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AIRCOMMANDANDSTAFFCOLLEGE
AIRUNIVERSITY

A IR

UN S IT I V ER

CenterofGravityorCenter ofConfusion
UnderstandingtheMystique

SEOW HIANG LEE,Major

AirCommandandStaffCollege WrightFlyerPaperNo.10

MAXWELLAIRFORCEBASE,ALABAMA

December1999

Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University,theUnitedStatesAirForce,theDepartmentofDefense,oranyother USgovernmentagency. Clearedforpublicrelease: distributionunlimited.

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Foreword
ItismygreatpleasuretopresentanotheroftheWright FlyerPapersseries.Inthisseries,AirCommandandStaff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the best of the best student research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our stu dentstomovebeyondtheschoolscorecurriculumintheir own professional development and in advancing aero space power. The series title reflects our desire to per petuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier genera tionsofairmen.Projectsselectedforpublicationcombine solidresearch,innovativethought,andlucidpresentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic rangeofdoctrinal,technological,organizational,andoper ationalquestions.Someofthesestudiesprovidenewsolu tionstofamiliarproblems.Othersencourageustoleavethe familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making theseresearchstudiesavailableintheWrightFlyerPapers, ACSChopestoencouragecriticalexaminationofthefind ingsandtostimulatefurtherresearchintheseareas.

JohnW.Rosa,BrigGen,USAF Commandant

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Preface
Myinterestinthecenterofgravity(COG)conceptbegan in the Republic of Singapore when I noticed with some amusement that a concept which purports to help cam paignplannersfocustheirmaineffortcanbeembroiledin such controversy and confusion. While attending the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), I witnessed how the same paradoxes dominated seminar discussions. In one instance,whenwewereaskedtodeterminetheCOGsofa certain historical campaignall given the same set of background documents, there were as many disagree mentsgeneratedastherewereassignedgroups.Acursory check with other seminar instructors revealed that the same pattern prevailed across the seminar groups. Was thisevidenceofthecreativityofACSCstudents,orarethe underlyingconceptionsoftheCOGsodissimilarthatpeo plearetalkingacrosseachotherwithoutevenrealizingit? Iattempttounravelsomeofthemystiquethatsurrounds theemploymentoftheCOGconcept.Hopefully,bydraw ing out the potential sources of confusion that often accompanytheuseoftheconcept,wecansoftenthediffi cultiesofcommunicationandshiftthefocusofourargu mentsinadirectionthatwillbemoreprofitabletoall. I am indebted to Dr. Richard R. Muller for his encour agement and invaluable advice. Special thanks to Lt Col ChristopherCookandmyACSCcolleagues,especiallyMaj Patricia Hoffman, for their insightful comments and patienceinputtingupwithmoreClausewitzianstuffthan they would otherwise choose. I, however, remain solely responsibleforanyshortcomingsthatprevail.

Abstract
Despiteitscrucialroleincampaignplanning,thecenter of gravity (COG) concept remains poorly understood and inconsistently applied. This research paper seeks to understand the common sources of confusion that can occur when the COG concept is employed. It investigates theextenttowhichtheseinconsistenciescanberesolved and the implications for the employment of the concept whentheseinconsistenciespersist. To address these core questions, the paper first high lights the confusions that are caused by an incomplete readingofClausewitzstheoreticalframeworkthatunder pinshismagnumopusOnWar. Theanalysisthenproceeds todistilltheadditionalsourcesofconfusionthatcanlead to disagreements during the employment of the concept. This paper discusses the contentious issues of inconsis tency in definitions, misunderstandings regarding the nature of the COG concept, divergent services percep tions, and finally, inconsistencies that are caused by the inherent unpredictability of war. The ideas are then appliedhistoricallytohelpunderstandtheanomaliesthat aroseduringthePersianGulfWar.Unlikepreviousstudies which purport that much of the confusion can be easily removedbyhavingclearerandmoreunambiguousdefini tions,thefindingssuggestotherwise;thesourcesofcon fusion are multifarious, and some may not even be amenabletocompleteresolution.Theimplicationofhaving these enduring inconsistencies is neither to jettison the conceptnortoreturntoareductionistconceptoftheCOG buttoconfrontnonlinearitiesbyapplyingtheprinciplesof systemsthinking,superiorleadership,anddecisiveaction thatissupportedbyaflexiblefeedbacksystem.

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Introduction
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. CarlvonClausewitz

Thecenterofgravity(COG)concepthasbeendescribed in joint doctrine as the basis for devising both national militaryandtheaterstrategies.1 Yet,theconceptremains a subject of much confusion, even among seasoned mili tarypractitionersandlearnedanalysts.Dr.EliotA.Cohen, director of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, writes the fol lowing:
Clausewitz argued that the essence of strategy lies in discerning the opponents center of gravity. . . and directing ones force againstit...(but)thetermisproblematic: Cantherebeonlyone centerofgravityorseveral?Whathappensifacenterofgravityis unreachable? Can one ever determine a center of gravity in advance, or can it be discerned only retrospectively? And, if all strategy ultimately involves a clash of forces anyway, what is the point?Theissue...isnotmerelyacademic.Duringtheplanning ofthecoalitionscampaignagainstIraqin1991,thetermcenterof gravity was used repeatedly, but it was not clear what it really wasthe person of Iraqs dictator, Saddam Hussein, his system command and control, the elite forces that were loyal to him (the RepublicanGuard),Iraqimilitaryindustry,ortheforcesoccupying Kuwait that were the proximate cause of war. The confusion over the center of gravity had real consequences for planning and for action,asAmericancommandersstruggledoverthepriorityofvar ioustargetsforairattack.(Emphasisadded)2

Cohens comments articulate a puzzle that this paper addresses.Specifically,thispaperexaminesthecoreques tions:Canweeverresolvetheinconsistenciessurrounding theuseoftheCOGconcept?Andifnot,whataretheimpli cations of this confusion for the employment of the con cept? Before proceeding, it is important to highlight that this research paper has a limited aim of understanding rather than explaining the inconsistencies. These terms are worth distinguishing as they embody very different purposesandsuggesttheuseofdifferentmethodologies.3 Explainersusuallyseektogenerateandtesthypotheses suchasachangeinx causedy.Theprocessinvolvesthe identificationofaparticularfactorthatisdeemedtohave causedaparticularoutcome,followedbyarigorousstudy of a statistically significant number of cases to test 1

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whetherthefactorsingledoutwasindeedthelikelycause or merely a coincidental occurrence. By contrast, the desire for understanding (as in this paper) involves a search not so much for the cause of an event as for its meaning. Understanders therefore seek to investigate a particular event or state of affairs, rather than a set of cases.Theydelveintohistorynotonlyasabankofinfor mationthatmightproveordisproveatheorybutalsoasa narrativethatpermitsagreaterappreciationoftheorigins, evolution,andconsequencesofanevent. With this limited aim in mind, the analysis addresses thethornyissueofwhetherwecaneverpenetratethemys tiquesurroundingtheuseoftheCOGconcept.Theanaly sisidentifiesthevarioussourcesofconfusionthatgiverise to the inconsistencies and examines the extent to which they can be resolved. One key assumption is that grap pling with the inconsistencies is not, as suggested by Cohen, an intractable enterprise. By carefully identifying theunderlyingassumptionsthataccompanytheuseofthe COGconcept,thisresearchpaperhighlightshowmuchof theconfusioncanbeunderstoodandinsomecaseseven beresolved.Theanalysistracessomeofthepresentcon fusionbacktoourfailuretofullygraspClausewitzsthink ing on the matter. The investigation examines four other keysourcesofconfusion.Asthereisnoattempttoapplya scientific explanation to each of these sources of confu sion,Ilabelthemaspropositions,whichIapplytoahis toricalanalysisofthePersianGulfWar.Thefocusisspecif ically on how these propositions can shed light on the heateddebateofwhethertheRepublicanGuard(RG)was a COG. Unlike previous studies that purport that some grandunifyingdefinitionordeterminationapproachtothe concept can help achieve universal consensus, the main thrustpositsadifferenthypothesis.Itsuggeststhatwhile someofthesourcesofconfusionareamenabletoeventual resolution,completeconsensusisunattainableduetothe unpredictablenatureofwar.Thisisnottominimizeefforts to secure greater consensus over the employment of the COG concept, but it is a warning against quick fixes. Raising the possibility of unpredictability brings ire for practitionerswhoarelessinterestedinintellectualqualifi cationsthanareadyguidefordecisionmakinginthereal

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world. The analysis will therefore be incomplete unless it addresses the application issues. It explores the implica tions that these enduring inconsistencies have on the applicationoftheCOGconcept.Itdealswiththeperennial paradox of employing the concept in the uncertain envi ronment of war. It proposes an overarching approach to helpusthinkaboutandunderstandtheCOGconceptso thatitsusersarenotparalyzed,andthattheusefulnessof theconceptisretained.Conclusionsofthisresearchand thelessonslearnedaresummarized.

IntheBeginningClausewitzs CenterofGravity
The teachings of Clausewitz remain and will always remain ambiguous. RaymondAron Clausewitz,PhilosopherofWar

AnyattempttostudyClausewitzsideasontheCOGor Schwerpunkt must avoid two potential pitfalls.4 First, becauseOnWar isrepletewithconceptsthatreflectacre ative tension,5 a cursory and selective analysis can often leadtoaone-sidedandbiasedunderstandingoftheCOG concept.Second,onemusttakecarenottooveremphasize the literal meanings of Schwerpunkt. After all, Clausewitz warnsthatourdefinitionsareaimedonlyatthecentersof certainconcepts;weneitherwishnorcangivethemsharp outlines.6 Withthesepointsinmind,acomprehensivelook atClausewitzsthinkingonthematterisdonebeforeout liningtheimplicationsthatemergefromtheoverview. Although the concept is briefly mentioned in book 4, ClausewitzsideasontheCOGarefoundprimarilyinbooks 6and8ofhismasterfulthesisOnWar.Inbook6,theCOG conceptisfirstfullydevelopedwhenClausewitzdiscusses theconceptatwhatwenowcalltheoperationallevelofwar, focusingonthearmedforcesoftheenemy.Thisfocusfol lowsfromhisearlierbook4,wherehecallsthebattlethe true COG of war.7 Clausewitz points out that a center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a

CENTEROFGRAVITYORCENTEROFCONFUSION

blow.8 After drawing this analogy with war, he launches intoadiscussionofunityandcohesion,necessaryelements of a COG, and illustrates how unity and cohesion can be found in a single fighting force. It is from this discussion thatsomereadersmistakenlyassumethattheenemysmil itary force is always the COG in combat. Clausewitz is quotedassayinginbook6thosecentersofgravitywillbe foundwherevertheforcesaremostconcentrated.9 This narrow definition of the COG finds a ready audi enceamongthosewhoprefertofocusonanenemysmili taryratherthanonotherlesstangibleelementsofpower. JamesJ.SchneiderandLawrenceL.Izzo,intheirarticle Clausewitzs Elusive Center of Gravity, even suggested thatClausewitzmayhavegonetoofarbysuggestingper sonalitiesandpublicopinionasCOGs.10 Yet,toconclude that the enemys army is always the COG is excessively restrictive.Attheendofbook6,Clausewitzcautionsthat theillustrationoftheCOGconceptisincomplete.Butbook 8willdescribehowthisideaofacenterofgravityinthe enemysforceoperatesthroughouttheplanofwar...That is where the matter properly belongs; we have merely drawnonithere[inbook6]inordernottoleaveagapin thepresentargument.11 Clausewitzacknowledgedincon sistencies in the way the term Schwerpunkt was used in hisdraftsofbooks2through6.Henotedinhisplansfor revisingOnWar thatbook6wasonlyasketch,andthathe hoped to clear his mind when writing book 8 and subse quently revising books 2 through 7 accordingly.12 Since Clausewitz died before the revisions could be made, it becomes crucial that we consider book 8 as we grapple withhisoverallintent.13 In book 8, Clausewitz described the COG concept by alluding to the sources of strength that emerge from the natureofconflictandtheuniquecharacteristicsandaims ofthebelligerents.EventhoughClausewitznotesinbook 8 that defeat and destruction of [the enemys] fighting forceremainsthebestwaytobegin,andineverycasewill beaverysignificantfeatureofthecampaign,14 heargues thatunderspecificcircumstancestheenemysCOGcould beacity,acommunityofinterestamongallies,apersonality ofaleader,orevenpublicopinion.15 TheClausewitziancon-

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ceptofSchwerpunkt inbook8extendedbeyondthedestruc tionbattlebetweenfieldedforcesandincludedbothtangible and intangible sources of moral and physical strength, power,andresistance. For readers accustomed to the unitary concept of the COG centered on military forces, it becomes even more unsettlingwhenonealsotakesintoaccountClausewitzs perception of war in general. In chapter 6 of book 8, Clausewitz made his underlying theoretical framework explicitwhenheexpoundedontheprimacyofpoliticsover the military.16 This resonated with the central ideas laid outinbook1,theonlyonecompletedtoClausewitzssat isfaction.Therehediscussestheparadoxicaltrinitystem mingfromprimordialviolence,theplayofprobabilityand chance, and rational calculation. He notes that we must developatheorythatmaintainsabalancebetweenthese threetendencies,likeanobjectsuspendedbetweenthree magnets.17 The trinity is a notion that helps to unify all the key concepts in On War. Yet, it is also a notion that reflects the nonlinear worldview of Clausewitz that some scholarshavepersuasivelypointedout.18 WhatDoesAllofThisMean? UnravelingtheClausewitzianconceptionoftheCOGis madedifficultdueinparttothemethodologyofhiswork,19 and in part because it was an unfinished masterpiece.20 Unlikepessimistswhowouldliketorelegatetheconcept, withamyriadofinterpretations,toalistofuselessdoc trinalbuzzwordsthatobscuresthemeaningofoperational art,21 thisauthorsuggeststhatcomprehendingClausewitz isnotahopelessendeavor.Specifically,acarefulreading of Clausewitz helps us identify two distinct approaches for interpretingtheconcept.Ifoneisabook6Clausewitzian, one will highlight Clausewitzs emphasis on the opposing army,whichisclearlyunderstandablegiventhecontextof hiswritingsinthenineteenthcentury.Thisinterpretation has found much favor among writers with a United States Army(USA)background,whobytrainingandexperiencewill generally prefer a terrain-centric perspective of the cam paign.22 Wordsinpublicationslikethe1993FieldManual (FM)100-5,Operations, theultimateaimofallmilitary

CENTEROFGRAVITYORCENTEROFCONFUSION

operations is the destruction of enemy armed forces further reinforce and perpetuate such a perception. On theotherhand,ifoneisabook8Clausewitzian,asit appearsClausewitzwouldlikeustobe, 23 onewilltakea broader and perhaps more amorphous view of the con cept.Inthisview,theCOGisderivedas a functionofour understandingoftheparadoxicaltrinitiesofthebelliger ents;drawingfromthat,anunderstandingofthehubof all power which characterizes the COG of the enemy emerges.24 Knowing these distinctions will help readers understand the underlying assumptions better when theynextseeaninvocationofClausewitzinsupportofa certaininterpretationoftheCOG. 25 Oftentheseassump tions are unstated and lead to great confusion. As this discussionhasshown,takingfractionsofhisarguments out of context can lead to a vulgarized variant of Clausewitz. Interpretations of the COG, however, do not end with Clausewitz. Since then, the concepts appeal to military strategistshasnotonlyensureditssurvivalbuthasalso producedmorenumerousandcontradictorydefinitionsas it is continually molded to suit the users purpose. This research paper also traces some of these additional sourcesofconfusion.

TheDefinitionandNature ofCenterofGravity:Revealing AdditionalSourcesofConfusion

Comprehending the COG is a complex enterprise. One shouldthereforebeskepticalaboutsingleisolatedexplana tions for the lack of consensus surrounding the concept. Nevertheless,weneedtopruneawayasmuchoftheunder growthaswecansothatwecanidentifythebestlumberto gainfullyemploytheconceptinwar.Otherwise,subsequent

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applicationoftheconceptcanbefecklessorevencounter productive.Thissectionsuggeststhat,inadditiontothemis reading of Clausewitz, much confusion and disagreement can be traced back to four key reasons. I denote them as propositions. By highlighting these reasons, hopefully we can remove some of the COG mystique that continues to hauntanalystsandoperationalplannerstoday. Proposition#1:ConfusionIsCausedbyaLack ofConsensusofDefinitions ThelackofconsensusoverthedefinitionoftheCOG has been one of more commonly studied issues. Yet, much confusion still ensues. To provide a flavor of the spectrum of views on this matter, see table 1 for some commondefinitions.26 Table1
DefinitionsforCenterofGravity

(1) Centerofgravityisnotasourceofstrength,butratheracriticalvulnerabil ity. (2) Centerofgravityisalwaysfoundwherethemassisconcentratedmost densely. Alternativebutpopularversion: centerofgravityisastrengthnota vulnerability. (3) Onemustkeepthedominantcharacteristicsofbothbelligerentsinmind. Outofthesecharacteristicsacertaincenterofgravitydevelops,thehubofall powerandmovement,onwhicheverythingdepends. . . thepointatwhichall ourenergiesshouldbedirected. (4) Centersofgravityarethosecharacteristics,capabilities,orlocationsfrom whichamilitaryforcederivesitsfreedomofaction,physicalstrength,orwillto fight. (5) Thecenterofgravityissomethingtheenemymusthavetocontinuemili taryoperationsasourceofhisstrength,butnotnecessarilystrongora strengthinitself. (6) Centerofgravityissomethingthatifaffected(i.e.,destroy,disrupt,neutral ize,ordelay)cancausecascadingdeteriorationthatpreventsthefoefrom achievinghisaimsandallowstheachievementofouraims.
Sources: (1)FleetMarineForceManual1, Warfighting,1989,85; (2)Book6Clausewitzian Interpretation, OnWar,485; (3)Book8ClausewitzianInterpretation, OnWar,59596; (4) JointPublication3-0, DoctrineforJointOperations, 1995,III-20(similarinAirForceDoctrine Document1, AirForceBasicDoctrine,1997andFieldManual100-5, Operations,1993); (5) NavalDoctrinePublication1,NavalWarfare,28March1994,35; and(6)authorsadaptation.

CENTEROFGRAVITYORCENTEROFCONFUSION

Whileeachofthesedefinitionssharesomesimilarities, they also convey different nuances; Definitions (1)27 and (2)28 evenappearingcontradictory.Consequently,itisnot surprising that these differences can lead to disagree mentsinthedeterminationoftheCOG.Isthereanyway toarriveatagreaterconsensusonthisissue?Toexam ine this question, we can analyze the pros and cons for adopting each definition. Definition (6) is adapted by author.29 The key criteria used for the evaluation is the extenttowhichtheparticularclassofdefinitionsprovides ausefulfocusforcampaignplanning,theprimepurpose fortheconcept.Tofacilitatetheassessment,theplethora of definitions is categorized into three main classes.30 ClassAfocusesonthenotionofcriticalvulnerabilities,for example definition (1); Class B focuses on the notion of strengthdefinition(2);ClassCfocusesonthesourcesof strengthdefinitions(3)(6).31 ClassAdefinitionsemphasizetheimportanceoffocus ing on vulnerabilities. Its motivations originate from the desiretoavoidastrength-on-strengthclashduringacon flict.Thisconceptisespeciallypopularamongwriterswho propound the theory of maneuver warfare as it provides themwithausefultooltodistinguishbetweenmaneuver and attrition warfare.32 Such a concept, however, is far removed from what Clausewitz originally had in mind.33 Indeed,theoristswhousethisdefinitionacknowledgethis and go to great length to explain why the original Clausewitzian concept should be avoided. By adopting a book 6Clausewitzian interpretation of the COG, they argue that the original definition simply encourages the bloody head-on clash between two armies, leading to an attrition battle that is seldom the most efficient form of warfare.Whilethecalltoseekvulnerabilitiesislaudable, themisappropriationofthetermtocreateanantithesisto promotethemaneuverwarfaretheorycanpotentiallylead togreaterconfusion.Itisunclearwhethertheenemysvul nerabilitiesheremeansomethingthatiseasyforfriendly forcestotarget(i.e.,thenotionofbeingopentoattack)or something which, when hit, makes the enemy vulnerable and leads him to capitulate (i.e., the notion of having its strengthorsourceofstrengthremoved).Clearly,ifitisthe latter,thenitsdistinctionfromtheotherclassesofdefini-

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tions is less significant than many maneuver theorists contend.Ontheotherhand,ifitreferstotheformernotion ofbeingopentoattack,onecancounterthatnotallofthe enemys critical nodes are inherently weak. Does that meanthatthosecriticalnodesthatarestronglydefended should, by definition, be ignored? Surely this would be a dangerous a priori assumption.34 More importantly, the definition is grossly incomplete as it does not help plan nersappreciatewhatcriticalmeansandhencefailstopro videausefulfocusforthecampaignplanningefforts. ClassBdefinitionsemphasizetheenemysstrengthand aremostclearlyidentifiedwithabook6Clausewitzian concept.Thesedefinitionsfocusthecampaignplannerson wherevertheforcesaremostconcentrated.COGisthere foresynonymouswiththecenterofmass.Adoptingsucha conceptraisestwoquestions.First,manyobservershave pointedoutthattheconceptofmasshaschangedsorad icallysincethenineteenthcenturythatonecanjustifiably questionthevalidityofitsoriginalconceptinthispostin dustrialage.35 Second,asmaneuverwarfaretheoristshave warned,thisnarrowfocusonphysicalmasscanpotentially lockitsadvocatesintoanattritionwarfareapproach,result ing in a massive and bloody contest of destruction, as in WorldWarI.Furthermore,suchaconceptleavesnoroom for the use of operational art to achieve paralysis of the enemy.AsCohenputsitstarkly:Ifallstrategyultimately involvesaclashofforcesanyway,whatisthepoint?36 This leads us to the class C definitions, which empha sizethesourcesofstrength.Althoughtherearemanyvari antsunderthiscategory,theysharethesimilaremphasis of focusing on the effect it renders on the enemy (i.e., it aimstotargettheverysourceoftheenemysstrength).The distinctionbetweenstrengthandsourcesofstrengthisnot oftenacknowledged,buttheyhavefundamentallydifferent underlying assumptions. Unlike the previous two cate gories,classCdoesnotmakeaprioriassumptionsasto whetherthefocusforthemaineffortisinherentlystrong orweak.Forexample,theenemyswilldoesnotneedtobe aphysicalstrongpoint,butitisclearlyapotentialsource of strength. Some theorists try to reconcile these differ encesbymakinganarbitrarydistinctionbetweentheoper ationalandstrategiclevelsofwar.Theyarguethatatthe

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operationallevelthefocusisgenerallyonthecenterofthe enemys mass, while at the strategic level the focus is broader and may include other sources of the enemys strength.37 Thisdistinctionismisleading.Evenattheoper ational level, a deeper analysis of the sources of an enemys strength can be made, as opposed to arbitrarily concluding that the enemys massed forces should natu rallybeourmainfocus.Thisauthorbelievesthatthecon ceptualdifferencesbetweenclassesBandCarerootedin thephilosophicaldividebetweenabook6andabook8 interpretation of Clausewitz.38 The latter goes beyond the simple emphasis of mass to a broader concept of the enemys characteristics as a whole, sometimes including even metaphysical considerations. This author also sub mitsthattheclassCdefinitionguidesanalyststoconsider thefullcomplexityoftheenemyandthenatureofwar.Of course, even within class C, there are variants of defini tions from which one can choose. By restricting our dis cussiontotheselectionslistedearlierdefinitions(3),(4), (5), and (6)it can be argued that definition (6) gives the operational planners the best focus for their campaign planning.Definition(5)simplydefinesCOGsassourcesof strength. It is concise and points operational planners in therightdirectionbutitsfocusistoobroad.Definition(3) uses the popular Clausewitzian analogy of the hub of powerandmovementtocapturetheideaofthesourceof strength.Buttheanalogyofahubmayprovideamislead ingnotionthatthereisonlyoneCOG.39 Definitions(4)and (6) contain a good elaboration of what might constitute a sourceofstrength.Definition(6)risestothetopbecause ofitsclearemphasisoncascadingdeteriorationwithinthe contextofsystemseffects,anditsexplicitlinkagebetween the COG concept and the considerations of friendly and enemyobjectives. Two principal implications emerge from this extended discussion.First,itdemonstrateshowexistingdefinitions oftheCOGcontainsubtleandimportantdifferencesthat canleadtoconfusionduringoperations.Second,thebrief analysisofeachdefinitionsuggeststhatobtaininggreater consensus on this issue is not an impossible task.40 Yet, much remains to be done in this area, both in updating doctrine publications, and, more importantly, in sensitiz-

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ing students and planners to the nuances of the various definitions. Without the latter, the revised definitions in thepublicationswillmerelybewordswithoutsignificance. Proposition#2:ConfusionIsCausedbyaLackof ConsensusoverItsNature The second source of confusion results from two con tentiousissuesregardingthenatureofthecenterofgrav ity.First,ashighlightedbyCohen:IsthereonlyoneCOG ormany?Second,whatistherelationshipbetweenobjec tivesandtheCOG?Wewillconsidereachissueinturnand assessthepossibilityofresolvingtheinconsistencies. One or Many? The origins of the first paradox can arguably be traced back to Clausewitz. When Clausewitz first adopted the phrase center of gravity, he employed a termthatisborrowedfromthefieldofphysics.Inscientific terms, there can only be one COG for each object. Additionally,hisuseoftheanalogythehubofallpower andmovementfurthergivestheimpressionthatthereis onlyoneCOG.Clausewitzsoperationalusageoftheterm, however,haslittleincommonwithitsphysicalanalogies, norwasithisintentionthatthisphrasebetakenliterally inaphysicalsense,asthediscussioninthesectiontitled In the BeginningClausewitzs Center of Gravity has pointed out. More specifically, while his intention was to emphasize the need to focus the main effort, Clausewitz wroteinOnWar thatthestateofhavingoneCOGwasan ideal one.41 Clearly, there was no inherent reason why therecouldnotbemorethanoneCOG.42 Thesoonerthis arbitraryconceptionisremoved,thesoonerwewillreduce theconfusiongeneratedthroughtheuseoftheconcept.43 Dominant Characteristics of the Belligerents. The second contentious issue involves the relationship between objectives and COGs. Much confusion arises because operational planners fail to make explicit the underlyingobjectivestheyhaveinmindwhentheyinsist thatx isthetrueCOGandnoty. Theproblemisaccen tuatedwhenoneremembersthatinanymajorcampaign, there are likely to be multiple objectives that might indi vidually be assigned to different parties. Consequently,

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each party will have a different perspective of where the main effort should be. Forcing them to share the same COG would be counterproductive in this situation. To resolvetheconfusion,weneedtoestablishwhyandhow objectivesarelinkedtotheCOG. One may be tempted to resolve the first question of whethertheobjectivesarelinkedtoCOGsbysimplyana lyzingthevariousdefinitionsofCOG;butsuchananaly sisquicklybecomesatautology.Forexample,iftheCOG issimplydefinedasasourceofstrengthasfoundindefi nition(5),onecanconceivablyapplyafive-ringanalysis( laWarden)toderivealistofenemyssourcesofstrength, regardlessoftheobjectivesathand.Ontheotherhand,if oneadoptsdefinition(6)theCOGisthatwhichcausesa cascadingeffectontheenemysothatitpreventsthefoe fromachievinghisaimsandallowstheachievementofour aimsthen objectives become intricately linked to the determinationoftheCOG.Thewaytoresolvethisdilemma istointroduceahighercriterion,suchasjudgingthealter native definitions against the original purpose for having the concept. If the purpose is not to provide campaign plannerswithafocusontheenemyssourcesofstrengths but instead on those that will significantly contribute to our ability to impose our will over the COG at the next higher level of war,44 then linking objectives with COGs will be essential. Doing so guides us to target enemys sourcesofstrengththatcanleadustoeventualvictory. If the above argument holds true, the next challenge thenistounderstandtherelationshipbetweenobjectives and the COG. Do objectives refer to friendly objectives, enemyobjectives,orboth?Theshortanswerisboth. Thereisadirectrelationshipbetweenfriendlyobjectives andtheCOG.Thepointofourmaineffortshouldbesuch thatit(theaffectedCOG)willcausetheenemysystemto changeinsuchawaythatitfunctionsthewaywewantit to(i.e.,inaccordancewithourfriendlyobjectives).Andif ourobjectivesarecongruentateachlevelofthewar,such actionswilleventuallyleadustovictory.Therelationship between enemy objectives is more subtle and indirect. A usefulwaytounderstandthisistoenvisagetheenemyas a system with many nodes. The enemys objectives will determinehowtheenemyemploysitssystem.Thisinturn

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determineshowthenodesinitssystemworktogether(i.e., thelinkages)tomeetitsobjectives.Inotherwords,under standing the enemys objectives helps one to understand the linkages in the enemys systems, which will in turn enablecampaignplannerstodeterminethecriticalnodes thathavethegreatestcascadingeffects(i.e.,COGs)onthe enemy. A failure to understand these dynamic relation shipshasledtounnecessaryconfusion. Agoodexampleofthiswasthecontentionintheearly stagesoftheGulfWaroverwhethertheIraqiScudsquali fied as a COG that justified the allocation of scarce air assets. Initially, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf was reluc tanttofollowSecretaryofDefenseDickCheneysdirection tostepuptheScudcampaign.Afterall,theaccuracyofthe Scudswaspoor,andsincetherewasnoevidencethatthe initiallaunchescontainedanypayloadofpoisongas,the military impact of the Scuds was deemed to be relatively insignificant (i.e., they did not appear to be a source of strength.Atonepoint,thisinsubordinationledSecretary CheneytoexclaimtoGenColinL.Powell,god----it,Iwant somecoverage(againstScuds)outthere.IfIhavetotalkto Schwarzkopf,Illdoit.45 Inthiscase,SecretaryCheneys judgment turned out to be closer to the mark. What General Schwarzkopf failed to consider were the enemy andfriendlyobjectives;SaddamHusseinsobjectiveforfir ing the Scuds was not to target military installations, whichrequiredgreatprecision,butagainstIsraelsgeneral population. With great astuteness, Secretary Cheney quickly saw the need to keep Israel out of the war and protect the coalitions unity. It was only when these dynamic connections became explicit that everyone, including the US Central Command, began to recognize how an inaccurate Scud could indeed become Saddams sourceofpower. Proposition#3:ConfusionIsCausedbyDifferences inServicesPerspectivesandConcept ofOperationalArt Reachingconsensusonthedefinitionandnatureofthe COGconceptismadedifficultbyathirdsourceofconfu-

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sion: inherent differences in services perspectives and underlying theoretical concept of operational art. Organizationalinertiaandconceptualdissimilaritiescau tionagainstanaivesearchforquicksolutionsinresolving the paradoxes. A brief survey of the diversity of services perceptionswillreinforcethis. The US Air Force (USAF) generally takes a targeting approach.46 Inlinewiththeflexibilityandversatilityofair power, the USAF prefers to describe multiple COGs in termsofstrategicandoperationaltargetsthroughoutthe theater of operations. On the other hand, as a relatively smallforceaccustomedtoforcedentryintoatheater,the US Marine Corps (USMC) naturally prefers to attack the enemywhereitisweak.Thus,foralongtime,theUSMC haselectedtodescribetheCOGasacriticalvulnerability ratherthanasourceofstrength.Ontheotherhand,the USA, being relatively more self-sufficient, has little prob lem viewing the COG as the enemys strength. Furthermore, the Armys concept of the COG has been greatlycoloredbythephysicalanalogiesofmassandthe hub of power, leading to a strong insistence that there should only be one COG. The US Navy (USN) has only introduced the COG concept into its doctrine in the past decade.Atfirst,theUSA,theservicethattheNavyhashad much operational experience supporting, heavily influ enced the USNs COG concept. Consequently, naval doc trineacknowledgedtheexistenceofonlyoneCOG.Withits emphasis on littoral warfare, naval doctrine has become increasinglyalignedwiththeUSMC;itnowseeksoppor tunitiestoaccessanddestroyaCOGthroughcriticalvul nerabilities.47 Whilemanyoftheaboveinconsistenciescanbetraced to disagreements over the definition and nature of the COG, one must remember that these differences also reflectadeeperdisconnect.Thispointwasmadepersua sivelybyColDennisM.Drew,associatedeanoftheSchool ofAdvancedAirpowerStudies(SAAS),whenhehighlighted the differing doctrinal worldviews of the USA and the USAF.Constrainedbygeography,theArmysworldviewis oftenlimitedtotheimmediateproblemofenemyforcesin front of them. The airmans worldview is limited only by the capability of his equipment. Even when the enemy is

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found at great distances, airpowers speed can make the airmansproblemasimmediateasthesoldiers.Thesedif fering worldviews often cause differences of opinions between soldiers and airmen, including their perceptions oftheCOG.48 Ultimately, differences in services perceptions lead to differenttheoriesofwar,contributingtodisparateconcep tionsofCOGs.Forinstance,toviewtheenemyascompo nentsofstatesystemsasinJohnA.WardenIIIsfive-ring theory,onewilldeterminetheCOGsaccordingtothecon centric rings of command, essential production, trans portation,population,andmilitaryforces,withdescending orders of importance.49 On the other hand, to adopt a model,asproposedbyJohnArquilla,thatseekstoexplain victoryintermsofinformationdominance,onereachesa differentconclusion.50 Howtoresolvethesedifferencesbymakingalistofall theexistingtheoriesofwaranddecidingwhichisthebest toadoptacrosstheservices?Besidestheimpracticalityof consolidating all existing (and indeed future) theories, such a research effort faces another difficulty. Many of thesetheoriesarereallyperspectivesthatsuggestgeneral izedpatternsthatseemtocorrelatewithhistory.Theydo not,onthewhole,presenthypothesesthatarefalsifiable. If one also takes into account the postmodernist con tentionthatdefinitions,perspectives,andtheoriesarenot only ways of representing the facts but are also ways of constructing facts, the problems appear even more intractable. This discussion is a reminder that the road to greater consensusisnotsimplyasearchforclearandunambigu ous definitions, as some commentators appear to sug gest.51 Therearenoeasyanswerstothequagmireofhow we can resolve the differences. Colonel Drews comments suggest that each services perception of war can be equally legitimate and yet significantly divergent. Stovepipingeachothersperspectiveintoanartificialcon structisnotnecessarilyproductiveorbeneficial.Instead, oneshouldstrivetogainadeeperappreciationofeachser vicesconcernsanditstheoreticalconceptionsofwar.This willallowustoasktherightquestionswhentherearedis agreementsandtobetterassessandweighthealternatives

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during operations. The postmodernist challenge also remindsustoquestionthewaysinwhichourperspectives andtheoriesconstructanddefinethewayweviewourene mies,andhenceaffectthewaywedefineCOGsandsub sequently,thewaywefight. Proposition#4:ConfusionIsCausedbythe UnpredictabilityInherentinWar Thefourthreasonfortheenduringdisagreementsover the COGs is the inherent unpredictability of war. Unpredictabilityofwarcanbecausedbyatleasttwofac tors.52 First, there is a lack of perfect intelligence. The amountofintelligencerequiredtoexamineallthelinkages withintheenemysystemwillalwaysexceedtheresources available.Eventoday,eightyearsaftertheGulfWar,new articles continue to suggest that campaign planners missed some critical information that supposedly repre sented Iraqis true COG.53 Second, there is the special forcethatchance,uncertainty,indirecteffects,unintended consequences, human errors and frailties, and a host of other nonlinearities exert on the outcomes of actual war. AlanD.Beyerchenremindsusthatmappingaseemingly linear concept like Schwerpunkt on the nonlinearities of realwarcanprovetobeextremelyunsettling.54 Inanut shell,wecomefullcircletothedilemmawefacedwhenwe studiedthedifferentinterpretationsofClausewitz.Dowe cutthroughthemazeofconfusionbyadoptingabook6 Clausewitzianapproachofsimplifyingandlinearizingthe COG to a quote: defeat of the enemy fighting forces remainsthebestwaytobegin?55 Ordowetrytounder stand the concept in both its psychological and physical realms that allow for nonlinearities, as a book 8 Clausewitz would suggest? This author believes that a book8Clausewitzianapproachbetterreflectsthecom plexitythatrealwarpresents.Ifthisistrue,itthensug geststhatsomedisagreementsovertheCOGmayneverbe resolved. This in turn raises the question of how one should act in such a situation fraught with uncertainty. Doesthisunpredictabilityrendertheconceptuseless?Will itparalyzethosewhochoosetoemployit?

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Summary The four propositions highlighted represent four main sourcesofconfusion.Theyarenotmutuallyexclusivenor do they always operate separately. Yet, these strands are worth distinguishing carefully as each has something to sayaboutthequestionstoaskwhenfacedwithdisagree mentsovertheCOGconceptandhowwemightsetabout answering them. The next section applies these proposi tionsinabriefhistoricalanalysisoftheGulfWar.

AnalyzingtheGulfWar:WillWe EverKnowIftheRepublicanGuard WastheOnlyTrueCOG?

During the Gulf War, many disagreements arose over thedeterminationofthetrueCOG.56 Thefollowingsec tionsfocusonthecentraldebateconcerningtheRG.The analysis is divided into two sections. The first section examineshowtheperceptionsoftheCOGsdifferedamong the key participants of the war. The second section out lineshowthepropositionslistedearlierhelptounderstand theinconsistenciesinvolvingthespecificdebateaboutthe RG. This analysis primarily aims to understand the sourcesofconfusionratherthantopresentacaseforthe trueCOGsortofullyresolvetheseinconsistencies.

DifferingPerceptionsofthe CenterofGravity
Beginningattheverytop,GeneralSchwarzkopfidenti fied the COG as that thing that if you destroy it, you destroyhisabilitytowagewar.Thecentersofgravitywere SaddamHusseinhimselfbecauseofthehighlycentralized leadership.Idontmeanpersonallydestroyed.Imeanthe ability to function. Number two, the Republican Guard. And number three, his chemical, biological and nuclear capability. It doesnt take a genius to figure out that if

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those things are gone, his ability to wage war is to all intents and purposes finished.57 Clearly, Schwarzkopf sawtheRGasoneofthreedistinctCOGs. For the USAF, perceptions differed substantially between the joint force air component commander, Gen Charles A. Chuck Horner, and the leader of the Checkmateplanningteam,ColonelWarden.Wardensper ception of the multiple COGs was clear from the initial presentationhegavetoGeneralSchwarzkopf(table2). Table2
IraqiTargetSystems

Leadership Key Production National Leadership NationalC2 OilInternal Consumption Military Production Port Airfields Electricity Railroads StrategicAir Defense StrategicChemical WarfareCapability Infrastructure Population FieldedForces

Source: Gulf WarAirPowerSurvey(GWAPS),vol. 1, PlanningandCommandandControl (Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOffice,1993),145.

These 10 target sets (COGs) were more than the three identifiedbySchwarzkopfbuttheplaneventuallysubmit ted by Horner was expanded to 12 target sets.58 Notable absences from Wardens initial list were the RG and the Scudmissiles. Truetotheirdoctrine,thegroundforcesidentifiedonly one military COGthe RG.59 The planning of the ground campaign was highly influenced by graduates from the SchoolforAdvancedMilitaryStudies(SAMS),specificallya smallJediteamheadedbyLtColJoePurvis.ColonelPurvis laterelaboratedtherationalefortheselectionprocess.
Weattemptedtoidentifythecenterofgravity.Thisproveddiffi cultduetothenormaldiscussions[thatoccurinSAMS].Also, theCENTCOMstaffbecamemorefocusedonwhatit[thecen ter of gravity] was as opposed to what do we do with it. Therefore,wedidnotusetheterm,exceptinthe[planningcell]. Inanycase,atthestrategiclevel,wedecidedthatSaddamwas

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thekey,butthatwecoulddonothingabouthimandcausethe battletobefoughtwithoutcentralizedcommand.TheRepublican Guard wasthefocusattheoperationallevel. Ifwecouldmass ourgroundforcesontheRGwithoutfightinganyotherforce, wehadperfectsuccess.Also,iftheRGleftthetheater,surren dered, or were defeated, we still had, to our opinion, dealt appropriatelywiththeC.G.(Emphasisadded)60

WillWeEverKnowIftheRepublicanGuard WastheOnlyTrueCOG? How then can we explain the confusion caused by the inconsistencies, and how far can we reduce these anom alies? Although the disagreements over the COGs are numerous,thefocushereisonthedebate:WastheRGthe onlytrueCOG?

Definitions
Some of the confusion could have been caused by an inconsistencyindefinitions.WardenviewsCOGsasacrit ical vulnerability,61 which possibly embodied both the notions of weakness and open to attack. Holding such a perspective may partially explain why he avoided listing theRGasaCOGasitwouldhaverepresentedanattrition strategyofpittingstrengthagainststrength,lathebook 6Clausewitzian concept of war. Purvis, on the other hand,reflectingtheUSAsperspective,appearedtoinclude thenotionofattainabilityintohisconceptofwhatconsti tutestheCOG.HeacknowledgesthatSaddamwasthekey butinthesamebreathdismissesitwhenheconcludedwe (i.e.,theArmy)coulddonothingabouthim.Itwasthere forenotsurprisingthatPurvissanalysis,withhisfocuson the enemys surface forces, would eventually lead him to concludethattheRGwasthesoleCOG.However,confus ingattainabilitywiththedeterminationoftheCOGledhim toignoreanenemysCOGjustbecausetheArmywasinca pableorunwillingtoimposeitswilluponthetarget.The feasibilityoftargetingaCOGshouldbemadeindependent ofitsidentification.

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Nature:NumbersandObjectives Inconsistency in the number of target lists (COGs) as perceivedbythevariousparties,andafailuretorecognize the linkages between mission objectives and the defined COGs, led to further confusion over what the true COGs were. For instance, the mission the Army received on 18 September 1990 was to plan the ground offensive. Given such a defined mission, it was perhaps understandable thattheArmyfocusedquicklyontheRGasthefocusfor their main effort. The USAF, however, was given a much broadermissionscopebecauseoftheflexibilityandversatil ityofairpower.Withitsexpandedobjectives,itsassessments oftheenemyshubsofpowerexpandedcorrespondingly.62 ServicesPerspectivesandTheoreticalConstructs Dissimilar services perspectives and theoretical con structsalsoledtoverydifferentviewsofwhatconstituted theenemyssourceofpower.Warden,forinstance,work ing from his theoretical five-ring framework, saw the enemys leadership as the key focus. The other rings organicessentials,infrastructure,population,andfielded forces,includingtheRGweredistractionsgenerallybest avoided. These target systems would only be attacked as necessarytoexposetheleadershipringtooffensiveaction. Consequently, Warden ranked the RG as far less signifi cant than did the other planners, who subscribed to the surface-centric AirLand Battle doctrine.63 Given the con troversial nature of Wardens theories, it is interesting to ask if we can verify these theories retrospectively in the lightofthehistoricalrecordswenowhave?Some,likeCol Richard Szafranski, USAF, believe that the answer is straightforward: Clausewitzian purists can argue over what the master intended by Schwerpunkt, just as intel lectualpuristscanargueoverwhattransformsadiagram intoanauthenticmodel.Purismmatterslesstoaction orientedpeoplethantheverifiableconsequences ofaction. (Emphasisadded)64 They(airoperations)worked,65 pro claims Szafranski, implying by inference, that Wardens theorieswerevalidated.IfSzafranskiisright,thenperhaps the RG, as suggested by Warden, was not the true COG

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afterall.Historicaleventsmayinrealityhavelessverifying power than Szafranski seems to suggest. To fully under standthis,weturntotheelementofunpredictabilityofwar. UnpredictabilityofWar DeterminingtheCOGrequiresustoassesstheimpact of the cascading effects on the enemy system, and the extenttowhichthisimpactachievesthefriendlyobjective. Yet,makingthatassessmentisfraughtwithgreatdifficul ties.Forexample,howdoweascertaintheimportanceof the RG in a cause-and-effect relationship? To the Army, thefieldedforcesdefinedtheirviewoftheenemy,andthe RGwasperceivedasthesourceofpowerthatanimatedthe entire military force. It was also implicitly assumed that Saddam would value his military capability highly and hencewouldbeverysensitivetothetargetingoftheRG.In other words, targeting the RG not only caused cascading effectsonthefieldedforcesbutalsoimpactedonSaddams overallcalculations.Warden,however,sawSaddamscal culations differently: Many people have thought of the RepublicanGuardasthemilitaryprimarilyresponsiblefor keeping Saddam in power. In actuality, the Republican Guard...wasnotthegroupwhichundertookthenasty day-to-day internal security work. Others did that, and theywereafarmoreimportant targetthantheRepublican GuardsoldiersinKuwait.(Emphasisadded)66 Even if we ignore the possibility of nonlinear second and third-order effects of targeting the RG (which would compound the element of uncertainty exponentially), it remainsclearthattherewasimperfectinformationavail able to the coalition during the war to make a definitive judgment on the correctness of each perspective. Did Saddam value his internal security forces more than his RG,asWardensuggested?Afterall,Saddamsufferedand enduredfarmoreattritionofhisgroundforcesduringthe Iran-Iraq War than he actually did during the Gulf War. How could intelligence analysts have known, with com plete certainty, Saddams psychology and the value he placedonhisinstrumentsofpower?Ultimately,onemay beresignedtoshareColPhillipS.Meilingers(professorof strategy, US Naval War College) conclusions: It is highly

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unlikely,however,thatitwilleverbepossibletodetermine exactly what drove Saddam to the negotiating table: per hapsSaddamhimselfwouldbeunabletoanswertheques tiondefinitively.Intruth,giventhecomplexityofwarand human nature, it is most likely that (many) factors went intoSaddamsdecision-makingprocess.67 Summary Writing in a Marine Corps University monograph after thewar,Dr.JoeStrangesuggestedthatthedebateoverthe RepublicanGuardwascausedbyaconfusionoverdefini tions.68 Hopefullythisanalysisdemonstrateshowthepre viouslyidentifiedfoursourcesofconfusionprovideafuller accountofthedisagreementsinvolved.Someofthesedis agreements could have been clarified if underlying assumptionsaboutthedefinitionsandnatureofthecon cept were made more explicit. Greater consensus could alsohavebeenobtainedifsomeoftheinformaldoctrine, suchasWardensinfamousfive-ringanalysis,hadaprior opportunitytobedisseminatedanddiscussedacrossthe services.Yet,manyoftheseconditionsarecounterfactual demands.Inreality,fogandfrictionwillalwayscharacter ize real war. This poses an important challenge for opera tionalplannerslivingintherealworldandhavingtomake realdecisionsinfinitetime.Howshouldonethinkaboutthe conceptofCOGgiventheinherentuncertaintiesinwar?

ImplicationsofEnduringInconsistencies: HowShouldOneThink aboutthe EmploymentoftheConcept?

A full understanding of the mystique surrounding the COG concept requires wrestling with the implications of enduring inconsistencies. Yet, doing so places a dilemma thatweallfaceinanincreasinglycomplexoperatingenvi-

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ronmentfraughtwithcontradictions.Ifwethinkweknow, wedont,andifwethinkwedontknow,westillhavetoact asifwedo.Thisthoughtprocessproducestheleadership schizophrenia that is so troubling and creates conditions forpotentialparalysis.Attheveryleast,leadersmaylook away and hope that their rationale for how they want thingsdonewillnotbetoosorelytested.Canwehelpbut wonderwhypositivethinkingissoseductivetothosefaced withcomplexitybeyondcomprehension?Thissectionpro poses three principles that help one think about the employmentoftheCOGconcept. Principle#1:EmployingtheCOGConcept RequiresSystemsThinking One of the key reasons why war is such an unpre dictable affair is the fact that the enemy is not a static entity.Onthecontrary,historysuggeststhattheenemyis better portrayed as an organism that continuously acts andreactsinternallyandwiththeenvironment.Itembod iestheinteractionoflivingandnonlivingsubentities,out ofwhichmultipleCOGsarise.69 Inordertograspthepro foundimplicationsofindirecteffectsandunintendedcon sequencesthatpervadewar,weneedtoengageinsystems thinkingorlearningtoviewthingsasawhole.70 Theestab lishmentofagrandsystemstheoryisbeyondthescopeof thisresearchpaperbutthementionofafewkeyimplica tionsofsystemsthinkingisinorder. First,systemsthinkingreferstotheattempttoviewthe worldintermsofirreduciblyintegratedsystems.Itfocuses attentiononthewholeaswellasonthecomplexinterrela tionships among its constituent parts. Systems thinking assumes that the enemy is a self-organizing system in whichindividualpartsadaptnaturallytocreateorderout of chaos. The focus is not just on individual entities but also on the dynamics between those entities and the embeddingcontextinwhichtheentitiesoperate. Second, the effects on social institutions, political states,andeconomicsystemsdependnotonlyonwhatthe case is but also on what its members and its leadership believe that it is. And since enemy nations are culturally

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conditioned,understandingrealityrequiresappreciationof historicalandculturaldynamics. Third, we must recognize that systems thinking is not naturaltomilitarypractitionerswhofavorquickanddeci sive action. Comprehending complex indirect effects can appeardauntingandwithmarginalutility.Thisdisdainfor systems thinking has also colored the way we orient our intelligenceestablishments.71 Information-gatheringagen ciesaremoreaccustomedtoeitherdevelopingdiplomatic insightsintotheenemysforeignpolicy,orsecuringtacti cal information about the enemys military strength and disposition.Ontheotherhand,adetailedunderstanding of the enemys systems and how they interact with each other requires a fundamentally different type of military intelligence that is capable of conducting second- and third-orderanalysesofcomplicatednetworks.Suchinter disciplinaryintelligenceistoooftenignored. Fourth,itisimportantnottoexaggeratesystemseffects. Just because chaos theory predicts that the beating of a butterflys wings can influence weather patterns halfway aroundtheworlddoesntmeanthateachtimeabutterfly flutters,stormsarecreated.Althoughthinkingintermsof one-way linear processes can often be misleading, it is unlikely that reductionist approaches could have become so entrenched if they were never applicable in the real world.Abetterwayofseeingsystemsthinkingisnotasan alternative but as a complement to the reductionist approach. The former is more comprehensive, embracing thespecializedperspectiveasoneaspectofageneralcon cept. Fifth, although systems are intricately connected, sys tem effects need not cripple human action. One strategy foractionisconstraining,wheresystemsarerenderedless system-like in their responsiveness, hence foreclosing optionsandfacilitatingaction.Agoodexampleofthiswas theoperationalmaneuverconductedduringtheGulfWar. Through feints and limited objective attacks, the assem blage of the Iraqi military strength was fixed into a well defined unit of space detached from its strategic rear, affordingthecoalitiontheoperationalopportunitytosplit thedefendingmassfromitscentralizedcommandauthor ity, its main logistical bases, and its friendly reinforce-

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ments. A second strategy that could be adopted is paral lelism.Whenwearedealingwithasystem,wecanrarely doonethingtoproduceadesiredchange.Becauseofindi rect,delayed,orevenunintendedreactionsbytheenemy system, one usually needs to have multiple and simulta neous engagements to constrain and work with the dynamics of the enemy system to effect a significant change.72 Still,inthefinalanalysis,oneiscautionedthatsystems thinkingwillnotleadtoadeterministicpath.Uncertainty will still prevail, and that brings us to the next essential element,leadership. Principle#2:EmployingtheCOGConcept IsanActofLeadership When discussing COGs, it is tempting to confine ones analysis to concepts, techniques, and theoretical con struct.Succumbingtothistemptationcanleadoneintoa spuriousandfrustratingefforttostriveformorecomplex anddeterministictheoriesfordiscerningtheCOG,without paying adequate attention to the people employing these tools. This oversight is dangerous because ultimately the effectiveemploymentoftheCOGconceptisanactoflead ership. This point is well articulated by Col Michael D. Wyly, who greatly influenced the formation of maneuver warfare doctrine in the Marine Corps: It takes courage andmoralcharactertoselectamaineffort.Thatiswhythe weakcommanderandtheamateursooftenfailtodothis. Infact,theweakcommanderwillactivelyavoidchoosinga main effort. It is convenient for the commander weak in character to avoid selecting a main effort because, if the battlegoesunfavorably,hecanblamesomeoneelseforthe mistake. The commander who has taken a stand and selectedhisownmaineffortcannotdothis.73 AlthoughColonelWylywaslecturingontheconceptof themaineffortattheloweroperationalandtacticallevels, itisapparenthowthesesameideasofleadershipcanbe pertinent when one interchanges the phrase main effort withtheCOG.Butwhatdowemeanbyleadership?Cynics maycounterthatattributingtheconcepttoanactoflead-

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ershipormilitarygeniusislikeascribingthewholeargu menttoablackbox. Tounravelthispuzzle,wereturntotheoriginatorofthe concepttoexaminehowClausewitzreconcilesametaphor that apparently demands a huge amount of intelligence withtheprevailingtruththatwarisoftenanunpredictable affair.AccordingtoClausewitz,uncertaintyonthebattle fieldcanonlybeconqueredbythemilitarygenius,aman with a very highly developed mental aptitude for war. Clausewitzisofcourseneverdogmaticinhisdescriptions: to every rule he prescribes, he immediately notes the exception or limitation. Nevertheless, three faculties appeartobethecornerstonesofmilitarygenius.Strength of character, the ability to keep ones head at times of exceptionalstressandviolentemotion,allowedthereason of the commander to dominate his passions without destroying his drive.74 Equally important was determina tionawillingnesstostandlikearock,75 toactonbelief despite uncertainty, to hold to a consistent course of actionamidconfusion.Clausewitzcommendedtheconsis tent pursuit even of an inferior course of action. Determination (in Clausewitzs sense) alone can prevent actionfrombeingparalyzedbyuncertaintyandthedelays andhesitationcausedbythought.Thethirdindispensable characteristicofamilitarygeniusishisinstincts.Allgreat commandershaveactedoninstinct.76 Clausewitziancon ceptofinstinctscombinedbothreasonandintuitionan intellectthat,eveninthedarkesthour,retainssomeglim merings of the inner light which leads to truth . . . the quickrecognitionofatruththatthemindwouldordinar ilymissorwouldperceiveonlyafterlongstudyandreflec tion.77 Itisthereforethisinformedintuition,aconfluence ofthoughtandtemperamentthatcanmasteruncertainty andconquerthebattlefield. While Clausewitz was talking about military genius in thewidercontextofwar,thesameappliesifonehopesto employ the COG concept effectively during operations. These leadership characteristics are crucial because they empower the players to act. Understanding the interplay betweenactionandtheCOGconceptisessentialifweare tofullygrasphowoneshouldthinkaboutCOGinasitu-

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ation of uncertainty. This is elaborated in the third and finalprinciple. Principle#3:DeterminationoftheCOGIsan EvolvingProcessThatBeginswithDecisiveAction andSustainedwithContinuousFeedback Thereisoftenamistakenbeliefthatoneneedstoknow thetrueCOGswithcompletecertaintybeforeacting.Yet, becauseconsensusisnevertrulyachieved,onemaybeled toconcludethattheconceptisrenderedoperationallyuse less. This study suggests otherwise. The more we under stand the concept, the more we realize that action is demanded,evenfromthepositionofincompleteinforma tion; procrastination can be the greatest hindrance to exploiting the enemys COG. There are two fundamental reasonswhythisisso. First, even though we may not be able to discern the COGs with complete certainty initially, action and feed backfromenemysresponsescanleadusclosertothetrue COGs. The strategic helix, first developed by Colonel Meilinger,bestillustratesthispoint(fig.1). Atthebeginning,plannerssurveytheenemysystemin its entirety and deduce a number of perceived enemys COGs. The true COG may in reality be hidden, as repre sented by the vertical pillar. Uncertain as it may be, the planners recommend targeting all the potential COGs through a series of parallel strategies, as suggested by Principle#1.Asthewarprogresses,thecommander,through feedbackontheeffectsofhisdecisiveactionsandenemys responses,shiftshistargetingstrategyandmovescloserto thetrueCOG.ThisprocesscontinuesuntilthetrueCOGis uncovered and effectively neutralized.78 Determining the COGsisthereforeanevolutionaryprocessthatissupported bydecisiveactionsandcontinuousfeedback.79 Second,notapparentfromthediagramisthedynamic relationship between our actions and the enemys that favors the side that seizes the initiative. Because war involvesthestrategicinteractionofatleasttwoparties,our aggressiveactionscanconfoundourenemy,denyinghim theabilitytoinfluencethefriendlyCOGswhileenhancing our own ability for exploitation. When commanders act,

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Time

Accuracy
Center Pole = Key True COG X = Potential Targets

Figure1. StrategicHelix they multiply all the conditions of uncertainty for their adversariesandindirectlycompensatefortheirownimper fect situational awareness. As opposing wills continue to interact, this creates further opportunities for either foe. Such opportunities are often born of the disorder that is naturalinwar.Theymaybetheresultofourownactions, enemymistakes,orevenchance.Byexploitingopportuni ties,wecreateinincreasingnumbersmoreopportunities forexploitation.Anditisoftenthisabilityandwillingness to create and exploit opportunities faster than the oppo nent that generate decisive results. That is why decisive action is essential. The player with higher tempo con stantlyforcestheopponenttoreactdefensivelytoaseriesof attacks,threats,andfeints,allthewhileadvancinghisown plan. At the extreme, the player does not need to be con cernedverymuchwiththeenemysintentions,becausethe players tempo serves as a shield against enemy attacks. TimethereforebecomesaCOGinitself,forwithoutthetime to respond, the enemys tools of war lose their power of influence,evenbeforetheyarephysicallydestroyed.80

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Summary Thislistofthreefundamentalprinciplesisbynomeans exhaustive.Theydohoweverhelpsupportthemainthrust of this research paper; that is, despite the pervasive fog thatcharacterizesouroperatingenvironment,uncertainty neednotcloudourunderstandingofhowtheCOGconcept caneffectivelybeemployed.Nordowehavetoreturntoan ageofLaplaciandeterminismthatassumesawaythereal ityofunpredictabilitywefindsoofteninwar.

ConclusionsandLessons
Oneofthetruismsofsocialscienceisthatwewillnever have complete answers to complex phenomena. This researchpaperdoesnotaimtoderiveagrandunifyingthe ory for determining and employing the COG concept. Instead,itisafocusedinquirytodiscoverhowoneshould think about and understand the employment of the con cept. Specifically, it deals with the twin challenges that Cohenimplicitlyplacesonanalystsandcampaignplanners: How do we handle the inconsistencies and disagreements thatsurroundtheuseoftheconcept?Whataretheimpli cationsifsomeoftheseinconsistenciesremainunresolved? This research paper recommends that to think about the COG concept requires a combination of two approaches.First,wemustrecognizethesourcesofcon fusion and take active steps to explicate the contentious issueswherepossible.Thispaperhashighlightedfourkey areas where disagreements may arise and outlined how someofthesemaylogicallyberesolved.Itisusefultoreit eratethatacompleteresolutionofthesedisagreementsis sometimeslessimportantthanadeepappreciationofthe differing perspectives and underlying assumptions. Only thencanwehopeforacommonframework,understoodby allpractitioners,fromwhichwecanplantofightasasin gle team. Second, and equally important, students and operational planners must learn to combine the art and science of employing the concept in an uncertain world where the desire for complete consensus will always be frustrated.Thispaperproposesthatoneshouldendeavor tograsptheessenceoftheconceptandtothinksystemat-

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icallyandcreatively.Onemustrealizethatitsemployment isanactofleadership,whereoneiscompelledtocarefully weigh the alternatives and risks, followed by boldness in decisionmaking.Andwithatingeofhumility,oneshould aggressivelyseektoestablishflexiblefeedbacksystemsto evaluate the effects of ones action, for the determination ofthetrueCOGisultimatelyanevolvingprocess.
Notes 1. JointPublication(JP)1,JointWarfareoftheUSArmedForces, 11 November1991,65;andJP1,10January1995,III-89andIV-2. 2. Quoted in Richard H. Shultz et al., Security Studies for the 21st Century (Washington,D.C.:Brasseys,1997),365. 3. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding InternationalRelations (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1990).Hollisand Smithraiseasimilarpointintheirbook. 4. CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,ed.andtrans.MichaelHowardand Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). The EnglishtranslationofcenterofgravitycomesfromClausewitzsuseofthe LatinandGermanwordscentragravitatis andSchwerpunkt inOnWar.In book6,Clausewitzusedthetermcentragravitatis andsubsequentlyused Schwerpunkt whendiscussingthesameconcept.HowardandParet,edi torsofthe1984translationofOnWar, considerthetermstobesynony mousandtranslatebothascenterofgravity. 5. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London:FrankCassandCo.,1996),18183.Handeldetailstheobser vationthatthereisacreativetensionthatunderliesmuchofClausewitzs understandingofwar. 6. Clausewitz,486. 7. Ibid.,248.InClausewitzstime,battleswereindeeddecisiveinthat theyoftendeterminedtheoutcomeofthewar.Thecourseofbattleoften realizedtheexhaustionofresources,andthatthereserveswerecommit tedinthesameday.Today,however,theresultsofamajorbattlearesel domsufficienttosecureastrategicobjective,butinsteadformpartofa largerwholethatseekstoachieveadecisiveaim. 8. Ibid.,485. 9. Ibid.,486. 10. James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, Clausewitzs Elusive CenterofGravity,Parameters,September1987,56. 11. Clausewitz,486. 12. Ibid.,7071. 13. IamindebtedtoTimothyJ.Kepplerforbringingtomyattention ClausewitzsnoteregardinghisplanstoreviseOnWar aswellasthesum maryofClausewitzsideasinbook8ofOnWar. 14. Ibid.,596. 15. Ibid.,59596. 16. Ibid.,6056.Itiscommontotreattheprimacyofpoliticsovermil itaryaffairsasadistinctcause-and-effectrelationshipfirstpoliticssets thegoals,thenwaroccurs,andthenpoliticsreignsagainwhenthefight ingstops.Anyoverlapssuggestpoliticalinterferenceintheexecutionof military operationsconjuring horrid images of the Vietnam experience

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thatresultedinmuchdisaster.Whilesuchadichotomyservestoprovide themilitarywithamaximumfreedomofmaneuver,itcreatesanartificial constructthatisfoundedonalinearsequentialparadigm.Inreality,as AlanD.Beyerchenpointsout,Clausewitzsdictumthatwarismerelya continuationofpolicyappearsfarmoreprofoundasheseemstosuggest not simply that political considerations take precedence over military deliberationsbutthatwarisintrinsicallyembeddedinpolitics,andevery military act has its accompanying political considerations, intended or otherwise. 17. Ibid.,89. 18. Alan D. Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992): 5990. See also Alan D. Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery, in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University [NDU], 1997), chap. 7. Similar points arenotedinthewritingsofBarryD.Watts. 19. EvenardentadmirerslikeMichaelHowardconcedethatitisnot easy...togiveafairandcomprehensivesummaryofClausewitzsstrate gic doctrine, since it is presented with infuriating incoherence. Quoted inLloydJ.Matthews,OnClausewitz,Army, February1988. 20. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). AronarguesthattheincompletenatureofOnWar istheprimarysource ofmisunderstanding. 21. John House, Do Doctrinal Buzzwords Obscure the Meaning of Operational Art? (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies[SAMS],1989).ThephraseisadoptedfromthetitleofthisSAMS monographbyHouse. 22. Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory, Cummings Center series (London: Frank Cass and Co.,1997),48.SomehaveeventracedtherootsofearlyGermanfailures inthiscentury(namelySchlieffensoperationalperceptions)backtothis particularreadingoftheClausewitzianconceptofCOG.Thereisanother groupofanalystswhousesthisnarrowdefinitiontosupporttheirasser tion that Clausewitzs ideas have passed their time by highlighting his overemphasisonthedestructionbattleaimedanddirectedtowardsthe enemyarmyasflawedanddangerous. 23. ThisviewisimpliedbyClausewitzsowncautionagainsttheten tativenatureofbook6,hisbeliefthatbook8waswherethematter(the COGconcept)properlybelongsaswellashisunderlyingunderstanding ofthenatureofwarasoutlinedinbooks1and8. 24. Categorizingtheconceptbyabook6andbook8distinctionis nottosuggestthatClausewitzwasschizophrenic.Instead,itistoalludeto thecreativetensionthatwashighlightedintheopeningparagraphofthis researchpaper.Beyerchenattributesthistensiontothenonlinearnature ofwar.However,unlikeBeyerchenwhodescribestheCOGasalinearcon cept,thispaperpositsthattheconceptthatClausewitzhadinmind,la book8,sharedthesamenonlinearfoundationsastherestofhismaster piece. 25. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, InterestandMoney (NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1965).Some view these inconsistencies as another reason to debunk the whole con cept.Basedontheexperienceinothersocialsciences,Isubmitthatdoing sowillbethrowingoutthebabywiththebathwater.Oneisremindedfor

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instancethateveninterpretationsofgreatworkssuchasKeynesssemi nal work which started the whole field of macroeconomics, continue to elude modern commentators. Some economists would call themselves chapter8Keynesiansandarguethatthemoderneconomyischarac terizedbyamorphousanimalspiritsthataredrivenbymarketandcon sumersexpectationsandconfidence.OthersseetheKeynesiantheoryas moredeterministic:moregovernmentexpendituremeansmoreeconomic growth, ceteris paribus. Neither camp would however reason that Keynesianideasshouldbeignoredinentirety. 26. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it does represent the mainspectrumofdefinitionsfromwhichotherdefinitionscanbederived. 27. Notethatthelatestversion(1997)ofFleetMarineForceManual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting, has aligned the Marines understanding of the COG with the definition adopted by JP 3-0, Joint Operations. It has instead introduced an additional concept of critical vulnerabilities to illustratetheessenceofmaneuverwarfare.Still,theideaofviewingcen ters of gravity as critical vulnerabilities has a long tradition in the Marines, as well as various military authors such as Robert Leonhard, JohnA.WardenIII,andalonglistofmaneuverwarfaretheorists,such asWilliamS.Lind,StevenCanby,andPierreSprey.Theolderdefinition is therefore retained for the purposes of this discussion, as it probably stillreflectsapopulardefinitionheldbymanyoperationalplannersand militaryanalysts. 28. MartinvanCreveld,AirPowerandManeuverWarfare (MaxwellAir ForceBase[AFB],Ala.:AirUniversityPress,1994),3.VanCreveldisan example of professional analysts who adopt a similar definition in their writings. 29. JeffreyE.Thieretetal.,HitemWhereItHurts:StrategicAttack in2025,WhitePapers, vol.3,bk.1,PowerandInfluence:2025(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, November 1996), 174; and Jason B. Barlow,StrategicParalysis:AnAirpowerTheoryforthePresent (Maxwell AFB,Ala.:AirUniversityPress,1994).Inrecentyears,somewritershave adoptedsuchdefinitionsascenterofvalueorlocusofvalue.Theideaof denoting COG as anything that the enemy holds dear or values is not incompatiblewiththeclassesofdefinitionsbutitistooencompassingto beusefulforseparatetreatmentanddiscussioninthisresearchpaper. 30. Eventhoughdefinitions3,4,and6donotexplicitlyusetheterm sources of strength, the underlying ideas are similar. Consequently, theyaregroupedunderthesamecategory. 31. Ibid. 32. SeeforinstanceworksbymaneuverwarfaretheoristslikeMichael Lind,RobertLeonhard,andIsraelianalystShimonNaveh,includingear lierversionsofWarfighting. 33. Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: BuildingontheClausewitzianFoundationSoThatWeCanAllSpeakthe SameLanguage, PerspectivesonWarfightingSeriesno.4(Quantico,Va.: MarineCorpsAssociation,1996).DoctorStrangehasextensivelyargued thispointinthisoccasionalpaper. 34. Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Naval Maneuver Warfare, Naval War College Review, Summer 1997, 2544. This point is well argued, albeit from a naval perspective, and Captain Hughes also warned that both maneuverwarfareandattritionwarfarecanbesuccessfulstylesofwar fare,dependingonthecontext.

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35. EdwardMann,OneTarget,OneBomb:IsthePrincipleofMass Dead? Airpower Journal, Spring 1993, 3543; and Kurtis D. Lohide, DesertStormsSirenSong,AirpowerJournal,Winter1995,100110. 36. Shultz,365. 37. K. Phillips Giles and P. Thomas Galvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Center forStrategicLeadership,ArmyWarCollege,31January1996),13. 38. See the discussion titled In the BeginningClausewitzs Center ofGravity,whichgivesafulleraccountofthedifferences. 39. ItsimportanceisfurtherdiscussedinProposition#2atthehead ingOneorMany. 40. Indeed,subsequentrevisionsintheMarineCorpsdoctrinalpubli cations have led to positive steps being taken in the latest edition of Warfighting (20June1997),4546,toavoidtheconfusionoftreatingcen ters of gravity as critical vulnerabilities. It will take some time before changesindoctrinepublicationspermeatethethinkingoftheentireMarine Corps.Meanwhile,appreciationofthesedifferenceswillbeessential. 41. Clausewitz,617. 42. Therearetwofurtherargumentsinsupportofthesingle-COGcon ceptthatneedtobedebunked.Thefirstargumentfindsitssupportnotby virtue of the physical analogies but in the need to focus limited combat powerononesingleeffort.Thecruxinthiscaseistoaskwhetherthecriti calnodesoftheenemyareafunctionofouravailablecombatresources.If the answer is negative (as this author believes it to be), a better way to addresstheconcernofconstrainedresourcesisnottoignoretheexistence ofotherCOGsbuttoacknowledgethatthereisaneedtoengagethemulti pleCOGssequentially,oneatatime.Thealternativeistosearchfortheelu sivesinglesilverbulletthatmilitaryhistorywarnsislikelytobemoreofan illusionthanreality.ThesecondargumentclaimsthatmultipleCOGscan exist because of the different levels of war (i.e., tactical, operational, and strategic),buttherecanonlybeoneCOGateachlevelofwar.Thisargument isseeminglymoresophisticatedbutitisaredherring.Besidesthefactthat thelevelsofwararenotinherentlydistinctcategoriesbutoftenoverlap,the contentionremainsthatthereisnoapriorireasonwhythereshouldbeonly oneCOGateachlevelofwar.Manyofthepointsraisedintheprecedingdis cussionremainpertinenttocounterthispopularfallacy. 43. GilesandGalvin.Whilethisappearstobeanobviousconclusion, these authors in their study continue to assume that there is only one centerofgravity. 44. William M. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity, Military Review, June 1993, 25. It is temptingtosaythatthedestructionofthecenterofgravitywillleadto immediatevictory.Insomespecialcases,thissilverbulletstrategymay exist.Inmostcases,however,suchacriterionwillbetoostringentasthe enemy will inevitably display greater persistence through its ability to reacttofriendlyattacks.Amorerealisticend-stateofconcentratingour subsequent efforts at the next higher level of war is therefore adopted. MendelandTookemakeasimilarpoint. 45. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals War: TheInsideStoryoftheConflictintheGulf(Boston:Little,BrownandCo., 1995),234. 46. Phillip Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington,D.C.:AirForceHistoryandMuseumsProgram,1995).See thefourthproposition,whichbeginsInessence,AirPoweristargeting. 47. NavalDoctrinePublication(NDP)1,NavalWarfare, March1994,35.

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48. DennisM.Drew,JointOperations,TheWorldLooksDifferentfrom 10,000 Feet, Airpower Journal, Fall 1988, 712; and Joseph C. Wylie, MilitaryStrategy:AGeneralTheoryofPowerControl (NewBrunswick,N.J.: RutgersUniversityPress,1966),67.AdmiralWyliemadeasimilarpointthat resonates today when he wrote, There is yet no accepted and recognized generaltheoryofstrategy...[that]absorbswithinitsconceptualframework therealitiesoftheexistingspecificconceptsofwarstrategy,thecontinental, themaritime,andtheairtheories.(Emphasisadded) 49. John A. Warden III, Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century,inTheFutureofAirPowerintheAftermathoftheGulfWar, eds. RichardH.ShultzJr.andRobertL.PfaltzgraffJr.(MaxwellAFB,Ala.:Air UniversityPress,July1992),64. 50. Naveh;andJohnArquilla,TheStrategicImplicationsofInformation Dominance, Strategic Review, Summer 1994, 28. Using a systems approach focusing on information and examining nations as entities that attackcomponentsoftheirenemy,thisviewholdsthatinformationbecomes thefactoronwhichtheoutcomeofaconflictdepends.Anotherinteresting accountofdifferingtheoriesofwarleadingtodifferentconceptsofcentersof gravity is given by Naveh, who contrasts the different understandings of Schwerpunkt betweentheblitzkriegwayofwar,theSovietconceptofvnezap nost, andtheevolutionoftheAirLandBattledoctrine.Navehsland-theater examplesarenoteworthyastheysuggestthatdifferencescanarisewithin thesameserviceandalsowarnsmilitaryhistoriansthattheuseofacom montermsuchasthecenterofgravity canhaveverydifferentconnotations whenthetheoriesofwardiffersubstantially. 51. Strange. 52. Beyerchen,Clausewitz,Nonlinearity,andtheUnpredictabilityof War; and Pat A. Pentland, Center of Gravity Analysis and Chaos Theory,researchreport(MaxwellAFB,Ala.:AirWarCollege,April1993). 53. Timothy D. Hoyt, Iraqs Military Industry: A Critical Strategic Target,NationalSecurityStudiesQuarterly, Spring1998,3350. 54. Beyerchen,Clausewitz,Nonlinearity,andtheUnpredictabilityof War,84. 55. SchneiderandIzzo,50. 56. EliotCohen,GulfWarAirPowerSurvey(GWAPS), vol.1,Planning and Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 2. The Gulf War is especially useful as a historical case studyontheemploymentofcentersofgravityastheCentralCommand, aswellasthecoalitionplanners,madeexplicituseoftheconceptinthe planningprocesses. 57. Otto Friedrich, ed., Desert Storm: The War in the Persian Gulf (Boston:TimeWarner,1991),40. 58. DODInterimReporttoCongress,4-2. 59. U.S. News & World Report Staff, Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf Conflict (New York: Times Books, 1992),266. 60. Colin Agee, Peeling the Onion: The Iraqis Center of Gravity (Fort Leavenworth,Kans.:SAMS,1992),2627. 61. John A. Warden III, Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington,D.C.:NDUPress,1988),910. 62. GWAPS, 192. The correspondence between the expanded list of theAirForceobjectivesandtheperceivedcentersofgravitywasclearly seen by General Horners Operations Plan 1002-90 briefing to General SchwarzkopfinApril1990.Thebriefingslidegaveanexplicitmatching betweentheobjectivesandthecentersofgravity(targetsets).

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63. Publication of Wardens theoretical assumptions only took place aftertheGulfWar,whichmusthaveaddedtotheconfusionduringthe GulfWar. 64. Richard Szafranski, The Problems with Bees and Bombs, AirpowerJournal, Winter1998,96. 65. Ibid. 66. John A. Warden III, Success in Modern War: A Response to RobertPape,SecurityStudies7, no.2(Winter1997/1998):182. 67. Phillip S. Meilinger, Air Targeting Strategies: An Overview, Air PowerConfrontsanUnstableWorld(London:Brasseys,1998),72. 68. Strange,93. 69. RobertJervis,SystemEffects:ComplexityinPoliticalandSocialLife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). Jervis provides an insightful account of how nations react as organic systems in interna tionalrelations. 70. Beyerchen,Clausewitz,Nonlinearity,andtheUnpredictabilityof War,87;andErvinLaszloandAlexanderLaszlo,TheContributionofthe SystemsSciencestotheHumanities,SystemsResearchandBehavioral Science, JanuaryFebruary 1997, 520. To say that we should view things as a whole is not to denigrate the importance of a reductionist approach.Bothholisticandreductionistapproacheshaveaplaceindeal ingwithcomplexproblems.However,givenouringrainedinclinationfor thereductionofcomplexproblems,leadingtowhatBeyerchencallsour truncatedexpectationsofthetheoryofwar,specialemphasisshouldbe giventotheneedforunderstandingsystemsinitsentirety,ratherthan inparts.Assystemstheoryremindsus,thereareemergentpropertiesthat are marked by the appearance of novel characteristics exhibiting on the levelofthewholeensemble,butarenotbythecomponentsinisolation. 71. Richard Hallion, Air Power Confronts an Unstable World (London: Brasseys, 1997), chap. 3. I am indebted to Col Phillip Meilinger for this observationfromhisessayAirTargetingStrategiespublishedinHallion. 72. John A. Warden III, Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century,inTheFutureofAirPowerintheAftermathoftheGulfWar, eds. RichardH.ShultzJr.andRobertL.PfaltzgraffJr.(MaxwellAFB,Ala.:Air University Press, 1992), 5782. The idea of parallelism is broader than the application of airpower. For instance, decisive results during the Bosnianconflictin1995weresecuredonlythroughtheparallelandsyn ergisticemploymentofdiplomaticandmilitarypower. 73. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985), 112. This quote originated from one of Colonel Wylys lecturetotheAmphibiousWarfareSchoolin1981,whenhewasheadof theTacticsDepartment. 74. Ibid.,1056. 75. Ibid.,117. 76. Ibid.,71. 77. Ibid.,102. 78. McGraw-HillEncyclopediaofScienceandTechnology, vol.3,507. Itisinterestingtonotethatthestrategichelixfindsitscorollaryinthe way our human body tackles the problem of defending against a wide arrayofpossibleinvaders.Looselyspeaking,whenahostilebacteriumor virusentersthebody,defensestrategiesaregeneratedatrandomuntila feedback loop indicates that the correct strategy has been found. The greatchallengeisthereforetomimicnatureandtofindnewanduseful waystoharnesschaos.

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79. Barry D. Watts, Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1984), 117. Clearly, it is conceivable that the greater the experience of the planner and the campaign commander, the tighter will be the helix and the shorterwillbethepathtothetruecenterofgravity.Theemphasisonbat tleexperiencewhenoperatingunderthecomplexitiesofwariswelllaid outbyWatts. 80. This emphasis on tempo clearly resonates with John R. Boyds conceptofobserve,orient,decide,act(OODA)loop.