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Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff's investigation related to the FBI, and

Remaining Areas of Investigation
The Joint Inquiry Staff had one team assigned to investigate the FBI
Counterterrorism Division's performance prior to the September 11th attacks. This team
was responsible for determining what the FBI knew or should have known about the
hijackers and the attack, and for evaluating the FBI's counterterrorism program and its
focus on al-Qa'ida in the years prior to the attacks.

To determine what the FBI knew or should have known about the hijackers and
the attack, the FBI team thoroughly reviewed all of the information in the FBI's
possession prior to the attacks about the 19 hijackers. Most specifically, this involved an
extensive investigation into what information the CIA provided to the FBI about two of
the hijackers in early 2000. The FBI team also reviewed the FBI's handling of the
"Phoenix EC," the Moussaoui investigation, and all intelligence relating to aircraft as
weapons, and to flight students in the U.S. with terrorist ties.

Determining why the hijackers did not appear on the FBI's radar screen prior to
the attacks required an in depth investigation of the hijackers' activities and associations
in the United States. The Joint Inquiry Staff spent considerable time reviewing FBI
documents and interviewing FBI agents who were involved in the post-September 11th
investigation.

The FBI team was able to perform a fairly thorough evaluation of the FBI's focus
on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida in the several years before the attacks. The
investigation exposed serious problems not only in the FBI's counterterrorism focus, but
also in the FBI's ability to run a national intelligence program. These deficiencies were
partially cultural in nature, but also due to the numerous problems with the FBI's
information technology systems, and analytic programs. The FBI Team also conducted a
review of the counterterrorism legal environment prior to September 11th. The Joint
Inquiry was able to determine that "The Wall" between criminal and intelligence
investigations, and other legal requirements had a major impact on the FBI's
counterterrorism investigations. In many cases, it was not the law or guidelines that
caused the problems, but rather misunderstandings of the legal landscape that developed
over time.

There are, however, significant gaps in the Joint Inquiry's investigation, due
primarily to time and resource constraints. These areas can be the focus of the
Commission's domestic intelligence investigation, as described in greater detail below.

The Joint Inquiry Staff was not able to complete an exhaustive review of the
hijackers' activities and associations during their time in the United States. The hijackers
activities and associations in Los Angeles, Florida, and Newark should be the subject of

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additional Commission investigation. Understanding the hijackers' modus operandi is

vital not only for the domestic intelligence team, to assess why it is that they did not
appear on the FBI's radar screen prior to September 11th, but also for the al-Qa'ida team,
in their effort to better comprehend al-Qa'ida and their operations. It should be noted that
there are also certain FBI agents whom the Joint Inquiry interviewed about the hijackers'
activities and associations, who should be reinterviewed by the Commission. The Joint
Inquiry investigative phase ended in approximately late October 2002, and these agents
may have developed significant additional information since that time.

An important aspect of this review of the hijackers activities and associations is

the relationship between the FBI and state and local law enforcement authorities in the
areas in which the hijackers operated prior to the actual attacks, both in and out of the
Joint Terrorism Task Force structure. As is frequently noted, state and local authorities
often have a better idea what is occurring in their territories than the FBI, and have many
more personnel than the FBI. If they are not engaged in the counterterrorism effort, this
represents a serious gap. The Joint Inquiry was not able to spent much time on this line
of inquiry, however, and it is one that the Commission should aggressively pursue. This
investigation can primarily be focused in terms of the September 11th attacks, by
interviewing state and local authorities and JTTF members in the cities where the
hijackers resided, such as Phoenix, San Diego, Newark, and Falls Church, Virginia.
Following this investigation, the Commission should then also evaluate whether the
changes in this arena since 9/11, particularly the dramatic increase in the number of Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, have made a significant difference in the cooperation between the
FBI and state and local authorities.

Although the Joint Inquiry Staff spent considerable time and effort looking at the
pre-9/11 legal environment, they did not assess the results of the post-attack legislative
changes. This could also be an area for the Commission to consider, with respect to its
proposed goals.

The Joint Inquiry Staff also did not adequately assess the FBI's reforms since
September 11th. Director Mueller has made numerous changes to the FBI since the
attacks, designed to strengthen the FBI's counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities
and focus.

Another FBI-specific area for Commission investigation is the role of the FBI's
agents posted overseas (known as "Legats," or "Legal Attaches."). The Legats play an
important role in the international terrorism arena, and the FBI continues to expand its
presence overseas, particularly to countries deemed significant in combating terrorist
activity. The FBI now has Legats in over 45 countries, and will be adding offices in the
near future in Yemen, Malaysia, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. The Joint Inquiry did not
conduct a thorough investigation of the FBI's Legat program. This investigation can
primarily be focused in terms of the September 11th attacks, by interviewing FBI Legats
responsible for the countries where the plot was developed and operated, such as
Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

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It is important that the Commission look closely at these FBI specific issues for
several reasons. First, the FBI plays a vital role in protecting the U.S. from a terrorist
attack against U.S. interests, and it is crucial to assess whether the FBI is adequately
fulfilling its responsibilities in that area. Second, the FBI's progress may help the
Commission answer the question of whether the FBI should retain primary responsibility
for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection in the United States. The
Commission should also explore alternatives as to how our domestic intelligence
programs should be structured and managed. This is not a question that the Joint Inquiry
looked at in great depth. In considering the various options, the Commission may also
want to consider the opportunity costs of having the FBI divert additional resources to
counterterrorism, possibly at the expense of its many other criminal investigative
responsibilities.

To conduct a thorough review, the Commission should look not only at the U.S.
government's efforts in this regard, but should consider how other countries have
structured their domestic intelligence responsibilities. Although England's MI-5 is often
cited as a model for how the U.S. might restructure, the Canadian experience may be
more relevant for our purposes. The Canadians, similar to the U.S., had their law
enforcement and domestic intelligence in one agency. In 1984, the Canadians split these
responsibilities into two separate agencies, with the creation of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service to handle domestic intelligence.

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Key Questions for the Commission:

Topic #1: Hijackers' associations and activities: an assessment of whether the

hijackers should have come to the attention of the FBI during their time in the
United States.

With whom did the hijackers associate during their time in the United States, and
did any of these individuals provide the hijackers with "witting" assistance of any
kind?

Should the hijackers activities and associations during their time in the United
States have brought them to the attention of the FBI, and if so, what are the
reasons that they did not?

Topic #2: FBI relations with: 1) other federal agencies and policymakers; 2) state
and local law enforcement entities, and 3) foreign law enforcement and intelligence
agencies

Were the state and local law enforcement entities adequately engaged by the FBI
in combating terrorism in the cities where the hijackers resided? Since 9/11, has
the FBI established more effective relationships in the counterterrorism arena with
the state and local law enforcement entities throughout the country?

How effective have the Joint Terrorism Task Forces been in facilitating
collaboration and information sharing among the various federal and state law
enforcement and intelligence entities? Is there sufficient collaboration outside of
the JTTF structure?

What role has the FBI played, both before and since September 11th, in the
national counterterrorism policymaking discussions?

What role has the FBI played in the U.S. Intelligence Community, and has this
role changed since the September 11th attacks?

How effective has the FBI Legal Attache program been in the counterterrorism
arena, both in terms of relations with their foreign countergarj^ and with other
U.S. intelligence community agencies, ananowTiaTthrs role changed since
September 11th?

Topic #3: Domestic Intelligence policy question

How successful have the FBI reforms been in improving the FBI's
counterterrorism capabilities, and can the FBI make the necessary transformation
to perform this function, if given sufficient time and resources?

Will this diversion of resources and focus negatively impact the FBI's criminal

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law enforcement investigations and capability? Is this a tradeoff the country is

willing to make?

As a basic question, is the U.S. government ensuring that counterintelligence and

foreign intelligence collection within the United States is adequately managed,
disseminated, analyzed, and exploited? If not, should the U.S. Government create
a new agency with responsibility for domestic intelligence collection and analysis,
or should the FBI maintain the primary responsibility for domestic intelligence,
and strengthen its capabilities in this regard?

What lessons can we learn from other countries, in terms of the way in which they
have their law enforcement and intelligence agencies structured?

Is the FBI making effective use of the range of available legal authorities and does
the FBI require additional legal authorities to adequately discharge its
counterterrorism responsibilities?

tL
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1) Factual Investigation related to 9/11

*Follow up on Joint Inquiry's investigation of hijackers' activities and
associations while in the United States.

List of possible interviews: FBI case agents for investigations of hijackers

and their associates (specific subjects' names are classified). Focus on
investigations in Florida, New Jersey, and Virginia.

*Relationship of FBI to state/local law enforcement in the cities where the

hijackers resided, and the extent to which this relationship has changed since 9/11.

List of possible interviews: police officials and state/local law

enforcement personnel who have served on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task
Forces

""Continuing investigation of hijackers' activities overseas (Spain, Germany,

UAE, Saudi Arabia, Yemen), focusing on the role of the FBI Legal Attaches in
those countries.

List of possible interviews: Current FBI Legal Attaches in Spain,

Germany, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and Legal Attaches in place
prior to 9/11.

2) FBI Specific Issues

Intelligence-related issues, focusing on reforms since 9/11

^Analysis: Office of Intelligence & Terrorism Threat Integration Center

List of possible interviews: I

9/11 Closed by Statute

* Information dissemination/reports officer cadre

List of possible interviews: |

9/11 Closed by Statute

*FBI technology Issues

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List of possible interviews: SCOPE user management group,

TRILOGY user management group, FBI headquarters and field
analysts.

^Training for agents and analytic personnel

List of possible interviews: Training Division officials, Office of

Intelligence personnel, field and headquarters analysts.

*Centralization of intelligence operations

List of possible interviews: Special Agents in Charge, Larry

Medford, Chuck Frahm, Mike Fedarchyk, Andy Arena, National
Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel.

*Asset validation

FBI relations with other U.S. government entities, both pre and post 9/11

*Relations with Department of Justice: counterterrorism policy,

prioritization, budget

List of possible interviews: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy

Attorney General Larry Thompson, former Attorney General
Reno, former Deputy Attorney General Holder, Jim Reynolds,
former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick, Barry Sabin, DOJ
budget personnel, Louis Freeh, Dale Watson, Maryanne Woodson,
Rose Rudden, AD Finance Division, Ronnie Edelman, Tom
Pickard.

^Relations with the White House: FBI involvement in national level

counterterrorism policy.

List of possible interviews: John Quattrocki, Ken Piernick, Tim

Almon, Susan Gregory, Tim Gladura, Dan Benjamin, Steve
Simon, Mara Rudman, Sandy Berger, Mary McCarthy, Jim
Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clark, Dale Watson, Ray
Mislock.

*Relations with the CIA: operational and analytic coordination;

information sharing

List of possible interviews: FBI detailees to CTC; CIA detailees to

FBI, "Gang of Eight."

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*Relations with the FAA/TSA: threat coordination; hijacking contingency

planning

List of possible interviews: Jack Salatta, Beverly Wright, Tim

Gill.

FISA and other legal authorities governing FBI investigations:

*Question: 1) is the FBI making effective use of the range of available

legal authorities? 2) does the FBI require additional legal authorities to
adequately discharge its counterterrorism responsibilities?

List of possible interviews: Judiciary and Intelligence Committee

staff and members; OIPR officials, FBI General Counsel's Office
managers and line attorneys.

2) Domestic Intelligence Policy Question

*Issues to explore:

How effectively counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection

within the United States is managed, disseminated, analyzed, and
exploited.

Whether the U.S. Government should create a new agency with

responsibility for domestic intelligence collection and analysis, or should
the FBI maintain the primary responsibility for domestic intelligence, and
strengthen its capabilities in this regard.

*List of possible interviewees:

Current and former FBI and CIA officials:

Howard Shapiro, Bear Bryant, John McGaffin, Jeff Smith, Judge
Webster, Dale Watson, James Woolsey, Jim Simon.

Current and former White House officials:

Johngode^ta, Jim Steinberg, Mary DiRosa, Dan Benjamin, Dick
:iark

Civil liberties organizations:

Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin

Other current and former government officials:

Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, Gary
Hart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, Warren
Rudman

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Exploring how other countries manage their domestic intelligence

responsibilities, and what lessons we can learn from these countries'
experiences.

Foreign intelligence and law enforcement:

1) United Kingdom:
I 9/11 Closed by Statute I

2) Australia:
| 9/11 Closed by S t a t u t e
3) Canada:
I 9/11 Closed by Statute I

Role of federal agencies with foreign intelligence collection responsibility

within the United States | 9/11 closed by statute |
| 9/11 closed by statute"] 2) Role of other federal law enforcement agencies which
may collect important foreign intelligence information in the course of
performing their responsibilities (e.g. DBA, Secret Service, INS,
Customs).

List of possible interviews:

9/11 Closed by Statute

Intelligence officials from: DBA, Secret Service, INS, Coast Guard

and Customs

Role of Department of Homeland Security in shaping domestic

intelligence collection

List of possible interviews:

Karen Morr and other DHS intelligence personnel

State/local law enforcement: their relationship with the FBI, and the
effectiveness of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces

List of possible interviews:

*JTTF supervisors and other personnel; pilot projects: Dallas FBI
Early Response Network, Houston Police Department, Criminal
Intelligence Division, Los Angeles County Sheriff Department's
Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. Louis Gateway Information
Sharing Initiative

Possible long-term costs in terms of criminal investigation of having FBI

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divert additional resources and focus to counterterrorism.

Criminology Experts:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal justice scholars

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Document requests:
1) Numerous specific requests on hijackers' associates (specific request items are
classified);

2) transcripts from Mottasadeq trial;

3) debriefings of Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Ramzi Binalshib, Khalid Shaikh

Mohammed, Mohammed Al-Hasawi, Abu Zubaida

4) relevant GITMO debriefings;

5) updated PENTTBOM timeline;

6) list of PENTTBOM investigations and responsible case agents;

7) curriculum from FBI new agent training;

8) curriculum from FBI College of Analytical studies;

9) FBI field office "burn" rates, both pre and post 9/11;

10) copy of the updated Manual of Investigative and Operational Guidelines;

11) copy of the updated Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures.

12) List of personnel assigned as reports officers

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COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDED READING LIST

1. Joint Inquiry Final Report, including Senator Shelby Additional Views

2. Joint Inquiry unclassified Staff Statements

3 Markle Foundation Task Force report, October 2002

4. Hart Rudman report

5. Gilmore Commission

6. Senator John Edwards' proposed legislation and fact sheet on the proposed
creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency

7. Jeff Smith's Washington Post Op-Ed, and Congressional testimony before the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

8. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE journal, dated

April 7, 2003

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RECOMMENDED BRIEFERS FOR THE COMMISSIONERS

1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff

2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice

3. Michael Woods, former Chief, FBI National Security Law Unit

4. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency

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