Gloria Forever
She Will if She Can
Joel Rocamora, April 22, 2009
Many analysts think Gloria’s chacha is dead. Apparently her people in the House
do not think so. While the Villafuerte resolution was not submitted the day Congress
opened April 13 as Speaker Nograles promised, plenary discussions on Nograles’
separate chacha resolution (HR 737) started on April 22. Chacha opponents in the House
fear that Gloria’s people are preparing a parliamentary maneuver that would enable them
to go ahead with a constituent assembly (ConAss).
Quezon Rep. Erin Tañada does not discount the possibility of “amendment by
substitution,” saying that Villafuerte’s draft resolution need not go through the committee
level and may simply be inserted in HR 737 during the period of amendments. Akbayan
Rep. Risa Hontiveros said a phrase has been inserted into the resolution authored by
Speaker Nograles that would pave the way for the convening of a constituent assembly.
It appears likely that Mikey Arroyo and Villafuerte have not been able to get the
197 votes they need to convene a “House only ConAss” otherwise they would have gone
ahead and filed it. This would have enabled them to go ahead and convene a ConAss, a
surefire way to get the issue to the Supreme Court. Keeping the Nograles resolution in
play means they have not given up on getting the issue to the Supreme Court where they
believe they have the votes.
"Puro porma, pero ni hindi man lang nakapag-first base," Hontiveros said. If they
don’t have 197 votes, even if they substitute the Villafuerte for the Nograles resolution,
they would still have difficulty convening a constituent assembly without the Senate.
Nograles insists that he won’t allow substitution, that HR737 will be sent to the Senate.
In this case, the Senate can just “dribble the ball”, not reject HR737 immediately, say
they will “take it up next week” several times until the end of session on June 5, and deny
the Gloria people an excuse to take the issue to the Supreme Court.
We need to carefully monitor what GMA’s people are doing in the House in case
they try to pull a fast one on us. But we also need to assess chacha carefully in relation to
other maneuvers by Gloria and her cabal to remain in power past 2010. We cannot be so
preoccupied with chacha that we do not prepare adequately in case presidential elections
go ahead as scheduled in May 2010. Some even fear that Gloria’s maneuvers extend
beyond 2010.
Can’t Buy Me Chacha
Anti-chacha people have always assumed that GMA can buy the House votes she
needs. With elections a year from now, congress people are particularly greedy. The fact
that it’s Mikey Arroyo and his sidekick Martin Romualdez soliciting votes means that it
is not just Malacanang operators pushing chacha but the Arroyo family itself. For all this,
the chacha project is having difficulty because of two factors, Lakas-CMD and Kampi
dynamics, and the fast approaching elections.
Retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban says he has
information that they only have 178 votes for the Villafuerte resolution. He doubts that
they can get the remaining 18 signatures. Of the 238 incumbent congressmen, 89 belong
to the Lakas, 52 to Kampi, 30 to the Nationalist People’s Coalition, 20 to the Liberal
Party, 10 to the Nacionalista Party and the rest are distributed among the LDP, PMP,
PDSP, PDP-Laban and Uno, and party list members.
Even if we assume that all 52 Kampi members will vote for the Villafuerte
resolution, the official position of the leadership of Lakas, NPC, the LP, and the NP is
against a “House only ConAss”. The NPC, LP and NP are deep into preparations for the
2010 elections for which they’ve already spent several hundred million pesos. We cannot
assume that the members of these parties can all be bought by Malacanang. Any
combination of congress persons from these parties plus some of the more progressive
party list representatives totaling 42 will frustrate Villafuerte.
The April 21 decision of the Supreme Court adding thirty five new party list
representatives does not make it any easier. Most of the new party list reps are local trapo
and rabid anti-Left people like Jun Alcover of Anad and Jovito Palparan of Bantay Party.
Even if GMA people manage to get three fourths of the new party list reps to sign on,
however, they still can’t make up for the missing signatories that six months of
solicitation have failed to produce. They can’t make up for the obvious hesitation of the
largest fraction in the House and the party of the Speaker.
At a meeting of the Lakas Executive Committee April 1, 2009, Lakas leaders
claimed a decision was made to abandon chacha efforts in the House. The party instead
opted for a constitutional convention after the 2010 elections. A couple of months ago,
the Speaker was taken to task by Kampi people for saying he is open to Concon. House
Speaker Nograles continues to make the motions, saying he will keep trying until the end
of the current session on June 5, after which, he says, “I will concede that it is too late”.
Even if Nograles really wanted to push chacha, he would have difficulty because
several congressmen in his inner circle have refused to sign the draft Villafuerte Con-Ass
resolution. Among them are Majority Leader Matias Defensor, senior deputy majority
leaders Jesus Crispin Remulla (Lakas, Cavite), Neptali Gonzales (Lakas, Mandaluyong)
and Kahlil Abraham Mitra (NPC, Palawan). Other Lakas members can refuse to sign and
say they are just following party policy.
Other congressmen close to Nograles who are against Villafuerte’s chacha
resolution are Rodolfo Plaza (NPC, Agusan del Sur), Justine Marc Chipeco (NP,
Laguna), Juan Edgardo Angara (LDP, Aurora), Carol Jayne Lopez (PL, Yacap),
Florencio Noel of An Waray, Mujiv Hataman of Anak Mindanao, and Joel Villanueva of
Cibac.
While paying lip service to the idea of a ConAss vote without the Senate,
Nograles’ chacha effort has focused on House Resolution 737 which seeks to amend the
Constitution through the usual legislative process. Constitutional law expert, and
Constitutional Commission member Joaquin Bernas SJ says the House and Senate, using
its usual legislative process can pass amendments if they follow the three fourths majority
rule. Nograles’ resolution passed the committee level back in February, but discussions in
plenary have just started.
The resolution reportedly has 163 signatures, 15 signatures short of the
constitutional requirement of a three fourths House vote to approve the amendment and
bring it to the Senate. House Resolution 737 calls for the amendment of Sections 2 and 3
of Article 12 of the Constitution "to allow the acquisition by foreign corporations and
associations and the transfer or conveyance thereto, of alienable public and private
lands." Nograles has said that his resolution, when brought to the plenary, could serve as
basis for raising a point of constitutional inquiry before the Supreme Court.
But he has not explained how this can be done. In standard jurisprudence, a
Constituent Assembly can be convened if the House and the Senate, separately, and by a
simple majority vote, pass a resolution. In this case, Nograles assumes that in exercise of
its constituent function, the House can initiate the amendment process. But on its own,
the House cannot become a Constituent Assembly. The Villafuerte formula is meant to
deal with this problem by asserting that the Senate is not necessary to convene a
Constituent Assembly.
The House can pass the Nograles resolution with 178 votes, three fourths of the
House. Majority Leader Arthur Defensor said the Nograles resolution "may or may not
be sent to the Senate." If it is sent to the Senate, opponents can easily block Nograles’
maneuver by delaying its deliberations until it is too late to have a “justiciable” case. But
if the House decides to by-pass the Senate, they would then have to have the 197 votes
called for in the Villafuerte resolution.
Nograles became Speaker because the Arroyos moved to kick out former Speaker
Jose De Venecia. He would prefer to remain in the good graces of the Arroyo
administration. But it looks more and more like Lakas is positioning itself for a role
independent of the Palace and Kampi in the 2010 elections. Unlike Kampi which only got
revived under GMA, Lakas has survived three administrations, FVR, Erap and nine years
of GMA. GMA as prime minister would mean that Kampi would just get stronger and
Lakas under increased pressure.
Nograles’ failure to get the chacha project in the House further than the limbo it’s
in is either poor leadership or deliberate sabotage. Kampi people think it’s the latter. At
various points in the last six months, Kampi people have tried to get him removed. Mikey
Arroyo and Martin Romualdez even talked to De Venecia asking for help to get the
signatures for the Villafuerte resolution in exchange for getting the speakership back.
This close to the election this move would make Malacanang look ridiculously inept, and
risk losing Lakas support if the 2010 election goes ahead.
The unification of Lakas and Kampi was recently revived after over a year of
trying. Speaker Nograles, and Villafuerte, who have been at loggerheads for some time,
resigned their party positions supposedly to facilitate unification. But it is not just that
many Kampi and Lakas local leaders are unlikely to unify, starting with Villafuerte and
his own son, Elray the governor of Camarines Sur, forcing unification will hasten the
break-up of the two parties. A lame duck president can’t unify the two parties, only a
strong presidential candidate can.
Kampi and the Palace
Palace efforts to get chacha going started with the federalism issue earlier in 2008.
Palace operatives insisted that apart from its inherent value for advancing
decentralization, the Bangsa Moro problem could only be solved in a federal rather than
unitary framework. This campaign ended with the collapse of the negotiations with the
MILF and the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA AD) controversy
in September. Having to deal with the MOA AD controversy, then yet another
impeachment move kept the Palace busy until the end of November when impeachment
was killed.
Although Kampi had supported Nograles’ resolution as early as October 2008,
deputy Speaker and Kampi leader Amelita Villarosa told reporters back then that
constitutionalists in the party knew that Nograles' bill had to be corrected. As a law-
making body, Congress cannot propose amendments to the Constitution. It must first
convene a Constitutional Assembly, which is the body tasked to amend and revise the
Constitution.
Rep. Luis Villafuerte of Camarines Sur, president of President Arroyo's political
party, Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) said he himself did not sign this
resolution since it would be premature for Congress, being merely a law-making
body, to take up Nograles' resolution. He said Congress must first transform itself into a
Constituent Assembly (Con-Ass) before Nograles' resolution can be taken up. Only a
Con-Ass and a Constitutional Convention can amend the charter, he said. Thus
Villafuerte’s proposal to convene a “House only Constituent Assembly”.
Since this would require 197 signatures, Rep.Mikey Arroyo was directly involved
in soliciting signatures. The drive got going at a birthday party of Mikey sidekick Martin
Romualdez in November. Not incidentally both Pres.Arroyo and FG Mike Arroyo were
present at this party. With 197 signatures for the Villafuerte resolution, a “House only
ConAss” would be convened, pass the amendments for a shift to a parliamentary form of
government, then push the Comelec to organize a plebiscite. If the Comelec refuses to
call a plebiscite, then they can go to the Supreme Court to challenge the Comelec.
Comelec Chair Melo has said he would not call a plebiscite at this point because this
amendment mode is unconstitutional, besides it is too late.
If anti-chacha people go to the Supreme Court earlier, the Palace will get what
they want because they believe the SC will support their “House only ConAss” position.
Getting a “justiciable” issue for adjudication by the Supreme Court is a key piece of
administration plans. Back in September, Bohol Cong. Adam Jala had filed a case in the
Supreme Court pleading for a ruling that would enable administration people to by-pass
the Senate. The Court dismissed the case after a week, saying that the petition was
"premature" because there was no conflict or controversy over the issue of charter
change. Thus the plan to collect 197 signatures, convene a ConAss, and pass amendments
generating what proponents think is a “justiciable” issue.
Although Nograles says he is giving himself until the last day of sessions on June
5, even now in April, it is already too late to do something as major as change the form of
government in the six months before the filing of candidacies in November.
Administration people will have to (1) Get the 197 signatures, then probably equally
difficult, get all of them to come to the House to vote, (2) Either separately or one after
the other, get the Comelec to schedule a plebiscite, and then get the Supreme Court to
decide. (3) If the SC decides in their favor, a process that will take at least a few months,
and the Comelec has no choice but to organize a plebiscite that will then take another few
months.
They will have to do all this in the midst of escalating opposition, not excluding
extra constitutional moves. Senate Resolution No. 473 "expressing the sense of the
Senate that any proposed amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution, requires the
approval of the Senate and House of Representatives, voting separately" was passed
unanimously in December 2008. On December 8, a large rally was held in Makati that
united a wide range of anti-chacha groups.
An April 2009 SWS survey once again confirmed that two thirds of the
population are opposed to any form of constitutional reform that would enable GMA to
remain in power past 2010. If GMA people succeed in getting the issue into the Supreme
Court, a massive anti-chacha rally is likely, one that could, under the right conditions turn
into a regime-toppling EDSA event. Military rebels, meanwhile, continue to plot and are
just waiting for political developments that would make a coup acceptable to the public.
Contingency Plans
Faced with overwhelming public opposition and quite simply, lack of time,
administration people in the House have begun to backtrack. “We have to explain to the
public that convening Con-ass was different from changing the Constitution. I only want
to implement the exact language of the Constitution through an SC ruling before 2010.
We can do Cha-cha (Charter change) after 2010,” said Villafuerte in a radio interview. As
long as the issue is kept alive by Nograles in the House, chacha opponents do not believe
Villafuerte and remain prepared to fight a “House only ConAss”. But anti-GMA people
are also beginning to prepare for other contingencies.
The problem for Gloria and her people is not just that the May 2010 elections are
thirteen months away. Because the Comelec has advanced the deadline for the filing of
candidacies from February 2010 to November 2009, politicians have only six months to
prepare. They don’t want to make decisions uncertain about whether there will be
elections at all. This is important not just for candidates for president and vice president,
but for all other candidates from the Senate to local positions. Once they’ve made up their
minds, Gloria and her people will have all politicians against any attempt to tamper with
the elections.
Villafuerte’s insistence on getting a Supreme Court ruling on his “House only
ConAss” proposal even if changes would not be implemented before 2010 has generated
speculation that GMA plans have shifted to a post 2010 elections scenario. In this
supposed plan, GMA would spend a lot to get a large majority of her people elected to
the House in 2010. She herself would run in Mikey’s district in Pampanga, then get
herself elected Speaker. From this vantage point, she would then engineer ConAss
changes in the constitution.
Another scenario that has been circulating in Manila’s hyperactive rumor mills,
the martial law scenario, appears to have been closed off by the appointment of Gen.
Ibrado to replace Gen.Yano as chief-of-staff when Yano retires in June. Indications are
that the PMA Class 1976 generals who control key positions at this point, blocked Palace
plans to appoint Gen.Bangit to replace Yano. Class 1976 generals, led by Yano, are
reliably reported to be opposed to the use of the military for partisan purposes. For GMA,
the trade off between placing its favored general in place, and the risk of Class 1976
generals joining military rebels is probably what tipped the balance in favor of Ibrado.
There are yet other rumored scenarios by conspiracy theorists including the
“failure of elections” scenario because of uncertainties about the automated elections.
Either the Comelec mismanages this difficult transition or it is sabotaged. GMA then
forms a “caretaker government”, a plan supposedly exposed by National Security Adviser
Bert Gonzales. By then Gen. Bangit will have become Chief-of-Staff because Gen.Ibrado
retires in March 2010 just before the elections, so GMA does not have to worry about the
military.
My problem with all of these conspiracy theories including the many
permutations of chacha is that it keeps the opposition preoccupied and prevents it from
preparing early for the 2010 elections. It also prevents the inevitable “lame duck’ing” of
GMA. Without chacha and all these other “conspiracies”, politicians would already be
choosing among the early front runners in the presidential race. If there is a chance that
GMA might still be in power past the 2010 elections, risk averse trapos in her camp will
remain with her.
Everyone assumes that the GMA camp will be at a disadvantage in the 2010
presidential elections because of GMA’s unpopularity, the “kiss of death” factor on
whoever her candidate is. But in a race with four or more candidates, the resources
available to an incumbent president will be a crucial factor. There is speculation that
GMA might support someone openly, say the Vice President, but discreetly support
someone else. The rumor mills say Chiz Escudero despite his denials because he can run
only if he has the support of Danding Cojuangco who has strengthened his business
alliance with the First Family recently.
The best way to fight “Gloria Forever” is to keep fighting the skirmishes on
chacha but to prepare for the bigger war, the 2010 presidential elections. The chacha past
the 2010 elections, and all the other rumors are desperation scenarios. If there is a new
president, even one supported by GMA, there’s no way GMA can retain enough power to
keep her control over the political situation. The best way to go from “Gloria Forever” to
“Gloria is Over” is to elect a reform president who will reverse the deterioration of our
political institutions under GMA’s watch.#
