USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 93-1845
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
EVANGELIST LACROIX,
Defendant, Appellant.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
___________________
_________________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
_____________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
_____________
_________________________
William E. Brennan,
____________________
with
whom Timothy I. Robinson
_____________________
and
Brennan, Caron, Lenehan & Iacopino were on brief, for appellant.
__________________________________
John D. Chapman, Trial Attorney, Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't
________________
of Justice, with whom Paul Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on
___________
brief, for appellee.
_________________________
June 27, 1994
_________________________
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
_____________
This sentencing appeal provides
an opportunity to clarify the operative standards for identifying
relevant
conduct under
We seize the
U.S.S.G.
opportunity and,
1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (Nov.
in the end,
affirm the
1993).1
sentence
imposed below.
I.
I.
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
For many years, defendant-appellant
Evangelist Lacroix
earned his livelihood as a building subcontractor in southern New
Hampshire.
He
became
acquainted with
the
brothers
Zsofka,
Matthew and Lazlos, who, through entities known as ZLM Realty and
101 Realty
(the Zsofka entities),
single-family residential
II."
In
late
together with
planned to develop
real estate complex
1985, appellant
and
Matthew
know as
"Sunview
Zsofka
(Zsofka),
Zsofka's construction foreman, John
corporation, Alpha Construction Company,
contractor for
Sunview II.
Appellant
a sizable
Lee, formed a
to serve as the general
became Alpha's president,
though by all accounts Zsofka retained ultimate control.
Construction and sales proceeded apace until the summer
of
1987, when
demand
began to
slacken.
adversity by retaining a marketing
(HNH),
firm
headed
by
Alpha
responded
to
agent, Horns of New Hampshire
Richard
Horn.
Zsofka
and
Horn
____________________
1Because
the case
sub judice involves a sentence imposed
___ ______
under the June 15, 1988 edition of the sentencing guidelines, see
___
infra Part II, all references herein are to that edition unless
_____
otherwise noted.
Nonetheless, the reasoning and method of
analysis that we propose for handling accomplice attribution in
the relevant conduct context are fully applicable to the current
version of the controlling guideline, U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)
(Nov. 1993).
2
masterminded an
illegal scheme
that enabled their
companies to
market and sell roughly 90 homes over the following two years.
The conspirators' plan
secretly gave money,
was seductively
simple:
they
secured by a late-filed second mortgage, to
any would-be homeowner who lacked the wherewithal for the minimum
down
payment required by the prospective purchase-money mortgage
lender (usually the Dime Savings Bank).
Appellant personally
falsely
represented,
both
handled 31
orally
closings at
and
in
undisclosed financing arrangements existed.
statements to be apocryphal when made.
were handled
appellant's
in much
the same
coconspirators.
which he
writing,
that
no
Appellant knew these
The other 60-odd closings
fashion by one
or the
other of
The transactions were structured in
such a way that, on paper, Alpha conveyed the houses, but not the
land, to the buyers.
at
every
things,
The company received in
closing.
These proceeds
excess of $37,000
enabled Alpha,
among other
to assist the Zsofka entities in funding the clandestine
second mortgages.
attended
After
Zsofka
weekly
staff
including those
and
Horn
meetings
hatched
at
which
handled by others, were
the
all
plot, appellant
the
closings,
discussed and approved.
At no fewer than three of these meetings Zsofka preached to those
present, appellant
among them,
about the importance
of keeping
all secondary financing hidden from the first mortgagees.
also gave instructions
on how
best to
feat.
3
accomplish this
Zsofka
furtive
During the under-three-year period
velivolant, appellant
salary from Alpha.
of Alpha,
In sum, as a
appellant
discussion of,
drew a total of
when the scheme was
approximately $385,000 in
part-owner and salaried officer
participated
in, or
was
every transaction, profited
from each sale,
and stood to gain more money
present
at least
at
the
indirectly
later (when and if
the buyers repaid the second mortgages).
Over time, many
the first
net
mortgages, resulting
cost to
Losses
of the borrowers proved unable
of
the
Dime Savings
this magnitude
federal grand
in widespread foreclosures
Bank
in excess
are seldom
jury returned
to pay
of
at a
$2,800,000.
unremarked.
In
a 102-count indictment
1992, a
against the
three Alpha principals and four persons associated with HNH.
indictment
charged
appellant
with
conspiracy
to
defraud
The
federally insured financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C.
371, and with various substantive offenses, including 12 counts
of bank
fraud, 18 U.S.C.
statements
U.S.C.
to
1014.
1344, and 12 counts
federally
After a
insured
financial institution,
17-day trial,
inability to reach agreement on
of making false
the jury
18
announced its
the 24 counts charging appellant
with the
commission of
substantive offenses,2 but
nevertheless
found him guilty of conspiring to defraud the Dime Savings Bank.
II.
II.
SENTENCING AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
SENTENCING AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In July
1993, the
trial judge convened
a disposition
____________________
2The 24 specific offense counts have since been dismissed on
motion of the prosecution.
4
hearing.
Apparently fearing
potential ex post
__ ____
facto problems,
_____
the judge, without objection, consulted the sentencing guidelines
that
had been in
namely,
the June
Harotunian, 920
__________
that
effect at the time
15,
1988
F.2d 1040,
the conspiracy wound down,
edition.
See
___
1041-42 (1st Cir.
United States
______________
v.
1990) (explaining
a sentencing court should apply the guidelines in effect on
the date of
sentencing unless
doing so will
implicate ex
__
facto concerns);
_____
United States
_____________
v. Arboleda, 929
________
(1st Cir. 1991)
(stating that,
if the guidelines
sentencing
not
are
used,
then
members
of
F.2d 858,
in effect
post
____
871
at
conspiracy are
ordinarily "subject to the sentencing guidelines in effect at the
time of the completion of the conspiracy").
Starting with a base offense level of six, see U.S.S.G.
___
2F1.1(a),
the
judge
added
ten
levels
on
the
theory
that
appellant shared responsibility for inflicting losses of at least
$2,000,000
(but
less
2F1.1(b)(1)(K), and
than
minimal
than
$5,000,000),
then added two incremental
planning,
see
___
U.S.S.G.
see
___
U.S.S.G.
levels for more
2F1.1(b)(2)(A).
calculations yielded an adjusted offense level of 18, which,
a first offender, produced a
27-33 months.
These
for
guideline sentencing range (GSR) of
The court imposed an incarcerative sentence at the
nadir of the range.
This appeal spotlights the court's determination of the
aggregate losses
properly attributable to Lacroix.
the judge
counted transactions handled by
"relevant
conduct" under U.S.S.G.
Noting that
his coconspirators as
1B1.3(a)(1), and, therefore,
tagged him with the
entire loss suffered by the
defrauded bank,
Lacroix assigns
error.
He contends
misconceived the applicable
test for
that the
sentencing court
relevant conduct,
mounted
too shallow an inquiry into the subject, and, in all events, that
the
court
found
the
facts
in
quixotic
first
contention
manner,
thereby
misapplying the test.
Appellant's
guideline
interpretation,
United States v.
_____________
that, when "an
which sparks
DeLuca, 17 F.3d
______
appeal raises a
poses
de
__
novo
____
question
review.
6, 7 (1st Cir.
See
___
1994) (holding
purely legal question
the proper interpretation of the sentencing
involving
guideline, appellate
review is plenary"); United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698,
_____________
_______
(1st Cir.
1992) (similar).
poses
a pure question
under
the same
from
standard.
different cloth;
Appellant's second
of law and is,
it
under the applicable guideline,
701
contention also
therefore, to be reviewed
Appellant's third contention
hinges on
of
a factbound
is cut
determination
thus evoking clear error review.
See United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 605 (1st Cir. 1990);
___ ______________
_______
see also
___ ____
United States v.
_____________
1994) (holding
must be
Brandon, 17
_______
that valuation of losses
reviewed under the
F.3d 409, 458
(1st Cir.
for sentencing purposes
clear error standard),
petition for
____________
cert. filed (U.S. May 16, 1994) (No. 93-9135).
___________
III.
III.
FORMULATING THE RELEVANT CONDUCT INQUIRY
FORMULATING THE RELEVANT CONDUCT INQUIRY
It is beyond serious
question that the losses stemming
from the 31 transactions
closed by appellant constitute relevant
conduct under
U.S.S.G.
1B1.3(a)(1).3
Less obvious
is whether
the remaining transactions, approximately 60 in number, closed by
coconspirators, may
be attributed to
him.
This
appeal centers
around appellant's insistence that the court below misinterpreted
the
test
governing
what
the Third
Circuit
aptly
has called
"accomplice attribution," see United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d
___ ______________
_______
985,
990 (3d Cir. 1992), by taking
too permissive a view of the
test's foreseeability prong.
A.
A.
The Accomplice Attribution Test.
The Accomplice Attribution Test.
_______________________________
The accomplice attribution test is restated in the case
law with great
frequency, but rarely in
with quite the same emphasis.
quite the same form
or
Thus, our perlustration must start
with the guideline itself.
____________________
3U.S.S.G.
1B1.3(a)(1) has always encompassed
performed personally
by a
defendant and acts
both acts
of others
attributable to that defendant
as relevant conduct.
The
barebones 1988 version, applied by the court below, treated these
two types of relevant conduct in separate clauses of the same
provision, defining relevant conduct as "all acts and omissions
committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the
defendant would be otherwise accountable . . . ."
In the most
recent version of the guidelines, the taxonomy is elaborated at
greater length, and the two types of relevant conduct are treated
in
separate
provisions,
namely,
1B1.3(a)(1)(A)
and
1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The category designed to include the first type
of relevant conduct
the defendant's own acts
has been
rephrased to make clear that it includes "all acts and omissions
committed,
aided,
abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant."
We need not
dwell on this linguistic change, since the acts committed
personally by Lacroix constitute relevant conduct under any
conceivable interpretation of the guidelines, past or present.
However, the Commission's clarification of the second category of
relevant conduct
the acts of others attributable to the
defendant
is significant to the task at hand, and, therefore,
we discuss it at some length, see infra note 4 & accompanying
___ _____
text.
7
In
its
current iteration,4
the
applicable guideline
states that relevant conduct includes "all reasonably foreseeable
acts and
omissions
of
others
in furtherance
of
the
jointly
undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission
of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or
in the
for
course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility
that
Reading the
offense."
1988
U.S.S.G.
version of
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)
section
(Nov.
1B1.3(a)(1) in
1993).
light
of
subsequent clarifying
commentary,
we
understand
mandated
a two-part
relevant
conduct
determine
of the
the
inquiry for
milieu.
both the guideline
Sentencing Commission
First, the
defendant's jointly
the court to
and its
to
accomplice attribution
what acts and omissions
task requires
the
amendments to
sentencing
have
in the
court
must
of others were in furtherance
undertaken criminal activity.
ascertain what activity
This
fell within
scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the
defendant's agreement
court must
(whether explicit or tacit).
determine to what
that were in furtherance
likely
would have
extent others' acts
Second, the
and omissions
of jointly undertaken criminal activity
been foreseeable
by a
reasonable person
in
____________________
4The Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G.
1B1.3(a)(1) in
1989 and again in 1992. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends. 78 & 439
___
(Nov. 1993); see also Collado, 975 F.2d at 991-92 (analyzing 1989
___ ____ _______
amendment); United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1023 n.6,
_____________
_______
1024 nn. 8-9, 1025 n.10 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing both
amendments).
Because the Sentencing Commission has labelled
these amendments as "clarifying" in nature, rather than as
revisionary, they may be taken into account retrospectively, not
only by the sentencing court, see U.S.S.G.
1B1.11(b)(2) (Nov.
___
1993), but also on appeal, see United States v. Valencia-Lucena,
___ _____________
_______________
988 F.2d 228, 234 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993).
8
defendant's shoes at the time of his or her agreement.5
We think it is important
point
for
the
foreseeability
defendant's agreement
undertook
not
to emphasize that the vantage
judgment
is
the
necessarily the time
the performance of
criminal activity, or
time
of
the
he personally
the time of
his entry into the conspiracy.
Siting the vantage
point in this
way has
implications.
one thing,
court
acts
at least
two salient
examining relevant
conduct may
For
attribute to
a defendant
committed by his accomplices prior to the commission of his
own acts, so long as they occur subsequent to his agreement.
another
thing,
because a
single
defendant
may make
For
multiple
agreements or expand an existing agreement, a defendant sometimes
may
be chargeable
with losses
arising out
of conduct
that he
could not have foreseen at the time he entered the conspiracy, so
____________________
5We have
considered the possibility that
the latest
reformulation of application note 2, U.S.S.G.
1B1.3, comment.
(n.2) (Nov. 1993), mandates a compound finding, such that, for
"conduct" to be "relevant," the accomplice's act would have to be
"in furtherance of activity within the scope of agreement."
We
reject this refinement for two reasons. First, the language of
the guideline itself refers only to the concepts of "furtherance"
and "foreseeability."
Second, application note 2, read as a
whole, appears to use "in furtherance" and "within the scope"
interchangeably
a practice consistent with earlier usage in
both the commentary and the case law.
See, e.g., U.S.S.G.
___
____
1B1.3, comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1991) (stating, within the space of
a few lines, that conduct for which a defendant would be
otherwise accountable includes conduct of others "in furtherance
of the execution of the jointly undertaken criminal activity that
was
reasonably foreseeable" and excludes conduct that was
"neither within the scope of the defendant's agreement nor was
reasonably foreseeable");
United States v. Garcia, 954 F.2d 12,
_____________
______
15-16 (1st Cir. 1992) (similar); see generally Paul J. Hofer,
___ _________
Implications of the Relevant Conduct Study for the Revised
_________________________________________________________________
Guideline, 4 Fed. Sent. R. 334, 335 (1992) (discussing confusion
_________
of the terms "furtherance" and "scope").
9
long as such conduct was foreseeable at the time that he signaled
his
agreement
to
the
expanded
scope
of
jointly
undertaken
criminal activity embracing such conduct.
In
never
this case, the inquiry may be truncated.
been any
closed by
suggestion
that the
60-something
appellant's coconspirators
appellant's
agreement,
transactions
were
undertaken criminal
other
or,
than
activity.
put
There has
transactions
were outside the
another
in furtherance
way,
of
Consequently, this
scope of
that
the
those
jointly
appeal turns
exclusively on the issue of foreseeability.
B.
B.
The Findings Below.
The Findings Below.
__________________
At the disposition hearing, defense counsel argued that
appellant could not
lower
have foreseen
court treated this
the conduct of
argument as
calling into
others.
The
question an
application of the guidelines.
The court then proceeded to find,
based on the trial evidence and the jury verdict, that:
Mr.
Lacroix
was involved
in this
conspiracy from the beginning. He was aware
of the nature and extent of the development
that was involved, the development that Alpha
was involved in. He was aware of the cost of
the homes. He was aware of the profit that
was being received, and he was also receiving
salaries
from
Alpha, $173,000
in '87,
$187,000 in '88, $25,000 in '89.
So in the opinion of the Court he was
well aware of the magnitude of what was
happening here, and . . . under all of the
circumstances in which he was involved, the
foreseeability in this situation is really
inherent in the nature of the conspiracy that
was involved here, which was a marketing
conspiracy.
IV.
IV.
ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS
10
Appellant says
that the
district court's
findings on
foreseeability are flawed both legally and factually.
A.
A.
Appellant
the court's
Questions of Law.
Questions of Law.
________________
raises two predominantly legal challenges to
formulation
of the
relevant conduct
inquiry.
We
inspect each challenge in turn.
1.
1.
court's
Mere Awareness.
Mere Awareness.
______________
repeated use of the
recurrence
betokens a
knowledge.
This
Appellant seizes on
word "aware" and
single-minded
focus
suggests that its
on the
focus is impermissible, appellant
because a finding of
"mere awareness," in and of
be
and
equated
with,
foreseeability
citations
precisely
in
does
not
the sentencing
to several
question.
the district
(or even
phase.
cases, his
Awareness does not
justify,
asseverates,
itself, cannot
a
finding
of
Despite
appellant's
asseveration begs
the pivotal
always bear on
roughly) the
defendant's
same way.
foreseeability in
To
understand the
inferences that lawfully can be drawn from awareness in any given
situation,
court must
first
assess
setting and then answer the question:
the particular
factual
"Awareness of what?"
The four cases upon which appellant principally relies,
read carefully,
United States
_____________
underscore this necessity.
v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d
_______
admonished sentencing
judges not
foreseeability
we
knowledge of
but
1015, is a case
to equate mere
were referring
historic facts."
Id.
___
The first
of them,
in which we
knowledge with
specifically to
at 1025.
By
"mere
this, we meant
that the foreseeability of acts performed after defendant's entry
_____
11
into
conspiracy
knowledge"
of
conspiracy.6
Carreon,
_______
from
acts
See
___
11
O'Campo).
_______
could
1225,
at
established
prior
_____
1026;
to
his
entry
"mere
into
the
also
____
United States
______________
1234-37 (5th
Cir.
1994)
the stratagemical
acts of
inapposite because
it did not
conspiracy
which he
was aware
the conspiracy.
deal with
v.
(discussing
involved in the instant
necessarily occurred after his entry into
O'Campo is
_______
his
by
see
___
Since Lacroix was
the start,
be
performed
id.
___
F.3d
not
Thus,
post-entry
acts.
The remaining three
advance
the
bland
cases upon which appellant
proposition
dispositively established
that
foreseeability
relies
is
not
by mere awareness of the existence or
____________________
illegality of a conspiracy.
___________________________
See United States v. Evbuomwan, 992
_____________
_________
F.2d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that "mere knowledge that
criminal activity
is taking place is not enough"); United States
_____________
v. Valencia-Lucena, 988 F.2d 228, 234 (1st Cir. 1993) (suggesting
_______________
that individuals may
is
illegal
but
"know that the agreement they
[nevertheless]
have
no
way
to
have entered
foresee
the
magnitude
or
Edwards, 945
_______
ambition of
F.2d 1387,
"foreseeability
[an
means
the
enterprise");
1393 (7th
Cir. 1991)
United States
_____________
v.
(commenting that
more than subjective awareness . . . that
accomplice] headed
long-standing
and successful
heroin
____________________
6We note in passing
that the O'Campo court did not say that
_______
awareness
of
pre-entry
acts was
bereft
of evidentiary
significance in determining the foreseeability of post-entry
acts.
The court said the opposite.
See O'Campo, 973 F.2d at
___ _______
1026 (stating that "knowledge of . . . prior acts will inform the
judgment about what [defendant] reasonably could have foreseen").
12
distribution network"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1590 (1992).
_____ ______
find no
fault with these cases
words cannot be read in a
knowledge of
always)
but we caution that the courts'
vacuum.
a conspiracy's
We
Awareness, even if limited to
unlawfulness, is always
relevant to the question of foreseeability
(or almost
and none of
the cited cases suggest the contrary.
More importantly, these three
denigrate the possibility that
cases do not in
any way
foreseeability may be established
by
different kind
of awareness,
that
is, by
a defendant's
knowledge of the nature and extent of a conspiracy in which he is
_______________________________________________________
involved.
________
This, of course,
detected by the court below.
that
defendant's
conspiracy
is exactly the
stripe of awareness
It is both good
law and good logic
awareness
choose
awareness"
to characterize
inner
attribution.
that
of
such
intimate
Although appellant
knowledge as
he is fishing
"mere
frequently
will
suffice
in an empty stream.
to
prove
ability to foresee the acts of coconspirators.
States
______
workings
a term that we view as verging on the oxymoronic in
a case like this one
knowledge
the
in which he is participating is germane to, and often
highly probative of, accomplice
may
of
the
Such
defendant's
See, e.g., United
___ ____ ______
v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 525 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding
_______
a
carried
defendant's
a
reasonably
firearm
knowledge that
justified
foresee that
the
a finding
accomplice would
accomplice
that
habitually
defendant
carry the gun
could
on the
occasion in question).
"Foreseeability"
is
conventionally
13
defined
as
the
"ability to see or know in advance."
(6th
ed. 1990).
act"
might well be
been
able
probability.
649
Viewed in that light, a "reasonably foreseeable
regarded as an act
who knew everything
have
Black's Law Dictionary
______________________
that the
to
know
Giving
between knowledge
that a reasonable person
defendant knew at
in advance
with
weight to
the
due
and foreseeability,
the time
fair
would
degree
intimate
of
connection
we conclude that
in this
case it was both permissible and advisable for the district court
to consider appellant's awareness
scope en
The
route to
of the conspiracy's nature and
an ultimate determination
district court,
therefore, did
elements of the accomplice
on foreseeability.
not misconstrue
either the
attribution test or the way
in which
the test should operate.
2.
2.
The Nature of the Inquiry.
The Nature of the Inquiry.
____________________________
Appellant's next
argument is pitched in a somewhat different direction.
He points
to a Third Circuit directive that instructs district courts, when
considering
accomplice
context, to
embark upon "a searching
into the circumstances
in the conspiracy."
us to adopt this
attribution
in
the
relevant
and individualized inquiry
surrounding each defendant's
Collado,
_______
conduct
975 F.2d at 995.
He
involvement
then invites
standard and calumnizes the district
mounting an inquiry that supposedly fell short of it.
court for
We believe
that this argument is largely an exercise in semantics.
In
the
first
place,
the invitation
that
appellant
extends
is
principle
wholly
of
gratuitous.
searching
We already
have
and individualized
endorsed
inquiry
the
in
the
14
relevant conduct
989 F.2d 20, 22
context.
See, e.g., United States v. Balogun,
___ ____ ______________
_______
(1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a sentencing court
ordinarily must make
specific, individualized findings regarding
foreseeability for each defendant).7
Indeed, the Third Circuit,
in constructing the rule appellant urges us to "adopt," cites our
opinion in United States v. Garcia, 954 F.2d 12
_____________
______
as a model.
have
See Collado, 975 F.2d at 995.
___ _______
employed
Circuit
slightly
The mere fact that we
different phraseology
is of no consequence.
(1st Cir. 1992),
The adjectives
than
the
Third
used in Collado,
_______
while concinnous, are neither talismans nor words of art.
The second
meritless.
Here,
half
the
of appellant's
district
argument
court honored
the
is
equally
spirit
of
Balogun by making extensive findings regarding the foreseeability
_______
of
others' acts from appellant's vantage point.
presided
Since the court
over a 17-day trial and based its findings, inter alia,
_____ ____
"on all of the evidence that the Court heard during the course of
the trial," it strains credulity to describe the inquiry below as
insufficiently searching.
We are
more the district court might have
hard pressed to
done
imagine what
and appellant, for all
____________________
7In
Balogun, we mused that there might be a possible
_______
exception to this rule in the rare case where foreseeability is
"inherent in the nature" of a particular conspiracy. 989 F.2d at
22.
We have yet to probe the parameters of this possible
exception, nor do we need to do so today. We note only that the
district
court's seemingly misplaced allusion to Balogun's
_______
"inherent in the nature" language, see supra at p. 10, does
___ _____
little to shed light upon the court's conclusions. Consequently,
we rely on the district judge's individualized findings in
respect
to foreseeability,
and
treat
his comment
that
foreseeability "is really inherent in the nature of [a marketing]
conspiracy" as mere surplusage.
15
his lamentations, has not advanced a single concrete suggestion.
B.
B.
Appellant's
district
court applied
Questions of Fact.
Questions of Fact.
_________________
fallback
the
position is
proper legal
that,
rules in
even
if the
determining
relevant conduct,
The facts
its findings
of the case,
of fact were
clearly erroneous.
taken without embellishment,
expose the
fallacy in appellant's position.
To
moving
be sure, Lacroix was neither the progenitor nor the
spirit
retained
of the
conspiracy, but
a proprietary
interest in it,
part in its operation.
of the firm that
an
inception
and played
Moreover, he served as the
home.
The record supports
inference
found it,
an integral
titular head
that
appellant
indeed, virtually
understood
from
the
that the object of the conspiracy was to sell homes by
hook or by crook.
and
helped to
oversaw the construction, marketing, financing,
and sale of every
compels
he
Taking the district court's explicit findings,
fleshing them out with
understand the
court to have
details derived from
concluded that appellant
along the sums involved in each transaction and the
method of
operation
the record, we
selling houses
knew all
conspiracy's
to unqualified
buyers by
providing, and then fraudulently concealing, secondary financing.
Because
time
any reasonable
appellant's position,
at the
of his agreement, would have recognized that ninety or more
homes might be sold
not
person in
err in
in this corrupt fashion, the court below did
concluding that
all the
16
losses resulting
from the
sales were fairly attributable to Lacroix.8
Appellant
particulars,
and, in
Instead, he seeks
reasoning
bottom,
cannot
fairness, does
to escape
by introducing
this
deny this
endeavor
analysis
not really
the force of
three
in
any of
try to
the district
do so.
court's
extraneous considerations.
reflects
basic
its
misunderstanding
At
of
sentencing principles.
First,
foreseeability
agree.
appellant
insists
is undermined
The jury
by the
that
jury verdict.
did not exonerate appellant in
the substantive
offense counts; rather, it
these counts.
Its
verdict,
finding
We
of
do not
connection with
simply deadlocked on
therefore, did
not
resolve
the
contested issues either way, but left them up in the air.
Moreover, the method of the
the
sentencing judge,
"conduct"
is
not the
"relevant"
to
guidelines is to leave
jury, the determination
the fashioning
of
to
of what
defendant's
sentence.
See United States v. Limberopoulos, ___ F.3d ___, ___
___ _____________
_____________
(1st Cir.
1994) [No. 92-1954, slip op. at 15]; see also U.S.S.G.
___ ____
6A1.3.
Thus, even a trial jury's refusal to find that a certain
fact has
been proven beyond a reasonable
district
court
from
making
precisely
doubt will not bar the
that
same
finding
at
____________________
8In our view,
this is
an especially potent
case for
such
attribution. Above and beyond what the government had to prove
in respect to that issue, appellant could easily have foreseen
that the coconspirators' method of operation carried with it a
heightened chance of default and foreclosure.
Thus, appellant
could foresee the consequences of the illegal marketing scheme
and the magnitude of the attendant financial risks to which the
bedeviled mortgage lender might fall prey.
17
sentencing, under a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
On
this basis, we have held squarely that a defendant's acquittal on
a
particular
count
flexibility in
to the count
does
not
limit
the
sentencing
considering the same underlying
of conviction.
F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989).
court's
facts in respect
See United States
___ _____________
v. Mocciola, 891
________
A fortiori, the case for permitting
__________
judges free rein to make whatever findings the record can support
is airtight where,
as here,
trial on the
disputed counts
ends
with a hung jury rather than an acquittal.
Second,
woods, an
uneducated carpenter
entrepreneurs.
bears
upon
himself as
in the company
a babe
in the
of sophisticated
For what this jeremiad may be worth insofar as it
accomplice
rejected by, the
See, e.g.,
appellant presents
attribution,
district judge.9
United States v.
it was
tendered
We discern
Ruiz, 905 F.2d
to,
no clear
499, 508 (1st
and
error.
Cir.
___
____
_____________
____
1990) (acknowledging that "where there is more than one plausible
view of
the circumstances,
the sentencing court's
choice among
supportable alternatives cannot be clearly erroneous").
Third, and relatedly, appellant
Zsofka and
harps on the fact that
Horn called the tune, to which he merely danced.
But
the concepts of "relevant conduct" and "role" are distinct in the
world
of the sentencing guidelines.
13 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st
Cir. 1994).
See United States v. Lilly,
___ _____________
_____
Whereas the former
helps to
____________________
9We note in passing that the judge sentenced appellant at
the lowest point in the GSR, a determination that, to some
extent, may have taken into account appellant's supposed lack of
sophistication.
18
gauge the gravity of an offense, the latter helps to measure
offender's culpability.
attribution
inconsistent
See
___
of the entire
with
the
id.
___
Hence, the
loss to appellant
fact that
he
may
the
district court's
is not
have
in any way
played only
supporting role.10
We need go no further.
The short of it is that none of
the
factors
upon which
appellant
dwells cast
doubt
upon the
district court's ascertainment of the amount of loss attributable
to appellant
activity.
in connection with the
jointly undertaken criminal
Consequently, we cannot say that the lower court erred
in constructing the sentencing calculus.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
________
____________________
10Of course, the guidelines permit a sentencing court to
reduce a defendant's offense level for "minor" or "minimal"
participation in the offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.2.
___
Appellant did not seek such an adjustment below and, therefore,
cannot challenge the lack of such an adjustment on appeal. See
___
United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
_____________
_____
that sentencing arguments not seasonably advanced below cannot be
introduced for the first time on appeal). At any rate, while
others may have been the ringleaders, we see no basis for
characterizing appellant's role as "minor" or "minimal."
19