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A Des Example

The document discusses the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm. It describes how DES exhibits the avalanche effect where a small change in the plaintext or key results in many changes in the ciphertext. Tables show how changing one bit of the plaintext or key completely alters the ciphertext after just a few encryption rounds. The document also examines concerns about the key size and nature of the DES algorithm and discusses how DES was eventually broken with specialized hardware.

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nagaraj
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511 views

A Des Example

The document discusses the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm. It describes how DES exhibits the avalanche effect where a small change in the plaintext or key results in many changes in the ciphertext. Tables show how changing one bit of the plaintext or key completely alters the ciphertext after just a few encryption rounds. The document also examines concerns about the key size and nature of the DES algorithm and discusses how DES was eventually broken with specialized hardware.

Uploaded by

nagaraj
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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A DES EXAMPLE

The plaintext is a hexadecimal palindrome.


The plaintext, key, and resulting ciphertext are as follows:

Results
Table (3.5) shows the progression of the algorithm.
The first row shows the 32-bit values of the left and right halves of
data after the initial permutation.
The next 16 rows show the results after each round.
Also shown is the value of the 48-bit subkey generated for each
round. Note that Li = Ri-1 .
The final row shows the leftand right-hand values after the inverse
initial permutation.
These two values combined form the ciphertext.

The Avalanche Effect


A desirable property of any encryption algorithm is that a small
change in either the plaintext or the key should produce a significant
change in the ciphertext.
In particular, a change in one bit of the plaintext or one bit of the key
should produce a change in many bits of the ciphertext.
This is referred to as the avalanche effect.
If the change were small, this might provide a way to reduce the size
of the plaintext or key space to be searched.
Using the example from Table 3.5,

Table 3.6 shows the result when the fourth bit of the plaintext is
changed, so that the plaintext is 12468aceeca86420.

The second column of the table shows the intermediate 64-bit values
at the end of each round for the two plaintexts. The third column
shows the number of bits that differ between the two intermediate
values.
The table shows that, after just three rounds, 18 bits differ between
the two blocks.
On completion, the two ciphertexts differ in 32 bit positions.

Table 3.7 shows a similar test using the original plaintext of with two
keys that differ in only the fourth bit position:
the original key,
0f1571c947d9e859, and the altered key,
1f1571c947d9e859.
Again, the results show that about half of the bits in the ciphertext
differ and that the avalanche effect is pronounced after just a few
rounds.

THE STRENGTH OF DES


Since its adoption as a federal standard, there have been persistent
concerns about the level of security provided by DES.
These concerns, by and large, fall into two areas: key size and the
nature of the algorithm.
The Use of 56-Bit Keys
With a key length of 56 bits, there are possible 256 keys, which is
approximately 7.2 x 1016 keys.
Thus, on the face of it, a brute-force attack appears impractical.
Assuming that, on average, half the key space has to be searched, a
single machine performing one DES encryption per microsecond
would take more than a thousand years to break the cipher.

However, the assumption of one encryption per microsecond is too


conservative.
As far back as 1977, Diffie and Hellman postulated that the
technology existed to build a parallel machine with 1 million
encryption devices, each of which could perform one encryption per
microsecond .
This would bring the average search time down to about 10 hours.
The authors estimated that the cost would be about $20 million in
1977 dollars.
DES finally and definitively proved insecure in July 1998, when the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) announced that it had broken a
DES encryption using a

special-purpose DES cracker machine

that was built for less than $250,000.

The attack took less than three days.


The EFF has published a detailed description of the machine,
enabling others to build their own cracker
And, of course, hardware prices will continue to drop as speeds
increase, making DES virtually worthless.
It is important to note that there is more to a key-search attack than
simply running through all possible keys.
Unless known plaintext is provided, the analyst must be able to
recognize plaintext as plaintext.
If the message is just plain text in English, then the result pops out
easily, although the task of recognizing English would have to be
automated.

If the text message has been compressed before encryption, then


recognition is more difficult.
And if the message is some more general type of data, such as a
numerical file, and this has been compressed, the problem becomes
even more difficult to automate.
Thus, to supplement the brute-force approach, some degree of
knowledge about the expected plaintext is needed, and some means
of automatically distinguishing plaintext from garble is also needed.
The EFF approach addresses this issue as well and introduces some
automated techniques that would be effective in many contexts.
Fortunately, there are a number of alternatives to DES, the most
important of which are AES and triple DES

The Nature of the DES Algorithm


Another concern is the possibility that cryptanalysis is possible by
exploiting the characteristics of the DES algorithm.
The focus of concern has been on the eight substitution tables, or Sboxes, that are used in each iteration.
Because the design criteria for these boxes, and indeed for the entire
algorithm, were not made public, there is a suspicion that the boxes
were constructed in such a way that cryptanalysis is possible for an
opponent who knows the weaknesses in the S-boxes.
Over the years a number of regularities and unexpected behaviors of
the S-boxes have been discovered.
Despite this, no one has so far succeeded in discovering the
supposed fatal weaknesses in the S-boxes.

Timing Attacks
We discuss timing attacks in more detail in Part Two,
As they relate to public-key algorithms.
However, the issue may also be relevant for symmetric ciphers.
In essence, a timing attack is one in which information about the key
or the plaintext is obtained by observing how long it takes a given
implementation to perform decryptions on various ciphertexts.
A timing attack exploits the fact that an encryption or decryption
algorithm often takes slightly different amounts of time on different
inputs.
reports on an approach that yields the Hamming weight (number of
bits equal to one) of the secret key.

This is a long way from knowing the actual key, but it is an intriguing
first step.
To conclude that DES appears to be fairly resistant to a successful
timing attack but suggests some avenues to explore.
Although this is an interesting line of attack, it so far appears unlikely
that this technique will ever be successful against DES or more
powerful symmetric ciphers such as triple DES and AES.

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