the mitigating circumstance 1, Thepenalty may be reduced by one or two degrees if majar- ‘of minority although said birth certificates were not presented ity of the conditions required to justify or exempt from crimi- ‘or offered in the tral court. (People vs. Regalario, March 1993) nal liability are present. In such case, the incomplete justiS- 5, Whenthe accused is exacly 15, thelaw isnot dear as tohow cation or exemption is privileged mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be reduced. It is submitted that the ten- 2. Ifthereis presentless than a majority of the conditions, there derness of the law be applied and include them in paragraph willonly bean ordinary mitigating circumstance, which will of Article 68. Jower the penalty to the minimum period. 6. When an accused is no longer 18 years of age at the time of & Penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the sentencing, he cannot anymore avail of the benefit of sus- deed is not wholly excusable, If majority of the requirements pension of his sentence under the Code. (People vs. delos for defense of property are present, the penalty may be low- Reyes, 215 SCRA) The full time he spent in actual commit- | ‘ered by two degrees to prision correccional. And when incom- ment and detention during trial shall, however, be credited. : plete self-defenseis coupled by two more mitigating circum- in the service of his sentence. (PD 603, Art. 197, par. 3) | stances, the penalty under Article 64(5) may further be re- : duced by one degree, that is, arresto mayor, because of the 7. ‘Theburden of proof thataccused was a minor at the time of 2 the commission of the offence is on him, presence of 2 mitigating circumstances and no aggravating 2 ‘The:ninor was 17 years old when he committed the offense. 7 Minority under paragraph 2 Article 68 should be appreci 4, Arts. 1 and 12 vie-vis Art. 69 and Art. 13(1): atedin his favor. The peralty prescribed for the crime of rob- All requisites present — exempting justifying bery with rape is reclusion perpetua to death The aggravat- | ae ‘ rape {ng circumstance of noctumity and abuse of superior strength 2ormore requisites present — privileged mitigating attended the commission of the crime. With two aggravat- dreumstance ing circumstances present with no ordinary mitigating cit- ' Lonly present — ordinary mitigating cumstances to offset them, the penalty shall be imposed in. ireumatance eres : Biut (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW But, ini defense of self, relatives or strangers, ‘unlawful aggression must always be present otherwice there is noth- ing to defend. i . 5, Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigat- ing circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by ag- int to offset this mitigating circumstance. (id) ARTICLE 70 — Successive service of sentences 1. When the culprit is given multiple sentences, the same must be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties per- { PENALTIES ous its it: Otherwise, the penalties shall be served successively Sinfultaneous service is the rule, whereas successive service is the exception. 2 ‘The penalty is to be served in the order herein prescribed observing the following limitations: b. Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years. Steps to determine the duration of sentence to be served: ‘a. get the most severe penalty (from Art. 70) b. multiply by3 c. _add the duration of the different sentences d. compare the results of b and ¢ e, accused to serve the lesser period which shall not ex- ceed 40 years. 4. This Article deals with SERVICE of sentence, not with impo- sition, hence, for the prison Director to follow, not for the remaining sentences shall be served in the order of sevedty. 5. Consequently, all the sentences on the prisoner imposed by any court for whatever crimes whenever filed should be av- ered by this rule, 6. Ifthe penalties imposed are all equal. the period thereof shall be considered as the most severe when applying the 3-fold mule.(COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW 7. When the death sentence is executed, all the death sentences ‘when more than one is meted are deemed simultaneously served. 8. When the most severe penalty is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (pena perpetua), the imputed duration shall be ‘30 years, thus 30 multiplied by 3 is 90 years. The culprit shall servenot90 but 40 years because of the express limitation in article 70. ARTICLE 75 — Increasing or reducing fino Fines are reduced by one or two degrees when the felony is attempted or frustrated or when imposed upon the accessory or taken. The penalty as computed shall inno case be lower than the minimum prescribed by law. For instance, if the fine prescribed that is, ?50. If the penalty is to be reduced by 2 degrees, the pen- alty is computed as follows: Step 1 — P200 divided by 4= P50 2 — P50 multiplied by 2 degrees = F100 8.— P20 minus P 100 =P 100 ‘The penalty as lowered by two degrees therefore is P50 to P100. by law is P50 to P200, — of the maximum amouintof P200is taken, ARTICLE 77 — Complex penalty 1. Acomplex penalty is one which is composed of three dis- tinct penalties each forming a period, the lightest of which shall be the minimum, the next shall be the medium and the ‘most severe the maximum. (Not to be confused with com- ‘plex crime under art. 48) 2. InPeople vs, Simon, the Court corrected the error in RA 7659 ‘which imposed in Sec. 20 a complex penalty composed of four periods — prision correccional to reclusion perpetua— by ‘construing the same to be prision correcionel to reclusion temt- poral, | : INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW 3, A penalty which provides for a penalty of reclusion temporal rR tualmum period to ecluson perpturis a complex and divisible penalty consisting of 3 periods. (People vs. Lian, 255 SCRA) ‘The 2nd paragraph of Art. 77 of the Code which deals with complex penalties, provides that “whenever the pen- alty prescribed does not have one of theforms specially pro- vided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, ap- INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW 1. Modifies the imposition of penalties under both the Revised ‘Penal Code AND special laws. The sentence must fix a mini- mum and a maxinum period of penalty. 2 1eisindcteminate after the convithas served the minim um alty when he becomes eligible for parole: ‘contin- {red stay in prison shall depend upon his conduct inside. The ‘minimum must beserved. When released the rest of his sere tence is served out of prison under thesupervision of a pro- bation officer. 3, ‘Thephilosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is that of redeeming valuable human material and prevent- {ng unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic ‘usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order (Vaca vs. CA, supra.) Thus, ater serving the minimum ‘and-upon showing that has reformed, the prisoner is given parole. 4, The law is not applicable: a. Inindivisible penalties of death and life imprisonment. ‘Also in case of reclusion perpetue, pursuant to Article 3, ‘paragraph 1 which provides that when the penalty im-e (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW posed is single and indivisible, the same shall be im- ‘posed without regard to any modifying circumstance. Prison terms of no! more than 1 year (one year or less) ‘Crimes of: Treason, Proposal or Conspiracy to Commut ‘Treason, Misprision of Treason, Rebelion, Espionage, Sedition, Piracy. Offenders who are: habitual delinquents, escapees from ‘confinement, evacers of sentence, viclators of condi- tional pardon granted by the Chief Executive. Recidivists are entitled to.an indeterminate sen- fe. Non-prison sentences of destierro, disqualification, etc. (Gee. 1) 5. How ISLAW operates: a, The sentence must state: “Within the range of (for in- b. © stance) prision mayor as minimum, and within the range of reclusion temporal as maximum.” This is necessary because of the accessory penalties. ‘Themaximum period is determined by considering the presence of modifying circumstances applying the rules on Art. 64, Privileged modifying circumstances must first be considered before applying the said rules. ‘The minimum is fixed at cite degree lower than that ~ provided by the Code. ‘The minimum thereof shall be taken from any pe- riod of the penalty next lower in degree. (People vs. Lian, 255SCRA) The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code forthe offense, with- out Brst considering any modifying circumstance at- e : nation of the minimum penalty is left by law to the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdi- * Yided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeter- minate sentence. (People vs. Saley, July 1998) 6 For complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be the basis for applying the Indeterminate Sentence e 7. ‘Therequirement of imposing a definite maximum and mini- ‘mum terms is mandatory. (Bacar vs. de Guzman, Jt, 271 SCRA) 8. ‘The fact that the lesser offense, and itsnecessarily lower pen- i no 9, Parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law and pardon: a, In parole, the minimum sentence must be served; in pardon, service is not required,a) (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWERIN CRIMINAL LAW b, Parole isa benefit granted by law, specifically the Inde- terminate Sentence Law; Pardon is an exercise of the power of the President under thie Constitution. 10, Notwithstanding the absence of any petition for a writ of habeas corpus or any similar judicial relief, release from im- prisonnentis in order after the maximum of the recomputed penalty under the amended Dangerous Drugs Law has been served. (People vs. Simon) PROBATION 1. It is a special privilege granted by the State to qualified of- fenders. Itessentially rejects appeals and encourages an oth- erwiseeligible convict toimmediately admit hs liability and save him the time, effort, expenses to jettison an appeal. (Fran- cisco vs. CA, April 6, 1995) 2, ‘The grant of probation rest primarily upon the discretion of the court whichis to be exercised primarily forthe benefit of thesociety as a whole and only incidentally forthe benefit of the accused. 3, Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot cextoné to those expressly excluded. It is an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the State which may be granted by the court toa ceemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the peralty imposed. by law for the offense. (id) 4, The convict should not assume that his application would automatically be granted. A hearing is required by due proc- ‘55 of law to give the prosecution a chance to be heard ifit is inclined to oppose the application. 5. Objectives: a, Topromote correction and rehabilitation of offender by giving him individualized treatment (positivist theory); b. Ta provide a better opportunity for the offender to r= form, PROBATION ma c. Toprevent further commission of crimes as he is placed under the supervision of probation officer; To decongest cur jails; and ‘To save the government much needed funds which reiting remorse. (id.) 7. Section 4 of the Law clearly mandates that no application for bation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. ‘Therefore, that an appeal should not bar the. accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty to “qualify” for probation is contrary to the mandate of the law. (id.) Appeal presupposcs thatthe convict disagrees with the find- ing of his guilt whereas probation admits his guilt and im- plies remorse on his part. Thus, appeal and probation are mutually exclusive remedies because they oppose one an- 9. Disqualified offenders: Those: a, Sentenced to a maximum term of more than 6 years, b. © a. (Probationable penalty is 6 years and below) Convicted of subversion or any crime against national security or the public order; Previously convicted by final judgment of offense pun- ished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or fine of not less than P200.00; ‘Who have been once on probation (available only once} e, Already serving sentence upon the effectivity of proba- tion law;m (COMPREHENSIVE RSVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW f Who have perfected an appeal. 10. “Maximum” is the termused by the law, hence if the convict 12. ‘was sentenced to multiple prison terms, those terms willnot be added together to determine whether the convictis quali- fied for probation if the total does not exceed 6 years but ‘what will be considered is the maximum among the sentences imposed. ‘be disqualified as the word “previous” refers to the convic- tion, not to the commission of the offense, notwithstanding that the crime arose out of a si act or transaction. The An order granting probation is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside where the accused who ‘was convicted for 54 counts of violations of B.P. 22, resorted Conditions imposable on the grantee: t ‘a, Mandatory conditions which are: ~- Ta 15. PROBATION wm 1 Toreportto the designated probation officer within ‘72 hours after receipt of the order a2 To report periodically to the officer at least once a ‘month or sooner as the latter may deem b. Discretionary conditions which depend upon the court ‘to impose. These must be constructive and not unduly restrictive of the offender's liberty and not offensive to his conscience. ‘The decision of the trial court on the application for proba- tion is not appealable. The proper remedy is to petition for certiorari if the decision is made without the benefit ofa hear- ing. ‘The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. The conviction of fencing which involves the accused applies for probation, although it is not execu- tory pending resolution of his application. (Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, July 1996) Probation and Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) compared: Probation ISL Sentence _mustnotbemore than must be more than 1 than 6 years year Penalty imprisonment or fine imprisonment only Disposition sentenceisuspended minimum to be Violation _entiresentence shall be unexpired portion is served to be served Appeal _forecloses right to pro- no effect on law’s op- bation eration as long as case not excluded ‘Available only oncene (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW - Article 80/Presidential Decree No. 603 1. Chapter III of PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) has expressly repealed Article 80. Article 189 of PD 603 defines “youthful offender” as a child, mintor, or youth, including imposes upon a person over 15 and under 18 a penalty next lower but in the proper period. (People vs. Paredes, November 1996) Note: Article 68, ike article 12 contains a lacuna in the ages of exactly 15 and exactly 9, respectively. In the Paredes ‘case, the court classified exactly 15 under paragraph 2 of ‘Aricle 68, which gives to the youthful offender a one-de- igrte deduction instead of under paragraph 1 of at least two- degree deduction] 2. Neris the fact that the youth has not shown himself to be incorrigible, a ground for reducing his penalty. This is a ground for suspension of judgment of youthful offenders, ie, those over 9 but under 18. But this could no longer be ordered since at the time the trial court rendered its decision petitioner was already over 18, This is not a mitigating cir- ‘cumstance and should not be used as basis for reducing the penalty. (David vs. CA, July 1998) evidence of this character if obtainable, should have been introduced. [PROBATION ps ARTICLE 81 — Execution of death penalty R.A. No. 8177 — LETHAL INJECTION LAW thereon to the Supreme Court with his recommendation. (chegaray vs. Sec. of Justice, October 1998) ‘The death penaity per seis not cruel, degrading or inhuman. Punishments are cruel when they inzoive torture or linger {ng death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within x the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution, Itim- plies there something inhuman and barbarous, something ‘more than the mere extinguishment of life. (id.) (Harden vs. Director of Prisons) 3. The “court” which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused after the Supreme Court has reviewed the entire records of the case and has aifirmed the judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter the records are remanded to the court below including a ce:tified copy of the judgment for execution. (id) 4, ‘The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than 1 ‘year nor later than 18 months after the judgmenthas become final and execxtory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times. Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of 18 months from the time of the finality of judgment imposing the death ‘penalty wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. (id.)‘COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ‘Any infliction of pain ia lethal injection is merely inciden- tal in carrying out the execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading ot inhuman punishment. Ina limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or dis- tress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this manely, The few minutes of pain does not rise to a consti- ‘tutonal violation. (id.) While Art, 83 , as amended by Section 25 of RA 7659, sus- pends the implementation of the death penalty while a gender-based discrimination, while the omission is an im- permissible contravention of the applicable law. As Section 17 finds no support ir. Art. 88 as amended, it must be de- clared invalid. Since the votes of the 5 justices fall short of the majority 8 votes needed to affirm the death sentence, the penalty of re- clusion perpetua should be imposed following Article 47 of the Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. (supri.) Inno case shall the burial of the person sentenced to death. be held with pomp which constitutes violation of Art. 153 on, Public Disturbance “The features of the Lethal Injection Law are: a. The death penalty shall be given preference over any __ other penalty and shall consist in putting the person to death by lethal injection. PROBATION wm ‘>. The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than ‘Lyear nor more than 18 months after the judgment has become final and executory without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency pow- ers atall times. ¢ _ Persons already sentenced by judgment, which has be- come final and executory, awaiting death by electrocu- tion or gas poisoning shall be covered by that Act. ARTICLE 89 — Total extinction of criminal liability ARTIGLE 84 — Partial extinction ARTICLE 36 — Pardon by the Chief Executive ARTICLE 23 — Pardon by the Offended 1. Causes of total extinction: ‘a. Death of convict (pecuniary ability is extinguished if death occurs before final judgment); Service of the sentence; Aminesty; Absolute pardon; Prescription of crime; Prescription of penalty; Marriage of the offended woman under Art. 266-c; Express repeal of penal law (act decriminalized). 2. Partial extinction: Conditional pardon; ‘Commutation of sentence; Good conduct allowance; Parole under the ISLAW; Probation under PD 968; Implied repeal or amendment of penal law lowering the penalty, yee me ees repose“Te aan (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW +3, Death of convict extinguishes criminal lisility at any stage of the proceeding; civil liability if death occurs before final judgment. The reason is that the penalty.requires personal service of sentence. If death occurs there will be nobody to serve the penalty for the crime. (People vs Bayotas, Septem- ber 1994) “Final” judgment refers to executory judgment. 4, Civil liability ex-delido is rooted in the court’s pronounce- ment of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to the death of the ac- ‘used pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant ‘extinction of the civil iability. The final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, hence, when the criminal action is extin- 6. Distinguish between amnesty and absolute pardon: AMNESTY PARDON a. Application generally to politi- generally to ordi- ‘al crimes and of- nary crimesand of fenders fenders b. Effect on convict obliterates the ef- relieves the of- . fects of conviction fender of penalty as if the act were but the effects of not cximinal conviction stay PROBATION ~ Congress concurrence. concurrence not required needed ‘When given ‘even before convic- after final convic- tion tion ‘Towhom given usually toa class of to a specific indi- of the private act of the President > Evidentiary value judicial notice must be pleaded taken and proved by a& cused Pardons given by the Chief Executive and as such itis a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the per- 50n pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty is by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (People vs. Casido, March 1997) 1. The limitations on the pardoning power of the Chief Execu- tive are’ a, That the power be exercised after final conviction, be- cause where the President is not so prevented by the“S130 b. (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW Constitution, noteven Congress can impose any restric- tion to prevent a presidential folly; and Before an appellant may be validly granted par- don, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, te, the appealed conviction must first be brought to fi- nality. ‘That such power does not extend to cases of impeach- ment, (People vs. Salle, December 1995) 8 A judgment of conviction becomes final a. When no appeal isseasonably perfected; b. ‘When the accused commences to serve the sentence; When the right to appeal is expressly waived in writ- ing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court; 4. When the accused applies for probation, thereby waiv- ing his right to appeal. 9. Pardon of the offended compared with pardon by the Chief ‘Executive: a. Executive Pardon extinguishes criminal liability; par- b. don bby the offended doesnot extinguish criminal Hiabil- ity except in Arts, 266-C (Anti-Rape Law) and 344, c. Executive Pardon cannot extinguish the civil liability _ of offender; the offended may be expressly waive the civil liability. PROBATION 10. An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accusec’s defenses, not the sole consideration 11. There are authorities holding that pardon misst be granted April 1997) ee 12, Prescription of crime refers to the loss of the right of the State to prosecute offenders, Iteannot be waived or extended since itis for the benefitof the accused. Once prescription has set in, the courts automatically lose jurisdiction. In prescription of crime: . a. The basis is the higher penalty if there were several.“a 13. (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW b. Running of the period starts from discovery by the of {fended or the authorities or their agents. This list is ex- clusive. c. Therunning of the period is interrupled by the filing of the complaint or information or when the offender is out of the country. 4. The period runs again when the proceedings are termi- nated without acquittal or conviction for reasons not attributable to the offender. Prescription of penalty occurs when the coavictescapes from detention or evades the service of his sentence. Evasion of service of sentence is condition precedent to the running of the period. ‘Tolling of periodof prescription of penalty occurs when ‘he commits another crime, or is captured or goes to another country with which the Philippines hasnc extradition treaty. PROBATION rey 16, Article 91 does not define the term offended party. Its defini- tion is in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as ‘the person against whom or against whose property the offense ‘was committed.” More specifically itis reasonable toassume the offended party is to whom the offender is civilly liable, in the light of Article 100 of the Code. The private individual to whom the offencer is civilly liable is the offended party. (id) 17. Trips abroad do not constitute the “absence” contemplated in Article 91. 18. If the Civil Code is to be resorted to in the interpretation of the length:of the month, so should it be resorted to in the supplied by its provisions. As the Revised Penal Code is de- ficient in that it does not explicitly define how the pericd is to be computed, resort must be had to its Article 13, which contains in detail the manner of computing a period. ‘The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and vs. Del Rosario) . ARTICLE 85 — Conditional pardon 1. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convict to the effect that the3 (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. (Alvarez vs. Dir. Of Prison, 80 pension of sentence.” (Torres vs. Dir. of Bureatt of Correc- tions, December 1955) 2. Conditional pardon can be extended to the convict in three ways: a. Through the operation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law; b, ‘Through the grant of probation under the Probation Lawrand Through the exercise of the President motu proprio of the power under the Constitution. 3. Aconditional pardon, when granted does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. (Mosanto vs. Factoran, Js, 170SCRA 190 [1°89]; People vs. Nacicnal, September 1995) 4, Ttmustbe given after FINAL judgment and must be accepted because of the conditions which must be strictly complie¢ with, 5. When conditions violated, the offender is: a. Rearrested and reincarcerated by order of the President under the Revised Administrative Code; OR b. Prosecuted under Art, 159 of the RPC, 6, Theexercise of presidential judgment isbeyond judicial scr finy. The determination of the violation of the conditional PROBATION ws pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive. The pardonee, having consented to place his Iit- erty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it cannot invoke the aid of the courts, how- ever erroneous the findings may be upon which his recom- ‘mitment was ordered. (Tesoro vs. Dir. of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154) A final judicial pronouncemen: as to the guilt of a pardonee is nota requirement for the President to determine ‘whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a con- ditional pardon. There is likewise nil abasis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the Presidentin the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office. (Torres vs. Dir. of Bureat of Corrections, December 1995) Iematters not that Torres had allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases fled against him subse- ‘quent to his conéitional pardon, and that the third case re- ‘mains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of hs right to a speedy trial. (id.} 7. Habeas Corpus is not the remedy of the reincarcerated pardonee, Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a ‘person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or ‘unlawful. The incarceration of Torres remains legal consid- ering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until y vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author af the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, ‘warrants the same, Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted erimi- nal. (id.)S16 (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWERIN CRIMINALLAW ARTICLE 98 — Deduction for loyalty 1. Leaving without returning within the time pariod prescribed —1/S addition to the remaining sentence which should not bemore than 6 months, thatis, 1/5 of the balance of the sen- tence to be served or 6 months whichever is lesser. 2, ‘Leaving and thereafter etuming within the time period pre- scribed — 1/5 deduction from his sentenceas provided un- der Article 98. 3. ‘Not leaving — no deduction for what is given premium is the loyalty shown by returning, not the “martyrdom” of not Teaving jail in the face of calamity. ‘tis submitted that the deduction for loyalty under Ar- ticle 98 should be based on the original sentence. As the Ar- tide did not qualify the word “sentence” unlike in Article 1158 which expressly stated that the sentencetobe added shall ing those suffered by his family or third persons by reason of the. crime. (Art.107) 2, Acquittal of the accused does not automatically extinguish his civil liability for the quantum of proof in criminal pros- cechtions is different from that in the civil, Acquittal shall bar e PROBATION 197 the civil action: arising from crime where the judgment of acquittal holds that: é a. The accused did not commit the acs imputed to him; or that b. * He was not guilty of criminal or civil negligence, But, his acquittal will NOT bar a civil actionin the following cases: a. Where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only a preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; 'b. Where the court declared that accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature; c. Where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. ‘The civil case for damages is not barred since the cause of action of the heirs in based on quasi-delict. Evenif the dam ages are sought onthe basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages,Lee (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW | Decause the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. (Guaring, Jr. vs. CA, ‘March 1997) What is included in civil liability: a, Restitution b. Reparation of damage caused ¢. Indemnification ‘or consequential damages Restitution is the return of thing itself whenever possi- ble. Otherwise, repara‘ion of the thing should be made. There i Restitution OR repara- S des 2206, 2219) ; ; 5. Civil liability in particular eases (101) By insane, imbecile, under 9, over 9but under 15: 4. Tt devolves upon the person who has control or authority upon them, unless heis without fault or negligence. 2. Tntherebenosuch person, or iffieis insolvent, the property of the mino? or insare shall answer for the liability except for those exempt froin execu- tion. b, Person who avoided a greater evil or injury (Art. 11, par. 4) —the one who benefited from such avoidance is liable. If there were several persons benefited, the court * shall determine their proportionate share, | | e PROBATION 18 Incase of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear—those 1e force or caused the fear shall be pri- 6. When the commission of a crime resulis in death, the dvil obligations arising therefrom are governed by penal laws, subject to the provisions of Art, 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Rela- tions, and of Title XVII of Book IV, regulating damages. (Art 1161, Civil Code) Thus: a. to be fixed by the court. ‘As moral damages for mental anguish —an amount to be fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the de- ceased. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances — an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same tobe considered separate from fines. e. As attomey’s fees and expenses of litigation — the ac tual amount thereof, (but only when a separate civilMo (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded), £ Interests in proper cases. * The recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damage is allowed under the ‘Grcumstances provided for in Articl2 2208 of the Civil ‘Code, one of which is when the courtdeems its ust and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses(of litigation. should be recovered. (People vs. Bergante, February 27, 1998) - 7. Inaddition to the above, actual damages for hospitalization/ funeral expenses which should be proved by receipts. In a case, however, the reason Arlene's father was unable to present the receipt for the funeral parlor was because the latter's representative refused to issue a receipt until he had fully paid the entire emount, which he had not done at the lime of the trial. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temper ate damages may be recovered ifitis shown that such party suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be approved with certainty. As there isno doubt the heirs cf the victim incurred funeral expenses, although the amount thereof has not been proved, it is ap- propriate to award P15,000.00 by way of temperate damages to the heirs of the victim. (People vs. Principe, G.R. No. 135862, May 2, 2002) is error for the judge to lump all the award of damages in ‘one because the moral, actual, exemplary, etc. damages are of different nature and are founded on different considera- tions. 9. Some doctrinal pronouncements on damages: a The indemnities for loss of eaming capacity of the de- * increased or lessened according to the mitigating or b. 4. PROBATION ut aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Techankee, Jr, October 1995} ‘The lower court however erred in categorizing the as moral dam- Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legis- lative response has been in the form of higher penal- ties, On like considerations, the jurisprudential path on pleasure of the court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.(Td,) In Rape, civil indemnity to the offended woman for the ‘wrong done to her is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages. The indemnity provided in criminal law as civil lability is the equivalent of actual or compensatory damages in civil law, and is distinct from moral damages. As currently fixed, the indemnity {for rape is P50,000.00; but if qualified by any of the dr- cumstances which would justify the imposition of the death penalty, the indemnity shall be not less than 75,000.00. (People vs. Malapo, 123115, August 25, 1988)7 oe (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW fe InZulueta vs. Pan Am (43 SCRA), the award for moral suffering of the appellant and his family deserves leni- ency as to his civil liability. (People vs, Narvaez, supra.) Where the crime resulted in the death of the victim, the ;- Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary orcorrecive dam ‘ages may be adjudged in order to deter the commission PROBATION 18 damages is awarded. (People vs. "Behankee, Jy Ooo- ber 1995) i. Theloss or damage that dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased may sustain by reason of the latter’s death is not the full amount of the deceased earnings, but the support they received or would have received from him had he not died. (People vs. Alvero, June 1993) j. The civil indemnity which, by reason of the added re- pugnance of the bestial act being committed on a preg- nant woman inthe presence of her husband, is increased ‘0 P50,000.00 foreach rape committed. (People vs. Reyes, July 1995) The offended party in the crime of rape is entitled to moral damages in the amount of at least 50,000.00. Where multiple rapes were committed, as rt 'P200,000.00 as moral damages. (People vs. Malapo,G.R. No. 123115, August 25, 1988) 10. Without a special power of attorney, the counsel for the ac- cused cannot bind nor compromise his client's civil liability. Both Art. 1878 of the Civil Code and Sec. 25 of Rule 138 of violative of law and jurisprudence. (Pecple vs. Carpo, etal, April 4, 2001) + Article 248 provides that persone guilty of rape, seduction 1 abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the of- fended woman; (b) acknowledge the olipring, unless the law should prevent him from doing s0; and (c) in every case in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the periodrr (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW af the offense coincides, more or less, with the period of con- ception. Ithhas been held, however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only sup- port for the offspring as part of the sentence. by the trial court only after due notice and hearing. (People + vs, Bayani, October 1996) Compulsory acnowledgment, as well as the support of the child is indeed proper there being no legal impedi 2B. oni not prevent it and tosupport the same. (People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689; People vs. Namayan, July 95) Persons subsidiarily liable: 2. _ Innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of establish- ments (102); >. Employers, teachers, persons, and. jons in any kind of industry (103). oc ‘The basis of subsidiary liability is the employer-employee relationship: The employer should be engaged in any kind of industry which means an undertaking for profit where labor and capital are utilized, PROBATION 16 14. A separate action against the employer for civil liability is not necessary because the latter’s liability for the employ- e's crime is absolute as long as the following conditions are present: a, The employer-employee relationship is established; 4. The accused was convicted and civil liability goes with the conviction. (If the employee died and hence could motbe mud the acon tbe pared under the Cr Code}; e. Judgment was final and executory but the writ of ex- cution was returned unsatisfied because the accused tion for the ‘ssuance of a subsidiary writ of execution ‘with notice to the employer #o that the latter may be heard therecn. 15, Theenforcement of subsidiary Kability in the same criminal proceedings is sanctioned on the thesis that it really isa part 16. Itisa basic postulate in criminal law that the criminal act of one ‘cannot be charged to another without a showing that he participated directly or constructively in the act ora6 (COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER IN CRIMINALLAW thet there was conspimacy, In cases of employer-employee relations, an employer is not criminally liable for the acts of his employee or agent unless he, in some ways, participates "Gh, counsels or abets hisemployee's acts or omissions. Insuch case, the employer himself becomes a participant to the crimi- nalact ofhis employee. His liability under the circumstances is direct and criminal. However, under Article 102, in rela~ tion to Article 103, the employers liability for the criminal negligence of his employee is subsidiary in nature and is lim- ited only to civil indemnity. (Fernando vs. Qcampo, 37 SCRA 311) Thus, an employer is party to a criminal case for the criminal negligence of his employee by reason of his sub- airy civil liability under the law. (Yusay vs. Adil, 164SCRA 438) “TITLE! . CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY 4. Crimes covered: Treason Coinspiracy and proposal to commit treason Misprision of treason Espionage Inciting to war and giving motives for reprisal Violation of neutrality Correspondence with hostiJe ccuntry Flight to ensmy country Piracy and mutiny 2. Crimesagainst national security are committed during astate rem me oP + of war except for: . & Espionage b. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisal Violation of neutrality 4. Mutiny and piracy 3. Rebellion is included in the Revised Penal Code in eres against public order thus it excluded from the extra territo- rial application of the Code under Article 2. ARTICLES 114-147 1. Acditizen owes not a qualified or tempore tan absolute and permanent allegiance, allegiance being fhe obligation of fidelity aid obedience to the government in retum to the : “7